Pusillanimity

To pride is opposed humility, the virtue which occupies the mean between the two extremes of pride and pusillanimity or mean-spiritedness. The mean-spirited man refuses to take the place for which his talents fit him, and which God intends for him. He puts himself beneath his equals and inferiors to the detriment of his dignity and office; he is afraid to exercise the authority entrusted to him, and the public good suffers in consequence. Humility, on the other hand, keeps a man in his place both with respect to God and his fellow-men. It is grounded on the knowledge of God and of self; the humble man knows and acknowledges that he has nothing but what he has received from God, that he is utterly and entirely dependent on God every moment of his life, that if left to himself he will fall into the lowest depths of sin and degradation; and this knowledge causes him to think much of God and little, very little, of self. This is the virtue so much recommended by our divine Lord: “‘ Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart.’’¹

Pride leads to many other vices, among which are: presumption, ambition, vainglory, boasting, and hypocrisy.

(a) Presumption is the inclination and wish to undertake what is above one’s capacity. Ordinarily it is a venial sin, but it will be mortal if it is the occasion of serious harm to the cause of God or our neighbour.

(b) Ambition is the inordinate striving after dignities and honours. The inordinateness consists in striving after honours to which one has no just claim or greater than one’s due, or by unlawful modes and means, or with too great eagerness. Apart from such inordinateness it is not sinful to seek after honours and dignities, as these belong to the class of things that are in themselves indifferent; it is a meritorious act to seek with moderation after dignities and honours in order thereby to be able to do more for God and one’s fellow-men. “If a man desire the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work.”² Such an act belongs to the virtue of magnanimity. Ambition is commonly a venial sin, but it becomes mortal when it is the cause of serious harm, or when the means employed to attain its end are grievously sinful.

(c) Vainglory is the inordinate striving after the esteem and praise of men. It is not wrong but praiseworthy to seek after and preserve a good reputation, which, as Holy Scripture teaches, is better than great riches.³ But inordinateness, vanity, and sin come in when the esteem and praise of those men is sought whose esteem is not worth having, or when esteem is sought for what does not deserve esteem, or not so great as is sought after, or when glory is not referred to the proper end. It is usually a venial sin, but may become mortal in the same way as ambition.

(d) Boasting is the inordinate bragging about one’s own good qualities or gifts, or even about what is sinful. If the inordinate display is in action rather than in word it is called ostentation.

(e) Hypocrisy is the feigning of virtues and qualities that one does not possess.

¹ Matt. xi 29.

² 1 Tim. iii 1.

³ Prov. xxii 1.

III. Opposed Vices. By excess there are opposed to magnanimity: presumption, by which someone attacks great things above his powers; ambition, by which someone inordinately seeks honor; vain glory, by which someone inordinately seeks glory. By defect there is opposed pusillanimity, or excessive diffidence, by which someone shrinks from great works, and from honor and glory owed to him (St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 130-133; St. Alphonsus, Theologia moralis, V, 66).

Presumption and Unbelief.—(a) Presumption is joined with unbelief whenever it proceeds from a speculatively false judgment about matters of faith. Persons, however, who are in error (e.g., Pelagians, Lutherans, Calvinists, etc.), may be in good faith, and hence guiltless of the formal sin of presumption. Examples: Caius expects to win heaven by his own unaided efforts (Pelagian presumption). Balbus expects to be equal in glory to the greatest Saints, and to be saved by the merits of Christ without repentance or observance of the Commandments (Lutheran presumption). Titus expects to be saved on the strength of wearing scapulars, practising certain devotions, or giving alms, while he wholly disregards church duties and important Commandments (Pharisaic presumption). Sempronius thinks that all members of his sect are predestined, and hence concerns himself little about the Commandments, being persuaded that all must end well with the elect (Calvinistic presumption).

(b) Presumption is committed without unbelief, when it proceeds from a practical judgment that one should act as if salvation were obtainable without merits or repentance, or as if natural efforts were alone sufficient, although speculatively one does not accept such errors (see 1067). The same is true when presumption springs from a failure to consider the divine justice or the established means of obtaining salvation.

The Subjects of Envy.—(a) The persons most inclined to envy are of two quite different types, namely, the ambitious and the pusillanimous. The ambitious man ardently covets honors, and he is correspondingly saddened when others surpass him, especially if he already enjoys repute or is not far removed from the object of his desires. The pusillanimous man, being petty, holds every small advancement of others as great and as a blow to his own prestige. He is, therefore, filled with intense envy, where a different person would see little or no cause for such a feeling. On the contrary, those who recognize their own unsuitability for what is above them, and those who are great of soul, are not so much inclined to envy. There are few, however, even among the most perfect, who are not tempted to envy in some form.

