Liberality

Covetousness is opposed to liberality by defect, while prodigality is opposed to liberality by excess. Liberality is the virtue which moderates the love of wealth and inclines us to spend it well, according to the dictates of right reason. Prodigality inclines a man to squander his wealth on unworthy objects, or to give more than he should do, so that he is not able to live according to his state of life, or he is unable to fulfil his obligations, or he reduces his family to beggary.

IV. Remedies of avarice: 1. Weigh the vanity of earthly goods, which slip away, while heavenly goods endure.¹ 2. Consider that you are destined for higher things and therefore that the heart of man is not satisfied by riches.² 3. Consider the example of Christ, who for our sake was made poor.³ 4. Exercise liberality, by distributing alms, etc.⁴

Note. Just as avarice is opposed to liberality by defect, so prodigality is opposed to it by excess. Now prodigality is a superfluous distribution of one's own goods. Prodigality per se, i.e., insofar as it is opposed to liberality, is a venial sin. It can become mortal, for example, by reason of harm to the family that will follow, etc. (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 119; St. Alphonsus, V, 68).

¹ Luke 12:20.

² Eccles. 5:9; Matt. 16:26; Luke 12:31.

³ 2 Cor. 8:9.

⁴ Cf. Sweens, Theologia moralis fundamentalis, n. 96.

The potential parts of justice are several. For justice is a virtue toward another, rendering to him what is owed according to equality. Therefore every virtue which by its nature is toward another, but falls short of justice by reason either of debt or of equality, must be joined to justice as a potential part. Now the virtues which fall short by reason of debt, or in other words which regard not a juridical debt but only a moral debt, that is, one to be rendered from the moral goodness of virtue alone, are of two species. For some regard a debt "so necessary that without it moral goodness of conduct cannot be preserved" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 80, single article); and these are truth, gratitude, and vindication. Others regard a debt which "is necessary as contributing to greater moral goodness, without which nevertheless moral goodness can be preserved" (St. Thomas, cited place); and these are liberality and affability. By reason of equality those virtues fall short, or in other words regard a debt which can in no way be rendered according to equality: religion, penance, piety, and observance.

Therefore there are nine virtues which are referred to justice as potential parts; two of them regard a debt toward God, namely religion and penance; the remaining seven have as their object a debt toward the neighbor.

I. Notion of Liberality. Liberality is a moral virtue inclining man to give money and things estimable by money according to the prescription of reason illumined by faith.

II. Object of Liberality. 1. The remote material object is money and things estimable by money, while the proximate object is constituted by the affections of the soul toward the remote object.

2. The remote formal object is the special reason of debt of giving riches. Thus liberality is distinguished from mercy, which has the need of the neighbor as motive, and from beneficence, which acts from love, while liberality proceeds from moderation of affection toward riches. The proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in rendering this debt (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 117, a. 1).

III. Opposed Vices. To liberality are opposed: by defect, avarice, by which someone omits to give riches according to the debt of moral goodness; by excess, prodigality, by which someone gives riches more than the prescription of reason illumined by faith permits, or to one to whom it does not permit.

Two virtues of the sensitive appetite that appear more excellent than justice are courage and liberality, but in reality justice is nobler than they.

(a) Thus, courage seems to be better, because it is more essential to the common good in time of great danger; but in reality justice is more useful to the community, for at all times, whether in peace or in war, it is justice that preserves unity and contentment among the people and promotes courage and devotion to the public welfare.

(b) Liberality seems to be better than justice, because it gives more than is due, while justice gives only what is due. But, on the other hand, justice is of more general advantage, since of necessity liberality must be exceptional and shown only to comparatively few, while justice must be exercised continually and must be shown to all; justice is also more necessary, for one must be just in order to be liberal, and not vice versa, since no one is praised as generous unless he first pays the debts of justice; finally, although liberality gives more than is due and may thus be a greater private benefit, justice without liberality is more serviceable to the common interest than liberality without justice.

Degrees of Moral Debt.—The remaining potential parts of justice are those in which there is not a legal debt, which is enforced by some law, but a moral debt to which one is obliged from the decency or the greater decency of virtue. There are, then, two degrees of moral debt.

