Sorrow expressed and present at absolution

257. When sorrow must be elicited. a. It must necessarily be elicited before sacramental absolution: for no one can be validly absolved who is not rightly disposed; but he who does not grieve concerning sins committed is not rightly disposed.

b. Of itself it is not required that it be elicited before confession, although this is greatly to be recommended; but it suffices that it be elicited after confession, whether because the penitent himself only after confession disposes himself to sorrow, or because after confession he is at last disposed by the confessor to detesting sin.

Confession performed without preceding sorrow can indeed seem insufficient for receiving valid absolution, both because it is a simple narration of sins, not a sacramental accusation, and because sorrow which follows confession is manifested by no sensible sign: for ordinarily sorrow becomes sensible only through confession. Nevertheless there is no doubt that in him who truly grieves after confession but before absolution, both are found: sacramental confession and sorrow outwardly manifested. For by the very fact that the penitent has confessed with the intention of obtaining absolution, the confession is sacramental; but sorrow becomes sensible because the penitent, expecting absolution, as it were continues the accusation informed by subsequent sorrow and orders it to absolution: for the confession, the petition for absolution, and the expectation of it morally pertain to confession and constitute and complete it.

c. It is not to be elicited so long before confession that at the time of confession it no longer morally endures. But sorrow is judged to endure morally as long as it has not been revoked and endures virtually, i.e., in some effect, e.g., in the will to confess, in flight from occasions, in more frequent prayers, etc.

1. How long elicited sorrow endures virtually cannot be accurately determined: for intense sorrow and sorrow ordered to confession endure longer than remiss sorrow and sorrow not ordered to confession. Without doubt it can endure for three or four hours, indeed for a whole day or a whole night, and in some circumstances (where namely confession is instituted not from mere devotion or from obligation, but from sorrow conceived concerning sins) even for several days. Moreover, in the opinion of those who affirm that sorrow is only a necessary disposition, it suffices that sorrow endure habitually; but it endures habitually as long as it is not revoked. Sorrow elicited before confession is judged to be revoked through a fall into sin; indeed through mortal sin every sorrow is revoked, but through venial sin at least sorrow concerning that very sin which is committed is revoked.

Therefore he who, for example, prepared himself for confession in the morning, can validly and licitly confess in the evening without a new act of sorrow: for sorrow elicited in the morning in order to confession and not revoked is judged still to endure in the evening, so that by force of that sorrow the confession is sorrowful.

2. Two things must be noted here for practice. First indeed, it must be inculcated to the faithful that they elicit sorrow before confession: for it could very easily happen that that little delay, while absolution is being given, would not suffice for conceiving contrition, and therefore absolution would be frustrated of its effect. Then, it is by no means necessary that confessors induce a penitent whom they could finally move in the confessional to due disposition, so that he outwardly manifest sorrow and refer it explicitly to the sins already set forth, by saying, for example, I grieve concerning my sins already set forth, or I grieve concerning my sins, concerning which I accuse myself again; rather they can absolve him without a new accusation.

258. Whether elicited sorrow must be with the intention of confessing. The negative opinion seems to be true and morally certain: for it suffices that the confession be sorrowful; but for this it is not required that the sorrow be elicited from the intention of confessing, provided that afterward, when confession is instituted, the sorrow still morally endures. The reason for this matter is taken from Trent, which, when it accurately describes the contrition required for the sacrament, nowhere demands that sorrow be elicited from the intention of confessing.¹

Therefore he who, thinking nothing of confession, has elicited contrition, can approach the sacrament without new sorrow, provided the contrition morally endures. For the explanation of this matter it must be noted that there were authors who, for valid absolution, required not only a moral union between sorrow and confession, but further demanded that sorrow be elicited in order to absolution and be referred to the sacrament through the intention of the penitent: for, they say, the parts of the sacrament (matter and form) must be ordered to the sacrament by intention. But, with the opinion admitted by force of which the acts of the penitent are parts of the sacrament, only those parts which are placed by the minister must be made from the intention of confecting the sacrament. Therefore, since the opinion of those authors lacks every foundation, it does not seem to be probable.²

¹ Cf. sess. 14, c. 4.

² Cf. Lugo, disp. 14, n. 37 ff.; Suarez, disp. 20, sect. 4, n. 29; Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 76 ff.

As contrition, according to the common view, forms a part of the sacramental sign in Penance, it should in some manner be expressed outwardly, not indeed that any form of words is necessary, but the sorrow of the penitent should appear from his confession, from his demeanour, or from his words or other signs. It must exist, if not before, at least when absolution is given, for sin cannot be forgiven if there be no sorrow for it. Moreover, as the different parts of the sacrament go to make one moral whole, the penitent’s act of sorrow should in some way be referred to the sacrament. For this, however, it will be sufficient if together with the act of sorrow there be the intention to confess the sin. In case, then, a penitent has inadvertently omitted a serious sin from his confession, but remembers it immediately after he has received absolution and mentions it to the confessor, the latter may absolve him at once, nor is it necessary for the penitent to make a fresh act of sorrow for that particular sin.

On account of the necessity of a moral union between the several parts of the sacrament, there must not be too long an interval between the act of sorrow for sin and the reception of absolution for it. Ordinarily, of course, the sorrow is virtually renewed and expressed when the sin is confessed, but if this were not the case, and the act of sorrow preceded the confession by more than one or two days, it would be doubtful whether there was the necessary union between the parts of the sacrament so as to constitute one sacramental sign.

447. QUESTION 6. Must contrition precede confession?

Reply 1. It must certainly precede absolution, or at least coexist with it, as is plain. But speaking practically, it is required that sorrow at least precede absolution, because no penitent who feels himself indisposed can ask for or receive absolution.

Reply 2. For the validity of the Sacrament, sorrow need not necessarily precede the accusation. The reason is that all things required for the Sacrament are present, provided that sorrow precedes absolution; nor can a precept of placing sorrow before the confession of sins be proved. - Lugo, Suarez, and others most commonly. Moreover, when Theologians require a sorrowful confession, they appear to require nothing other than that the confession not be a mere narration of sins, but that it be a self-accusation ordered to obtaining absolution. - St. Lig., no. 445 ¹⁰.

¹⁰ Thus St. Alphonsus: Laymann with others (namely, Coninck and Palaus) require the confession to be sorrowful, or sorrow to precede confession, only insofar as they demand that the confession not be a mere narration of sins but have the nature of sacramental confession; and for this it suffices that the confession be made with the intention of obtaining absolution, and that sorrow then be manifested at least by the petition or expectation of absolution. These last words meet Coninck's objection that sorrow must be sensible. Since various authors reply to this difficulty in various ways (see Lugo, disp. 14, nos. 14-18), as the words of St. Alphonsus indicate, perhaps another could also answer that there is no need at present for those subtleties if, according to what was said elsewhere (above, in the Note to no. 414), one prefers the opinion which holds the acts of the penitent merely as the matter circa quam, and therefore attributes to absolution alone that it is the efficacious sign of grace.

Moreover, Lugo writes thus concerning Coninck's opinion (De Poenitentia, loc. cit., no. 13): This opinion is singular and has all the other theologians against it.... It also has against it the practice of the faithful; for if they have perhaps confessed their sins without sorrow and afterward, moved by the exhortation of the confessor, are excited to have sorrow for their sins, they think they satisfy sufficiently if they then grieve before absolution. Indeed, confessors are accustomed especially then to move penitents to sorrow for this end (which is also the practice prescribed in the Roman Ritual), that they may dispose themselves to receive valid absolution; nor do they oblige them, after sorrow has then been conceived, to repeat the confession which was made without preceding sorrow. These things plainly show that the solicitude of certain confessors is to be banished to empty scruples: after they have excited the penitent to sorrow, they wish altogether to extort from him again some confession, at least in a few words, for example: I accuse myself of the sins narrated.

** And St. Alphonsus in fact has it thus (bk. 6, no. 445, at the end): But the Salmanticenses add that, merely for quieting scruples, Confessors are accustomed, if they doubt the internal indisposition of the penitent, to excite him to grieve over the sins explained a little before, which is done if it is said: I grieve over the sins narrated, and I accuse myself. The holy Doctor placed these words immediately after those read above in this Note, which the holy Doctor had said to show that in this question no discord exists among the Doctors except in words: Therefore, he says, these are not two opinions, but one.

