Section — Koch–Preuss
Section 3: The Moral Principles Involved in War
- LAWFULNESS OF WAR.—What self-defense is for the individual, that war (bellum) is for society or the State, namely, the act of warding off unjust attacks or of asserting important rights by force of arms.1
1 J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 418: “War is the struggle of a multitude against an external multitude for the purpose of defending or vindicating the commonwealth. Hence it differs: 1. From a brawl, which is a fight of a few against a few; 2. From sedition, which is a disturbance or conflict of a multitude against political society.”
The purpose of war, therefore, is to protect the material, moral, and spiritual possessions of a nation, such as religion, liberty, independence, honor, good name, its right and power to conclude treaties, etc. When war is waged within the limits of a just self-defense, that is, after all other means to preserve the peace2 (such as diplo- matic negotiations, arbitration, reprisals, blockade, etc.) have proved ineffective, and the sword has become the final and inevitable arbiter, and if the moderamen inculpatae tutelae is duly observed, war is not only morally lawful, but may be a social duty, and participation therein may become a highly meritorious act.3
2 Cfr. Deut. XX, 10.—Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 419: “For a just and lawful war the following are required: 1. Public authority, that is, supreme authority acknowledging no other superior in civil matters. The reason is that where a higher authority exists, it must judge the dispute; 2. A just and grave cause which outweighs the disadvantages that will follow from the war, e. g., a kingdom or province to be recovered, or a grave injury done to the commonwealth to be repelled, or a rebellion of subjects to be suppressed, etc.; 3. The proper manner of waging war, namely, that before war adequate satisfaction be demanded from the opposing party, and if it is offered, it must be accepted as a matter of justice; for where war ceases to be necessary, it also ceases to be just.” N. 424: “A prince, once the justice of a war has been recognized, must present it to the opposing party and cannot begin the war, if adequate satisfaction is offered to him; indeed, even a war already begun he is bound to abandon when adequate satisfaction is offered, if not from the rigor of justice, at least generally from charity, provided the other party is willing to compensate all expenses already incurred and it is not necessary for the public good that it be repelled.”
3 Cfr. Judg. XI, 27.—Gury, op. cit., Vol. I, n. 419: “War is of itself permissible either to repel an injury or to vindicate one's right. The reason is that every society independent of another society must have a means of protecting itself against injury and vindicating its right. Sometimes, however, no other means is available for obtaining this end except war. For since higher authorities to whom nations or princes might have recourse are lacking, they may wage war to obtain satisfaction from another society.”
God repeatedly commanded His Chosen People to wage war against their enemies and lent them His special assistance and co-operation.4 St. John baptized soldiers, but neither he nor Christ Himself required of them that they renounce their profession;5 all they asked of them was, to “do violence to no man,” i. e. abstain from injustice.6 St. Paul says that the civil authority, as the representative of God, has the right of wielding the sword in order to protect law and order against domestic evil-doers and foreign enemies.7
4 Ex. XIV, 13 sq.; Deut. I, 29 sq.; III, 21 sqq.—Cfr. F. Schwally, Semitische Kriegsaltertümer, Leipzig 1901, 1. Heft, pp. 3 sqq.
5 Cfr. St. Augustine, Contra Faustum Manich., l. XXII, c. 74: “Otherwise John, when soldiers came to him to be baptized, saying, ‘And what shall we do?’ would have answered them: ‘Cast away your arms, abandon this military service, strike no one, wound no one, lay no one low.’ But because he knew that when they did these things as soldiers they were not murderers but ministers of the law, and not avengers of their own injuries but defenders of the public safety, he answered them: ‘Do violence to no one,’” etc. (Migne, P. L., XLII, 447.) IDEM, Epist. 189 (al. 205), n. 4: “Do not think that no one who serves under arms in war can please God. Holy David was among them, to whom the Lord bore such great testimony; among them also were very many righteous men of that time. . . . John certainly did not forbid those soldiers to serve under arms whom he instructed that their own pay ought to suffice.” (P. L., XXXIII, 855).
