Section — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
§ 3. On the Qualities of Contrition, Whether Perfect or Imperfect
The qualities of contrition are those conditions which are required for the validity of contrition, whether perfect or imperfect. Four are customarily enumerated: 1. that it be true and formal; 2. supernatural; 3. appreciatively supreme; 4. universal.
346. 1. True and formal contrition or attrition is required, as has thus far been explained in the preceding paragraph.
It is therefore required, a) that contrition be true or internal, and consequently there does not suffice: a) the merely external recitation of a formula of contrition, unless true internal sorrow and detestation of sin are at the same time present. b) Supposed sorrow does not suffice, but true sorrow is required. The reason is that, just as supposed water does not suffice for baptism, so supposed sorrow is insufficient for the sacrament of penance. But if certain older theologians seem to have taught the contrary, either they must be abandoned or benignly interpreted in this sense: that they thought at least supposed contrition necessary; if this is not truly present, true attrition which exists and is in good faith held by the penitent to be perfect contrition suffices. c) Nor does a desire for sorrow and absolution suffice; nevertheless, in practice the faithful of timorous conscience who sincerely desire to have true sorrow for sins committed are not to be disturbed, even if they say that they feel no sorrow at all. For since contrition is an act of the will, it is not always felt.
b) Formal contrition is required, that is, a positive act by which a man truly and explicitly sorrows over sins committed. Therefore implicit or virtual contrition, such as is included in an act of charity, does not suffice, as very few after Lugo140 have taught; for although an act of perfect charity justifies outside the sacrament of penance, nevertheless, speaking per se, it does not suffice in the sacrament, because formal contrition pertains to the proximate matter of this sacrament. Nevertheless, in practice it is scarcely possible that a sinful man eliciting an act of perfect charity should not at the same time sorrow over his sins and detest them. Still less does that implicit sorrow suffice which is included in the will not to sin henceforth; because it is absolutely possible for someone to have complacency in past sins but nevertheless no longer to wish to sin.141
140 De poenit., diss. V, n. 92 ff.
347. 2. Sorrow must be supernatural, and this in two ways: a) by reason of the principle, inasmuch as it must be elicited with the aid of supernatural grace;142 b) by reason of the motive, which is in some manner referred to God.
Hence a merely natural motive for sorrowing over sins is insufficient, and Innocent XI condemned proposition 57: "It is probable that natural attrition suffices, provided that it is upright."143 Insufficient natural motives are, for example, the punishment of imprisonment inflicted for sin, misfortune arising from it, infamy, and so forth. Suitable motives, however, can be reduced to four: 1. fear of punishment to be inflicted or already inflicted by God; 2. hope of reward in eternity; 3. the supernatural turpitude of sin; 4. the goodness of God. In a word: all those motives are suitable which are apprehended by the light of supernatural faith, but not those which are known by the light of reason alone.
142 Thus, after the Council of Orange, the Council of Trent defined, session 6, can. 3 (Denz., n. 813).
143 Denz., n. 1207.
348. 3. Contrition must be supreme, not indeed intensively, but appreciatively.
Contrition supreme in intensity is not only not required, but is not even possible, since the bitterness and intensity of sorrow can always be increased more and more through the grace of God. Contrition, however, must be appreciatively supreme, inasmuch as sin is judged to be an evil more detestable than any other evil; and therefore the sinner must be prepared to lose any good and to suffer any evil rather than to commit sin. In practice, however, both the confessor and the penitent should abstain from expressly instituting comparisons between a sin to be avoided and some atrocious evil to be undergone. St. Thomas144 wisely observes concerning this matter: "A contrite man is bound in general to will to suffer any punishment rather than to sin; ... but he is not bound to descend in particular to this punishment or that. Indeed, he would act foolishly if someone were to trouble himself or another concerning particular punishments of this kind. For it is manifest that, just as delightful things move more when considered in particular than in common, so terrible things terrify more if they are considered in particular; and there are some who do not fall in a lesser temptation who perhaps would fall in a greater one. Thus someone hearing of adultery is not incited to lust, but if by consideration he descends to each enticement, he would be moved. And similarly someone would not refuse to suffer death for Christ; but if he descended to considering each punishment, he would be more withdrawn. And therefore to descend to particulars in such things is to lead a man into temptation and to furnish an occasion of sinning." Hence certain customary formulas of contrition are altogether unsuitable, for example: "I would rather die a thousand times than offend You again, O God."
