The Motives of Credibility

670. (A) Concerning intellectual causes. In order to preserve faith safely and reasonably, knowledge of the motives of credibility is necessary; but these are unknown by many, and rejected by others on account of prejudices.

(a) Many lose faith because of ignorance, because, while they attentively read the works of unbelievers, they pass over the books of apologists; thus they cannot solve the difficulties proposed against faith, and soon slip into infidelity. Therefore there must be inculcated upon laymen the necessity of inquiring from the more learned the solution of difficulties, and upon priests the necessity of studying, so that they may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to refute those who contradict; but let them beware lest they hand down as dogmas those things which have not yet been proposed by the infallible magisterium of the Church: for not a few are deterred from faith on account of the opinions of certain theologians, which are presented as truths of faith.⁴

⁴ Those indeed understand this who read through books written by modern unbelievers; cf. A. D. White, Warfare of Science and Theology, New York, in French, Histoire de la lutte entre la Science et la Theologie, Paris, Guillaumin, 1899.

(b) Besides, the mind of modern men, imbued with many prejudices, perceives the force of the motives of credibility with difficulty. Not a few, namely, favoring Kantianism, proclaim the autonomy of reason, and denounce revelation as something extrinsic and unworthy of human reason. Others, trusting more than is right in the methods of positivists, reject miracles, as not proved by sufficiently constant experience or observation,⁵ or, as others say, because they are repugnant to modern consciousness.⁶ - There are indeed other motives for believing, which are drawn from the fact that the legitimate aspirations of the intellect, of the will, and of our whole soul are fulfilled only in the Christian religion; but this argument, which pleases some, is accepted only by those who are rightly disposed, who thirst for truth and justice, and who seek divine consolation.

⁵ "Pride of mind is therefore often the great obstacle to believing. One does not resign oneself to relying upon the testimony of another when one has explored all the mysteries of nature, from the resolution of nebulae to the role of microbes... Too intelligent to be frankly materialists, many of our scholars take shameful refuge in the mists of agnosticism; as if, because we cannot know everything, we could know nothing at all. From this results, as we have said, a general tendency no longer to believe in miracles, to identify the miracle with the unexplained: which is still a new form of agnosticism." (Mignot, loc. cit., p. 584.)

⁶ "If we no longer admit the miracle, it is not only because it is produced only when one believes in it, it is because it is rejected by consciousness even more than it is denied by science. Far from being proof, henceforth the miracle is a reason to put in doubt and to submit to examination the truths which one pretends to support by this singular authority." (Seailles, Les affirmat. de la conscience, p. 34.)

Therefore apologists must offer not only one argument or another, but diverse arguments adapted to diverse minds. First of all these principles must often be recalled to memory: in a moral and religious matter, only moral certitude is to be expected; very probable arguments produce moral certitude when all taken together conspire toward the same end.⁷ Likewise it must be shown that by revelation the light of reason and legitimate autonomy are not destroyed, but perfected.⁸

⁷ "It is necessary then, in our opinion, to proceed by accumulation of proofs, by a view of the whole. One resists one proof, perhaps two or three: one does not resist a hundred, unless one is biased. If we arrive at certitude by the congeries probabilitatum, as they say, much more surely shall we arrive there by the congeries probationum. By a singular inconsistency, one would wish to demand in religious questions a certitude which one does not have in the things of ordinary life. Why this difference?" (Mignot, loc. cit., p. 578.)

⁸ F. Dubois, apud Rev. du Cl. francais, t. XXXIX, 1904, pp. 113-136.

671. (B) Concerning moral causes, or on the part of the will. In order to believe it is necessary that the will move the intellect to assenting to revealed truths (above, n. 618). But the will, which wishes to remain independent, not rarely does not command the assent of faith, because, on the one hand, it bears with difficulty the authority of God, and, on the other, it desires to indulge the passions, which the Christian religion restrains. This disposition is often increased by abuse of the democratic spirit, which pervades the minds of many, and incites some to shake off the yoke of any authority whatsoever, not only civil but also divine: hence by a certain natural instinct they abhor a religion which rests upon authority. Moreover, because the love of pleasure insinuates itself more and more into all orders of citizens,⁹ they naturally flee a religion which preaches self-denial and mortification of the passions to all: how much more easily would arguments in favor of revelation be admitted, if, as happens in mathematical truths, they in no way stood in the way of lusts!

⁹ "To do what pleases, to move as one likes, to satisfy all one's needs, according to the order in which they present themselves and their degree of intensity, this is to enjoy, this is to be happy. On the contrary, not to do what pleases, not to move according to one's liking, not to satisfy one's needs, this is to suffer, this is to be unhappy... To live, to be happy, to be free, is all one." Thus many conceive the moral life, as can be seen apud Seailles, Les affirmat. de la conscience moderne, pp. 130-131.

Therefore it must be inculcated upon these that no society, civil or religious, can subsist without some authority, and that a reasonable submission to legitimate authority is the most efficacious means for avoiding the tyranny of many; but that the passions do not contribute to true happiness except insofar as they are ordered to the good, and that in the Christian religion all helps are found for moderating and rightly ordering the passions.

672. (C) Since faith cannot be acquired and preserved without the grace of God, not a few fall away from it because, trusting too much in their own powers, they neglect to pray. The necessity of prayer for overcoming temptations against faith must frequently be recalled to their memory: "I believe, Lord; help my unbelief... Increase our faith."¹⁰

¹⁰ Mark 9:23; Luke 17:5. - Nor is prayer less necessary for obtaining faith when it has been lost, as M. d'Hulst splendidly explains, Confer. 1892, p. 110: "I believe, Lord, come to the aid of my unbelief! How many poor souls could repeat this cry of distress and confidence! I believe, that is to say I see that it is necessary to believe; the trials of life have instructed me; my failing reason has not been able to resolve the problems which torment me. I have looked toward those who believe, I have envied their happiness. I have opened the Gospel and I thought I recognized my Savior. I have listened to the great voice of the Christian centuries and I have been moved by their testimony. But between this inclination to believe and the final abdication of my doubt; between these reasons for believing and this voluntary gift of my mind and my heart which is called faith, I feel that there is an abyss to cross, that it depends upon me to cross it, and I do not yet dare. Credo, Domine, adjuva incredulitatem meam. Ah! Gentlemen, I beg you, seize upon this prayer; God will hear it, He will answer it by the gift of faith."

673. There are many extrinsic causes today which concur in diminishing and utterly overthrowing faith:

(A) Neutral education handed down in schools, colleges, and universities, which often begets indifferentism, and sometimes irreligiosity. Almost everywhere on earth in our days very many schools are found in which nothing is taught concerning the Christian religion, indeed nothing concerning the Supreme Deity.¹ Thus the way is prepared not only for religious indifferentism, but also for atheism. For the authority and dignity of religion is greatly diminished among the young, when it is wholly banished from the course of studies. But neutrality cannot long be preserved in schools; in historical and moral matters, the opportunity of speaking about religion presents itself many times, namely in order to attack and mock it.²

¹ Things have come to such a point in France that from certain schools books have been expelled in which the name of God can be read; indeed expurgated editions of classical books are printed, in which the name of God is wholly banished. (M. Le Francois, op. cit., p. 19, note 1.)

² In France, the matter has today become certain. For in the work written by J. Payot, Cours de Morale... destine aux Maitres de l'Enseignement primaire et de l'Enseignement secondaire, aux ecoles normales d'Instituteurs et d'Institutrices..., Paris, Colin, 1904, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are already called into doubt, pp. 189-213. Other books, for the use of children, diffuse the same errors into many schools. Cf. Goyau, L'Ecole d'aujourd'hui.

674. (B) The reading of books attacking faith. That there are innumerable books and journals in which the mysteries of our faith are denied or mocked, there is no one who is ignorant; they are the more dangerous insofar as they are written in a more elegant style and with a more scientific apparatus, and are adapted not only to the intelligence of the learned but also of the simple. Many Catholics, drawn by curiosity, read them, and begin to conceive doubts against revealed truths; very few take care to solve these doubts by reading Catholic books; moreover, difficulties are more easily proposed than solved.

675. Therefore deservedly these are prohibited by the Church:

"Books of apostates, heretics, schismatics, and any writers whatsoever defending heresy or schism, or overthrowing in any way the very foundations of religion... books of non-Catholics which treat professedly of religion, unless it is established that nothing is contained in them against Catholic faith;

"Books in which God, or the Blessed Virgin Mary, or the Saints, or the Catholic Church and its worship and sacraments, or the Apostolic See is disparaged...; works in which the concept of the inspiration of sacred Scripture is perverted, or its extension is too greatly restricted...

"Books which establish duel, suicide, or divorce as lawful, which deal with Masonic sects or other societies of the same kind, and contend that these are useful and not pernicious to the Church and civil society, and which defend errors proscribed by the Apostolic See...

"Daily papers, sheets, and periodical booklets which purposely attack religion or good morals are to be held proscribed not only by natural, but also by ecclesiastical law. But let Ordinaries take care, where there is need, opportunely to warn the faithful concerning the danger and harm of reading of this kind."³

³ Leo XIII, Constit. Officiorum ac munerum, Jan. 25, 1897, nn. 2, 3, 11, 14, 21. For the understanding of these, one may read Vermeersch, De prohibitione et censura librorum, 2nd ed., Tournai, 1898; Gennari, La costituzione Officiorum, Naples, 1898; G. Peries, L'Index, Paris, 1898; A. Boudinhon, La nouvelle legislation de l'Index, Paris, 1899.

But in order that the faithful may be kept away more efficaciously from the reading of depraved books, it is necessary that Catholic books be recommended for them to read, accommodated to the capacity of each, distinguished no less by elegant style than by solidity of doctrine.

676. (C) Frequenting heretics, apostates, and infidels. For today, in most regions, Catholics live among non-Catholics, haters of our faith, and have frequent and sometimes intimate relations with them, whether in colleges and academies, or in workshops, in political life, indeed in family life. Therefore erroneous opinions, or conversations in which truth is mixed indiscriminately with errors, are often heard. From this not a few begin to waver in faith: for when they hear difficulties moved against religion by men by no means ignorant, and moreover do not know what to answer, certain persons easily doubt concerning the truth of religion, or bid farewell to it altogether.⁴

⁴ In France the difficulty is increased by the secularization, as they say, of all institutions. To the point Msgr. Mignot, loc. cit., pp. 581-582: "The secularization of the State in all its services, the willed absence of every religious character in the official world contributes in large part to the weakening of beliefs. Religion is regarded as a purely personal and individual affair; the nation as nation has none. On leaving childhood, the young man, if he has not received strong convictions in the family, since he has not even been spoken to of God in his school stage, will fatally undergo the deleterious action of his surroundings. Far from being sustained, encouraged, strengthened by examples, his faith will go on weakening every day."

