Laxism

232*. Lax probabilism or laxism teaches: it is lawful to follow the opinion for liberty, even if it is only doubtfully or tenuously probable.

1. No one has taught lax probabilism in these terms or as a principle and moral system: for those who affirm that even slight probability suffices say that it is nevertheless one which merits prudent assent. Nevertheless there are authors who are called laxists, such as Sancius (John Sanchez), Leander, Diana, Bauny, Moya, and especially Caramuel, whom St. Alphonsus calls the prince of laxists.

2. Therefore they are called laxists not because they defend a system too benign, but a. some because they exhibit the principle of probabilism in such a way that it can be taken in the more benign part: for they say that it is lawful to follow the less probable, without excluding the doubtfully or tenuously probable; b. others because they do not restrict the principle of probabilism sufficiently to its proper matter, but extend it also to other matters in which it cannot licitly be employed; c. finally, others because in reality in particular questions they admit opinions as licit which, as being only doubtfully or tenuously probable, are too benign.

3. Refutation. a. The principle of laxism has been condemned by the Church in proposition 3 of Innocent XI: "Generally, while trusting in probability whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however tenuous, provided one does not go beyond the limits of probability, we always act prudently." b. A law whose obligation is not truly doubtful must be observed; but doubtful or tenuous probability which is against the law does not render this law truly doubtful. c. If the opinion for liberty rests upon a tenuous or doubtful reason, the law is judged morally certain, if not with direct certitude, at least with indirect certitude: for it is certain that man cannot follow doubtful, slight, and improbable reasons.

An opinion tenuously probable is not simply improbable, which is in no way contained within the limits of probability, but is an opinion resting not upon a grave and solid foundation but only upon a slight and apparent one, so that it is contained within the limits of tenuous and doubtful probability, not true and certain probability.¹

¹ Cf. Viva, Damnatae theses, in prop. 3 condemned by Innocent XI.

In this difficult question, the Catholic Church so far has been content to condemn extreme views, and allows her children to follow any of the moderate systems mentioned above. Alexander VIII¹ condemned rigorism, which required direct moral certainty in all cases about the lawfulness of an action, and denied that it is ever lawful to follow an opinion which is very probable among several. Laxism was condemned by Innocent XI, since it taught that one might lawfully act on a slight probability.² The systems which are known as Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, and Probabilism all have their adherents; the Catholic moralist is free to follow whichever he wishes.

To us it seems that probabilism is the true system, and if it be rightly understood, as it is taught by its moderate supporters, and not as it is misinterpreted by its opponents, we are convinced that it will recommend itself to practical common sense.

Its maxim may be formulated thus: When there is only question of committing sin or not, it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion, even though the opposite may be more probable.

The wording of the formula should be carefully weighed. The words “ when there is only question of committing sin or not ” limit the application of the principle to cases where the only question is whether by following such a course sin will be committed because a certain law, human or divine, will be broken. Probabilism, then, cannot be applied to cases where the validity of an act is in question, where some end must be obtained, or where there is question of the certain right of some other person which must be respected. In all these cases we are bound to safeguard the end by taking means that are sure and not merely probable. These are not so many exceptions to the use of probabilism; there is a certain obligation to use secure means to obtain the end in view in such cases, and so there can be no question as to whether probabilism is applicable or not. This will explain why Innocent XI condemned a proposition which asserted that it is not unlawful for a minister of the sacraments to follow a probable opinion about their validity when administering them; and another, which taught that a judge might use probabilism in giving sentence in a court of law; and a third, which excused an infidel who followed a probable opinion and remained in infidelity. In all these cases there is not merely question of sin, but the certain rights of others are at stake, or there is question of an end which cannot lawfully be exposed to risk.

Again, the words “ it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion ” should be noted. It is not a question as to what is more perfect, what the noble and generous thing to do may be. The rule merely asserts that there is no obligation under pain of sin to follow the more perfect course, if in the case there be one.

Finally, the words are added “ even though the opposite may be more probable.” For the greater probability of the other view does not make it certain, nor is the supposed greater probability a sure guarantee that the more probable view is the more true. It very frequently happens that an opinion which is considered more probable at one time is thought less probable or altogether improbable at another. Moreover, degrees of probability are very difficult to determine. What seems more probable to one theologian seems less so to another, or even to the same at a different time. And even if it be granted that one opinion is certainly and absolutely more probable, the opposite may for all that remain solidly probable.³ With these provisos the proof of the thesis is not very difficult.

¹ Prop. 3, condemned December 7, 1690.

² Prop. 3, condemned March 2, 1679.

³ Decree of March 2, 1679, props. 1, 2, 4.

III. Diverse systems. Seven are enumerated, namely: absolute Tutiorism, mitigated Tutiorism, Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, Probabilism, Laxism, and the System of Compensation.

Absolute Tutiorism states: It is not licit for me to follow an opinion favoring liberty unless this is certain to me; or: The law obliges me unless I am certain that it does not exist.

Mitigated Tutiorism teaches: It is not licit for me to follow an opinion favoring liberty unless this is most probable to me; or: The law obliges me unless I hold it as most probable that the law does not exist.

Probabiliorism states: It is not licit for me to follow an opinion favoring liberty unless this is more probable to me; or: The law obliges me unless I hold it as more probable that the law does not exist.

Equiprobabilism professes: In doubt about the making of a law, it is licit for me to follow an opinion favoring liberty, provided this is equally or almost equally probable to me as the opposite opinion favoring the law. But in strict doubt about the cessation or fulfillment of a law, the law is to be observed.

Probabilism contends: It is licit for me to follow an opinion favoring liberty, provided this is truly probable to me, and this even if the contrary opinion is certainly more probable to me; or: The law does not oblige me provided I hold it as truly probable that it does not exist, and this even if I hold it as more probable that it does exist. And these things hold even if the law certainly existed, provided it has probably ceased or has been fulfilled.

Laxism admits the use even of a thinly probable opinion.

The System of Compensation teaches that in doubts the safer thing is to be followed unless a relatively grave inconvenience excuses.¹

Absolute Tutiorism,² mitigated Tutiorism, and Laxism³ are commonly rejected; Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, Probabilism, and the System of Compensation are sustained. We admit Equiprobabilism, which system indeed we now undertake to prove and to vindicate from objections.

¹ Thus Laloux, De actibus humanis; Potton, De theoria probabilitatis; Boisdron, Theorie et systemes des probabilites; Prummer, Manuale Theol. Mor., t. I, n. 351; McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science, p. 254. The system of Cardinal d'Annibale deserves special mention; in his Summula Theologiae moralis (I, nn. 262 and 264), relying only on the principle of possession, he gives his vote, with respect to doubt about the existence of a law, rather to Probabilism; and with respect to doubt about the cessation or fulfillment of a law, to Equiprobabilism. That system could be called the System of Possession, or Possessionism.

² Alexander VIII struck down the thesis: "It is not licit to follow an opinion, or among probable opinions the most probable one."

³ Innocent XI condemned this proposition, the third: "Generally, while, relying on probability either intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not go beyond the limits of probability, we do something, we always act prudently."

Laxism.—The extreme opposite of Tutiorism is Laxism, whose principle is: “When one is undecided between the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe, if it is only slightly or uncertainly probable,” because whatever seems at all probable may be prudently followed, and so forms a certain conscience. Example: According to Laxism, one would be justified in following an opinion, because it was defended by one theologian, even though he was of little authority.

This system has been condemned by the Church for the following reasons:

(a) It is contrary to the teaching of the Gospels and of the Fathers, which requires one to observe the laws of God with understanding and diligence;

(b) It leads to corruption of morals. The Laxists of the seventeenth century were called in derision those “who take away the sins of the world,” and it was against their loose teachings that Pascal inveighed;

(c) Its argument is of no value, for no prudent person would feel that he should follow what was only slightly above the improbable, or that a law should be deemed uncertain because an opinion of uncertain probability could be quoted against it.

Note: 1. "That diverse species of probabilities are given.... A tenuously probable opinion is one which rests on some foundation, but not such as avails to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man.... Probable is that which rests on a grave moment, either of intrinsic reason or extrinsic authority, which avails to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man, although with fear of the opposite. More probable is that which rests on a graver foundation, but still with prudent fear of the opposite, so that the contrary is also judged probable. Most probable is that which rests on a most grave foundation, and for this reason the opposite is judged either tenuously or doubtfully probable.... An opinion or sentence morally certain is one which excludes every prudent fear of falsity, so that the opposite is reputed altogether improbable. Finally a safe opinion is one which withdraws from every danger of sinning; but the safer is one which withdraws more from such danger, although it may not rest on stronger reasons." L. l. c. But S. D. speaks more exactly about a most probable opinion, H. A. tr. 1. n. 65: "Unless we wish to confuse a most probable opinion with an absolutely certain opinion, it is necessary to say that the opinion contrary to the most probable is not tenuously probable, but doubtfully probable." The reason is that a most probable opinion "is within the limits of probability," and therefore "does not exclude every prudent fear." "But tenuous probability is not true probability, and therefore does not bring with it a prudent reason. But doubtful probability brings some prudent reason, although not altogether certain and stable." Cf. also Op. Mor. l. 1. n. 85. But lest there be quibbling about words, as far as concerns us, we recognize no opinions, as regards doctrine, within the limits of true probability except the probable opinion, the more probable, and the most probable. Below the probable there is only the non-probable, the improbable, of which there can indeed be various grades; above the most probable there is only the certain. The probable is immediately opposed, by an opposition of comparison, to the more probable; but mediately to the most probable; and likewise the most probable is immediately opposed to the more probable, but mediately to the probable, unless someone wishes really to confuse the most probable with the certain.