(b) The persons who are most likely to be envied are those who in some way or other are one’s likes or equals, for one does not feel that one is thrown into the shade by a person who is always far above one, or by those who are far removed in time, place, age, etc. Thus, a beggar will envy a fellow-beggar who becomes a millionaire, but not those acquaintances who were always rich, and still less the fortunate persons whom he knows only from hearsay. The elder son envied his brother, not his father (Luke, xv. 28). Many exceptions to this are only apparent. Thus, persons sometimes are envious of those far above them, but it is because these have advanced at their expense, as when a poor person envies those who have the property he once owned. Persons are sometimes envious of their equals who have not surpassed them, but it is because these latter have obtained with little or no effort what they themselves have gained only by hard work. Persons are sometimes envious of their inferiors, but this is because they make a comparison from some viewpoint in which there is equality, as when an old man envies a youth the advantages that were not enjoyed in his own youth, or the present promotion that surpasses his own.

Vice Opposed to Greatness of Soul by Defect.—The sin opposed to greatness of soul by defect is pusillanimity (littleness of soul), which does not desire great things when one should desire them.

(a) Pusillanimity is sinful, because it excludes nobility of soul, springs from a lazy ignorance of one’s own ability and worth and from a false fear of failure, and leads to the loss of great things that could be done for God and humanity. The Scriptures reprove Jonas, who fled from the great task set for him by God (Jonas, i. 1 sqq.), and the fearful servant who hid his talent in a napkin (Matt, xxv. 24 sqq.). Pusillanimity is not to be confused, therefore, with humility; for humility excludes the unreasonable or immoderate desire of excellence, whereas pusillanimity represses even that desire of greatness which is reasonable and moderate. Indeed, meanness of spirit may be associated with pride on account of obstinate refusal to take upon oneself what is commanded (Prov., xxvi. 16). Thus, Moses and Jeremias showed humility by their fears of unworthiness (Exod, iii. 11; Jerem., i. 6), but they would have sinned by pusillanimity, and also by pride, had they held out against God’s charge to them.

(b) Pusillanimity is per se a venial sin (see 2450), but it may become mortal on account of its matter or consequences, as when one is so self-depreciative as to neglect grave obligations of correcting abuses. It is essentially more evil than presumption, for it turns one away from things and pursuits that are noble, and is thus more opposed to greatness of soul; but radically presumption is more evil, as it springs from pride (Ecclus., xxxvii. 3). The dread of attempting great deeds or pursuits is sometimes no sin at all, as when it is due to inculpable ignorance of what one can do or what one deserves, or from a fear that overpowers judgment, or from bodily disease, or from a sense of inferiority caused by education, excessive repression and habit (Col., iii. 21).

What are the daughters of pride and vainglory? "Those vices which of themselves are apt to be ordered to the end of some capital vice are called its daughters." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. The daughters of pride are three: 1. Presumption, which is an inordinate appetite of undertaking something above one's powers. It is commonly only venial. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 130, a. 1; q. 134, a. 2 ad 4; q. 21, a. 4. Nevertheless it becomes mortal if it brings grave harm, e.g., if someone presumes to obtain ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the office of physician, etc., without due knowledge. But insofar as presumption is a special sin, opposed to theological hope, it is always a mortal sin, unless imperfection of act excuses. 2. Ambition, which is the inordinate appetite of dignity and honor not owed, or in an undue way and by an undue means. It is per se a venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 131, a. 1. But it becomes mortal by reason of the matter from which; or by reason of the means by which; or by reason of the end for which honor is sought; or by reason of the harm which is inflicted on one's neighbor. 3. Vainglory, namely the desire of empty glory, whose end is the inordinate manifestation of one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious. It is per se a venial sin. It is often mortal per accidens, as was just said concerning ambition. But to perform even sacred things on account of vainglory, e.g., to preach, does not exceed venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, aa. 3, 4; q. 162, a. 7; L. 66. Pusillanimity corresponds by opposition to the three daughters of pride, by which someone, distrusting himself too much, refuses honors, glory, or an office for which he is worthy. It is venial from its genus; and it becomes mortal if you refuse that to which you are bound under mortal sin. L. 67.

Moreover, the daughters of vainglory, which St. Thomas constitutes as a capital vice, are assigned thus by the same Holy Doctor, 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. A man can tend to the manifestation of his own excellence in two ways: "in one way directly, either by words, and thus there is boasting; or by deeds, and thus, if they are true things having some admiration, there is presumption of novelties, which men are accustomed to admire more; but if they are false, thus there is hypocrisy. In another way someone strives to manifest his own excellence indirectly, by showing himself not to be less than another, and this in four ways. First indeed as to the intellect, and thus there is pertinacity, by which a man cleaves too much to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe a better opinion. Second as to the will, and thus there is discord, while he does not wish to depart from his own will so that he may agree with others. Third as to speech, and thus there is contention, when another by words quarrels noisily against another. Fourth as to deed, and thus there is disobedience, namely while someone does not wish to execute the precept of a superior." And thus these vices are fittingly called the daughters of vainglory.

Boasting is a certain vain proclamation of one's own excellence, and is per se venial if it is concerning good things; and it can be grave per accidens. If it is concerning lightly evil things, it is likewise per se light, grave per accidens, if, for example, it proceeds from a grave cause against God or neighbor. But if it is concerning gravely evil things, it is grave, because the approval of a work has the same species as the work, which therefore must be expressed in confession, at least when complacency concerning the same sin was joined with the boasting. At least when, etc.; because, if it was without that complacency, many hold that it is not necessarily to be explained. For any boasting concerning mortal sin, abstraction made from complacency in it, is of the same species, namely that someone glories in this, that he has offended God. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 112; L. 26, 66, 67; l. 3, n. 426; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 266 seqq.

