§ III. Proof of the System

For the sake of clarity and order, we divide the subject matter into three parts, demonstrating the System 1° by parts, by intrinsic and extrinsic arguments; 2° as a whole at once, from the approbation of the Church; 3° by refuting the opposite systems.

70. • The Equi-probabilism of St. Alphonsus, as is clear from its explanation, is opposed on one side to Probabiliorism, insofar as it teaches that, in the concurrence of opinions equally or almost equally probable, it is lawful to follow the less safe one, as often as the doubt is turned, as most often happens, to the existence of the law. On the other side, however, and indeed by the twin part of itself, it excludes simple and common Probabilism, insofar as it teaches that it is illicit to follow the less safe opinion in the concurrence of the safer, when 1° the latter is notably more probable, or 2° the doubt concerns the cessation of a certain law. We complete the whole matter in three propositions.

71. • It is not permitted to follow the less probable opinion for liberty in concurrence with a notably more probable one for the law.

Proof I. From reason. - For in the case posited, on one side the opinion for liberty does not appear truly probable; and on the other side the law is not truly doubtful. Hence it follows that the reflex principles of Probabilism cannot be applied here, since they proceed only in doubt; for they are: "A doubtful law does not oblige. - In doubt the condition of the possessor is better."

I say: 1° The opinion for liberty does not appear truly probable. - That opinion is truly and readily, that is, notwithstanding the opposite, probable, whose motives are such that they suffice to obtain the assent of a prudent man. But the motives of the less probable sentence in concurrence with one much more probable do not suffice to obtain the assent of a prudent man, but only to introduce some fear of the opposite. Therefore a sentence of this kind is not truly and readily probable.

Proof of the minor. For 1° the force and efficacy of those motives is weakened and elided by much stronger motives, since, as St. Alphonsus says,¹ the certainly or notably more probable sentence has for itself a certain foundation that it is true, which foundation the opposite lacks.

2° No prudent person can assent to an opinion which he judges to be much more probably false than true. For assent is an act of the mind by which we judge something true or likely to be true; but the more one opinion is much more likely to be true, the more we necessarily judge this one much more probably true, but the opposite not only not probably true, but on the contrary much more probably false. Therefore we cannot prudently assent to the latter.

Therefore, although a less probable opinion considered apart can appear probable, nevertheless, compared with the opposite much more probable opinion, it certainly ceases to be probable. Wherefore St. Alphonsus writes suitably:² "A truly probable opinion is only that which has intrinsic and extrinsic foundations equally or almost equally valid as the opposite for the law, so that the law appears certainly and strictly doubtful."

I say: 2° The law is not truly doubtful. - For doubt is a suspension of assent between opposites. But in the case of the proposition assent for the law cannot be suspended. Therefore the law is not truly doubtful.

Proof of the minor. Then alone does the intellect fluctuate between two opposed parts, when motives for each part are either absent or appear equal. This is the doctrine of St. Thomas, which we related in n. 68. But in the case the motives are by no means equal, but appear much stronger for the law than for liberty. Therefore the intellect cannot deny assent to the law, though with some fear of the opposite part.¹

72. • Proof II. From the authority of St. Thomas. The Angelic Doctor altogether favors the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, since on one side he teaches that doubt then occurs when reasons move equally or almost equally to each part, as we noted in n. 68, 2°; whence it follows spontaneously that, if reasons move much more strongly to one part, we are outside the state of doubting; and on the other side he affirms that in human acts strict certainty is not demanded, but probable certainty suffices, as we showed in n. 68 under 2. These two things agree perfectly with the thesis of St. Alphonsus.

73. • From the things said above we conclude: if, notwithstanding these things, the will should choose the part favoring liberty, it will choose from affection alone toward that part, not from the dictate of reason; therefore it will choose rashly and imprudently, because an election which is not led by reason cannot be free from imprudence and temerity.²

Deservedly, therefore, the Holy Doctor affirms: "This sentence" (that someone can licitly follow an opinion even less probable for liberty, although the opinion for the law is certainly more probable) "the authors of the past century almost commonly held; but we say that it is lax and cannot licitly be embraced."³

74. • When opinions almost equally probable concur, in doubt concerning the existence of the law, it is permitted to follow the opinion favoring liberty.

I. It is proved from reason.

The obligation of pursuing the safer part, if any were present, would come either from the part of liberty destitute of its right, or from the part of the law endowed with the force of obliging. But from neither of the aforesaid parts can the obligation arise. Therefore no obligation of pursuing the safer part is given.

Proof of the minor by parts. I. Not from the part of liberty as though destitute of its right.

This is drawn from the principle of possession: "In doubt the condition of the possessor is better," which in other words signifies: A certain right cannot be taken away by a supervening uncertain opposed right. Hence I reason thus: in doubt the possessor conquers; but liberty is in possession against every doubtful law (understand: doubtful as to existence); therefore in doubt concerning the existence of the law, liberty conquers. - The same reasoning can be proposed thus: in doubt no one is to be deprived of his own thing or his own right, which he legitimately possesses; but liberty is a legitimately possessed right; therefore on account of a doubtful law a man is not deprived of his liberty.

Proof of the major assumption. In doubt the possessor conquers. - Natural reason proclaims the truth of this axiom. For whoever certainly and in good faith possesses some thing cannot be deprived of that thing except on account of certain reasons which prove that there is no longer a right of possessing for him, since everyone who possesses is presumed to possess by right until the contrary is shown, just as no one is presumed evil unless he is proved so. Therefore until this has been proved by certain reasons, the presumption arising from possession gives a certain right to the possessor according to the principle of law: "In doubt one must stand for that part for which presumption stands." Besides, that principle has always been admitted by all in the matter of justice before all tribunals, both civil and ecclesiastical.