6 Luke III, 14; Acts X, 1 sqq.
7 Rom. XIII, 1–5; cfr. John XIX, 10 sqq.
If some of the Church Fathers objected to Christians serving as soldiers, they did so for the reason that the life of a soldier in their days was full of danger to faith and morals, and that the ancient State, with its emperor-worship, was essentially pagan. There is sufficient evidence to show that the early Christians acknowledged legitimate warfare as morally licit.8 The canonical law exempting clerics from military service was based upon the supernatural and pacific character of their office.9 The Church not only admits that war may be just, but she admonishes her children to fight for their highest and most sacred possessions.10
8 Cfr. Ch. Lupus, De Antiqua Disciplina Christianae Militiae, XI (Opera Omnia, Venice ed., 1729), pp. 94 sqq.—Hefele, Beiträge zur Kirchengeschichte, Vol. I, pp. 20 sqq.—K. Künstle, Zwei Dokumente zur altchristlichen Militärseelsorge, Mayence 1900, pp. 3 sqq.—A. Bigelmair, Die Beteiligung der Christen am öffentlichen Leben, Munich, 1902.—A. Harnack, Militia Christi, Tübingen 1905, pp. 46 sqq.
9 Syllabus Errorum, n. 32 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1732).—C. Richert, Die Anfänge der Irregularitäten, Freiburg 1901, pp. 114 sqq.
10 Errores M. Lutheri damn. a Leone X, n. 34 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 774).
- GUIDING PRINCIPLES.—a) Every just war is by its very definition defensive (bellum defensivum), because war is permitted only as an extreme means of self-help or to protect a na- tion's legitimate rights or interests. It does not, however, follow that when a State is unjustly menaced in its vital interests,—be they material, moral, or spiritual,—it is not permitted to make use of its right per modum praeventionis, i. e., to forestall a threatening attack, for instance, by occupying foreign territory, compelling enemy troops to lay down their arms, cutting off their supplies, destroying fortifications, and so forth. Such a war, though seemingly offensive, would in reality be defensive, for the justice of a war depends not upon its physical, but upon its moral authorship. It is also licit and therefore just, nay, it may even be a duty for a nation to assist another, especially an allied nation, in warding off an unjust attack.
The socalled principle of non-intervention, that is, non-interference of a State in hostilities between other States, unless its own territory or rights are attacked, may be justifiable from a purely political point of view, but not morally,11 because if a nation unjustly attacks another, all others are threatened in their very existence, and under the law of nations every State is in duty bound to protect right and justice. Intervention, if exercised in accordance with the principles of morality, constitutes an effective support of international law and order. For the rest, its exercise in most cases will not entail war, but merely lead to diplomatic negotiations.
11 Syllabus Errorum, n. 62: “The principle which they call that of non-intervention must be proclaimed and observed.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1762).—Cfr. M. Pachtler, S. J., “Das Prinzip der Nichtintervention,” in the Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, Vol. I (1871), pp. 107 sqq., 196 sqq.—A. Stöckl, Das Christentum, Vol. II, pp. 353 sqq.; Vol. III, pp. 22 sqq.
b) The moderamen inculpatae tutelae must be kept inviolate even in a just war. Consequently, war may not be continued longer than is necessary to accomplish its object, that is, until full satisfaction or reparation has been obtained and peace secured. Disregard of this principle would be a violation of the moral law of nature and involve the duty of restitution. To undertake or continue a war solely for the acquisition of territory or as a preventive of internal dissensions would be positively criminal.12
12 Osee V, 13.—St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, l. IV, c. 6: “To bring wars upon neighboring peoples and thence proceed against others, and from mere lust for dominion to crush and subjugate peoples who do not trouble one—what else should this be called but grand robbery?” (Migne, P. L., XLI, 116 sq.).—Contra Faustum Manich., l. XXII, c. 74: “What is blamed in war? Is it that those who will die sometime die, so that those who will live in peace may be subdued? To censure this belongs to the timid, not to the religious. The desire to harm, the cruelty of vengeance, an unpacified and implacable spirit, the savagery of rebellion, the lust for domination, and anything similar—these are the things rightly blamed in wars.” (P. L., XLII, 447).
Secondly, not all is fair in war. Absolutely damnable and illicit means of warfare are: lying, perjury, the intentional dissemination of false reports, e. g., of faked victories. Among the licit means are: espionage, stratagems, ambuscades, etc.; these are allowed because they are not based on lies pure and simple, but merely furnish the enemy an occasion for drawing false conclusions.
Third, the means employed in warfare must not be more cruel than is necessary for the successful termination of the bloody struggle.