Presumption of novelties, which is also called ostentation, if those deeds have nothing of admiration, is also per se venial. And thus it is light to be dressed in foreign garments, or to adorn oneself too much from lightness of mind, vanity, etc.; but grave if it is such as notably to corrupt morals. L. 66, 67. Presumption of novelties can be in opinions, in a mode of speaking, in a mode of acting, etc.

Hypocrisy, by which someone "does not care to have holiness, but only to appear holy... is a mortal sin.... To simulate holiness from which one is deficient through mortal sin... is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes venial," according as it happens to oppose charity or not. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 111, a. 4. Likewise to simulate improbitity is a sin, and can be mortal. S. Th. ibid., a. 1; L. 66, 67.

Pertinacity. "Someone is called pertinacious who is imprudently holding, as if wholly tenacious." Hence pertinacity is opposed to perseverance; for the persevering person persists in his own opinion "according as he ought"; but the pertinacious person perseveres in it "more than he ought." And therefore it is a sin because of excess. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 138, a. 2.

Discord is a dissent of wills concerning the good which we ought to will from charity. Moreover, since certain goods can be owed to one's neighbor not only from charity, but also from justice, discord and dissent from the rendering of similar goods is opposed both to charity and to justice. Discord is per se from its genus a mortal sin. For it directly repugns to charity. But per accidens it can become venial, from the smallness of the owed good in the rendering of which we do not wish to consent. Indeed, sometimes it will be no sin, if it arises, namely, from a probable judgment, from which one person judges this, another that, for the honor of God and the utility of neighbor, and if the mode of dissenting is not opposed to charity. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 38; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 37.

Contention is the impugnation of truth with confidence of shouting. Contention is from its genus a mortal sin. The reason: because by charity we ought to will and communicate to others truth necessary or useful for the salvation of the soul, or even of the body; and therefore to impugn it, and to wish to defeat it, is opposed to the virtue of charity, and is from its genus a mortal sin. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 39; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 38.

Disobedience, properly and speaking per se, or formal disobedience, is had only when "someone contemns a precept, because moral acts have their species from the end. But when he does something against a precept, not on account of contempt of the precept, it is disobedience only materially, but formally pertains to another species of sin," according to various motives, e.g., to the species of theft, homicide, etc. Therefore disobedience by its nature is a grave sin. For not to obey the precepts of God and of Superiors is contrary to charity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 105, a. 1.

What are the daughters of acedia? - They are the following: 1. Malice, namely a special malice by which, by reason of sadness to be fled, someone hates and detests spiritual goods, and would wish them not to exist, or by which he is sorry that he has done well or fulfilled that to which he was bound, or by which he contemns a benefit of God, e.g., by desiring not to have been born, or not to have known Christ, etc. It is mortal from its genus. - 2. Pusillanimity, by which someone flees those things which are arduous and which fall under counsels. 3. Torpor, by which someone flees those things which pertain to common justice, or precepts, and does good things without due fervor.

4. Rancor, by which those who induce to spiritual things are wearisome; whence rancor is a certain indignation. 5. Wandering of mind, by which someone in the exercise of spiritual things wanders toward exterior illicit delights, whether by thought, and it is called curiosity; or by speech, and it is called verbosity; or by bodily restlessness, and it is called restlessness, which are commonly venial. 6. Despair of salvation, which is flight from the end itself, and mortal. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 20, a. 4; q. 35; L. 84.

What is fortitude, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Fortitude is the virtue which moderates and strengthens the soul against grave dangers, especially of death. - No precept per se of this virtue is given, but only by reason of some special precept to be fulfilled, e.g., even martyrdom to be undergone, lest faith be denied. But whether and when there is an obligation of observing the law even with danger to life was said in the treatise on Laws, and is explained in the individual treatises, when it is asked whether it is licit to do something at least to avoid death. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 140.

There is a twofold act of fortitude, to attack and to sustain: to attack distinguished and arduous things; to sustain adversities. For the act of attacking two things are required. The first is preparation of soul, namely that someone have a prompt soul for undertaking great things, which magnanimity provides. The other regards execution of the work, namely that someone not fall short in the execution of those things which he began magnanimously, which magnificence provides. For the act of sustaining two things also are required. The first is that by the difficulty of imminent evils the soul not be broken through sadness, and fall away from its greatness; and for this patience is posited, by which someone bears evils with an even soul, without disturbance of sadness. The other is that from long-lasting suffering of difficult things man not be wearied up to the point that he desists; and for this perseverance is posited.

R. To the second. These four virtues, magnanimity, magnificence, patience, perseverance, are integral parts of fortitude if they are concerned with dangers of death; but they are potential parts of fortitude if they are concerned with lesser dangers. But fortitude does not have subjective parts, because it is not divided into many virtues differing in species, since it concerns a very special matter, namely dangers of death, which are all of the same genus, although some are greater than others.

