Kissing and embracing

56. On kisses. 1. Lingering kisses, often repeated, impressed with great affection between persons of diverse sex, ordinarily are grave sins, because they stir very much; besides, they often proceed from libidinous affection: for among the unmarried they rarely have another cause.

Nevertheless it can happen that they are not grave sins. Thus if someone, for example, about to depart elsewhere, kisses a person of diverse sex, related by blood or well known, more often or lingeringly from sensual affection, but does not care about the carnal movements which perhaps he experiences and does not consent to them, he does not sin gravely: for a legitimate cause is present and both libidinous affection and consent to pleasure are excluded. Since nevertheless due moderation is lacking in the use of a licit action, a venial sin is committed; but kisses and embraces of this kind, repeated and lingering, between parents and children, which are done as a sign of special love, are free from all fault.

2. Decent kisses, which are done according to the custom of the country, for the sake of courtesy, friendship, kinship, or for signifying and increasing honorable love, even between persons of diverse sex, are licit, although carnal movements are excited, provided consent to venereal delectation is avoided. The same must be said concerning embraces and handling of hands.

3. Decent kisses, embraces, hand-pressures, which are done from play, levity, or even from sensual affection, with no cause of necessity or utility making them honorable, are light sins, if venereal delectation either does not arise or arises without foresight, and if, on account of the danger of consent and pollution, there is cessation from those actions when delectation of this kind is perceived.

Likewise it is a venial sin if decent kisses, touches, embraces are done from sensual affection, n. 7, by which someone, for example, follows after an impubescent boy or girl on account of beauty. This is not mortal, because depraved intention and proximate danger of exciting delectation or pollution are lacking; nevertheless it is not without fault, because a reasonable end is lacking. But because the passage from sensual delectation to venereal delectation is easy, these acts committed from sensual affection are grave sins if they are done lingeringly and without a just cause among pubescent persons of diverse sex and there is no cessation when the increasing delectation is already perceived, because they induce grave danger of pollution, indeed of consent.¹

4. Kisses on the less honest parts, and especially on the indecent parts, are a grave sin, because they stir very much. Besides, these can scarcely proceed except from libidinous affection, since a reasonable cause for kissing those parts can with difficulty be imagined.

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri II, n. 976 ff.

The morality of kissing and embracing is regulated by the same principles as the above. Kissing in the ordinary way of greeting or leave-taking between relations and friends, according to the custom of the country, as theologians say, is of course harmless and allowed. Even if such marks of pure affection or civility unintentionally sometimes cause venereal excitement, no notice should be taken of it.. Apart from this, kissing and embracing, especially between different sexes, naturally tends to cause venereal excitement, and is more or less sinful. Mortal sin will be committed as a rule by indulging in passionate and prolonged embraces and kisses; otherwise the sin will be only venial. Those who intend marriage and are already engaged to each other have an excuse for showing each other the ordinary signs of affection, but they should use their privilege with due caution and Christian prudence. As a rule, little harm will be done if they have a witness of their conduct, or if they only permit themselves to do what they would do if such a witness were present.

Non-consummated sins of impurity are specifically distinct from consummated sins, in the same way as attempted homicide is specifically distinct from homicide. Impure touches, however, and lascivious kisses and embraces contract the malice of the circumstances of the object, just as consummated sins do. For, just as fornication with one bound by a vow of chastity or with a relation is not simple fornication, but contracts the malice of sacrilege or incest according to the circumstances, so impure touches of the same persons would also be sacrilegious or incestuous. The reason is because sins receive their specific malice from the object, and sins of touch take their malice from the concrete object as it exists with its special circumstances.

Impure speech and looks, on the contrary, do not seem to contract the malice of the circumstances of the object, for such sins are affected by the general character of the object only, and not by its special circumstances. This, at least, is the opinion of many theologians.

It is a disputed point among divines whether impure touches, looks, talk, or reading, are specifically distinct from each other apart from any difference in the object. Would it, for example, be sufficient to say in confession, “I committed a sin [by indulging in venereal pleasure by myself,” without mentioning whether it was procured by touch, or look, or other means ? Although the common opinion is that such a general form of self-accusation would not be sufficient, and that the penitent must say whether the sin was one of touch, or look, etc., yet the contrary view seems probable, for such imperfect acts are wrong, not precisely in themselves, but on account of their tendency to excite venereal pleasure. The reason, then, and source of their malice is the same, and so they would seem not to be specifically distinct as sins, though they are physically distinct acts.

Morality of Kissing and Similar Acts.—(a) Per se, or from their nature, these acts are indifferent, since they can be employed, not only for evil (Job, xxxi. 27; Luke, xxii. 48), but also for good, as we see from the examples of the kiss of peace (I Thess., v. 26), the kiss of fraternal greeting (Gen., xxvii. 26, 27), and the kiss of respectful homage (Luke, vii. 38, 45).

(b) Per accidens, or from their circumstances, these acts are often venially or mortally sinful against purity or against some other virtue, or against both. Thus, justice is offended by injuries or violence (e.g., stolen kisses, unhygienic kisses that transmit venereal or other disease); charity is offended by scandal given the object of affection or the onlookers (e.g., kisses given by way of greeting to a member of the opposite sex by an ecclesiastic or religious, kisses forced upon children by grown-ups and which are harmful to the youthful sense of modest reserve); purity itself is offended by familiarities which, though not impure in themselves, constitute a peril for the virtue of one or both parties, as is true especially in demonstrations of sensual affection or pleasure. But even though there be some carnal commotion, it is not unlawful to give with a pure intention the decent salutation customary in one’s country (e.g., to shake hands with a lady, to kiss one’s stepmother or sister-in-law).

22. Kisses can be of three kinds: of honesty, of levity, of pleasure. - Kisses of honesty, or those which are made according to the custom of the country, for the sake of urbanity, or for attesting honorable love, friendship, peace, reconciliation, or from another honorable end, are no sin. The reason is that similar kisses are of themselves indifferent; and therefore, if they are done from an honorable motive, they can exhibit no dishonesty. Therefore kisses which mothers or nurses are accustomed to imprint on infants are free from every fault. And the same is to be said at least ordinarily of others who kiss infants of tender age even of the other sex, every depraved affection being excluded. Yet it does not befit nuns, religious, and clerics to kiss persons of the other sex, except relatives in the first degree of consanguinity or affinity, on account of a certain natural indecency and the scandal which would follow from it. - G. 415.

Kisses of levity, curiosity, or even sensuality, provided they are not base from the object or manner, per se do not exceed venial sin. The reason is that they do not exhibit the proximate danger of venereal delectation.

Finally, kisses of pleasure, that is, venereal pleasure, are grave sin. Such certainly are kisses in the base parts, that is, the genital parts or neighboring parts. Such also almost must be held to be kisses impressed on less honorable and usual parts of the body, especially between persons of the other sex, for example on the breast, breasts, etc.; or even on honorable parts, but in a less usual manner, for example if they are very lingering, or repeated and pressed, and especially with the tongue introduced into the mouth, etc. The reason is that kisses of this kind show an affection for venereal delectation and contain the proximate danger of venereal delectation. - Ithurriaga, Cas. 18, n. 3, 4; Billuart, l. c.

23. As kisses, so embraces are of three kinds: of honesty, of levity, of pleasure. - Embraces of honesty, which are made from the custom of the country, or by reason of office or benevolence, per se speaking, are altogether free from every fault. - Embraces of levity, curiosity, or sensuality, provided they are not base from the object or manner, per se do not exceed venial sin. - Finally, embraces of pleasure, namely venereal pleasure, are mortal sin. Such ordinarily are embraces which are made very lingeringly and closely between persons of the other sex. - The reason for this threefold resolution is always the same, namely danger of venereal delectation, only remote or proximate. - Billuart, l. c.; L. 417, 429, 430.

24. 1. Kisses, embraces, and other base or less honorable touches are illicit for betrothed persons in exactly the same way as for others. The reason is that betrothal gives them no special right to intercourse and venereal delectation; and therefore neither to those acts which contain a more or less proximate danger of venereal delectation. Billuart, l. c.; L. l. 6, n. 854.

2. Kisses, embraces, and other honorable touches, from their object and from the manner of performing them, are permitted to betrothed persons. The reason is that those acts are lawful in themselves, and therefore, as they are permitted to other unmarried persons, so also they are permitted to betrothed persons. But the question is moved specially concerning betrothed persons rather than concerning others, because in reality those acts can more easily be permitted to them on account of a special reason which has force for them, namely for mutually fostering benevolence, which is altogether necessary for them so that the future marriage may be completed. But as it is lawful to act with sensible delectation, but illicit to act on account of the same, by stopping in it, so it is altogether lawful for betrothed persons, as also for any others, to take sensible pleasure in these acts.

25. Hence there arises a threefold question that is altogether practical. The first question is: What is to be thought of those acts of betrothed persons, if they contribute to exciting venereal acts? - R. Here the general rule has force: these acts are culpable only when either the cause is bad, or there is present the proximate danger of consent.

The second question is: What if it is established for the betrothed man or woman that the other sins in these acts because of a depraved affection? - R. 1. If those touches are made before others, the other can lawfully permit those touches, lest he or she be defamed, or bring suspicion upon himself or herself, and lest others be scandalized. - 2. If those touches are made secretly, and it is certain that they are being made maliciously, when there is question of others and of betrothed persons, the doctors commonly teach that one is bound to repel those touches. But if there is question of betrothed persons, for whom often there could be a notable inconvenience in this matter, because the other will certainly withdraw from marriage, the general rule concerning scandal received seems to have to be applied, namely that this can be permitted if it cannot be impeded without grave inconvenience; but it must be impeded if this can be done without notable inconvenience.

Finally, the third question is: What is to be thought concerning these same acts when, from the frequency of lapses, the danger of consenting to the subsequent venereal delectation must be held as a proximate occasion of sinning? - And this question, as the preceding ones, can also be made concerning the looks and conversations themselves, which have a most just cause; whence parents can altogether lawfully permit such looks and conversations, although great caution and prudence must always be used in these matters.

R. Here the general rule concerning a necessary proximate occasion has force; for it is morally impossible that a betrothed man, seriously thinking of entering marriage, should not visit, look at, and speak to his betrothed woman, and according to custom exhibit to her other signs of benevolence which manifest his mutual love. Therefore the confessor will suggest remedies not only general, but also special, so that due moderation may be preserved and necessity may not be exceeded in exhibiting those signs; and then, so that he never act alone with her alone, care must also be taken that the marriage not be long deferred. But if those and other remedies do not obtain fruit, this one thing remains: that they be dealt with no otherwise than with recidivists. G. Ballerini, n. 413; Gury-Dumas, Cas., v. 2, n. 695; Reuter, Neo-conf., n. 112.