(a) A moral debt is more urgent, when without its fulfillment one cannot keep to the decency of virtue, that is, one cannot preserve the character of a virtuous man. Thus, if a moral debt is considered from the side of the debtor, he is obliged to show himself in words and deeds to others what he really is, has been, or intends to be (virtue of truthfulness); if the debt be viewed from the side of the creditor to whom some recompense is owed, there is the duty of gratitude to him for his benefits and of punishment for his injuries (virtues of gratitude and vindication). These parts of justice just mentioned are readily distinguishable from acts that pertain to general or particular justice and that are owed as legal debts. Thus, truthful testimony on the witness stand is a legal obligation, for the person who questions has a strict right to hear the truth; but veracity in social intercourse, or the habit of speaking the truth to others, is a moral obligation, one imposed by God but not enforced legally. Compensation for services bestowed according to contract is a legal duty, and the debtor can be compelled to pay; but thankfulness for gifts or other benefits is only a moral duty, and generally laws do not take account of ingratitude. Punishment of a delinquent by public authority is an act of commutative justice; but punishment meted out by a private person in self-defense, who appeals to the law or who forcibly but lawfully repels an injury, is an act of a virtue annexed to justice.

(b) A moral debt is less urgent, when without its fulfillment one can preserve virtue, but not the more becoming or more perfect course of virtue. The chief examples here are the virtues of friendship or affability and of liberality. To treat others in a friendly manner and to make oneself agreeable in company is suitable, not chiefly because of any benefits one has received from others, but because one is better for this oneself and by it the ways of life are made easier for all. Likewise liberality is not due, but it shows a better disposition as to money and other temporal goods to be willing to distribute them to others willingly and generously. Without friendship and liberality the peace and harmony of social intercourse may be maintained, but with them it is maintained more easily and receives an added grace and distinction.

Liberality.—Liberality is a virtue that moderates the love of riches and inclines one in ordinary affairs to bestow one’s own goods upon others willingly, when and as right reason may dictate.

(a) It moderates the love of riches; that is, it makes one value and esteem money at its true worth. In this respect it pertains at least improperly to temperance inasmuch as the love of money is a passion. Liberality is thus distinguished from mercy and beneficence. These virtues are open-handed from charity, and give because another is in need or is loved; liberality, on the contrary, may be without charity and its bounty may be shown even to those who are not in need or who are not liked, for it is free in using money precisely because it does not prize external things excessively.

(b) It inclines one to bestow one’s own possessions, or freely to communicate them. In this respect liberality is assigned to justice, since its object is external things as owed by a certain moral debt to others. Since liberality consists primarily in a generous inclination, even the poor may have this virtue; in fact, the poor oftentimes, being less wedded to money, are far more disposed to liberality than the rich.

(c) It functions in ordinary affairs, for there is a special virtue of magnificence that makes wealthy men spend money lavishly in enterprise of the greatest moment.

(d) The beneficiary of liberality is another, for no special virtue is needed to make one use money freely for one’s own needs or comfort.

(e) Liberality bestows gladly, but according to right reason, for there is no merit in unwilling gifts, and no virtue in gifts bestowed unsuitably as to time, place, purpose, person, quantity, quality, etc. Liberality, then, is not inconsistent with prudence about temporal affairs, that is, with economy which adapts expenditures to income, with thrift which puts something by for the future, and with frugality which spares unnecessary expenses on self, especially in the matter of luxuries (see 1681 sqq.).

The Importance of Liberality.—(a) Liberality is not the greatest virtue. It is less than temperance, for temperance regulates the passions in reference to the body, while liberality regulates them in reference to externals; it is less than fortitude and justice, which serve the common good, whereas liberality regards individuals; it is less than the virtues that are concerned with divine things, for liberality has to do directly with temporals.