Therefore it is necessary to instruct the faithful in such a way that, whatever they read or hear, they may remain unmoved in faith.⁵ Therefore they are to be warned that they seriously apply themselves to the study of religion, and have recourse to the more learned, especially priests, when difficulties occur which they themselves cannot solve.

⁵ Therefore worthy of all praise are pastors who have special sermons for fortifying the faith of men against present-day objections. Cf. Gibier, Confer. aux hommes, Les objections contemporaines contre la religion, Paris, 1902 and 1903.

677. But the Church, in order to avert or at least remove the danger which arises from communication with heretics and infidels, has made special laws concerning this matter, which it helps to explain briefly.

The general principle is that communication with heretics or infidels in civil and social matters is not prohibited, the danger of perversion being removed;⁶ but active communion in sacred things is forbidden, insofar as it implies an external profession of false religion. - Again, communication with infidels is more strictly prohibited than with heretics, because their worship is altogether false and superstitious. - Finally, in regions in which Catholics have already for a long time lived mixed with heretics, many things are tolerated which are strictly prohibited in other regions, for example, in Italy, where heretics are beginning to spread their errors: for there the danger of perversion is much greater. - Let us set forth certain particulars.

⁶ Formerly it was forbidden that Christians live with Jews in the same house, or be present at the same banquet, use a Jewish physician, or serve Jews, etc.; but these things have fallen into disuse, and today one must attend only to the danger of perversion.

678. (a) Concerning the attendance of heretics and infidels at Catholic offices. These can indeed enter our churches, and there hear sermons and attend Mass, because good fruit is hoped for from this; but, from the decree of the Holy Office, June 8, 1859, "it is unlawful in sacred functions to invite heretics into the choir, to chant alternately, to give them the peace, sacred ashes, candles and blessed palms, and other external worship of this kind, which are rightly and deservedly considered indications of an interior bond and agreement, both in the active sense, namely by giving similar things to them, and in the passive sense, by receiving them from them in their sacred rites."⁷ Likewise it is not permitted to allow them to sing in the musical choir,⁸ or to carry torches or lights at liturgical functions.⁹

⁷ Apud Collectanea S. C. Prop. F., n. 1843. - What is said there and in the following concerning heretics is to be applied to schismatics, since in fact they are heretics.

⁸ Holy Office, May 1, 1889, apud Collectanea, n. 1851.

⁹ Ibid., n. 1840.

679. (b) Concerning the attendance of Catholics in the sacred rites of heretics. Scandal and the danger of perversion being removed, Catholics may enter the temples of heretics for the sake of mere curiosity, without any communication in sacred things; for "to enter the temples of heretics is an act indifferent of itself, which becomes evil only from a depraved end or from circumstances. Namely it becomes evil: 1) if someone goes to them with the intention of assisting at the sacred functions of heretics; 2) or even without such intention, if the very entrance into the churches of heretics carries or seems to carry some communication with these same heretics in divine things, and hence offers an occasion of scandal; 3) or if such entrance has been commanded by a heretical government, as a protestation of the same faith and religion between Catholics and non-Catholics; 4) or if either is commonly held as a token of one and the same communion of Catholics and non-Catholics."¹⁰ - Therefore of itself it is not permitted to be present at the sermons of heretics, unless there is question of learned men, who wish to hear them in order to know and refute the errors scattered there. - Nor is it permitted in the temples of heretics, when they exercise false worship there, to play the organ or sing; for this would be active communication in sacred things.¹¹

¹⁰ Holy Office, Jan. 13, 1818, apud Collectanea, n. 1833.

¹¹ Holy Office, July 8, 1889, apud Collectanea, n. 1854.

With regard to the funerals of heretics, it is permitted to be present at them by material attendance, for the sake of a civil duty, on account of a grave reason, and provided that there is no communication in sacred rites and ceremonies.¹² - With regard to pastors and priests, the Holy Office declared, March 30, 1859 and May 8, 1889, that "a pastor, as pastor, cannot be present at funerals of non-Catholics: but if he assists only civilly, without sacred vestments and without any communication in the sacred rite with heretics, it can be tolerated, provided that it is notoriously established that there was a bond of kinship or friendship between the pastor and the deceased non-Catholic."¹³

¹² Holy Office, Jan. 13, 1818, apud Collectanea, n. 1833.

¹³ Collectanea, n. 1852.

680. (c) Concerning simultaneity. It is not permitted to allow heretics to celebrate their rites in Catholic churches, nor that Catholics perform sacred rites in their temples; for this is the same as consenting to their heretical rites, or at least providing Catholics an occasion of communicating with non-Catholics in sacred matters.¹ - Yet, for a very grave cause, especially for more easily promoting the conversion of schismatics and infidels by consideration of the sacred ceremonies, sometimes missionaries are permitted the faculty of celebrating Mass by the Catholic rite upon altars in the temples of heretics or schismatics, "so that the same altars serve only as bare tables, and are arranged after the manner of Catholics with a consecrated stone, linens, the image of the Most Holy Crucified One, candlesticks, and other necessary furnishings for the use of the sacrifice of the Most Holy Mass in the aforesaid rite."²

¹ Holy Office, May 10, 1753, apud Collect., n. 1816.

² Holy Office, Apr. 12, 1704, apud Collect., n. 1808; cf. n. 1853.

681. (d) Concerning participation in the sacraments. It is not permitted for Catholic parents to allow their children to be baptized by a heretical minister; if this cannot be avoided without grave inconvenience, let them hold themselves passively. Absolutely it is not permitted to them, "neither by themselves nor by others, to perform the office of sponsor in baptisms which are administered by heretics to the children of heretics."³

³ Holy Office, May 10, 1770, apud Collect., n. 1825.

With regard to weddings, it is indeed permitted to attend the wedding feast, but regularly Catholics ought not be present at weddings celebrated before a minister by a heretical rite; yet "it can be tolerated that Catholics be present at weddings of this kind for the sake of civil duty only, scandal and any danger of perversion being removed, and also contempt of ecclesiastical authority being absent."⁴ But it is not permitted there to perform the function of witness or groomsman, because this is active cooperation in a heretical rite.

⁴ Holy Office, Jan. 14, 1874, apud Collect., n. 1848.

Concerning mixed marriages, or marriages with infidels, or weddings celebrated before a heretical minister, we spoke in the Treatise on Matrimony, nn. 237-253 and 366-371.

682. (e) Concerning disputation with heretics. Public disputations, that is, those which are held on a fixed day and hour, before a multitude and judges of the controversy, are to be avoided: "Let Catholics beware lest they have disputations or conferences, especially public ones, with non-Catholics, without the permission of the Holy See or, if the case urges, of the local Ordinary."⁵

⁵ Code, can. 1325, § 3.

Therefore the Holy See frequently prohibited that disputations of this kind be held without the permission of the Apostolic See, or at least of the Bishop, when recourse to the Supreme Pontiff cannot be had.⁶ - But private disputations, before a few hearers, are permitted to clerics when some fruit is hoped for in the hearers, and moreover the clerics are skilled and instructed with sufficient doctrine. But even private disputations are not permitted to laymen by common law, because generally it is presumed that they are not sufficiently instructed in matters of faith. Today, however, this prohibition has fallen into disuse, especially where errors rage; therefore, if laymen are learned and capable of turning back sophisms, they can privately refute heretics and infidels.

⁶ Cf. Decretal., lib. V, c. 2 Quicumque, de Haereticis, in Sexto; Collectanea, n. 1674. - Perrone, op. cit., n. 570, says that these disputations are sometimes useful, "because, even if the disputant grows hardened, fruit is at least hoped for from the hearers, either from the conversion of some, or from the confirmation of Catholics, or even from the lesser boldness of heretics." St. Thomas had gone before (Comment. in II Timoth., c. 2, lect. 2): "But should someone not dispute without contention before the people concerning faith? I answer: a distinction must be made on the part of the hearers, because either they are being solicited by infidels, and then public disputation is useful, because through this the simple become more instructed when they see those erring refuted; but if they are not solicited by infidels, then disputation is not useful, but dangerous."

Besides, today there are not rarely held conferences, as they say, contradictory conferences, in which learned laymen, before a multitude, set forth and defend, with happy outcome, religious, moral, and social truths, with certain adversaries nevertheless contradicting. This indeed is to be left to the prudent judgment of Ordinaries: for it belongs to them to judge when and under what conditions disputations of this kind can be called lawful and opportune.⁷

⁷ The S. C. assigned to extraordinary affairs declared that disputations with socialists are subject to the same rules, Jan. 27, 1902, apud Acta S. Sedis, t. XXXVIII, p. 407; cf. Canoniste, t. XXV, p. 335; Etudes, Aug. 20, 1905, p. 480; Ami du Clerge, Apr. 27, 1905, p. 354.

The conditions commonly required are these: (a) that the defender of Catholic truth be so firm in faith that he incurs no danger of falling into heresy; (b) that he be suited to set forth and defend the truth, so that the faith of the hearers is not weakened; (c) that there be founded hope that from this great utility will arise for the faithful or for adversaries.

683. (D) Concerning cooperation in matters pertaining to faith. Today, in mixed societies in which Catholics live together with infidels or heretics, there are many occasions of cooperating in matters pertaining to false religion. And certainly every formal, or intentional, cooperation is unlawful; but cooperation merely material can be lawful on account of a proportionately grave cause. It will not be beside the matter to set forth certain particular cases.

(a) Concerning the building of heterodox temples. With regard to the temples of heretics, we have an instruction of the Holy Office, given Jan. 14, 1818, to the Apostolic Vicar of Kentucky, and confirmed July 7, 1864.⁸ To the question "whether it is permitted to build churches or synagogues of heretics," the answer was: "They are not to be disturbed, provided that scandal is not present, nor that it is in contempt of religion. But let the bishop take care that the artisans be opportunely instructed by missionaries and confessors... Namely they are bound to abstain from the work: 1) where a work of this kind is commonly held for a sign protesting false religion; 2) or something is contained in it which of itself directly and uniquely expresses reprobation of Catholic worship, and approbation of the condemned worship of heretics; 3) or it is established that Catholic artisans are driven to or called to the work by heretics in contempt of the Catholic religion. - Moreover, although outside these cases they are to be left in good faith, yet they are always to be warned lest they intend to cooperate with the worship of heretics." Here there is question of workmen; but if the question is of architects, a graver cause is required for them lawfully to construct a heretical temple, because the cooperation is more proximate.