Proof of the minor assumption. Liberty is in possession against every doubtfully existing law. The minor assumption will stand if we have proved the following two things: 1° that the principle of possession also holds in the matter of simple honesty; 2° that man possesses liberty against a doubtful law.

As to the 1st. Both the principle of presumption, "In doubt one must stand for that part for which presumption stands," and that one, "Against a preceding certain right a doubt which has arisen cannot prevail," are plainly universal principles and of natural right. But the principle of possession taken analogically is exactly the same, as we explained above in n. 65. Therefore the principle of possession holds in any matter of simple honesty.

Besides, St. Alphonsus suitably notes: "Possession," says Sanchez,¹ "is a universal title for all the virtues, in that way in which another potential part of justice, such as obedience to God, transcends all virtues. For since the essence of justice is to render to each one his own right, this belongs to every virtue; insofar as religion renders his right to God, charity to the neighbor, temperance to oneself, and so of the others; and therefore it is deservedly said that the notion of justice is a potential, or generic, part of all the virtues, in which the other virtues agree among themselves. Wherefore, if it were against justice to deprive a possessor in doubt of his own right, it is likewise against justice in doubt of law to despoil man of his possessed liberty."¹

Notes to preceding text - note sequence 1.

1 Dec. L. I, c. 10, n. 11.

Add that the force of this principle in the matter of simple honesty is commonly admitted by Probabilists, chief among whom besides St. Alphonsus are Suarez,² Lugo,³ Sanchez,⁴ Croix, Salmanticenses,⁶ Roncaglia,⁷ Bonacina,⁸ Sporer,⁹ etc.

It will help to have noted in this place that the principle of possession admits a stricter application in the matter of justice than in the matter of the other virtues, because justice is more rigid than the other virtues. For unlike the other virtues, the mean of justice is the mean of the thing, that is, of equality of thing to thing; and the right which justice regards is a strict or rigorous right. Hence it happens that disputes concerning justice demand stricter proofs.¹⁰

As to the 2nd. God from his good pleasure created man free and afterwards imposed precepts upon him by which his liberty is restricted, according to that of Eccli.¹¹ "God from the beginning established man and left him in the hand of his own counsel. He added his commandments and precepts."

Notes to preceding text - note sequence 2.

1 Dissert. a. 1763, n. 19. 2 In 1. 2. D. Thom. tr. 3, de bonit. et malit. act. human. Disput. 12, Sect. 5, n. 7, 8. - De Relig. tr. 6, l. 4, c. 5, n. 7 et seqq. - De Censur. Disp. 40, Sect. 5, n. 14, 15. 3 De Justit. Disp. 17, n. 87. Disp. 23, n. 110. | 4 Decal. L. I, c. 10, n. 10, 11. | 5 Lib. I, n. 502. | 6 Tr. 20, c. 6, n. 7. | 7 Tr. 1, q. 1, c. 3, q. 3. 8 De Peccat. q. 4, p. 7, n. 13. | 9 Tr. 1, n. 75. | 10 Cf. S. Alph. L. I, 36. L. VI, 905. | 11 15, v. 14, 15.

From this, in doubt concerning the existence of some law, the following argumentation can be used. The certain divine will must be preferred to the uncertain; but that God endowed man with liberty and does not will that he be deprived of his liberty insofar as some precept does not require its restriction (for that is called licit, from St. Thomas, which is prohibited by no law), is a certain divine disposition. But whether God wills that in the case of a doubtful law man renounce his own liberty is uncertain. Therefore with a safe conscience he persists in possession of the liberty with which God endowed him, until his contrary will becomes known to him.¹

Conclusion. - From the things proved there follows: 1° Since liberty is certain and prior to the law, man is presumed free in every case where the law is not established. Hence this rule flows spontaneously: "What is not certainly prohibited is licit."

2° The rule of the Anti-Probabilists is false: "Nothing is licit unless it is morally established that it was permitted by God." For if this were true, God should not have had to promulgate a law, but those things which he permits us to do.²

75. • II. No obligation is given from the part of the law, as though endowed with the force of obliging. - In order that the assertion may appear, the principle must be established: "A doubtful law does not oblige."

But it must be warned beforehand that the enunciated principle, taken in a too general sense, is false. For from the things proved and still to be proved in Proposition III, it is established that it must be understood of a law simply doubtful, that is, doubtfully existing. In the same way St. Alphonsus understands the principle; for he always uses it to prove that a doubtful law, as insufficiently promulgated, and therefore doubtfully existing, does not oblige.

That principle is proved: 1° From defect of promulgation and invincible ignorance. The promulgation of law in subjects is required essentially, so that the law may have the force of obliging. But where the law is doubtful, true promulgation of it is lacking. Therefore a doubtful law does not oblige.

Proof of the major. Law cannot be a rule of acting for a free being unless it becomes known to him; but it is brought to his notice through promulgation; therefore promulgation is of the essence of law.³

Proof of the minor. A law invincibly unknown to subjects is not sufficiently promulgated; but doubt of law, invincible by human study, is invincible ignorance; therefore a doubtful law is a non-promulgated law.

Proof of the minor assumption. We are said invincibly to be ignorant of those things concerning which we do not have sufficient foundation for affirming rather than denying. But such a sufficient foundation is equally lacking where the reasons for law and liberty are almost equal on each side, and where there are none, since in either case the intellect remains equally suspended. Therefore.

Note. - 1° In the argument brought forward, the Holy Doctor does not expressly distinguish the promulgation of the law made to the community from the knowledge of it in the subject. He considers the matter practically; for practically a law not becoming sufficiently known to the subject returns to the same point as a law not sufficiently promulgated.