Since intensity does not pertain to the essence of sorrow in penance, it follows: a) that sensible sorrow, which manifests itself by sighs and tears, is in no way required; b) that no delay of time is necessary for eliciting contrition, since, as a spiritual act, it can be exercised in an instant. Nevertheless, in practice the faithful are earnestly to be admonished to consider the eliciting of contrition more necessary than oral confession, and therefore to spend some time in eliciting true and sincere contrition.
144 Quodl. 1, a. 9.
349. 4. Contrition must be universal, inasmuch as it extends to absolutely all mortal sins not yet remitted.
The reason is that every mortal sin is a total aversion from God. Now contrition is conversion to God and must destroy every aversion from God, and therefore one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another. It is not strictly required, however, although it is generally better, that special contrition be elicited for each mortal sin. It suffices that the penitent, from a universal motive, namely, because he has offended the most good God and has merited the punishments of Gehenna, sorrow over all mortal sins committed, whether known or here and now unknown.
Since venial sins need not necessarily be accused in confession, it is not required that contrition be universal concerning them. But if someone confesses only venial sins, he must under grave obligation elicit true and formal contrition for at least one, or for other free matter consisting of sins already remitted, because otherwise he would not furnish sufficient proximate matter for the sacrament, which would therefore be frustrated; and this is certainly a grave sacrilege.
350. Corollaries. From the fact that contrition pertains to the proximate matter, while absolution is the form of the sacrament of penance, the following are deduced:
Contrition must be manifested by a sensible sign. For the matter of a sacrament pertains to a sensible sign. This sensible manifestation, however, is sufficiently had through the sorrowful confession of sins or through a devout petition for absolution. Nevertheless, children and the uneducated are to be counseled to elicit contrition also in express words, because these words are accustomed to help them greatly toward sincere internal contrition.
Contrition must necessarily be elicited before absolution and coexist with it. The reason is that contrition is the matter, while absolution is the form of the sacrament of penance. But the matter must be present when the form arrives. Of itself, indeed, it is not required that contrition be elicited before confession; but in practice this is altogether to be counseled and done, since it is sufficiently difficult to elicit contrition during confession or in that short interval between confession and absolution. Contrition must coexist with absolution, and therefore it cannot be elicited so long before absolution or confession that it no longer virtually perseveres. But how long contrition is judged to persevere virtually cannot be determined by a general rule, since this depends upon its intensity and upon the disposition of the penitent. Certain theologians think that contrition perseveres virtually for three or four hours; others, for one day and night; others, for several days.145 In practice it is to be counseled that contrition elicited long before confession be renewed again before absolution. But it is evident of itself that contrition is altogether to be renewed when a new mortal sin has afterward been committed.
145 Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 446.
351. 3. Contrition elicited must have some ordering toward absolution; or, in other words, it must be sacramental. St. Alphonsus146 indeed calls more probable the opinion which denies the necessity of this ordering, but he urges that the opposite opinion, since it is safer, be observed in practice. This opinion, however, seems to be not only safer but also truer. For if even in perfect contrition the desire to confess and to receive sacramental absolution must be included, a fortiori this is necessary in attrition. This desire is the same as an intention or ordering toward the sacrament of penance. But it is by no means required that the penitent first have the intention of receiving the sacrament of penance and, moved by this intention, elicit contrition. Hence without doubt a member of the faithful who, for example, is accidentally aroused to contrition while hearing a sermon and afterward confesses is validly and licitly absolved. But if the preceding sorrow is in no way referred to confession, the absolution seems to be invalid; and thus if the same member of the faithful today is most vehemently aroused by a sermon to sorrow for sins while thinking nothing of confession, but on the following day, thinking nothing of the contrition had yesterday, confesses his sins, he seems to receive absolution invalidly. Contrition and confession, therefore, must mutually influence one another. Contrition renders confession sorrowful and not merely narrative; confession, however, joins contrition with absolution and thus constitutes the whole sacrament.
146 Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 447.
