Article I. On Immodest Kisses and Touches

413. Things To Be Established. - I. Truly immodest kisses ¹ and touches, that is, those had without cause on the dishonorable parts of another, can scarcely ever be excused from mortal sin, even when venereal affection is removed, because of the grave indecency and the imminent danger of lust which they induce. Yet they are more easily excused from mortal sin if they are done on a person of the same sex than if on a person of a different sex. - St. Lig., n. 419, 420.

¹ In this place the Author denotes kisses which are imprinted on dishonorable parts. But there is this difference between kisses and touches of this sort: that sometimes a just cause can underlie the employment of those touches, for example for healing; but not likewise for kissing.

II. Kisses and touches on honorable or less honorable parts ² constitute mortal sins if they are done from venereal delight; they are venial if they are done from levity, jest, curiosity, etc.; but they lack all fault if they are done according to the custom of the country, for the sake of civility or honorable benevolence ³. The reason of these things is clear per se. - St. Lig., n. 417.

² Carefully note the distinction between the parts of the body which are less honorable and those which are dishonorable. The genital parts and those proximate to them are called dishonorable, or also base or obscene; but the breast, arms, legs, etc., are called less honorable and not base. Thus St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 422). But what the Author says about those things which have venial fault if they are done about less honorable parts from levity, jest, curiosity, etc., can be taken of some touch, but is not truly to be transferred to kisses, as the thing itself speaks per se, which the Author also notes below in the third Resolution.

Likewise, what the Author says lack all fault if they are done according to the custom of the country, or for the sake of civility, etc., must be taken of honorable parts, but must not be extended to less honorable parts.

³ ** [N. B. These things, and the Note which immediately follows, furnished matter for the VV. to write through seventy-six columns (pp. 296-334). All of them present themselves as of altogether the same weight as those which we have already seen them object many times in advance. Rather than subjoin something at the bottom of these Notes, if anything should seem worthy of some response, it has seemed opportune to insert it enclosed in brackets in the course of the Notes. Let the Reader patiently bear that, for this reason, the broken context of the discourse requires a little more labor for retaining the connection of things.]

To this pertains the common opinion of the Doctors that for the sake of civility and benevolence and for showing love, chaste touches are lawful for betrothed persons for the future, for example taking the hand, embraces, and kisses. [After the VV. (p. 297) said that in the Note the state of the question is rather darkened than clarified, they accuse it because it is said that chaste touches are lawful, not only for the sake of civility, but also for the sake of benevolence and for showing love; which (p. 299) they say was subtly added in the Note; and they continue (ibid.): "this opinion, namely that chaste touches are lawful for betrothed persons FOR SHOWING BENEVOLENCE AND LOVE APART FROM THE CUSTOM OF THE COUNTRY, is neither common, nor do the witnesses adduced testify to it." Thus they. - Resp. 1. Let the Reader see with his own eyes in the texts placed below whether the words "for the sake of benevolence" and "for showing love" are a subtle addition of P. B., or are the words of the alleged Authors. - Resp. 2. Let the Reader again see whether that phrase "APART FROM CUSTOM" is found in the words of P. B. And nevertheless against this fantastic shadow, namely that in the Note kisses, touches, etc., apart from the custom of the country, are asserted and defended as licit, the VV. seriously continue to fight also on pp. 300 and 301. - Moreover, by those words of the Doctors, "according to custom," "according to the custom of the country," a twofold sense, each right, can be understood: one, so that the custom of exhibiting those signs of benevolence after betrothals is indicated; the other, so that in the manner of exhibiting those signs the custom of the country is observed; and the words of St. Alphonsus have this sense also, that they are permitted in no other way than they are permitted to unmarried persons, where the usage flourishes.] I said, "common"; for thus Lucius Ferraris (V. Luxuria, n. 90): "All touches, kisses, embraces..., which are done between betrothed persons..., if they are done chastely, from a right end, according to the custom of the country, are licit. COMMON." - Thus also Giribaldi of the Clerics Regular of St. Paul (the Barnabites) (De Matrim., cap. 19, dub. 15, n. 114): "You will ask, 5. whether kisses, touches, and embraces are lawful for betrothed persons for the future? The COMMON opinion denies that dishonorable touches on immodest and hidden parts are lawful.... But it concedes that otherwise honorable touches, embraces, kisses..., are lawful; and these indeed will be venial sin if they are done only for delight to be captured; and without any fault if they are done as a sign of love and benevolence according to the accustomed manner." - Nor otherwise Reiffenstuel (Th. mor., tr. IX, dist. 4, q. 7, n. 77): "But whether touches and kisses are lawful between betrothed persons for the future is another difficulty. And indeed the Doctors everywhere confess that immodest touches between betrothed persons are not excused from mortal sin.... But if kisses and embraces are not of themselves immodest, and at the same time are done... with a view to honorable love and benevolence, they are free from fault." [Reiffenstuel, say the VV. (p. 299), alleges Navarrus; but he recommends that mothers not allow daughters to be alone and in secret with betrothed persons. - Resp. They themselves could have seen that this also is recommended below in this Note. - The VV. add (p. 300) that in the newest edition of Reiffenstuel's Theology Flavianus Ricci adds the opinion of Pontas, that the opinion condemning kisses, etc., in betrothed persons as grave sin is to be preferred, because this opinion is safe. - Resp. Let Pontas have for himself the theory of condemning something as grave fault because this is safe. St. Antoninus, to whom St. Alphonsus subscribes, says this is the same as building for Gehenna.] - And the Salamancans (De Matrim., cap. 15, n. 91): "The last difficulty is whether kisses, embraces, touches... are licit between betrothed persons for the future? It is answered that if such acts are done for capturing pleasure, they will be venial sins.... If as a sign of love, there will be no sin." [Here the VV. object (p. 299) that the Salamancans retracted these things (tract. 26, c. 3, n. 56-61). - Resp. Yet this difference intervenes between each place: that in the former, reported here, the Salamancans follow the common opinion and confirm it by authorities which have some worth; but in the latter they fortify a new opinion (l. c., n. 60) with a heap of false allegations, so that they do not hesitate to allege for it Busembaum and Cajetan, whom, forgetful of themselves, they had alleged (ibid., n. 56) also for the opposite, and whom the VV. themselves (p. 304) traduce as if excusing venereal delights! And indeed even in this place the Salamancans merely conclude that this newest opinion seems to them more probable in practice! If any seize suffrages of this sort, we willingly leave them to them.]