R. To the third. Timidity, fearlessness, and audacity are opposed to fortitude. Timidity is a vice exceeding in fearing; for it fears what one ought not, when one ought not, or more than one ought, whence one does not dare to attack when reason dictates, or as it dictates. If it stands in itself, it is a light sin; but if it impels to sin, it will be grave or light according to the condition of that to which it impels. - Fearlessness is a vice deficient in fearing; for one does not fear when he ought to fear, or the things that ought to be feared. It is not a sin distinct from that to whose danger someone exposes himself; for it is a sin only insofar as it is the cause of that, tacitly containing consent to that danger.

Audacity is that which rashly casts itself into dangers. Rashly, namely without just reason. It is a sin according to the account of the evil and danger to which one exposes himself.

Presumption, ambition, vainglory, pusillanimity are opposed to magnanimity. - Presumption is excessive confidence in one's own powers, by which it happens that someone undertakes something, or is prepared to undertake something, above his powers. It is a deadly sin when it occurs with danger or injury of another, as the presumption of a physician, judge, confessor; or when it proceeds from error against the faith, as the presumption of heretics. Outside these cases it is almost always a venial sin. Ambition is an inordinate appetite of honor, by desiring more honor than is fitting. It is a light sin, unless honor is desired either with injury and harm of another, or from a gravely illicit thing, or in a gravely illicit mode or end. Vainglory is desire of vain glory. Vain, if glory is sought from simulated excellence or reputation, if greater than is fitting, or from an illicit thing, or among those who cannot judge rightly about things, or by referring it to an undue end. Per se it is a venial sin, nor does it become a mortal sin except by reason of another sin, which is sometimes involved in its effect. Pusillanimity is a sin by which someone from smallness of soul does not attempt those things which are commensurate with his natural virtue. It is grave or light according to the goods from which he recedes.

Small-magnificence and consumption or excessive profusion are opposed to magnificence. - Small-magnificence is the vice by which man falls short of the proportion which ought to be between expense and work. Consumption or excessive profusion is the vice by which someone exceeds the said proportion, namely so that he spends more than is proportioned to the work. Each is per se a light sin; it can be grave by reason of scandal, or notable harm then following to others, or by another extrinsic reason, e.g., of a vow, testament, etc., by which someone is bound to that magnificent work and ought to be contained within due expenses.

Insensibility and impatience are opposed to patience, but softness and pertinacity to perseverance. - Insensibility is had when someone is touched by no evils, neither his own nor those of neighbors. It is a sign either of brutish stupidity or of inhuman hardness. Insensibility or hardness is rarely a mortal sin; certainly per se it is only venial. - Impatience is had when someone grieves too much, or even from grief departs from the right. Impatience per se is only a venial sin, because it is only an excess in grief, or in a movement of anger, expressed by an external sign; nevertheless it can be deadly by reason of scandal or of the evil which someone does from impatience. - Softness is if someone easily recedes from good because of certain difficulties which he cannot sustain; for that is called soft which easily yields to one touching it. But it is manifest that fear of dangers impels more gravely than desire of pleasures; and the desire itself of pleasures moves more strongly than sadness concerning the lack of pleasure withdraws, because lack of pleasure is a pure defect. And therefore he is properly called soft who recedes from good because of sadness caused by the defect of delights, as if yielding to a weak mover. This is a grave sin in a venereal matter or in another matter of great moment, to which someone is bound by law, precept, vow, or oath; but it is light in a light matter. Pertinacity is perseverance in one's own opinion more than one ought; and it is venial or mortal according to the gravity of the matter, e.g., if someone is unwilling to embrace the Catholic religion lest he seem inconstant; if a Prince is unwilling to revoke pernicious laws. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 123 seqq.; Theol. Wirceb., de Virt. Card. de Fortit.

638. 1. Three vices are opposed to fortitude, namely, timidity or cowardice, fearlessness, and daring or temerity.

a) Timidity, of which there is discussion here, is not the passion of fear, for passions in the Aristotelian sense are something indifferent; but it is inordinate fear of temporal evils and especially of the dangers of death. Certainly, in every sin an inordinate fear is included; thus the avaricious man fears the loss of money, the intemperate man the loss of pleasure, and so concerning the others. But the principal fear is that of the dangers of death. And therefore an inordination of such fear is opposed to fortitude, which concerns the dangers of death. Thus St. Thomas.¹¹⁶² Inordinate fear, therefore, is excess in fearing and defect in daring. From the first head it is called timidity; but from the second, cowardice; yet on account of their affinity each is called by the common term timidity. This timidity of itself is only a venial sin; if, however, someone from inordinate fear transgresses a grave precept, this is a mortal sin, or rather the cause of a mortal sin. How fear or dread takes away or diminishes the voluntary and consequently the notion of sin was said above, I, n. 69. The greatest cowardice is when someone, on account of the miseries of this life which he considers intolerable, commits suicide.

b) Fearlessness is the vice which does not fear dangers, and especially the dangers of death, when they ought to be feared. This vice arises either from contempt for life, which a man esteems little, or from pride by which he attributes too much strength to himself, or from stupidity of soul. Fearlessness is a sin insofar as it causes other sins, or insofar as from it a man sins against charity toward himself.

c) Daring or temerity, insofar as it is taken here, is excess in attacking dangers.¹¹⁶³ Daring arises from the same causes as fearlessness, with which it is intimately connected, but chiefly from vain boasting. The same holds concerning the sinfulness of this vice as was said concerning fearlessness. In a duel, in certain contests, in acrobatic exercises, etc., the vices of temerity and fearlessness are accustomed to occur.