(b) Liberality is one of the most useful of virtues since it disposes one to use money well in the service of God and humanity, and gives one an influence that can be employed for good (Ecclus., xxxi. 28). According to Aristotle, the virtues that chiefly attract fame are first bravery, next justice, and then liberality. Moreover, this virtue of generosity is one of the surest indexes of internal religion and charity, as being the natural expression of devotion and benevolence (see 2185, 1211), while miserliness is a sign of coldness towards God and man.

Vice of Avarice.—The vice which is opposed to liberality by defect in giving is avarice, which, properly speaking or as distinguished from theft and robbery, is an immoderate desire, love or delight entertained in respect to external corporal goods, such as lands or money.

(a) The Absolute Malice of Avarice.—This sin is per se venial, since it is only an excess in the love of a thing that is in itself indifferent and lawful; but it becomes mortal if the affection for money is so great that one is prepared to sacrifice grave obligations for its sake (e.g., to stay away from church rather than contribute to religion or the suffering poor). It is not merely carnal, since not concerned with bodily pleasure; nor merely spiritual, since riches are not a spiritual object; hence, it stands midway between spiritual and carnal vices.

(b) The Comparative Malice of Avarice.—In regard to deformity, avarice is not worse than other sins, but rather the contrary. The less the good to which a vice is opposed, the less the deprivation caused by the vice; and hence since external goods, to whose proper esteem avarice is opposed, are less important than divine or human goods, it follows that avarice is not so sinful as irreligion, homicide, theft, etc. In regard to shamefulness, however, avarice is worse than other sins. The less valuable the created good that a vice pursues, the more disgraceful the vice; and hence since the miser sets his heart on external things, which are the lowest of all goods, preferring them to goods of body and of soul (e.g., to health, education) and even to divine goods, he is rightly regarded as more contemptible than other sinners. Some forms of avarice, too, are more despicable than others. Thus, in some persons avarice shows itself in their fear to consume or expend for their own necessary uses (parsimony, penuriousness); in others it shows itself by an unwillingness to give to others (stinginess, niggardliness), or a willingness to live at the expense of others (sponging); finally, the most disgusting form of avarice is seen in those who cannot bear to part with their possessions either for their own sake or for the sake of others, and find their happiness in mere possession (miserliness). In regard to influence, avarice has a pre-eminence among sins that causes it to be numbered among the seven capital vices. A capital vice is one of the chief sources of evil attraction that produces other sins, and it is clear that immoderate love of riches is one of the most prolific of sins. All are drawn to happiness, and money seems to secure the requisites for happiness (Ecclus., x. 16); hence we see that for the sake of holding to money men become hard of heart (Matt., xxiii. 14; Luke, xvi. 21), for the sake of acquiring it they become carnal and restless in mind (Ecclus., xiv. 9; Matt., xiii. 22) and have recourse to deeds of violence (III Kings, xxi. 2), of deception (Acts, xxiv. 26), of perjury (Matt., xxviii. 12 sqq.), of fraud (Luke, xvi. 4 sqq.), and of treachery (Matt., xxvi. 15). Avarice is at the same time one of the most dangerous of sins, for it will lead a man to sell even his own soul (Ecclus., X. 10) and to commit any enormity (I Tim., vi. 9), and one of the most incurable, for the miser never has enough (Prov., xxx. 15, 16) and is always able to make believe that his avarice is prudence or some other virtue (Wis., xv. 12).

Vice of Prodigality.—The vice opposed to liberality by excess in giving is prodigality, which is an insufficient regard for temporal things and an extravagant bestowal of them on others.

(a) It is an insufficient care for temporal things: that is, as the miser loves money too much, so the prodigal esteems it too little; as the miser is over-anxious to get and keep money, so the prodigal is careless about earning or saving.

(b) It is an extravagant bestowal of temporal things; that is, the prodigal gives more than he should, or else the circumstances do not call for his gift, as when he gives when or where or to whom he should not give.

The Sinfulness of Prodigality.—(a) From its nature it is venial. The prodigal is not the absolute owner of his goods, but a steward who is held to administer them according to reason. But his sin is not grave, since it does not injure others and the goods of which he deprives himself are of the lowest kind.

