§ I. On the Necessity of Contrition

442. Things to be established. I. Either perfect contrition with the desire of the Sacrament, or imperfect contrition with the Sacrament itself, is altogether necessary to the sinner by a necessity of means for obtaining justification and salvation.

1. It is established from Sacred Scripture, Matt. 3:2: Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven has drawn near. - Luke 13:3: Unless you shall have penance, you shall all likewise perish. - And ibid. 5: Unless you shall do penance, you shall all likewise perish. - Ecclus. 2:22: If we shall not do penance, we shall fall into the hands of the Lord and not into the hands of men. - Apoc. 2:5: Do penance and perform your first works; otherwise I come to you and will move your candlestick out of its place, unless you shall do penance. - Acts 3:19: Do penance, therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out.

2. It is established from the Councils, especially from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, ch. 4: At every time this movement of contrition has been necessary for obtaining pardon of sins. And sess. 6, ch. 6, where hatred and detestation for sin are numbered among the chief dispositions for justification.

443. II. Mortal sin being supposed, contrition is necessary by a necessity of precept, at least at some time in life. For this precept is gathered from the words of Sacred Scripture related above, from the words of St. John the Baptist at the beginning of his preaching, and especially from the words of Christ Himself in the Gospel. That contrition which is required for justification is understood to fall under the precept, namely, perfect contrition outside the Sacrament, or attrition with the Sacrament. - St. Lig., no. 337. - Billuart, diss. 4, art. 3, and all others.

III. The precept of contrition obliges sometimes per se, sometimes per accidens.

1. It obliges per se when a grave necessity of reconciling oneself with God presses, namely, in even probable danger of death, and this on account of the precept of attaining the ultimate end; likewise, when someone is in the state of sin, because of the proximate danger of dying in this wretched state ¹, or of falling into graver sins ².

¹ These things are not to be understood so generally as though a man were obliged to this immediately after sin; for that, as the Author himself teaches a little below, is contrary to the common opinion of Theologians after St. Thomas, and is excluded by the same reasons by which St. Thomas (In IV Sent., dist. 17, q. 3, art. 1, q. 4) rejects the necessity of confessing immediately after sin. Apart from the point of death, however, the more common opinion, as Palaus says (De Poenitentia, disp. un., punct. 3, no. 9), admits at least that delay which the precept of the Church concerning annual confession also admits (see Laymann, De Poenitentia, ch. 2, no. 6); and St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 473) attributes this doctrine even to St. Thomas.

² This obligation also of eliciting an act of contrition for warding off other sins is a mere opinion of certain authors. Therefore, the statement of Cardinal de Lugo (De Poenitentia, disp. 15, nos. 55-56) is to be observed: Because of the variety of opinions, we cannot impose upon him (namely, the penitent) a certain obligation.

On this argument, the things which Suarez has (De Poenitentia, disp. 15, sect. 6, nos. 7-8) and Cardinal de Lugo (loc. cit. and disp. 7, nos. 240, 242) are to be seen; from these it may be concluded either that no necessity of eliciting contrition for this reason is proved, or that its omission is not a sin distinct from that into which one falls because that means was omitted.

2. It obliges per accidens when another precept presses which cannot be fulfilled without contrition, especially in the following cases: namely, when the precept of annual confession presses; when the precept of an act of charity presses; when one guilty of grave sin is about to receive or administer a Sacrament; whenever the Sacrament of Penance is received, even for the sake of devotion. - St. Lig., ibid.

444. Questions. QUESTION 1. Does the precept of contrition oblige immediately after a mortal sin has been committed?

Reply. Negative, against a few of the ancients ³, because the precept of contrition is affirmative, namely, Do penance; but an affirmative precept does not oblige at every moment; therefore, the precept of contrition does not press immediately after a sin has been committed. Moreover, sins would thus be multiplied according to the number of instants of delay, which is contrary to the common sense of the faithful ⁴. - St. Lig., no. 437. - Elbel, no. 54. - Billuart, etc.

³ Nevertheless, this opinion is undeservedly attributed to most of them; for example, Alexander of Hales, Paludanus, and Thomas of Strasbourg indeed affirm that the penitent is bound to be contrite for committed sins always throughout his whole life, but they explain this so that he is bound to it negatively, that is, not again to take complacency in the sin when it occurs to his memory. Cajetan (Summa, s.v. Contritio) explains this opinion thus: From the fact that sins occur to the memory, just as one is not bound to confess, so neither is he bound to be contrite. For each is an affirmative precept, obliging at a time of necessity, which memory does not constitute; but he is bound always not to approve, not to take complacency, because these are negative precepts, which oblige always and at every time.

** It was indeed a remarkable achievement of Cardena that, against the common opinion, he gathered together (pt. 4, diss. 6, no. 47) both the authors just mentioned and several others, among whom scarcely, if at all, one is to be found who really pertains to the matter. He contends that this obligation of applying the means of justification immediately after sin arises from this (which no one either before or after him ever dreamed), because, as he says (no. 53), Christ commanded all men in the Gospel that they always watch and be ready for the hour of death to be expected, because they know neither the day nor the hour.

⁴ This reason is to be understood with discretion. For the Doctors are not accustomed to say that one who, for example, culpably delays restitution or annual confession sins anew at every instant, but rather whenever, advertent to the obligation and able to fulfill it, he neglects it. Indeed, even this occurs only when the subsequent acts do not follow by virtue or efficacy of the preceding purpose. See On Sins, vol. 1, no. 166.

QUESTION 2. What delay of contrition induces a grave sin?

Reply. The Theologians do not agree. It is indeed commonly admitted that there is a grave delay of contrition independently of the precept of annual confession; but how great this delay must be in order to be judged grave cannot be determined with certainty. Some extend it to a year; others to six months; others, with St. Alphonsus, to a month. Yet no reason or authority favors this last opinion ⁵. Indeed, St. Alphonsus himself adds, no. 437, that sinners, especially the uneducated, can for the most part, indeed almost always, be excused from this sin of delayed penance because of inadvertence ⁶.

⁵ ** For this monthly obligation of contrition the VV. produce a threefold argument from St. Alphonsus (p. 394, no. 106). 1. Because we are bound each month to elicit an act of charity, as the holy Doctor has it (bk. 2, no. 8, and Homo apostolicus, tr. 16, no. 10). 2. Because otherwise a man could with difficulty observe the divine commandments for a long time (bk. 2, no. 8). 3. To this is added the authority of St. Thomas, who cites St. Gregory the Great and says: Without justifying grace it is not possible for one to remain long without mortal sin.