Nevertheless, behold, the VV. (p. 935, no. 108) oppose the things which St. Alphonsus elsewhere has thus (Homo apostolicus, tr. 16, no. 20): Must sorrow precede confession? Laymann ... affirms it, both because sorrow must be sensible and cannot become such except by confession, and because confession ... must be sorrowful; otherwise it would be a simple narration of sins. But others more commonly deny it ..., and the Ritual favors them.... And they rightly reply to the first reason by saying that sorrow becomes sensible not only through confession, but also by other signs and words. But to the second reason they bring no convincing reply; hence, on account of it, I say that the first opinion is probable and therefore is to be followed in practice. They commonly agree ..., however, that it suffices if the penitent, after the act of sorrow, says: Again I accuse myself of all the sins confessed.

Reply. It does not sufficiently appear to what end the VV. produce these things. For in order that anyone may at times use the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, will it also be necessary that he undertake the burden of examining every little work of the holy Doctor? But where the opinions of the different Works of the holy Doctor do not appear to agree very well with one another, as in the present matter, by what means indeed will you avoid the complaints of the VV., who, whichever opinion of the holy Doctor you finally choose, do not hesitate to oppose to you the other, contrary one? And indeed, to the things which the VV. object from the Homo apostolicus, someone could reply according to the things which are taken from the Moral Work (bk. 6, no. 445), and therefore with St. Alphonsus as guide: I deny the antecedent, namely, that in either opinion confession cannot be called sorrowful; and consequently I deny the antecedent, namely, that the contrary opinion is probable; and therefore I deny the consequence, namely, that this opinion is to be followed and therefore, except perhaps for quieting an empty scruple, it is necessary to add: Again I accuse myself, etc. Why would this man be liable to the censure of the VV.? For even if he had chosen the opinion which is handed down in the Homo apostolicus, would it not have been ready at hand for the VV. to object the things read in the Moral Work?

But something more serious to be noticed in the present matter occurs. The opinions of St. Alphonsus which the VV. here object from the Homo apostolicus are also found in the Moral Work of the same holy Doctor published in earlier years, namely, both in the edition of the year 1748 (bk. 6, tr. 4, ch. 1, dub. 2, note A, q. III) and in the other of the year 1757 (bk. 6, no. 445); in that same year he published the work written in Italian under the title Istruzione e pratica per un Confessore, which work he then published in Latin in the year 1759 under the title Homo Apostolicus instructus, etc. But since these same opinions are not found in the later editions of the Moral Work, as is plain from the texts cited above from bk. 6, no. 445, it is manifest that the holy Doctor himself, his opinion having been changed, corrected that place. But if the matter is thus, by what right of equity, by what zeal for truth, or by what zeal for sound doctrine do the VV. now draw forth and oppose against one who proposes the doctrine refined and reformed by the holy Doctor himself those things which the same holy Doctor had rejected?

QUESTION 7. For what space of time does an act of sorrow morally endure for validly receiving the Sacrament?

Reply. This cannot be determined. According to the common opinion, it can endure for one or even several days, provided that it was elicited with the intention of making confession ¹¹, and was not retracted by another sin. Moreover, penitents should be counseled to renew, immediately before confession, the act of contrition previously elicited, especially if afterward they turned their mind to other things for a notable delay. - St. Lig., no. 446 ¹².

¹¹ What the Author indicates, that sorrow must be elicited with the intention of confession, has at most some probability. Indeed, even St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 447) could not deny that the opinion is more probable which teaches that sorrow is valid even if someone elicits it while then thinking nothing of the Sacrament, which he afterwards receives when the occasion is offered.

On this argument, compare Cardinal de Lugo (De Poenitentia, disp. 14, nos. 37-40), who not only excludes by most weighty reasons the necessity of that intention, but moreover notes that, according to Suarez and Reginald, who support the contrary opinion, it suffices that the preceding sorrow, even though elicited without an intention of confession, afterward moves one to confession or is in some way expressed in confession; these things, as is plain, fall entirely into the common opinion of Cardinal de Lugo.

But the little reason adduced to the contrary (in St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.), that through intention the matter must be ordered to the Sacrament, as ablution to Baptism and the touching of the instruments to Holy Orders, first supposes that sorrow is the matter of the Sacrament in the same sense as ablution in Baptism, namely, matter ex qua, which pertains to a mere opinion (see above, Note to no. 414); and then it is refuted by the very example of Holy Orders, for the Ordination of an infant is held valid, although he certainly cannot, through an intention of which he is incapable, order the touching of the instruments to the Sacrament.

Nor does the reason taken from Proposition I proscribed by Innocent XI press any more, both because of what was just said concerning the nature of the matter in this Sacrament, and because of the things which the Author noted above, no. 437, concerning this proposition.

** The VV. contend against this Note in fourteen columns (pp. 411-418). Let us touch briefly upon all these things, as the matter permits.

1. The VV. gather together several Writers (pp. 416-418) who either hold absolutely, or teach as more probable, that sorrow must be elicited with the intention of confession.

Reply. Against these, St. Alphonsus judged the opposite opinion more probable, as was noted. Therefore, let the VV. show the holy Doctor this honor: on account of him and with him, let them hold the reasons of those Authors as less solid.

2. The VV. complain (pp. 414-416) that the argument of St. Alphonsus was called a little reason, namely, that just as the minister, so the recipient must order the matter to the Sacrament. They then say that the contrary example of an infant, who is validly ordained without this intention, is sufficiently refuted by the common doctrine that no intention is required in infants for validly receiving the Sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation, or even Orders, since the intention of Christ or of the Church supplies in them, as St. Alphonsus says (bk. 6, no. 80).

Reply. This refutation falls of itself because there is no parity at all. For the will to receive a Sacrament is one thing, and the will ordering sorrow to the Sacrament is another. The latter, as they themselves contend, belongs to constituting an essential element of the Sacrament; the former, however, is altogether extrinsic to the essential elements of the Sacrament, and sometimes a merely habitual or even merely interpretative intention suffices. But the Church certainly cannot supply that which pertains to the intrinsic essence of the Sacrament. Therefore, if the Ordination of an infant is valid, as it certainly is, although the infant is incapable of ordering the contact with the instruments to the Sacrament, it is manifestly plain that this ordering intention is not necessary. To this might also be referred what is commonly said concerning the fulfillment of sacramental satisfaction. For if all the parts must be ordered to the Sacrament through intention, this will therefore hold also with regard to satisfaction. But where is that coordinating intention present when even St. Alphonsus (bk. 1, no. 165) admits that sacramental penance is truly fulfilled even if someone, forgetful of the precept and therefore having no intention of fulfilling it, nevertheless performs the prescribed work?

3. The VV. insist (pp. 412-416) that in the case the condemnation of the Proposition concerning the use of probable matter when the safer has been abandoned presses, both because the opinion concerning sorrow to be elicited with the intention of confession is probable, and because the matter here concerns matter ex qua; and that the interpretation of the condemned Proposition brought forward by Gury must be rejected.

Reply. As regards the first: let them first bring forward other reasons by which some solid probability of the opinion concerning the necessity of that intention may be proved. For if the argument adduced by St. Alphonsus, which must be considered the strongest of all, does not have that force, as we saw, then certainly, until some other reason appears, it is lawful to hold that these reasons are lacking. And since it is very well known that extrinsic probability has force insofar as it is presumed to rest upon intrinsic probability, where intrinsic arguments are lacking, it profits little to multiply citations. Therefore, thus far that condemnation is urged in vain.

As regards the second, first the VV. (p. 415), after asserting that the doctrine which holds the acts of the penitent to be matter ex qua is most probable, infer from this that the opinion which establishes that sorrow must necessarily be ordered to confession is sufficiently probable; but there will certainly be one who adds to these words: I deny the consequence, as is plain from what has been said. But, this omitted, the VV. would certainly have acted more usefully if, instead of copying the text of Suarez and citing others who followed Suarez, they had devoted some labor to the things touched upon above (Note to no. 414) concerning this argument. It was indeed said there that it cannot be the purpose of our work to undertake the solution of this question in a brief Compendium. Nevertheless, we indicated certain difficulties which neither Suarez nor anyone else has yet satisfied, just as a suitable reply to the arguments produced by Maldonatus, cited there, is still desired. But what those two lights of Theology, Suarez and Lugo, appear not to have attained, it is very uncertain whether it is to be hoped from others. Moreover, since for the probability of any opinion it is required not only that it be supported by solid reasons, but also that it solidly satisfy the contrary reasons, shall we rightly be angry with those who perhaps still hold that opinion not only not most probable, but not even solidly probable?