2° You would wrongly turn back upon him the argument which he seeks from invincible ignorance, by inferring from it that even a certainly more probable law, as not certainly known, is invincibly unknown. For he holds that this law, as sufficiently known, that is, from the rules of prudence, which is a virtue of the practical intellect,¹ obliges.

2° From the principle of causality. A doubtful law obliges either certainly, or doubtfully, or in no way. But the first is impossible, because an effect cannot be greater than its cause. The second is absurd; for the will follows the intellect, and therefore unless the intellect is convinced, the will is not bound. But no doubtful knowledge necessitates the intellect to assent; therefore no doubtful law binds the will to obey. Therefore the third remains.

3° From the presumed will of the Divine Legislator. God is legitimately presumed not to will to oblige by a doubtful law when the end of creation is obtained equally. But thus the matter stands. Therefore.

Proof of the minor. The end of creation is the glory of God and the salvation of men. But each is obtained even when doubtful laws are not observed. Therefore.

Proof of the minor assumption. The glory of God as well as the salvation of men exists from the perfect obedience of men given to the divine laws. But while certain laws are observed, doubtful laws, which are believed not to oblige, even not being observed, an equally perfect submission is given to God by men. Therefore, without the observance of those laws, the end of creation is obtained equally.

Proof of this minor. Although the law exists objectively, nevertheless God does not will it to oblige proximately and subjectively unless it also exists subjectively in conscience, sufficiently known by moral diligence. But when doubtful laws are believed by the conscience of men not to oblige, men perfectly obey God from the observance of certain laws alone.¹

76. • It pleases us to note in this place that it is illicit to use two probable opinions at the same time in the same act, if from this one law is certainly violated. For example, a testament lacking legal form is probably valid; it also more probably is not valid. Therefore it is not permitted, by following the former sentence, to enter upon the inheritance, and at the same time, by following the latter, not to pay the legacies contained in the same testament. By this deed the observance of one or the other law is necessarily evaded, and the agent contradicts himself in the same act.²

77. • Historical notice. Disputations about the choice of opinions in practice arose after the middle of the sixteenth century. Then first came forth the System of Probabilism, whose author is reputed to be Bartholomaeus Medina, of the Order of Preachers; this System was immediately received very commonly, as the adversaries themselves confess. (Therefore if, St. Alphonsus observes, the rigid sentence, as its followers assert gratuitously, had from the beginning of the Church up to that time been in possession, how could it have happened that so quickly it was commonly rejected by the Doctors, and the benign sentence received?) In the time of Cornelius Jansenius various Systems of Anti-Probabilism came forth, among which Probabiliorism, from the influence of Jansenistic fraud, was more commonly received up to our century. But, as usually happens in controversies of this kind, extremes were avoided by neither part. For just as certain Probabilists slipped into too lax doctrines, which the Supreme Pontiffs proscribed, so also their adversaries struck upon extreme rigor, which was likewise reproved by the Holy See. For the rest, that the use of probable opinion in the matter of honesty alone has always flourished in the Church can be proved against the Anti-Probabilists by many testimonies, some of which we shall bring forward, and by no certain testimony can it be refuted. Besides, Probabilism numbers among its patrons theologians of great name. Finally, today it is received everywhere in the Church.

78. • I. From the testimony of the Holy Fathers. From them it is evidently shown that in doubt the safer part is not always to be followed. Thus St. Augustine: "For what is proved to be neither against faith nor against good morals must be held indifferently."¹ St. Gregory Nazianzen: "Either prove that the matter is thus, or if you cannot do that, do not condemn; but if the matter is doubtful, let humanity and ease conquer."² St. Leo the Great: "In those things which are doubtful or obscure, let us know that this must be followed which is found neither contrary to the evangelical precepts nor opposed to the decrees of the Holy Fathers."³ St. Bernard: "Indeed there each one abounds safely in his own sense, where that which is thought by him does not stand opposed either to certain reason or to an authority not to be despised."⁴

That the force of the argument sought from the Fathers may be clearer to you, go, if you please, to the cited passages of the Fathers, where, from the occasion on which the words adduced were written, you will discover that cases really probabilistic are dealt with in them. The cited words of St. Leo the Great and Bernard are general. The praised epistle of St. Augustine is wholly occupied in admonishing Januarius that he should not condemn customs observed in various regions or churches, unless they are certainly opposed to the Faith or good morals. The passage from St. Gregory Nazianzen regards the question whether it is lawful for widows after Baptism to proceed to second marriages.

79. • II. From the consent of the Doctors. The prince of theologians, St. Thomas, speaks thus: "The command of one governing is related to binding in voluntary matters by that mode of binding which can happen to the will, as bodily action is related to binding bodily things by the necessity of coercion. But the bodily action of an agent never introduces necessity into another thing except through the contact of the coercion itself with the thing in which it acts; hence neither is anyone bound from the command of any lord unless the command reaches him to whom it is commanded. But it reaches him through knowledge. Hence no one is bound by some precept except through the mediation of knowledge of that precept. . . . As in bodily things a bodily agent does not act except through contact, so in spiritual things a precept does not bind except through knowledge."¹ St. Isidore: "But the law will be manifest."² To these are added most excellent theologians who are Probabilists, as Suarez, Lugo, Sanchez, Sylvius, Toletus, Lessius, Laymann, Bonacina, the Salmanticenses, Amort, and many others.³

80. • From the approbation of the Works of St. Alphonsus. Recall what was said on p. lxxix, and notice that by the judgment of the Holy See itself the System of St. Alphonsus is safe, and that any other system, for example that of simple and common Probabilism, lacks a testimony of this kind.

81. • When opinions almost equally probable concur, in doubt concerning the cessation of a certain law, the opinion favoring the law must be followed.