Reply to 1. Elsewhere (vol. 1, no. 218, q. 2, in the Note) it was shown that an obligation of this kind is urged without foundation either of reason or authority, and indeed contrary to principles received by all.

To 2. Reply: If contrition were the only means of avoiding sins, let it pass; otherwise, I deny it. See Suarez, De Poenitentia, disp. 15, sect. 6, no. 7, and Lugo, De Poenitentia, disp. 15, nos. 51-52.

To 3. I reply by using the words of St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 437), who, after saying that he thinks one who, existing in mortal sin, delays penance for a notable time is in no way excused from mortal sin, then adds: But what this notable time is, the Doctors disagree greatly.... The Salmanticenses, Palaus with Laymann and Elbel, Lugo, Henno, etc., think that one who satisfies the annual confession is excused; and St. Thomas, in IV Sent., dist. 17, q. 3, art. 1, q. 4, appears to adhere to this opinion. Therefore, according to St. Alphonsus himself, the cited words of St. Thomas, with St. Thomas himself interpreting both himself and St. Gregory the Great, are to be understood of those who do not satisfy the obligation of annual confession.

Moreover, the things noted in vol. 1, loc. cit., must be recalled here also, namely, that a conscience of a grave obligation or grave guilt must not be introduced where this is not established by a certain reason; for this also is a most firm principle of St. Alphonsus himself.

⁶ Cardinal de Lugo (De Poenitentia, disp. 15, no. 55) speaks thus on this matter: It is not necessary to question the penitent concerning this sin of omitting due penance throughout the whole year, whether per se from the precept of the virtue of penance, ... or per accidens for avoiding the danger of a new sin, nor even to admonish him in particular.... And this can be proved by the example of the precept of loving God, concerning which penitents are not questioned in particular whether they have loved God above all things, nor are they admonished concerning that obligation of fulfilling this precept at some time; both because from the very course of the confession it sufficiently appears how the penitent is disposed toward God, and because, on account of the variety of opinions, we cannot impose upon him a certain obligation. Indeed, he continues thus concerning the omission of the questioning and admonition: Such questioning or admonition appears useless, indeed harmful. For either the penitent is invincibly ignorant of that obligation; and then it is better to leave him in good faith than to bring him into bad faith, from which his scandal can prudently be feared. For very few among sinners of this kind will afterward, because of that knowledge, be moved to grieve over their sins before the end of the year; rather, they will add this also to their other sins by omitting the penance which they ought to have. But if the penitent knew such an obligation, he will be admonished about it in vain. Finally, he proposes an objection, in solving which he also touches upon the uncertainty of the obligation. You will say: nevertheless, it will be necessary to inquire concerning the omission ...; because if he knew the obligation, or was culpably ignorant of it, the omission was a sin, and consequently must be explained in confession. But to the contrary: neither under this heading is it necessary to inquire distinctly; for EVEN IF IT WERE CONCEDED THAT SUCH AN OBLIGATION EXISTS, nevertheless, the Confessor, having heard the confession of the penitent, from the sins which he committed throughout the whole year sufficiently understands that he did not satisfy the obligation, IF THERE WAS ANY, of grieving frequently over his sins.... Therefore, he would be questioned or admonished more distinctly in vain, especially in such matter CONCERNING WHICH THE CONFESSOR HIMSELF COULD NOT ESTABLISH ANYTHING CERTAIN FOR DETERMINING THE OBLIGATION for the following time (ibid., no. 56).

445. QUESTION 3. Is one who at the point of death receives the Sacrament of Penance with attrition bound, in addition, to elicit an act of perfect contrition?

Reply 1. He does not appear to be bound to an explicit act of contrition, since he is morally certain that he has been justified by attrition alone with the Sacrament. - Thus Lugo and others commonly, against some.

Reply 2. According to some, however, he is bound, for they say that the precept of perfect charity presses especially at the point of death. Whatever may be the case, it is expedient that the dying be excited, as far as can be done, both to an act of charity and to an act of perfect contrition. - St. Lig., no. 437 ⁷.

⁷ ** The VV. here produce (p. 935, no. 107) the things which St. Alphonsus has (bk. 6, no. 437): Each opinion, says the holy Doctor, is probable; but the first (the second here in Gury) is altogether to be counseled.... Indeed, I say that it is altogether to be followed by one who is at the actual point of death. For then everyone is bound to elicit an act of charity ..., which no one can satisfy if, when the memory of sin occurs, he does not detest the sin from the same motive of charity.

Reply. If each opinion, as the holy Doctor testifies, is probable, therefore the obligation of either one can by no means be imposed. For obligation is so called from binding. But a doubtful law does not bind, as the holy Doctor repeats a hundred times. Therefore, a merely probable law does not bind.

But what is added concerning the obligation of an act of charity at the point of death requires a distinction. For if the discussion concerns a man in the state of sin who has no other means of justification, it is conceded that there is an obligation of obtaining justification through contrition perfected by charity; otherwise, it is denied. See what is said concerning this argument in vol. 1, no. 219, resolution 2, in the Note.

QUESTION 4. For obtaining grace in the Sacrament, are explicit acts of Faith and Hope required in addition to sorrow?

Reply. Negative. The reason is that it cannot be proved by any probable argument that these acts are explicitly required ⁸. Moreover, a penitent eliciting an act of sorrow also in some way explicitly and exercitively elicits these acts, although not reflexively; because he then without doubt exercitively believes and hopes that his sins are to be remitted through the Sacrament of Penance by virtue of the merits of Christ. - St. Lig., no. 439, and others commonly, against some.

⁸ Some required these acts because they are expressly mentioned by the Council of Trent where the process of justification is described (sess. 6, ch. 6). This reason would also prove the necessity of hearing a preacher of the faith, since it is said there: conceiving faith from hearing; and, moreover, the insufficiency of sorrow perfected by charity without imperfect sorrow, because it is added there: they are struck by fear of divine justice!

Suarez speaks to the matter (De Poenitentia, disp. 4, sect. 2, no. 7): Finally, in sess. 6, ch. 6, the Council numbers several acts in the disposition of the sinner, all of which need not always concur formally, but it suffices that they concur virtually or implicitly, as an act of hope.

And yet there are confessors who, led by that prejudice, require penitents before the confession of sins to recite the customary formulas of the acts of the theological virtues, unless perhaps they even dismiss them so that they may first satisfy this supposed necessity. This is all the more remarkable because in the customary formula of the act of faith you will not find the things which the Council said must be believed, namely, that God through Christ will be propitious to him, etc.