2. Various moral systems: Tutiorism: A moral system which establishes that in doubt the safer part is to be followed practically. One kind is absolute, and is Rigorism, which establishes that the safer part must always be followed. Another is mitigated, which establishes that the safer part must be followed unless the other part favoring liberty is most probable. Probabiliorism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is licit to follow an opinion favoring liberty only when it is more probable than the opposite favoring the law. Therefore according to this system a doubtful law obliges, against the most common opinion and against reason. Equiprobabilism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is not licit to follow the less safe opinion unless it is equally or almost equally probable as the opposite. It is indeed a right norm of acting, but not to the exclusion of probabilism, which is a moral system containing an altogether right norm of acting, embracing all the cases of a true probable opinion favoring liberty, when the question concerns merely the subjective honorableness of an action. Probabilism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is licit to follow a truly probable opinion favoring liberty, although the opposite in favor of the law is more probable, whether a little or much more probable, where nevertheless the question concerns only the liceity of a human action. The reason is that when there is a truly probable opinion against a law, the law is doubtful, and a doubtful law does not oblige. Laxism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is licit to follow an opinion even doubtfully and tenuously probable against the law. It was condemned by Innocent XI, proposition 3, condemned March 2, 1679.

It is not licit practically to follow a tenuously probable opinion, the safer one being left aside. - The proposition is against lax probabilists. This is clear first from proposition 3 condemned by Innocent XI. Moreover, a tenuously probable opinion is an opinion resting on a slight motive; but a slight motive is a motive by no means sufficient to move a serious or prudent man to assent, and therefore it is not truly probable. Indeed that opinion is called truly probable which rests on such a motive that it is sufficient to move a prudent man to assent. But if such an opinion is insufficient to move a prudent man to judgment about the non-existence of the law, it is impossible to form for oneself a conscience concerning the liceity of the action. L. 1. 1. n. 40; E. M.

343. 6. Lax Probabilism, or simply Laxism, teaches that it is licit to follow not only an opinion truly and certainly probable, but also an opinion probably or slightly probable. This system indeed seems to have been taught by Thomas Tamburinus (+ 1675), who explained his opinion in this naked and crude manner: "Absolutely I think, with Salas, Vasquez, Sanchez, Merolla apud Bardi (de consc. dist. 1, c. 6, to whom add Pasq. dec. 18), that it is enough in all cases that it be established probably that an opinion is probable; for then that truth, morally certain, will be sufficiently strengthened, directing me in about this manner: I here and now act prudently, because while I probably think that this is probable, I follow that judgment in practice prudently enough. For the fact that the opposite is evidently more probable does not cast down my opinion from its probability."¹¹² Ioannes Caramuel (+ 1682), who was called by St. Alphonsus "the prince of the laxists," expressed the same opinion under these words: "If opinions are now probable which previously were not, now men do not sin, although previously they sinned, since every probable thing excuses from sin."¹¹³ Contemporary with Caramuel was another Probabilist indulging somewhat in Laxism, namely Antonius Diana, a Theatine (+ 1663), concerning whom St. Alphonsus writes:¹¹⁴ "Diana, in selecting opinions, for the most part inclines toward the benign part, and not rarely inclines more than is fitting." - Diana is a pure Casuist (he was called "the Atlas of the casuistic world"); he brings forward the opinions of almost innumerable authors and then solves individual cases in a casuistic manner. Although in other matters he is found not rarely too benign, nevertheless concerning sins of lust he sometimes defends rather rigid opinions. - Besides the authors cited, Ioannes Sanchez (+ 1624), Stephanus Bauny (+ 1649), Matthaeus Moya (+ 1684), whose work Quaestiones selectae was placed on the Index on 26 Feb. 1704, favored Laxism. Indeed, a work of the same author, which he published under the pseudonym "Amadaeus Guimenius" and whose title is Opusculum singularia universae fere theologiae moralis complectens adversus quorundam expostulationes contra nonnullas Iesuitarum opiniones morales (Lyons 1664), was proscribed by a special Brief of Innocent XI on 16 Sept. 1680 and therefore prohibited under pain of excommunication. - Among the Laxists Escobar y Mendoza (+ 1669) also is sometimes named, and in reality he defended some opinions too indulgent; nevertheless he did not merit the too vehement attacks made by Blaise Pascal in the Lettres Provinciales. - In present times no Catholic theologian favors Laxism. Besides, this system has been proscribed by the Church; for Innocent XI condemned proposition (3): "Generally, while trusting in intrinsic or extrinsic probability, however slight, provided one does not go outside the limits of probability, we always act prudently."¹¹⁵ But Alexander VII, in the decree issued on 24 Sept. 1665, proclaimed: "That lax mode of opining is altogether foreign to evangelical simplicity and to the doctrine of the Holy Fathers; and if the faithful were to follow it in practice as a right rule, a great corruption of Christian life would creep in." Hence, as St. Augustine says very well, "it is better to love with severity than to deceive with leniency."

¹¹² Explicatio decal. l. 1, c. 3, § 3, n. 8.

¹¹³ Cf. E. Muller, Theol. mor. I, § 78, where this citation is found. This Caramuel taught several opinions which, while he was still living, were proscribed by the Church; for example: "It seems so clear that fornication according to itself involves no malice and is evil only because it is forbidden, that the contrary seems altogether dissonant from reason." Innocent XI condemned this proposition on 2 March 1679 (Denz. n. 1198).

¹¹⁴ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 257. In mockery Diana was called "the lamb who took away the sins of the world" (so Concina, Apparatus ad Theol. christ. l. 3, diss. 1, c. 2, de Probabilismo).

¹¹⁵ Denz. n. 1153.

83. • II. Laxism. It was condemned, proposition 3 having been condemned by Innocent XI: "Generally, when relying on probability either intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not depart from the bounds of probability, we do something, we always act prudently"; and proposition 27, condemned by Alexander VII: "If a book is by some younger and modern author, the opinion must be judged probable, as long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable." Deservedly also was this doctrine condemned; for a law cannot be judged truly doubtful which is founded on so grave a reason that against it no solid reason can be brought forward, but only a slight reason or authority.

Since the right formation of conscience is made by varied application of principles, it is not strange if the doctrine on this matter did not exist from the beginning perfect and complete, but was slowly elaborated.

I. Among the Fathers no definite system is found; nevertheless there are traces of principles which can serve for forming conscience.

Frequently they rather favored the safer part. Namely the safer is to be taken in choosing religion (Lact., De Div. Inst. III, 13), in avoiding danger of nullity in the administration of the sacraments (Aug., De B. c. Don. I, c. 3, n. 5), in admitting the whole truth of faith without regard to the empty opinions of heterodox persons (Greg. Naz., or. XXXVI, 7; Chrys., In II Cor., hom. XIII, 4; Aug., De util. cred. XI), in conforming oneself through all things to the divine law (Tertul., De spect. XX-XXI), in striving to inquire into truth (Aug., De Civ. Dei, l. XXII, 23), in certainly establishing necessary penance for sins and avoiding the uncertainty of penance at the end: "hold the certain and dismiss the uncertain," Augustine cries, serm. 393. He also inveighs against the Academics (l. III, n. 35-36) who say: "when each one does what seems probable to him, he neither sins nor errs," who understood probability as merely subjective and empty, which each one fashioned for himself.

Even outside these cases, they quite generally favored the safer part, both because of the rigorous penitential discipline of those times and because ignorance of law was regularly held by many as culpable (cf. Aug., ep. 194).

On the opposite side, however, certain more benign solutions are found, for sometimes they did not urge an uncertain obligation in practice.

Lactantius says that one must not care about the precepts of the philosophers, as being mere conjectures without solid foundation; on which occasion he writes: "It belongs to a most foolish man to wish to obey their precepts, concerning which it is doubted whether they are true or false; and therefore no one obeys, because no one wishes to labor toward what is uncertain" (De Div. Inst. III, 27).

Gregory Nazianzen, or. XXXIX, 19, replies to the rigorists who did not wish the baptized to be admitted to penance: "Either prove that the matter is so, or, if you cannot, do not condemn. But if the matter is doubtful, let humanity prevail."

Thus Jerome, in the question concerning bigamists to be ordained, permits an uncertain and less safe opinion to be embraced, "prejudging no one from following what he wishes" (Adv. Ruf. I, 32). And Theodoret repeats the same (P. G. LXXXIII, 136 B C).

Indeed Augustine in various questions: 1. whether it is licit on the Lord's Supper to receive the Eucharist after food, says: "we compel no one to eat before that Lord's supper, but neither do we dare to contradict anyone" (ep. 54); 2. whether it is licit to enter marriage with an infidel: "since," he says, "truly in the New Testament nothing is prescribed concerning this, and therefore either it has been believed to be licit, or it has been left as doubtful" (De fide et op. XIX, 35); 3. whether it is licit to eat food which has been found in an idol's temple, he replies: "Either it is certain to be idol-offering, or it is certain not to be, or it is unknown; if therefore it is certain to be, it is better rejected by Christian truth; but if it is known either not to be or is unknown, it is taken up for the use of necessity without any scruple of conscience" (ep. 47); 4. whether it is licit for a soldier to fight in a perhaps unjust war: "A just man," he says, "...can rightly fight,... for whom it is certain either that what is commanded is not against God's precept, or it is not certain whether it is, so that perhaps the injustice of commanding makes the king guilty, but the order of serving shows the soldier innocent" (c. Faust. man., l. 22, c. 75).