And that St. Alphonsus did not reject this doctrine is clear from this, that after these things were reported from Busembaum (lib. 6, n. 854): "Touches that are immodest are not lawful for betrothed persons, although embraces and kisses as a sign of love may be lawful," he finds nothing to reprehend. [Here the VV. subjoin (p. 301): "The illustrious Professor" (that is, P. Ballerini) "seems here to have labored either from a hallucination of the eyes or from distraction of mind." - Resp. Behold the words of St. Alphonsus (lib. 6, n. 584), which the VV. themselves also transcribe (p. 297): "Croix and Viva, with other authors adduced by them, concede that kisses and embraces according to the custom of the country can sometimes be permitted to betrothed persons, but in no other way than they are permitted to unmarried persons. And THIS IS PROBABLE, provided such acts are not pressed and prolonged for some time, as Roncaglia well warns, who also admits them FOR A DEMONSTRATION OF BENEVOLENCE; but I would not admit them except where such a usage flourished, as Mazzotta also says." Does St. Alphonsus differ even a little from the opinion of the Authors who are reported above in the Note? Does he not concede that, where this usage flourishes, kisses and embraces are lawful even for a demonstration of benevolence, which nevertheless the VV. just before were traducing as a subtle addition of P. B.?]

This one thing can move some, that acts of this sort contribute to stirring up carnal and wicked motions. But here the general rule must be valid which we touched on above (note to n. 412), namely that then only are these motions culpable when either the cause is evil, or there is danger of consenting. Therefore it pertains to the Confessor in the case to inspect, not indeed whether the cause is guilty, for since it is just, by that very fact it is honorable, but whether there is danger of consent into evil, and according to his prudence to furnish remedies to the penitent. In this matter he must indeed take care that the desire of removing one from danger of sin does not drive him so far that he condemns those things as sin, especially grave sin, which according to the common opinion of the Doctors have either no guilt or only light guilt. For zeal of this sort, not indeed according to knowledge, must finally obtain this one effect: that perhaps it may deter very few from those acts, but in reality drive very many, through a false conscience thrown in, into the snares of sin; whence it will easily happen besides that, once the fear of God has been trampled because of the imprudence of the Confessor, and the horror of sin lost, they may then slip into true and graver basenesses.

The very same thing also must be observed concerning looks and conversations between betrothed persons, when from these also those motions, and sometimes even to pollution, follow. For there is a just cause why a betrothed man should visit his betrothed, and have conversations with her. Therefore the whole question will turn on that danger of consenting about which it was said above in the note to n. 412.

In this matter a difficulty not light will indeed seem to offer itself, when from the frequency of falls the danger of consenting appears to be of such a kind that it ought to be considered as a proximate occasion of sinning. Nevertheless here in reality there is no greater difficulty than if there is question of a necessary proximate occasion: necessary, I say; for, considering all the adjuncts, the Confessor would require something morally impossible if he wished to keep a betrothed man from approaching and speaking with his betrothed, or (as after Sanchez, De Matrim., lib. 9, disp. 46, n. 48-50, and many others alleged by the same, Diana notes, tom. 1, tr. 4, res. 37; and tom. 2, tr. 6, res. 37) from exhibiting the customary signs of benevolence. Therefore he must use other means for removing the danger. If the penitent does not refuse these, what Giribaldi has according to the commonly received principles will be valid (De Poenit., cap. 10, dub. 3, n. 31). To the question, Whether a betrothed man can be absolved who frequently visits his betrothed, on which occasion he sins, he responds that he can be absolved when the visits are according to the custom of the country, from which he cannot abstain without mark and disgrace, because the betrothed woman would think herself despised because he did not visit her as other betrothed men do; and the same is valid concerning a betrothed woman who from speech and the sight of the betrothed man suffers distillation and pollution; for she is not bound to flee the sight of the betrothed man if otherwise she does not have a just cause and excuse, since the sight and words are honorable and according to the custom of the country, and cannot be avoided without mark and disgrace. But the Confessor will suggest means not only general but special to the matter; and according to his prudence it is necessary that he deter, as he can, from exhibiting those signs of benevolence by which the tinder of concupiscence can more easily be stirred up, or at least propose that manner and frequency which does not exceed necessity. But the manner and measure which can easily be understood by all is this: that no more be provided than what can be provided in this matter before others, for example parents, without offense to anyone. Then especially it must be required that one never remain alone with one alone, especially in a secret place. And this indeed pertains most especially also to those who have care of them. Therefore with parents, and especially with mothers, one must deal most severely, and the grave obligation of this watchful custody and caution must be urged; to which they ought to be impelled not only by conscience, but also by fear lest daughters, once corrupted, grow old dishonored in the paternal home.