446. QUESTION 5. Does one sin who confesses some venial sin without sorrow?

Reply. Negative, more probably, provided that sorrow concerning other sins, or at least one, is not lacking, and that the penitent does not knowingly submit the other sins as matter of absolution ⁹. The reason is:

⁹ Distinguish with Suarez (De Poenitentia, disp. 20, sect. 6, no. 7) a twofold manner in which someone can confess a venial sin without true attrition or a purpose of amendment. 1. If he discloses to the confessor this very defect of sorrow and purpose; then neither ought the priest to absolve from such a sin, nor, if the penitent is prudent, ought he to tell it for this end, namely, as matter of the Sacrament, since it cannot truly be such. Nevertheless, it can licitly be told either for the sake of humility, counsel, or incitement to true penance; but this manner has nothing to do with the present matter. 2. If he discloses the venial sin over which he does not grieve, like the others, as matter of absolution. Then, says Suarez, many think it a mortal sin.... But although it cannot be denied that it is some fault, nevertheless I do not judge it mortal, because the matter of such a fault is light; because the defect of that sorrow or purpose, of itself and by its nature, is not contrary to grace and justification, which is the primary effect of this Sacrament signified by the form ...; nor does it impede the remission of the other venial sins concerning which a true accusation capable of true absolution is made, notwithstanding the obstacle of some venial sin. See also Lugo, De Poenitentia, disp. 14, no. 48.

Moreover, even that light fault of which Suarez speaks will more often be absent, either because the penitent does not advert to this defect of sorrow or to the disorder of that defect, or because all displeasure is rarely absent, although it may not be sufficiently efficacious; in this matter it is often difficult to avoid deception.

1. for the validity of the Sacrament, it suffices that some certain matter be furnished, namely, that there be sorrow for some venial sin; for venial sins are not necessary matter of the Sacrament of Penance, and, moreover, since they do not deprive one of the grace and friendship of God, some can be remitted without the others; 2. because no injury is thereby inflicted upon the Sacrament if they are declared for a good end, all levity being excluded. Indeed, those venial sins for which one does not have at least certain sorrow are also very often usefully disclosed, namely, for a fuller manifestation and direction of conscience, for conceiving some confusion, etc. - See St. Lig., no. 449.

447. QUESTION 6. Must contrition precede confession?

Reply 1. It must certainly precede absolution, or at least coexist with it, as is plain. But speaking practically, it is required that sorrow at least precede absolution, because no penitent who feels himself indisposed can ask for or receive absolution.

Reply 2. For the validity of the Sacrament, sorrow need not necessarily precede the accusation. The reason is that all things required for the Sacrament are present, provided that sorrow precedes absolution; nor can a precept of placing sorrow before the confession of sins be proved. - Lugo, Suarez, and others most commonly. Moreover, when Theologians require a sorrowful confession, they appear to require nothing other than that the confession not be a mere narration of sins, but that it be a self-accusation ordered to obtaining absolution. - St. Lig., no. 445 ¹⁰.

¹⁰ Thus St. Alphonsus: Laymann with others (namely, Coninck and Palaus) require the confession to be sorrowful, or sorrow to precede confession, only insofar as they demand that the confession not be a mere narration of sins but have the nature of sacramental confession; and for this it suffices that the confession be made with the intention of obtaining absolution, and that sorrow then be manifested at least by the petition or expectation of absolution. These last words meet Coninck's objection that sorrow must be sensible. Since various authors reply to this difficulty in various ways (see Lugo, disp. 14, nos. 14-18), as the words of St. Alphonsus indicate, perhaps another could also answer that there is no need at present for those subtleties if, according to what was said elsewhere (above, in the Note to no. 414), one prefers the opinion which holds the acts of the penitent merely as the matter circa quam, and therefore attributes to absolution alone that it is the efficacious sign of grace.

Moreover, Lugo writes thus concerning Coninck's opinion (De Poenitentia, loc. cit., no. 13): This opinion is singular and has all the other theologians against it.... It also has against it the practice of the faithful; for if they have perhaps confessed their sins without sorrow and afterward, moved by the exhortation of the confessor, are excited to have sorrow for their sins, they think they satisfy sufficiently if they then grieve before absolution. Indeed, confessors are accustomed especially then to move penitents to sorrow for this end (which is also the practice prescribed in the Roman Ritual), that they may dispose themselves to receive valid absolution; nor do they oblige them, after sorrow has then been conceived, to repeat the confession which was made without preceding sorrow. These things plainly show that the solicitude of certain confessors is to be banished to empty scruples: after they have excited the penitent to sorrow, they wish altogether to extort from him again some confession, at least in a few words, for example: I accuse myself of the sins narrated.

** And St. Alphonsus in fact has it thus (bk. 6, no. 445, at the end): But the Salmanticenses add that, merely for quieting scruples, Confessors are accustomed, if they doubt the internal indisposition of the penitent, to excite him to grieve over the sins explained a little before, which is done if it is said: I grieve over the sins narrated, and I accuse myself. The holy Doctor placed these words immediately after those read above in this Note, which the holy Doctor had said to show that in this question no discord exists among the Doctors except in words: Therefore, he says, these are not two opinions, but one.

Nevertheless, behold, the VV. (p. 935, no. 108) oppose the things which St. Alphonsus elsewhere has thus (Homo apostolicus, tr. 16, no. 20): Must sorrow precede confession? Laymann ... affirms it, both because sorrow must be sensible and cannot become such except by confession, and because confession ... must be sorrowful; otherwise it would be a simple narration of sins. But others more commonly deny it ..., and the Ritual favors them.... And they rightly reply to the first reason by saying that sorrow becomes sensible not only through confession, but also by other signs and words. But to the second reason they bring no convincing reply; hence, on account of it, I say that the first opinion is probable and therefore is to be followed in practice. They commonly agree ..., however, that it suffices if the penitent, after the act of sorrow, says: Again I accuse myself of all the sins confessed.