It goes without saying that the direct slaying of innocent and unarmed persons, such as women, children, and old men, or the dishonoring of women can never be justified under any pretext.13
13 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 40, art. 3: “It is permissible in war to prepare ambushes and employ stratagems, so that enemies may be deceived by ruses and cast into various dangers. For these things are not reckoned lies, because the adversaries are deceived by their own fault, since such means are customarily employed in war; thus it is permissible to feign flight, to use the enemy's standards, etc. But those deceptions are illicit which cannot be guarded against by any prudence, e. g., to poison wells and springs, etc. For these things, in common judgment, conflict with the laws of war.”
Fourth, the right to kill the enemy or damage his property belongs to individual soldiers or single divisions of an army only in so far as they have been authorized to proceed by legitimate authority. Therefore, if an army, or any single division thereof, marches through enemy territory plundering and robbing the populace, without the express or at least implicit authorization of its commander, it is no better than a band of marauders and its members are bound to restitution. Officers bearing a flag of truce are inviolable.
c) In addition to these general principles, derived from the moral law of nature, the so-called international law has laid down others which deserve mention. One of these is that the laws of war apply only to active combatants, i. e., persons actually wielding or entitled to wield arms. Hence it is not allowed to kill a disarmed or captured soldier. Non-combatants engaged in the service of an army, such as chaplains, physicians, nurses, etc., may not be killed, but they may be made captives. Prisoners of war should be treated humanely, but not better than the soldiers of one's own army, lest cowardly members of the latter be tempted to surrender. Weapons which render war more cruel without hastening the decision are forbidden. To this class belong explosive hand guns, poisoned arrows, poison substances, the poisoning of wells, etc. Those living peaceably in enemy territory should not be treated harshly and their property should be spared unless it is needed to enable the invading army to live. The retention of hostages, the devastation of the country, the destruction of crops, the burning of dwelling houses and other necessities of life are permissible only in exceptional cases, when necessary for the carrying out of an important operation or to overcome the hostile attitude of the populace. Wounded soldiers who are no longer able to fight should be protected against attacks upon their person.14
14 Of the barbarities of war Fr. Ross justly says: “Once the dogs of war are let loose, it is difficult to keep them within the bounds of civilized Christian custom. The records of Sherman's march to the sea, of English conduct in the Sepoy rebellion, of our water cure and other tortures in the Philippines, of the international intervention in China during the Boxer rebellion, do not make us very proud of humanity. There is an old saying, ‘Scratch an Englishman and you find a barbarian,’ and this is equally true of the Germans, French, Italians, and Americans.” (Christian Ethics, pp. 426 sq.).
Under the Geneva Convention, of August 22, 1864, all military hospitals and ambulances with their attendants, physicians and nurses, when carrying the Red Cross, as well as all buildings containing wounded soldiers who display the Red Cross flag, are neutral and must not be attacked or molested. Citizens who receive wounded war victims into their houses shall be excused from quartering troops and also, partially, from paying war contributions.15
15 H. Dunant, Un Souvenir de Solférino, Geneva 1862; 2nd ed., Paris 1871; C. Lueder, Die Genfer Konvention, Erlangen 1876; H. Lammasch, Die Fortbildung des Völkerrechts durch die Haager Konferenz, Stuttgart and Vienna 1900; A. Zorn, Das Kriegsrecht zu Lande in seiner neuesten Gestaltung, Berlin 1906; J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, pp. 430 sq.; Lawrence, Principles of International Law, Boston 1909.
The use of savages or convicted criminals is morally objectionable, because they are apt to disregard the laws of war. Attempts to induce enemy soldiers to break their oath of loyalty or to rebel against their superiors are likewise inadmissible.