II. Among the Scholastics the question of the formation of conscience is explicitly proposed; and they especially insist on this, that conscience ought to be certain, so that to act in doubt is sin, for he who acts while remaining in doubt commits himself to risk and to danger of sinning. Thus St. Thomas, Quodl. VIII, 13; IV Sent. d. 21, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3; III, q. 83, a. 6, ad 2; before or after him, William of Auxerre (Sum. l. II, tr. 29, c. 1, q. 3), William of Paris (De coll. benef. a. 8; De legibus, c. 21), Alexander of Hales (Sum. II, q. 112, cas. 8; q. 121, m. 3, a. 1, ad 2), David Augustine (De hom. compositione, l. III, pr. 5, c. 19; pr. 6, c. 43), Henry of Ghent (Quodl. IV, 33), Scotus (in Sent., prol., q. 2, n. 15; l. III, d. 25, q. 1).

They generally did not know the use of a reflex principle in forming conscience, except in cases of epikeia and a few others: for it is admitted that one must also do that which seems rather illicit, both for a soldier in a war not certainly unjust, and for a religious when the superior commands what is not certainly illicit: this last is noted in the decree of Gratian and is handed down by St. Bernard, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, William Peraldus, Paludanus.

Hence in practice they rather often give safer solutions, as St. Thomas in Quodl. VIII, 13. There he asks "whether he who has several prebends sins," concerning which there were then contrary opinions; he replies that he who "is brought into a certain doubt from the contrariety of opinions,... if while such doubt remains he has several prebends, commits himself to danger, and thus without doubt sins." Thus he simply declares that a certain conscience is required and that it is not safe to act in practical doubt; without inquiring or seeming to suspect whether in the case the doubt perhaps could be solved by some indirect principle. Nevertheless they have several things which favor the more benign part. Thus the principle proposed by St. Thomas in Q. D. De Ver. 17, a. 3: "no one is bound by a precept except through knowledge of the precept"; for although there it is adduced to prove that an unknown law does not bind, nevertheless logically the same holds concerning an uncertain law. Besides this, sometimes he holds more benign opinions: thus he denies the necessity either of confessing merely aggravating circumstances (IV Sent. d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 5), or of confessing at once after a fall (d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 4), or of repeating an unformed confession (ibid. a. 4); without concluding, on account of the opposite opinions, that to act thus is to commit oneself to danger.

To the safer practice in the thirteenth century a certain corrective was added from the principle of probabiliorism. William of Auxerre seems to have explained this first rather clearly, says Prummer, Th. M. I, n. 345, when he wrote in the treatise on pollution: "That magisterial rule, that one doubting about something, whether it is illicit, and doing that thing while the doubt stands, sins, because he commits himself to danger, is to be understood of such doubt which is vehement, and more, or at least equally, induces the mind to believe that it is mortally illicit, as that it is licit. It is otherwise where the mind inclines more and judges that it is licit than that it is illicit, although it does not have in every way evident or fixed certitude, because not even this itself is required."

St. Albert the Great accepts the principle of probabiliorism (Sum. de creaturis, p. II, q. 70, a. 2), and his disciple Ulrich of Strasbourg; likewise Monaldus; but in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries several do so, as Gerson (De consol. theol., l. IV, pr. 2 and 3), John of Dambach (De consol. theol., l. XIV, c. 8), Nider (Consol. tim. consc., p. 3, c. 11-16), Conradus (De contr.), Gabriel Biel (in IV, d. 15, q. 8, a. 3, dub. 2; and a. 16, q. 3, a. 3, dub. 6); likewise various summae: Tabiena, Trovamala, Angelica. Yet several continued to adhere to the safer part, as Dionysius the Carthusian, Bartholomaeus Fumus, and Adrian VI.

Another corrective is noted among others, when they prescribe to the confessor as a rule: to respect the opinions of the penitent, unless they are openly false. Thus Godfrey of Fontaines (Quodl. IX, a. 16), and Paludanus (in IV, d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, n. 5).

III. In canon law various principles are stated which can serve for forming conscience.

1. In doubt the safer part is to be chosen. Thus Eugenius III, decr. l. IV, t. 1, c. 3; Clement III, l. V, t. 12, c. 12; Innocent III, l. III, t. 43, c. 3; l. V, t. 12, c. 18; Honorius III, l. V, t. 12, c. 24. Moreover, it is invoked not as a universal principle, but in certain cases, when namely there is present danger of salvation, or irreverence, or scandal, in one word, of a greater evil; or also by way of an equitable principle in solving certain peculiar difficulties. But sometimes in the law solutions opposed to this saying are found, as was the license of attempting conjugal copulation for three years in doubt of impotence; and it is to be reconciled with other principles admitted in law, such as: In doubt the condition of the possessor is better, or Laws are to be interpreted more benignly.

2. In obscure matters we look at what is more like the truth. This was borrowed from Roman law, in which it is a rule for judges for establishing presumptions in certain doubts of fact. In canon law it is invoked as a rule in authentic interpretation of law (l. II, t. 9, c. 4), or as a norm prescribed to judges in interpreting facts, contracts, testaments (l. VI, reg. 45), or it also holds concerning some speculatively more probable opinion to be held; but it is not invoked in questions concerning a law to be observed or concerning uncertain obligation. St. Antoninus is recounted as the first who applied this to these matters (Sum. p. I, t. 20), and indeed for positive laws.

3. In doubt one must stand for that for which presumption stands. Thus l. II, t. 23. The principle holds in many doubts of fact, and is stated under various forms; in doubts regarding the existence of a fact: a fact is not presumed but must be proved; one must stand for that for which presumption stands; one must judge from things ordinarily occurring; in doubt concerning the conditions of a fact: no one is presumed evil unless it is proved; one must stand for the validity of the act; that is judged to have been rightly done which by law had to be done.

Yet it cannot validly be applied in doubts of law: for how can it be solved from presumption whether a contract entered under such a form is just or unjust, whether interest is licitly received from money loaned or not, whether abortion or embryology or vasectomy are ever licit, etc.? Hence we do not understand how some could write that this is the universal principle to which all the others are reduced.

4. A doubtful law does not bind. This is handed down under various forms, for example, in doubt of promulgation: "Unless you have been certain concerning the mandate of the Apostolic See, you will not be compelled to execute it," says Innocent III, decr. l. I, t. 29, c. 31; in doubt concerning the intention of a human legislator: "interpretation is to be made against him who could have stated the law more openly"; in doubt concerning the sense of the law: "laws are to be interpreted more benignly, so that their will may be preserved," and "in obscure matters the minimum is to be followed" (reg. 30). But since the body of law contains positive laws, it is not strange if the principle does not regard the natural law.

5. In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. Thus l. II, t. 19, c. 3; t. 26, c. 6; l. III, t. 4, c. 31; l. VI, reg. 65 and 11. It is invoked in doubts of fact for the matter of justice, when possession of the thing or of right or power is present, but not where possession is lacking; sometimes in speculative doubts of law, if from use a presumption can be taken for the force or extinction of a law; besides this in practical doubts whether the accused is to be condemned on account of a crime committed or to paying a debt: his condition is better until the crime or the obligation of paying is certainly demonstrated.

As we noted in n. 84, under the form of the principle of possession can be stated the faculty of neglecting slight reasons and negative doubt.

IV. From the sixteenth century there are well-defined systems. At the beginning several profess probabiliorism, especially from the Dominican school, as Sylvester Prierias and Cajetan; also outside this school, as John Major.

Cajetan explicitly posited the distinction between speculative and practical doubt (op. 31, resp. 13, dub. 7), from which distinction the question received notable progress, so that from this there came to be a broader use of the reflex principle for rendering practical judgment certain.

The Dominican school of Salamanca, with the masters Fr. de Victoria, Melchior Cano, and Dominic Soto as leaders, also stood generally, and with certain cases of the safer part excepted, for the more probable opinion; but at the same time it affirmed that he does not sin who, among truly probable opinions (equal ones), follows whichever he wishes; so that they approached equiprobabilism.

These things were the occasion of a certain longer and diverse evolution.

1. Probabilism arose from this. For Bartholomew de Medina was the first who in the year 1577 formally taught at Salamanca: "if an opinion is probable, it is licit to follow it, although the opposite is more probable." This position was soon accepted not only in Spain, but also in other regions. Thus the Preachers generally held it: Did. Alvarez, Lopez, Bannez, P. de Ledesma, V. Candidus, Gr. Martinez, John of St. Thomas, Arauxo, Barth. de Ledesma, etc., yet with a few excepted, as I. Martinez de Prado; likewise generally the theologians of the Society of Jesus, as is known to all; several Franciscans such as Reiffenstuel, Mastrius, and Herincx; also several Sorbonists and Louvain theologians, as Malderus, Wiggers, Sylvius; likewise the Carmelite theologians of Salamanca.

Yet certain persons continued to think otherwise, as Dr. Navarrus Azpicuelta, Ant. Corduba and Fabri from the Order of Friars Minor, Palacios, also P. Comitoli and A. Bianchi from the Society of Jesus, all probabiliorists; Perez, O.S.B., and Rebello, S.J., equiprobabilists; and Merenda, a tutiorist.

