Morals of the Church
Library › Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology › On the Principles of Moral Theology › Book Fourth. On Conscience. › Question Second. On the Moral System. › Article First. On the Various Systems.

paragraph — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology

§ 4. On Laxism.

232*.

232*. Lax probabilism or laxism teaches: it is lawful to follow the opinion for liberty, even if it is only doubtfully or tenuously probable.

  1. No one has taught lax probabilism in these terms or as a principle and moral system: for those who affirm that even slight probability suffices say that it is nevertheless one which merits prudent assent. Nevertheless there are authors who are called laxists, such as Sancius (John Sanchez), Leander, Diana, Bauny, Moya, and especially Caramuel, whom St. Alphonsus calls the prince of laxists.

  2. Therefore they are called laxists not because they defend a system too benign, but a. some because they exhibit the principle of probabilism in such a way that it can be taken in the more benign part: for they say that it is lawful to follow the less probable, without excluding the doubtfully or tenuously probable; b. others because they do not restrict the principle of probabilism sufficiently to its proper matter, but extend it also to other matters in which it cannot licitly be employed; c. finally, others because in reality in particular questions they admit opinions as licit which, as being only doubtfully or tenuously probable, are too benign.

  3. Refutation. a. The principle of laxism has been condemned by the Church in proposition 3 of Innocent XI: "Generally, while trusting in probability whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however tenuous, provided one does not go beyond the limits of probability, we always act prudently." b. A law whose obligation is not truly doubtful must be observed; but doubtful or tenuous probability which is against the law does not render this law truly doubtful. c. If the opinion for liberty rests upon a tenuous or doubtful reason, the law is judged morally certain, if not with direct certitude, at least with indirect certitude: for it is certain that man cannot follow doubtful, slight, and improbable reasons.

An opinion tenuously probable is not simply improbable, which is in no way contained within the limits of probability, but is an opinion resting not upon a grave and solid foundation but only upon a slight and apparent one, so that it is contained within the limits of tenuous and doubtful probability, not true and certain probability.1

1 Cf. Viva, Damnatae theses, in prop. 3 condemned by Innocent XI.

Laxism