Reply. It does not sufficiently appear to what end the VV. produce these things. For in order that anyone may at times use the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, will it also be necessary that he undertake the burden of examining every little work of the holy Doctor? But where the opinions of the different Works of the holy Doctor do not appear to agree very well with one another, as in the present matter, by what means indeed will you avoid the complaints of the VV., who, whichever opinion of the holy Doctor you finally choose, do not hesitate to oppose to you the other, contrary one? And indeed, to the things which the VV. object from the Homo apostolicus, someone could reply according to the things which are taken from the Moral Work (bk. 6, no. 445), and therefore with St. Alphonsus as guide: I deny the antecedent, namely, that in either opinion confession cannot be called sorrowful; and consequently I deny the antecedent, namely, that the contrary opinion is probable; and therefore I deny the consequence, namely, that this opinion is to be followed and therefore, except perhaps for quieting an empty scruple, it is necessary to add: Again I accuse myself, etc. Why would this man be liable to the censure of the VV.? For even if he had chosen the opinion which is handed down in the Homo apostolicus, would it not have been ready at hand for the VV. to object the things read in the Moral Work?

But something more serious to be noticed in the present matter occurs. The opinions of St. Alphonsus which the VV. here object from the Homo apostolicus are also found in the Moral Work of the same holy Doctor published in earlier years, namely, both in the edition of the year 1748 (bk. 6, tr. 4, ch. 1, dub. 2, note A, q. III) and in the other of the year 1757 (bk. 6, no. 445); in that same year he published the work written in Italian under the title Istruzione e pratica per un Confessore, which work he then published in Latin in the year 1759 under the title Homo Apostolicus instructus, etc. But since these same opinions are not found in the later editions of the Moral Work, as is plain from the texts cited above from bk. 6, no. 445, it is manifest that the holy Doctor himself, his opinion having been changed, corrected that place. But if the matter is thus, by what right of equity, by what zeal for truth, or by what zeal for sound doctrine do the VV. now draw forth and oppose against one who proposes the doctrine refined and reformed by the holy Doctor himself those things which the same holy Doctor had rejected?

QUESTION 7. For what space of time does an act of sorrow morally endure for validly receiving the Sacrament?

Reply. This cannot be determined. According to the common opinion, it can endure for one or even several days, provided that it was elicited with the intention of making confession ¹¹, and was not retracted by another sin. Moreover, penitents should be counseled to renew, immediately before confession, the act of contrition previously elicited, especially if afterward they turned their mind to other things for a notable delay. - St. Lig., no. 446 ¹².

¹¹ What the Author indicates, that sorrow must be elicited with the intention of confession, has at most some probability. Indeed, even St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 447) could not deny that the opinion is more probable which teaches that sorrow is valid even if someone elicits it while then thinking nothing of the Sacrament, which he afterwards receives when the occasion is offered.

On this argument, compare Cardinal de Lugo (De Poenitentia, disp. 14, nos. 37-40), who not only excludes by most weighty reasons the necessity of that intention, but moreover notes that, according to Suarez and Reginald, who support the contrary opinion, it suffices that the preceding sorrow, even though elicited without an intention of confession, afterward moves one to confession or is in some way expressed in confession; these things, as is plain, fall entirely into the common opinion of Cardinal de Lugo.

But the little reason adduced to the contrary (in St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.), that through intention the matter must be ordered to the Sacrament, as ablution to Baptism and the touching of the instruments to Holy Orders, first supposes that sorrow is the matter of the Sacrament in the same sense as ablution in Baptism, namely, matter ex qua, which pertains to a mere opinion (see above, Note to no. 414); and then it is refuted by the very example of Holy Orders, for the Ordination of an infant is held valid, although he certainly cannot, through an intention of which he is incapable, order the touching of the instruments to the Sacrament.

Nor does the reason taken from Proposition I proscribed by Innocent XI press any more, both because of what was just said concerning the nature of the matter in this Sacrament, and because of the things which the Author noted above, no. 437, concerning this proposition.

** The VV. contend against this Note in fourteen columns (pp. 411-418). Let us touch briefly upon all these things, as the matter permits.

1. The VV. gather together several Writers (pp. 416-418) who either hold absolutely, or teach as more probable, that sorrow must be elicited with the intention of confession.

Reply. Against these, St. Alphonsus judged the opposite opinion more probable, as was noted. Therefore, let the VV. show the holy Doctor this honor: on account of him and with him, let them hold the reasons of those Authors as less solid.

2. The VV. complain (pp. 414-416) that the argument of St. Alphonsus was called a little reason, namely, that just as the minister, so the recipient must order the matter to the Sacrament. They then say that the contrary example of an infant, who is validly ordained without this intention, is sufficiently refuted by the common doctrine that no intention is required in infants for validly receiving the Sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation, or even Orders, since the intention of Christ or of the Church supplies in them, as St. Alphonsus says (bk. 6, no. 80).

Reply. This refutation falls of itself because there is no parity at all. For the will to receive a Sacrament is one thing, and the will ordering sorrow to the Sacrament is another. The latter, as they themselves contend, belongs to constituting an essential element of the Sacrament; the former, however, is altogether extrinsic to the essential elements of the Sacrament, and sometimes a merely habitual or even merely interpretative intention suffices. But the Church certainly cannot supply that which pertains to the intrinsic essence of the Sacrament. Therefore, if the Ordination of an infant is valid, as it certainly is, although the infant is incapable of ordering the contact with the instruments to the Sacrament, it is manifestly plain that this ordering intention is not necessary. To this might also be referred what is commonly said concerning the fulfillment of sacramental satisfaction. For if all the parts must be ordered to the Sacrament through intention, this will therefore hold also with regard to satisfaction. But where is that coordinating intention present when even St. Alphonsus (bk. 1, no. 165) admits that sacramental penance is truly fulfilled even if someone, forgetful of the precept and therefore having no intention of fulfilling it, nevertheless performs the prescribed work?

3. The VV. insist (pp. 412-416) that in the case the condemnation of the Proposition concerning the use of probable matter when the safer has been abandoned presses, both because the opinion concerning sorrow to be elicited with the intention of confession is probable, and because the matter here concerns matter ex qua; and that the interpretation of the condemned Proposition brought forward by Gury must be rejected.

Reply. As regards the first: let them first bring forward other reasons by which some solid probability of the opinion concerning the necessity of that intention may be proved. For if the argument adduced by St. Alphonsus, which must be considered the strongest of all, does not have that force, as we saw, then certainly, until some other reason appears, it is lawful to hold that these reasons are lacking. And since it is very well known that extrinsic probability has force insofar as it is presumed to rest upon intrinsic probability, where intrinsic arguments are lacking, it profits little to multiply citations. Therefore, thus far that condemnation is urged in vain.