But if the remedies proposed by the Confessor do not obtain the desired fruit, this one thing remains, that these persons be dealt with no otherwise than it is handed down in the Treatise on Penance that one must deal with relapsing persons.

414. • III. Touches and kisses even on honorable parts will sometimes not be free from grave fault, especially if they are exercised more often or lingeringly by young persons of a different sex without any necessity or other just cause, although on account of merely organic pleasure. The reason is that from acts of this sort, repeated or lingering, carnal commotion and venereal delight will rarely be absent. - St. Lig., n. 416 ⁴.

⁴ ** By "organic pleasure" here the Author calls that which above (note to n. 411) we called purely sensible; where we also suggested that in practice, if there is question of adults who aptly seek it, it scarcely has place precisely as such.

But that the Author seems to except from the rule which he hands down the case of necessity or of a just cause, this must not be extended to more lingering and more pressed kisses, from which even betrothed persons themselves are to be deterred, since scarcely any just cause can be thought up as regards those. (The VV. (p. 304), at these words of the Note: "this is not to be extended to more lingering and more pressed kisses," argue thus: P. B. says that betrothed persons are to be deterred from more lingering and more pressed kisses; therefore not altogether from simply lingering and pressed ones. - Resp. I deny the consequence. It is well known that among the Latins the comparative form, where a term of comparison is lacking, sometimes signifies less than the positive form; it is, namely, an elliptical locution, and there is understood "than is fitting," or "than the thing, or person, or time, or other circumstance bears or requires," etc.)

Yet the Doctors have moved another question concerning betrothed persons, namely whether some delight is lawful for them which they voluntarily take from kisses or embraces or chaste touches. I said, 1. "some delight"; for here venereal delight properly so called and proper to the genital parts is altogether excluded. I said, 2. "which they voluntarily take"; for concerning one arisen besides the intention and admitted by no consent, there is no controversy, even if it were venereal.

St. Alphonsus also treats the question thus proposed (lib. 6, n. 854), yet in such a way (for it will be useful to have touched this one thing concerning this matter in a merely historical way) that from the things disputed there it can scarcely be understood in what place the matter truly stands. And indeed for the opinion which holds that this delight is either licit for betrothed persons or not more than lightly evil (which nevertheless he does not seem to set forth accurately enough), he himself brings forward only five authors, namely Sanchez, the Salamancans, Aversa, Diana, and Azor. [The VV. complain (p. 305) that here it is said that with St. Alphonsus it can scarcely be understood in what place the matter stands. - Resp. 1. St. Alphonsus (lib. 6, n. 854) poses the question thus: "It is asked whether between betrothed persons chaste kisses and touches are mortal sins, if they are done for capturing pleasure"; but it is passed over in silence of what pleasure there is question; 2. For those standing for the first opinion St. Alphonsus alleges only five, while very many others stand for it, indicated here, to whom also three others are added by Diana (l. c. below, res. 38). But when the question is proposed thus, it is certainly not easy to understand in what place the matter stands. Therefore. - The VV. subsume (l. c.) that, if the thirteen Authors whom the holy Doctor alleges for his opinion (l. c.) are counted, and to these are added seven others with Sanchez, fifteen others with Diana, and sixteen others with the Salamancans, now a number rises up which equals the sum of those cited in this Note. - Resp. 1. The seven with Sanchez were transcribed by the Salamancans; therefore lest they be counted twice, they must be taken away. 2. The fifteen with Diana are against the opinion of St. Alphonsus, not for it; nevertheless four are alleged also for it (l. c. below, n. 1); but since these are found repeated by the Salamancans, they cannot be counted. 3. We have already said that the allegations of the Salamancans are false, and we see some of these also with St. Alphonsus. Of what strength the allegations reported with St. Alphonsus are is shown in the following things. Therefore.] But Sanchez (De Matr., lib. 9, disp. 46, n. 48) had alleged for the same opinion seventeen others; but Diana (tom. 2, tract. 6, res. 36, n. 2, 3) had added nine others to these, so that now we have thirty-one, among whom you may see the names of Soto, Cajetan, Toletus, Navarrus, Valencia, Sayrus, Reginaldus, etc.; and to these could be joined Laymann (lib. 3, sect. 4, n. 11), Palaus (De Sponsalibus, disp. 3, punct. 4, §2, n. 7), Sporer (Theol. Sacram., p. 4, c. 2, sect. 4, n. 430), Escobar (lib. 26, sect. 2, dub. 26), Filliuccius (tr. 10, part 1, cap. IX, n. 357), Tamburini (In Decal., lib. 7, cap. 3, §5, n. 61), Joann. Henriquez (in Mendo, disp. 5, q. 12, n. 4), and Giribaldi, who (De Matrim., cap. 19, dub. 15, n. 114) asserts that it is the common doctrine.