26. Another related question can be raised here: namely, whether it is lawful "for a marriageable girl to encourage several suitors to this end, that from them she may finally choose someone to whom she may be joined in marriage?"

R. 1. Negatively, "if, honesty being neglected, and not solicitous for modesty, they themselves both love and endeavor to be loved back." The reason is clear. - 2. Affirmatively, if it is done "with the greatest honesty on their part, and without any stain of modesty." The reason is that if "girls conduct themselves in this most honorable way, it makes no difference if at times they are loved basely by some one of the suitors, as can easily happen. For provided they are led not by this base end, but by an honorable desire of marriage, sin ought not to be imputed to the girls attracting suitors, but to him who takes the occasion to his own ruin, which honorable girls do not give him, while they use the right which they have to employ a means not evil of itself for the most honorable end of marriage. Therefore access is barred to all those dangerous familiarities, clandestine conversations, and unspeakable exchanges of letters; and if these are warded off by girls proceeding elegantly but modestly, no ground remains" whence the matter should be forbidden, though it must altogether be forbidden if otherwise, as often happens. Therefore as regards practice, since the matter is full of danger, great caution and prudence are needed. Ithurriaga, Cas. 14, n. 3 seqq. And here it must be noted that a girl per se sins who accepts gifts from a lover, if they come from base love, for they foster that base love; otherwise, however, as is clear, if they proceed only from honorable benevolence and friendship. G., v. 1, n. 240; L., l. 2, n. 76; La-Croix, l. 2, n. 264.

27. It is a principle, already commonly admitted among theologians, that in this matter all things are lawful for spouses, except pollution and those things which participate in the malice of pollution, without grave sin, and without even venial sin, if a reasonable cause is present. Hence kisses, embraces, and other touches, even base ones, and generally all incomplete acts, whatever they may be and in whatever way they are performed, per se speaking, contain among spouses no grave guilt of fault, and with a sufficient reason added are not imputed even to venial fault. The reason is that in the married state, since intercourse is lawful, venereal delectation not consummated outside intercourse is lawful. For to him to whom the complete and consummated act is lawful, the incomplete begun act also is lawful, which from its intrinsic nature tends to the complete and consummated act; and such is the carnal venereal motion bringing venereal delectation. But those incomplete acts, which from their intrinsic nature do not pertain to lust but to sensuality, are prohibited insofar as they contain the proximate danger of venereal delectation, which, outside intercourse, not consummated, is not prohibited to spouses. Therefore, etc. Busenbaum apud L., l. 6, n. 932.

28. Corollaries. 1. Looks, kisses, embraces, and touches upon parts both honorable and even less honorable, indeed even simply base, are free from grave fault among spouses, provided, however, that they are done cautiously, so that the danger of pollution is absent. Thus the commoner and truer opinion from St. Alphonsus. "The reason is that, just as the conjugal state makes intercourse honorable, so also it makes touches and looks of this kind honorable; otherwise, since there is so great a society between spouses, and they often cannot have intercourse, they would be exposed to continual dangers if such acts were gravely illicit for them. But just as delectation sought in intercourse does not exceed venial fault, so also in these touches and looks." L., l. 6, n. 933; G., v. 2, n. 910.

2. The aforesaid looks and touches are per se altogether free from every fault, provided, however, as has been said, that they are done cautiously, so that danger of pollution is absent, whenever they are exercised for the sake of showing conjugal affection or fostering love. The reason is that such acts are in reality from their intrinsic nature means to this end of signifying and fostering conjugal love, and therefore lawful to those who by the matrimonial bond ought to become one heart and one flesh. - A fortiori the aforesaid looks and touches are per se free from fault if they are immediately referred to intercourse, or are necessary or useful for exciting nature; for then they are a certain preparation for intercourse and, as it were, its beginning. But if these acts, by which a spouse disposes himself or herself to the conjugal act, are such that they per se easily provoke pollution, they can be culpable if diligence is lacking for avoiding pollution outside congress; and omission of diligence of this kind, where it is such that through it one is thought nearly to will pollution outside the vessel, can even be grave fault. But if, due diligence having been used, such pollution follows beyond intention, there is no fault. G., l. c.; L., l. 6, n. 934.

3. Spouses do not sin gravely, even if from the aforesaid looks and touches, had even without intention of intercourse, there arises a commotion of the spirits or of the members serving generation, or if distillation follows; although these would be mortal in the unmarried. The reason is that, the crime of voluntary pollution outside the vessel or of sodomy being excluded, nothing is done against the good of marriage. But the light fault which can be in acts of this kind is easily excused by ends intrinsic to marriage itself or other extrinsic ends; for example because they are suitable for fostering affection or for calming concupiscence. - Indeed it is even probable, and an opinion sufficiently common, that these acts are excused from every fault even in the one requesting, although pollution is foreseen as about to follow in oneself or in the other, if nevertheless the pollution is not intended, nor is there danger of consent to it, and provided some grave cause is present, for example to foster mutual love or to avert the jealousy of the other. The reason is that then that just cause makes such acts honorable, which otherwise are not illicit among spouses; and if pollution occurs this will be per accidens. Wherefore, as is consequent, it is also probable that these acts are altogether lawful for the one rendering, although there is danger of pollution in either one, because then the one rendering gives his work to a lawful thing. - Diana, tr. 6, de Sacr. Matr., R. 207; L., l. 6, n. 934; Tamburini, Explic. Decal., l. 7, c. 3, n. 56; G., l. c.

But this doctrine, as is clear of itself, is not to be extended to those acts which so tend to pollution that they are, as it were, pollution begun, as if a woman were very lingeringly to touch and stimulate the genital members of the man, or a man were wholly lingeringly to insert a finger within the female vessel. Cf. Sanchez, l. 9, D. 45, 46.

Finally, to this doctrine a question is joined: Do spouses sin if, intercourse having been begun, they restrain insemination? - R. Per se speaking, they do not sin, at least mortally, if both spouses consent in this. The reason is that this penetration of the female vessel is reckoned as, so to speak, a touch of the private parts, which is by no means prohibited under grave sin to spouses. But it is said: 1. per se speaking; for an act of this kind, considered concretely, since it tends to pollution and is, as it were, pollution begun, is illicit concretely. Wherefore, if pollution would always or at least ordinarily follow in reality, then that withdrawal would per se in reality tend to pollution, and then it would be gravely illicit. But if pollution either never followed, or at least did not follow ordinarily, and only sometimes pollution followed, since this would be per accidens and beyond intention, that withdrawal would not then be gravely illicit. 2. At least mortally; for if there is a just cause for acting thus, for example because of poverty and multitude of offspring, and at the same time for calming concupiscence, every fault will be absent. 3. If both consent; for if one withdraws without the consent of the other, he certainly sins gravely. - L., l. 6, n. 918; Diana, tr. 6, de Sacr. Matr., R. 205, n. 2; R. 207; Sporer, de Matr., n. 500; Sanchez, de Matr., l. 9, d. 19, n. 3.

4. "Touches with oneself from venereal delectation, the other spouse being absent, according to the opinion of many, cannot be excused from grave sin, even with pollution or its proximate danger excluded. The reason is that the spouse does not have the right of using his own body in order to unfold pleasure with himself, but only in order to intercourse. La-Croix, n. 339, etc.; L., l. 6, n. 936. Yet not a few others apud St. Alphonsus say that, with the danger of pollution excluded, this does not exceed venial fault. St. Alphonsus judges the first opinion more probable and to be recommended." G. 920. Tamburini, however, says that each opinion is probable, Explic. Decal., l. 7, c. 3, n. 45. And Sanchez says the second is more probable, l. 9, d. 44, n. 16.

Now it must be noted here, according to the reason explained above in n. 27, that these acts, if they are venial, are venial only on account of the extrinsic disorder of the agent. Wherefore, consequently to the principle established above, we say that even these acts, exercised by one spouse alone, altogether apart from the other, per se speaking, or from their intrinsic nature, probably contain not even venial fault. And the reason is: 1. because if these acts are intrinsically culpable, since the matter here is always grave, they are either gravely culpable or in no way; 2. because mutual touch of a spouse with a spouse is probably lawful outside consummated intercourse precisely because that touch from its intrinsic nature is ordered to intercourse. Wherefore, just as consummated intercourse is lawful for spouses, so also intercourse only begun is lawful, which is contained in those acts. But any voluptuous touch of a married person from itself is referred to intercourse, which is already lawful to him or her. Therefore the light fault which can be in these acts can easily also be excused on account of an honorable end, because, for example, they are suitable for calming concupiscence and for avoiding another grave sin.

29. "How ought a woman conduct herself who is touched by a man not her own?" - R. "If she is touched in dishonorable parts, she ought in every morally possible way to repel the one touching. But that is called morally impossible which cannot be applied without such inconvenience as would outweigh, or at least be equal to, the endurance of this touch, such as would be danger of death, infamy, grave loss of goods, and similar things, if she resisted the one touching; in which cases, according to Lessius, l. 4, c. 3, n. 64, and Loth, the woman would not be bound to resist the exterior touch, because such a touch according to species is not evil on the part of the woman, as fornication would be, provided, however, that danger of consenting to interior lust is absent. Since I judge this to be very rare and very difficult, I also think that a woman is regularly bound to resist in every possible and lawful way, whatever may threaten her. But if a woman is touched in honorable parts, yet notices the lustful mind of the one touching, a distinction is needed. Either she is touched in the presence of others, who from the woman's resistance would conceive an evil suspicion concerning the one touching or embracing, or not. If the first, she is not bound to withdraw herself, because there is present a cause of neglecting the other's sin; if the second, she is bound, because we are bound to impede the sin of our neighbor when we conveniently can. Thus Sylvius here, conclusion 1, and others." Billuart, l. c. See about corollary 4. Cf. here n. 25.

413. Things To Be Established. - I. Truly immodest kisses ¹ and touches, that is, those had without cause on the dishonorable parts of another, can scarcely ever be excused from mortal sin, even when venereal affection is removed, because of the grave indecency and the imminent danger of lust which they induce. Yet they are more easily excused from mortal sin if they are done on a person of the same sex than if on a person of a different sex. - St. Lig., n. 419, 420.

¹ In this place the Author denotes kisses which are imprinted on dishonorable parts. But there is this difference between kisses and touches of this sort: that sometimes a just cause can underlie the employment of those touches, for example for healing; but not likewise for kissing.