¹¹⁶² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 125, a. 2.

¹¹⁶³ Waghalsigkeit, Tollkühnheit [foolhardiness, rash boldness].

639. 2. Four vices are opposed to magnanimity, namely, three by excess: presumption, ambition, and vainglory; one by defect, namely, pusillanimity.

a) Presumption,¹¹⁶⁴ which is opposed to magnanimity, is not to be confused with presumption which is contrary to hope.¹¹⁶⁵ The former is a vice inducing one to undertake works which surpass the powers of the agent; the latter is that which hopes for eternal beatitude through means not ordained by God. If it is said that presumption opposed to magnanimity undertakes those things which altogether exceed the powers of the agent, the powers to be understood are not only his own but also those of others which are nevertheless available to the agent; for that which we can do with the assistance of friends and especially of God is not considered altogether to exceed our powers; whence we are not presumptuous when we undertake works of the virtues, even difficult ones, with confidence in the assisting aid of divine grace. An example of sinful presumption is Peter, who, led by excessive confidence, said: "Lord, I am ready to go with thee, both into prison and to death,"¹¹⁶⁶ and nevertheless afterward denied Christ at the voice of a maidservant. Those also sin by such a sin of presumption who, without sufficient capacity, undertake the offices of judge, pastor, confessor, etc. The origin and culpability of this presumption were already discussed above, I, n. 412. Seneca describes presumption very vigorously: "If magnanimity raises itself beyond its measure, it will make a man threatening, inflated, turbulent, restless, and hasty toward whatever excellences of words and deeds, honorableness being neglected."¹¹⁶⁷

b) Ambition,¹¹⁶⁸ which is opposed to magnanimity by excess, is a vice by which someone inordinately desires an honor which he does not merit or which he refers not to God but only to his own utility; or it can be defined more briefly: an inordinate appetite for honor.¹¹⁶⁹ Since honor is a thing good or indifferent in itself, an inordinate appetite for it is of itself only a venial sin; nevertheless, it can become mortal on account of circumstances, for example, if someone places his last end in such human honor, or if he seeks honor from some mortal sin (boasting concerning sins committed), or if someone seeks his own honor with grave harm to others. The inordinate appetite for honor, or ambition, often has very contrary effects, since instead of true honor, mockery and contempt befall the ambitious man.

c) Vainglory,¹¹⁷⁰ insofar as it is opposed to magnanimity by excess, is taken for an inordinate appetite for empty glory. The appetite for one's own glory is not of itself something vicious, whence we are admonished: "So let your light shine before men";¹¹⁷¹ but the appetite for empty glory is sinful; for to desire something vain is vicious, according to this: "Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?"¹¹⁷² Glory can be called vain in three ways: in one way on the part of the thing concerning which someone seeks glory, as when someone seeks glory concerning that which is not worthy of glory, such as some fragile and perishable thing (for example, bodily beauty); in another way on the part of the one from whom someone seeks glory, such as a man whose judgment is not certain (for example, if someone wishes to be praised by an ignorant man as learned); in a third way on the part of the very person who desires glory, namely, when he does not refer the appetite for his glory to a due end, such as the honor of God or the salvation of his neighbor. Thus St. Thomas.¹¹⁷³ Vainglory in itself is only a venial sin, because it is not simply repugnant to charity and because it is only an inordination concerning a thing indifferent in itself; nevertheless, it can easily become not only a mortal sin, but also a capital sin from which many other sins spring, as was said above, I, n. 414.¹¹⁷⁴

d) Pusillanimity¹¹⁷⁵ is opposed to magnanimity by defect, and it is a disposition of soul by which someone shrinks from undertaking or doing something as though it were too great and surpassed his powers, when in reality it does not surpass them. Whence, just as the magnanimous man rightly tends toward great things, so the pusillanimous man, from culpable ignorance of his own condition, shrinks from great things which befit him. An example of such pusillanimity in the Gospel is the slothful servant who hid his talent in a napkin and on that account was gravely rebuked. Pusillanimity of itself does not signify a grave sin; nevertheless, it can become a grave sin if someone from pusillanimity omits a grave duty; for example, if parents omit correcting disobedient children because they think themselves unable to make an effective correction; if someone no longer fights against temptations, thinking himself unable to conquer them. Pusillanimity which concerns things altogether necessary for salvation can become the sin of despair. Pusillanimity is conquered by placing hope in divine assistance, which will never fail men of good will. Pusillanimity often arises from a morbid quality of the body or from fixed ideas.

¹¹⁶⁴ Selbstüberschätzung, Vermessenheit [self-overestimation, presumption]; cf. above, I, n. 412.

¹¹⁶⁵ Cf. I, n. 549.