There was not one tendency of probabilists. Some, the moderate, said it was licit to follow a less probable opinion, provided the opposite was not notably more probable. Others, more benign, who are called pure or absolute probabilists, held licit every less probable opinion, provided it was probable in itself, even if the opposite was notably more probable. Hence probabilism gradually became more lax.

2. Laxism followed from this. For certain persons held it licit to act according to thin probabilities, or applied probabilism to cases in which, on account of danger of bringing in harm or frustrating an effect, one must act more safely. Thus, for example, John Sanchez, Bauny, Escobar, Tamburini, Moya, and others from the Society of Jesus; Leander, O.S.Tr.; Diana the Theatine; Caramuel, O.Cist.; etc.

Against those excesses of laxer probabilism a reaction arose, especially at Paris (in the year 1640) and at Louvain (in the year 1649), first in the universities, afterward among bishops and clergy, and among the Jansenists, whose leader was Pascal in the so-called Provincial Letters (1656-1657).

Hence Alexander VII condemned 45 laxer propositions, in the years 1665-66. But in the year 1677 four Louvain professors, M. Steyaert, Chr. Wolf or Lupus, Fr. van Viaene, and P. L. Ledrou, go to Rome so that they might obtain from Innocent XI the condemnation of lax propositions; and in fact he condemned 65 in the year 1679.

3. From this tutiorism was born. The safer practice which had mostly flourished in the middle age was now erected into a general system. Sinnich, a Louvain professor, in the book Saul Ex Rex is said to have defended this opinion: "it is not licit to follow an opinion even the most probable among the probable," which was condemned by Alexander VIII (in the year 1690).

Wherefore others taught a certain mitigated tutiorism, as Steyaert, van Opstraet, Henricus a S. Ignatio, Dens, Perin, Neesen; to whom there closely approached in France Habert, in Italy Fagnanus and Card. Gerdil.

4. Revived probabiliorism is also taught by many. Alexander VII had commended to the general chapter of the Order of Preachers held at Rome in 1656 that they fight against laxer opinions. This was done. Advancing further, the Preachers from this moment rather generally taught probabiliorism, as Mercorus, Gonet, Natalis Alexander, Contenson, Billuart, Cuniliati, Concina, Patuzzi, etc.; yet not all: thus Bancel, Ferre, and Larraga are probabilists.

But not only among the Dominicans; also in the French clergy many probabiliorists are found, with Bossuet as leader; and in Italy Berti, O.S.A., P. Ballerini, and Benedict XIV hold it. Indeed in the Society of Jesus itself it has defenders. Thyrsus Gonzalez had written the book The Foundation of Moral Theology concerning the Right Use of Probable Opinions, in which he strenuously defended probabiliorism. Since he could not easily publish it, Innocent XI ordered that the general Father of the Society command that he permit Gonzalez himself and other Fathers to write for the more probable opinion and to attack the view that it is licit to follow the less probable. But when Father Gonzalez himself was elected General of the Society, and since Innocent XI and afterward Clement XI favored the more probable opinion, several from the Society now taught probabiliorism, as Antoine, Elizalde, Estrix, Gisbert, Taberna, and others. In the year 1694 the book of Thyrsus Gonzalez was at last published, but it was attacked by the Jesuits Segneri and Rassler.

5. Equiprobabilism, which already before was held by several, was now proposed systematically by Rassler, De Ruvere, Mayr, Biner from the Society of Jesus; by Eusebius Amort, canon regular; by B. Schmier, O.S.B.; and by others.

St. Alphonsus de Liguori, who had been instructed in probabiliorism, when he had learned by experience that that system could not be applied in practice, first (in the year 1755) taught moderate probabilism, although nevertheless he did not specially defend that a less probable opinion could be chosen in practice when a certainly more probable one occurred; afterward (in the year 1762) he perfected and corrected his system with a twofold restriction, namely equality of probabilities and the principle of possession, so that, in order that a law bind, it must be more probable; in order that it cease to bind, it must be more probable that it has been removed or fulfilled. He was vehemently attacked by probabiliorists, especially by Patuzzi, O.P.

And so St. Alphonsus truly was an equiprobabilist, and those err who contend that he never abandoned pure probabilism. But they would err more who tried to bring him into the party of probabiliorism, or who held equiprobabilism as a logical evolution of probabiliorism, forgetful that the holy Doctor chiefly attacked probabiliorism and was sharply attacked by probabiliorists, and that he firmly and broadly defended that principle so hateful to all tutiorists and probabiliorists: A doubtful law does not bind.

Laxism, no distinction having been made between solid and slight probability, always exempts from the law as often as any opinion whatever is brought forward against it, even if it is only slightly probable. This system was condemned, as is clear from prop. 3, proscribed by Innocent XI, which reads thus: "Generally, when trusting in probability whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not depart from the boundaries of probability, we do something, we always act prudently." But the reason of the condemnation is open; for since slight probability is that which does not merit the assent of a prudent man, by force of it the law cannot be said to be uncertain. Cf. Bouquillon, n. 287 and seq.

I. In this whole work I shall first of all recall before the readers' eyes the theses condemned by the Church, that they may be able in advance to guard themselves from the danger of erring. The following, in the controversy of Probabilism, the Roman See proscribed under Alexander VII and the Venerable Innocent XI, Supreme Pontiff:

1. If a Book be that of some more recent and modern author, its opinion ought to be considered probable, so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the apostolic See as improbable. — Proposition 27 of Alexander VII.

2. It is not illicit, in conferring the Sacraments, to follow a probable opinion regarding the validity of the Sacrament, leaving aside the safer one, unless law, convention, or the danger of incurring grave harm forbid it. Hence it is only in the conferring of Baptism, of priestly or episcopal Orders, that a merely probable opinion must not be used. — Proposition 1 of Innocent XI.

3. I probably think that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable. — Proposition 2 of the same.

4. In general, when we do anything relying upon probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not depart from the bounds of probability, we always act prudently. — Proposition 3 of the same.

5. An infidel who does not believe, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused of infidelity. — Proposition 4 of the same.

6. It is probable that the precept of charity towards God does not, of itself, rigorously oblige even once in every five years. — Proposition 6 of the same.

I. In a doubt about the honesty of an action, the condition of the possessor is the better. The law takes away the right of liberty, say the Probabilists. When Theologians dispute about the obligation of a law, the law becomes doubtful; therefore it cannot take away the right of liberty. For in doubt, the condition of the possessor is the better.

II. It has been shown above that this rule holds only in the matter of justice, for the exterior forum. But now I admit it in any matter whatsoever, that I may prove that this very rule utterly overthrows Probabilism. Before the probabilistic tribunal, then, there present themselves the eternal will of God, and the human will. Each sets forth its rights, which appear equal, or controverted. The probabilistic tribunal decides the cause in man's favor against God, because in an equal cause the condition of the possessor is the better. Be not affrighted, says the prince of the Probabilists, Fr. Terillus, at hearing that man brings suit against God — for God too brings suit against man. Hear what Terillus writes in his treatise On conscience, question 23, number 48, page 426: I answer that the same rule equally favors God against us, and us against God. It favors us, so long as we are in possession of liberty; it favors God, so long as the law is in possession. Whence, if the law certainly exists, and it be doubtful whether I have paid the debt, I am as much bound in that doubt to pay, as if I had certainly not paid the debt. Since, therefore, this rule favors God when possession stands for the law, so it favors us when possession stands for liberty, and the doubt is about the law.

III. There exists, then, a title which equally favors man against God, and God against man? Why not? replies Terillus. The same rule equally favors God against us, and us against God. The Probabilists speak of liberty not physical, but moral. When it is disputed whether a contract be usurious, it is disputed whether I am free to celebrate the contract. When therefore it is disputed whether the contract be licit or illicit, it is disputed whether I am free, or not, to complete the contract. Therefore, when the Probabilists allege in controverted matters the said rule, The condition of the possessor is the better, they commit a most ridiculous begging of the question. That you may be able to allege this rule in the tribunal, the possession of the estate must be certain; otherwise it would be opposed in vain. Now what Christian can display a certain possession of liberty against God, by which he may celebrate that contract about which Theologians dispute on both sides? None, surely. For while it is disputed whether the contract be usurious, it is disputed whether the man is free to enter into it. Therefore the possession of liberty is controverted, not certain, in respect of such a contract.

IV. Is not the free dominion of man over his own actions subject to the supreme dominion of God? You grant it. Therefore, whenever it is doubted whether God has granted such dominion over this or that contract or work, the rule cited — The condition of the possessor is the better — favors God, not man. For the possession of God is most certain; that of man, doubtful. Therefore, if the rule holds, it favors God, the certain, supreme, and absolute possessor — not man, subject to God, and a doubtful possessor. Therefore the right of possession which in controverted matters the Probabilists ascribe to human liberty is false and altogether chimerical; it wounds the supreme divine dominion, inflicts injury upon the tremendous majesty, disturbs the subjection of men to God, and equals man to God.

V. [The Probabilists apply this paradox to] natural, divine, and human laws, about which Theologians dispute on both sides. This paradox also appears incredible; therefore their words must be transcribed. Fr. Terillus, On the rule of morals, part I, question 2, number 45, page 19, writes as follows: No law obliges unless it be sufficiently promulgated. But whenever reasons are present probably establishing that the less safe part is licit, the law commanding the safer part is not sufficiently promulgated. Therefore that law obliges no one, so long as it is certainly probable that the less safe part is not prohibited. Terillus is followed by La-Croix, Viva, Paolo Segneri, and commonly all the Probabilists.