As regards the second, first the VV. (p. 415), after asserting that the doctrine which holds the acts of the penitent to be matter ex qua is most probable, infer from this that the opinion which establishes that sorrow must necessarily be ordered to confession is sufficiently probable; but there will certainly be one who adds to these words: I deny the consequence, as is plain from what has been said. But, this omitted, the VV. would certainly have acted more usefully if, instead of copying the text of Suarez and citing others who followed Suarez, they had devoted some labor to the things touched upon above (Note to no. 414) concerning this argument. It was indeed said there that it cannot be the purpose of our work to undertake the solution of this question in a brief Compendium. Nevertheless, we indicated certain difficulties which neither Suarez nor anyone else has yet satisfied, just as a suitable reply to the arguments produced by Maldonatus, cited there, is still desired. But what those two lights of Theology, Suarez and Lugo, appear not to have attained, it is very uncertain whether it is to be hoped from others. Moreover, since for the probability of any opinion it is required not only that it be supported by solid reasons, but also that it solidly satisfy the contrary reasons, shall we rightly be angry with those who perhaps still hold that opinion not only not most probable, but not even solidly probable?

As regards the third, finally, it is easily plain that the interpretation of the condemned Proposition which Gury has at no. 437 was mentioned only because it explains what these words of the condemned Proposition mean: In conferring the Sacraments. And since St. Alphonsus (bk. 1, no. 51), as the VV. themselves note, sufficiently shows that for this reason it is disputed among the Doctors whether the condemnation affects others besides the minister of the Sacrament, another reason now arises from this by which it is abundantly established that the condemnation of that proposition is objected with less efficacy, even if other reasons for this were not brought forward.

¹² ** In this place also the VV. (p. 935, no. 109) oppose to the Author, who says that sorrow can endure for one or even several days, St. Alphonsus, who (Homo apostolicus, tr. 16, no. 20) affirms that whenever confession derives from sorrow for sins, sorrow always virtually endures for one or two days.

But St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 446) admits and approves the opinion of Roncaglia, who (De Poenitentia, ch. 3, q. 2, reply 2) teaches that sorrow suffices even if it preceded by several days.

448. QUESTION 8. Is a new act of sorrow required for receiving a new absolution when the penitent, immediately after absolution, confesses a mortal sin omitted through forgetfulness?

Reply. It is controverted. The FIRST OPINION, common and much more probable, denies it; because the prior contrition certainly endures, and, being universal, extended to all sins, even those omitted through forgetfulness; nor, moreover, is it required that contrition be explicitly ordered to the Sacrament. Furthermore, explicit sorrow appears to be sufficiently present in the very act of accusing that same sin. - Lugo. - Roncaglia. - Reuter, etc., with St. Lig., no. 448.

The SECOND OPINION affirms it; because the judgment was completed through absolution; therefore, if a new absolution is to be imparted, new proximate matter is required; and although sorrow endures in itself, nevertheless it does not endure in relation to the second absolution. - Bonacina, etc. Yet this opinion appears to rest upon a slight foundation ¹³.

¹³ Cardinal de Lugo in fact denies (De Poenitentia, disp. 14, nos. 28-30) that some partial proximate matter cannot serve the same for two forms. But it was already said above that the ordering of sorrow to confession is not necessary. Moreover, it must be denied that such ordering is lacking here; for one who grieves over sins with the intention of confessing sufficiently orders the sorrow for each to the confession and absolution of the same. Add further that Vasquez, Bonacina, and Filliucci are wrongly cited for this second opinion (in St. Alphonsus, bk. 6, no. 448, from Croix, bk. 6, pt. 2, no. 711). For when these say that sorrow must be repeated, they do not dispute concerning sins omitted through forgetfulness, but concerning a repeated confession of the same sins. Therefore, neither authority nor any solid reason supports this opinion. But, on the contrary, the common practice stands for the first opinion, as Lugo says (loc. cit., no. 27); St. Alphonsus (loc. cit.) calls this opinion common, and testifies that it is called morally certain by Roncaglia, most probable by Sporer with Elbel and many others, and finally indubitable among all by others. For although perhaps one or another confessor admonishes the penitent in the aforesaid case to renew sorrow, nevertheless all the others commonly do not do so. Dicastillo also testifies to this common practice of confessors (De Sacramentis, tr. 8, disp. 6, dub. 22, no. 160).

Two things must not be omitted here. The first is that, according to the common opinion, the foregoing doctrine holds not only in the case which is ordinarily more frequent, of some sin which one forgets in confession and then confesses immediately after absolution or a little afterward, but also in two other cases: both when a dying person, because of the danger of imminent death, must be absolved after one or another sin has been heard and the confession of the rest must then be continued; and when someone, his confession being divided (which case, however, will occur very rarely, as will be said in its place), is absolved by a Superior only from reserved sins and is then absolved by another from the nonreserved sins.

The second is that, according to several, not even the aforesaid opinion of Vasquez, Bonacina, and Filliucci concerning the necessity of repeating sorrow in a repeated confession of the same sins must necessarily be admitted. Cardinal de Lugo certainly thinks the complete contrary.

First, he indicates that this opinion of his agrees with the Doctors thus (loc. cit., no. 34): Although the Authors do not treat expressly of this sin, nevertheless, from the manner in which they speak, they appear to indicate this.... Indeed, Father John Salas, in his manuscript On Penance, q. 84, art. 10, after relating the opinion of certain recent authors who said that new sorrow, just as a new confession, is required for the validity of the second Sacrament, himself says that the contrary is truer, and that it suffices that the sensible parts, namely, the confession and in the confession itself the expression of sorrow, be new, etc. But he had disclosed his own mind thus (ibid., no. 31): If the things which we have adduced in confirmation of the first part are true, it does not appear why sometimes a confession and new absolution concerning even the same sins cannot be repeated by virtue of the preceding sorrow which still endures morally and virtually (namely, has not been retracted). And he concludes (next no. 32): The reason appears the same for either case.