(b) From its circumstances it may be mortal. Thus, it is made mortal on account of the purpose (e.g., extravagant presents made with a view to seduction or bribery), or the consequences (e.g., wastefulness which makes one unable to pay debts or assist a relative who is in grave need), or the special obligation of devoting superfluities to charity, as when one squanders the excess revenues of a benefice (see 1252).

Comparison of Avarice and Prodigality.—(a) They are associable, for the same person may be both avaricious and prodigal, though in different respects (e.g., some persons are spendthrifts in giving money away, and are thus forced to be grasping to get money and ready to obtain it by any means, foul or fair). (b) They are unequal in malice. Prodigality is less sinful than avarice, because it is less removed from liberality, less harmful to self and others, and less difficult to cure. It is said that prodigality is the vice of youth, avarice the vice of old age.

What is avarice? Avarice is the inordinate appetite of temporal goods. An inordinate appetite, by being unwilling rather to lose them than God; by denying alms to the poor when the obligation of charity urges; by unjustly desiring others' things; by loving or desiring riches too much, or by taking too much delight in them. Too much, beyond due measure, namely by acquiring or retaining them according as they are necessary for life, according to one's own condition. Avarice, insofar as it is precisely opposed to the virtue of liberality, is from its genus only a venial sin. Nevertheless it can become mortal in three ways: 1. Against charity toward oneself, by constituting the last end in riches, or by transgressing the precepts of God rather than suffer loss in temporal goods. 2. Against charity toward neighbor, by not helping him when constituted in grave necessity, etc. 3. Against justice, by taking what belongs to another, etc. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 84, a. 1; 2. 2. q. 118; L. 68.

Liberality is the virtue by which we use well all those external goods which have been granted to us for our sustenance. There is a twofold use of exterior goods, one toward oneself, another toward others. And therefore it pertains to liberality that on account of immoderate love of money someone not be impeded from fitting expenditures, nor from fitting gifts. But to give pertains most of all to liberality, since this is more perfect than to receive, or to spend upon oneself. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 117, aa. 1, 4. As avarice, so also prodigality is opposed to liberality, both according to excess in giving, and according to defect in retaining and acquiring. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 118, 119.

What is justice, and what are its parts? - R. To the first. Justice is the virtue which renders what is owed according to equality. Hence other moral virtues hold the mean of reason, according namely to prudent estimation. For since they are concerned with ruling passions, that which is right for one person is little or too much for another. But justice attains the mean of the thing, according namely to the equality of thing to thing, so that as much is rendered as is owed. For the equal is really the mean between greater and lesser. And thus the mean of justice cannot vary according to persons, places, and time; but whoever it may be, wherever and whenever, who owes one hundred, and whoever the creditor may be, he ought to render one hundred to him. If he renders fifty he injures justice; if one hundred and fifty he exercises liberality. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 58, 59, 61, 80.

R. To the second. The parts as it were integral of justice are: to decline from evil and to do good, namely to do owed good and to decline from the opposite evil. Owed; for if the speech is about good and evil in common, then to do good and to avoid evil pertains to every virtue. But if it is considered under the account of what is owed, then it pertains to justice. For justice is one kind general, namely legal, another special, namely distributive and commutative; these are the three subjective parts, or its species. To general or legal justice it pertains to do owed good in order to the Community and to God, in order to divine or human law; and accordingly as to the proper account of legal justice it pertains to attend to the debt of the precept, to do good, so to the proper account of transgression it pertains to attend to contempt of the precept, to decline from evil. - But to special justice, distributive and commutative, it pertains to do good owed to the neighbor and to avoid the opposite evil, namely that which is harmful to the neighbor. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79.