¹¹⁶⁶ Luke 22:33.

¹¹⁶⁷ In St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 130, a. 2 ad 3.

¹¹⁶⁸ Cf. above, I, n. 413.

¹¹⁶⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 131, a. 1.

¹¹⁷⁰ Cf. above, I, n. 414.

¹¹⁷¹ Matt. 5:16.

¹¹⁷² Ps. 4:3.

¹¹⁷³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 132, a. 1.

¹¹⁷⁴ Pascal says very wittily and truly concerning vainglory: "Vanity is so rooted in the heart of man that a lackey, a kitchen boy, and a porter boast and wish to have their admirers; and the philosophers themselves want them. Those who write against glory wish to have the glory of having written well; and those who read it wish to have the glory of having read it; and I who write this perhaps have this desire, and perhaps those who will read it will also have it" (Pensées [1907] 400).

¹¹⁷⁵ Kleinmütigkeit [pusillanimity, faintheartedness].

640. 3. Two vices are opposed to magnificence, namely, one by excess: inordinate sumptuousness,¹¹⁷⁶ the other by defect: parvificence.¹¹⁷⁷ Each vice is an inordination concerning great expenditures to be made, and for this reason parvificence is distinguished from avarice and illiberality. Whence St. Thomas teaches: "Just as the magnificent man agrees with the liberal man in this, that he expends money promptly and delightfully, so also the parvificent man agrees with the illiberal or avaricious man in this, that he makes expenditures with sadness and slowness. But they differ in this, that illiberality is considered in regard to common expenditures, whereas parvificence concerns great expenditures, which it is more difficult to make, and therefore parvificence is a lesser vice than illiberality."¹¹⁷⁸ The sinfulness of these vices must be measured from the other sins which are committed on account of them.

¹¹⁷⁶ It was called by the Greeks banausia, by which word both a low, tradesmanlike disposition and the excessive luxury and ostentation proceeding from it are signified; moderns use the word chiefly in the former sense.

¹¹⁷⁷ Knauserei, Engherzigkeit [stinginess, narrow-mindedness].

¹¹⁷⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 135, a. 1 ad 3.

641. 4. Two vices are opposed to patience, one by defect and the other by excess. By defect there is opposed insensibility or hardness, namely, when someone is touched in no way by any evils, whether his own or another's. This indeed is a defect of sadness, although it is an excess of endurance. That this insensibility is sinful is clear of itself, since it is consonant neither with human nature nor with social life, but savors of stupid brutality and unnatural hardness. By excess (of sadness, but by defect of endurance) there is opposed to patience impatience, by which someone is excessively saddened or withdraws from the good because of sadness or pain. The impatient man for the most part outwardly manifests his impatience by murmurings, lamentations, or irascibility. Each sin, namely, insensibility and impatience, is of itself only a venial sin; nevertheless, it becomes mortal if on account of it another virtue, for example, fraternal charity, is gravely injured.¹¹⁷⁹

¹¹⁷⁹ It is remarkable that St. Thomas does not speak of the vices opposed to patience in the Summa theologica.

642. 5. Two vices are likewise opposed to perseverance, namely, one by defect, which is softness or inconstancy, when someone, on account of difficulties which occur in the continuation of a good work, easily withdraws from it contrary to the right dictate of reason. This inconstancy is called softness by St. Thomas,¹¹⁸⁰ which nevertheless is not to be confused with softness which is a sin against chastity. Inconstancy of itself is not a grave sin; nevertheless, it is the cause of many evils and impedes very many goods; for it renders the soul of man weak and almost powerless to accomplish any great work, since difficulties arise in every great work. By way of excess there is opposed to perseverance pertinacity,¹¹⁸¹ which is an inclination to persist in a resolution contrary to the dictate of right reason, as if someone wills to persist in a false religion which he clearly knows to be false. This pertinacity is a mortal or light sin according to the quality of the obligation and virtue which is injured through it.

¹¹⁸⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 138, a. 1.

¹¹⁸¹ Hartnäckigkeit [obstinacy].

S. Th. II-II, q. 130-133.

918. To magnanimity by excess there are opposed: presumption, ambition, and vainglory, which inordinately seek excellence in works, in honor, or in reputation and estimation. Presumption regards the proximate matter: acts worthy of honor; ambition the remote matter: honors; vainglory the natural effect of honor: praise.

1. Presumption (verwaandheid) or overconfidence is the inordinate appetite of attacking something above one's powers. It is excessive hope. But in the present matter the question is not about presumption opposed to theological or divine hope, which rashly expects beatitude through means not ordained by God and rejects or perverts the divine help from which it is to be hoped for (of which we spoke in the treatise on hope, I, 833), but about presumption or excessive hope in one's own powers: this, namely, is opposed to magnanimity, which is concerned with the passion of hope.

It arises from culpable error concerning one's own powers. Concerning these, error can be committed in two ways: in one way according to quantity, as when someone judges himself to have greater virtue or knowledge or something of this sort than he has, for example, those who without sufficient capacity undertake the office of judge, physician, advocate, confessor, etc., who usurp power which they do not have, who by their own authority without long study interpret the Scriptures...; in another way concerning the genus of the thing from which someone dignifies himself, as when someone esteems himself great and more worthy from that from which he is not great nor worthy, for example, on account of riches or some goods of fortune.