But for the opinion which contends that this delight is gravely illicit for betrothed persons, you will see alleged with the same St. Alphonsus (l. c.) Lessius, Mazzotta, Roncaglia, Concina, Bonacina with Henriquez and Rebellus, Croix with Mendo, and Viva with Suarez, Perez, and Hurtado; which allegations indeed seem to have been gathered almost from Croix, Mazzotta, and Viva. But, 1. Lessius (De Iust. et Iur., lib. 4, cap. 3, n. 59) indeed condemns these acts as grave fault in persons altogether unmarried; but (ibid., n. 58) he had handed down the opposite concerning betrothed persons thus: "To betrothed persons for the future that pleasure is conceded which is perceived precisely from a kiss and from contact of the hand or face, so that they do not sin in it even venially." [The VV. object (p. 313) that these words of Lessius are an argument which adversaries use, and whose opinion Lessius reprobates. - Resp. I concede the antecedent, and deny the consequence. Namely, those are the adversaries who treat not of betrothed persons, but of unmarried persons. Now Lessius reprobates their opinion, but does not deny the antecedent of the argument. And in reality the VV. themselves (l. c.) write: "Lessius concedes that kisses are lawful for betrothed persons by reason of the marriage begun, even on account of the delight which arises precisely from them." - The VV. subsume (ibid.) that Lessius concedes this speaking speculatively, but practically does not judge this opinion probable; and they subjoin these words of Lessius: "Therefore I would not call that opinion probable." - Resp. Those words of Lessius regard the opinion of the adversaries concerning unmarried persons, nor is it easy to understand how the VV. traduce Lessius, a classic author, as contradicting himself in the same place. Those things pertain to betrothed persons by which, at the end of the same n. 59, Lessius responds to the argument which the adversaries took from kisses licit as regards betrothed persons: "It is conceded to betrothed persons because it is a sign of future copula, to which by reason of the marriage begun they can consent." Hence it is clear that Lessius plainly concedes that antecedent of the adversaries.]

2. Say the same thing of Perez, who, while (De Matrim., disp. 8, sect. 6, n. 7) he condemns as grave libidinous delight, which is a certain beginning of copula, nevertheless concedes as licit for betrothed persons the delight perceived from kisses (ibid., n. 4). [The VV. contend (p. 314) that Perez teaches that nothing is lawful for betrothed persons except that which would be lawful for others not married. - Resp. I deny altogether. Behold the words of Perez (l. c.) which the VV. also report: "I say first, it is certain among all Doctors that the aforesaid kisses, embraces, and touches not immodest are lawfully done between betrothed persons for the future, when they are done as a sign of benevolence according to the custom of the country, for reconciling and fostering mutual love in order to contracting marriage.... Hence with the aforesaid Doctors I gather that the delight following from them is licit and honorable." Indeed (which the VV. omit) Perez (ibid., n. 5) adds: "Add that the aforesaid kisses, embraces, and touches are also licit on account of the aforesaid end, even if danger of pollution is present, provided danger of consent into sensual and venereal delight is not present." But the objection premised by the VV. distorts Perez into a sense not his own. Perez (n. 8) responds to those objecting that betrothals give no right to those things which are opposed to chastity. But he responds by conceding this freely. And when (n. 7) he had premised that sin is committed through kisses and touches even not immodest, if they are done for the sake of libidinous delight, he infers (n. 8) that betrothals do not excuse in betrothed persons for the future from mortal or venial fault kisses, embraces, and touches even not immodest, which in them, if they were unmarried, would truly be mortal or venial, that is, which would be done for the sake of sensual and libidinous delight.]

3. Bonacina (De Matr., q. 4, punct. 9, n. 6) and Mazzotta (tr. VII, disp. II, q. 2, cap. 2, q. 1) say each opinion is probable. [The VV. object (p. 315) that Bonacina said the opposite opinion was safer and more probable. - Resp. That he concedes the other to be probable is sufficient for a judgment about the liceity of the act. But that he says the opposite is more probable is not sufficient for injecting into the faithful a conscience of grave sin. These things follow from common principles approved and inculcated by St. Alphonsus. As regards Mazzotta, the VV. object that he said the opposite was far more probable. - Resp. Mazzotta said that of carnal and (as he then explains) venereal delight, I concede, and he spoke very benignly thus concerning that; that he said it of the delight about which there is now question, I deny. Behold the words of Mazzotta (l. c.), which the VV. too much truncate here and there: "I respond with Perez and others that then they are lawful, when they are done as a sign of benevolence according to the custom of the country, for reconciling and fostering mutual love in order to contracting marriage; because thus not only does baseness not appear, but indeed an honorable end is present. Which is true, says Perez, even if in the case, besides the intention, commotion of the spirits or even pollution follows, provided danger of consent into that is not present. But if they are done on account of carnal delight... which sounds like venereal delight..., far more probably they contradict," etc.]