But as to do good is a certain special part of justice distinct from the declining of evil, so omission, which is opposed to the former, is altogether distinguished from transgression, which is opposed to the latter. For omission is properly of owed good, e.g., if someone does not show owed reverence to parents; and transgression is properly in doing evil, e.g., if someone inflicts contumely or any injury upon parents. The former is opposed to the affirmative precept, to do good; the latter to the negative precept, to decline from evil. Properly omission; for this imports the passing over of good not just any whatsoever, but of owed good. But good under the account of what is owed properly pertains to justice; to legal justice indeed, if the debt is taken in order to divine or human law; but to special justice if in order to neighbor. Properly transgression; for transgression materially taken is common to all species of sins, because by any species of sin man transgresses some divine precept. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79. "But these two parts of justice, general or special, are called as it were integral, because each of them is required for the perfect act of justice. For it pertains to justice to constitute equality in those things which are toward another. But it belongs to the same thing both to constitute something and to conserve what has been constituted in those things which are toward another. But someone constitutes the equality of justice by doing good, i.e., by rendering to another what is owed to him; and he conserves the equality of justice already constituted by declining from evil, i.e., by inflicting no harm upon the neighbor." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 72, a. 1.

The potential parts of justice, or the virtues annexed to it, are: religion, piety, observance, truth, gratitude, vindication, friendship, liberality. For these virtues are annexed to justice because they too in some way render what is owed according to equality. In some way; for since it belongs to justice to render what is owed according to equality, some of these fall short of the account of the equal, others of the account of what is owed. Religion, piety, and observance fall short of the account of rendering the equal, as is clear of itself. But truth, gratitude, vindication, liberality, and friendship fall short of the account of what is owed. For religion, piety, and observance cannot render worship and service to God, Parents, and Persons constituted in dignity according to equality. But the debt is deficient on the part of the one owing, in truth, so that namely man shows himself in words and deeds such as he is. Likewise the debt is deficient on the part of him to whom it is owed, in gratitude, by which someone recompenses another according to the things he has done in good things; and in vindication, by which another is recompensed according to the things he has done in evil things. Finally the debt is deficient in the account of the debt itself, in liberality and friendship, which are only toward a certain greater honorableness. For liberality renders us prompt to spend easily our things estimable by price, when right reason requires it; to this liberality avarice and prodigality are opposed. But friendship moderates our intercourse with neighbor, so that it may be pleasing to him, and such as according to right reason it ought to be. Likewise the debt is deficient in other things of this sort, which have little of the account of debt. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 80, a. 1.

Obedience is included in observance; for to preeminent persons there is owed both reverence of honor and obedience. In truth is included fidelity, through which the things said are done, as regards the observance of promises. But vengeance which is done by the authority of public power, according to the sentence of a judge, pertains to commutative justice; but vengeance which someone does by his own motion, not however against the law, or which someone requires from a judge, pertains to the virtue joined to justice. S. Th. 2. 2. l. c. ad 1, 3. Friendship or affability is a special virtue according to which "man is fittingly ordered to other men both in deeds and in words." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 114, a. 1. Flattery and quarrelsomeness are opposed to friendship. Flattery is a sin by which someone beyond the due mode of virtue wishes to delight others by words or deeds in common intercourse, with the intention of obtaining some advantage. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 115, a. 1. But quarrelsomeness, by which someone contradicts another because of defect of love toward the person speaking, is a species of discord contrary to charity; but that by which someone contradicts another rather in order to sadden him than to contradict him is especially opposed to the virtue of affability and friendship. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 116, a. 1.

Since justice renders what is owed according to equality, it of itself brings a precept, and injustice is opposed to justice, which falls short of rendering that debt and of preserving that equality. Justice and its various species are treated especially in the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, and tenth precepts of the Decalogue. But the other virtues annexed to justice are treated in the first, second, third, fourth, and eighth precepts of the Decalogue. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 122.

615. Notion. Liberality or largesse is a virtue moderating the love of money and rendering a man prompt to expend money according to the dictate of right reason.

Explanation. The material object of this virtue is money and other external goods, but its proximate and immediate object is the desire for money, which must be rightly moderated lest it be either too great or too small. Mediately and consequently, liberality is occupied with the right use and reasonable distribution of money, which a liberal man gives willingly, cheerfully, and abundantly, as right reason demands.¹⁰⁸² From these things it is evident that even the poor can possess the virtue of liberality as regards its proximate and immediate object, namely, when they have a right affection toward money so that they would be prepared to distribute it if they possessed it. The exercise itself of liberality, however, is often impossible for the poor on account of their poverty.