As regards the third, finally, it is easily plain that the interpretation of the condemned Proposition which Gury has at no. 437 was mentioned only because it explains what these words of the condemned Proposition mean: In conferring the Sacraments. And since St. Alphonsus (bk. 1, no. 51), as the VV. themselves note, sufficiently shows that for this reason it is disputed among the Doctors whether the condemnation affects others besides the minister of the Sacrament, another reason now arises from this by which it is abundantly established that the condemnation of that proposition is objected with less efficacy, even if other reasons for this were not brought forward.

¹² ** In this place also the VV. (p. 935, no. 109) oppose to the Author, who says that sorrow can endure for one or even several days, St. Alphonsus, who (Homo apostolicus, tr. 16, no. 20) affirms that whenever confession derives from sorrow for sins, sorrow always virtually endures for one or two days.

But St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 446) admits and approves the opinion of Roncaglia, who (De Poenitentia, ch. 3, q. 2, reply 2) teaches that sorrow suffices even if it preceded by several days.

448. QUESTION 8. Is a new act of sorrow required for receiving a new absolution when the penitent, immediately after absolution, confesses a mortal sin omitted through forgetfulness?

Reply. It is controverted. The FIRST OPINION, common and much more probable, denies it; because the prior contrition certainly endures, and, being universal, extended to all sins, even those omitted through forgetfulness; nor, moreover, is it required that contrition be explicitly ordered to the Sacrament. Furthermore, explicit sorrow appears to be sufficiently present in the very act of accusing that same sin. - Lugo. - Roncaglia. - Reuter, etc., with St. Lig., no. 448.

The SECOND OPINION affirms it; because the judgment was completed through absolution; therefore, if a new absolution is to be imparted, new proximate matter is required; and although sorrow endures in itself, nevertheless it does not endure in relation to the second absolution. - Bonacina, etc. Yet this opinion appears to rest upon a slight foundation ¹³.

¹³ Cardinal de Lugo in fact denies (De Poenitentia, disp. 14, nos. 28-30) that some partial proximate matter cannot serve the same for two forms. But it was already said above that the ordering of sorrow to confession is not necessary. Moreover, it must be denied that such ordering is lacking here; for one who grieves over sins with the intention of confessing sufficiently orders the sorrow for each to the confession and absolution of the same. Add further that Vasquez, Bonacina, and Filliucci are wrongly cited for this second opinion (in St. Alphonsus, bk. 6, no. 448, from Croix, bk. 6, pt. 2, no. 711). For when these say that sorrow must be repeated, they do not dispute concerning sins omitted through forgetfulness, but concerning a repeated confession of the same sins. Therefore, neither authority nor any solid reason supports this opinion. But, on the contrary, the common practice stands for the first opinion, as Lugo says (loc. cit., no. 27); St. Alphonsus (loc. cit.) calls this opinion common, and testifies that it is called morally certain by Roncaglia, most probable by Sporer with Elbel and many others, and finally indubitable among all by others. For although perhaps one or another confessor admonishes the penitent in the aforesaid case to renew sorrow, nevertheless all the others commonly do not do so. Dicastillo also testifies to this common practice of confessors (De Sacramentis, tr. 8, disp. 6, dub. 22, no. 160).

Two things must not be omitted here. The first is that, according to the common opinion, the foregoing doctrine holds not only in the case which is ordinarily more frequent, of some sin which one forgets in confession and then confesses immediately after absolution or a little afterward, but also in two other cases: both when a dying person, because of the danger of imminent death, must be absolved after one or another sin has been heard and the confession of the rest must then be continued; and when someone, his confession being divided (which case, however, will occur very rarely, as will be said in its place), is absolved by a Superior only from reserved sins and is then absolved by another from the nonreserved sins.

The second is that, according to several, not even the aforesaid opinion of Vasquez, Bonacina, and Filliucci concerning the necessity of repeating sorrow in a repeated confession of the same sins must necessarily be admitted. Cardinal de Lugo certainly thinks the complete contrary.

First, he indicates that this opinion of his agrees with the Doctors thus (loc. cit., no. 34): Although the Authors do not treat expressly of this sin, nevertheless, from the manner in which they speak, they appear to indicate this.... Indeed, Father John Salas, in his manuscript On Penance, q. 84, art. 10, after relating the opinion of certain recent authors who said that new sorrow, just as a new confession, is required for the validity of the second Sacrament, himself says that the contrary is truer, and that it suffices that the sensible parts, namely, the confession and in the confession itself the expression of sorrow, be new, etc. But he had disclosed his own mind thus (ibid., no. 31): If the things which we have adduced in confirmation of the first part are true, it does not appear why sometimes a confession and new absolution concerning even the same sins cannot be repeated by virtue of the preceding sorrow which still endures morally and virtually (namely, has not been retracted). And he concludes (next no. 32): The reason appears the same for either case.

But both John de la Cruz and Peter de Ledesma (in Diana, vol. 1, tr. 3, res. 88, no. 1) had preceded him; Diana moreover testifies that this doctrine is common. Dicastillo also joined these (in Diana, loc. cit.), whose thesis is this: It must be asserted that, not only when someone confesses a new sin which he had not told through forgetfulness, but when altogether the same sins are submitted to a new confession, old sorrow which still endures either physically or morally suffices. Indeed, it is due to the reasons adduced by Dicastillo that Diana, who had previously hesitated to adhere to this doctrine (see loc. cit., res. 89, no. 3), afterward embraced it absolutely. For after copying Dicastillo's arguments (loc. cit., res. 88, no. 4), he concludes: Thus far Dicastillo, to whom I now adhere absolutely. Then he adds that not only did another Salamancan doctor think the same (see ibid., res. 90, no. 2), but that, with Diana himself as author, Leander also passed to the same opinion; concerning him Diana writes (ibid., res. 95, no. 4): The same Leander (De Sacramentis, vol. 1, tr. 5, disp. 7, q. 4) teaches, citing even me and Cardinal Lugo, that when someone confesses the same sins from which he had already been directly absolved, he is not bound to have new sorrow for the same sins; because when the vocal confession is repeated, at least the sorrow of the preceding confession, which still endures morally and virtually, is virtually repeated. Finally, add to these Thomas Tamburini (Methodus Confessionis, bk. 1, ch. 2, sec. 5, no. 7), who praises Joseph de Ianuario for the same doctrine: Read, he says, Ianuarius (pt. 1, res. 30), who teaches that one who confesses sins otherwise duly confessed and absolved is not bound again to elicit an act of sorrow if the prior one endures habitually (that is, has not been retracted) or virtually.

Moreover, a doctrine of this kind neither ought nor can serve practice insofar as either confessors or penitents ought to be less solicitous about exciting sorrow even in the confession of sins which have already been duly expiated by the Sacrament. Far be this. Nevertheless, it can sometimes be useful, insofar as by its aid, as Diana says (loc. cit., res. 89, no. 2), confessors will quiet many scruples, especially those of persons who confess ordinary venial sins and with them some mortal sin otherwise confessed and absolved. For although it is not greatly to be feared that sorrow for past grave sins is lacking in one who otherwise brings only venial sins, and therefore manifests a soul averse from grave fault by constantly overcoming temptations, nevertheless scruples concerning a defect of sorrow not rarely hold certain persons anxious, especially if they happen to hear some preacher who, perhaps with less discreet zeal, declaims vehemently against repeated confessions of old faults without sorrow. The confessor will fittingly be able to restrain these anxieties both with other aids and also with the support of the present opinion.

Fifteen columns which the VV. oppose to this Note (pp. 418-426) must be answered here. First, they do not hesitate to deny that Vasquez, Filliucci, and Bonacina were cited wrongly by St. Alphonsus. For, they say (p. 420), Filliucci (tr. 6, no. 76) speaks in express words of forgotten sins, not of sins previously confessed.

Reply 1. They therefore concede that Vasquez, and likewise Bonacina, were cited wrongly by St. Alphonsus. 2. St. Alphonsus with Croix does not cite no. 76 from Filliucci, but no. 77, where the discussion is not of forgotten sins, but of sins previously confessed, and this most deliberately. For in no. 77, where the discussion concerns sins previously confessed, Filliucci says that new sorrow must be elicited; but not in no. 76, where forgotten sins are treated. Therefore, if they had cited no. 76, the citation would have been not only futile but also false. Hence an argument against the VV.: if Filliucci had thought that new sorrow had to be elicited even where forgotten sins were treated, he would not have been silent about it, just as he was not silent where sins previously confessed were treated. But he was silent. Therefore.