II. Kisses and touches on honorable or less honorable parts ² constitute mortal sins if they are done from venereal delight; they are venial if they are done from levity, jest, curiosity, etc.; but they lack all fault if they are done according to the custom of the country, for the sake of civility or honorable benevolence ³. The reason of these things is clear per se. - St. Lig., n. 417.

² Carefully note the distinction between the parts of the body which are less honorable and those which are dishonorable. The genital parts and those proximate to them are called dishonorable, or also base or obscene; but the breast, arms, legs, etc., are called less honorable and not base. Thus St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 422). But what the Author says about those things which have venial fault if they are done about less honorable parts from levity, jest, curiosity, etc., can be taken of some touch, but is not truly to be transferred to kisses, as the thing itself speaks per se, which the Author also notes below in the third Resolution.

Likewise, what the Author says lack all fault if they are done according to the custom of the country, or for the sake of civility, etc., must be taken of honorable parts, but must not be extended to less honorable parts.

³ ** [N. B. These things, and the Note which immediately follows, furnished matter for the VV. to write through seventy-six columns (pp. 296-334). All of them present themselves as of altogether the same weight as those which we have already seen them object many times in advance. Rather than subjoin something at the bottom of these Notes, if anything should seem worthy of some response, it has seemed opportune to insert it enclosed in brackets in the course of the Notes. Let the Reader patiently bear that, for this reason, the broken context of the discourse requires a little more labor for retaining the connection of things.]

To this pertains the common opinion of the Doctors that for the sake of civility and benevolence and for showing love, chaste touches are lawful for betrothed persons for the future, for example taking the hand, embraces, and kisses. [After the VV. (p. 297) said that in the Note the state of the question is rather darkened than clarified, they accuse it because it is said that chaste touches are lawful, not only for the sake of civility, but also for the sake of benevolence and for showing love; which (p. 299) they say was subtly added in the Note; and they continue (ibid.): "this opinion, namely that chaste touches are lawful for betrothed persons FOR SHOWING BENEVOLENCE AND LOVE APART FROM THE CUSTOM OF THE COUNTRY, is neither common, nor do the witnesses adduced testify to it." Thus they. - Resp. 1. Let the Reader see with his own eyes in the texts placed below whether the words "for the sake of benevolence" and "for showing love" are a subtle addition of P. B., or are the words of the alleged Authors. - Resp. 2. Let the Reader again see whether that phrase "APART FROM CUSTOM" is found in the words of P. B. And nevertheless against this fantastic shadow, namely that in the Note kisses, touches, etc., apart from the custom of the country, are asserted and defended as licit, the VV. seriously continue to fight also on pp. 300 and 301. - Moreover, by those words of the Doctors, "according to custom," "according to the custom of the country," a twofold sense, each right, can be understood: one, so that the custom of exhibiting those signs of benevolence after betrothals is indicated; the other, so that in the manner of exhibiting those signs the custom of the country is observed; and the words of St. Alphonsus have this sense also, that they are permitted in no other way than they are permitted to unmarried persons, where the usage flourishes.] I said, "common"; for thus Lucius Ferraris (V. Luxuria, n. 90): "All touches, kisses, embraces..., which are done between betrothed persons..., if they are done chastely, from a right end, according to the custom of the country, are licit. COMMON." - Thus also Giribaldi of the Clerics Regular of St. Paul (the Barnabites) (De Matrim., cap. 19, dub. 15, n. 114): "You will ask, 5. whether kisses, touches, and embraces are lawful for betrothed persons for the future? The COMMON opinion denies that dishonorable touches on immodest and hidden parts are lawful.... But it concedes that otherwise honorable touches, embraces, kisses..., are lawful; and these indeed will be venial sin if they are done only for delight to be captured; and without any fault if they are done as a sign of love and benevolence according to the accustomed manner." - Nor otherwise Reiffenstuel (Th. mor., tr. IX, dist. 4, q. 7, n. 77): "But whether touches and kisses are lawful between betrothed persons for the future is another difficulty. And indeed the Doctors everywhere confess that immodest touches between betrothed persons are not excused from mortal sin.... But if kisses and embraces are not of themselves immodest, and at the same time are done... with a view to honorable love and benevolence, they are free from fault." [Reiffenstuel, say the VV. (p. 299), alleges Navarrus; but he recommends that mothers not allow daughters to be alone and in secret with betrothed persons. - Resp. They themselves could have seen that this also is recommended below in this Note. - The VV. add (p. 300) that in the newest edition of Reiffenstuel's Theology Flavianus Ricci adds the opinion of Pontas, that the opinion condemning kisses, etc., in betrothed persons as grave sin is to be preferred, because this opinion is safe. - Resp. Let Pontas have for himself the theory of condemning something as grave fault because this is safe. St. Antoninus, to whom St. Alphonsus subscribes, says this is the same as building for Gehenna.] - And the Salamancans (De Matrim., cap. 15, n. 91): "The last difficulty is whether kisses, embraces, touches... are licit between betrothed persons for the future? It is answered that if such acts are done for capturing pleasure, they will be venial sins.... If as a sign of love, there will be no sin." [Here the VV. object (p. 299) that the Salamancans retracted these things (tract. 26, c. 3, n. 56-61). - Resp. Yet this difference intervenes between each place: that in the former, reported here, the Salamancans follow the common opinion and confirm it by authorities which have some worth; but in the latter they fortify a new opinion (l. c., n. 60) with a heap of false allegations, so that they do not hesitate to allege for it Busembaum and Cajetan, whom, forgetful of themselves, they had alleged (ibid., n. 56) also for the opposite, and whom the VV. themselves (p. 304) traduce as if excusing venereal delights! And indeed even in this place the Salamancans merely conclude that this newest opinion seems to them more probable in practice! If any seize suffrages of this sort, we willingly leave them to them.]

And that St. Alphonsus did not reject this doctrine is clear from this, that after these things were reported from Busembaum (lib. 6, n. 854): "Touches that are immodest are not lawful for betrothed persons, although embraces and kisses as a sign of love may be lawful," he finds nothing to reprehend. [Here the VV. subjoin (p. 301): "The illustrious Professor" (that is, P. Ballerini) "seems here to have labored either from a hallucination of the eyes or from distraction of mind." - Resp. Behold the words of St. Alphonsus (lib. 6, n. 584), which the VV. themselves also transcribe (p. 297): "Croix and Viva, with other authors adduced by them, concede that kisses and embraces according to the custom of the country can sometimes be permitted to betrothed persons, but in no other way than they are permitted to unmarried persons. And THIS IS PROBABLE, provided such acts are not pressed and prolonged for some time, as Roncaglia well warns, who also admits them FOR A DEMONSTRATION OF BENEVOLENCE; but I would not admit them except where such a usage flourished, as Mazzotta also says." Does St. Alphonsus differ even a little from the opinion of the Authors who are reported above in the Note? Does he not concede that, where this usage flourishes, kisses and embraces are lawful even for a demonstration of benevolence, which nevertheless the VV. just before were traducing as a subtle addition of P. B.?]

This one thing can move some, that acts of this sort contribute to stirring up carnal and wicked motions. But here the general rule must be valid which we touched on above (note to n. 412), namely that then only are these motions culpable when either the cause is evil, or there is danger of consenting. Therefore it pertains to the Confessor in the case to inspect, not indeed whether the cause is guilty, for since it is just, by that very fact it is honorable, but whether there is danger of consent into evil, and according to his prudence to furnish remedies to the penitent. In this matter he must indeed take care that the desire of removing one from danger of sin does not drive him so far that he condemns those things as sin, especially grave sin, which according to the common opinion of the Doctors have either no guilt or only light guilt. For zeal of this sort, not indeed according to knowledge, must finally obtain this one effect: that perhaps it may deter very few from those acts, but in reality drive very many, through a false conscience thrown in, into the snares of sin; whence it will easily happen besides that, once the fear of God has been trampled because of the imprudence of the Confessor, and the horror of sin lost, they may then slip into true and graver basenesses.

The very same thing also must be observed concerning looks and conversations between betrothed persons, when from these also those motions, and sometimes even to pollution, follow. For there is a just cause why a betrothed man should visit his betrothed, and have conversations with her. Therefore the whole question will turn on that danger of consenting about which it was said above in the note to n. 412.

In this matter a difficulty not light will indeed seem to offer itself, when from the frequency of falls the danger of consenting appears to be of such a kind that it ought to be considered as a proximate occasion of sinning. Nevertheless here in reality there is no greater difficulty than if there is question of a necessary proximate occasion: necessary, I say; for, considering all the adjuncts, the Confessor would require something morally impossible if he wished to keep a betrothed man from approaching and speaking with his betrothed, or (as after Sanchez, De Matrim., lib. 9, disp. 46, n. 48-50, and many others alleged by the same, Diana notes, tom. 1, tr. 4, res. 37; and tom. 2, tr. 6, res. 37) from exhibiting the customary signs of benevolence. Therefore he must use other means for removing the danger. If the penitent does not refuse these, what Giribaldi has according to the commonly received principles will be valid (De Poenit., cap. 10, dub. 3, n. 31). To the question, Whether a betrothed man can be absolved who frequently visits his betrothed, on which occasion he sins, he responds that he can be absolved when the visits are according to the custom of the country, from which he cannot abstain without mark and disgrace, because the betrothed woman would think herself despised because he did not visit her as other betrothed men do; and the same is valid concerning a betrothed woman who from speech and the sight of the betrothed man suffers distillation and pollution; for she is not bound to flee the sight of the betrothed man if otherwise she does not have a just cause and excuse, since the sight and words are honorable and according to the custom of the country, and cannot be avoided without mark and disgrace. But the Confessor will suggest means not only general but special to the matter; and according to his prudence it is necessary that he deter, as he can, from exhibiting those signs of benevolence by which the tinder of concupiscence can more easily be stirred up, or at least propose that manner and frequency which does not exceed necessity. But the manner and measure which can easily be understood by all is this: that no more be provided than what can be provided in this matter before others, for example parents, without offense to anyone. Then especially it must be required that one never remain alone with one alone, especially in a secret place. And this indeed pertains most especially also to those who have care of them. Therefore with parents, and especially with mothers, one must deal most severely, and the grave obligation of this watchful custody and caution must be urged; to which they ought to be impelled not only by conscience, but also by fear lest daughters, once corrupted, grow old dishonored in the paternal home.