4. Suarez (De Pecc., disp. 5, sect. 7, n. 12) and Henr. Henriquez (lib. XI, cap. 19, n. 4) have altogether nothing which makes to the matter. [The VV. confess (pp. 315-316) that Suarez has nothing about betrothed persons. But it could better have been noted that that allegation of Suarez regards another Suarez, of whom mention is made in Diana (tom. 2, tr. 6, reg. 38, n. 1), and about him nothing is to be cared for. But as regards Henriquez, he merely says (l. c.) that honorable embraces and kisses for benevolence were conceded by learned men; but they ought not to be permitted, since now betrothals do not pass over into marriage by copula with marital affection. I ask: why does he not say "ought," but "would ought"? The reason is rendered there in the note thus: "for danger of copula is present, while without arbiters they touch one another immodestly." Therefore he says this merely for forestalling dangers; which is consonant with that paragraph, where he treats of the office of the mother in the custody of daughters. But those whom he alleges in the Note, Cajetan, Navarrus, Angelus, and Silvester, are known not to forbid these signs of benevolence to betrothed persons, although Silvester (V. Matrim., 5, §8) distinguishes a twofold genus of kisses: one, which would irreprehensibly be done only with wives and betrothed persons for the present, and which would suffice so that betrothals pass over into marriage; the other, which are customarily exhibited even to betrothed persons for the future in some places, etc. From these allegations it is permissible to judge the opinion of the VV., where they say (p. 305) that up to the sixteenth century no one is found who conceded this to betrothed persons.]

5. Rebellus (De oblig. Iust., part 2, lib. 3, q. XIX, sect. 2) and Gaspar Hurtado (De Matr., disp. 10, diffic. 10, n. 48) discuss, the one indeed libidinous delight, or kisses through which venereal pleasure is begun; the other, libidinous touches and the delight perceived therefrom; which likewise are not to the matter. [The VV. concede (p. 316) that Rebellus and Hurtado treat of libidinous or venereal delight; but they deny that they are alleged beside the matter, because some Authors in reality do not condemn at least as mortal some such delight. - Resp. Whether some author has excused at least from mortal sin venereal delight is of no interest now. It is of interest in this way: that St. Alphonsus alleges the authors of the second opinion as contradicting the authors of the first. But none of the five whom he brings forward for the first opinion speaks of venereal delight; therefore Rebellus and Hurtado, who attack merely venereal delight, are alleged against them beside the matter.]

6. Croix (lib. 6, p. 3, n. 151) merely opposes to the common opinion the false allegations of Lessius, Suarez, Henriquez, and Hurtado, to which he adds Comitolus; but also this one wrongly, because Paulus Comitolus, although a man of anomalous talent and of zeal inclined to stricter things, nevertheless did not depart from the common opinion in this matter, as is clear from these things (Resp. mor., lib. 4, q. 20, n. 4): "Wherefore girls and virgins who, either from kisses and embraces of chaste young men whom they love, take honorable pleasure, whether when they think of those touches or also admit them bodily; either do not sin, or sin lightly, as Sylvester says, V. Delectatio, n. 7. Rosella, V. Cogitatio morosa, n. 4, affirms that they do not sin mortally. It must be said otherwise if they drew in obscene pleasure in mind or base pleasure in body." [The VV. note (p. 317) that, even if the force of the allegations which Croix puts forth wavers, nevertheless the suffrage of Croix himself is present. - Resp. A suffrage of this sort has as much force as the consequence which is drawn from false premises, that is, none. But the reason brought by Croix (lib. 3, p. 1, n. 894), namely that this sensible delight, especially if it is sought, could be followed by venereal delight; and if perhaps venereal delight should approach, danger could be present of consenting to it - this reason, I say, proves too much, nor does Logic consent that from a probable particular case an argument be taken for asserting grave sin for any cases whatsoever. - Concerning Comitolus the VV. (pp. 318-319) dispute through three columns, and ask whether he could rightly allege Paludanus and the Summas of Silvester and Rosella. - Resp. Those things make nothing to the matter. This is the question: whether Croix rightly and justly alleged Comitolus against those twenty authors who (as he himself says, lib. 3, p. 1, n. 894) say that delight only sensible, which arises in kisses or touches, is not mortal. Let anyone who shall have read with his own eyes the premised words of Comitolus judge.]

7. Finally Viva (De Matr., q. 1, art. 7, n. 6), although he seems to fight against the common opinion of Sanchez, nevertheless speaks ambiguously of delight, now sensible, now carnal; and he entangles the matter more when in this place he says that he follows the more common doctrine against Sanchez, while elsewhere (on proposition 40 condemned by Alexander VII, n. 23) he attributes the opinion of Sanchez to very many; which two things would plainly be contradictory. [The VV. contend through three columns (pp. 319-320) that Viva is altogether to be exempted from every note both of confusion and contradiction. Resp. Viva (l. c.) attacks not only Sanchez, Cajetan, and Navarrus, as the VV. feign, but also Toletus, Fagundez, Bonacina, Salas, Valencia, and others with Diana; namely he attacks those fifteen whom the VV., as we have seen, wished to cite for the opinion of St. Alphonsus! But Viva attacks these because they excuse betrothed persons from mortal sin even if they intend sensitive and carnal delight. Now let us ask: of what sort is the delight which Viva reproves? For if it is merely sensitive or sensible, such as Sanchez asserts (lib. 9, disp. 46, n. 49), calling it "sensitive delight which arises from kisses," how does he subjoin that it is more commonly condemned as mortal sin? How does he object against those authors Rebellus and Hurtado, who fight only, as we have seen, against venereal delight? Indeed, how with these does he oppose Perez also, who, as we saw above, admits this sensible delight as licit? But if Viva wishes to fight against venereal delight, how does he attribute this opinion to those fifteen Writers with Diana, who follows them? How does he attribute it to those very many whose cause (on prop. 40 of Alex. VII, n. 23) he makes common with Sanchez? I ask: is this the most suitable way of treating questions clearly, distinctly, and coherently?]