2. The VV. insist, saying that according to Filliucci (no. 76), in the confession of a forgotten sin a new Sacrament is effected. Therefore, Filliucci is not cited wrongly. Reply. The question now is not whether in the case a new Sacrament is effected, but whether, when a new Sacrament is effected, it is necessary to elicit another act of sorrow, or whether the preceding act suffices. Filliucci expressly says the former thing; concerning the latter, Filliucci has not even a word; indeed, as we have said, by his silence he denies it. Therefore, Filliucci also is cited wrongly.

3. Nevertheless, in order to show that the opinion which St. Alphonsus, as the VV. say (p. 419), rightly calls more probable is supported by grave authority, they produce eight authors, namely, Concina, Lacroix, Holzmann, Reiffenstuel, Billuart, Antoine, Reuter, and Voit. Reply. Six among these, indeed, call the contrary opinion, namely, that a renewal of sorrow is not necessary, more probable or certain. Is it thus shown, with authority considered, that St. Alphonsus rightly called his opinion more probable? But neither do the other two call the opinion of St. Alphonsus more probable. For Concina merely says: Follow the safer things in this highest affair. But the other, whom the VV. thought was Antoine, is in reality Philip of Carboneano, an unhappy annotator of a most unhappy Work; he writes: In practice new contrition is required, ... because the opposite is not altogether certain.

4. The VV. insist that the cited Authors at least implicitly held the opinion of St. Alphonsus as probable when they called their own more probable; but Croix and Holzmann expressly call it probable. Reply. As regards the first part, I deny it. For they produce, and could produce, not even one author who defended that opinion as probable; but since they did not think their own altogether certain, they therefore counseled that the opposite should be followed in practice so that one might proceed more safely. Thus, for example, Voit (vol. 2, no. 508): The opinion is most probable (the VV. omitted these words) that new sorrow need not necessarily be elicited.... Nevertheless, in practice it is better to elicit new sorrow, so that one may proceed more safely; these words sound rather like counsel. And Reuter (pt. 4, tr. 5, no. 282): Although this opinion appears morally certain (these words likewise are omitted by the VV.), nevertheless, because the opposite appears to some not altogether improbable ..., greater reverence for the Sacrament is to be counseled. These words likewise present counsel rather than doctrine.

But as regards Holzmann and Croix, Reply. Each of them rests upon citations of Vasquez, Bonacina, Amicus, and Mastrius, who establish the necessity of new sorrow not for our case, but concerning sins previously confessed, as we already said concerning the citations of St. Alphonsus. Therefore, they rest upon citations which do not pertain to the matter.

But as regards the intrinsic reasons, Holzmann says that the arguments which he himself had objected appeared to him to have been solved probably indeed, but not evidently. Yet it is easily replied to this that it is enough and more than enough that there be a solid solution of the objections; but he himself concedes that the solution is solid. But if something appears to him not sufficiently evident, it satisfies us that it has appeared sufficiently evident to other grave Doctors.

In this matter, indeed, this Author's manner of disputing can appear singular. For he asks (pt. 5, no. 511): Can one and the same contrition suffice for two or more Sacraments of Penance in number? Here he does not distinguish whether the second confession concerns a forgotten sin or a sin previously confessed. He then adds (and the VV. ought not to have omitted these things): It is replied that it can, if contrition still physically endures at the time of each confession; indeed, even if it endures only morally. The first part is common AND CERTAIN. Cardinal de Lugo, John Bosco, Lacroix, bk. 6, pt. 2, no. 707, and very many others hold the second against others to be cited below. But the Authors whom he cites below treat only of sins previously confessed; why, then, does he not conclude that this second part of the thesis does not touch the question of forgotten sins, and therefore that what he establishes concerning the first part holds concerning them, namely, that this doctrine is common and certain? But he himself (no. 512) says that the opinion is not certain even when the penitent returns after receiving absolution to confess a forgotten sin. Reply. Let it pass; but what, then, will you draw from this confusion of things? Yet one thing is sufficiently established. For he calls the doctrine concerning the sufficiency of one contrition for two or more Sacraments certain and common if contrition physically endures. Let us now omit asking what this physical endurance means with him and why it is required. For he himself had written a little before (no. 510): If yesterday you elicited sorrow with the purpose of confessing today, while you confess today you do not need new sorrow. For does sorrow then endure physically or morally? As regards the present matter, if according to his CERTAIN opinion one contrition suffices in the case for two or more absolutions, what force, then, will his objection have (no. 511), namely, that A new composite requires new parts; or that new contrition entitatively is necessary for a new Sacrament? Does he not expressly contend that it is certain and common that one suffices? How, then, does he attribute so much strength to these objections (no. 512) that because of them he thereafter wishes the doctrine which he himself contends is certain to be uncertain? But let us now dismiss Holzmann with this obscure heap of things which do not cohere with one another, and pass to Croix.

Besides those empty citations of which we have spoken, Croix produces this one argument, as though from reason (no. 711): There is, he says, almost the same reason concerning sins which someone has forgotten and concerning those which he has previously confessed. That is, since he treated both questions together (no. 707), he contends that the little reasons which he objects to himself where sins already confessed are treated also hold for the case of a forgotten sin; and he thinks that all the more force accrues to these little reasons because certain Authors (he adduces four or five) who deny that sorrow must be renewed where forgotten sins are treated nevertheless require new sorrow with regard to sins previously confessed. Reply. The argument can easily and with greater right be turned back upon Croix himself. And indeed (now omitting those who have nothing concerning forgotten sins, such as Vasquez, Bonacina, and John Sanchez), there are very many, as Holzmann admits, who deny that new sorrow is necessary with regard to a forgotten sin. But among these, those few do not find the reasons which they find valid with regard to a forgotten sin confessed immediately afterward sufficiently valid also with regard to sins previously confessed. Yet from the very fact that those who dissent with regard to sins previously confessed nevertheless agree with the others concerning the confession of a forgotten sin, can it not rather be and ought it not be concluded that the reasons adduced in the case of a forgotten sin are of such strength and such clarity that they have extorted assent even from those who dissent in the other question?

Let us conclude, therefore, that neither Holzmann nor Croix has produced anything either from authority or from intrinsic reason which confers any probability upon that opinion which is adduced against the common opinion.

Moreover, as we have already noted elsewhere, it was altogether to be desired that the VV. devote their labors to some advancement of science, namely, to the investigation of truth rather than to defending some cause in any manner whatsoever. Thus, in the present matter, when they offered the texts of Authors, they would not have concealed that Edmund Voit calls the opinion which they endeavor to attack most probable; they would not have concealed that the same appeared morally certain to Reuter; they would not have concealed that Holzmann calls the same certain and common.

But, moreover, why did they remain silent about the judgments of other Doctors? Indeed:

1. Dominic Viva (De Poenitentia, q. 3, art. 3, no. 8) writes: Forgotten sins which are disclosed immediately after absolution do not need new sorrow in order that absolution be conferred again concerning them, as the practice of the faithful shows. He then adds (ibid., no. 9): You will ask whether these opinions concerning sorrow ... after the first thesis was proscribed by Innocent XI are probable in practice? I reply that the opinions hitherto explained ... are probable in practice, ... because it is lawful to follow an opinion which is MORALLY CERTAIN. And again (on Prop. 1 of Innocent XI, no. 26): Whatever may be the case as to whether absolution can universally be repeated concerning the same sins when sorrow is not repeated, as many think ..., it nevertheless appears CERTAIN from the practice of the Church and of Confessors that it is not necessary that those who are reconciled immediately after absolution be admonished to repeat new sorrow.

2. Felix Potestas (De Poenitentia, ch. 18, no. 5080): One who has confessed before and is reconciled by confessing a forgotten sin, although he effects a new Sacrament, is not bound to elicit new sorrow.... This opinion is MORALLY CERTAIN to me.

3. Elbel (conf. 3, De Contritione, no. 75): If he submits a new sin immediately or shortly after absolution was received, most probably he is not only validly but also licitly absolved without new sorrow.... Therefore, Cardenas and Lacroix appear to condemn the practice of this opinion too scrupulously.