⁸ Collectanea, n. 1845.

With regard to Mohammedan temples, Catholics likewise are not to be disturbed, "provided that they act compelled by fear of grave evil, and do not intend to cooperate with the superstitions of Mohammedans."⁹

⁹ S. C. de Prop. F., apud Collect., n. 1733.

684. But if there is question of temples or altars of idols, the Holy See has declared many times that this is not permitted, even to avoid death: "The Japanese faithful cannot, in order to avoid danger of death or exile, build altars or temples for idols or cooperate in their building."¹⁰ The reason seems to be that, in the individual cases proposed, the erection of a temple was considered to be a sign protesting false religion. Therefore, if in some case the cooperation were merely material, and were not held as approbation of the worship of idols, it could be tolerated for a very grave reason.

¹⁰ S. C. de Prop. F., apud Collect., n. 1697; cf. nn. 1700, 1704, 1706, 1748.

685. It was also asked whether it is lawful for Catholics to contribute money for the building of heretical temples; the Sacred Penitentiary answered (in the year 1822): "Affirmatively, but only for freeing themselves and their temples from that inconvenient and scandalous simultaneity with Protestants."¹¹ From this it follows that this cooperation is not intrinsically evil, but can be permitted on account of a very grave cause. The Sacred Congregation, in the aforesaid case, alleged only one cause, because perhaps, in this case, there was no other which seemed sufficient; but grave authors¹² say that this is also permitted whenever a very grave reason is present, for example, lest a merchant's shop be utterly deserted by Protestants; which indeed we judge probable; and in fact many Catholic merchants act thus in mixed regions. - It is also permitted, by way of tribute, to pay monies which are in fact expended on idolatries, provided it is established, from circumstances or from open declaration, that Catholics do not consent to false superstitions.¹³

¹¹ Bucceroni, Enchiridion, ad n. 192.

¹² Konings, n. 313; Genicot, n. 237; Noldin, n. 122.

¹³ Holy Office, Apr. 21, 1847, ad 4, apud Collect. I, n. 742.

686. From the same principle the question must be solved whether it is lawful to sell utensils or works of art for adorning a non-Catholic temple. When these can have a good or indifferent use, for example, benches, organs, bells, it is permitted to sell them on account of a grave reason. But if the question is of idols, which are destined not for adorning gardens or houses, but for superstitious worship, it is for the most part altogether unlawful, and can be tolerated only from a very grave and most urgent cause.

687. (b) Concerning the erection and support of non-Catholic schools and orphanages. Since the end of these institutions is not directly religious, a lesser cause is required than where there is question of temples. Yet, in order that scandal may be removed, money must be granted to non-Catholics not as followers of a sect, but as fellow-citizens; and care must be taken lest money thus contributed be used for perverting Catholics.

688. (c) Concerning calling a heretical minister to a dying person. It had been asked of the Holy Office whether nuns, taking care of a hospice in which non-Catholics are received, can call a heretical minister, if Protestants ask for one, so that they may receive from him the helps and consolations of religion. It was answered, on March 15, 1848, "according to the things set forth, it is not permitted; let them hold themselves passively." This decree indeed was confirmed Dec. 16, 1898, but at the same time it was declared that nothing prevents the minister from being called through a non-Catholic person;¹⁴ moreover a non-Catholic person can be made more certain concerning the state of the dying person. - But if the minister does not come, a Catholic priest or nun can arouse the dying person, being in good faith, so that he may elicit an act of contrition, and thus prepare himself for a Christian death.

¹⁴ Apud Ami du Clerge, t. XXI, 1899, p. 497.

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2; q. 2, a. 1, ad 1; a. 9, ad 3; a. 10.

699. Thesis. For the act of faith a judgment of credibility is required beforehand. - Namely, the first act required for faith, which precedes the others, is the previous judgment of credibility (Ps. XCII, 5 according to the Greek and Latin text; John X, 25, 37-38). This is altogether required before the act of faith as a condition. The reason is that the will cannot move the intellect to believing something and command faith in something, unless this be proposed to it by the intellect as credible, and the intellect see that it is to be believed. And indeed:

a) That judgment must be evident, because the will cannot prudently command an altogether certain and firm assent, unless something appears to the intellect and is proposed by it as certainly and evidently credible.

b) That judgment is the conclusion of a ratiocination similar to that which Lugo said to be the act itself of faith: What God infallible in speaking says is credible and to be believed. But God infallible in speaking revealed the Incarnation. Therefore the Incarnation is credible and to be believed. - Or more reflexively: What, all things considered, after diligent examination sufficiently appears to me to have been infallibly attested by God, is to be believed. But, all things considered, it sufficiently seems to me that God revealed the Incarnation. Therefore it is to be believed.

c) Hence the premises of this ratiocination, namely, that God is infallible in speaking and credible, and that in fact He has spoken, must be known with certitude at least practical, not absolute, but respective, that is, which in relation to the capacity of each one's intellect excludes every prudent doubt; otherwise a certain judgment of credibility could not be founded upon them.

Hence proposition 21 was condemned by Innocent XI: "The assent of supernatural faith and useful for salvation stands with only probable notice of revelation, indeed with fear by which someone fears lest God has not spoken"; and proposition 25 of the Modernists by Pius X: "The assent of faith ultimately rests on a heap of probabilities."

700. The judgment of credibility rests upon the preambles of faith and the motives of credibility. - Those things whose knowledge is prerequired for faith, and upon which the judgment of credibility rests, are called the preambles of faith. Indeed divine authority or infallibility in speaking is known by reason: for, once it is supposed that God exists, it is easily deduced from the fact that He is the most perfect being. But the fact of revelation is known by diverse men through diverse arguments, according as they are adapted to their intellect; these arguments are called motives of credibility.

Therefore the motives of credibility and the formal object or motive of faith differ:

a) the former proximately demonstrate the motive of faith, namely, that God revealed something, and thus only remotely dispose, induce, impel to believing; the latter altogether proximately and immediately moves to believing;

b) the former precede the act of faith, and are a condition extrinsic to it; the latter enters the act of faith as an essential element and motive intrinsically constitutive of it;

c) the former show that faith is reasonable; and they are not the formal motive why we believe something, but only why we judge something to be credible and to be believed: the latter is the very motive why we believe something, that is, judge it to be true.

1. Evidence of credibility arises even from merely practical certitude without evidence concerning the existence of revelation, because evidence of credibility is occupied with the thing as prudently affirmable: it is evident to me that one must act prudently, that is, according to practical certitude in the defect of certitude strictly so called. This is clear from the second form of the syllogism indicated, in which the three propositions are evident.

701. External motives of credibility are altogether certain. - Most certain signs are had, and external arguments adapted to the intelligences of all (Vatican Council), even of men of this time (profession of faith against the Modernists), and even for the wiser altogether apodictic, by which the existence of revelation is proved, as the Vatican Council defined, sess. 3, c. 3, can. 3 and 4, namely, certain facts which cannot be explained in a natural mode, and which appear as supernatural and divine. But, as the same Council teaches, c. 3, they are chiefly 1. miracles and 2. prophecies; - also 3. the Church, which, by herself, on account of her admirable propagation, eminent holiness and fecundity in good things (confirmed by the testimony of innumerable martyrs), Catholic unity and unconquered stability, appears as a divine work and institution and is an irrefragable testimony of her divine mission; and 4. the same Church, which, as marked by the notes and characters of her mission from Christ, evidently and easily appears to all as the legate of God, and thus as the guardian and teacher of revelation, proposing faith in the name of God.

Nor say: the Church is known by faith and revelation; therefore she cannot be the means of knowing revelation itself, and a motive of credibility; otherwise we would fall into a vicious circle. - For the answer is that the Church, insofar as she is the means of knowing revelation and the motive why we judge that one must believe, is known not by revelation and faith but by reason and history, insofar as we can inspect her, for example, insofar as she is described in the Gospels and in the testimonies of ecclesiastical writers, not insofar as these are the word of God or testimonies of divine tradition, but insofar as they are historical books having human authority. But afterwards the Church, as supernatural and divine, is known and believed by revelation and faith.

702. Internal motives of credibility are less certain. - Motives intrinsic to the Christian religion, such as the holiness of Christ and the sublimity of Christian doctrine, if they alone are considered, even as external divine facts naturally inexplicable, do not seem to prove the existence of divine revelation with certitude strictly so called and demonstrative, but only with the highest probability and practical certitude; besides, they are arguments requiring much study and liable to great difficulties, nor are they adapted to all intelligences. Hence they are not efficacious for convincing all, nor do they deserve to occupy the more principal part in Apologetics.

Still more vehemently do those err who, with the external motives of credibility rejected or at least set after others, for founding supernatural faith uniquely or chiefly appeal to merely internal motives, such as internal experience, the need of the religious soul, religious sense; or also hold faith as something instinctive. For these motives:

a) are not evident, nor are they capable of founding practical certitude in all, indeed they are subjective, so that others say that they need another faith or even none;

b) are repugnant to the supernaturality of faith, if what they say is taken to the word: that faith is something pleasing to nature, or that it alone satisfies the aspirations of nature or the necessities of society, since natural religion also satisfies sufficiently;

c) are repugnant to the motive of faith, which would no longer be the testimony of God but congruence with nature or society: for that God has spoken cannot be proved by all the aforesaid or by other internal criteria, but only by external divine facts. Hence those motives can prepare for receiving faith, remove obstacles of faith, dispose the will to receiving revelation, and confirm it; they cannot truly demonstrate it.

703. Motives of credibility suffice if broadly certain; yet certain ones can found absolute certitude. - Motives of credibility, although among many they are not certain except by practical certitude and certitude improperly so called, nevertheless can be absolutely certain. Hence it is false, what Lugo is compelled to say, that the act of faith - which he thinks to be the conclusion of a ratiocination - is obscure and free, because the premises, namely, the authority of God and at least the fact of revelation, are obscure and are not known with evidence or certain demonstration, but only with great probability and practical certitude. For 1. the infallibility or authority of God revealing in speaking can be clearly perceived, as happens by philosophers; - 2. concerning the fact of revelation, it seems that we can acquire true historical certitude a) from prophecies, or from the miracles of Christ, concerning whose life and deeds we have historical certitude, but as it were physical certitude concerning the supernaturality of His acts, - and especially b) if all the motives of credibility are considered together, because if so many and all indications concur in showing the truth of our one religion, Providence itself would deceive if that religion were not true: it is not only improbable, but impossible to explain the Catholic Church and the miracles of Christ and the Apostles, if the religion of Christ is not true; - indeed 3. that God has spoken can be evident, as it was to Angels, Apostles, and others who are immediately instructed by God in faith; which does not impede faith, because the more evident the authority of God and the fact of revelation appear, the more evident the obligation of believing appears.