It is of itself a venial sin, because it is not against charity; accidentally it becomes mortal by reason of the cause, as if it proceeded from culpable error in faith, or by reason of the effect, as if it is done with great danger or notable harm, proper or another's, as can happen in physicians, confessors, advocates, who presume without skill to undertake an office or to exercise it in such a way, and in those who without a reasonable cause thrust themselves into the proximate occasion of sinning.

2. Ambition (eerzucht) is an inordinate appetite for honor.

It happens in four ways: by seeking honor for excellence which is not possessed, as if an ignorant man wishes to be honored as learned; or for a blameworthy thing, as for sin or for a thing acquired by sin; or by not referring honor to God, to whom honor is owed principally on account of excellent goods; or by not referring it to the utility of others, but resting in honor: for that in which man excels is given to man by God so that from it he may benefit others.

It is of itself a venial sin, because it is not against charity; accidentally it becomes mortal either by reason of the cause, as if it comes from culpable error in faith, or if someone seeks honor from affection for mortal sin, or abuses honor for that sin; or by reason of the effect, as if someone commits mortal sin to seize honor, prepared for all things on account of honor, or constitutes his last end in honor, or if it is done with grave harm or injury of the neighbor.

3. Vainglory (roemzucht, ijdelheid) is an inordinate appetite for glory and reputation, that is, an appetite for vain glory, or for vain manifestation and estimation among others concerning one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious; an excessive desire for human esteem and praise. This is also a capital sin, as was set forth in the treatise on Sins (I, n. 502).

Glory is clear knowledge with the praise of others; and it is the natural effect and end of honor, since from honor someone is rendered clear in the knowledge of others. For from the fact that testimonies of honor are exhibited to someone, his excellence is clear among others. Hence honor is sought because glory from honor is sought. Whence consequently magnanimity is also concerned with glory, and the inordinate appetite for glory is opposed to magnanimity.

It happens in three ways: a) by seeking glory from that which is not worthy of glory, or of so much glory, as from an evil, false, fictitious, fragile thing, from riches, trifles, etc.; b) by seeking it from those who are not able to discern what is worthy of glory, for example, from one whose judgment is not certain; c) by seeking and not referring glory to the due end, namely, to the honor of God or proper or another's utility. For glory of itself is an indifferent thing, and accordingly to stand in it as in an end and to seek it for its own sake is illicit: for to seek an indifferent thing is not good unless it is done for a good end extrinsic to the thing; therefore to seek glory is illicit except insofar as it is useful for something, otherwise it would be an idle and vain act and accordingly sinful (q. 132, a. 3; cf. Q. D. De Malo 9, a. 2).

Vainglory of itself is a venial sin: for of itself it does not say anything against charity, but is only an inordination of the appetite of a thing indifferent according to itself. Yet accidentally, that is, by reason of another thing or something joined to it, it becomes mortal: 1. on the part of the one glorying himself: a) by reason of the effect, for example, if someone is prepared to sin mortally in order to acquire glory, or constitutes his last end in glory, or grave harm to the neighbor follows from it, as if on account of it a physician is unwilling to employ a colleague, with grave danger of health in the sick person, or a teacher is unwilling to retract a great error which he taught; b) by reason of the end, as if he seeks glory from affection for a mortal sin. 2. Also on the part of the matter about which someone glories: a) if someone glories concerning a good, but falsely, which is against reverence for God (for example, to seek divine honors for oneself), or concerning goods as if they were not from God, or concerning a temporal good loved more than God, or concerning the testimony of men which he prefers to divine testimony; b) if he glories concerning evil, namely, concerning a mortal sin committed (q. 132, a. 3; cf. Q. D. De Malo 9, a. 2).

919. Remarks. - Let the words of St. Thomas be noted (q. 132, a. 1, ad 3): "It pertains to the perfection of man that he know himself; but that he be known by others does not pertain to his perfection; and therefore it is not to be sought for its own sake. Yet it can be sought insofar as it is useful for something, either for this, that God be glorified by men, or for this, that men profit from the good which they know in another, or for this, that the man himself, from the goods which he knows in himself, through the testimony of another's praise, may strive to persevere in them and to advance to better things. And according to this it is praiseworthy that someone have care for a good name and that he provide good things before God and men; but not that he be vainly delighted in the praise of men."

920. To magnanimity by defect there is opposed pusillanimity. - This is a disposition of soul by which someone flees as though too great and exceeding his powers those things which, all circumstances considered, he could and ought to do, since in reality they do not exceed them. Thus one who, terrified by difficulties and not sufficiently trusting in divine help, flees offices proposed to him by superiors, or does not fulfill the offices of his own state, from empty fear.

It arises from culpable ignorance. It is a mortal sin if it draws one back from a grave precept.

FOUR are these, of which three are opposed by excess, Presumption, Ambition, and Vain glory: the fourth by defect, namely Pusillanimity.