It is a logical corollary of the preceding proposition. For: 1° If a doubtful law, supervening upon certain liberty, does not bind the latter, by the same reason, conversely, doubtful liberty, supervening upon a certain law, does not dissolve the latter. 2° As invincible ignorance concerning the existence of a law excludes obligation, so the same ignorance concerning the cessation of the law excludes disobligation. 3° If in invincible doubt concerning the existence of a law liberty is presumed, likewise in invincible doubt concerning the cessation of a law obligation is presumed; for the rights of law and of liberty, in an equal cause, must be equal. On these causes especially the Probabilism of St. Alphonsus merits the name of Equi-probabilism, namely because it not only indicates most rightly the limits of true probability, but also favors law and liberty with an equal balance, attributing equal rights to each in the same circumstances, not using weight and weight.⁴

82. • I. Strict Rigorism. This System was condemned, proposition 3 having been condemned by Alexander VIII: "It is not permitted to follow an opinion, either among probable opinions the most probable, or among probable opinions the most probable of all." This proposition is openly false; for if the opinion for liberty is most probable of all, the opinion for the law will be only slightly or doubtfully probable; but on account of a weak motive to despoil liberty of its own certain right is openly against natural right. Therefore the System is false.

83. • II. Laxism. It was condemned, proposition 3 having been condemned by Innocent XI: "Generally, when relying on probability either intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not depart from the bounds of probability, we do something, we always act prudently"; and proposition 27, condemned by Alexander VII: "If a book is by some younger and modern author, the opinion must be judged probable, as long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable." Deservedly also was this doctrine condemned; for a law cannot be judged truly doubtful which is founded on so grave a reason that against it no solid reason can be brought forward, but only a slight reason or authority.

84. • III. Mitigated Tutiorism. As such it did not live long. It is refuted by this argumentation. If the less safe opinion is notably more probable, the opposite for the law becomes slightly or doubtfully probable; but on account of a motive only slightly or doubtfully probable to despoil liberty of its own right is certainly against natural right; therefore . . . Besides, notable greater probability for some opinion founds probable certainty of it; but in human acts probable certainty must suffice; therefore . . . Recall what was said in n. 68 under 2.

85. • IV. Probabiliorism. This System adds uncertain obligations to certain obligations, and thus, with the number of obligations increased, it increases the number of sins. But from the principles of Equi-probabilism it has been demonstrated that uncertain obligations are repugnant to the natural right of liberty. Therefore Probabiliorism denies to liberty the justice owed to it.

86. • V. Simple Probabilism. This system labors under a twofold vice. First indeed, it extends the limits of probability more than is just, by contending that an opinion can enjoy solid probability even though the opposite is much more probable, which we sufficiently showed cannot be admitted in nn. 71-73. Then Probabilism does not temper the principle by the principle of possession; hence it violates the right of possession of the law and indulges liberty more than is just. For the patrons of this System, by always defending the parts of liberty wherever the opinion is probable, use weight and weight; indeed, the arguments by which they prove that liberty is not bound by a doubtful law do not convert against liberty, where precisely the same reason has force for a certainly existing law. For if the following reasoning has force in favor of liberty where the law is doubtful - a doubtful law does not oblige, because he is not obliged who invincibly does not know himself to be obliged - the conversion of the same must necessarily be made in favor of the law when a doubt concerning liberty follows.

Finally it must be noted here that most Probabilists sustained a false principle, namely: "He who acts probably acts prudently." The vice of this principle is in this, that in order to make a certain judgment concerning the honesty of an action it relies on probability, and therefore on doubt as on a motive, but not as on a mere condition, which being posited, a certain reflex principle is employed to form a certain conscience. For when two opposite opinions are about equally probable, the motives of each elide each other's strength for determining the assent of the intellect to one rather than the other. For as much as the motives of one strive to obtain assent, so much do the motives of the other strive in the opposite direction; hence the intellect can prudently adhere to neither before the other, but necessarily remains unmoved and suspended, just as a balance remains suspended in equilibrium when equal weights are in each pan, or just as a stone, drawn in opposite parts by a double equal force, rests unmoved. Therefore he who in such a case commands assent to the opinion favoring liberty, and from it forms the ultimate dictate of conscience, acts imprudently and culpably.¹

87. • Up to this point we have proved that the moderate use of a probable opinion is licit. Further, now it is asked here whether it is also expedient for the salvation of souls to follow benign opinions rather than rigid ones. Concerning this the following rules are handed down.

I. In general: 1° "Where it is a question of removing a penitent from the danger of formal sin, the confessor must, generally speaking, and insofar as Christian prudence suggests" (elsewhere¹ he says more expressly: "insofar as Christian prudence concedes"), "use benign opinions." 2° "But where benign opinions render nearer the danger of formal sin, . . . then it is always expedient that the confessor use, indeed I say that he himself, as a physician of souls, is bound to use, the safer opinions, which lead penitents to be preserved in the state of grace."² Yet as to the manner let him observe this distinction: where the probable danger of sin is present only doubtfully, he is bound altogether to persuade safer opinions; but where such danger is certainly present, he is bound altogether to oblige them to be followed. Moreover, of this kind are some opinions, probable but dangerous in practice, in the matter of the Sixth Precept, concerning touches, kisses, dances, comedies, the repression of sensual motions, the avoiding of proximate occasions, readings dangerous with respect to faith or morals, and similar matters.³

II. As to perfection. Certainly it is more perfect to follow the safer opinions wherever they contain acts of greater virtue and do not give occasion to anxieties and scruples. Hence, generally speaking, we ought to counsel the use of opinions of this kind, as of counsels, when penitents show themselves prepared to follow safer things and prudence dictates that this will profit them.⁴

88. • Objections against Probabilism in general. - Some of these attack the application of the principle: In doubt the condition of the possessor is better, namely, of liberty; and you will easily refute these if you always have properly before your eyes the proper thesis of the Probabilists. For they do not ask whether liberty precedes the law insofar as it is existing in first act, but this one thing: whether it precedes the law insofar as it is actually obliging, or apprehended by conscience.⁵ The Anti-probabilists, by denying this, fall into that absurdity which we noted in n. 74, Conclusion, under 2°. - Notice besides that Probabilists do not affirm that doubtful liberty is certain in itself (which would imply a contradiction in terms), but that in doubt concerning the law liberty certainly possesses, and therefore preserves its right.