352. 4. Contrition need not necessarily be elicited anew when the penitent, immediately after absolution, confesses a mortal sin omitted through forgetfulness and is absolved again. Thus Billuart,147 who thinks this opinion more probable; Roncaglia holds it morally certain, while Sporer, Elbel, and many others hold it most probable, according to the testimony of St. Alphonsus.148 The reason is that the contrition previously and universally had virtually perseveres and also extends itself to that sin omitted through forgetfulness. Nor should anyone say that in this case there are two sacraments and a twofold absolution or form, and therefore that a twofold contrition is also required as proximate matter. For, supposing that the virtually persevering contrition extends itself to the omitted sin, sufficient proximate matter for confession is truly present. Moreover, this second absolution does not remit the omitted sin, since it has already been remitted through the first absolution. Therefore the second absolution is nothing other than the complement of the first, and both seem to be one sacrament. For if the penitent then truly received two sacraments, he would be in a better condition than if he had forgotten nothing and had declared all his sins integrally in the first accusation. This certainly seems unsuitable.
Nevertheless, in practice authors are accustomed to counsel that in this case the confessor invite the penitent to a new act of contrition, and that he also impose upon him a new satisfaction, or impose again the penance already imposed. The reason is that this practice is safer, indeed, according to a probable opinion of certain authors, necessary.149 Certain authors, for example Noldin,150 teach generally that one and the same act of sorrow suffices for several confessions; for example, if on the following day the penitent again submits to the keys sins already duly accused and remitted, the sorrow elicited yesterday suffices for absolution to be validly granted again, provided that yesterday's universal sorrow still virtually perseveres. But this opinion does not seem licit in practice if such an interval exists between the two sacramental judgments. For then there are certainly two sacraments, and therefore two acts of contrition are also required. Habitual contrition does not suffice for valid reception, but an act of contrition, at least virtually enduring, is required as the partial proximate matter.
147 De poenit., diss. 4, a. 8.
148 Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 448.
149 Cf. ibid.
150 De sacr. n. 258.
353. Scholion. Can the sacrament of penance be valid but unformed? This question has no practical moment, because this case scarcely ever occurs. According to the opinion of those authors who think that the whole essence of the sacrament of penance consists in absolution, nothing prevents the sacrament of penance from being valid but unformed. But this opinion is scarcely probable. Supposing, however, that the three acts of the penitent are the proximate matter of the sacrament, if they are not truly present with all their essential qualities, even inculpably, the sacrament is null because of a defect of matter. Therefore the opinion denying that the sacrament of penance can be unformed seems better.151 Nor does the authority of St. Thomas,152 who admits an unformed confession, stand in the way; for the Angelic Doctor manifestly treats only of confession and not of the whole sacrament of penance, because it is certain that the sacrament of penance without contrition is not only unformed but also invalid.
Moreover, even those who admit an unformed sacrament of penance say that this cannot occur except in a twofold case, namely: 1. If someone guilty of two mortal sins, through invincible forgetfulness, sorrows only over one from a particular motive and confesses this alone. For then the other sin remains, which was neither accused nor affected by contrition, and therefore could not be remitted. But in this case the sacrament seems to be invalid, because the essential quality of universality is lacking in the contrition, and therefore the contrition is insufficient. 2. If someone through invincible ignorance believes that it is not a mortal sin to approach the sacrament without sorrow for all sins, provided that sorrow for some sin is present. This case is truly chimerical, and, if it occurred, the sacrament would be invalid, since invincible ignorance cannot render valid a sacrament which otherwise would be invalid. Thus also someone would contract marriage invalidly with a blood relative in the second degree, although through invincible ignorance he thought such a marriage valid and licit.
151 Cf. Billuart, loc. cit., diss. 7, a. 1, and, among modern writers, P. Galtier, De poenitentia, tractatus dogmatico-historicus (Paris 1923), n. 405 ff.
152 Suppl., q. 9, a. 1. Commentators agree very little in the explanation of this truly difficult text, which Capreolus, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, the Salamancans, and, among modern authors, Billot (De poenit., thesis 16, p. 162) subtly explain. Perhaps it is better and simpler to say with Dominic Soto (In IV Sent., dist. 18, q. 3, a. 3): "St. Thomas was speaking with the common populace, that is, as a commentator he handed down the opinion of Peter Lombard, which was then common in the schools." Cf. Jos. Göttler, Der hl. Thomas ... über die Wirkungen des Bußsakr. (1904), p. 23.