PRESUMPTION is the vice by which one attempts things that exceed his powers and capacity. Thus St. Thomas, art. 1. and 2., following Aristotle, 2. Eth. cap. 7. and lib. 4. cap. 3. For the magnanimous man does not strive for things greater than befit him, nor does he transgress the proportion of his capacity, just as naturally every action is commensurated with the power of the agent. The same St. Bonaventure teaches, in speculo animae, cap. 1.

BUT SINCE what we can do through others we can in a manner do through ourselves, according to Aristotle, 3. Eth. cap. 3., therefore it is not presumption to attempt a work of virtue with Divine help, which is denied to no one. It will, however, be presumption if one attempts it from himself, or for his own merits, or falsely, or more than others, as Bl. Bonaventure teaches, loco citato.

AMBITION is the vice by which one inordinately desires honor. Thus Bl. Thomas, quaest. 130. art. 1. and 2.; Bl. Bonaventure, in speculo animae, cap. 4. This, moreover, happens in three ways: either the ambitious man seeks an honor he does not merit, or an honor which he does not refer to God, or to the utility of others, but to his own advantage. Thus St. Thomas, quaest. 131. art. 1. and 2.; Bl. Bonaventure, in Pharetra 3. part. cap. 24., proving this with many authorities of the Fathers.

Wherein the Seraphic Doctor notes, serm. 5. Hexaëmer., that honor is not a good desirable per se.

VAIN glory is the vice by which glory is sought vainly, either about what is not, or about what is not worthy of glory; or about what is praised only by the judgment of men, either by seeking glory, or by referring glory itself to an undue end. Thus Bl. Thomas, quaest. 132. art. 1. and 2.; Bl. Bonaventure, in speculo animae, cap. 1. and 4. Thus it is opposed to magnanimity, seeking a glory which is a certain effect of honor unduly. See also Bl. Bonaventure, p. p. Centil. sect. 18. and in explicatione terminorum Theol.

It can, moreover, be mortal, if one glories in illicit things, or refers glory to himself as his last end.

VAIN glory is a capital vice, whose daughters are Disobedience, Boastfulness, Hypocrisy, Incontinence, or Contentiousness, Obstinacy, Discord, and Presumption of novelty. Thus St. Bonaventure, in speculo, loco cit. and p. p. Centil. sect. 18.; Bl. Thomas, quaest. 132. art. 4. and 5., from Bl. Gregory, 31. moral. cap. 31.

DISOBEDIENCE is the will fleeing subjection, unwilling to be subject to superiors.

BOASTFULNESS is the will, on account of an apparent power of its own, showing itself off.

HYPOCRISY is the will simulating itself deceitfully under the appearance of sanctity, acting openly in a base manner and vilely in secret, with no intention, no work.

INCONTINENCE is the will, by conforming itself, seeking to be praised by those who are evil.

OBSTINACY is the will fleeing the warning of probity, irrevocably defending its words or deeds.

Discord is the will fleeing the lessening of its wisdom, dissenting from what is said by others.

Presumption of novelty is the will exceeding the quality of its state, desiring to be conspicuous on account of an apparent novelty of knowledge or wisdom.

But Bl. Isidore, lib. in Deuter. cap. 16., distinguishing between pride and vainglory, says that from pride arise Contempt, Envy, Disobedience, Blasphemy, Murmuring, Detraction, and others. But from Vain glory, he says, arise Contentions, Heresies, Boastfulness, and Presumption of novelty. So the holy Doctor, p. p. Centil. sect. 18.

Nothing, however, is to be wondered at, that these are born of Vain glory, as of a bad shrub, for the appetite for glory is vehement, and on the part of the universal matter, as Tanner also notes, d. 3. quaest. 2. dub. 5. num. 73.

Pusillanimity is the vice opposed to Magnanimity by defect, whereby one shuns great things, even those proportioned to his powers; thus that servant who on that account hid his talent was punished, Matth. 25. Lucae 19. Thus Bl. Thomas, quaest. 133. art. 1. and 2. It is placed among the vices by Aristotle, 4. Eth. cap. 3., and by Bl. Gregory, p. p. Pastor. cap. 5. It is, moreover, at the other extreme from presumption, as Bl. Bonaventure teaches, in speculo animae, cap. 3. He names this vice a child of Sloth.

The holy Doctor adds that it has the nature of mortal sin, when by pusillanimity the things necessary for salvation are omitted; if anyone out of pusillanimity should neglect the defense, preaching, or correction, to the detriment of faith, or the spiritual, or even temporal loss of his neighbor, as St. Gregory says in Past. part. 1. cap 5.

From this branch arise servile, human, and worldly fear. Servile fear is when one abandons evil out of fear of punishment.¹ Human fear is when one, sparing the flesh, shuns spiritual goods that are adverse to the flesh. Worldly fear is when out of fear of the world, that is, of some person, one omits a good. ¹ Editor's note: the print reads 'ob metum poenae timorem' — a typesetter's doublet ('metum... timorem'); rendered as 'out of fear of punishment'.

The first fear is always mortal; but the second and third are only mortal when on their account things necessary for salvation are omitted. See all this in speculo animae, loc. cit.