Liberality is a virtue annexed to justice because, although it does not equal justice in rendering strict and due equality, it nevertheless in some measure renders a due to one's neighbor. Liberality differs: a) from mercy, which proceeds from the motive of compassion; b) from beneficence, which proceeds from the motive of charity; c) from magnificence, in that liberality is occupied with moderate and ordinary distributions, but magnificence uses great expenditures for accomplishing splendid works,¹⁰⁸³ as will be said below, n. 631.

¹⁰⁸² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 117, a. 2.

¹⁰⁸³ Ib., a. 3 ad 1.

616. Opposed vices. Two vices are opposed to liberality: one by excess, namely, prodigality; the other by defect, namely, avarice. Avarice was already discussed above, I, n. 416ff., among the capital sins. Prodigality is the superfluous and irrational expenditure of one's own things; and consequently it is a sin, because man is not the absolute master of his goods, but only, as it were, God's steward, obliged to administer the goods received according to the intention of God and not according to his own whim. Of itself, however, prodigality is only a venial sin, since so great a disorder is not found in it; but accidentally it often becomes a mortal sin, namely: 1. by reason of the end, as if riches are squandered for a mortally evil end, for example, to adorn a harlot; 2. by reason of the harm following from it, for example, if a father of a family by his prodigality thrusts his wife and children into poverty.

S. Th. II-II, q. 117-119.

884. Liberality (vrijgevigheid) is a virtue moderating the love of riches and rendering a man prompt to disburse them when right reason dictates; but under the name of riches come all external goods insofar as they are useful to man and can be valued by money.

It is a virtue, because in distributing money it moderates affection and use according to the dictate of reason, and so makes one use well those things which we can use badly.

Immediately it is concerned with passions: the estimation and affection of money, by moderating these so that money is not esteemed more or less than it ought; mediately and consequently it is concerned with the use of riches: both indirectly, by removing the impediment of right use, namely, excessive love of them; and directly, by moving to their prompt distribution to others. As regards the use of money toward oneself, nature sufficiently moves each person, but for distributing it to others when and how one ought, there is need of a special virtue added above nature. From this it follows that the poor can have the virtue of liberality as to its immediate object, when they have a right affection toward money, so that they are prepared to distribute what they would possess.

It is annexed to justice, because on the one hand it falls short of it, since it does not render to another what is his, but what is one's own; on the other hand it agrees with it, insofar as it is toward another and is concerned with external things as justice is: thus in some way it renders a debt according to the equality of that which is becoming.

Hence it differs a) from mercy and from the beneficence of charity: these also give to others what is one's own, but from diverse motives, because one has compassion for the needy or because one loves; but liberality does so because it does not esteem money more than it ought; hence it gives even to the unknown, not only to friends;

b) from magnificence: this uses riches under a special account, according as they are assumed for the completion of some great work; liberality is concerned with moderate disbursements. Hence magnificence is added above liberality.

885. Liberality is not the greatest of the virtues, because it is less to moderate affection concerning the use of riches than to moderate passions pertaining to one's own body, which temperance does; and than to procure the common good, which fortitude and justice do; and than to be concerned with the divine good, as the theological virtues are. Yet consequently it has a certain excellence and is useful for many things: for from the fact that a man is not too affected toward money, it follows that he easily uses it both for the utility of others and for the glory of God.

886. Avarice is opposed to liberality by defect. - Avarice is an inordinate appetite for riches, which is twofold:

a) an inordinate appetite in accepting and retaining unduly, which is opposed to justice and therefore from its genus is gravely evil;

b) an inordinate affection by which riches are loved too much, or desired, or are too pleasing to delight, which is opposed to liberality, and of itself is lightly evil, because it is only an excess in love of a thing indifferent and licit according to itself; unless on account of affection for riches someone is prepared to commit some mortal sin, or constitutes his last end in riches.