VI. No law without promulgation. No sin, not even a material one, without a law. These two things are certain among all. When you embrace an opinion, whether less or more probable, you sin at least materially, supposing the opinion to be false; which fault is not imputed to you on account of invincible ignorance, as all the Probabilists teach. But if the law, on account of greater and lesser probability on both sides, were not a law, because not promulgated, there would be no sin, not even a material one: because, as I have said, there is no sin without a law.

VII. Upon the same law there are given two contrary probable opinions, of which the one affirms, the other denies, that the action is licit — as all the Probabilists attest. But if it were true that a controverted law is not sufficiently promulgated, and therefore is not a law, the first proposition would be false. Nay, this principle being admitted — that a law probably controverted on both sides is not a law — no probable opinion would be given at all. For the opinion, whether affirming or denying that the action is licit, no law existing, would be not probable, but false and chimerical, as being about a non-supposing subject, as they say. Therefore, etc.

VIII. God commands in Deuteronomy 17: If thou perceive that there be among you a hard and doubtful matter in judgment ... arise ... and thou shalt come to the priests of the Levitical race ... and thou shalt do whatsoever they shall say. If a law controverted among the Doctors were not a law, the divine command would be both empty and about an impossible thing. And yet this is the principle which the Probabilists most loudly exaggerate. Perchè legge dubbia non fu mai legge — "because a doubtful law was never a law" — says Fr. Paolo Segneri in his third epistle. Against them cry out all the grave Theologians with St. Thomas, who, I-II, q. 106 [recte 96], article 6, ad 2, defines: for if the matter be doubtful, one must either act according to the words of the law, or consult one's Superior.

IX. There is given a less probable opinion against a civil or canonical law which forbids a usurious contract, in view of the more probable. In this position the law is controverted. Therefore doubtful. Therefore null. The litigants bring their suit to the tribunal. What is the judge to do? If he pronounces sentence in favor of the Party defending the more probable opinion, he sins, because he adjudges the contract usurious by force of a law which, according to the Probabilists, does not exist in the nature of things. If he judges according to the less probable, he sins, because by the precept of the Church he must judge according to the more probable opinion.

X. Either the Probabilists say that natural, divine, and human laws are true laws, and have the complete force of laws, before the disputations and controversies of subjects — or they deny it. If the second, they err most shamefully, and offer themselves up to be laughed at by all Theologians and Jurisconsults. If the first, their Probabilism goes up in smoke.

XI. Scarcely is there a commandment in the Decalogue immune from disputations. The probabilistic principle being admitted, that a controverted law is not a law, nearly the whole Decalogue collapses. Nor is there any force in the objection that the probabilistic controversies regard not the existence of the laws, but the extension of the laws. For they stray no less shamefully in denying the extension of the laws, as is evident from holy Scripture, Deuteronomy 17, where God commands that the judges be consulted, whether or not a work be forbidden by the law. But, that you may grasp more fully the horror of the probabilistic doctrine, hear Terillus, On conscience, question 23, number 19, page 413, speaking thus: "A human legislator, if he be prudent, knows well that the sense of his laws is in many things doubtful, and that many men more learned than himself prudently reckon that such an expression does not extend to such objects. Whence there is a manifest presumption that he does not will to comprehend such things under his law with obligation. For if he had willed to comprehend them, he would have expressed it: therefore they are to be counted as not included in the law. And this holds above all because favors are to be enlarged, and burdens restricted. The same holds of the eternal law, by which God corroborates human laws ... nay, the same holds of the divine law, which God himself promulgates by such signs as men do not perfectly understand. For hence arises an evident presumption that God does not will to oblige us to those things about which we have prudent motives for reckoning that they were not intended by him through the law. For God, who comprehends all things, if he had willed otherwise, would have expressed that very thing, since this would have been as easy for him as the opposite. But God has not expressed it. Therefore he has not willed it to fall under obligation. This is the whole of what we intend; and it follows most manifestly from the defect of sufficient promulgation." Then he adds, number 25, page 416: In these matters, therefore, let the Legislators blame themselves, if they sometimes see their commands violated, since they have not sufficiently explained their will.

XII. The Legislators have sufficiently explained their wills, and the laws are perspicuous; but cavils often obscure and disturb them — nay, do away with them. If laws probably controverted on both sides are not laws, let all tribunals go into exile from the Catholic world. This probabilistic doctrine being admitted, Christians can straightway abolish the greatest part of the natural, divine, and civil laws. Let them take up the books of Diana, of Zanardi, of Candidus, of Tamburini, of Escobar, of Gobat, of La-Croix, of Viva. Let them gather a most numerous catalogue of the opinions which are probably disputed on both sides concerning natural, divine, and human law. Thence let them draw out this conclusion: Controverted rights are not rights; a doubtful law is not a law. Therefore we are free from all the laws about which Theologians probably dispute on both sides. These are the paradoxes by which Probabilism is sustained. See more in Tome 2 of the Apparatus, book 3, dissertation 8, chapter 3.

I. I have most briefly touched upon the reasons which prove the manifest falsity of Probabilism. I have indicated their cavils, and the unheard-of paradoxes which they have devised, that they might oppose darkness to the most splendid truth. Now I shall lay open certain absurdities which follow upon the new manner of opining. Some things are premised.

II. It is of faith that there are sins of ignorance, as is found in Leviticus 5 [recte 4-5]: if he shall sin through ignorance ... he shall offer a ram without blemish. Again, John chapter 16: The hour cometh, that whosoever killeth you will think that he doth a service to God. St. Paul: I was a blasphemer, and a persecutor, and contumelious; but I obtained the mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly: 1 Timothy 1. I pass over innumerable other testimonies of holy Scripture. The heresiarch Pelagius, first of all, sustained the opposite error, which the Synod of Palestine condemned.

III. Ignorance is the privation of knowledge. Error is the approbation of falsity. One ignorance is of law, which is ignorant of a law or precept; another of fact, which admits knowledge of the law, but is ignorant of the fact. One is vincible, or voluntary, consequent, and culpable — this can be conquered by diligence and study, and through negligence is not conquered. Another is invincible, which can be overcome by no study — this is without all fault. Of vincible ignorance, one kind is affected, which repels knowledge: He would not understand, that he might do well. Another is crass and supine, which applies no diligence at all to know those things which one can and ought to know.

IV. The error of Jansenius is the opposite of the error of Pelagius: Jansenius contended that invincible antecedent ignorance itself is a sin — which error the Church proscribed.

V. This most difficult question I have treated with full pen in Tome 2 of the Apparatus, book 2, dissertation 2, chapter 3. The brevity prescribed for a compendium does not permit me to bring the same again to the anvil; I shall only subjoin a few animadversions.

VI. Animadversion I. There are many oracles of Scripture which upbraid men with sins of ignorance. There is a way which seemeth just to a man; but the ends thereof lead to death: Proverbs 16. St. James, chapter 1, says: But if any of you want wisdom, let him ask of God, who giveth to all men abundantly, and upbraideth not; and it shall be given him. But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering. For he that wavereth is like a wave of the sea, which is moved and carried about by the wind.

VII. Animadversion II. The ancient Fathers, making no distinction of the natural law into universal principles, proximate conclusions, and remote conclusions, deny invincible ignorance of the natural law.

VIII. Animadversion III. The precept of inquiring after the truth is most luminous. The oracles of the Scriptures which promise the grace of finding the truth to sedulous investigations are well attested, and frequent. We have been left in this valley of darkness, that with continual prayers we may implore the light of truth. God does not deny his grace, unless fault on our part precede.

IX. Animadversion IV. Vincible ignorance is most frequent; invincible, rare. Whether in some rare case there can be given an invincible ignorance of some remote conclusion of the natural law, I dare not define. Things which occur rarely ought not to hold us anxious. Against those things which happen frequently — such as the sins of vincible ignorance — we must watch incessantly.

X. Animadversion V. Let Theologians and Confessors meditate with what vigilance, with what study, they endeavor to attain the understanding of the divine law. Let them consider whether they can say with David, Psalm 1: Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly ... But his will is in the law of the Lord, and on his law he shall meditate day and night. First of all, then, let the Priests of the Lord occupy themselves in coming to know the divine law, and in comprehending and tasting its spirit, that they may be able to discern what doctrine is conformed to this divine law.

XI. Animadversion VI. Dismissing, therefore, the controversy whether in some very rare case there can be given an invincible ignorance of the natural law, what St. Augustine writes in book 22 of the City of God, chapter 23 [recte 19, ch. 4 of book 19], must above all be weighed and executed: With continual vigils we keep watch, lest a verisimilar opinion deceive us, lest cunning speech beguile us, lest the darkness of some error pour itself over us, lest what is good be believed evil, or what is evil be believed good. Let us fear and tremble with Paul: For I am not conscious to myself of any thing; yet am I not hereby justified.

XII. Animadversion VII. Fr. La-Croix errs shamefully, and imposes a falsehood upon his readers, when in his book on laws, number 726, he narrates that in the year 1685 there was condemned the opinion of all the ancients, and of many, and indeed the gravest, of the more recent Theologians, denying invincible ignorance of any part whatsoever of the natural law. In that year, indeed, a book was forbidden in which errors were contained; but not everything taught in it was proscribed — just as not everything contained in the books of Luther and Calvin is proscribed.