But both John de la Cruz and Peter de Ledesma (in Diana, vol. 1, tr. 3, res. 88, no. 1) had preceded him; Diana moreover testifies that this doctrine is common. Dicastillo also joined these (in Diana, loc. cit.), whose thesis is this: It must be asserted that, not only when someone confesses a new sin which he had not told through forgetfulness, but when altogether the same sins are submitted to a new confession, old sorrow which still endures either physically or morally suffices. Indeed, it is due to the reasons adduced by Dicastillo that Diana, who had previously hesitated to adhere to this doctrine (see loc. cit., res. 89, no. 3), afterward embraced it absolutely. For after copying Dicastillo's arguments (loc. cit., res. 88, no. 4), he concludes: Thus far Dicastillo, to whom I now adhere absolutely. Then he adds that not only did another Salamancan doctor think the same (see ibid., res. 90, no. 2), but that, with Diana himself as author, Leander also passed to the same opinion; concerning him Diana writes (ibid., res. 95, no. 4): The same Leander (De Sacramentis, vol. 1, tr. 5, disp. 7, q. 4) teaches, citing even me and Cardinal Lugo, that when someone confesses the same sins from which he had already been directly absolved, he is not bound to have new sorrow for the same sins; because when the vocal confession is repeated, at least the sorrow of the preceding confession, which still endures morally and virtually, is virtually repeated. Finally, add to these Thomas Tamburini (Methodus Confessionis, bk. 1, ch. 2, sec. 5, no. 7), who praises Joseph de Ianuario for the same doctrine: Read, he says, Ianuarius (pt. 1, res. 30), who teaches that one who confesses sins otherwise duly confessed and absolved is not bound again to elicit an act of sorrow if the prior one endures habitually (that is, has not been retracted) or virtually.

Moreover, a doctrine of this kind neither ought nor can serve practice insofar as either confessors or penitents ought to be less solicitous about exciting sorrow even in the confession of sins which have already been duly expiated by the Sacrament. Far be this. Nevertheless, it can sometimes be useful, insofar as by its aid, as Diana says (loc. cit., res. 89, no. 2), confessors will quiet many scruples, especially those of persons who confess ordinary venial sins and with them some mortal sin otherwise confessed and absolved. For although it is not greatly to be feared that sorrow for past grave sins is lacking in one who otherwise brings only venial sins, and therefore manifests a soul averse from grave fault by constantly overcoming temptations, nevertheless scruples concerning a defect of sorrow not rarely hold certain persons anxious, especially if they happen to hear some preacher who, perhaps with less discreet zeal, declaims vehemently against repeated confessions of old faults without sorrow. The confessor will fittingly be able to restrain these anxieties both with other aids and also with the support of the present opinion.

Fifteen columns which the VV. oppose to this Note (pp. 418-426) must be answered here. First, they do not hesitate to deny that Vasquez, Filliucci, and Bonacina were cited wrongly by St. Alphonsus. For, they say (p. 420), Filliucci (tr. 6, no. 76) speaks in express words of forgotten sins, not of sins previously confessed.

Reply 1. They therefore concede that Vasquez, and likewise Bonacina, were cited wrongly by St. Alphonsus. 2. St. Alphonsus with Croix does not cite no. 76 from Filliucci, but no. 77, where the discussion is not of forgotten sins, but of sins previously confessed, and this most deliberately. For in no. 77, where the discussion concerns sins previously confessed, Filliucci says that new sorrow must be elicited; but not in no. 76, where forgotten sins are treated. Therefore, if they had cited no. 76, the citation would have been not only futile but also false. Hence an argument against the VV.: if Filliucci had thought that new sorrow had to be elicited even where forgotten sins were treated, he would not have been silent about it, just as he was not silent where sins previously confessed were treated. But he was silent. Therefore.

2. The VV. insist, saying that according to Filliucci (no. 76), in the confession of a forgotten sin a new Sacrament is effected. Therefore, Filliucci is not cited wrongly. Reply. The question now is not whether in the case a new Sacrament is effected, but whether, when a new Sacrament is effected, it is necessary to elicit another act of sorrow, or whether the preceding act suffices. Filliucci expressly says the former thing; concerning the latter, Filliucci has not even a word; indeed, as we have said, by his silence he denies it. Therefore, Filliucci also is cited wrongly.

3. Nevertheless, in order to show that the opinion which St. Alphonsus, as the VV. say (p. 419), rightly calls more probable is supported by grave authority, they produce eight authors, namely, Concina, Lacroix, Holzmann, Reiffenstuel, Billuart, Antoine, Reuter, and Voit. Reply. Six among these, indeed, call the contrary opinion, namely, that a renewal of sorrow is not necessary, more probable or certain. Is it thus shown, with authority considered, that St. Alphonsus rightly called his opinion more probable? But neither do the other two call the opinion of St. Alphonsus more probable. For Concina merely says: Follow the safer things in this highest affair. But the other, whom the VV. thought was Antoine, is in reality Philip of Carboneano, an unhappy annotator of a most unhappy Work; he writes: In practice new contrition is required, ... because the opposite is not altogether certain.

4. The VV. insist that the cited Authors at least implicitly held the opinion of St. Alphonsus as probable when they called their own more probable; but Croix and Holzmann expressly call it probable. Reply. As regards the first part, I deny it. For they produce, and could produce, not even one author who defended that opinion as probable; but since they did not think their own altogether certain, they therefore counseled that the opposite should be followed in practice so that one might proceed more safely. Thus, for example, Voit (vol. 2, no. 508): The opinion is most probable (the VV. omitted these words) that new sorrow need not necessarily be elicited.... Nevertheless, in practice it is better to elicit new sorrow, so that one may proceed more safely; these words sound rather like counsel. And Reuter (pt. 4, tr. 5, no. 282): Although this opinion appears morally certain (these words likewise are omitted by the VV.), nevertheless, because the opposite appears to some not altogether improbable ..., greater reverence for the Sacrament is to be counseled. These words likewise present counsel rather than doctrine.

But as regards Holzmann and Croix, Reply. Each of them rests upon citations of Vasquez, Bonacina, Amicus, and Mastrius, who establish the necessity of new sorrow not for our case, but concerning sins previously confessed, as we already said concerning the citations of St. Alphonsus. Therefore, they rest upon citations which do not pertain to the matter.

But as regards the intrinsic reasons, Holzmann says that the arguments which he himself had objected appeared to him to have been solved probably indeed, but not evidently. Yet it is easily replied to this that it is enough and more than enough that there be a solid solution of the objections; but he himself concedes that the solution is solid. But if something appears to him not sufficiently evident, it satisfies us that it has appeared sufficiently evident to other grave Doctors.