Therefore, from those alleged, there will remain Mendo, Concina, and Roncaglia, of whom the last (tract. XII, cap. 1, q. 6) says that he marvels that some admit kisses as licit between betrothed persons, and that he never sufficiently perceived how it can be said that betrothals bestow on betrothed persons a right to mutual kisses. To these things others perhaps would reply that the reason which did not shine before Roncaglia's eyes nevertheless did shine commonly before the understanding of the other Doctors whom we have suggested; for no other sufficient cause of so common an opinion can be assigned except some reason sufficiently considerable, which compels very diverse talents into one opinion. The same must be replied to Mendo, who (Statera Opin., diss. V, q. 12, n. 118) feared to follow the doctrine of so many and so grave Authors, as he says, because he did not see through the foundation of the same.

[The VV. note (p. 323) that the testimony of Concina is left untouched in the Note. - Resp. Do they not themselves (p. 324) expressly confess that Concina is called most rigid by the holy Doctor Alphonsus? Now the suffrage of a rigid author indeed is worth more than moderately when he absolves; not likewise when he condemns. Therefore in the case let them have him for themselves. - The VV. reply (p. 324): St. Alphonsus reproves very many opinions of Concina because they are more rigid than is just, or most rigid; but in this question... he does not think him rigid. - Resp. If it is so, then the force of the suffrage is not taken from Concina's authority, but from St. Alphonsus's. Now a suffrage which has no force except from the authority of the same person alleging the suffrage can be omitted without damage to the cause, since it contributes no help to the cause by itself. - The VV. add (pp. 321-323) that Roncaglia and Mendo do not stop in mere admiration, but overthrow the adverse opinion with very grave (!) arguments. - Resp. The reasons brought by Mendo are so valid that they condemn even that which St. Alphonsus approves as licit (see preceding note) in that general thesis of Sanchez (l. c., n. 47): "Kisses and embraces and other touches not immodest are excused from mortal fault between betrothed persons for the future." Nor truly is this strange; for Mendo is from those whose name scarcely appears elsewhere among allegations, except where some anomalous opinion is produced. - But as regards Roncaglia, it must be noted first that the question is restricted by him not only to kisses pressed and prolonged for some time, but moreover to those done for capturing sensible delight. Now Logic does not permit that from this a conclusion be drawn concerning all kisses, with St. Alphonsus's distinction set aside between one acting on account of delight and one acting with delight. But the argument already produced by Rebellus, and then repeated by the rest also wholly beside the matter, namely that betrothals do not give a right over the body of the other, with examples then added for illustrating the matter both of one buying a vineyard, who does not yet have a right in the thing, and of a man destined for the office of judge, which nevertheless he has not yet received - this argument, I say, is nothing but a pure sophism. And indeed do we assign a right over the body of another when we say that friendship gives a right of embracing or kissing a friend, or that the same right is present in parents toward children, etc.? It is indicated, namely, that the condition of friend to friend, of parents to children, etc., and also of betrothed persons mutually, is such that demonstrations of affection and benevolence of this kind cannot be condemned as incongruous to their state. Indeed, since that love is legitimate and honorable to such a degree that St. Thomas (see above, note to q. 7, n. 32) holds that a woman fittingly adorns herself to please the man whom she ought to receive as an act of virtue and meritorious of eternal life, it is likewise honorable to foster that love by signs of this sort.]