89. • Others attack the principle itself: A doubtful law does not oblige, and deny that it has force; either because a) in very many cases it is not doubted whether the law exists, but whether a certainly existing law comprehends this or that case; or because b) the Probabilist, by following a probable less safe sentence, is exposed to the danger of sin; or because c), according to the principle of Canon Law, in doubt the safer part must be chosen.

You will easily remove the objection under a), if you notice that a law, although certainly existing, becomes doubtful with respect to that case about which there is really doubt whether it is comprehended under the law, and therefore with respect to that case does not oblige.¹

To the objection under b):

Resp. 1° I retort the argument against the Probabiliorists: for by following the more probable opinion favoring liberty, which itself can be false, the same danger is given; therefore one would have to flee to condemned Rigorism.

2° I distinguish. It is not permitted to expose oneself to the danger of formal sin: I concede; of material sin: I deny; because merely material sin is not imputable, nor does it offend God, since it is nothing other than the matter of sin, separated from every malice of the will; but where no depraved will intervenes, no sin is present. For this reason proposition 46 of Baius was condemned: "To the reason and definition of sin the voluntary does not pertain."² But Probabilists are in danger of material sin, not of formal sin; for from the reflex principles of Probabilism we are plainly certain that a doubtful law, even if objectively perhaps it were present, is not present subjectively, or does not oblige, that is, is not a law as to us, and therefore its material transgression cannot be imputed to fault.

3° The objection of the adversaries either proves that the principle of possession cannot be applied even in the matter of justice, or it proves nothing. For in the matter of justice, if someone, after a doubt has arisen, perseveres in the use of the right which he possesses, he exposes himself to the danger of violating the natural law; but, as the adversaries confess, this danger of violating the natural law in the matter of justice does not prevent the possessor from conquering in doubt. Therefore the same has force for liberty in any other matter. - Proof of the major. For as soon as a doubt has arisen concerning the property of a thing which someone possesses, there is danger of exercising a right which perhaps belongs not to the possessor but to another, and of receiving fruits which perhaps are not the possessor's, but belong to another despoiled of his right; these two things are manifestly contrary to the natural law.

90. • To the objection under c):

Resp. 1° The aforesaid rule has force a) in practical doubt concerning the formal honesty of the action; b) in doubt of fact with which there is joined the danger of an evil which does not depend on conscience and which we are bound to avoid, about which we spoke in nn. 58-60. For such were the doubts to which the Canons apply that rule; for in those cases it was always a question of practical doubt, or of some evil to be avoided, independent of conscience, as St. Alphonsus clearly proves,¹ by discussing each of those cases. Besides, theologians almost commonly teach that the aforesaid rule of the Canons, as to speculative doubts, is of counsel, not of precept.

2° To the cited rule we oppose Rule 15 in the Sixth: "It is fitting that odious things be restricted and favors amplified"; the 30th: "In obscure things the minimum must be followed"; and this Canon: "Unless you have been certain of the mandate of the Apostolic See, you will not be compelled to execute what is commanded."²

91. • There are those who also object this: that Probabilists are not consistent with themselves, since they except from the principle, A doubtful law does not oblige, those cases which we said in nn. 58-60 must be excepted. But this is objected absurdly, since those cases are improperly called excepted, and in reality must be called cases foreign to Probabilism or not pertaining to Probabilism. For what is the case? Probabilism is occupied with doubtful law, not with certain law. But in those exceptions there is a question of cases in which some law is known certainly to exist, and the doubt is whether by those means which are employed for executing the law the end of the law, and that necessarily to be obtained, is in reality obtained, and therefore whether the law itself is really fulfilled; in which case the safer thing must always be chosen. And the reason is ready to hand: for, since the law is certain, and its execution altogether urges, those means must be used by which the end of the law is certainly, or at least more safely, obtained, and in this way satisfaction is made to the law. For he who wished to employ only doubtful means, where certain means are supplied, would deliberately commit himself to the danger of violating a known law, and therefore would sin. Therefore, where there is a certain obligation of obtaining the end, safer means for attaining this end must be used.

92. • Objections against Equi-probabilism.

These are reduced to three classes.

The first is of those who contend that the distinguished authority of St. Alphonsus, and one sanctioned by the Church, is invoked undeservedly for the patronage of Equi-probabilism, since, as they say, the Holy Doctor of the Church in his Dissertations for the moderate use of probable opinion openly adheres to simple Probabilism. - But how falsely this is objected, and how much this betrays either sloth in reading the works of the Saint or obstinacy in an opinion once undertaken, the things which follow show more clearly than light.

For to one looking through the writings of the Holy Doctor, and indeed the very Dissertations objected, these two things will easily become clear: first, that the Holy Doctor never adhered to simple Probabilism even in his earlier writings, but already taught Equi-probabilism implicitly; second, that in the later writings Equi-probabilism is handed down by him explicitly and systematically. Since even the adversaries themselves do not deny this second point, we dispense all the more from proving it, because the nature of our Compendium does not allow useless discourse (see, for the rest, what was said in n. 73, § Deservedly, and, if you wish, the Vindiciae¹). Therefore it remains that we prove the first. Let the following arguments suffice.