But if the remedies proposed by the Confessor do not obtain the desired fruit, this one thing remains, that these persons be dealt with no otherwise than it is handed down in the Treatise on Penance that one must deal with relapsing persons.

414. • III. Touches and kisses even on honorable parts will sometimes not be free from grave fault, especially if they are exercised more often or lingeringly by young persons of a different sex without any necessity or other just cause, although on account of merely organic pleasure. The reason is that from acts of this sort, repeated or lingering, carnal commotion and venereal delight will rarely be absent. - St. Lig., n. 416 ⁴.

⁴ ** By "organic pleasure" here the Author calls that which above (note to n. 411) we called purely sensible; where we also suggested that in practice, if there is question of adults who aptly seek it, it scarcely has place precisely as such.

But that the Author seems to except from the rule which he hands down the case of necessity or of a just cause, this must not be extended to more lingering and more pressed kisses, from which even betrothed persons themselves are to be deterred, since scarcely any just cause can be thought up as regards those. (The VV. (p. 304), at these words of the Note: "this is not to be extended to more lingering and more pressed kisses," argue thus: P. B. says that betrothed persons are to be deterred from more lingering and more pressed kisses; therefore not altogether from simply lingering and pressed ones. - Resp. I deny the consequence. It is well known that among the Latins the comparative form, where a term of comparison is lacking, sometimes signifies less than the positive form; it is, namely, an elliptical locution, and there is understood "than is fitting," or "than the thing, or person, or time, or other circumstance bears or requires," etc.)

Yet the Doctors have moved another question concerning betrothed persons, namely whether some delight is lawful for them which they voluntarily take from kisses or embraces or chaste touches. I said, 1. "some delight"; for here venereal delight properly so called and proper to the genital parts is altogether excluded. I said, 2. "which they voluntarily take"; for concerning one arisen besides the intention and admitted by no consent, there is no controversy, even if it were venereal.

St. Alphonsus also treats the question thus proposed (lib. 6, n. 854), yet in such a way (for it will be useful to have touched this one thing concerning this matter in a merely historical way) that from the things disputed there it can scarcely be understood in what place the matter truly stands. And indeed for the opinion which holds that this delight is either licit for betrothed persons or not more than lightly evil (which nevertheless he does not seem to set forth accurately enough), he himself brings forward only five authors, namely Sanchez, the Salamancans, Aversa, Diana, and Azor. [The VV. complain (p. 305) that here it is said that with St. Alphonsus it can scarcely be understood in what place the matter stands. - Resp. 1. St. Alphonsus (lib. 6, n. 854) poses the question thus: "It is asked whether between betrothed persons chaste kisses and touches are mortal sins, if they are done for capturing pleasure"; but it is passed over in silence of what pleasure there is question; 2. For those standing for the first opinion St. Alphonsus alleges only five, while very many others stand for it, indicated here, to whom also three others are added by Diana (l. c. below, res. 38). But when the question is proposed thus, it is certainly not easy to understand in what place the matter stands. Therefore. - The VV. subsume (l. c.) that, if the thirteen Authors whom the holy Doctor alleges for his opinion (l. c.) are counted, and to these are added seven others with Sanchez, fifteen others with Diana, and sixteen others with the Salamancans, now a number rises up which equals the sum of those cited in this Note. - Resp. 1. The seven with Sanchez were transcribed by the Salamancans; therefore lest they be counted twice, they must be taken away. 2. The fifteen with Diana are against the opinion of St. Alphonsus, not for it; nevertheless four are alleged also for it (l. c. below, n. 1); but since these are found repeated by the Salamancans, they cannot be counted. 3. We have already said that the allegations of the Salamancans are false, and we see some of these also with St. Alphonsus. Of what strength the allegations reported with St. Alphonsus are is shown in the following things. Therefore.] But Sanchez (De Matr., lib. 9, disp. 46, n. 48) had alleged for the same opinion seventeen others; but Diana (tom. 2, tract. 6, res. 36, n. 2, 3) had added nine others to these, so that now we have thirty-one, among whom you may see the names of Soto, Cajetan, Toletus, Navarrus, Valencia, Sayrus, Reginaldus, etc.; and to these could be joined Laymann (lib. 3, sect. 4, n. 11), Palaus (De Sponsalibus, disp. 3, punct. 4, §2, n. 7), Sporer (Theol. Sacram., p. 4, c. 2, sect. 4, n. 430), Escobar (lib. 26, sect. 2, dub. 26), Filliuccius (tr. 10, part 1, cap. IX, n. 357), Tamburini (In Decal., lib. 7, cap. 3, §5, n. 61), Joann. Henriquez (in Mendo, disp. 5, q. 12, n. 4), and Giribaldi, who (De Matrim., cap. 19, dub. 15, n. 114) asserts that it is the common doctrine.

But for the opinion which contends that this delight is gravely illicit for betrothed persons, you will see alleged with the same St. Alphonsus (l. c.) Lessius, Mazzotta, Roncaglia, Concina, Bonacina with Henriquez and Rebellus, Croix with Mendo, and Viva with Suarez, Perez, and Hurtado; which allegations indeed seem to have been gathered almost from Croix, Mazzotta, and Viva. But, 1. Lessius (De Iust. et Iur., lib. 4, cap. 3, n. 59) indeed condemns these acts as grave fault in persons altogether unmarried; but (ibid., n. 58) he had handed down the opposite concerning betrothed persons thus: "To betrothed persons for the future that pleasure is conceded which is perceived precisely from a kiss and from contact of the hand or face, so that they do not sin in it even venially." [The VV. object (p. 313) that these words of Lessius are an argument which adversaries use, and whose opinion Lessius reprobates. - Resp. I concede the antecedent, and deny the consequence. Namely, those are the adversaries who treat not of betrothed persons, but of unmarried persons. Now Lessius reprobates their opinion, but does not deny the antecedent of the argument. And in reality the VV. themselves (l. c.) write: "Lessius concedes that kisses are lawful for betrothed persons by reason of the marriage begun, even on account of the delight which arises precisely from them." - The VV. subsume (ibid.) that Lessius concedes this speaking speculatively, but practically does not judge this opinion probable; and they subjoin these words of Lessius: "Therefore I would not call that opinion probable." - Resp. Those words of Lessius regard the opinion of the adversaries concerning unmarried persons, nor is it easy to understand how the VV. traduce Lessius, a classic author, as contradicting himself in the same place. Those things pertain to betrothed persons by which, at the end of the same n. 59, Lessius responds to the argument which the adversaries took from kisses licit as regards betrothed persons: "It is conceded to betrothed persons because it is a sign of future copula, to which by reason of the marriage begun they can consent." Hence it is clear that Lessius plainly concedes that antecedent of the adversaries.]

2. Say the same thing of Perez, who, while (De Matrim., disp. 8, sect. 6, n. 7) he condemns as grave libidinous delight, which is a certain beginning of copula, nevertheless concedes as licit for betrothed persons the delight perceived from kisses (ibid., n. 4). [The VV. contend (p. 314) that Perez teaches that nothing is lawful for betrothed persons except that which would be lawful for others not married. - Resp. I deny altogether. Behold the words of Perez (l. c.) which the VV. also report: "I say first, it is certain among all Doctors that the aforesaid kisses, embraces, and touches not immodest are lawfully done between betrothed persons for the future, when they are done as a sign of benevolence according to the custom of the country, for reconciling and fostering mutual love in order to contracting marriage.... Hence with the aforesaid Doctors I gather that the delight following from them is licit and honorable." Indeed (which the VV. omit) Perez (ibid., n. 5) adds: "Add that the aforesaid kisses, embraces, and touches are also licit on account of the aforesaid end, even if danger of pollution is present, provided danger of consent into sensual and venereal delight is not present." But the objection premised by the VV. distorts Perez into a sense not his own. Perez (n. 8) responds to those objecting that betrothals give no right to those things which are opposed to chastity. But he responds by conceding this freely. And when (n. 7) he had premised that sin is committed through kisses and touches even not immodest, if they are done for the sake of libidinous delight, he infers (n. 8) that betrothals do not excuse in betrothed persons for the future from mortal or venial fault kisses, embraces, and touches even not immodest, which in them, if they were unmarried, would truly be mortal or venial, that is, which would be done for the sake of sensual and libidinous delight.]

3. Bonacina (De Matr., q. 4, punct. 9, n. 6) and Mazzotta (tr. VII, disp. II, q. 2, cap. 2, q. 1) say each opinion is probable. [The VV. object (p. 315) that Bonacina said the opposite opinion was safer and more probable. - Resp. That he concedes the other to be probable is sufficient for a judgment about the liceity of the act. But that he says the opposite is more probable is not sufficient for injecting into the faithful a conscience of grave sin. These things follow from common principles approved and inculcated by St. Alphonsus. As regards Mazzotta, the VV. object that he said the opposite was far more probable. - Resp. Mazzotta said that of carnal and (as he then explains) venereal delight, I concede, and he spoke very benignly thus concerning that; that he said it of the delight about which there is now question, I deny. Behold the words of Mazzotta (l. c.), which the VV. too much truncate here and there: "I respond with Perez and others that then they are lawful, when they are done as a sign of benevolence according to the custom of the country, for reconciling and fostering mutual love in order to contracting marriage; because thus not only does baseness not appear, but indeed an honorable end is present. Which is true, says Perez, even if in the case, besides the intention, commotion of the spirits or even pollution follows, provided danger of consent into that is not present. But if they are done on account of carnal delight... which sounds like venereal delight..., far more probably they contradict," etc.]

4. Suarez (De Pecc., disp. 5, sect. 7, n. 12) and Henr. Henriquez (lib. XI, cap. 19, n. 4) have altogether nothing which makes to the matter. [The VV. confess (pp. 315-316) that Suarez has nothing about betrothed persons. But it could better have been noted that that allegation of Suarez regards another Suarez, of whom mention is made in Diana (tom. 2, tr. 6, reg. 38, n. 1), and about him nothing is to be cared for. But as regards Henriquez, he merely says (l. c.) that honorable embraces and kisses for benevolence were conceded by learned men; but they ought not to be permitted, since now betrothals do not pass over into marriage by copula with marital affection. I ask: why does he not say "ought," but "would ought"? The reason is rendered there in the note thus: "for danger of copula is present, while without arbiters they touch one another immodestly." Therefore he says this merely for forestalling dangers; which is consonant with that paragraph, where he treats of the office of the mother in the custody of daughters. But those whom he alleges in the Note, Cajetan, Navarrus, Angelus, and Silvester, are known not to forbid these signs of benevolence to betrothed persons, although Silvester (V. Matrim., 5, §8) distinguishes a twofold genus of kisses: one, which would irreprehensibly be done only with wives and betrothed persons for the present, and which would suffice so that betrothals pass over into marriage; the other, which are customarily exhibited even to betrothed persons for the future in some places, etc. From these allegations it is permissible to judge the opinion of the VV., where they say (p. 305) that up to the sixteenth century no one is found who conceded this to betrothed persons.]