XIII. The Probabilists rather commonly teach that sin is never committed without actual consideration, clear or obscure, of the malice of the action. This opinion, as it seems to my weakness, is the same as the error of the Pelagians denying the sins of ignorance, as Jerome and Augustine and the other Fathers testify. No crime, said the Pelagians, without liberty; no liberty without knowledge; therefore no sin without knowledge. The Probabilists deny that sin can be committed without some actual knowledge of the malice of the action: therefore the doctrine of the Pelagians and of the Probabilists is the same, so far as appears from the force of the reasoning. Which I prove thus.

XIV. It is a Catholic truth that men commit sins of ignorance. Actual advertence being admitted, the darkness of ignorance vanishes. The Probabilists teach that actual knowledge, or advertence, is necessary that the ignorance be vincible and criminal. Therefore the doctrine of both parties is the same. Tell me: what is opposed to ignorance? Knowledge. Therefore it cannot be that he sins ignorantly who knows, and considers — and that actually — that he is sinning.

XV. Actual consideration being removed, there is no sin. When therefore men inconsiderately vomit forth perjuries, blasphemies, revilings, and maledictions against God and against men, they in no way sin, because they do not actually advert that they are sinning. Those who, stirred by wrath and fury, shed human blood; those who, blinded by the enticements of concupiscence, violate the marriage-beds of others; those who defile the chastity of virgins — are guilty of no crime, because, carried away by passion, they do not in fact advert that they are offending God. What shall I say of the crimes of heresies and of infidelity? So far were very many infidels from reckoning that they were contemning the true Religion, that they rather judged that they were worshipping God with their sacrifices. Did the Circumcellions believe they were sinning, when they hurled themselves headlong from the cliffs? Did Nestorius consider that he was sinning, when he chose rather to abdicate the Patriarchate of Constantinople than to abjure his error?

XVI. In the name of the Probabilists, Fr. La-Croix answers, book 5, numbers 16 and 21, in these words: Although the ignorance or unthinkingness be culpable, the work following from it has no special malice, except precisely that of the negligence, or neglect, in knowing or adverting to that malice. Behold the most sweet yoke of flattering benignity! The Infidels, the Arians, the Iconoclasts, the Wycliffites, the Hussites, the Lutherans, the Calvinists, the Socinians, blinded by the perversity of their opinions, sinned indeed a sin of negligence in learning Catholic doctrine; but when, carried away by fury, they blurted out that the Son of God is a creature, tore sacred images to pieces, trampled the body of Christ underfoot, leveled the monasteries of Monks to the ground, defiled Virgins consecrated to God — these and other crimes have no special malice, except precisely that of the negligence, or neglect, in learning or adverting to the malice. I do not doubt that readers shudder as they hear these things.

XVII. The sophism of the Pelagians, which they obtrude today, drawn from liberty, is futile and empty. For nothing is more frequent among the Fathers and Theologians than the twofold voluntary and free: the one direct, the other indirect. The direct free act requires actual and formal knowledge and advertence. The indirect free act demands implicit, virtual, indirect knowledge and advertence — that is, knowledge in its cause. These things are obvious even to beginners.

XVIII. The philosophical sin condemned by the Church is of this kind: A philosophical, or moral, sin is a human act disagreeing with rational nature and with right reason. A theological and mortal sin is a free transgression of the divine law. The philosophical sin, however grave, in him who either is ignorant of God or does not actually think of God, is a grave sin, but is not an offense against God, nor a mortal sin dissolving the friendship of God, nor worthy of eternal punishment.

XIX. By what reasoning this condemned error can be separated from the ignorance just described, I truly do not perceive; nor will anyone perceive it who is not prejudiced. For, this hypothesis being admitted — that, actual advertence being removed, sin is never committed, nor God offended — philosophical sin necessarily follows. For in this hypothesis those who fornicate, commit adultery, lie, and perjure themselves, without actually adverting that they sin, will commit philosophical, not theological, sins. And it is my pleasure to confirm this by the authority of a Theologian of the illustrious Society of Jesus, Fr. Ignacio de Camargo, book 2, controversy 4, article 6, number 530, saying: This is Ignorantism — that is, the doctrine of the sins of ignorance among the recent Probabilists — of which you know not whether it be the parent of Probabilism, or its nursling, or its son, or its companion, or its full brother. Ignorantism, Probabilism, and Philosophism are so mutually connected, that you can scarcely define which is the parent and which the children. See Tome II of the Apparatus, book 2, dissertation 2, chapter 4.

XX. This paradox surpasses the rest. The Probabilists teach that the ignorance is invincible whenever the less probable opinion, in view of the more probable, is false: than which nothing more monstrous, it seems, can be devised or brought forth in the whole of Theology and Philosophy.

XXI. Invincible ignorance is that — as the very word bears on its face — which cannot be conquered and overcome. The mere doubting of the thing which is unknown makes the ignorance vincible and criminal. When you doubt whether such an action be depraved, by the confession of all you sin, because you expose yourself to the danger of sinning. And when you judge it more probable that the action is befouled with malice, and you repudiate this more probable opinion, and select the opposite, less probable one — if this be false, will your ignorance be invincible? You flee from the more splendid light, you close your eyes to it, that you may select the less probable opinion, which favors your liberty and is opposed to the Law: and in this case your error will be insuperable? Who, I pray you, endowed with common sense, can defend so great a paradox? Yet this is the paradox which all the Probabilists champion. But it is repugnant to common sense. For that is called invincible which cannot be conquered and overcome. With what face, then, do the Probabilists assert that this error cannot be overcome and conquered, at that very time at which they turn their eyes away from the greater light shining forth — at which they will not understand, that they may do well, and may at least approach nearer to the truth?

At the beginning of the first volume of this Compendium I set forth with a brief pen the loci of Christian theology. At present I shall set forth certain axioms which very many casuists, probabilism having been invented, hold as it were for theological loci, whence they draw their conclusions. Probabilism, as has been shown in its own place, constitutes as the rule of the honesty of conscience both truth and falsity, provided the latter be clothed with the garb of probability and invincible ignorance. And indeed, a new manner of opining having been invented, principles had to be devised which should be consonant with such a system. I say nothing which Pope Alexander VII, the Gallican Church, and the graver theologians did not foretell. But lest anyone could rightly suspect that I write these things to create odium against all casuists, I declare first that I venerate and look up to all authors; then openly and plainly I declare that I do not ascribe generally to all casuists the axioms which I shall presently subjoin, but only to those who in just so many words teach the same, and use the same. Finally, if what I am about to write shall appear to some less true, let there be full liberty of confuting and overthrowing the same. What now seem certain to me I bring forth. Beyond doubt I can be deceived, and therefore I subject them to the judgment of others. Moreover I have reserved this place for the refuting of these axioms, because their use chiefly obtains in the administering of the sacrament of Penance, as experience known to all makes plain. To the matter.

Beware of Rigorism, beware of the Rigorists. Holy kindliness is to be maintained: and Rigorism, daily growing stronger, is to be exterminated in the administering of the sacrament of Penance.

Public experience, known to all, argues the falsity of this first axiom. Matrons and little matrons, mistresses and lovers, mimes and sometimes mime-women, frequent the sacrament of Penance. What are their penances, what their fasts, what their hair-shirts, what their vigils, what their disciplines, what the correction of their morals? Rigorism therefore is a chimera. Where then is that Rigorism to be guarded against? Assuredly among those Christians to whom you say that the sacrament of Penance is administered you will not find Rigorism. Where then? Among those who refuse to administer the sacrament to the aforesaid Christians unless they first bid farewell to the amatory art, to games of money and of chance, to comedies, tragedies, theatres, dances, and usuries. But this is the evangelical doctrine and that of the universal Church, unless all things deceive me. And if those Christians in fact leave behind both sins and the occasions of sinning, they are at once absolved by those very theologians who are proclaimed as Rigorists. Guard is therefore to be kept against Laxism, which unfurls its banner higher, not against Rigorism, driven into exile by all Catholics. Do you appeal from experience open to all, to books? Behold, on one side Merbesius, Morinus, Gennet, Natalis Alexander, Pontas, Besombes, Antoine, who are called Rigorists. Behold, on the other side Caramuel, Bordon, Diana, Bonacina, Zanardi, Moya, La Cruz, Veracruz, Leander, Tamburini, Gobat, Castropalao, Sánchez, La Croix, Escobar, Alcover, Bizozer, Burgaber, Sporer, Razemberger. I ask all that they object even one single proposition of Rigorism, condemned or to be condemned, extracted from the works of the former class, and then let them call those men Rigorists. I on the contrary will give from the books of the second class not one, but hundreds and hundreds, partly certainly condemned, and partly such as to my weakness seem to be condemned. Let the wise now judge whether complaint is to be made of Rigorism. See the preface to Volume IX.

Every law is grave and burdensome. Therefore it is to be expounded in favour of subjects.

This is the second locus which certain casuists hold as it were for a theological one, that they may thence deduce kindly opinions. Beyond doubt all laws are adverse to human appetitions, to the flesh, and to the blood. But this casuistical axiom being admitted, all laws divine and human fall to the ground. Everywhere the Gospel of Christ cries out and commands that we crucify the flesh with our concupiscences, that we daily impose the cross upon our shoulders and follow, that we wage continual war upon our appetitions, that we renounce worldly spectacles, delights, and pomps, that finally we turn our eyes and senses away from vanity. What is graver, what more burdensome to humanity? If laws are to be interpreted in favour of human liberty, it is all up and done with the whole Gospel and with the rest of human laws.

So great is the divine mercy and kindliness toward men, that it holds in the same place truth and falsity adorned with the cloak of probability. Wherefore Christ the Lord on the dreadful day of the last judgment will say: Come, ye blessed of my Father, because you were liars, perjurers, and avaricious, judging probably that such things were lawful and honourable.