4. And Sporer (Theologia Sacramentalis, pt. 3, ch. 2, no. 298): When in Confession you have forgotten some mortal sin and, having remembered it a little after absolution was given, you confess it, although it is advisable and safest to renew sorrow, nevertheless it is not necessary that you have new sorrow concerning it. Thus ... COMMONLY. And again (no. 300): This is more certain: if, because of the imminent danger of death, you gave someone absolution before he confessed all his sins, you can absolve him from the others which he will narrate afterward, even though he does not elicit new sorrow concerning the rest. This resolution directly attacks the little reason customarily objected to the contrary, that new matter is required for a new Sacrament.

5. Marcus Struggl (tr. 11, q. 2, art. 2, no. 25): Learned and pious Confessors, when the penitent after the first absolution has been conferred proposes a mortal sin which he had previously forgotten, confer absolution upon him without being solicitous about new sorrow on the part of the penitent. And this opinion, although it treats of the validity of the Sacrament, is SAFE IN PRACTICE.

6. Martin Stoz (bk. 1, q. 1, art. 7, no. 52): I willingly admit that one who confessed a little before and again confesses sins which had escaped him ... is not bound to elicit new sorrow.

7. Mazzotta (tr. 6, disp. 1, q. 3, ch. 1, sec. 3, q. 3): The same sorrow can suffice ... if someone immediately after absolution adds a new forgotten sin and is absolved again either by the same or by another Confessor; and similarly, if someone is absolved when death is imminent before he has confessed integrally, and afterward ... completes his confession, he can again be absolved without new sorrow.

COMMONLY, and Moya says that it is INDUBITABLE among the Doctors. Nor does the cited proposition condemned by Innocent XI stand in the way, because this opinion is most probable, whatever Croix may have said.

8. Babenstuber (tr. 8, pt. 6, disp. 4, art. 3, no. 57): When someone has forgotten some sin in confession and then immediately or a little afterward confesses it, the Confessor must again impart absolution.... In this case neither the penitent nor the Confessor is accustomed to be solicitous about new sorrow. Thus the Theologians COMMONLY.

9. Roncaglia (tr. 19, ch. 3, q. 3), concerning this doctrine: These foundations appear SO SAFE to me that this opinion by no means appears to me subject to the censure of that condemned opinion according to which it was said that in confecting the Sacraments it is lawful to follow a probable opinion when the safer has been abandoned.

10. Giribaldi (tr. 7, ch. 5, dub. 8, no. 63): Although one or another (confessor) admonishes the penitent to renew sorrow, nevertheless others more commonly do not do so; and thus it can be observed in practice that when the penitent returns to tell forgotten sins, he is not compelled to elicit a new act of contrition.

11. Illsung (tr. 6, disp. 6, q. 3, art. 5, no. 43): When someone has forgotten one sin and, returning to the priest either immediately or a little afterward, confesses it ..., the confessor must impart absolution again; but in such a case commonly neither penitents nor confessors are solicitous about new sorrow. Therefore, new sorrow is not required.

12. Honoratus Fabri (tr. 9, ch. 2, no. 10): The same sorrow suffices for several absolutions, as when someone after absolution discloses some sin of which he had not previously remembered.

13. Tamburini (Methodus Confessionis, bk. 1, ch. 2, no. 9): If, after absolution has duly been conferred, the penitent remembers and brings forward something which he had forgotten to confess, ... it is not necessary that he grieve again.

14. Gobat (tr. 6, no. 165): When, having forgotten some sin in confession, you confess it a little after absolution has been given, it is not necessary that you have new sorrow concerning it. COMMONLY.

15. Escobar (bk. 14, sect. 2, nos. 116-118): Someone, while making confession, forgets one or another mortal sin and immediately after absolution remembers and discloses it: he ... does not need a new act of sorrow. But here he cites Vasquez and Bonacina as contrary without relevance, for, as we have said, they do not discuss this question but another, different one.

QUESTION 9. Can there be a Sacrament of Penance at once valid and unformed, because of a defect of sufficient disposition?

Reply. It is controverted. Some deny it with Billuart, diss. 7, art. 1. - Elbel, no. 81. Their reason is that in the Sacrament of Penance, contrition is the matter of the Sacrament; therefore, if it is insufficient, the Sacrament will be invalid. But if it is sufficient, the Sacrament is valid and at the same time formed, and therefore it immediately remits sins. - Others, however, and indeed grave Theologians, affirm it with Lugo, disp. 14, no. 65. - Lacroix, no. 672; and St. Lig., no. 444 ¹⁴, calls this more probable. The reason of those who affirm is that there can be a certain lower degree of disposition which suffices for the matter of the Sacrament but does not suffice for actual justification ¹⁵. - Recall what was said On the Sacraments in General, nos. 191 and 232.

¹⁴ This opinion, says Lugo (De Poenitentia, disp. 14, no. 68), is taught by St. Thomas ... and by the Thomists commonly, Capreolus, Paludanus, Cajetan, Soto, Cano, Ledesma, Sylvester, Richardus, whom Suarez adduces ..., who follows the same in part; and this is also commonly embraced by the more recent Thomists and Henriquez ... and Cardinal Toletus ..., and others whom Antoninus and Diana relate and follow ...; all of whom consequently teach that such a valid confession is not afterward to be repeated.

The same de Lugo relates the multiple cases in which one or another Theologian thought this could occur (ibid., no. 69); nevertheless, he appears to admit it in only two circumstances: 1. when someone guilty of two sins, through invincible forgetfulness, grieves over only one and confesses only this; 2. when someone through invincible ignorance believes that it is not a mortal sin to approach the Sacrament without sorrow for all sins, provided that sorrow is present for some one. See ibid., nos. 74 and 89.

¹⁵ Yet this reason favors the cases which Cardinal de Lugo did not approve rather than those which he admitted.

The qualities of contrition are those conditions which are required for the validity of contrition, whether perfect or imperfect. Four are customarily enumerated: 1. that it be true and formal; 2. supernatural; 3. appreciatively supreme; 4. universal.

346. 1. True and formal contrition or attrition is required, as has thus far been explained in the preceding paragraph.

It is therefore required, a) that contrition be true or internal, and consequently there does not suffice: a) the merely external recitation of a formula of contrition, unless true internal sorrow and detestation of sin are at the same time present. b) Supposed sorrow does not suffice, but true sorrow is required. The reason is that, just as supposed water does not suffice for baptism, so supposed sorrow is insufficient for the sacrament of penance. But if certain older theologians seem to have taught the contrary, either they must be abandoned or benignly interpreted in this sense: that they thought at least supposed contrition necessary; if this is not truly present, true attrition which exists and is in good faith held by the penitent to be perfect contrition suffices. c) Nor does a desire for sorrow and absolution suffice; nevertheless, in practice the faithful of timorous conscience who sincerely desire to have true sorrow for sins committed are not to be disturbed, even if they say that they feel no sorrow at all. For since contrition is an act of the will, it is not always felt.

b) Formal contrition is required, that is, a positive act by which a man truly and explicitly sorrows over sins committed. Therefore implicit or virtual contrition, such as is included in an act of charity, does not suffice, as very few after Lugo¹⁴⁰ have taught; for although an act of perfect charity justifies outside the sacrament of penance, nevertheless, speaking per se, it does not suffice in the sacrament, because formal contrition pertains to the proximate matter of this sacrament. Nevertheless, in practice it is scarcely possible that a sinful man eliciting an act of perfect charity should not at the same time sorrow over his sins and detest them. Still less does that implicit sorrow suffice which is included in the will not to sin henceforth; because it is absolutely possible for someone to have complacency in past sins but nevertheless no longer to wish to sin.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ De poenit., diss. V, n. 92 ff.

¹⁴¹ Council of Trent, session 14, c. 4 (Denz., n. 897).

347. 2. Sorrow must be supernatural, and this in two ways: a) by reason of the principle, inasmuch as it must be elicited with the aid of supernatural grace;¹⁴² b) by reason of the motive, which is in some manner referred to God.

Hence a merely natural motive for sorrowing over sins is insufficient, and Innocent XI condemned proposition 57: "It is probable that natural attrition suffices, provided that it is upright."¹⁴³ Insufficient natural motives are, for example, the punishment of imprisonment inflicted for sin, misfortune arising from it, infamy, and so forth. Suitable motives, however, can be reduced to four: 1. fear of punishment to be inflicted or already inflicted by God; 2. hope of reward in eternity; 3. the supernatural turpitude of sin; 4. the goodness of God. In a word: all those motives are suitable which are apprehended by the light of supernatural faith, but not those which are known by the light of reason alone.