5. Rebellus (De oblig. Iust., part 2, lib. 3, q. XIX, sect. 2) and Gaspar Hurtado (De Matr., disp. 10, diffic. 10, n. 48) discuss, the one indeed libidinous delight, or kisses through which venereal pleasure is begun; the other, libidinous touches and the delight perceived therefrom; which likewise are not to the matter. [The VV. concede (p. 316) that Rebellus and Hurtado treat of libidinous or venereal delight; but they deny that they are alleged beside the matter, because some Authors in reality do not condemn at least as mortal some such delight. - Resp. Whether some author has excused at least from mortal sin venereal delight is of no interest now. It is of interest in this way: that St. Alphonsus alleges the authors of the second opinion as contradicting the authors of the first. But none of the five whom he brings forward for the first opinion speaks of venereal delight; therefore Rebellus and Hurtado, who attack merely venereal delight, are alleged against them beside the matter.]

6. Croix (lib. 6, p. 3, n. 151) merely opposes to the common opinion the false allegations of Lessius, Suarez, Henriquez, and Hurtado, to which he adds Comitolus; but also this one wrongly, because Paulus Comitolus, although a man of anomalous talent and of zeal inclined to stricter things, nevertheless did not depart from the common opinion in this matter, as is clear from these things (Resp. mor., lib. 4, q. 20, n. 4): "Wherefore girls and virgins who, either from kisses and embraces of chaste young men whom they love, take honorable pleasure, whether when they think of those touches or also admit them bodily; either do not sin, or sin lightly, as Sylvester says, V. Delectatio, n. 7. Rosella, V. Cogitatio morosa, n. 4, affirms that they do not sin mortally. It must be said otherwise if they drew in obscene pleasure in mind or base pleasure in body." [The VV. note (p. 317) that, even if the force of the allegations which Croix puts forth wavers, nevertheless the suffrage of Croix himself is present. - Resp. A suffrage of this sort has as much force as the consequence which is drawn from false premises, that is, none. But the reason brought by Croix (lib. 3, p. 1, n. 894), namely that this sensible delight, especially if it is sought, could be followed by venereal delight; and if perhaps venereal delight should approach, danger could be present of consenting to it - this reason, I say, proves too much, nor does Logic consent that from a probable particular case an argument be taken for asserting grave sin for any cases whatsoever. - Concerning Comitolus the VV. (pp. 318-319) dispute through three columns, and ask whether he could rightly allege Paludanus and the Summas of Silvester and Rosella. - Resp. Those things make nothing to the matter. This is the question: whether Croix rightly and justly alleged Comitolus against those twenty authors who (as he himself says, lib. 3, p. 1, n. 894) say that delight only sensible, which arises in kisses or touches, is not mortal. Let anyone who shall have read with his own eyes the premised words of Comitolus judge.]

7. Finally Viva (De Matr., q. 1, art. 7, n. 6), although he seems to fight against the common opinion of Sanchez, nevertheless speaks ambiguously of delight, now sensible, now carnal; and he entangles the matter more when in this place he says that he follows the more common doctrine against Sanchez, while elsewhere (on proposition 40 condemned by Alexander VII, n. 23) he attributes the opinion of Sanchez to very many; which two things would plainly be contradictory. [The VV. contend through three columns (pp. 319-320) that Viva is altogether to be exempted from every note both of confusion and contradiction. Resp. Viva (l. c.) attacks not only Sanchez, Cajetan, and Navarrus, as the VV. feign, but also Toletus, Fagundez, Bonacina, Salas, Valencia, and others with Diana; namely he attacks those fifteen whom the VV., as we have seen, wished to cite for the opinion of St. Alphonsus! But Viva attacks these because they excuse betrothed persons from mortal sin even if they intend sensitive and carnal delight. Now let us ask: of what sort is the delight which Viva reproves? For if it is merely sensitive or sensible, such as Sanchez asserts (lib. 9, disp. 46, n. 49), calling it "sensitive delight which arises from kisses," how does he subjoin that it is more commonly condemned as mortal sin? How does he object against those authors Rebellus and Hurtado, who fight only, as we have seen, against venereal delight? Indeed, how with these does he oppose Perez also, who, as we saw above, admits this sensible delight as licit? But if Viva wishes to fight against venereal delight, how does he attribute this opinion to those fifteen Writers with Diana, who follows them? How does he attribute it to those very many whose cause (on prop. 40 of Alex. VII, n. 23) he makes common with Sanchez? I ask: is this the most suitable way of treating questions clearly, distinctly, and coherently?]

Therefore, from those alleged, there will remain Mendo, Concina, and Roncaglia, of whom the last (tract. XII, cap. 1, q. 6) says that he marvels that some admit kisses as licit between betrothed persons, and that he never sufficiently perceived how it can be said that betrothals bestow on betrothed persons a right to mutual kisses. To these things others perhaps would reply that the reason which did not shine before Roncaglia's eyes nevertheless did shine commonly before the understanding of the other Doctors whom we have suggested; for no other sufficient cause of so common an opinion can be assigned except some reason sufficiently considerable, which compels very diverse talents into one opinion. The same must be replied to Mendo, who (Statera Opin., diss. V, q. 12, n. 118) feared to follow the doctrine of so many and so grave Authors, as he says, because he did not see through the foundation of the same.

[The VV. note (p. 323) that the testimony of Concina is left untouched in the Note. - Resp. Do they not themselves (p. 324) expressly confess that Concina is called most rigid by the holy Doctor Alphonsus? Now the suffrage of a rigid author indeed is worth more than moderately when he absolves; not likewise when he condemns. Therefore in the case let them have him for themselves. - The VV. reply (p. 324): St. Alphonsus reproves very many opinions of Concina because they are more rigid than is just, or most rigid; but in this question... he does not think him rigid. - Resp. If it is so, then the force of the suffrage is not taken from Concina's authority, but from St. Alphonsus's. Now a suffrage which has no force except from the authority of the same person alleging the suffrage can be omitted without damage to the cause, since it contributes no help to the cause by itself. - The VV. add (pp. 321-323) that Roncaglia and Mendo do not stop in mere admiration, but overthrow the adverse opinion with very grave (!) arguments. - Resp. The reasons brought by Mendo are so valid that they condemn even that which St. Alphonsus approves as licit (see preceding note) in that general thesis of Sanchez (l. c., n. 47): "Kisses and embraces and other touches not immodest are excused from mortal fault between betrothed persons for the future." Nor truly is this strange; for Mendo is from those whose name scarcely appears elsewhere among allegations, except where some anomalous opinion is produced. - But as regards Roncaglia, it must be noted first that the question is restricted by him not only to kisses pressed and prolonged for some time, but moreover to those done for capturing sensible delight. Now Logic does not permit that from this a conclusion be drawn concerning all kisses, with St. Alphonsus's distinction set aside between one acting on account of delight and one acting with delight. But the argument already produced by Rebellus, and then repeated by the rest also wholly beside the matter, namely that betrothals do not give a right over the body of the other, with examples then added for illustrating the matter both of one buying a vineyard, who does not yet have a right in the thing, and of a man destined for the office of judge, which nevertheless he has not yet received - this argument, I say, is nothing but a pure sophism. And indeed do we assign a right over the body of another when we say that friendship gives a right of embracing or kissing a friend, or that the same right is present in parents toward children, etc.? It is indicated, namely, that the condition of friend to friend, of parents to children, etc., and also of betrothed persons mutually, is such that demonstrations of affection and benevolence of this kind cannot be condemned as incongruous to their state. Indeed, since that love is legitimate and honorable to such a degree that St. Thomas (see above, note to q. 7, n. 32) holds that a woman fittingly adorns herself to please the man whom she ought to receive as an act of virtue and meritorious of eternal life, it is likewise honorable to foster that love by signs of this sort.]

But another sophism must not be omitted here, against which some do not take enough caution in treating this question. Namely, they so distinguish merely sensible delight, which for example is drawn from touching silken cloth, from venereal delight, that if indeed the delight perceived from an embrace is not that merely sensible delight, it must already be held as venereal and gravely damnable, just as if there were question of brute animals. But in a rational man another element must not be neglected, whence there is delight which can neither be called back to that merely sensible delight, nor again be condemned as venereal. And in truth, does the delight which a mother experiences in the embrace of a son returned from war have anything in common with the touch of a flower? This delight indeed so inheres in an embrace of this sort that she kisses the son a hundred times, nor for a long time allows him to be torn away from her arms. Therefore, if that delight is not sensible, will it be venereal? Namely, a pleasure and delight of its own and of an altogether diverse character is present when an ardent affection of the heart pours itself out through signs or demonstrations of this sort, and seems to satisfy itself and as it were rest in them. But as often as this affection is legitimate and honorable, and in pouring itself out keeps the limits of honesty and decency, what is there in which it may be condemned, or to what purpose is that theory concerning merely sensible delight and delight proper to the touch of silken cloth summoned hither? But from this it is understood why Authors, for rendering honorable embraces and kisses of this sort, bring forward the demonstration of love and benevolence, and the fostering of the same, as an end in some way intrinsic to the work; but add the question concerning delight, which either accompanies the act or perhaps even is intended, as it were concerning a thing which accrues to the act per accidens. And indeed perhaps someone would have thought not altogether absurdly that the graver Authors, when they here name sensible or sensitive delight, by no means wished to indicate merely the sense arising from the touch of a smooth thing. For there is another affection of the sensitive appetite, and that now pleasant, now unpleasant, which almost accompanies the affection of the rational appetite from which it arises, and has joined to it also some bodily change, and especially a change of the motions of the heart, now pleasant, now unpleasant; whence commonly the heart is said to be dilated or pressed. Yet this affection and bodily change of itself has nothing common with venereal delight, to such a degree that indeed it accompanies even the most pious affections toward God; and on that account we are warned not to cling too much to this sensible delight among spiritual exercises. Now by what more apt name than that of sensitive delight would Authors designate this sensitive affection, which arises spontaneously and accompanies those acts by which, in the case, it is brought forth and is shown by some effect? And from here indeed the sense of certain locutions can be drawn out, which the VV. try wholly to drag over to signifying venereal delight; whence they accuse both Navarrus and Cajetan and also Sanchez, as if they had asserted that venereal delight is licit for betrothed persons, or at least not gravely culpable in the case. But even in these matters they have against them the rigid Mendo, whose words they themselves report (p. 322). The VV. take the occasion of accusing Navarrus from those words of Navarrus (Man., c. 16, n. 12): "For betrothals, which are the beginning of marriage, make a faculty of enjoying pleasure preambulatory to matrimonial pleasure, which is the singular determination of the same Cajetan on 2. 2, q. 154, art. 4." But these words rather persuade the opposite. For if according to Navarrus the pleasure conceded to betrothed persons is related to matrimonial pleasure as betrothals are related to marriage, it must be concluded that that preambulatory pleasure is nothing other than a certain disposition prior to another. Wherefore, just as betrothals are a disposition to marriage in such a way that nevertheless they participate nothing of the nature of marriage, so also that preambulatory pleasure must be understood as wholly without the nature of that pleasure which is exclusively marital. And from here it is given to know better what those locutions of Cajetan alleged by Navarrus mean, where (l. c.) he writes: "But it seems that just as betrothal is a certain beginning of marriage, so also an act of this sort" (namely a kiss) "is a certain beginning of carnal copula"; or (as he has in the Summa, V. Sponsalitia): "Just as a betrothed woman belongs to the betrothed man inchoatively, so the venereal delight of carnal joining between them is permitted inchoatively between the same; but it is clear that kisses... import only the beginning of venereal delight." Now the same argument as above returns. For the delight of kissing is the beginning of venereal delight just as betrothal is the beginning of marriage. But betrothal is a mere prior disposition to marriage. Filliuccius (tr. 10, c. 9, n. 357), aptly rendering the sense of these Authors, has it thus: "If they are not immodest, that is, if they are on honorable parts, as kisses, embraces, touches of hands, and the like, they are lawful, even if they" (the betrothed) "intend to capture from them sensitive delight, but not venereal. The reason is that, as marriage in the present renders copula honorable, so betrothals, which are a certain remote beginning of marriage, render honorable those touches which are a remote beginning toward copula. Cajet., Navarr., Lopez, and others with Sanchez." From these things it appears that they are indeed called a beginning, yet in such a way that venereal delight itself is excluded.]

