Article III: On the Judgment of Credibility or on the Preambles of Faith

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2; q. 2, a. 1, ad 1; a. 9, ad 3; a. 10.

699. Thesis. For the act of faith a judgment of credibility is required beforehand. - Namely, the first act required for faith, which precedes the others, is the previous judgment of credibility (Ps. XCII, 5 according to the Greek and Latin text; John X, 25, 37-38). This is altogether required before the act of faith as a condition. The reason is that the will cannot move the intellect to believing something and command faith in something, unless this be proposed to it by the intellect as credible, and the intellect see that it is to be believed. And indeed:

a) That judgment must be evident, because the will cannot prudently command an altogether certain and firm assent, unless something appears to the intellect and is proposed by it as certainly and evidently credible.

b) That judgment is the conclusion of a ratiocination similar to that which Lugo said to be the act itself of faith: What God infallible in speaking says is credible and to be believed. But God infallible in speaking revealed the Incarnation. Therefore the Incarnation is credible and to be believed. - Or more reflexively: What, all things considered, after diligent examination sufficiently appears to me to have been infallibly attested by God, is to be believed. But, all things considered, it sufficiently seems to me that God revealed the Incarnation. Therefore it is to be believed.

c) Hence the premises of this ratiocination, namely, that God is infallible in speaking and credible, and that in fact He has spoken, must be known with certitude at least practical, not absolute, but respective, that is, which in relation to the capacity of each one's intellect excludes every prudent doubt; otherwise a certain judgment of credibility could not be founded upon them.

Hence proposition 21 was condemned by Innocent XI: "The assent of supernatural faith and useful for salvation stands with only probable notice of revelation, indeed with fear by which someone fears lest God has not spoken"; and proposition 25 of the Modernists by Pius X: "The assent of faith ultimately rests on a heap of probabilities."

700. The judgment of credibility rests upon the preambles of faith and the motives of credibility. - Those things whose knowledge is prerequired for faith, and upon which the judgment of credibility rests, are called the preambles of faith. Indeed divine authority or infallibility in speaking is known by reason: for, once it is supposed that God exists, it is easily deduced from the fact that He is the most perfect being. But the fact of revelation is known by diverse men through diverse arguments, according as they are adapted to their intellect; these arguments are called motives of credibility.

Therefore the motives of credibility and the formal object or motive of faith differ:

a) the former proximately demonstrate the motive of faith, namely, that God revealed something, and thus only remotely dispose, induce, impel to believing; the latter altogether proximately and immediately moves to believing;

b) the former precede the act of faith, and are a condition extrinsic to it; the latter enters the act of faith as an essential element and motive intrinsically constitutive of it;

c) the former show that faith is reasonable; and they are not the formal motive why we believe something, but only why we judge something to be credible and to be believed: the latter is the very motive why we believe something, that is, judge it to be true.

1. Evidence of credibility arises even from merely practical certitude without evidence concerning the existence of revelation, because evidence of credibility is occupied with the thing as prudently affirmable: it is evident to me that one must act prudently, that is, according to practical certitude in the defect of certitude strictly so called. This is clear from the second form of the syllogism indicated, in which the three propositions are evident.

701. External motives of credibility are altogether certain. - Most certain signs are had, and external arguments adapted to the intelligences of all (Vatican Council), even of men of this time (profession of faith against the Modernists), and even for the wiser altogether apodictic, by which the existence of revelation is proved, as the Vatican Council defined, sess. 3, c. 3, can. 3 and 4, namely, certain facts which cannot be explained in a natural mode, and which appear as supernatural and divine. But, as the same Council teaches, c. 3, they are chiefly 1. miracles and 2. prophecies; - also 3. the Church, which, by herself, on account of her admirable propagation, eminent holiness and fecundity in good things (confirmed by the testimony of innumerable martyrs), Catholic unity and unconquered stability, appears as a divine work and institution and is an irrefragable testimony of her divine mission; and 4. the same Church, which, as marked by the notes and characters of her mission from Christ, evidently and easily appears to all as the legate of God, and thus as the guardian and teacher of revelation, proposing faith in the name of God.

Nor say: the Church is known by faith and revelation; therefore she cannot be the means of knowing revelation itself, and a motive of credibility; otherwise we would fall into a vicious circle. - For the answer is that the Church, insofar as she is the means of knowing revelation and the motive why we judge that one must believe, is known not by revelation and faith but by reason and history, insofar as we can inspect her, for example, insofar as she is described in the Gospels and in the testimonies of ecclesiastical writers, not insofar as these are the word of God or testimonies of divine tradition, but insofar as they are historical books having human authority. But afterwards the Church, as supernatural and divine, is known and believed by revelation and faith.

702. Internal motives of credibility are less certain. - Motives intrinsic to the Christian religion, such as the holiness of Christ and the sublimity of Christian doctrine, if they alone are considered, even as external divine facts naturally inexplicable, do not seem to prove the existence of divine revelation with certitude strictly so called and demonstrative, but only with the highest probability and practical certitude; besides, they are arguments requiring much study and liable to great difficulties, nor are they adapted to all intelligences. Hence they are not efficacious for convincing all, nor do they deserve to occupy the more principal part in Apologetics.