APOLOGY
FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE JESUITS
SENT TO HIS LORDSHIP THE BISHOP OF ARRAS ON THE OCCASION OF HIS CENSURE OF THE BOOK OF A GERMAN CASUIST

The alleged lax moral teaching of the Jesuits is the most plausible means that the Innovators and their other enemies have employed to discredit them and to estrange upright persons from them. This means has often succeeded for them. Many persons, judging the sincerity of others by their own, cannot persuade themselves that anyone would wish to defame an entire Society by reproaches which, if supposed false, would be atrocious and horrible calumnies.

With this prepossession, they enter blindly into the sentiments of those who speak ill of the Jesuits, and even join themselves to them, believing that they earn merit before God by assisting a zeal whose sole aim, it seems, is to arrest the course of a pernicious doctrine, by discrediting everywhere those who pass for its authors. It is thus that the prejudgment forms and imperceptibly increases, until it passes into the minds of many as a constant truth against which the accused can no longer be admitted to justify themselves.

But if these persons, either a little better instructed or a little more attentive, wished, before pronouncing so decided a judgment in a matter of this importance, to consult the rules of prudence and charity more than they do, I believe that the scruple of a rash judgment might arise in their conscience. I am persuaded that they would at least suspend for some time the sentence which they pronounce without hesitation against an entire Society, which has perhaps rendered some services to them themselves, and which, constantly for more than a century, has served the Church in every part of the world with some success and with some advantage to Religion.

Would it then be possible, say these persons, whose intentions are often very upright, would it be possible that so many people of every rank, of every condition, and of the holiest professions should all be calumniators; or that, without knowledge of the cause, they should every day carry themselves away, in public and in private, into cruel invectives against a body that was innocent of the frightful excesses with which they reproach it? But let them permit me to ask them in turn whether they can easily persuade themselves that a Society such as that of the Jesuits is only a collection of villains and abominable persons. For there is no middle ground here; and if they are such as they are depicted in the libels published against them, they must be regarded as monsters within Christianity.

In vain do their most declared enemies, through an affected moderation, sometimes contrast the regularity of this Society with the detestable doctrine they attribute to it. They live well, says one of their most venomous adversaries, but they teach badly. This contrast is a chimera. To live well and to undertake to ruin the doctrine of the Gospel throughout the earth by a detestable Moral Theology are two things that cannot be reconciled. It has indeed been seen at various times that certain leaders of a heretical party constantly maintained, in order to gain followers, the appearance of a severe virtue. But a Society as extensive as that of the Jesuits, which preserved the integrity of morals for more than a century while applying itself to corrupting them among Christians throughout the earth, would be a prodigy without example and beyond probability.

It is in no way natural to reserve severity for oneself while teaching laxity to others. The contrary happens every day to several of those who appear most animated against this alleged corrupted Moral Theology of the Jesuits. The world is witness to it. Worldly though it is, it is scandalized by it and makes sport of it. Many upright persons groan over it. But after all, judging things by the lights of good sense, it will always be less surprising to see Rigorism preached by those who live in laxity than it would be to see laxity preached by those who practice Rigorism. It is easy to do the first, and it is very much the fashion in the time in which we live. There is no attraction in the second. One gains nothing thereby either on God’s side or on the world’s. It would be to damn oneself at great cost, without being able to reimburse oneself for anything; it would be to enter hell by the narrow gate. Such a project was never in accordance with the ideas of self-love, and, to have conceived it, the Jesuits would all have to be different from the rest of mankind.

This presumption alone appears decisive to many persons in the subject at issue; but I do not wish to avail myself of it to the point of making it the sole proof of the Jesuits’ innocence in defending them against the execrable undertaking imputed to them, of undertaking to ruin everywhere the Moral Teaching of Jesus Christ. What I intend solely is thereby to put all equitable persons who might be prejudiced in a better state to judge soundly of so important a fact, to engage them to suspend for a moment their judgment between the two parties, and to dispose them to receive, with a spirit of charity and equity, the declaration I shall make in the name of the Society of Jesus on the point of Moral Theology. It is for the same end that I am going to add some reflections on the occasion and the origin of the accusations made against it in this matter, and on the means that have been used to support them and to render them plausible to an infinity of persons to whom their atrocity alone had at first rendered them incredible.

Until the time of Baius and Jansenius, the Jesuits were in possession of the reputation of persons perfectly orthodox in matters of Faith and Moral Theology. They could produce on this subject the praises which the Sovereign Pontiffs have so many times bestowed upon their Society, and in particular upon several of their principal Doctors. The heretics of France, England, and Germany could further serve them as witnesses in this regard. According to these Protestant Doctors, to attack the doctrine of the Jesuits was to attack that of the Roman Church. At that time the reproaches of laxity and semipelagianism were common to the Society of Jesus and to the congregation of the faithful. It was a very great honor to this Society to see itself, together with the Church, the object of the calumnies and persecutions of heretics; and nothing contributed more to increasing the esteem and affection that true Catholics had for the Jesuits.

But as soon as the Theologians of this Society had risen up against the innovations of Baius, had denounced them to the Sovereign Pontiffs, and had obtained their condemnation - and much more still when the errors of Jansenius had been anathematized by the Church - then the supporters of this heresy and all the partisans of Jansenius suddenly turned against the Jesuits and began, more than ever, to take them to task.

This was a stratagem to cause the public to mistake the issue. These Innovators were continually pressed hard concerning the fact of Jansenius, over which they persisted in their revolt against the Church and against the Ordinances of the King. To be ceaselessly on the defensive was for them a disadvantageous and very inconvenient course. This, therefore, is again what determined them to attack the Jesuits and to bring suit against them concerning their alleged corrupted Moral Theology.

Then appeared that fine System of the policy of the Jesuits, who have among themselves, it was said, two sorts of Directors: severe Directors and accommodating Directors; the one sort to attract persons of virtue, the other so as not to repel sinners - an infallible means of making themselves masters of every conscience, a secret of the Society which no one until then had penetrated, and whose use turned upon the doctrine of probable opinions.

Since this was a pure counteraccusation to which all the Author’s wit, whatever efforts he might make, could give no plausibility, this idea at first amused many more persons than it persuaded. It even scandalized several who believed that raillery could not be permitted in a subject of this nature. Nevertheless they continued; and, by making various extracts from the books of the Society - some faithful, some unfaithful, some capable of shocking the ordinary run of people who do not examine matters deeply, although there was nothing in them but what was orthodox - they succeeded in giving some color to what had at first appeared a pure chimera.

They did not stop there; and those whom the condemnation of the doctrine of Jansenius had consternated, profiting from the impression that these first attempts had made against the Jesuits, took courage again. They stirred up on every side, especially in Flanders and in France, in every Town and even in the countryside, persons who began, in rivalry with one another, to cry out against the corrupted Moral Theology of the Jesuits. Nothing was seen but libels scattered everywhere, but persons who, dispersed throughout all assemblies and private companies, let themselves loose against the Jesuits. The pulpits of truth, destined to preach charity to the peoples, became in several places theaters of the most venomous calumny. Mechanisms were set in motion to bring into this plot entire bodies of Ecclesiastics from the most considerable cities of the Kingdom. The diversity and multiplicity of the Jesuits’ employments, and the blessings God bestows upon them therein, having at all times raised up many jealous rivals against them, they saw new adversaries rise against them in the Universities and in several religious orders.

One individual of their Society was perhaps the person who caused them the greatest harm in this persecution. In defiance of his Provincial, he caused a Book entitled Apology for the Casuists to appear, in which, taking his position very imprudently upon several particular cases, he drew upon himself the just censure of several Prelates. They did not fail to make all the Jesuits answerable for a work which the wisest and most learned among them were themselves the very first to detest and which was authentically disavowed. Everywhere this book and these censures were used to confirm the idea of the Jesuits’ Moral Theology which the partisans of Jansenius were spreading everywhere. The libels most filled with falsehoods and the grossest calumnies were received with applause and found credence everywhere. The Apologies of these Fathers, however solid they were, were scarcely regarded and produced hardly any other effect than to give occasion for replies even more insulting and calumnious than the first works written against them. All the censures of Rome which branded most of these libels were mocked, and no more account was made of the Decrees of the King’s Council which condemned them to the fire.

But at last the storm was calmed with time. Composure returned after this violent and impetuous fire. Wise persons for the most part soon perceived that passion and cabal had more part in this persecution than true zeal. Those who knew the Jesuits, or who until then had entrusted to them the direction of their conscience, bore witness to themselves that the Moral Theology of these Fathers was not such as it was depicted in the satires published against them. The Parish Priests of Paris and Rouen, who had made the greatest noise, came back for the most part and were sorry to have seconded, contrary to their intention, the passion of a party whose evil designs they recognized.

The greater part of the Prelates of France and Flanders have shown since that time, by the conduct they have maintained toward the Jesuits, that they did not have of their doctrine the ideas which people had endeavored to give them; and they have often borne witness that they had no persons in their Dioceses who labored for the spiritual good of the peoples with more usefulness, more edification, more disinterestedness, and more submission to their Orders.

The most distinguished persons in the Kingdom did not recognize them in the frightful portraits made of them: the intercourse they had had with them; the education that several had received from them; the conduct of those among these Fathers whom their employment obliged sometimes to appear at Court, where, whatever care one takes to dissemble, one is soon known for what one is; their constant application in their most arduous functions; their zeal for the most dangerous Missions - all these ideas, which calumny had not yet been able to efface, rendered the most violent efforts of their Adversaries almost useless.