In this matter, indeed, this Author's manner of disputing can appear singular. For he asks (pt. 5, no. 511): Can one and the same contrition suffice for two or more Sacraments of Penance in number? Here he does not distinguish whether the second confession concerns a forgotten sin or a sin previously confessed. He then adds (and the VV. ought not to have omitted these things): It is replied that it can, if contrition still physically endures at the time of each confession; indeed, even if it endures only morally. The first part is common AND CERTAIN. Cardinal de Lugo, John Bosco, Lacroix, bk. 6, pt. 2, no. 707, and very many others hold the second against others to be cited below. But the Authors whom he cites below treat only of sins previously confessed; why, then, does he not conclude that this second part of the thesis does not touch the question of forgotten sins, and therefore that what he establishes concerning the first part holds concerning them, namely, that this doctrine is common and certain? But he himself (no. 512) says that the opinion is not certain even when the penitent returns after receiving absolution to confess a forgotten sin. Reply. Let it pass; but what, then, will you draw from this confusion of things? Yet one thing is sufficiently established. For he calls the doctrine concerning the sufficiency of one contrition for two or more Sacraments certain and common if contrition physically endures. Let us now omit asking what this physical endurance means with him and why it is required. For he himself had written a little before (no. 510): If yesterday you elicited sorrow with the purpose of confessing today, while you confess today you do not need new sorrow. For does sorrow then endure physically or morally? As regards the present matter, if according to his CERTAIN opinion one contrition suffices in the case for two or more absolutions, what force, then, will his objection have (no. 511), namely, that A new composite requires new parts; or that new contrition entitatively is necessary for a new Sacrament? Does he not expressly contend that it is certain and common that one suffices? How, then, does he attribute so much strength to these objections (no. 512) that because of them he thereafter wishes the doctrine which he himself contends is certain to be uncertain? But let us now dismiss Holzmann with this obscure heap of things which do not cohere with one another, and pass to Croix.

Besides those empty citations of which we have spoken, Croix produces this one argument, as though from reason (no. 711): There is, he says, almost the same reason concerning sins which someone has forgotten and concerning those which he has previously confessed. That is, since he treated both questions together (no. 707), he contends that the little reasons which he objects to himself where sins already confessed are treated also hold for the case of a forgotten sin; and he thinks that all the more force accrues to these little reasons because certain Authors (he adduces four or five) who deny that sorrow must be renewed where forgotten sins are treated nevertheless require new sorrow with regard to sins previously confessed. Reply. The argument can easily and with greater right be turned back upon Croix himself. And indeed (now omitting those who have nothing concerning forgotten sins, such as Vasquez, Bonacina, and John Sanchez), there are very many, as Holzmann admits, who deny that new sorrow is necessary with regard to a forgotten sin. But among these, those few do not find the reasons which they find valid with regard to a forgotten sin confessed immediately afterward sufficiently valid also with regard to sins previously confessed. Yet from the very fact that those who dissent with regard to sins previously confessed nevertheless agree with the others concerning the confession of a forgotten sin, can it not rather be and ought it not be concluded that the reasons adduced in the case of a forgotten sin are of such strength and such clarity that they have extorted assent even from those who dissent in the other question?

Let us conclude, therefore, that neither Holzmann nor Croix has produced anything either from authority or from intrinsic reason which confers any probability upon that opinion which is adduced against the common opinion.

Moreover, as we have already noted elsewhere, it was altogether to be desired that the VV. devote their labors to some advancement of science, namely, to the investigation of truth rather than to defending some cause in any manner whatsoever. Thus, in the present matter, when they offered the texts of Authors, they would not have concealed that Edmund Voit calls the opinion which they endeavor to attack most probable; they would not have concealed that the same appeared morally certain to Reuter; they would not have concealed that Holzmann calls the same certain and common.

But, moreover, why did they remain silent about the judgments of other Doctors? Indeed:

1. Dominic Viva (De Poenitentia, q. 3, art. 3, no. 8) writes: Forgotten sins which are disclosed immediately after absolution do not need new sorrow in order that absolution be conferred again concerning them, as the practice of the faithful shows. He then adds (ibid., no. 9): You will ask whether these opinions concerning sorrow ... after the first thesis was proscribed by Innocent XI are probable in practice? I reply that the opinions hitherto explained ... are probable in practice, ... because it is lawful to follow an opinion which is MORALLY CERTAIN. And again (on Prop. 1 of Innocent XI, no. 26): Whatever may be the case as to whether absolution can universally be repeated concerning the same sins when sorrow is not repeated, as many think ..., it nevertheless appears CERTAIN from the practice of the Church and of Confessors that it is not necessary that those who are reconciled immediately after absolution be admonished to repeat new sorrow.

2. Felix Potestas (De Poenitentia, ch. 18, no. 5080): One who has confessed before and is reconciled by confessing a forgotten sin, although he effects a new Sacrament, is not bound to elicit new sorrow.... This opinion is MORALLY CERTAIN to me.

3. Elbel (conf. 3, De Contritione, no. 75): If he submits a new sin immediately or shortly after absolution was received, most probably he is not only validly but also licitly absolved without new sorrow.... Therefore, Cardenas and Lacroix appear to condemn the practice of this opinion too scrupulously.

4. And Sporer (Theologia Sacramentalis, pt. 3, ch. 2, no. 298): When in Confession you have forgotten some mortal sin and, having remembered it a little after absolution was given, you confess it, although it is advisable and safest to renew sorrow, nevertheless it is not necessary that you have new sorrow concerning it. Thus ... COMMONLY. And again (no. 300): This is more certain: if, because of the imminent danger of death, you gave someone absolution before he confessed all his sins, you can absolve him from the others which he will narrate afterward, even though he does not elicit new sorrow concerning the rest. This resolution directly attacks the little reason customarily objected to the contrary, that new matter is required for a new Sacrament.

5. Marcus Struggl (tr. 11, q. 2, art. 2, no. 25): Learned and pious Confessors, when the penitent after the first absolution has been conferred proposes a mortal sin which he had previously forgotten, confer absolution upon him without being solicitous about new sorrow on the part of the penitent. And this opinion, although it treats of the validity of the Sacrament, is SAFE IN PRACTICE.

6. Martin Stoz (bk. 1, q. 1, art. 7, no. 52): I willingly admit that one who confessed a little before and again confesses sins which had escaped him ... is not bound to elicit new sorrow.

7. Mazzotta (tr. 6, disp. 1, q. 3, ch. 1, sec. 3, q. 3): The same sorrow can suffice ... if someone immediately after absolution adds a new forgotten sin and is absolved again either by the same or by another Confessor; and similarly, if someone is absolved when death is imminent before he has confessed integrally, and afterward ... completes his confession, he can again be absolved without new sorrow.

COMMONLY, and Moya says that it is INDUBITABLE among the Doctors. Nor does the cited proposition condemned by Innocent XI stand in the way, because this opinion is most probable, whatever Croix may have said.