The 1st is sought from the very inscription of the Dissertations, even the two earlier ones, which especially are objected. Namely, the inscription is this: "Dissertation . . . for the moderate use of probable opinion." But the epithet moderate, which the Holy Doctor was the first to use, and certainly not without some reason, sufficiently intimates that Probabilism circumscribed by certain limits is defended by him, and that not only by those by which it is distinguished from condemned Probabilism, but by those by which it is discerned from simple Probabilism. For you see the same epithet placed in the title of the later Dissertations, in which Equi-probabilism is explicitly defended.¹ This argument, although by itself it would not seem to complete the matter, receives force from the following.

The 2nd argument is sought from the little work published by the Holy Doctor in the year 1765, whose title is: "Appendice all' Apologia" (1764), "in risposta all' autore della Regola de' costumi."² In this little work the Holy Doctor writes these things pertaining to our matter: "Speaking of our controversy, in which the question is of two equally probable opinions," etc. Then a little below he adds: "My sentence," namely that very one which he embraces concerning two opinions equally probable, "I examined and recalled to the balance for thirty years and more, . . . often conferring concerning the reasons both of one part and of the other, with Probabilists and Probabiliorists." . . . Therefore, unless you should wish to charge the most holy man with a lie (which God forbid!), it will be necessary to admit that he, at least from the year 1735, and even throughout the very 14 years which preceded the first Dissertation (1749), had already adhered to Equi-probabilism. For in the cited little work, or in the year 1765, the Saint affirms two things: one, that he is an Equi-probabilist; the other, that he had been an Equi-probabilist for 30 years and more. Therefore already long before the first Dissertation, and certainly at that time at which he wrote this first Dissertation, namely in the year 1749.³

The 3rd argument is drawn from the Dissertations of the years 1749⁴ and 1755,⁵ or from those very ones which especially are opposed.

For in these, to the axiom objected to him, "greater probability elides the lesser," the Holy Doctor responds, "that it is false that greater probability elides the lesser, unless when that lesser probability is drawn from the same principle, or unless the more probable opinion has for itself so convincing an argument that the contrary opinion seems truly improbable, or no longer gravely and certainly probable. Yet otherwise it must be said, if the excess is not notable, and the opposite probability receives force from diverse principles (as almost always happens in the concurrence of opinions)." Therefore St. Alphonsus clearly and distinctly teaches that the use of a probable opinion for liberty is licit in concurrence with a more probable one; but only in that case in which the excess is not notable, such as also is the evident excess of only one degree, as the Saint teaches elsewhere.¹²

That we not be longer, we send the reader to the Vindiciae,³ where difficulties are dissolved which are opposed against these three arguments from the writings of the Saint, admonishing our readers of this one thing: that, mindful of the rules of sound criticism, they seek the sense of the Holy Doctor, where his earlier writings seem to fight with his later ones, from these later writings and not from the earlier; and that in the earlier writings, in which he attacks the Probabiliorists, they attend to the purpose of the writing.

93. • The second class of objections comprehends those difficulties which are opposed to Equi-probabilism insofar as it favors the law when the latter is notably or certainly more probable. Namely, the adversaries say that nothing prevents the opinion for liberty from remaining truly and solidly probable even in the case in which the opposite opinion for the law is notably or certainly more probable, provided the more probable reasons which fight for the law are not taken from the same motives from which the reasons for liberty are taken.

But those who argue thus do not attend to the following things.

1° They do not attend to the nature of probability. For a probable opinion is that which rests upon a foundation which has force to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man, or is consistent with the prudence of the agent (n. 52). But prudence requires that, where the truth cannot be clearly found, we embrace that opinion which is undoubtedly known to approach nearer to truth.⁴

2° They do not attend to the inclination implanted in the human mind itself. For where truth cannot be known certainly, the intellect spontaneously embraces what it clearly perceives to approach nearer to the truth; so that he who preferred the less probable opinion to another certainly more probable one would satisfy the will, wherefore he would not act consistently with reason, nor prudently, nor therefore well. See the words of St. Alphonsus cited in n. 73, § From the things said above.

3° They do not attend to the true sense of the reflex principles: "In doubt the condition of the possessor is better," and "A doubtful law does not oblige." For those principles have force only in a true or strict doubt (n. 48, 1 and 68, 2°), or in a perfect suspension of the intellect between each part of a contradiction. This perfect suspension is lacking where the intellect without any hesitation knows one opinion to approach nearer to certainty than the other. Hence St. Alphonsus¹ says: "when an opinion is certainly more probable, in that case, . . . although the law is not altogether certain, nevertheless because of that greater probability, the opinion for the law seems morally truer, and consequently the law also seems morally or sufficiently promulgated; and therefore the law cannot then be called altogether doubtful, with strict doubt; in that case there remains only some broad doubt, which does not permit one to depart from the safer opinion." - You have almost the same in Scotus² in these words: "Since to many the negative part is more probable, someone exposes himself to doubt not without sin, by following the less probable affirmative." Likewise in Suarez³ in these other words: "Greater probability is a certain certainty, if the excess of probability is certain."

4° They do not attend to the twofold mode by which greater probability can elide lesser probability. For one is absolute, by which namely the probability of one proposition is so destroyed by the probability of another that it no longer exists either in itself or relatively; this happens when the probability of contradictory propositions is sought from the same motives. The other, however, is relative or moral, consisting in this, that one probability by reason of the manifest preponderance of reasons takes away from another the force of moving the intellect to a prudent assent.⁴

94. • The third class of objections is constituted by the difficulties which are moved against that part of Equi-probabilism which regards doubts concerning the cessation of a law (n. 81).

To dissolve these, always have before your eyes:

1° That the principle of possession has force not in the matter of justice alone, but also in the matter of honesty, or of any virtue whatsoever, as we proved in n. 74, p. 37, col. 1, § Besides.