But another sophism must not be omitted here, against which some do not take enough caution in treating this question. Namely, they so distinguish merely sensible delight, which for example is drawn from touching silken cloth, from venereal delight, that if indeed the delight perceived from an embrace is not that merely sensible delight, it must already be held as venereal and gravely damnable, just as if there were question of brute animals. But in a rational man another element must not be neglected, whence there is delight which can neither be called back to that merely sensible delight, nor again be condemned as venereal. And in truth, does the delight which a mother experiences in the embrace of a son returned from war have anything in common with the touch of a flower? This delight indeed so inheres in an embrace of this sort that she kisses the son a hundred times, nor for a long time allows him to be torn away from her arms. Therefore, if that delight is not sensible, will it be venereal? Namely, a pleasure and delight of its own and of an altogether diverse character is present when an ardent affection of the heart pours itself out through signs or demonstrations of this sort, and seems to satisfy itself and as it were rest in them. But as often as this affection is legitimate and honorable, and in pouring itself out keeps the limits of honesty and decency, what is there in which it may be condemned, or to what purpose is that theory concerning merely sensible delight and delight proper to the touch of silken cloth summoned hither? But from this it is understood why Authors, for rendering honorable embraces and kisses of this sort, bring forward the demonstration of love and benevolence, and the fostering of the same, as an end in some way intrinsic to the work; but add the question concerning delight, which either accompanies the act or perhaps even is intended, as it were concerning a thing which accrues to the act per accidens. And indeed perhaps someone would have thought not altogether absurdly that the graver Authors, when they here name sensible or sensitive delight, by no means wished to indicate merely the sense arising from the touch of a smooth thing. For there is another affection of the sensitive appetite, and that now pleasant, now unpleasant, which almost accompanies the affection of the rational appetite from which it arises, and has joined to it also some bodily change, and especially a change of the motions of the heart, now pleasant, now unpleasant; whence commonly the heart is said to be dilated or pressed. Yet this affection and bodily change of itself has nothing common with venereal delight, to such a degree that indeed it accompanies even the most pious affections toward God; and on that account we are warned not to cling too much to this sensible delight among spiritual exercises. Now by what more apt name than that of sensitive delight would Authors designate this sensitive affection, which arises spontaneously and accompanies those acts by which, in the case, it is brought forth and is shown by some effect? And from here indeed the sense of certain locutions can be drawn out, which the VV. try wholly to drag over to signifying venereal delight; whence they accuse both Navarrus and Cajetan and also Sanchez, as if they had asserted that venereal delight is licit for betrothed persons, or at least not gravely culpable in the case. But even in these matters they have against them the rigid Mendo, whose words they themselves report (p. 322). The VV. take the occasion of accusing Navarrus from those words of Navarrus (Man., c. 16, n. 12): "For betrothals, which are the beginning of marriage, make a faculty of enjoying pleasure preambulatory to matrimonial pleasure, which is the singular determination of the same Cajetan on 2. 2, q. 154, art. 4." But these words rather persuade the opposite. For if according to Navarrus the pleasure conceded to betrothed persons is related to matrimonial pleasure as betrothals are related to marriage, it must be concluded that that preambulatory pleasure is nothing other than a certain disposition prior to another. Wherefore, just as betrothals are a disposition to marriage in such a way that nevertheless they participate nothing of the nature of marriage, so also that preambulatory pleasure must be understood as wholly without the nature of that pleasure which is exclusively marital. And from here it is given to know better what those locutions of Cajetan alleged by Navarrus mean, where (l. c.) he writes: "But it seems that just as betrothal is a certain beginning of marriage, so also an act of this sort" (namely a kiss) "is a certain beginning of carnal copula"; or (as he has in the Summa, V. Sponsalitia): "Just as a betrothed woman belongs to the betrothed man inchoatively, so the venereal delight of carnal joining between them is permitted inchoatively between the same; but it is clear that kisses... import only the beginning of venereal delight." Now the same argument as above returns. For the delight of kissing is the beginning of venereal delight just as betrothal is the beginning of marriage. But betrothal is a mere prior disposition to marriage. Filliuccius (tr. 10, c. 9, n. 357), aptly rendering the sense of these Authors, has it thus: "If they are not immodest, that is, if they are on honorable parts, as kisses, embraces, touches of hands, and the like, they are lawful, even if they" (the betrothed) "intend to capture from them sensitive delight, but not venereal. The reason is that, as marriage in the present renders copula honorable, so betrothals, which are a certain remote beginning of marriage, render honorable those touches which are a remote beginning toward copula. Cajet., Navarr., Lopez, and others with Sanchez." From these things it appears that they are indeed called a beginning, yet in such a way that venereal delight itself is excluded.]

This also must not be omitted here, that St. Alphonsus in this question in no way objected proposition XL from those proscribed by Alexander VII, which sounds thus: "The opinion is probable which says that a kiss had on account of carnal and sensible delight which arises from the kiss, with danger of further consent and pollution removed, is only venial." But it seems this must be repeated from a twofold cause. For first indeed that proposition speaks of carnal or venereal delight, of which there is no question (see Duarte on this proposition, n. 489, and Viva on the same prop., n. 3); hence St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 415) uses that proposition to prove that smallness of matter is not given in a venereal thing. But then (even abstracting from the species of delight), this proposition admits exceptions, as is clear from married persons. But exceptions are not to be sought from the proposition itself, since it presents none, but from the sense of the Catholic schools. But the Catholic schools did not even suspect that the question concerning betrothed persons about which we are treating was contained in that proposition.

And these things indeed, as was premised, have been said merely historically. To these it will be useful to have added only this, that in questions of this sort the distinction which St. Alphonsus also elsewhere (lib. 3, n. 416) uses is very useful, namely that it is one thing to act on account of delight, another to act with delight. For, as we warned above (note to n. 411), the former manner of acting will most easily lead on to further things.

Here the VV. ask (p. 331): What do those words mean: "And these things indeed have been said merely historically"? Resp. They signify that the things which have been said hold the place of premises, from which others can elicit a suitable conclusion. The VV. themselves sometimes close their discourse with those words: "Let the Reader judge."

Indeed it is useful here also, merely historically, to subjoin in what way the VV. themselves gathered other Authors for the thesis of St. Alphonsus (pp. 324-330).

1. They allege Potestas thus (p. 327): "Kisses and embraces on account of natural and sensible delight... are mortal sins for betrothed persons for the future" (tom. 1, n. 2237); but they omit this explanation of the same Potestas (ibid., n. 2203): "Natural sensible delight is formally and intrinsically venereal."

2. They bring forward these things from Antoine (De Pecc., c. 7, q. 13): "Since betrothals are only a promise of future marriage, not a handing over of bodies, they bestow no present right over the body of the other in order to copula to be exercised here and now, nor therefore to acts which are ordered to it." But they omit what acts those are concerning which Antoine treats; but he expresses them thus in the thesis itself: "Every venereal delight, look, and base touch or touch of the pudenda, and any act of lust, are mortal."