This also must not be omitted here, that St. Alphonsus in this question in no way objected proposition XL from those proscribed by Alexander VII, which sounds thus: "The opinion is probable which says that a kiss had on account of carnal and sensible delight which arises from the kiss, with danger of further consent and pollution removed, is only venial." But it seems this must be repeated from a twofold cause. For first indeed that proposition speaks of carnal or venereal delight, of which there is no question (see Duarte on this proposition, n. 489, and Viva on the same prop., n. 3); hence St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 415) uses that proposition to prove that smallness of matter is not given in a venereal thing. But then (even abstracting from the species of delight), this proposition admits exceptions, as is clear from married persons. But exceptions are not to be sought from the proposition itself, since it presents none, but from the sense of the Catholic schools. But the Catholic schools did not even suspect that the question concerning betrothed persons about which we are treating was contained in that proposition.

And these things indeed, as was premised, have been said merely historically. To these it will be useful to have added only this, that in questions of this sort the distinction which St. Alphonsus also elsewhere (lib. 3, n. 416) uses is very useful, namely that it is one thing to act on account of delight, another to act with delight. For, as we warned above (note to n. 411), the former manner of acting will most easily lead on to further things.

Here the VV. ask (p. 331): What do those words mean: "And these things indeed have been said merely historically"? Resp. They signify that the things which have been said hold the place of premises, from which others can elicit a suitable conclusion. The VV. themselves sometimes close their discourse with those words: "Let the Reader judge."

Indeed it is useful here also, merely historically, to subjoin in what way the VV. themselves gathered other Authors for the thesis of St. Alphonsus (pp. 324-330).

1. They allege Potestas thus (p. 327): "Kisses and embraces on account of natural and sensible delight... are mortal sins for betrothed persons for the future" (tom. 1, n. 2237); but they omit this explanation of the same Potestas (ibid., n. 2203): "Natural sensible delight is formally and intrinsically venereal."

2. They bring forward these things from Antoine (De Pecc., c. 7, q. 13): "Since betrothals are only a promise of future marriage, not a handing over of bodies, they bestow no present right over the body of the other in order to copula to be exercised here and now, nor therefore to acts which are ordered to it." But they omit what acts those are concerning which Antoine treats; but he expresses them thus in the thesis itself: "Every venereal delight, look, and base touch or touch of the pudenda, and any act of lust, are mortal."

3. They report these words from Candidus (disp. 11, art. 1, dub. 5): "Yet it seems to me truer and more probable that kisses and touches of this sort between betrothed persons for the future, if the end is only SENSUAL delight, are not licit, but mortal." But they omit to note that these things are not opposed to the preceding thesis of the same Candidus, where he treats not of sensual but of only sensitive delight, between which words nevertheless even Potestas (l. c.) notes that there is much difference. I said, the thesis of Candidus; for thus he begins: "I say seventh," etc.; therefore the VV. do not well feign that there the opinion of others is reported. But the thesis has itself thus: "If the end of these kisses," etc., "between betrothed persons for the future is delight only sensitive, they will be venial fault, because as such" (namely on account of defect of a right end) "even between spouses they are of similar fault."

4. The VV. bring forward these words of Cardenas (tr. 5, disp. 45, n. 205): "And thus I deny that opinion to be probable intrinsically, and after the condemnation of Alex. VII I think it is not even probable extrinsically." But the VV. wish these things to contain a response to those objecting: "Between betrothed persons for the future kisses and the delight arising precisely from them are not illicit mortally." But they omit those things which make clear that that response regards only venereal delight. For Cardenas premises these things in the same n. 205: "I respond secondly and chiefly, according to my opinion, ... that chaste embraces and kisses are licit for betrothed persons for the future, but not libidinous embraces and kisses; that embraces and kisses are licit, provided they resist the venereal delight and commotion arising from them. For... it is not lawful for them to provide consent to venereal delight, which is ordered to copula, not yet licit for them."

5. The VV. allege Mastrius; who nevertheless merely reports diverse opinions; but the suffrage for the cause of the VV. is worth as much as it is worth with Mastrius to have opposed the three false allegations of Lessius, Rebellus, and Henriquez to more, as Mastrius himself confesses, Doctors.

6. They allege Joannes Conradus, Ant. Fernandez de Moure, and Babenstuber. But in the texts which the VV. themselves allege, you discern that those authors are disputing there about venereal, carnal, libidinous delight. And from these indeed let the Reader judge also concerning some other allegations of the same weight.

IV. Kisses, touches, and embraces exercised on account of venereal delight contract malice diverse in species according to the various circumstances of the persons; for they are judged to be of the same nature as the consummated act toward which by their nature they tend. Hence in confession it must be explained whether they were had with the same or a different sex, with a married person, etc. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig., n. 417. - Lessius, etc.

415. Resolves. - 1. Kisses which mothers or nurses are accustomed to imprint on infants are free from fault. Say the same, at least ordinarily, of others who kiss infants of tender age, even of a different sex, with every wicked affection removed.

2. Young persons of either sex who in some games decently and without wicked intention embrace one another are not immediately to be accused of sin, and much less of grave sin, although they are to be turned away from games of this sort because of the danger joined to them.

3. But kisses impressed on less customary parts of the body, especially between persons of a different sex, for example on the breast, etc., or also if they are done lingeringly, especially with the tongue introduced into the mouth, likewise if they are long-lasting, repeated, etc., almost must be held as mortal. - St. Lig., n. 417.

416. • 4. They do not sin per se who touch themselves for wiping away bodily filth, or for calming itching, or for curing infirmities; yet if the itching is tolerable, it must be suggested that, insofar as they can without grave trouble, they abstain from touches. It is necessary, however, that the Confessor use great discretion in these things. For doubts of this sort are accustomed to vex especially persons of timorous conscience. But persuasions, if they are a little more vehement and are not seasoned with an open declaration about the otherwise absence of any guilt, will often and easily entangle consciences in most troublesome scruples. - St. Lig., Hom. apost., n. 3. - But if touches of one's own body are done without cause, they do not exceed venial sin when, venereal affection being removed, they are had only in passing, and from mere levity or curiosity, because they are not very much incentives of lust. - St. Lig., n. 419.

5. Touches on the private parts of the same sex or on neighboring parts, even over clothes, ordinarily are not excused from grave sin, unless perhaps they are done from petulance, jest, levity, and in passing. - St. Lig., n. 420.

6. A fortiori, with the case of necessity excluded, touches on the private parts of a different sex, even had for a brief time, cannot be excused from mortal sin; since they can scarcely proceed from any cause other than lust, and, besides that they are most indecent, they create per se a proximate danger of pollution or venereal delight. - St. Lig., n. 420. Yet probably maids are not to be accused of grave sin who perhaps touch the pudenda of infants while they clothe them, unless they do this with delay or carnal delight. - Lacroix, n. 902. - St. Lig., ibid.

7. It does not exceed venial sin, speaking per se, lightly and without delay to touch the fingers, hands, face of a person of a different sex, a wicked end being removed, and every affection and danger of lust, if these things are done, for example, from mere levity, and do not have a special danger joined by reason of one's own fragility or that of another.

Moreover, since in so slippery a matter it is not always easily clear what is venial or mortal, and on the other hand since not rarely there is present a proximate danger of gravely offending even in those things which per se do not exceed light sin, for example if they are done often and with delay between persons inclined to lusts, the Confessor must take the greatest pains to remove penitents, especially younger ones, from any touches with a different sex.

26. 1. Concerning kisses. Kisses and embraces can be done on account of venereal delectation, on account of sensual delectation, or for the sake of civility and friendship.

(A) If they proceed from venereal affection, fully deliberate, they are mortal sins from what has been said. - Say the same if they are done upon dishonorable or less honorable parts, such as the breasts, because they usually excite grave carnal movements, and moreover suppose libidinous affection, since honorable persons are not accustomed to kiss these parts. - Generally also grave sins are kisses which are morose, repeated often, with great affection, between mature persons of different sex, especially when the tongue is introduced into the mouth: for these of themselves tend to move concupiscence and can scarcely be done without depraved affection.