¹⁴² Thus, after the Council of Orange, the Council of Trent defined, session 6, can. 3 (Denz., n. 813).

¹⁴³ Denz., n. 1207.

348. 3. Contrition must be supreme, not indeed intensively, but appreciatively.

Contrition supreme in intensity is not only not required, but is not even possible, since the bitterness and intensity of sorrow can always be increased more and more through the grace of God. Contrition, however, must be appreciatively supreme, inasmuch as sin is judged to be an evil more detestable than any other evil; and therefore the sinner must be prepared to lose any good and to suffer any evil rather than to commit sin. In practice, however, both the confessor and the penitent should abstain from expressly instituting comparisons between a sin to be avoided and some atrocious evil to be undergone. St. Thomas¹⁴⁴ wisely observes concerning this matter: "A contrite man is bound in general to will to suffer any punishment rather than to sin; ... but he is not bound to descend in particular to this punishment or that. Indeed, he would act foolishly if someone were to trouble himself or another concerning particular punishments of this kind. For it is manifest that, just as delightful things move more when considered in particular than in common, so terrible things terrify more if they are considered in particular; and there are some who do not fall in a lesser temptation who perhaps would fall in a greater one. Thus someone hearing of adultery is not incited to lust, but if by consideration he descends to each enticement, he would be moved. And similarly someone would not refuse to suffer death for Christ; but if he descended to considering each punishment, he would be more withdrawn. And therefore to descend to particulars in such things is to lead a man into temptation and to furnish an occasion of sinning." Hence certain customary formulas of contrition are altogether unsuitable, for example: "I would rather die a thousand times than offend You again, O God."

Since intensity does not pertain to the essence of sorrow in penance, it follows: a) that sensible sorrow, which manifests itself by sighs and tears, is in no way required; b) that no delay of time is necessary for eliciting contrition, since, as a spiritual act, it can be exercised in an instant. Nevertheless, in practice the faithful are earnestly to be admonished to consider the eliciting of contrition more necessary than oral confession, and therefore to spend some time in eliciting true and sincere contrition.

¹⁴⁴ Quodl. 1, a. 9.

349. 4. Contrition must be universal, inasmuch as it extends to absolutely all mortal sins not yet remitted.

The reason is that every mortal sin is a total aversion from God. Now contrition is conversion to God and must destroy every aversion from God, and therefore one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another. It is not strictly required, however, although it is generally better, that special contrition be elicited for each mortal sin. It suffices that the penitent, from a universal motive, namely, because he has offended the most good God and has merited the punishments of Gehenna, sorrow over all mortal sins committed, whether known or here and now unknown.

Since venial sins need not necessarily be accused in confession, it is not required that contrition be universal concerning them. But if someone confesses only venial sins, he must under grave obligation elicit true and formal contrition for at least one, or for other free matter consisting of sins already remitted, because otherwise he would not furnish sufficient proximate matter for the sacrament, which would therefore be frustrated; and this is certainly a grave sacrilege.

350. Corollaries. From the fact that contrition pertains to the proximate matter, while absolution is the form of the sacrament of penance, the following are deduced:

1. Contrition must be manifested by a sensible sign. For the matter of a sacrament pertains to a sensible sign. This sensible manifestation, however, is sufficiently had through the sorrowful confession of sins or through a devout petition for absolution. Nevertheless, children and the uneducated are to be counseled to elicit contrition also in express words, because these words are accustomed to help them greatly toward sincere internal contrition.

2. Contrition must necessarily be elicited before absolution and coexist with it. The reason is that contrition is the matter, while absolution is the form of the sacrament of penance. But the matter must be present when the form arrives. Of itself, indeed, it is not required that contrition be elicited before confession; but in practice this is altogether to be counseled and done, since it is sufficiently difficult to elicit contrition during confession or in that short interval between confession and absolution. Contrition must coexist with absolution, and therefore it cannot be elicited so long before absolution or confession that it no longer virtually perseveres. But how long contrition is judged to persevere virtually cannot be determined by a general rule, since this depends upon its intensity and upon the disposition of the penitent. Certain theologians think that contrition perseveres virtually for three or four hours; others, for one day and night; others, for several days.¹⁴⁵ In practice it is to be counseled that contrition elicited long before confession be renewed again before absolution. But it is evident of itself that contrition is altogether to be renewed when a new mortal sin has afterward been committed.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 446.

351. 3. Contrition elicited must have some ordering toward absolution; or, in other words, it must be sacramental. St. Alphonsus¹⁴⁶ indeed calls more probable the opinion which denies the necessity of this ordering, but he urges that the opposite opinion, since it is safer, be observed in practice. This opinion, however, seems to be not only safer but also truer. For if even in perfect contrition the desire to confess and to receive sacramental absolution must be included, a fortiori this is necessary in attrition. This desire is the same as an intention or ordering toward the sacrament of penance. But it is by no means required that the penitent first have the intention of receiving the sacrament of penance and, moved by this intention, elicit contrition. Hence without doubt a member of the faithful who, for example, is accidentally aroused to contrition while hearing a sermon and afterward confesses is validly and licitly absolved. But if the preceding sorrow is in no way referred to confession, the absolution seems to be invalid; and thus if the same member of the faithful today is most vehemently aroused by a sermon to sorrow for sins while thinking nothing of confession, but on the following day, thinking nothing of the contrition had yesterday, confesses his sins, he seems to receive absolution invalidly. Contrition and confession, therefore, must mutually influence one another. Contrition renders confession sorrowful and not merely narrative; confession, however, joins contrition with absolution and thus constitutes the whole sacrament.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 447.

352. 4. Contrition need not necessarily be elicited anew when the penitent, immediately after absolution, confesses a mortal sin omitted through forgetfulness and is absolved again. Thus Billuart,¹⁴⁷ who thinks this opinion more probable; Roncaglia holds it morally certain, while Sporer, Elbel, and many others hold it most probable, according to the testimony of St. Alphonsus.¹⁴⁸ The reason is that the contrition previously and universally had virtually perseveres and also extends itself to that sin omitted through forgetfulness. Nor should anyone say that in this case there are two sacraments and a twofold absolution or form, and therefore that a twofold contrition is also required as proximate matter. For, supposing that the virtually persevering contrition extends itself to the omitted sin, sufficient proximate matter for confession is truly present. Moreover, this second absolution does not remit the omitted sin, since it has already been remitted through the first absolution. Therefore the second absolution is nothing other than the complement of the first, and both seem to be one sacrament. For if the penitent then truly received two sacraments, he would be in a better condition than if he had forgotten nothing and had declared all his sins integrally in the first accusation. This certainly seems unsuitable.

Nevertheless, in practice authors are accustomed to counsel that in this case the confessor invite the penitent to a new act of contrition, and that he also impose upon him a new satisfaction, or impose again the penance already imposed. The reason is that this practice is safer, indeed, according to a probable opinion of certain authors, necessary.¹⁴⁹ Certain authors, for example Noldin,¹⁵⁰ teach generally that one and the same act of sorrow suffices for several confessions; for example, if on the following day the penitent again submits to the keys sins already duly accused and remitted, the sorrow elicited yesterday suffices for absolution to be validly granted again, provided that yesterday's universal sorrow still virtually perseveres. But this opinion does not seem licit in practice if such an interval exists between the two sacramental judgments. For then there are certainly two sacraments, and therefore two acts of contrition are also required. Habitual contrition does not suffice for valid reception, but an act of contrition, at least virtually enduring, is required as the partial proximate matter.

¹⁴⁷ De poenit., diss. 4, a. 8.

¹⁴⁸ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 448.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. ibid.

¹⁵⁰ De sacr. n. 258.

353. Scholion. Can the sacrament of penance be valid but unformed? This question has no practical moment, because this case scarcely ever occurs. According to the opinion of those authors who think that the whole essence of the sacrament of penance consists in absolution, nothing prevents the sacrament of penance from being valid but unformed. But this opinion is scarcely probable. Supposing, however, that the three acts of the penitent are the proximate matter of the sacrament, if they are not truly present with all their essential qualities, even inculpably, the sacrament is null because of a defect of matter. Therefore the opinion denying that the sacrament of penance can be unformed seems better.¹⁵¹ Nor does the authority of St. Thomas,¹⁵² who admits an unformed confession, stand in the way; for the Angelic Doctor manifestly treats only of confession and not of the whole sacrament of penance, because it is certain that the sacrament of penance without contrition is not only unformed but also invalid.