2° The more specious objections are those which here we set down with responses.

Obj. I. As often as the law has not proved its own existence, it is nothing for the human will; therefore also as often as the law ceases to prove its own existence, that law also ceases to exist for the human will. For just as obligation depends upon certain knowledge of the law, so also the continuation of the obligation depends upon the continuation of the certain knowledge of the same.

Resp. 1° I retort the conclusion. Therefore also as often as liberty ceases to prove its own existence, liberty also ceases to exist; therefore also, as often as someone ceases to prove his own innocence, innocence also ceases to exist; therefore also, as often as a superior ceases to prove his own power, his power also ceases to exist for the human will. But these conclusions are certainly false. Therefore also the conclusion of the objection, since all rest on the same foundation.

2° It is a pure sophism. I deny the parity. For once the existence and obligation of a law are known, it continues to exist and to oblige until cessation is proved; for it is of the nature of a law to remain, just as it is of the nature of a precept to be determined to one or a few acts. Hence one would have to argue in the following way: As often as the existence of a law is not proved, it is nothing for conscience; therefore also as often as the cessation of a certain law is not proved, there is no cessation for conscience. For just as obligation depends upon certain knowledge of the law, so also cessation of obligation depends upon certain knowledge of cessation.

Obj. II. If a law doubtful with respect to cessation obliges, it follows that a doubtful law obliges as certainly as a certain law; but this does not seem reasonable; therefore it does not oblige.

Resp. 1° I retort the argument. If a doubtfully existing law does not oblige, it follows that doubtful liberty liberates as certainly as certain liberty, which does not seem more reasonable.

2° I distinguish the major. It follows that a law which has doubtfully ceased obliges as certainly as a certain law directly, or by its own force: I deny; indirectly, or by the force of a reflex principle: I concede. - I deny the minor. For this is altogether reasonable, since that principle renders conscience practically certain in doubt.

Obj. III. Equi-probabilists, relying on the principle of possession, teach that one certain of a debt, but doubtful concerning its payment, is bound to pay the whole debt. But it seems too hard and irrational to oblige such a debtor to pay the whole debt, with danger of paying twice and thus undergoing grave loss. Therefore the principle of possession cannot be admitted as a general rule.

Resp. 1° I retort the argument. That does not seem more hard and irrational than prescription made by a possessor who in good faith acquired a thing of notable value, but afterwards invincibly doubts whether it is not another's; and nevertheless, according to the common sentence of theologians and of all tribunals, he can retain that whole thing, with danger of retaining another's thing and gravely harming a third party, that is, the true owner. Likewise, one doubtful concerning a debt is obliged to pay nothing, notwithstanding the same danger of gravely harming another, perhaps the true creditor. Modern writers who in the case objected wish payment to be made according to the proportion of the doubt, if they wished to be consistent with themselves, should also, in the cited case of prescription, oblige the possessor to divide according to the proportion of the doubt, and similarly, in the case of a doubtful debt, oblige the debtor to pay according to the proportion, since in each case entirely the same reason fights; indeed, they should utterly reject the principle of possession even in the matter of justice, which nevertheless they do not do.

2° I deny the minor. The resolution of the Equi-probabilists has nothing contrary to equity, since it rests on a certain principle and, if it is considered as it ought to be, in general, before every event, can equally benefit anyone as it can harm him. In doubts of this kind each one must equally, now for himself, now against himself, resolve the doubt, and in his turn undergo the danger of loss and enjoy the hope of gain: in a doubtful debt, the uncertain creditor sustains the danger; in a doubtful payment of a debt, the uncertain debtor. What is not reasonable in this solution? Neither in this case certainly suffers unjust loss or receives unjust gain. On the contrary, if the debtor in the aforesaid doubts is always forced to pay according to the proportion, one or the other will certainly undergo unjust loss. For in a doubtful debt, if the debt does not exist, someone is forced to pay what he does not owe; but if it exists, the creditor does not receive the whole of what is his; and so likewise in doubt concerning payment having been made. Is this not much less reasonable?

95. • Obj. IV. He who has probably satisfied some obligation is held to nothing further. I prove it: 1° For probability is supported by a grave and prudent judgment; therefore whoever has probably satisfied an obligation does that which suffices in a prudent judgment for fulfilling the precept. But neither does equity allow that more be exacted than what is prudently believed sufficient for fulfilling the precept; nor is a prudent and equitable legislator deservedly judged to will anything more. Therefore.

2° Any exaction beyond that which probably suffices for fulfilling the precept has against itself the probability of this prudent judgment. But an exaction which has against itself a probable judgment becomes, as to this, an uncertain obligation or law, which cannot have the force of obliging. Therefore.

3° From absurdity. For if for a certain obligation you likewise demand a certain satisfaction, the precept cannot be said to be fulfilled not only through a probable or more probable satisfaction, but not even through a most probable satisfaction; for there always remains room to reply that the obligation is certain, but the satisfaction is uncertain or less certain. But this leads by a straight way to condemned Tutiorism. Hence also Billuart¹ and others, although they held Probabiliorism, nevertheless judged that it suffices if you probably satisfy the law. Therefore.

Resp. I. If a single or solitary probability is present (n. 52 under 3°), or a presumption that someone has satisfied, we gladly concede. Recall what was said in n. 67, 1°, b).

II. If there is probability on both sides, as the objection supposes, I deny. Therefore to the 1st and 2nd I retort the argument.

1° Probability is supported by a grave and prudent judgment; therefore whoever probably does not satisfy an obligation does that which, in a prudent judgment, does not suffice for fulfilling the precept. But equity demands that that be exacted which is prudently believed to be required for fulfilling the precept, and a prudent and equitable legislator is deservedly judged to will this. Therefore.