Hence the act of faith is obscure and free only because revelation does not make the revealed things appear, and especially because only those things are believed which are not fully evident, as was said above.

704. How can children and the unlearned form for themselves a judgment of credibility? - By children and the more unlearned the fact of revelation is often not known except by the human authority of parents, wise men, the pastor, etc., whom they believe: for right and prudent reason dictates to them that in necessary things which they cannot see through themselves, they subject themselves to the authority of those who naturally can and must instruct them. Therefore they believe by human faith those things which they have received from parents or the parish priest concerning the history of revelation made by God, for example, that God taught such or such things; once this is posited, they believe those things by divine faith on account of the authority of God revealing alone.

Generally they have the judgment of credibility. This is formed rather easily by the following or equivalent ratiocination, at least implicit: In necessary things which cannot be investigated by me, it is prudent or obligatory to admit the testimony of those who are naturally leaders or instructors. But through myself I cannot be made certain that God has spoken these things. Therefore it is prudent and obligatory to admit this because it is said by those who are naturally leaders and instructors; and therefore to believe on account of the testimony of God.

Therefore let parents and priests, to whom it belongs to instruct such persons, attend: 1. that doctrine be proposed to them at least as the word or revelation of God, for otherwise they would believe only by human faith on account of their authority, and not by divine faith on account of the authority of God revealing. Indeed 2. if they are instructed a little more, they will easily recognize that parents teach the same as their priests, and that these cohere with the bishops, and that the bishops are united with the Roman Pontiff, for example, because all teach a similar catechism; whence they will know that the doctrine proposed is not of private persons, but of the universal religious society which is very strong in authority, and that it is not taught by pastors in their own name, but as by ministers of the Church, who have been sent by her and by Christ to preach; - indeed 3. they will easily recognize this doctrine to be the word of God, on account of the miracles by which revelation was confirmed, and on account of the Church, which by her notes (great authority and truth, Catholic unity of doctrine, holiness and fecundity in good things, unconquered stability) easily appears to all as the legate of God and guardian of the revealed word.

705. Observations. - 1. On the part of the judgment of credibility, faith is called reasonable, and a special property belongs to it, namely, reasonableness (Vatican Council, c. 3), to which rational credibility responds on the part of the revealed object.

2. Although the Holy Spirit can teach directly and immediately, and sometimes does teach even the more unlearned, nevertheless Protestants err in saying that revelation is credible on account of the immediate and internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, which would be granted to all (cf. treatise on Theological Places).

3. De Lugo and those who hold that the act of faith is the conclusion of a ratiocination which is admitted on account of the premises, in order to explain in their opinion how the proximate, immediate, and ultimate motive of faith is the authority and revelation of God, are compelled to say that the premises, and by name the fact of revelation which is asserted in the minor, are known by all immediately and without a new ratiocination, because miracles, fulfillments of prophecies, the proposition of the Church, etc., by which revelation is proved or shown and on account of which revelation is affirmed in the minor, are the completing part of the divine locution. - But:

a) at most all these things are nothing but the external locution of God, which is not the motive of faith, as was said above, n. 669;

b) more probably they are not even the external locution itself of God except improperly; properly they are only signs of divine locution, as the seal is the sign of the king's letter;

c) at least the first time, we did not know divine revelation immediately, but only by several arguments.

Unbelievers, or deists, are those who acknowledge a supreme being, that is, the true God, but deny that he revealed anything to men, and therefore regard the Christian Religion, with its mysteries, as a human fabrication. They will, however, be led by reason alone in matters that concern God, themselves, or others; and they acknowledge it as the one rule and judge of truth and life in all things.

Hence they pass into various inventions. Some hold that the rational soul is material, and therefore deny its immortality; these are called Materialists; others acknowledge the rational soul to be spiritual and immortal. Some deny divine providence over human affairs, and that God punishes the wicked or rewards the good; others think the opposite. Some reckon justice and injustice to be mere words, and place the supreme rule in their own advantage; others subject the rational creature to certain duties toward God and its equals, according to the dictate of reason. Nor is it any wonder if they are thus torn apart among themselves; for since, as I said, they hold reason alone as their leader and rule, each one forges his own system at the nod of his own reason.

Against this most pestilential error, subversive of all religion and gaining strength in these times, very many and most learned writings have appeared, in which its various systems are effectively assailed and the error utterly routed. But since I aim at brevity, for the benefit of studious youth, I think I have sufficiently accomplished my task if I have invincibly proved that the Christian Religion is divine, revealed and instituted by God. For this being granted, it plainly follows that all the things which it proposes to be believed, such as the mysteries of the Most Holy (it continues on p. 26).

Trinity and of the Incarnation, divine providence over human affairs, the immortality of the soul, the laws of morals, original sin, the eternity of punishments, the resurrection of the dead, the sacraments, etc., are true, and that to them a certain and undoubted faith must be given, notwithstanding their incomprehensibility; for God can neither be deceived nor deceive, as the deists themselves concede; and thus all their fabrications and sophisms vanish. And since these men listen to reason alone, I shall assail them also by reason alone, setting forth the principal motives of credibility of the Christian Religion, against which no one can stand, unless he extinguish within himself the light of human reason.

I argue, therefore, as follows. Reason persuades, indeed compels — unless it be wholly inverted and disordered — to acknowledge as true, revealed and instituted by God, that religion which, first, the prophets foretold long beforehand; secondly, which its author and his coworkers alike confirmed by the prophecies fulfilled and by most manifest miracles; finally, thirdly, which by the power of God alone was born, grew up, and was spread through the whole world against all the laws of human prudence. Now this is the Christian Religion. Therefore. — The major they cannot deny; for the three arguments assigned are the most evident proofs of divinity. Therefore only the minor needs to be proved. Whence it will be demonstrated in the following articles.

[Although reason alone can find the motives of credibility of the Christian Religion, proofs of this kind also belong to faith, as defined by the Vatican Synod thus decreeing: « If anyone shall say that divine revelation cannot be made credible by external signs, and that therefore men ought to be moved to faith by internal experience alone, or by private inspiration of each one: let him be anathema. »]

[I say 1°, with St. Thomas, 2ae 2ae, q. 171, a. 1 : « Prophecy consists first and principally in cognition,. namely, that prophets know things distant and remote from human knowledge... Prophecy secondarily consists in speech, insofar as prophets announce to others, for their edification, the things they know by divine instruction, according to Isa., XXI, 10 : What I have heard from the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, I have declared unto you. » Prophecy comes from two Greek words, προ, before, and φημί, I speak, and signifies in general an announcement made beforehand of an event. It is commonly defined thus : « A sure presentiment and prediction of some event which could not have been foreknown from natural causes. » Or more narrowly : « The manifestation of a future thing hidden from creatures. » From this notion of prophecy it is clear that three conditions are required for it to be truly and properly such, namely : 1° that it be a sure prediction, not conjectural ; 2° that it be a prediction of a future contingent thing, which accordingly can be known neither by art nor by any natural science whatever ; 3° that it be so determinate that the event is not accommodated to the prophecy, but rather the prophecy determines the event : that is, that it not be so vague, obscure, and equivocal as to fit any event whatsoever, and its application not arbitrary ; so that prophecy, which is a true miracle, supplies its own proof.

I say 2° : Prophecy is possible.

This is against the ancients and the more recent authors who denied the possibility of prophecy. Among the ancients were, on the testimony of Cicero¹², the Colophonian and Epicurus. The latter had no other reason for rejecting all divination than that he did not admit that mankind was of concern to the gods. Such was also the judgment of Carneades, as the same Cicero asserts¹³. Among the more recent, Spinoza and the Socinians deny to God himself the faculty of foreseeing future things. Finally, all rationalists now deny that man can receive a prophetic spirit from God. ¹² De divinat., lib. I, c. 3 ; De natura deorum, lib. I, c. 19. ¹³ De fato, c. 14.

Proof. by reason. The possibility of prophecy reduces to these two questions : first, whether God can foreknow things future ; second, supposing the foreknowledge of things future, whether.

God can manifest them to man. But both of these are possible. Therefore.

Proof. of the first part, minor. The first is not only possible but necessary. For in God there is omniscience, and therefore foreknowledge, which is included in perfect and infinite science. If God did not have this foreknowledge, he would not be infinitely perfect under this respect, and consequently would not be God. And this knowledge in God is not properly foreknowledge, but simply knowledge. This is proved by St. Thomas, [[Iª p., q. 14, a. 13, o|summa-theologiae:pars.I/quaestio.14/articulus.13]] : « Since God knows all things, not only those which actually exist, but also those which are in his own power or in the creature's, and since some of these are contingent as to their future occurrence, it follows that God knows future contingents... Now God knows all contingents, not only as they are in their causes, but also as each of them actually is in itself. And although contingents come into actual existence successively, God does not know contingents successively in their being, as we do, but simultaneously, because his knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also his being. And eternity, existing whole and at once, embraces all time. Hence all things which are in time are present to God from eternity, not only by the reason that he has the notions of things present within himself, as some say, but because his gaze is directed from eternity upon all things as they stand in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingents are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight according to their presentiality ; and yet they remain future contingents in comparison with their proximate causes. » Therefore.

It is confirmed by the manifold testimonies of Scripture, of which the following may suffice to cite. Heb., IV, 13 : All things are naked and open to his eyes. Ps., cxxxviii, 3 and 4 : You have understood my thoughts from afar... you have foreseen all my ways. Wis., VIII, 8 : She knows the signs and wonders before they come to pass, and the events of times and ages. The prophecies recorded in the Scriptures, which were certainly fulfilled even in the smallest particulars, demonstrate this possibility evidently from the fact itself.

Proof. of the second part, minor. If God could not manifest future things to man, the impediment would evidently stand only on the side of man, who would not be capable of such communication. But this incapacity cannot be admitted. Therefore. — Proof. of the minor. Man learns from man the things he does not know, and among these are many that learned men, aided by the natural light alone, foresaw as about to arise from their causes. But if it should please God, man can be taught by him no less, indeed much more, in the extraordinary way of inspiration, that is, of interior illumination whereby future contingents, naturally hidden, are opened up to him. Therefore.