d) Voluntary participation in a war which one regards as unjust is sinful. Since, however, the individual citizen is rarely in a position to form a reliable judgment concerning the justice or injustice of a war, and since, moreover, a soldier employed or drafted by the government (miles subditus) has not the right to question the justice of an international quarrel, he must obey his supe- rior officers even though he doubts the justice of the cause. But he is never permitted to co-operate in manifest injustice or criminal acts of violence, e. g., the maltreatment of peaceful non-combatants or the killing of soldiers who have unconditionally surrendered. Mercenaries (milites conducti), who have been hired before the outbreak of a war, may take part therein even if they doubt its justice. The case is different with those who volunteer their services after the war has started (milites nondum conducti); if they are in doubt as to the justice of the cause in which they intend to enlist, they are in duty bound to obtain certainty, for no man is permitted to co-operate in an unjust cause.16
16 Rom. XIII, 1 sqq.—St. Augustine, Contra Faust. Manich., l. XXII, c. 74: “And for this purpose taxes are paid (Mt. 22, 21), so that, because of wars, pay may necessarily be furnished to the soldier.” (Migne, P. L., XLII, 447).—IDEM, ibid., c. 75: “When a just man happens to serve as a soldier under a king who is even a sacrilegious man, he can rightly wage war at that king's command while preserving the order of civic peace: either it is certain that what is commanded of him is not contrary to God's precept, or it is not certain whether it is; so that perhaps the injustice of commanding makes the king guilty, while the order of serving shows the soldier innocent.” (P. L., XLII, 448).—J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 421: “It is asked whether soldiers may wage war while in doubt about the justice of the war. The answer is: 1. If the question concerns a subject soldier, he is bound to obey where the war is not evidently unjust, because it does not belong to him to examine the reasons of his superiors. 2. If the question concerns a soldier hired before war was declared, he may obey; for he is hired for this, and therefore must conduct himself almost as if he were a subject. 3. If the question concerns a soldier not yet hired, he is bound to inquire into the justice of the war and cannot place himself in doubt about its justice. The reason is that no one can co-operate in despoiling another of a thing which he possesses unless he is certain that it is possessed by him unjustly.”
The causes of war are as a rule hidden to the ordinary citizen, nay ofttimes even to the better informed and more sensitive organs of public opinion. Ordinarily, the private citizen may and should presume that his country is right. The question how far his duty of obedience goes, and for what acts of violence he may allow himself to be used, are answered by the ius belli, but its provisions are of little practical importance, because in case of doubt every citizen will naturally submit his subjective opinion to the supposedly more enlightened judgment of the authorities.17
17 Cfr. F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 469 sqq.; Ross, Christian Ethics, p. 440.
- MORAL ESTIMATE OF WAR.—a) Just war is not only permissible as an act of self-defense, but it may be useful for the punishment of injustice, the restoration of law and order, and as an instrument of correction in the hands of God.18
18 Judg. II, 20 sqq.; III, 1 sqq.; Is. X, 5 sqq.; 2 Macch. V, 17 sq.
Nor can it be denied that a number of noble virtues, e. g., loyalty, courage, self-sacrifice, fidelity to duty, are developed by and in war, and that bloody conflicts with other nations often strengthen the moral and religious fibre of a nation and promote patriotism. A war waged against savage tribes, may, moreover, serve the purpose of genuine culture and the legitimate needs of colonization.19
19 Cfr. Horace, Epist., l. II, 1, 156 sq.: “Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artes intulit agresti Latio.”
b) On the other hand, though a just war may prove a moral blessing for a nation or for humanity at large, even the justest war is in- variably accompanied by so many horrors and barbarities, and entails so much material and moral destruction that it must be regarded as an evil and a terrible scourge. Though the Bible acknowledges the legitimacy of war and of the military profession, there are many passages in both Testaments which point to lasting peace as the final goal for the human race to strive after.20 War does not fit into the ideal picture of international intercourse. Its existence and relative necessity is merely a sad proof how little even Christian nations are actuated by the spirit of charity, peace, and justice. The highest good of the State, the ideal political condition of a people, is that “rest from all enemies round about” described in Deuteronomy,21 and permanent peace must be the first and foremost aim of every real statesman. Kant's idea of a universal peace22 has no prospect of realization because it is based for the most part upon purely worldly interests or upon so-called humanitarian or philanthropic considerations and motives, which are at bottom utopian, instead of seeking the peace of Christ which the world cannot give.23 Nevertheless every attempt to settle international difficulties and quarrels by means of arbitration should be hailed with joy. An international tribunal of arbitration might not prevent war entirely, but it would postpone the outbreak of hostilities and thus give reason instead of passion an opportunity to speak the last word. Even though war were abolished, it would still be “sweet and meet to die for one's fatherland,”24 and every citizen would have sufficient opportunities to prove his patriotism by faithfully performing his duties towards God and the legitimate civil authorities.