Still more vehemently do those err who, with the external motives of credibility rejected or at least set after others, for founding supernatural faith uniquely or chiefly appeal to merely internal motives, such as internal experience, the need of the religious soul, religious sense; or also hold faith as something instinctive. For these motives:

a) are not evident, nor are they capable of founding practical certitude in all, indeed they are subjective, so that others say that they need another faith or even none;

b) are repugnant to the supernaturality of faith, if what they say is taken to the word: that faith is something pleasing to nature, or that it alone satisfies the aspirations of nature or the necessities of society, since natural religion also satisfies sufficiently;

c) are repugnant to the motive of faith, which would no longer be the testimony of God but congruence with nature or society: for that God has spoken cannot be proved by all the aforesaid or by other internal criteria, but only by external divine facts. Hence those motives can prepare for receiving faith, remove obstacles of faith, dispose the will to receiving revelation, and confirm it; they cannot truly demonstrate it.

703. Motives of credibility suffice if broadly certain; yet certain ones can found absolute certitude. - Motives of credibility, although among many they are not certain except by practical certitude and certitude improperly so called, nevertheless can be absolutely certain. Hence it is false, what Lugo is compelled to say, that the act of faith - which he thinks to be the conclusion of a ratiocination - is obscure and free, because the premises, namely, the authority of God and at least the fact of revelation, are obscure and are not known with evidence or certain demonstration, but only with great probability and practical certitude. For 1. the infallibility or authority of God revealing in speaking can be clearly perceived, as happens by philosophers; - 2. concerning the fact of revelation, it seems that we can acquire true historical certitude a) from prophecies, or from the miracles of Christ, concerning whose life and deeds we have historical certitude, but as it were physical certitude concerning the supernaturality of His acts, - and especially b) if all the motives of credibility are considered together, because if so many and all indications concur in showing the truth of our one religion, Providence itself would deceive if that religion were not true: it is not only improbable, but impossible to explain the Catholic Church and the miracles of Christ and the Apostles, if the religion of Christ is not true; - indeed 3. that God has spoken can be evident, as it was to Angels, Apostles, and others who are immediately instructed by God in faith; which does not impede faith, because the more evident the authority of God and the fact of revelation appear, the more evident the obligation of believing appears.

Hence the act of faith is obscure and free only because revelation does not make the revealed things appear, and especially because only those things are believed which are not fully evident, as was said above.

704. How can children and the unlearned form for themselves a judgment of credibility? - By children and the more unlearned the fact of revelation is often not known except by the human authority of parents, wise men, the pastor, etc., whom they believe: for right and prudent reason dictates to them that in necessary things which they cannot see through themselves, they subject themselves to the authority of those who naturally can and must instruct them. Therefore they believe by human faith those things which they have received from parents or the parish priest concerning the history of revelation made by God, for example, that God taught such or such things; once this is posited, they believe those things by divine faith on account of the authority of God revealing alone.

Generally they have the judgment of credibility. This is formed rather easily by the following or equivalent ratiocination, at least implicit: In necessary things which cannot be investigated by me, it is prudent or obligatory to admit the testimony of those who are naturally leaders or instructors. But through myself I cannot be made certain that God has spoken these things. Therefore it is prudent and obligatory to admit this because it is said by those who are naturally leaders and instructors; and therefore to believe on account of the testimony of God.

Therefore let parents and priests, to whom it belongs to instruct such persons, attend: 1. that doctrine be proposed to them at least as the word or revelation of God, for otherwise they would believe only by human faith on account of their authority, and not by divine faith on account of the authority of God revealing. Indeed 2. if they are instructed a little more, they will easily recognize that parents teach the same as their priests, and that these cohere with the bishops, and that the bishops are united with the Roman Pontiff, for example, because all teach a similar catechism; whence they will know that the doctrine proposed is not of private persons, but of the universal religious society which is very strong in authority, and that it is not taught by pastors in their own name, but as by ministers of the Church, who have been sent by her and by Christ to preach; - indeed 3. they will easily recognize this doctrine to be the word of God, on account of the miracles by which revelation was confirmed, and on account of the Church, which by her notes (great authority and truth, Catholic unity of doctrine, holiness and fecundity in good things, unconquered stability) easily appears to all as the legate of God and guardian of the revealed word.

705. Observations. - 1. On the part of the judgment of credibility, faith is called reasonable, and a special property belongs to it, namely, reasonableness (Vatican Council, c. 3), to which rational credibility responds on the part of the revealed object.

2. Although the Holy Spirit can teach directly and immediately, and sometimes does teach even the more unlearned, nevertheless Protestants err in saying that revelation is credible on account of the immediate and internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, which would be granted to all (cf. treatise on Theological Places).

3. De Lugo and those who hold that the act of faith is the conclusion of a ratiocination which is admitted on account of the premises, in order to explain in their opinion how the proximate, immediate, and ultimate motive of faith is the authority and revelation of God, are compelled to say that the premises, and by name the fact of revelation which is asserted in the minor, are known by all immediately and without a new ratiocination, because miracles, fulfillments of prophecies, the proposition of the Church, etc., by which revelation is proved or shown and on account of which revelation is affirmed in the minor, are the completing part of the divine locution. - But:

a) at most all these things are nothing but the external locution of God, which is not the motive of faith, as was said above, n. 669;

b) more probably they are not even the external locution itself of God except improperly; properly they are only signs of divine locution, as the seal is the sign of the king's letter;

c) at least the first time, we did not know divine revelation immediately, but only by several arguments.