It is confirmed by the consent of the human race; for it has always been the persuasion of men that some have received divine communications concerning things to come. Thence, among the pagans, oracles, divinations, auguries, and magical arts.]

[I answer: affirmative.

Proof. Holy Scripture, which most frequently invokes prophecies as proof of the truth of revelation. Christ himself says, John, v, 39: Search the Scriptures, for you think that in them you have life everlasting. And they are they that testify of me. So that he might prove to the disciples going to the town called Emmaus that all things that had happened of him had come to pass by the divine will, Luke, XXIV, 27, beginning from Moses and all the prophets, he interpreted to them in all the Scriptures the things that were concerning him. St. Peter, after narrating the prodigious transfiguration of Christ, in which the heavenly Father proclaimed him his own Son with an audible voice, adds, to refute more fully the unbelief of the Jews, 2 Pet., I, 19: And we have a firmer prophetic word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a lamp shining in a dark place, until the day dawn. St. Paul expounded to the Jews the heavenly doctrine, Acts, XXVIII, 23, testifying the kingdom of God and persuading them concerning Jesus out of the law of Moses and the prophets. Therefore.

Proof. by a second argument. Prophecy properly so called cannot be except from God; for, as the Angelic Doctor says, 2a 2ae, q. 171, a. 2, c., « the principle of those things that pertain to supernatural knowledge, which are made manifest through prophecy, is God himself, who is not seen by the prophets through essence. » Therefore, whenever a true prophecy is had as confirmed by the event, so often an unavoidable argument arises for divine and supernatural revelation. — The antecedent follows from the very notion of prophecy itself. — The consequent therefore cannot be denied.

It is confirmed from this, that a true prophecy is a true miracle, and below it will be proved that a miracle demonstrates the truth of the doctrine in whose favor it is wrought.

Proof. thirdly from the Fathers, of whom it will suffice to cite one and another. Tertullian, Apologet., c. 20: « A fitting testimony of divinity, I think, is the truth of divination. Hence among us faith in things to come also is safe, because they were foretold along with those things which are daily proved. » Splendid is this passage of Augustine, serm. 43 de Script., n. 5. Having recounted out of St. Peter the transfiguration of Christ, and having cited these words: And we have a more certain prophetic word, he says: « That voice sounded from heaven, and the prophetic word is more certain... Who among us does not marvel that, the voice having been brought down from heaven, the Apostle said the prophetic word was more certain? He said indeed more certain: more certain, not better, not truer. For that voice from heaven was as true as the prophetic word, as good, as useful. What then is more certain, except that in which the hearer is more confirmed? Why this? Because there are unbelieving men who so disparage Christ as to say that he did what he did by magical arts... But the prophets were before: I do not say before that voice, but before the flesh of Christ. Christ was not yet when he sent the prophets... Behold why the Apostle Peter says: We have a more certain prophetic word. A voice from heaven, whereby the faithful are admonished; a prophetic word, whereby the unbelieving are convinced. » Therefore.]

The prophecies of the Christian religion are contained in the books of Moses and of the other prophets.

1° God spoke to Moses, and revealed to him the Jewish religion, as is clear from Exod., XIX, 3-6. Further, if the Jewish religion is true and revealed, then Christ is the Messiah. Therefore the Christian religion, which he instituted, and of which the Jewish religion was the foundation, is true and revealed.

2° In the books of Moses and the prophets are foretold the Messiah, his birth, the place, the time of his birth, his life, doctrine, works, miracles, passion, death, resurrection and other things pertaining to this, the calling of the nations, the rejection of the Jews, the abolition of the temple and of sacrifice, the substitution of a new law and a new sacrifice, etc. And yet all these things have been verified exactly of Jesus of Nazareth, the author of the Christian law. Therefore he himself is the Messiah; therefore his religion is true and divine.

Proof of the minor. 1° Our Christ was born after the scepter had been taken away from Judah, according to the prophecy of Jacob, Genes., XLIX, 10; at the time fixed in the 70 weeks of Daniel, Daniel, IX, 24-27; before the destruction of the second temple, as Aggaeus, II, 8-10, and Malachias, III, 1 had foretold. — 2° He was born in Bethlehem, as had been foretold, Mich., V, 2; of the tribe of Judah and the family of David, Isa., XI, 1 and 10; of a virgin, Isa., VII, 14. — 3° His coming was preceded by him who would prepare his ways, Malach., III, 1. — 4° He worked miracles, as Isaias, LXI, 1 seqq. had foretold. — 5° He was sold for thirty pieces of silver, with which the potter’s field was bought, as Zacharias, XI, 12 foretold. — 6° He was spat upon and struck in the face, Isa., L, 6. — 7° He was scourged, Psal. XXXIV, 15 and CXXXVII, 3. — 8° His hands and feet were pierced, Psal. XXI, 17. — 9° He was crucified among thieves, Isa., LII, 12. His garments were divided, cast by lot for the robe, Psal. XXI, 19. Hanging on the cross, he was given gall to drink, Psal., LXVII, 22. As he was dying, the sun suffered an eclipse,

Amos, VIII, 9; he rose again, Psal. III, 6;¹⁴ he ascended into heaven, Psal. LXVII, 34; he sent the Holy Spirit, Ioel, II, 28. — 10° He called the nations through the Apostles to his religion, and destroyed idolatry, as had been foretold, Genes., XXII, 17 et 18; Isa., II, 2, 3 et 18; XIX, 19; XLIX, 6 seqq.; Zach., XII, 2, and elsewhere. — 11° He substituted a new priesthood for the Levitical, a new law for the Mosaic law, and finally rejected the Jews, as foretold everywhere in the prophets, Isai., Ierem., Ose., Amos, Mich. ¹⁴ Editor's note: the print reads "Psal. III, 6"; the passage proves Christ's resurrection, which Psalm III, 6 ("Ego dormivi") does not treat, so the citation may be a printer's error (cf. Psal. II, 7 or XV, 10).

Seek all these things set out more fully in our previous Work, tract. de Incarn., dissert. II, a. 3.

What will the deist say to these things? Will he say that Moses is a teller of fables and an impostor, who fraudulently sold false and invented things to the Israelites as true?

Sed contra : 1° Moses calls the Israelites themselves eyewitnesses of the things he narrates. He narrates the plagues of Egypt, harmless to the Israelites looking on. He narrates that they passed unharmed through the Red Sea, while the Egyptians were drowned in it. He narrates that manna was given them from heaven for forty years, and that during that time their garments were not worn out. He narrates that the law was given them by God on Mount Sinai amid lightnings and thunders. He narrates that he drew forth a fountain from the rock for their relief, and that Dathan and Abiron, while they looked on, were swallowed alive into the earth, as he had foretold; he subjects them to a most harsh law, even under pain of death in certain matters. He narrates that he ordered twenty-five thousand men to be killed by the Levites for idolatry, and many other things. If therefore all these things are false, and Moses fraudulently sold them to the Israelites as true, it must be that Moses was foolish, to hope that he could persuade the Israelites that they had seen what they had not seen, and thereby subject them to a most harsh law; and that the Israelites were in like manner foolish, to believe that they had seen what they had not seen, and thereby subject themselves to a most harsh law.

2° In memory of the deeds and prodigies which Moses narrates, feasts and sacrifices were then instituted which are still scrupulously observed by the Jews. But who would believe that a whole nation instituted feasts and sacrifices for events not certainly known to it, or fabulous, and observed them so religiously through so many centuries.

3° Moses not only narrates deeds and prodigies, but foretells many future things that depend solely on the will of God, and which were fulfilled: likewise the other Prophets. But it is not for an impostor, nor for any other man whatsoever, to predict future things that depend solely on the will of God.

Perhaps he will reply that neither Moses nor the prophets ever existed; or, if they existed, that the books attributed to them are not their own, but were fabricated after the birth of Christianity by some impostor.

Sed contra : 1° It is as certain that Moses and the prophets existed and wrote the things that are attributed to them, as it is certain that Cyrus, Alexander, Caesar, Cicero, Virgil existed, and that the writings attributed to them are their own. Of these latter no one doubts, on account of the constant tradition, against which nothing can be opposed. Therefore neither may one doubt about the former.

Likewise, it is as certain that Moses and the Prophets existed, and that the works inscribed with their names were written by them, as it is certain that the Jewish nation existed and now exists, which always venerated and venerates them as Prophets and saints, and has always kept their writings, as divine, with the greatest diligence, and keeps them. But that the Jewish nation existed before the rise of Christianity is known to the whole world.

2° Aristeus, one of the legates of Ptolemy to Eleazar, high priest of the Jews, whose book exists in the Bibliotheca Patrum, tom. VII, Josephus and Philo, both Jews, relate that the Old Testament was translated from Hebrew into Greek by the 70 Interpreters, under Ptolemy king of Egypt, two hundred years before Christ was born. Likewise profane historians, Cicero, Phlegon, Tacitus, Suetonius, Sallustius, Quintus Curtius, make mention of the law, the temple and the wars of the Jews.

3° By what art could this impostor have persuaded the Jews that this was the history and law of their nation handed down by God, of which they had never heard anything, and which contains many things disgraceful to them and commands most harsh things, and could he have obtained from them so scrupulous an observance of this most harsh law, such as they profess even now? Whoever had attempted this would without doubt have been regarded by the Jews as a fanatic.

4° If the Old Testament is the work of a recent impostor, the same must be said of the New, since the latter is nothing but an explanation and fulfillment of the former, and Christ often appeals the Jews to Moses and to the prophets of the Old Testament.

5° Let the deists say who this impostor was, of what condition, stock and religion: whether a Jew, a Samaritan, or a Christian? If a Jew, he would have obtained nothing from the Samaritans, the bitterest enemies of the Jews. Likewise, if a Samaritan, with respect to the Jews. Moreover, neither would have inserted in these books things so ignominious to the Jewish and Samaritan nation, namely their crimes, ingratitudes, idolatries and punishments. If a Christian, how would he have been acceptable to the Jews and Samaritans, alike the bitterest enemies of the Christians?

6° Likewise, let them say at what time, in what year, in what part of the world this impostor appeared; whom he first deceived; how the Jews, Samaritans, and Christians dispersed through the whole world were at once and together furnished with copies of all these books, in every language, Hebrew, Syriac, Chaldaic, Greek, as they were at the birth of Christianity. To these things the deists fall silent. Let them acknowledge therefore their fictions, and that they betray themselves as impostors, while they plead the cause of a fictitious impostor.