3. They report these words from Candidus (disp. 11, art. 1, dub. 5): "Yet it seems to me truer and more probable that kisses and touches of this sort between betrothed persons for the future, if the end is only SENSUAL delight, are not licit, but mortal." But they omit to note that these things are not opposed to the preceding thesis of the same Candidus, where he treats not of sensual but of only sensitive delight, between which words nevertheless even Potestas (l. c.) notes that there is much difference. I said, the thesis of Candidus; for thus he begins: "I say seventh," etc.; therefore the VV. do not well feign that there the opinion of others is reported. But the thesis has itself thus: "If the end of these kisses," etc., "between betrothed persons for the future is delight only sensitive, they will be venial fault, because as such" (namely on account of defect of a right end) "even between spouses they are of similar fault."

4. The VV. bring forward these words of Cardenas (tr. 5, disp. 45, n. 205): "And thus I deny that opinion to be probable intrinsically, and after the condemnation of Alex. VII I think it is not even probable extrinsically." But the VV. wish these things to contain a response to those objecting: "Between betrothed persons for the future kisses and the delight arising precisely from them are not illicit mortally." But they omit those things which make clear that that response regards only venereal delight. For Cardenas premises these things in the same n. 205: "I respond secondly and chiefly, according to my opinion, ... that chaste embraces and kisses are licit for betrothed persons for the future, but not libidinous embraces and kisses; that embraces and kisses are licit, provided they resist the venereal delight and commotion arising from them. For... it is not lawful for them to provide consent to venereal delight, which is ordered to copula, not yet licit for them."

5. The VV. allege Mastrius; who nevertheless merely reports diverse opinions; but the suffrage for the cause of the VV. is worth as much as it is worth with Mastrius to have opposed the three false allegations of Lessius, Rebellus, and Henriquez to more, as Mastrius himself confesses, Doctors.

6. They allege Joannes Conradus, Ant. Fernandez de Moure, and Babenstuber. But in the texts which the VV. themselves allege, you discern that those authors are disputing there about venereal, carnal, libidinous delight. And from these indeed let the Reader judge also concerning some other allegations of the same weight.

IV. Kisses, touches, and embraces exercised on account of venereal delight contract malice diverse in species according to the various circumstances of the persons; for they are judged to be of the same nature as the consummated act toward which by their nature they tend. Hence in confession it must be explained whether they were had with the same or a different sex, with a married person, etc. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig., n. 417. - Lessius, etc.

415. Resolves. - 1. Kisses which mothers or nurses are accustomed to imprint on infants are free from fault. Say the same, at least ordinarily, of others who kiss infants of tender age, even of a different sex, with every wicked affection removed.

2. Young persons of either sex who in some games decently and without wicked intention embrace one another are not immediately to be accused of sin, and much less of grave sin, although they are to be turned away from games of this sort because of the danger joined to them.

3. But kisses impressed on less customary parts of the body, especially between persons of a different sex, for example on the breast, etc., or also if they are done lingeringly, especially with the tongue introduced into the mouth, likewise if they are long-lasting, repeated, etc., almost must be held as mortal. - St. Lig., n. 417.

416. • 4. They do not sin per se who touch themselves for wiping away bodily filth, or for calming itching, or for curing infirmities; yet if the itching is tolerable, it must be suggested that, insofar as they can without grave trouble, they abstain from touches. It is necessary, however, that the Confessor use great discretion in these things. For doubts of this sort are accustomed to vex especially persons of timorous conscience. But persuasions, if they are a little more vehement and are not seasoned with an open declaration about the otherwise absence of any guilt, will often and easily entangle consciences in most troublesome scruples. - St. Lig., Hom. apost., n. 3. - But if touches of one's own body are done without cause, they do not exceed venial sin when, venereal affection being removed, they are had only in passing, and from mere levity or curiosity, because they are not very much incentives of lust. - St. Lig., n. 419.

5. Touches on the private parts of the same sex or on neighboring parts, even over clothes, ordinarily are not excused from grave sin, unless perhaps they are done from petulance, jest, levity, and in passing. - St. Lig., n. 420.

6. A fortiori, with the case of necessity excluded, touches on the private parts of a different sex, even had for a brief time, cannot be excused from mortal sin; since they can scarcely proceed from any cause other than lust, and, besides that they are most indecent, they create per se a proximate danger of pollution or venereal delight. - St. Lig., n. 420. Yet probably maids are not to be accused of grave sin who perhaps touch the pudenda of infants while they clothe them, unless they do this with delay or carnal delight. - Lacroix, n. 902. - St. Lig., ibid.

7. It does not exceed venial sin, speaking per se, lightly and without delay to touch the fingers, hands, face of a person of a different sex, a wicked end being removed, and every affection and danger of lust, if these things are done, for example, from mere levity, and do not have a special danger joined by reason of one's own fragility or that of another.

Moreover, since in so slippery a matter it is not always easily clear what is venial or mortal, and on the other hand since not rarely there is present a proximate danger of gravely offending even in those things which per se do not exceed light sin, for example if they are done often and with delay between persons inclined to lusts, the Confessor must take the greatest pains to remove penitents, especially younger ones, from any touches with a different sex.