Moreover, even those who admit an unformed sacrament of penance say that this cannot occur except in a twofold case, namely: 1. If someone guilty of two mortal sins, through invincible forgetfulness, sorrows only over one from a particular motive and confesses this alone. For then the other sin remains, which was neither accused nor affected by contrition, and therefore could not be remitted. But in this case the sacrament seems to be invalid, because the essential quality of universality is lacking in the contrition, and therefore the contrition is insufficient. 2. If someone through invincible ignorance believes that it is not a mortal sin to approach the sacrament without sorrow for all sins, provided that sorrow for some sin is present. This case is truly chimerical, and, if it occurred, the sacrament would be invalid, since invincible ignorance cannot render valid a sacrament which otherwise would be invalid. Thus also someone would contract marriage invalidly with a blood relative in the second degree, although through invincible ignorance he thought such a marriage valid and licit.

¹⁵¹ Cf. Billuart, loc. cit., diss. 7, a. 1, and, among modern writers, P. Galtier, De poenitentia, tractatus dogmatico-historicus (Paris 1923), n. 405 ff.

¹⁵² Suppl., q. 9, a. 1. Commentators agree very little in the explanation of this truly difficult text, which Capreolus, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, the Salamancans, and, among modern authors, Billot (De poenit., thesis 16, p. 162) subtly explain. Perhaps it is better and simpler to say with Dominic Soto (In IV Sent., dist. 18, q. 3, a. 3): "St. Thomas was speaking with the common populace, that is, as a commentator he handed down the opinion of Peter Lombard, which was then common in the schools." Cf. Jos. Göttler, Der hl. Thomas ... über die Wirkungen des Bußsakr. (1904), p. 23.

S. Th., Suppl., q. 2, a. 6; q. 3, a. 3 and 4.

481. Principle I. Contrition must be true and internal, i.e., truly conceived in heart and soul. - Thus by reason of essence: for it is sorrow of soul and detestation of sin, which indicate an act of the will (Joel II, 12-13; Ezek. XVIII, 31). And indeed contrition, as a reparation of sin, ought to proceed from that source from which sins proceed, i.e., from the heart or will (Mt. XV, 19); whence it is a retraction of the depraved will, by which the sinner sincerely says within himself: I would that I had not committed the sin, and I will that it be uprooted in its consequences, and, if I could act anew, I would that I had not sinned, and I am prepared to do so here and now.

Moreover, in the sacrament of Penance, in order that it may be part of the sacrament, sorrow must in some way be external and sensibly manifested; and what is required, not only of itself, but altogether and always, is formal and explicit, as is clear from the Council of Trent, which requires for the sacrament contrition itself or sorrow (sess. 14, c. 3 and 4), which alone is the act of penance: namely, it is a positive act by which the will truly and explicitly sorrows over and detests sin as it is an offense against God. Therefore such an act is a necessary condition in order that absolution be a judicial act and be valid.

Hence there does not suffice: 1) the mere external recitation or reading of a formula, without the internal affection of the will;

2. nor estimated contrition, by which someone in good faith thinks he is contrite, while in reality he is not: this can excuse the penitent from sacrilege, but cannot supply the defect of the necessary part; just as estimated water is not sufficient for Baptism;

3. nor, in order to the sacrament of Penance, is virtual and implicit sorrow in the act of another virtue sufficient, e.g., in an act of charity, although practically love of God above all things can scarcely be had without formal sorrow for sins in one who is thinking about them: namely, an act of charity, which is virtual penance, is sufficient for the remission of sin, but not for the value of the sacrament of Penance, because it was not instituted as the sacramental sign and integral part of the sacrament, just as in the Eucharist virtual bread or virtual wine is not sufficient;

4. nor does the purpose of not sinning for the future suffice: for this can stand with complacency in past sin; nor implicit sorrow in the purpose, because it is not formal;

5. nor does implicit sorrow in the desire of sorrowing suffice, e.g., if you choose to sorrow or sorrow that you do not sorrow, for the part of the sacrament is sorrow itself concerning sin, not the desire of sorrow, nor sorrow concerning the absence of sorrow;

6. nor even implicit sorrow in the desire of absolution, or in the will desiring to receive the fruits of the sacrament, even if there are only venial sins or mortal sins already remitted as matter of confession;

7. nor does sorrow concerning sin in the abstract suffice, but concerning sin as committed by the guilty one confessing.

482. Principle II. Contrition must be supernatural. - And indeed a) both subjectively, by reason of the principle, so that it is elicited from the supernatural help of God, or grace inspiring and assisting, as the Council of Trent defined, sess. 6, can. 3; whence the same Council also explicitly says that attrition is a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit moving (sess. 14, c. 4); b) and objectively, by reason of the object or motive, so that it is elicited on account of a supernatural motive, i.e., one supernaturally known through the light of faith and looking to salvation, such as God Himself under some aspect, or something regarding God, but in such a way that God is considered, not as a natural end, but as the supernatural end known by the light of faith. Whence natural sorrow on account of a merely natural motive without relation to God as supernatural end is not sufficient. Hence Innocent XI condemned prop. 57: It is probable that natural attrition, provided it is honorable, is sufficient.

It is proved: For a means must be proportioned to the end, and the disposition of the same order as the thing to which it disposes. But contrition is a means and disposition to grace altogether supernatural, namely on the part of the principle and of the object. Therefore the act of contrition must be supernatural in both ways, not only on the part of the principle and of grace, but also on the part of the object or motive. And indeed an act essentially, as a whole, depends upon the object, because it is nothing except a tendency to the object, just as motion is to the term; whence it is not an act supernatural in itself unless the object also is supernatural (I, n. 188).

Hence a) sorrow for sin that is only natural does not suffice, namely, on account of a merely natural motive, namely insofar as it is opposed to right reason; just as neither does sorrow on account of the philosophical baseness of sin, on account of its intrinsic unworthiness without relation to God, or on account of infamy or natural punishment without this relation, or on account of an effect of sin, e.g., illness, etc.

b) Nor does sorrow elicited merely on account of God the author of nature, known by the light of reason alone, suffice; but it must be referred to God as the supernatural end known by the light of faith. Concerning this there will not be difficulty in practice, because among the faithful it will of itself be done in this way.

483. Principle III. Contrition must be appretiatively supreme. - Thus by reason of proportion, so that it may be the greatest sorrow of all: according to appreciation, however, by which the penitent by his intellect esteems sin above all evils, and from this estimation detests it by the will more than every other evil; so much so that he is dispositively prepared to lose any good whatever or suffer any detriment rather than perpetrate sin, and for nothing would will to commit it; otherwise the will would not be turned away absolutely and for every case from sin.

It is proved: 1° For contrition must already involve the disposition by which (at least through the mediation of absolution) it becomes possible to please God. But if someone preferred some created good to God, he could not please God, according to that saying of Christ (Mt. X, 37): He who loves father or mother more than Me is not worthy of Me. Therefore contrition must involve the disposition by which someone would prefer to lose every created good rather than offend God.

2° The more something contrary is to please, the more something must be displeasing. But what is opposed to sin, namely the ultimate end, must appretiatively please more than every other good: for all things are to be sought on account of the ultimate end. Therefore contrition, which sorrows over the opposed sin, must be supreme sorrow, or sorrow above all evils (q. 3, a. 1).

This is confirmed: a) From Joel II, 12 and from the Council of Trent (sess. 14, c. 4), according to which contrition must exclude every affection toward sin and every will of sinning; and it cannot accomplish this unless it is appretiatively supreme: for unless someone esteems and detests sin as the greatest evil, at some time he will choose sin rather than an evil which is apprehended as greater.

b) Right reason demands that with appretiatively greatest hatred we pursue that which is truly the greatest evil; but sin, as an offense against God that is in a certain way infinite, and as depriving man of the greatest goods, is the greatest evil of all; therefore.