Let there remain unmoved, therefore, that the books of Moses and the prophets are their genuine works, that the prophecies which they contain concerning the Christian religion and its author are divine and revealed, and consequently that the Christian religion is true, divine and revealed; for there is no more efficacious argument for the truth of any doctrine than prophecies concerning its author and its truth, since no one but God, or one inspired by the divine Spirit, can long beforehand predict future things, which depend solely on the will of God, with all their circumstances, according to that of Isa., XLI, 23 : Announce the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that you are gods.

Obi. 1° that paganism also had its oracles.

That we may find the most excellent definition and essence of FAITH, we must examine the object, from which the essence is taken, or at least is known a posteriori.

D. Bonaventure observes in the body of the text that a twofold object is assigned, one material, called the Quod (That which); the other formal, the Quo (That by which), concerning which see p. 1. tract. 1. quaest. 4. The material is the thing considered; the formal is the ratio by which, and under which, it is considered.

All concede that God is the principal Quod object of our faith, against Calvin, book 2. Institut. cap. 6., who holds that not God alone is the object of faith, but also Christ, as He is Man. So the Holy Doctor here, and D. Thomas here, and p. 1. quaest. 1. art. 7.; Alensis 3. p. quaest. 79. membr. 6.; Albert. 3. dist. 23. art. 12.; Durand. ibi quaest. 1.; Capreolus in Prol. sent. quaest. 4. art. 2. around the fifth conclusion; Caiet. ad art. cit. of D. Thomas; Valentia disp. 1. quaest. 1. punct. 1.; Caspens. tract. 15. sect. 1.; Morand. tract. unico in 2. 2. quaest. 1.; Scotus 3. dist. 23. quaest. un.; G. and his followers; Mastrius tom. 3. disp. 6. quaest. 1. art. 1.; Vulpes tom. 2. p. 3. disp. 30. art. 2.; Arriaga tom. 5. tract. 1. disput. 1. sect. 1.; Suarez disp. 2. sect. 1. and 2.; Cardinal Lugo tract. de fide disp. 3. sect. 2.; Amicus tom. 4. disp. 1. sect. 1. and following; Tannerus disp. 1. quaest. 1. dub. 2., who say it is the common view. Yet some deny that God is the object of attribution as God, but will have it to be God complexly, as willing to beatify. So Vulpes with Gregory quaest. 4. prol. art. 2. and other Nominalists. They rely on John 20. These things are written, that you may believe, and that believing you may have life in his name; but this opinion is refuted even by the Scotists; nor does it rest on Scotus, as Mastrius notes num. 8. Arriaga indeed grants that God is the principal object of faith; but he denies that He is the object of attribution; and Mastrius notes that many Recentiores stumble here, confusing the principal object with the object of attribution, which many call the adequate object.

OTHERS, however, distinguishing these two objects, assert that God is the object in both ways. So Morandus.

OTHERS distinguish the principal object, and the material object of attribution, from the adequate, as Caspensis with Suarez. These, however, are disputes of no great weight.

D. Bonaventure holds that the principal material object, and the object of attribution, is God; yet it is not the adequate material object. This is the common opinion, from Tannerus disp. 1. quaest. 1. dub. 2. and Fulsens. lib. 3. cap. 1.

I ASSERT first, that the principal object, and the object of attribution, of faith is God.

It is PROVED first from D. Bonav., because Faith is a Theological virtue, which has God for its object. For this reason Faith is often denominated from God: Mark 11. Have the faith of God. John 14. You believe in God, believe also in me. Ephes. 4. One Lord, one faith. From the unity of God note the unity of faith: 1 Thessal. 1. In every place your faith, which is towards God, has gone forth. Hebr. 6. Not casting aside again the foundation from dead works, and of faith towards God. Hebr. 11. He that comes to God must believe that he is. It is confirmed by the Holy Doctor from the Symbol: I believe in God. The same is taught by the Holy Fathers: Aug. lib. 4. de civit. cap. 20.; Cyril of Jerusalem catech. 5.; Irenaeus lib. 4. cap. 13.; and others. So argue Caspens. and others.

It is PROVED second from D. Bonav. Every simple habit ought to have one object, to which all things are reduced; but faith is one habit, and has no other to which all objects are reduced than the Uncreated True, that is, God: Therefore. The major is clear. The minor is proved first from the Apostle, who often testifies that our faith is ordered to the knowledge of God. So Ephes. 1. Coloss. 2. and 3., as cited by Valentia; and from D. August. l. 1. de civitate, cap. 2. It is confirmed: for God is the most excellent object of faith.

I ASSERT second, that the adequate material object comprises many things besides God.

It is PROVED from S. Bonav. first from the Symbol, in which are proposed, besides God, the things to be believed: Creation, Incarnation, and other Mysteries of the Redemption, the Universal Judgment, the Church, the remission of sins, the resurrection, and eternal life.

It is PROVED second from D. Bonav. Faith is of as great amplitude as charity; for we believe the things that are to be loved, and the things that are believed are loved supernaturally. Indeed faith believes even things not to be loved, as eternal punishments; but charity loves not only the Uncreated Good, but also our neighbor and other created things: Therefore.

It is PROVED third from the Holy Doctor, because no future thing is God. But future things are believed, namely eternal life, retribution, and the infliction of punishments: Therefore. The major is evident; for God is eternal.

It is PROVED fourth from the Holy Doctor. If anyone did not believe the histories of Scripture, even the smallest details, as that Saul sought the asses, 1 Reg. 9., or that Tobias's dog wagged his tail, he would be a heretic.

But Arriaga denies that these are ordered to God. Indeed Scotus, 3. dist. 25. quaest. 2., denies that the faith of such things is ordered to God. Yet surely these too are not proposed in vain to be believed on faith: For with the heart we believe unto justice: but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation: Roman. 10.

He ANSWERS, then, that such minutiae are ordered to God, who is truthful even in the smallest things. Moreover Saul's solicitude denotes his obedience, by which he made himself worthy of command; and the exultation of the dog indicates the Divine goodness, which sent forward even a rejoicing little creature as a messenger to the blind man FOR HIM. Nevertheless faith is denominated from the principal object, that is, from God and from Christ, because this is our faith properly so called. Hence Calvin is mocked.

It is PROVED finally, because prophecy accompanies faith; and that is concerning created good.

AS REGARDS the formal object, there is greater difficulty.

The FIRST opinion, which is ascribed to Aureolus 3. dist. 24. art. 2. and is defended by Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 1. art. 1., asserts that the formal object of faith is God under the ratio of first truth in being, and consequently under the ratio of deity. Bannes seems to follow him here, Valent. quaest. 1. p. 1., Tann. num. 25., and others cited by him. These, however, call the formal object the Quod.

The TRUE opinion is, that the formal object of faith is God under the ratio of the truthful revealer. So S. Bonav. in the body of the text, where he brings forward a similitude: For just as a Luminous body moves a power, as its object, when it is set before it either in Light, or as incorporated into earthly matter, as in the adamant and the carbuncle; so Divine truth moves the intellect in a twofold way, either as it is per se in the articles referring to God, or as united to a creature, as in the humanity of Christ, or in some other work. All the Thomists and Scotists follow him, with Scotus quaest. 1. Prol. and others as related by Mastrius num. 21., Tannerus dub. 3., Valent. quaest. 1. p. 1. §. 4., Fulsens. lib. 3. cap. 1., Bassaeus v. Fides.

VULPES, however, declines aside with a crooked nail, saying that God, as willing to reveal, is the formal object of faith. Surely He is believed because we have in fact that God has already revealed; yet we may say that faith embraces everything that God shall will to reveal, for we are bound to believe also what the Church is going to declare in a Council, Decree, or the like.

THEREFORE our opinion is also that of Alensis 3. p. quaest. 78. membr. 4.; Alberti 3. dist. 23. art. 7. and 12.; Altisiodor. lib. 3. summa, Tract. 3. cap. 1. quaest. 3.; Richardi 3. dist. 23. art. 4. quaest. 3.; Durand. ibi, quaest. 7. num. 12., and dist. 24. quaest. 1. and quaest. 2.; Capreol. dist. 24. quaest. unica, art. 1. concl. 4.; Gabrielis dist. 23. quaest. 2. art. 1.; Marsil. 3. quaest. 14.; Cani. Lib. 12. de locis Theolog. cap. 3.; and the rest cited above.

Soto 3. dist. 23. quaest. un. art. 2. and Gulielm. Paris. de fide DECLINE from it, saying that we believe God, not because He is truthful, or because what He says is true, but because He commands it to be so believed; and thus faith would be an effect of the obedience of the intellect exhibited to God.

I ASSERT with D. Bonaventure that the formal object of faith, the Quo, is the first truth revealing.

It is PROVED first from the Holy Doctor in foundation 4. In that is the formal ratio of faith by which we firmly assent to the articles and mysteries; but this is the Divine truth and authority revealing: Therefore. So argue Valentia, Mastrius, and the rest. The minor is proved: for Scripture testifies to this in 1 John 5., where He gives as the reason why we should believe none other than that: The Spirit is he who testifies; and he argues from the lesser: If we receive the testimony of men; the testimony of God is greater. 1 Thessal. 2. When you had received from us the word of hearing, that is, of God, you received it not as the word of men, but (as it is indeed) the word of God, who works in you that have believed. And 1 Timot. 3. All Scripture inspired of God, etc. And 2 Peter 1. The holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost. The same is found in Matth. 16. Flesh and blood has not revealed it to you, but my Father. John 1. The Only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has declared it. 2 Corinth. 4. God has shone in our hearts, etc. Galat. 1. For neither did I receive it (the Gospel) of man, but by revelation.

The same holds S. Dion. cap. 7. de Divinis nominibus; Irenaeus libro 4. cap. 14.; Athan. in oratione, quod unus sit Christus; Chrysost. homil. 8. in secundam ad Corinth.; Ambrosius serm. 21.; Hieron. in cap. 1. ad Titum,; August. contra epist. fundam. capite 14. The Holy Doctor confirms it from Richard of S. Victor.

From these you have that the Divine truth entitatively in being is rather the Quod object, partial, of our faith. I know that the Divine truth in being is the first root of belief: for when I believe some revealed thing, I believe it because it is revealed by God, who cannot lie.