2° The exaction of that which is probably required for fulfilling the precept has for itself the probability of this prudent judgment. But an exaction which has for itself a probable judgment becomes, as to this, a prudent exaction and therefore has the force of obliging. Therefore.

No one fails to see that miserable arguments of this kind, by which someone could prove contradictories with the same right, are of no weight at all, since they utterly elide one another. Thus this manner of arguing could be likened to that poisonous serpent which devoured itself with a monstrous draught, so that nothing remained except the tail. Moreover, it is clear that the aforesaid arguments rest on no other foundation than that false principle of many Probabilists: "He who acts probably acts prudently."

To the 3rd, I deny the consequence. If the satisfaction is notably more probable, it is morally certain, as we showed in nn. 71-73; consequently there is not even the least danger of condemned Tutiorism, but we constantly remain within the bounds of moderate Probabilism. Moreover, that doctrine which the objection attacks is the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, and also of Billuart;¹ if it led by a straight way to condemned Tutiorism, it would itself have to be condemned, and for that reason the Holy See would have erred when it declared the doctrine of St. Alphonsus immune from every censure. Therefore the objection is exploded from absurdity. - I add that the arguments brought forward by the adversaries rather lead by a straight way to Laxism, since they tend to form the ultimate dictate of conscience from doubt.

Obj. V. St. Alphonsus, teaching that a law only doubtful with respect to cessation still obliges, fights with himself; for in not a few practical resolutions he deflects from that principle. Therefore.

Since the refutation of this objection would demand a more extended discourse than the limits of this compendium allow, we send the reader to the Vindiciae, P. I, C. IV, § II.

96. • 1st. St. Alphonsus rightly and deservedly charged simple Probabilism with Laxism and denied that it could licitly be brought into practice. See n. 73, § end. For it neglects the rules of prudence (n. 93), and contrary to the dictate of reason is led in judging by affection alone toward liberty (ibid.), which is proper to laxists.

2nd. The Equi-probabilism of St. Alphonsus differs from simple Probabilism in a threefold way:

a) As to the degree of probability. See n. 71.¹

b) As to the manner of proceeding. - For Equi-probabilism requires a comparison of opinions in one doubting, which simple Probabilism thinks neither necessary nor possible.² Besides, in order to apply the reflex principles legitimately, the former inquires whether the doubt is strict or broad; the latter cares only about the probability of the proposition considered in itself, not about its relative probability.³ Cf. n. 71 under 2°.

c) As to the principles themselves. - For Equi-probabilism utterly rejects the principles which are called probabilistic; but Probabilism does not utterly reject them. Those principles are: "He who acts probably acts prudently," and "When either opinion is probable, man suspends judgment concerning the safer opinion, and relying on the probability of the benign opinion, he acts."⁴ The former in every matter and in every strict doubt, whether it favors law or liberty, admits the principle: In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. The latter, outside the matter of justice, admits this either not at all, or only in negative doubt.⁴ The former proclaims this distinguished axiom: A doubtful law does not oblige. The latter uses this broader and ambiguous rule: There is no obligation unless it is certainly established.⁵ The former in broad doubt follows the principle: The more likely must be held, and this in favor both of liberty and of law. The latter rejects that principle where the rights of law against liberty are dealt with.⁶

3rd. The rule of Equi-probabilism handed down by St. Alphonsus excels all others - in rectitude, prudence, facility, and authority.

1. In rectitude, as is established from the things proved from n. 71-81.

2. In prudence; for on one side it blocks the way against excessive affection toward liberty, since it does not allow us to act unless the relative value of the opinions has first been weighed, namely, the reasons of each opinion being weighed, or at least some grave doctor, who has weighed them rightly,¹ for example St. Alphonsus, having been consulted; but on the other side it prevents scruples. For Equi-probabilism does not demand that strict equiprobability of each opinion, which is rare and more rarely perceived without any hesitation of mind, and which would bring the intellect into straits. On the contrary, it teaches that almost equal probability suffices, which admits an excess of probability that is not notable, or not certainly apparent. It certainly requires diligence and consideration in the theologian; but whenever, after reasonable investigation has been made, the intellect does not clearly perceive the greater probability of the safer opinion, and that as certain, liberty remains entire.

3. In facility, since it demands only two things from one doubting: one, that he see which possesses, law or liberty; the other, that unless the opinion favoring one part is evidently more probable, he yield the palm to the part which possesses.

Nor should you say that it is easier to judge concerning the valid and grave probability of some opinion than concerning the excess of probability of the opposite, and therefore that the rule of common Probabilism is easier. For before you embrace some opinion, either you consider it alone, or you compare it with its contradictory. If the first, you sin by acting imprudently, similar to a judge who adjudges the case to one part, and indeed to the one friendly to himself, while the other has not been heard. - If the second, there is no reason why you should boast of an easier rule, as is plain in itself.

Note. - As to practice, the disciple of St. Alphonsus hesitates less in untying difficulties than many others; for, according to the response of the Sacred Penitentiary, he will not be disturbed if he follows the opinions of the Saint, even with the weighing of reasons neglected. And "would that all," as the illustrious De Wit² pleasantly writes, "with highest zeal strove to have the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus, and the practical doctrine of a confessor, plainly understood and faithfully to apply it. Holy Mother Church would by no means complain that among these there would not be found faithful dispensers of the mysteries of God; on the contrary, she would declare joyfully: Among these I find no one whom I ought to disturb."

4. In authority, as has been shown more than sufficiently on p. lxxxiii sq.

Thus with Kenrick¹ we conclude: "Well and happily St. Alphonsus vindicated the moderate use of probable opinions; since he shone forth with zeal for the salvation of souls, and with long experience, and with very extensive reading of authors, there is no reason that those who follow so great a leader should be more anxious."