Nevertheless, there is not required:

1. That contrition be intensively supreme, so that in vehemence it surpasses all other sorrows and that one sorrow with the whole or greatest effort of the soul.¹

¹ Several have said that contrition is required to be not only appretiatively but also intensively supreme. This was explained by a threefold different opinion: 1) some required the supreme intensity absolutely possible, as Adrian VI, in IV, on Penance, q. 2; - 2) others, supreme relatively to other goods loved, as Peter de Soto, De Inst. Sacr., lect. 14-15; - 3) others finally the supreme intensity which God knows, namely relative to the powers of grace, as Lupus, Ledrou, Berti, Juenin, Morinus, Witasse, Gazzaniga.

a) For thus contrition would be most difficult and morally impossible for many, which would cast them into scruples, because penitents quite often cannot distinguish either intensity or the grade of intensity; whence also the practice of confessors is not accustomed to require such contrition from the faithful.

b) Intensity, vehemence, bitterness does not pertain to the essence of sorrow, nor does it vary the species: contrition even less intense is sorrow above all things, namely appretiatively. Any grade of charity, because it is total conversion to God, excludes sin; whence also any grade of contrition. Whence St. Thomas (q. 5, a. 3): "however small the sorrow may be, provided it suffices for the notion of contrition (i.e., it detests sin above all things), it blots out every guilt."

c) Indeed, intensively supreme sorrow does not seem possible; neither a) supreme simply and absolutely, since the grace of God can always be increased more and more; - nor b) supreme relatively to the evils of this life, for this is not always in our power, because in the present state we are moved more vehemently by sensible things and by objects nearer and proper to our faculties than by the goods of reason and spiritual goods, which are not our proper objects nor so near to us. And then too the absurdity would follow that, from two who sorrow with equal intensity, one would be justified and the other not; e.g., if one sorrows intensely for sin but more intensely for the death of his father, he would not be justified, while one who sorrowed more remissly over this would be justified; - nor c) supreme relatively to the powers of grace here and now granted by God, because no one can know how great that intensity is which is required, and because God would altogether arbitrarily demand greater contrition for a lesser sin.

2. A fortiori, sensible contrition is not required, or sorrow which overflows into the sensitive appetite and bursts forth into tender affections of heart, sighs, and tears; nor consequently a sorrow more sensible than that which we often feel on account of temporal losses or the death of relatives and friends.

For contrition does not reside in the sensibility, but in the will, as being rational sorrow; nor is sensible sorrow always in our power, since the sensitive appetite does not obey reason at a nod; finally, it can happen that someone, without sensible sorrow, sorrows more vehemently than another who is prone to emotions of this kind.

3. Nor is it required that an explicit comparison be instituted between sin and other evils (for a virtual and implicit comparison suffices), nor would it sometimes be useful, because not rarely it will be dangerous if it is proposed explicitly to the weaker.

"For it is manifest," says St. Thomas, Quodl. I, 9, "that just as delightful things move more when considered in particular than in common, so terrible things terrify more if they are considered in particular; and there are some who do not fall in a lesser temptation, who perhaps would fall in a greater one. Just as... someone would not refuse to suffer death with Christ; but if he descended to considering the individual punishments, he would be more drawn back. And therefore to descend in such matters to individual things is to lead a man into temptation and to provide an occasion of sinning" (cf. q. 3, a. 1, ad 4).

But it is enough if the will is prepared to bear all evils rather than commit sin; - nor will it be necessary that one weigh individual evils, but it suffices to trust that grace will be given to him for bearing even the extreme thing, if it were necessary, rather than offend God. Indeed, it will be enough if, on account of God, the sinner detests sin, sorrows over it, and consequently now does not will to sin.

Yet for the more perfect such comparisons can be useful, because in this way they expressly detest sins supremely, show affection toward God, and render the will more prepared for such cases, if they should occur.

4. Nor is equal sorrow required for all sins, although it is always above all other evils.

But it can be greater and lesser estimatively, indeed it ought to be, according to the gravity of the sin: for the greater the evil is, the greater the sorrow can be (a. 3).

484. Principle IV. Contrition must be universal. - Thus by reason of matter, with regard to mortal sins committed and not yet duly subjected to the keys, even unknown ones and those not occurring to the memory. For:

a) No mortal sin can be remitted without the sacrament of Penance, and a sin concerning which sorrow is not had is a sin not subjected to penance; therefore.

b) We must sorrow for sins insofar as they are an offense against God, turning away from God and depriving one of divine friendship; but this reason extends itself to each and all mortal sins; therefore we must sorrow for all and each: namely, each one requires contrition.1

c) Without contrition no sin is remitted; but one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another, because one cannot be a friend of God and an enemy, turned away from God and turned toward God; therefore no mortal sin is remitted without contrition for all.²

² Ibid.

d) Whence the Scriptures urge sinners to retract all sins, so that they may be able to obtain pardon (Ezek. XVIII, 30-31).

Hence 1) it is not sufficient that someone sorrow for many diverse sins from a motive which is special to some one of them, namely, on account of its own proper baseness; e.g., if someone hates theft on account of a special baseness, he does not thereby detest luxury.

2. Nevertheless it is not required that the penitent run through individual mortal sins and formally and distinctly sorrow over each; but it suffices that he virtually and implicitly detest them from a motive common to all. Namely, contrition can be explicitly universal, or explicitly extend itself to all mortal sins, in two ways: a) if the penitent, thinking of each, elicits so many distinct sorrows; b) if by one act of sorrow he repents for all which he distinctly has in memory. Likewise it can become implicitly universal also in two ways: a) formally implicitly, if the penitent in a confused way knows that he has committed several mortal sins and from a universal motive sorrows over all his sins; b) virtually, if the penitent thinks distinctly of one or another sin and sorrows only over that one, but from a motive common to all (in the same way as one who believes one article of faith on account of the authority of God revealing virtually and implicitly admits all revealed truths concerning which the formal motive has force). Thus, for example, if he sorrows because sin is opposed to infinite good, or because it deprives one of eternal beatitude, or because it merits the eternal punishment of Gehenna, or has a common baseness as being against God the supreme legislator or benefactor. This contrition suffices; nevertheless the penitent must know all sins distinctly, not for contrition, but that confession may be integral.

3. Nor is it required that at the same time he sorrow for all or some venial sins, which do not turn one away from the final end nor destroy divine friendship, because mortal sins can be remitted without venial sins, and one venial sin without another. Whence, just as we are not bound to confess them, and can confess one without another, so neither in the sacrament are we bound to sorrow for them, and we can sorrow for one without another. Nevertheless,

Question 6. Whether a new act of sorrow is required for receiving a new absolution when the penitent immediately after absolution confesses a mortal sin omitted from forgetfulness? Resp. The opinion which, according to St. Alphonsus, is more common, but according to very many grave theologians is common, undoubted, and morally certain, denies that this is required. For since the prior contrition has not been destroyed by the absolution received, it certainly perseveres; and because it was universal, it extended also to that sin omitted from forgetfulness and now is again manifested in the very act of the new accusation. But St. Alphonsus holds the affirmative opinion as more probable, because sorrow must be not only elicited, but also elicited in order to absolution. Therefore in practice before the fact, if someone does not hold the negative opinion as morally certain, it is necessary that he seek from the penitent a new act of contrition; and this indeed he will most easily accomplish while he raises his hand to impart the new absolution. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 448. - Baller. note (a) p. 320.

II. QUESTION II. Ought grief to precede confession, or is it enough that it be elicited after confession and before absolution? ANSWER. All affirm that grief ought to precede absolution, since it is its proximate matter. But theologians dispute the other part, namely whether it ought to precede the confession which is called sorrowful. Navarrus, Toletus, Vásquez, Hurtado, Diana, Bonacina, Suárez, de Lugo, Sporer, Gobat, Moya, Tamburini, and others defend that it is enough that it follow the confession and precede absolution. Others maintain the opposite. Sudden and unusual cases being excepted, speaking commonly, it is to me more probable that it ought to precede confession: both because in the sacraments we ought to follow the safer things when the matter is called into controversy; and because by that middle grief the penitent ought to pass from the state of mortal sin and diabolical servitude to the state of the sons of God. That passage, commonly speaking, is not made in an instant, or in a few moments. Account nevertheless is to be had of penitents. For when the just confess, they most easily grieve and are contrite, since they are habitually disposed. On the contrary sinners, laden with a grave bundle, more difficultly conceive this birth of grief. It is the part of confessors to instruct penitents that, before they approach the sacred tribunal, they spend some congruous time in conceiving this grief. Let them propose to them what points they ought to meditate, what considerations to form, that they may excite themselves to conceive this grief: let them be taught that there is need of prayers, by which they may implore help from God, whereby they may be able to be contrite as they ought.