But a difficulty arises that twists exceedingly. For if the first root of our belief is the veracity of God, a circle follows: for when I ask, why do I believe the Incarnation? and answer, because God revealed it: and then am asked again: Why do you believe the revelation? and say: Because God cannot lie. Again, when it is asked: Why do I believe Him truthful? I answer: Because He Himself said and revealed that He is truthful. Behold a circle.

FURTHER, revelation is obscure, therefore it cannot of itself produce assent: so it must be reduced to human faith, so that I believe because it is revealed by the Church, which says that revelation was made to it by God; But whence do I know that this was revealed to it by God? Thus there will never be an end.

SOME seem to hold that our belief is reduced to human faith as its root. And this seems to be the view of Scotus, because at dist. 23. art. 1. he said with D. August. contra Manichaeos: I would not believe the Gospel, unless I believed the Catholic Church. But truly Scotus does not hold this, as Caspensis d. 1. sect. 3. and Mastrius num. 37. note very well; for Scotus knew that human faith is fallible, and therefore cannot be the basis of our belief.

It WILL seem, then, that our belief is resolved into God the truthful, who, however, since He is incidental to me, must become an evident revelation through something: Does another revelation then come forth? surely, and this too will be through another; and so to infinity: Or it is necessary that it rest in some revelation which first makes me certain; but every one is unevident unless some Light is added: Will there be a habit which carries us to assent? But surely then the assent would not be on account of the extrinsic authority of the one declaring; and so it will not be an act of Faith. Nor will it be a free act, but necessary. For thus a boy, arriving at the age of discretion, would be determined by an infused habit to the articles to be believed, the terms alone being foreknown; just as, the terms of natural principles being known, we assent to them. Scotus is agitated by these doubts, yet he inclines to our way of speaking, which resolves faith into the veridical revelation of God, as Smisingh, Aretinus, and Mastrius observe.

THEREFORE it must be known that the formal cause of my assent is the revelation of God the truthful declaring: but the material cause is the article itself; and among the articles, that one: I believe the holy Church, to which I believe, not simply moved by its bare attestation; for whence should I know that it cannot err? I am moved, therefore, dispositive by the Church: Because faith is from hearing: Rom. 10. It is, moreover, worthy of belief for many reasons: on account of the authority of so many wise men, on account of its integrity, on account of miracles which cannot be done by human power, etc. Nevertheless not even this suffices, but an efficient Light is required. Hence Ephes. 2. it is said: Faith is the gift of God, and John 6. No man comes to me unless the Father, who sent me, has drawn him. Thus, then, the Light of the Holy Spirit, with the infused habit also operating, inclines our will, so that it commands the intellect to give assent to the articles handed down by the Church, to which Church I believe as to a mistress of truth proposed to me by God, attesting, and dictating to me with His infallible truth, that she teaches the true faith. So D. Bonav. in 2. dist. 23. quaest. ult. and in 3. dist. 24. dub. 2. litt.

If, therefore, you are asked: Why do you believe the Symbol? Say: because God revealed it, who is truthful. By what means do you know this was revealed by God? Say: The Church tells me so. But whence do you know the Church does not err? Because the first Truth said that she is the mistress of truth; and this alone is the principle credible per se by divine faith, the divine light of the Holy Spirit operating, and the infused habit inclining. And thus one arrives at the root, which is the veracity of God; but this must be preceded by some disposition, lest a circle arise; and surely also by natural reason it is established that God is truthful, because He is the highest Being. See Valentia at the place cited; Artiagam disp. 1. sect. 4. num. 58.; Cardinalem de Lugo disp. 1. sect. 6.; Caspensem sect. 3.

From which it comes about that the Veracity of God is as it were the principle; but the Truth of revelation is the conclusion deduced, as Lugo shows sect. 7.

Nor indeed is the natural disposition for believing the veracity of God, and for inferring the truth of the articles, sufficient, but the concurrence of the supernatural is required.

HENCE a certain argument of Poncius is solved, disput. 27. quaest. 2. What connection (he says) has the veracity of God with the coming of Antichrist? For God would be truthful even if Antichrist were not to be: Therefore the veracity of God is not the formal object of faith. It is confirmed: for we believe even if we do not think about this veracity of God.

It is ANSWERED, that the Veracity of God, not entitative, but declaring, is the formal object of faith; and thus, although God could not reveal Antichrist, yet, revelation supposed, he is the material object, believed because revealed by God, whence arises the very formal ratio.

You will say with Vulpes, and the Author of the Controv. among the Scotists. If the ratio of belief is the Divine veracity, insofar as God willed to reveal. Therefore the will of God is the formal ratio of faith.

It is answered, that the will does not enter into the object of faith, but is supposed as a condition. From what has been said that question is almost solved: Whether revelation enters into the formal object of faith.

The FIRST opinion is, that it is a mere condition, that the articles be believed. So commonly the Scotists: Smisingh, Vulpes disp. 19. art. 1., Arretinus, and others, as cited by Meldula Tom. 3. disp. 6. quaest. 2. Suarez seems to approve this mode disp 3. sect. 2. et alii.

I. Ecclesia is a Greek word, which in Latin signifies a convocation; under the state of grace it is wont to be described thus: It is a society of men called to the faith of Christ, which is inwardly vivified by faith, hope, and charity; but outwardly is governed by the profession of the same Christian faith, by the communion of the Sacraments, and by the preaching of the divine word by legitimate Pastors under its visible head on earth, the Vicar of Christ and successor of St. Peter. The Church is also taken for the material house itself dedicated to God, where the Faithful assemble, of which Matthew 21 says: My house shall be called the house of prayer. But it is commonly taken for the society of the Faithful; and in this sense Paul speaks to the Galatians, chapter 1: Beyond measure I persecuted the Church of God.

II. Just as in the physical human body certain members are vivified by the soul, while certain others adhere to the body yet are not informed by the soul, so it happens in the moral body of the Church. Some Christians communicate with the society both in the external participation of the sacraments and in the other rites, and also in faith, hope, and charity; and these are vivified by the soul, and are living members of the Church. Others only outwardly profess the faith with the other Faithful, and frequent the Sacraments. These are said to be of the body of the Church, but they are outside her soul. That the Church comprehends both good and bad is evident from Matthew 3 [recte 13], where she is compared with the threshing-floor containing wheat and chaff, and with the net gathering together every kind of fish. Wherefore shamefully erred the Cathari and the Donatists, who excluded from the Church all those stained with fault.

III. Heretics, schismatics, and the excommunicated are outside the Church. Children of Heretics who have been baptized are within the Church until the use of reason; and when they have attained it, if they criminally adhere to the synagogue of the Heretics, they become Heretics outside the Church; if they withdraw from it and betake themselves into the bosom of the catholic Church, they become Catholics and members of the true Church.

IV. The marks of the Church are four: One, holy, catholic, and apostolic. She is one by unity of body, because the faithful compose one moral body or society. One body: therefore one head. She is one by unity of spirit, which animates the whole body. She is one by unity of faith and doctrine, by unity of hope, by unity of charity, by unity of the invisible Lord God and of Jesus Christ, and of his visible Vicar the Roman Pontiff. Not even the Heretics themselves dare to deny her unity. One body, one spirit, one faith, one hope, one baptism, one charity, one head they freely admit. But they contend that this head is invisible only — namely, Christ Jesus. But they err shamefully. The body of the Church is visible: therefore the head is visible. In very deed Christ the Lord instituted Peter as the head of his Church, and the successors of Peter. For as he willed the body of the Church to be perpetual, so also its head. Which truth the perennial tradition of the Church confirms.¹

¹ See Tome I, Apparatus, Book 1, Dissertation 3, chapter 4.

V. The second mark of the Church is Sanctity, in that she is consecrated to God, both on account of the sanctity which shines forth in her chief members and on account of the purity of doctrine which she professes. She is named Catholic, or universal, under a threefold title: first, by reason of doctrine, which excludes and execrates all errors; second, by reason of time, because she will endure in unbroken series even to the end of the world; third, by reason of place: Going into the whole world, preach the gospel to every creature (Mark 16). Nor is it required that she extend herself at the same time to all places; nay, Christ himself foretold that his Religion, on account of the crimes of the Faithful, would pass from kingdom to kingdom. From the East it has migrated into the West, and from the West into other parts of the world.

VI. The Donatists objected many things against this universality, and exaggerated the spread of the Arian heresy. The Donatists have been imitated by the Lutherans and Calvinists. The mouths of all these St. Augustine stops, On the Unity of the Church, chapters 13 and 19, and again in Epistle 103. This single epistle grinds to pieces the audacity of the Lutherans and Calvinists.²

² See Tome I, Apparatus, Book 1, Dissertation 3, chapter 4.

VII. The Church is called Apostolic, both because she was founded and propagated by Christ through the Apostles; and because in her there is a perennial and never interrupted succession of Bishops derived from the Apostles; and finally because by the ministry of these the doctrine of the Apostles is kept immaculate.

VIII. That the Church is visible even Calvin himself confesses, Book 4 of the Institutes, chapter 1, section 2; to which subscribes the Lutheran Melanchthon, under the title On the Church. The disciples of Luther and Calvin, more demented than their masters, pressed by the arguments of the Catholics, invented an invisible Church. And in very truth their Church is invisible and fictitious — instituted not by Christ, not by the Apostles, but by Luther, by Calvin, by Zwingli, and by other men of the same bran. Therefore their Churches are named Lutheran, Calvinist, Protestant — not Catholic, not Apostolic, not Christian. So well ascertained are the testimonies of divine Scripture which demonstrate the Church to be visible, that it is superfluous to transcribe them.

IX. That the Holy Spirit assists his Church, lest she err in matters of faith and morals, is an ineluctable dogma. Innumerable most illustrious Theologians — Melchior Cano, Pedro de Soto, Bellarmine, Bossuet, to whom are added Arnauld and Nicole — have confirmed it with every kind of argument, the deliriums of the Protestants being utterly overthrown. So lucid is the promise by which Christ the Lord testifies, Matthew 28, that he will preserve his Church from all error, that it can be eluded by no tergiversation: All power is given to me in heaven and in earth. Going therefore, teach ye all nations; baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world.