The Lords of the Court, the Magistrates, and the Nobility of all the Provinces were seen to entrust their children, as before, to these Fathers, to raise them in Letters and in the fear of God, and to render them the honorable testimony that nowhere were the two better united. Their College of Paris, despite all contrary intrigues, did not cease to be as it were the Seminary of all the most distinguished children in the Kingdom. Several of those who were the least attached to them followed the example of the others in this regard, themselves contributing, as if in spite of themselves, to justify them by their own conduct; and everyone agreed that this was the most solid Apology that could be made in their favor against the continual and horrible satires of their enemies.

Notwithstanding all this, the agitations have recommenced for some time past more vigorously than ever; and the Jesuits were often warned that a new storm was forming against them. In fact, severe blows have been dealt them during the last few years. They have tried to parry some of them. They have done so with equal force and modesty; and they have had the consolation of seeing that equitable and well-informed persons have always rendered them justice against Adversaries who do not become discouraged, and who are as constant in the persecution they have stirred up against them as in their revolt against the Church.

Nevertheless, neither do I wish to draw advantage for the defense of this Society from this new presumption furnished me by the character of most of those who for fifty years have made so harsh a war upon it, while they secretly prepare other devices against the Church itself. The sole use I intend to make of it, as also of the first, is to prevent people from relying too readily upon witnesses who must be so suspect, and upon certain others whom they have prejudiced by their artifices and by the clamor they have deliberately raised on every side; and to obtain from those who will read this defense some attention to what I am going to say in what follows.

All Christian Moral Theology can be reduced to two articles. The first comprises what is expressly contained in Scripture, in Tradition, in the Commandments of God and of the Church, in the Councils, and in the Decisions of the Holy See. The second contains an infinity of other cases which are not evidently decided by these first Rules and concerning which, for this reason, there is division among the Doctors in the Schools. One may further include in this number the explanation sometimes given to the Commandments of God or to Scripture, on the occasion of certain particular difficulties which arise in the dealings that men have with one another and which concern the extent of their duties, whether toward God, toward their neighbor, or toward themselves.

I do not believe that the Jesuits need an Apology on the first article; and I think they will not be reproached with ever having taught that adulteries, robberies on the highways, blasphemies, and other similar sins are permitted. It is true that they have been accused of having permitted Idolatry in China; but they have always said that Idolatry was a crime, and the question was reduced to knowing whether what they permitted was actually Idolatry.

It is therefore only the second article that is at issue, that is, things which are not evidently contained in the rules of our Faith, concerning which it is claimed that they always fall into laxity. Here are some propositions whose examination will clarify the truth or falsity of this accusation.

The Jesuits, in matters of Moral Theology, have always followed, in conformity with one of their Rules, the common opinions of the Catholic Schools.

If this proposition is true, it alone suffices to place the doctrine of this Society beyond all suspicion. Now it is a fact which the Jesuits boldly advance: that what ought to be regarded as the doctrine of their Society has always been a doctrine common in the Catholic Universities.

Since this proposition is the solid foundation upon which the justification and conduct of the Jesuits in matters of doctrine must be supported, it is appropriate to apprehend it well and explain it well, so that it may not be believed that, in a proposition too general and capable of having various senses, they are preparing evasions for themselves in order to elude the reproaches their adversaries make against them.

First, this does not mean that the Society of Jesus has a determinate opinion on each point of Theology which is also the general opinion of all the Schools and all the Catholic Universities. That could not be, because upon an infinity of questions opinions are divided there. But in this very division the opposed opinions are often equally common, and it is said of both the one and the other that they are a common doctrine in the School, because the affirmative and the negative are maintained indifferently.

When, therefore, the Jesuits say that their Society has always professed to follow the doctrine commonly received in the Schools and in the Catholic Universities, this means that in each question of Theology it has always kept to the opinions which were current in the School, and which were ordinarily followed there by the Catholic Doctors.

Second, when the Jesuits advance that the doctrine of their Society has always been the common doctrine of the Schools and Catholic Universities, they do not mean that no individual member of their body has ever departed from it, nor that none of their Theologians has ever maintained any proposition worthy of being reproved and censured. They are far from either thinking it or saying it. That would be to give themselves a praise which befits only Holy Scripture and the Church inspired by the Holy Spirit. There is within Christianity neither School nor University several of whose Doctors have not been subject to these weaknesses and these wanderings of the human mind. The Body of the holy Fathers itself, the most respectable body in the Church, is not exempt from this stain. Saint Augustine, saint though he is, has propositions of lax Moral Theology; some could be shown in Saint Jerome and in several other Fathers. And the Jesuits have no difficulty in making such an admission with regard to some of their Theologians. But what they advance without fear, and of which they are ready to furnish the proof, is that the doctrine received and authorized in their Society, that which is commonly followed there, is the same as that which they found was taught in the other Catholic Schools and Universities when they entered them, and that they can no more than the others be reproached for having departed from it.

Here, then, is a means altogether suited to the purpose and a very just rule for determining the truth or falsity of the reproach of lax Moral Theology made against the Jesuits. Has anything been commonly taught in their Society other than what has been commonly taught in the Catholic Schools and Universities? If a difference can be shown in this respect between their School and the other Catholic Schools, condemnation must be pronounced against them; if it cannot be shown, from that moment they are justified.

Some particular cases may be produced in which some of their Theologians have been mistaken; the same will be produced from the other Societies, and I dare advance that a greater number will be produced. Since these mistakes of certain individuals do not take from the other bodies the quality of being orthodox in the matter of Moral Theology, what injustice would it be if they caused the Society of Jesus alone to lose it? Here, then, once again, is the fixed point upon which everything must turn in this matter.

Let the adversaries of the Jesuits attack them on this point and press them as vigorously as they can. They must necessarily make an opening in them at this point; otherwise, it will always be the most manifest injustice to wish to distinguish them from all the other Societies by the shameful character of laxity in Moral Theology.

I add some other propositions which will serve to develop further the general proposition I have just made.

When a Jesuit Theologian has adopted some particular opinion rejected as bad in the Catholic Schools, the greater part of the Theologians of the Society have been against it; and, generally speaking, this Theologian has been neither the only nor the first of the Theologians to have departed on that point. I shall later descend into some detail which may serve as proof of this proposition. The Jesuits again boldly expose it to the criticism of their most vigorous adversaries: let them only take care to apprehend it correctly. But if this fact is true, if, when it is advanced by the Jesuits, it is left without its falsity being shown, calumny is disarmed, and the truth of the fundamental proposition I made at the outset is perfectly established: that the doctrine of the Society, that is, the doctrine authorized by the common sentiment of the Jesuits, is the same as that of the other Catholic Schools; and that, consequently, it is wrong to affect to establish a kind of opposition between the doctrine of the Jesuits and that of the other Catholic Doctors.

When some opinion has been condemned by the Church or by the Holy See, by whatever authority it had previously found itself supported, there is no Society whose superiors have taken greater care than the superiors of the Jesuits have done to ensure that it was not taught in their Schools; and it has scarcely happened that any individual has done so, and has done so with impunity.

This proposition is likewise submitted to the examination of those who will be willing to take the trouble to make it, provided that, as has sometimes happened, they do not go and make the Popes say things they have not said, and that they keep precisely to their censure, without extending it according to their caprice and following their own fixed notions.

To these three points in justification of the conduct of the Jesuits in matters of doctrine, upon which they consent to be put to the severest test, I do not see very well what could be opposed, unless perhaps that, for them, it is not a sufficient means of justification to have followed the common doctrine received in the Catholic Schools, because this very doctrine, common though it is, is a lax doctrine.

It will no doubt not be for the Jesuits to reply to such an answer, all the more because in this very proposition they win their cause on the capital point. For the essential part of the injustice done to them, and that which must be most keenly felt by them, is that people affect to distinguish them from all the others and to regard their Theology as the sole source of corrupted Moral Theology. Now, this answer being supposed, they are merged into the crowd. Here are the School of Saint Thomas, that of Scotus, that of the Sorbonne, and all the other Catholic Universities placed in the same rank. It will no longer be said that lax Moral Theology and the Moral Theology of the Jesuits are the same thing. They will no longer be made solely answerable for the laxity of Christians. They came after the others, and it is a misfortune for them to have drawn from sources already poisoned; and they will no longer need anything but a reform which will be common to them with all the Doctors who until now have passed for Catholics. But these are among those paradoxes in which the character of the Innovating spirit appears too visibly for them to need to be refuted.

The Jesuits do not intend to stop here with these general justifications, however solid they may be. They wish to make an authentic declaration of the sentiments of their Society upon certain particular points concerning which calumny has most cruelly outraged them. They wish to make known to the whole Church that they take, as one of the rules of their doctrine, the condemnation of that great number of propositions in matters of cases of conscience pronounced by Popes Alexander VII, Innocent XI, and Alexander VIII. Moreover, they maintain that none of these condemned propositions has ever been the doctrine of their Society; that most have never been taught by any of their authors; that those which have been taught by some, as it has happened that several other non-Jesuit Theologians maintained them, they disavow; that since the Briefs of the Popes they have always watched to ensure that they were no longer taught in their Schools; and that they are resolved to do in this regard what they have always constantly done since their Society was established, namely, to yield to no Ecclesiastical body in the submission they owe to the Orders of the Church and of him who is its visible head upon earth.