8. Babenstuber (tr. 8, pt. 6, disp. 4, art. 3, no. 57): When someone has forgotten some sin in confession and then immediately or a little afterward confesses it, the Confessor must again impart absolution.... In this case neither the penitent nor the Confessor is accustomed to be solicitous about new sorrow. Thus the Theologians COMMONLY.

9. Roncaglia (tr. 19, ch. 3, q. 3), concerning this doctrine: These foundations appear SO SAFE to me that this opinion by no means appears to me subject to the censure of that condemned opinion according to which it was said that in confecting the Sacraments it is lawful to follow a probable opinion when the safer has been abandoned.

10. Giribaldi (tr. 7, ch. 5, dub. 8, no. 63): Although one or another (confessor) admonishes the penitent to renew sorrow, nevertheless others more commonly do not do so; and thus it can be observed in practice that when the penitent returns to tell forgotten sins, he is not compelled to elicit a new act of contrition.

11. Illsung (tr. 6, disp. 6, q. 3, art. 5, no. 43): When someone has forgotten one sin and, returning to the priest either immediately or a little afterward, confesses it ..., the confessor must impart absolution again; but in such a case commonly neither penitents nor confessors are solicitous about new sorrow. Therefore, new sorrow is not required.

12. Honoratus Fabri (tr. 9, ch. 2, no. 10): The same sorrow suffices for several absolutions, as when someone after absolution discloses some sin of which he had not previously remembered.

13. Tamburini (Methodus Confessionis, bk. 1, ch. 2, no. 9): If, after absolution has duly been conferred, the penitent remembers and brings forward something which he had forgotten to confess, ... it is not necessary that he grieve again.

14. Gobat (tr. 6, no. 165): When, having forgotten some sin in confession, you confess it a little after absolution has been given, it is not necessary that you have new sorrow concerning it. COMMONLY.

15. Escobar (bk. 14, sect. 2, nos. 116-118): Someone, while making confession, forgets one or another mortal sin and immediately after absolution remembers and discloses it: he ... does not need a new act of sorrow. But here he cites Vasquez and Bonacina as contrary without relevance, for, as we have said, they do not discuss this question but another, different one.

16. Dicastillo (tr. 8, disp. 6, dub. 12, no. 160): It must be asserted that, when someone confesses a new sin which he had not told through forgetfulness, ... old sorrow which remains either physically or morally suffices.... Ledesma follows this opinion and testifies that it is MORE COMMON. And again (no. 165): Our opinion can be confirmed from the practice of the Church and of Confessors, because there are few, if any, who are solicitous about admonishing the penitent to renew sorrow in reconciliations, as Lugo rightly noted.

17. Aversa (De Poenitentia, q. 9, sect. 1): It can be observed in practice that, when the penitent returns to tell forgotten sins, he is not compelled to elicit a new act of contrition.

18. Ferraris (s.v. Poenitentia, art. 2, no. 37): One who in confession has forgotten some mortal sin can confess it a little after absolution without having new sorrow. Gobat with Dicastillo testifies that this is COMMON.

19. And, lest we linger longer over these things, see Diana (vol. 1, tr. 3, res. 88), Mezger (tr. 18, disp. 46, art. 4, no. 7), Gabriel of St. Vincent (De Poenitentia, disp. 4, q. 2), the Salmanticenses (Theologia Scholastica, tr. 24, disp. 7, nos. 116 and 121), Ledesma, Salas, Henriquez, Arriaga, Platelius (in Mazzotta, loc. cit.), John de la Cruz, and Joseph de Ianuario (in Tamburini, loc. cit.), Perez and Bosco (in St. Alphonsus, bk. 6, no. 448), cited by the foregoing.

And indeed, take careful note that the above-praised Doctors hand down this doctrine absolutely and as to be observed in practice beyond controversy; and that most of them wrote after the propositions had been condemned by Innocent XI, and even made express mention of this condemnation. And since the authorities customarily opposed have altogether nothing to do with the matter, while the little reasons objected are solved without difficulty and indeed can very often be turned back by an argumentum ad hominem against those objecting them, it is manifest that this doctrine can also be held safest in practice.

But as regards the six columns in which the VV. detain the reader (pp. 423-426) concerning the other part of the Note, namely, concerning the renewal of sorrow for a sin previously confessed, it is truly not worth the effort to linger. They say they do not see how that doctrine can contribute to quieting the scruples of certain persons. But others have seen this; and perhaps the VV. themselves do not appear to have fully grasped the sense in which the opinion in the Note is said to be able to contribute to quieting scruples.

QUESTION 9. Can there be a Sacrament of Penance at once valid and unformed, because of a defect of sufficient disposition?

Reply. It is controverted. Some deny it with Billuart, diss. 7, art. 1. - Elbel, no. 81. Their reason is that in the Sacrament of Penance, contrition is the matter of the Sacrament; therefore, if it is insufficient, the Sacrament will be invalid. But if it is sufficient, the Sacrament is valid and at the same time formed, and therefore it immediately remits sins. - Others, however, and indeed grave Theologians, affirm it with Lugo, disp. 14, no. 65. - Lacroix, no. 672; and St. Lig., no. 444 ¹⁴, calls this more probable. The reason of those who affirm is that there can be a certain lower degree of disposition which suffices for the matter of the Sacrament but does not suffice for actual justification ¹⁵. - Recall what was said On the Sacraments in General, nos. 191 and 232.

¹⁴ This opinion, says Lugo (De Poenitentia, disp. 14, no. 68), is taught by St. Thomas ... and by the Thomists commonly, Capreolus, Paludanus, Cajetan, Soto, Cano, Ledesma, Sylvester, Richardus, whom Suarez adduces ..., who follows the same in part; and this is also commonly embraced by the more recent Thomists and Henriquez ... and Cardinal Toletus ..., and others whom Antoninus and Diana relate and follow ...; all of whom consequently teach that such a valid confession is not afterward to be repeated.

The same de Lugo relates the multiple cases in which one or another Theologian thought this could occur (ibid., no. 69); nevertheless, he appears to admit it in only two circumstances: 1. when someone guilty of two sins, through invincible forgetfulness, grieves over only one and confesses only this; 2. when someone through invincible ignorance believes that it is not a mortal sin to approach the Sacrament without sorrow for all sins, provided that sorrow is present for some one. See ibid., nos. 74 and 89.

¹⁵ Yet this reason favors the cases which Cardinal de Lugo did not approve rather than those which he admitted.