X. So invincible have the disciples of Calvin found the arguments of the Catholics, by which it is proved that the Church cannot be deceived and is directed by the Holy Spirit lest she err, and so inept the sophisms formerly devised for obscuring this truth, that they have been compelled to fabricate a new chimerical system. They blurt out, with the minister Jurieu, that the Church is visible, perpetual, indefectible, comprehending all the schismatic and heretical Sects which admit the fundamental articles; and this Jurieu explains at length in his book entitled The True System of the Church, where on page 51 he refutes Augustine, and prates that he was deceived because he excluded from the catholic Church the Schismatic communions which do not destroy the foundation. This grossest of errors collapses of itself. For the catholic Church has always cut off from her bosom the schismatic and heretical communions. Let the Calvinist minister explain to us: who defined that these articles are fundamental, and not others? Where is this Church to be found, composed of various Sects which tear one another to pieces with mutual censures? This Church is Lutheran and Calvinist, Protestant — not Catholic and Apostolic. The divine Scripture, the Fathers, the Councils have always cut off the schismatic and heretical Sects from communion and from the apostolic succession, as rotten members. The Church pronounced anathema against the Origenists, the Novatians, the Donatists, the Quartodecimans, the Sabbatians: were the errors of these fundamental? Not even Jurieu himself will dare to assert it. His new system, therefore, collapses of itself — a system devised precisely because he saw and knew that the other systems of the Lutheran, Calvinist, and Protestant synagogue were utterly inept.

XI. Controversies concerning Religion cannot be settled by divine Scripture alone, but the definition of the Church is necessary. This is the fundamental truth on which all the controversies between Heretics and Catholics depend. With a full pen I have treated this controversy elsewhere;³ now I compress it into few words. Scripture has a twofold sense: one literal, the other spiritual. The letter killeth, but the spirit quickeneth, says the Apostle Paul. The letter killed the Jews, who explained the oracles of the Scriptures concerning the coming of Christ in an alien sense. The letter kills all Heretics. The Sabellians admitted one single divine person, whom they called by three names — Father, Son, and Holy Spirit — on account of the diverse offices. The Arians blasphemed that Christ was absolutely inferior to God. The Manicheans blurted out that the old Testament wars with the new. The Pelagians denied original sin. All these, and very many other Heretics, perished by the killing letter. All of them contended that the holy Scriptures stood on their side; and they fought one against another with the weapons of the divine Scriptures.

³ Tome I, Apparatus, Book I, Dissertation 3.

XII. I do not so much wonder that the Protestants, Lutherans, and Calvinists disagree with the Catholics in the articles concerning the real presence of Christ, concerning Justification, concerning the veneration of images, concerning the Sacrifice, and other points: for those who excel in acumen and erudition in discussing points of this kind can color even errors with certain paints. But in this capital controversy, on which all the rest depend, they betray that they lack sanity of mind and labor under manifest fatuity. The Lutherans and Calvinists contend that Scripture alone is the judge of controversies; and at the same time they dispute most fiercely about the sense of these words: This is my body. The Lutherans defend that these words are to be taken in the literal sense; the Calvinists, in the spiritual sense. The Lutherans maintain that when these words have been pronounced, the body of Christ exists truly and really under the sacred symbols; the Calvinists, on the contrary, teach that the body of Christ is found there only in figure. The Lutherans assert that the body of Christ is really found there, that the substance of the bread remains, and that the body of Christ is there only in the use, and deny that it remains when the use is over. The Catholics, on the contrary, maintain that the very substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ, and that this remains under the sacred symbols even apart from the use. The Calvinists utterly deny all this. That article is fundamental, as is evident. For if the body of Christ does not exist there, the Catholics are idolaters, because they adore bread; if it really exists, the Calvinists are impious, who despise it. If holy Scripture is of itself, no otherwise than the Sun, as Calvin says, splendid and perspicuous, then blind are the Lutherans and Calvinists, who for two centuries have been disputing over the aforesaid sense of the words and do not see the most splendid light. If the sense can be pulled apart into various directions by the wits of men, then utterly fatuous in this controversy are the Lutherans and Calvinists who deny the necessity of a judge to define this controversy and six hundred others. From the founding of the Christian Church heresies, and those very many, have always stalked abroad, and stalk abroad daily. Every Sect boasts the holy Scriptures for itself. And nonetheless the Protestants are not ashamed to prate that no judge is required to settle these controversies. Read what I have adduced from John Locke in Tome I, Apparatus, Book I, Dissertation 3, chapter 5, section 4.

XIII. The vicious circle which the Protestants object is a childish rattle, and the offspring of a most rotten calumny. They calumniate the Catholics as teaching that the Church bestows upon the divine Scriptures their authority and, as they say, their infallibility, and that at the same time the Church receives her authority from those very Scriptures. The Catholics teach that holy Scripture has its authority and infallibility from God. But because, on account of the vain wits of men, this divine Scripture can receive various senses, God instituted the Church as judge, to declare which is the genuine sense intended by God; which sense has its authority from God, and from the Church only the declaration that such a sense is from God. And lest the Church err in this, God promised his help; and this promise he consigned to his divine Scriptures. The Church herself is subject to the divine Scriptures, and is bound to embrace the sense which she judges to have been intended by God. Where here is even the shadow of a vicious circle? See more in the place cited.

Caius, a missionary priest who is very busy, received several non-Catholics into the Church. He does not labor to instruct them before reception; rather, after a catechism has been given and some instruction received from certain lay people, when they declare that they understand the catechism and wish to be received into the Church, he receives them immediately without delay, saying within himself that the less instructed especially cannot understand difficult questions about the motives of credibility of the Catholic religion, and that they will gradually understand everything necessary. Nevertheless, because of certain things recently discovered by him, he is troubled by scruples about this manner of proceeding, and indeed about the lawfulness of administering the sacraments to some of them; for he heard one of his converts say that he had entered the Church led only by greater probability and that afterward he had not attained greater certainty. Hence it is asked:

1. What dispositions are required in order that non-Catholics may be received into the Church?

2. What motives of credibility of the Catholic religion are required and sufficient so that the less instructed especially may be able to embrace the faith?

3. Is it lawful to absolve one who doubts about the faith?

4. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. What dispositions must non-Catholics have to be received into the Church?

They must believe with a firm faith all that the Catholic Church proposes to be believed, and they must have the purpose of performing all the duties which are of obligation for Catholics. With regard to the faith, it is not sufficient to believe everything implicitly. It is necessary as a means of salvation to believe explicitly that God exists, that He is a rewarder of them that seek Him, and probably also the mysteries of the Blessed Trinity and of the Incarnation. It is of precept to believe explicitly the articles of the Faith contained in the Creed, the sacraments which the faithful are under the obligation of receiving, the Lord’s Prayer, and the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church. Hence the necessity of instruction in all these matters.

2. What motives of credibility of the Catholic religion are necessary and sufficient so that especially the illiterate may be able to embrace the Faith?

The Council of the Vatican teaches that miracles and prophecy are motives of credibility which are suited to the capacity of all. The existence, history, and fertility in good of the Catholic Church is also a motive by itself for embracing and persevering in the Faith, and it is suited to the capacity even of the illiterate. The motives should be such as to render the Catholic religion evidently credible, and, moreover, such as can not be displaced by future experience or learning. On this account, although motives which are respectively sufficient to produce moral certainty in illiterate minds, though not in others, might be sufficient to enable the illiterate to make an act of faith, yet even the illiterate should be furnished with something more solid and stable before being admitted into the Church.

3. Is it allowable to absolve one who doubts about the Faith?

No, it is not. If he positively doubts whether some article of the Faith is true, he is a heretic. If he doubts negatively or suspends his assent, he sins gravely against the Faith, and can not be absolved as long as he remains in that state.

4. The case. Caius, a missionary priest and a busy man, received many converts into the Church. He did not take great pains in their instruction, but gave them a catechism, and after they had received a certain amount of instruction from some pious lay people, on their declaring that they knew the catechism and wished to be received into the Church, he received them, saying to himself, that the illiterate especially could not understand difficult questions about the motives of credibility of the Catholic religion, and that they would by degrees learn all that was necessary.

In this Caius made a mistake. It would have been better to receive a few converts well instructed than many badly instructed. Ignorance of their religion is one of the causes why so many Catholics lead un-Catholic lives, and profess such un-Catholic sentiments. Many ill-instructed converts leave the Church when difficulties arise. Caius should, at least, see that his converts have a good knowledge of the catechism. It is not necessary for them to go into difficult questions about the motives of credibility, but they should have some clear idea why they wish to become Catholics, and in some way that reason should be reducible to one or other of the ordinary motives of credibility.

Caius began to have scruples about his method of dealing with converts when he heard one of them say that he came into the Church because he thought that more probably it was the true Church of God, and that he has never had greater certainty than that. Caius had reason to be troubled, for this convert had never been a Catholic at all, inasmuch as he never had the Faith, as we gather from the twenty-first proposition condemned by Innocent XI: Supernatural assent of faith useful for salvation stands with merely probable knowledge of revelation, even with a fear by which someone fears that God has not spoken. Caius may not administer the sacraments to such as these until they are better instructed and until they firmly, without any doubt, believe the Catholic faith.

132. Thesis IV. Miracles and prophecies are infallible proofs of a Divine Revelation.

Explanation. In this thesis we maintain that if, unmistakably, miracles have been worked or prophecies been made in confirmation of a doctrine, that doctrine is thereby known to be approved by the Creator as His own Divine Revelation. The immediate inference from the thesis would be that such a doctrine must be accepted by all men.

Proof. A true miracle can be wrought by God alone. Hence, it is a Divine seal, stamped as it were upon the doctrine, in express confirmation of which the miracle is worked. The Divine origin of such a doctrine, therefore, is infallibly true, because it is impossible for God to affix His seal to a falsehood.

A prophecy is an accurate prediction of a future event that is not dependent upon necessary causes. But God alone is the author of such a prediction, for He alone can possess such knowledge. Therefore, prophecies made in confirmation of a doctrine which is published as coming from God, are infallible proofs that such a doctrine is a Divine Revelation.

133. God is at perfect liberty to choose the manner of His Revelation. As a matter of fact, however, He has chosen to manifest it to the vast majority of men, not immediately, i. e., by directly acting upon the intellect with an overpowering illumination, but mediately, i. e., through the medium of other men whom He has commissioned to publish His revealed truths. Thus, the evidence of Revelation does not overmaster the rational faculties, but leaves a man free to accept it, and, in this manner, to increase his merit. This acceptance is an act of the highest prudence, while the rejection of Divine Revelation would be unreasonable and a grievous wrong. Indeed, from man's complete dependence upon God, and his consequent duty to reverence the Divine teachings and to accept them with loving promptness, it follows, logically, that every one who conceives a well-grounded suspicion that a Divine Revelation has been made, is obliged in conscience to inquire into the matter with more than ordinary diligence.