27. (B) Decent kisses, which are had for the sake of sensuality, on account of sensible love, without reasonable cause, do not exceed venial sin: for on the one hand they are not free from fault, because a reasonable cause is lacking, and on the other hand the fault is not mortal, because libidinous affection or proximate danger of exciting carnal delectation is lacking. But because from sensual love and delectation to pleasure there is an easy passage, especially among mature persons of different sex, kisses of this kind, if they are done frequently and morosely, soon reach mortal sin.

(C) Kisses, embraces, touches of the hands, which are done according to the custom of the country, for the sake of civility, friendship, or kinship, even among mature persons of different sex, without depraved affection, are lawful, even if by accident a carnal movement should sometimes be excited therefrom, provided the danger of consenting to venereal delectation is absent.

290. - We call those persons betrothed (for the future) who, whether from a betrothal agreement properly so called or from the equivalent introduction of one into the house of the other, have a certain and mutual hope of marriage.

Sanchez ¹ indeed seems to consider only those betrothed persons between whom betrothals for the future have been contracted absolutely. But many theologians who treat what is lawful and unlawful between betrothed persons are not accustomed to define accurately whom they address by the name of betrothed persons. Yet all persons who have attained a certain hope of marriage, whether they are bound by a formal agreement or are content with a mutual firm resolution, seem to be situated in a similar condition and are commonly called betrothed persons (fiancés); so that the rules to be handed down seem to apply to both.

¹ De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 46, no. 47.

Nevertheless, a prudent application of these rules demands that, even among those who are formally betrothed, the distance by which they are separated from marriage not be neglected; but those between whom marriage negotiations have begun are already to be regarded as approaching the condition of betrothed persons.

291. - Now it is conducive to the mutual happiness of spouses that, before they contract an indissoluble covenant, they should be able to make a mutual trial of qualities, affections, and inclinations; or rather, for thus we will reply more according to what commonly happens, that if through mutual conversation they learn that they had falsely judged one another's character and inclinations to be such as promise a happy and fruitful marriage, an honorable manner of renouncing the nuptials should remain.

But for the dignity of conjugal life, and especially for the honor to be rendered to the wife, it is expedient that mutual esteem and a love nobler and firmer than that which arises from carnal concupiscence should found the nuptial covenant. This love, as we saw (no. 178), can sometimes become a protection of an inviolate life for a young person.

Moreover, love inclines toward external signs and is itself promoted by them. Wherefore, "embraces and kisses had between those betrothed for the future, as a sign of benevolence and for acquiring and fostering mutual love in order to contract marriage, are altogether lawful because the end is honorable." (Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 46, no. 50. Cf. also no. 53.)

292. - Immodest signs by means of touches, less honorable looks, etc., are in no way lawful for those betrothed for the future; indeed, because of the danger of a graver abuse and for the very happiness of the future marriage, they are more strongly to be avoided and restrained from the beginning. For no less than others who are not married, betrothed persons must abstain from carnal commerce, of which these things are the beginnings; but they rather place the happiness and dignity of marriage in danger than assist them. For with what reverence, civility, and moderation will a betrothed man who acts insolently toward a girl not yet his own conduct himself toward a wife subject to him? And the more carnal lust is fostered before the nuptials, the less they will be joined on account of a nobler affection. Cf. Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 46, no. 51.

293. - Sensible enjoyment taken from honorable demonstrations seems lawful. For the rule of St. Thomas recurs: the pleasure of a good operation is good.

But can betrothed persons seek or admit by consent a pleasure not only more generally sensible ², but also venereal, which easily accompanies or follows the former? With the danger of pollution or of consent to it excluded, Sanchez ³, with Cajetan ⁴, Navarre ⁵, and certain others, seems to judge that this is not gravely blameworthy.

² Cf. no. 24.

³ Nevertheless, he himself does not explain very perspicuously what he understands by the name of sensible pleasure not gravely prohibited to betrothed persons, so that his meaning is doubtful.

⁴ Summula, s.v. "Betrothals"; and on II-II, question 154, article 4, in the response to objection 2, at the end.

⁵ Manuale, chapter 14, no. 18; and chapter 16, no. 12, at the end.

For Sanchez has this: "Betrothals excuse from mortal sin this pleasure, which is a beginning of copulation and which in altogether unattached persons would be a mortal fault ⁶." And afterward: "Nevertheless, it will be venial, as idle and as lacking necessity and piety ⁷." But Cajetan, treating the same kisses which he declares to be mortal in unattached persons, and distinguishing them from kisses and embraces which he pronounces plainly lawful as signs of benevolence and familiarity between those betrothed for the future, judges those kisses between those betrothed for the future, just as between spouses of the present, to be only venial, and for this reason: because a betrothal is the beginning of marriage. Finally, Navarre, loc. cit., adheres to Cajetan; and he permits to betrothed persons what he forbids to others, that is, to enjoy the pleasure which arises from kisses, without employing any distinction.

⁶ De matrimonio, disputation 47, no. 6.

⁷ [No corresponding footnote is printed in the source.]

But today, with most authors, this is more rightly rejected. For betrothed persons, as far as copulation is concerned, differ in nothing from persons who are altogether unattached. Consequently, the beginning of copulation, or of a prohibited thing, is prohibited to them no less than to the latter. No handing over of bodies has been made; therefore no use of bodies is lawful; therefore no pleasure which pertains to imperfect use can be excused from grave sin.

For the fact that a special pleasure of venereal sensation also easily arises from an honorable kiss flows from the rebellion of the flesh because of the affinity of the things; but no venereal pleasure pertains of itself to an honorable kiss, which proceeds from an affection nobler than venereal lust. Wherefore this does not hold here: "The pleasure of a good work is good." Rather, it is something disordered and prohibited equally to betrothed and unattached persons. Thus the chief argument which the adversaries used is snatched away from them.

Nor can they say: betrothal is the beginning of marriage; therefore the beginning of copulation is permitted to them. For it is a beginning not properly so called, which would give all the rights of marriage in an inchoate manner, but one improperly so called, or a preparation through a union of souls, not of bodies. Moreover, as St. Alphonsus admonishes ⁸, betrothal is a promise. But a promise to hand over a thing does not yet permit the use of the thing.

⁸ Book 6, no. 854.

294. - Those who give these honorable kisses or engage in conversations in order to take pleasure (not venereal pleasure), with the danger of consent to mortal sin excluded, sin venially, not indeed because of the end itself, taken as such, but because of the danger which is not excused by the honorable end ⁹. But they must resist the carnal movement when it arises and positively renounce it. Wherefore, they are to be dissuaded from seeking kisses expressly and deliberately on account of sensible pleasure. Cf. Lessius, book 4, chapter 3, nos. 58 and 59.

⁹ Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 46, no. 50.

295. - Since betrothed persons are very prone to excesses, they are to be admonished that they engage in tender conversations temperately and rather sparingly, and that in their demonstrations they not exceed the custom of upright persons in their country. Above all, let them beware of more frequent kisses, kisses given on the mouth rather than on the cheeks, and lingering embraces: these are accustomed to move the flesh gravely.

Nevertheless, some excess is not immediately to be condemned as mortal.

But betrothed persons are formally to repudiate venereal pleasure. Then, if any involuntary pleasure arises, they will be excused by a just cause. For a testimony of love is a just cause for them.

Therefore, if this is reasonable, it gives place to the principle of double effect. Nevertheless, a betrothed person who senses a more imminent pollution in these demonstrations ought, in order to act sincerely, then gently to interrupt the demonstration, if he can conveniently do so.

The betrothed woman especially is to be exhorted not to permit anything which is reserved to spouses. This is wicked and very dangerous to her present reputation: once she has permitted it, even before the time she is already so placed in the power of the man that she no longer has the option of breaking the betrothal, while she has rendered the nuptials less lovable to the man who, outside the nuptials, and consequently without their burden, has obtained what he could ask only in the conjugal state. And even if he remains constant, it is harmful to the happiness of the marriage that the betrothed woman should in some manner satiate the betrothed man before the marriage has been celebrated. For provident God wisely established that the new burdens of marriage should be relieved by new joys.

Let her also know that more things can be performed by her without carnal commotion more easily than by a young man. Wherefore, let her not admit too many signs of love, much less solicit them. Nor should she in any way fear on that account for the perseverance of the betrothed man. On the contrary, while she provides for her dignity, she increases his esteem; but disgust is generated by excessive familiarity. This is especially to be noted where the nuptials must be deferred for a long time.

The counsel of moderation, therefore, will be opportune in every respect, provided that they are not regarded as uncivil or austere. Let this brief rule be established: let them perform no more, even if it is permitted to them, than what can be performed in this matter before others, for example, their parents.

But a moral excuse will more easily be present in the one rendering than in the one requesting.

Wherefore, a betrothed woman who admits a kiss of her betrothed which, in its external appearance, is honorable and customary does not sin of herself, although she suspects or holds for certain a less good affection or intention. For she consents only to the exterior act, which is good; this does not remove the guilt of the other's evil affection or intention, so that her slight cooperation has an easy excuse from the circumstances. Cf. Cajetan, on II-II, question 154, article 4, at the end.

Nevertheless, a betrothed woman who by a gentle admonition of displeasure leads the betrothed man toward better things will be greatly praised. And she is to be exhorted to act thus when she can.

296. - Since betrothed persons are accustomed to be sufficiently exposed to temptations to evil, a grave sin is committed by parents who have no care for the familiar intercourse of the betrothed persons or who imprudently permit them to be alone ¹⁰. A scruple, therefore, is to be instilled in them.

¹⁰ Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 46, no. 52.

297. - St. Alphonsus ¹¹, led by the danger of consent to pollution or to venereal movement, seems to have written severely concerning this argument.

¹¹ Book 6, no. 854.

He merely tolerates kisses and embraces where the custom prevails, even if they are done in passing; nor does he regard as practically probable the opinion which grants sensible pleasure (not carnal pleasure) to betrothed persons.

These are indeed holy admonitions. Nevertheless, care must also be taken lest upright betrothed persons be tormented by scruples and, because of the excessive rigor of a counselor, begin to have a constrained, fearful, and impeded manner of acting which renders them ridiculous, not without danger to their own religion, and more certainly turns and deters others who are less pious from piety and religion. Let us preach conduct that is sincerely honorable but not timid. It is greatly to be desired that the manner of acting of the good should be as easy and human as it is honorable and dignified.