The sin of avarice in some respect is graver and baser than others, namely, on the part of the good to which the human appetite is inordinately subjected. For since it is baser to be inordinately subject to a lower good than to a higher one, the less is the good to which the appetite is inordinately subjected, so much the more deformed is the sin. But the good of external things, to which the avaricious man is subjected, is the lowest among all human goods, namely, less than the good of the body or of the soul. Therefore avarice in this respect is baser than other sins. - Yet simply it is not graver, namely, on the part of the good which it corrupts or of which it deprives: for according to this, a sin which is against God is graver, and under this is a sin against one's own or another man's person, and under this that which is only against external things, which are deputed for the use of man, as avarice is. But since the privation of good has itself formally in sin, while conversion to a created good has itself materially, the consideration according to the formal element is weightier; therefore, speaking simply, avarice is not the greatest of all sins.

Yet it is a capital sin, indeed the root of all sins, as was explained in the treatise on Sins (I, n. 504 and 497).

887. Prodigality is opposed to liberality by excess. - Prodigality is called the superfluous disbursement of one's own things; it is against liberality, which places measure according to right reason in disbursing riches, which measure prodigality removes, not precisely because it exceeds in quantity, for the liberal man can give more than the prodigal, but because he does not disburse according to right reason, insofar as he gives where, when, what, and to whom he ought not give.

But it is opposed to avarice according to excess and defect at the same time: in affection for riches the avaricious man exceeds, the prodigal falls short; in the use of riches the prodigal exceeds in giving, falls short in retaining, whereas the avaricious man falls short in giving and exceeds in retaining. Hence someone can be at the same time avaricious and prodigal, avaricious in acquiring, prodigal in giving, as if he is avaricious so that he can be prodigal.

Yet prodigality is a lesser sin than avarice: a) by reason of the object, because the latter differs more from the opposite virtue: for giving, in which the prodigal abounds, pertains more to liberality than accepting or retaining, in which the avaricious man abounds; b) also by reason of the effect, because the prodigal man is useful to many, but the avaricious man to no one, not even to himself; c) by reason of duration, because prodigality is easily healed, by age or by the want which it causes, but avarice is not.

According to itself it is a venial sin, because it is only an excessive use of one's own goods, and indeed of the lowest goods. Yet it can be mortal: 1) by reason of a mortally evil end, as if riches are poured out for lust; 2) by reason of harm, as if someone thereby becomes unable to pay debts or to procure necessities for the family; 3) by reason of a special obligation of giving superfluous things to a determined cause, for example to pious causes, as concerning ecclesiastical goods (n. 195).

LIBERALITY is a special virtue, by which one conducts oneself rightly regarding gifts and expenses, and therefore regarding the use of Money and of other things that are measured by money. Thus D. Thom. art. 1, 2, and 3, from Aristotle 4 Eth. cap. 1. It is defined by D. Bonavent. 3. part. Centil. sect. 44: It is the virtue dispensing benefits, which is called benignity as regards the affection, but beneficence as regards the effect. The same is found in the Declaratorio terminorum Theologiae, from which definition you have that it consists in the ordination of the passion, or affection, regarding money, lest it impede one from those things that ought fittingly to be expended. So also D. Thom. art. 3, ad 3.

It is placed among the potential parts of justice for the reasons often given. Thus S. Bonavent. in the places adduced, and D. Thom. quaest. 117, art. 5 and 6. It approaches justice, because it is directed to another; it declines from justice, because it gives what is one's own, not what is another's; Justice, indeed, gives what is another's.

It is defined by D. Bonavent. in the opusc. Declaratorio terminorum Theologiae: Prodigality is superfluity, which gives what ought not to be given. Hence it recedes to the other extreme from the mean of Liberality, and is less opposed to it than avarice; for Liberality draws nearer to him who gives too much than to him who gives nothing, or less than is fitting. Second, because the prodigal helps others; but the avaricious man is harmful to all. Third, because prodigality is more easily cured.

It is only a venial sin in its genus. Thus D. Thom. art. 3. But it can be mortal, if he consumes his resources to the ruin of his children, of the needy, of creditors, and of all those to whom he is bound to bring aid, as Tannerus noted disp. 6. quaest. 2. dub. 2. num. 46.

The detriments of Prodigality St. Doctor sets forth admirably on Luke 15, on the parable of the prodigal son.