20 Ps. 67, 31; Is. II, 4; Mich. IV, 1 sqq.; Matt. XXIV, 6; Mark XIII, 7; Luke XXI, 9 sq.
21 Deut. XII, 9 sq.; XXV, 19. St. Augustine, Epist., 189 (al. 205), n. 6: “The will ought to have peace, necessity war, so that God may free us from necessity and preserve us in peace. For peace is not sought so that war may be stirred up, but war is waged so that peace may be acquired.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 856).—IDEM, Epist., 229 (al. 262), n. 2: “Great indeed are not only the bravest warriors, and they have their own glory, but also—and this is a truer kind of praise—the most faithful warriors, by whose labors and dangers, with the aid of God who protects and helps, the untamed enemy is conquered and tranquility is procured for the commonwealth and the pacified provinces. But it is of greater glory to kill wars themselves with a word than men with the sword, and to acquire or obtain peace by peace, not by war. For even those who fight, if they are good, undoubtedly seek peace, but nevertheless through blood.” (P. L., XXXIII, 1020).
22 I. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, Königsberg 1795 (edited by K. Kehrbach, Leipsic 1881).—Cfr. F. von Holtzendorff, Die Idee des ewigen Völkerfriedens, Berlin 1882.—L. Stein, Das Ideal des ewigen Friedens, Berlin 1896.—Ch. Richet, Les Guerres et la Paix, Paris 1901. K. F. Küster, De Treuga et Pace Dei, Cologne, 1902.—P. Meyer, Die Idee des ewigen Friedens bei Kants Zeitgenossen, Berlin 1903.—K. Geissler, Der Krieg und die sozialen Sünden, Jena 1905.
23 John XIV, 27; cfr. Judith XVI, 3: “The Lord putteth an end to wars.”—St. Leo the Great, Serm., 82 (al. 80), c. 1: “Although [the city of Rome], enlarged by many victories, extended the jurisdiction of your empire by land and sea, nevertheless what military toil subjected to you is less than what Christian peace subjected to you.” (Migne, P. L., LIV, 423).
24 Horace, Carm., III, 2, 18: “Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.”—Cfr. Homer, Ilias, XII, 243.
In striving for international peace it is well for us to realize that there are many strong “interests” that must be vigorously opposed. First of all come the war traders. “Those who en- gage in the sale of materials of war know that it is to their advantage to foster the military spirit. The more one nation spends on preparation, the more the others are forced to spend. It is an endless chain. A few individuals are enriched, but the vast majority suffer from such enormous expenditure in unproductive ways. Perhaps the problem could be partly solved by the various governments taking over the munition factories. But the solution is problematical and at best would be merely partial. For only a completely socialized State could take over all the industries directly and indirectly depending upon war. A hardly less important expression of commercialism versus peace is found in yellow journalism. Newspapers recognize that in order to sell large editions they must exaggerate. As a consequence they are absolutely conscienceless in dressing up reports of differences between nations. Again, there arises in the popular mind induced by this irresponsible journalism a certain spread-eagleism, an attitude that sees no fault in one's own nation, but faults innumerable in others—a loud-mouthed patriotism [rectius: jingoism] that is ready to call every man a traitor who happens to advocate peaceful methods. . . . This evil of yellow journalism tends to grow worse and worse. New forms of exaggeration, new appeals to this false patri- otism must be constantly devised; for as one form grows stale, it becomes useless from a journalistic standpoint. And so one fosters the other. The public, weary of the drab dullness of everyday life, demands of the newspapers a certain amount of sensationalism and grows more rampant the more it gets.”25
25 J. E. Ross, Christian Ethics, pp. 436 sqq.
READINGS.—St. Augustine, Contra Faust. Manich., l. XXII, c. 74–78.—IDEM, Epist., 189 (al. 205), n. 4 to 6.—St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 40 (Rickaby, Aquinas Ethicus, I, 407 sqq.).—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 402–411 (ed. Gaudé, I, 659 sqq.).—H. Grotius, De Iure Belli et Pacis, Amsterdam 1712.—J. Walter, Naturrecht und Politik, pp. 462 sqq.—A. Stöckl, Das Christentum, Vol. III, pp. 417 sqq.—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 468 sqq.—V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 741 sqq.—F. Kattenbusch, Das sittliche Recht des Krieges, Giessen 1906.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 663 sqq.—Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, pp. 191 sqq.—Chs. Macksey, S.J., art. “War” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XV, pp. 546–550.