Question — Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V · from Schola Thomistica
Question IV: On liberality
LIBERALITY is a special virtue, by which one conducts oneself rightly regarding gifts and expenses, and therefore regarding the use of Money and of other things that are measured by money. Thus D. Thom. art. 1, 2, and 3, from Aristotle 4 Eth. cap. 1. It is defined by D. Bonavent. 3. part. Centil. sect. 44: It is the virtue dispensing benefits, which is called benignity as regards the affection, but beneficence as regards the effect. The same is found in the Declaratorio terminorum Theologiae, from which definition you have that it consists in the ordination of the passion, or affection, regarding money, lest it impede one from those things that ought fittingly to be expended. So also D. Thom. art. 3, ad 3.
LIBERALITAS est virtus specialis, qua recte quis se habet circa dationes, et sumptus, adeoque circa usum Pecuniae, rerumque aliarum, quae pecunia mensurantur. Ita D. Thom. art. 1. 2. et 3. ex Aristotele 4. Eth. cap. 1. Definitur a D. Bonavent. 3. part. Centil. sect. 44. Est virtus beneficiorum erogatrix, quae pro affectu benignitas, pro effectu vero beneficentia vocatur. Idem habet in Declaratorio terminorum Theologiae, ex qua definitione habes, eam consistere in ordinatione passionis, seu affectionis circa pecuniam, ne impediat ab his, quae convenienter sunt expendenda. Ita etiam D. Thom. art. 3. ad 3.
It is placed among the potential parts of justice for the reasons often given. Thus S. Bonavent. in the places adduced, and D. Thom. quaest. 117, art. 5 and 6. It approaches justice, because it is directed to another; it declines from justice, because it gives what is one's own, not what is another's; Justice, indeed, gives what is another's.
PONITUR pars potentialis iustitiae ob rationes saepius latas. Ita S. Bonavent. locis adductis, et D. Thom. quaest. 117. art. 5. et 6. Accedit ad iustitiam, quia est ad alterum; declinat, quia dat quod suum est, non id, quod est alterius; Iustitia vero dat, quod est alterius.