298. - True betrothals or promises having been made, betrothed persons are bound by a certain mutual obligation to abstain from every other carnal commerce, so that those who sin lustfully with others are to be regarded as unjust in some manner. Common sense itself teaches this. Wherefore, even those parents who are accustomed to indulge many sins in young persons sharply censure the sins of a betrothed person with outsiders, so that there seems to them to be a cause for breaking the betrothal. Indeed, most theologians think that the fornication of a betrothed woman with another, because in the common estimation it makes the nuptials notably less desirable, adds to the sin a grave species to be accused in confession. Nevertheless, the matter is disputed, so that the confessor is not compelled to be solicitous about that accusation. Yet he will be able usefully to inculcate upon them their mutual right and duty. Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, vol. 6, treatise 10, nos. 75-82; and Palmieri, in the theological part of the same work, vol. 2, no. 1007.

299. - You will ask how one must act with betrothed persons who frequently fall into mortal sins.

We suppose that there is question of those who would avoid these sins if they were free from the betrothal.

Therefore, if the marriage is sufficiently near, the occasion is regularly to be regarded as necessary. By suitable means, caution, and the use of the sacraments, it is to be converted into a remote occasion.

But if the marriage is remotely distant and cannot take place soon, the case becomes very complicated.

Even then the occasion must not rarely be regarded as more or less necessary, either because the danger does not arise from the special circumstances of this familiar intercourse, so that, if it were removed, another equally dangerous occasion would then succeed it, or because the opportunity of marriage is of singular value and will with difficulty be present again. Where a rationale of this kind is present, one must act in almost the same manner as in the former hypothesis.

If an excuse of this kind is lacking, a proximate occasion which cannot easily be converted into a remote one is of itself to be abandoned.

But if, as not rarely happens, it cannot be obtained that the betrothed persons either marry soon or break off or suspend their commerce, let the visits at least become less frequent, with cautions employed; and, especially from the girls, let assiduous access to the sacraments and the use of a stable confessor be required.

401. - 1. A touch which is commonly judged modest, such as holding a hand, an embrace, or a kiss according to the custom of the country, can be disapproved only from the depraved affection of the agent, which is not to be presumed even in doubt. Nor is it very stimula- ting, and there is a just cause for permitting a spontaneous movement of the flesh.

But if the truly depraved affection of the agent is established, even a touch of this kind cannot be admitted unless a just cause of one's own detriment or that of the agent - who would be defamed by the repulse - excuses the cooperation. Therefore, an easy excuse from the grave guilt of this cooperation is at hand. Cf. what was said concerning betrothed persons, no. 295, at the end.

2. Nor are kisses given and returned from an affection of piety between parents and descendants incentives to lust.

3. Mercy, another noble affection, can also prudently - by guarding against delusion - be expressed through kisses which are directed toward an end wholly diverse from Venus.

B. As to kisses and embraces.

1. Those done from venereal affection are mortal.

2. Those done on dishonorable parts, or on less honorable parts such as the breasts, are ordinarily mortal, because they generally excite grave carnal motions and are accustomed to indicate venereal affection, unless perhaps they are done in passing and from levity alone.

3. Those done on honorable parts, without a reasonable cause, but on account of sensible love and from levity, joking, or sensuality, are venial, unless there is a proximate danger of consent to venereal pleasure, as easily happens if they are lingering, or repeated rather often, or impressed with great affection between persons of different sex, especially the dove-like kiss by which the tongue is introduced into the mouth of the other.

4. Kisses, embraces, and handlings of hands according to the custom of the country, for the sake of urbanity, friendship, or kinship, are licit, even if per accidens carnal motions are excited, provided the danger of consent is absent.

693. Decent kisses, which are customarily given (even in the presence of others) according to the custom of the country for manifesting honorable affection, are licit,¹³³⁶ although carnal movements sometimes arise from them, provided, however, that complacency in venereal pleasure is restrained. Hence the kisses which, for example, are customarily given between betrothed persons, blood relatives, relatives by affinity, etc., are licit. In practice, kisses are recognized as more or less illicit if they would not be given while another honorable person was watching; but if they are given from levity or in jest, they are venial sins,¹³³⁷ provided that proximate danger of consent to venereal pleasure is absent.

But indecent kisses, which, namely, are given upon less honorable or dishonorable parts, or with insertion of the tongue into the mouth of another (the dove's kiss), are ordinarily gravely illicit because of the danger of illicit venereal pleasure.¹³³⁸ Between spouses, however, no kiss as such is a mortal sin unless proximate danger of pollution arises from it.

¹³³⁶ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 154, a. 4.

¹³³⁷ Cf. Billuart, l.c. a. 16, dico 5.

¹³³⁸ Cf. ib.

1027. Applications. - The principles have been applied by theologians to many concrete cases; some solutions of these we add here. Yet these solutions for the most part admit exceptions; hence generally they are not to be considered as rules altogether universal, but only as general rules which hold only as in the majority of cases.

A. As to touches.

1. To touch one's own body or another's from lustful intention or venereal affection is always mortal.

2. To touch the genital parts of others, especially of the other sex, even mediately over clothing, except in a case of necessity as happens for physicians, surgeons, and others having care of the sick, is easily mortal because it provokes lust, and for the most part shows a depraved affection; unless it happens from levity alone and only in passing, as among nurses touching the organs of little children, or among those before puberty of the same sex touching one another. Likewise, to touch the breasts of a woman, and especially the nipples, morosely, because they are seats of pleasurable excitation, which usually brings with it a commotion of the genitals, even a vehement one; or on the contrary, from levity and in passing.

3. To touch the genitals of brute animals from curiosity or sensuality generally does not exceed venial sin, especially if it happens in passing, because it does not gravely move to lust; but if it is done for a long time or even to the pollution of the animal, it easily induces danger of one's own pollution.

4. To touch the less honorable parts of a person of the same or different sex, not from venereal affection nor from utility, but from curiosity, sensuality, or sensible love, generally is only venial, especially if it happens in passing, from jest or levity; but if morosely and with grave commotion of the genital organs, especially if it is a question of a person of different sex, it will easily be mortal because of proximate danger of consenting to venereal pleasure.

5. To touch oneself in dishonorable parts for the sake of necessity or utility, for example, to drive away itching, to wipe away filth, or to cure infirmity, is not a sin, provided consent to the venereal pleasure which can arise from it is excluded. To do this without a just cause, from levity or curiosity and without venereal affection, is a venial sin, unless the touches gravely influence vehement carnal motions or bring in proximate danger of consent.

B. As to kisses and embraces.

1. Those done from venereal affection are mortal.

2. Those done on dishonorable or less honorable parts, such as breasts, are easily mortal, because they for the most part excite grave carnal motions and usually indicate venereal affection; unless perhaps they are done in passing and from levity alone.

3. Those done on honorable parts, without reasonable cause, but because of sensible love and from levity, jest, or sensuality, are venial, unless there is proximate danger of consent to venereal pleasure, as easily happens if they are morose, or repeated rather often, or impressed with great affection between persons of different sex, especially the columbine kiss by which the tongue is inserted into the mouth of another.

4. Kisses, embraces, and handlings of hands according to the custom of the country, for the sake of courtesy, friendship, or kinship, are licit, even if accidentally carnal motions are excited, provided danger of consent is absent.

C. As to looks.

These must be carefully distinguished from mere sight, and they move toward lust, though less than touches, and therefore are dangerous:

1. Without necessity, to look morosely and deliberately either at the genitals of the other sex, or even at the breasts of a woman, entirely bare or covered with a transparent veil, or at a man and woman exercising copulation or immodest acts toward one another, or at persons polluting themselves, is easily mortal because it gravely moves to venereal pleasure; unless it happens in passing or very remotely, or only a child is looked at, or the one looking is a cold old man or an infant.

2. Without a just cause, to look at the less honorable parts of a person of different sex, or at the coition of animals, from curiosity or levity and without venereal affection, ordinarily does not exceed venial sin, especially if it happens in passing.

3. Without cause, to look at one's own genitals from curiosity or levity and without venereal affection is venial, especially if it happens in passing; likewise, in this mode, to look at the genitals of a person of the same sex, unless someone is prone to sodomy, or unless a very beautiful adolescent is looked at morosely.

I say 1st. Kisses had for the sake of venereal pleasure, in whatever part of the body they are done, are always a mortal sin, and contract a malice diverse in species according to the various circumstances of the persons. The reason for the first is drawn from prop. 40 condemned by Alexander VII, which has itself thus: "The opinion is probable which says that a kiss had for the sake of carnal and sensible pleasure which arises from the kiss is only venial, with the danger of further consent and of pollution excluded." But the reason for the second is that kisses immediately and directly touch the person to whom they are given, and accordingly are judged to take on the morality of the consummated act to which by their own nature they tend. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 417.

I say 2nd. Actual venereal pleasure being excluded, the sin of kisses will have to be measured from the danger of experiencing that pleasure, and accordingly if the danger is proximate, the sin must again be judged mortal; but if remote, the sin will be either only venial or none. But the danger is always and from its own nature reputed proximate if kisses are done on immodest or base parts, such as the genitals and places near them, and almost always if they are done on less modest but not base parts, as are the arms, breast, and legs. But if kisses are had on modest parts, such as the face and hands, the danger also is judged proximate, at least ordinarily, if they take place often, lingeringly, outside the custom of the country, and between persons of diverse sex. The reason for all these things is evident of itself, and is confirmed from the common consent of theologians, from consideration of human nature, and from experience itself. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 417 and following.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. Ordinarily those kisses which are called columbine are to be reputed mortal, namely by introducing the tongue into the mouth, especially if they are not done from jest or wantonness, but in a more pressing manner and between persons of diverse sex.

2nd. The opinion of Sanchez, the Salmanticenses, and other theologians asserting that modest kisses had between betrothed persons, even if some pleasure is intended which is midway between venereal and natural, and a slight stirring of the genital spirits is present, are not mortal sins, with danger of pollution or consent to copulation excluded, is held as practically improbable by St. Alphonsus. Indeed the holy Doctor holds that the opinion teaching that such acts are prohibited to betrothed persons in the same way in which they are forbidden to unmarried persons is much more probable, even speculatively, and altogether to be followed. The reason is that the betrothed do not yet have mutual right over bodies, nor do they have the right to copulation, to which alone such acts are ordered. But because the first opinion does not seem altogether destitute of reasons and authorities, perhaps it can sometimes be useful to confessors. Cf. St. Alphonsus, de matrim., n. 854. - Baller., note (a), p. 402.

3rd. Kisses which mothers or nurses are accustomed to impress upon infants lack fault. And the same must be said at least ordinarily of others who kiss infants of tender age, even of diverse sex, any wicked affection being excluded.

4th. Young persons of either sex who in some games, decently and without wicked intention, kiss one another, are not at once to be accused of grave sin, although they are to be turned away from games of this kind on account of the danger annexed to them.