Article I: On the Endowments of Contrition Itself

S. Th., Suppl., q. 2, a. 6; q. 3, a. 3 and 4.

481. Principle I. Contrition must be true and internal, i.e., truly conceived in heart and soul. - Thus by reason of essence: for it is sorrow of soul and detestation of sin, which indicate an act of the will (Joel II, 12-13; Ezek. XVIII, 31). And indeed contrition, as a reparation of sin, ought to proceed from that source from which sins proceed, i.e., from the heart or will (Mt. XV, 19); whence it is a retraction of the depraved will, by which the sinner sincerely says within himself: I would that I had not committed the sin, and I will that it be uprooted in its consequences, and, if I could act anew, I would that I had not sinned, and I am prepared to do so here and now.

Moreover, in the sacrament of Penance, in order that it may be part of the sacrament, sorrow must in some way be external and sensibly manifested; and what is required, not only of itself, but altogether and always, is formal and explicit, as is clear from the Council of Trent, which requires for the sacrament contrition itself or sorrow (sess. 14, c. 3 and 4), which alone is the act of penance: namely, it is a positive act by which the will truly and explicitly sorrows over and detests sin as it is an offense against God. Therefore such an act is a necessary condition in order that absolution be a judicial act and be valid.

Hence there does not suffice: 1) the mere external recitation or reading of a formula, without the internal affection of the will;

2. nor estimated contrition, by which someone in good faith thinks he is contrite, while in reality he is not: this can excuse the penitent from sacrilege, but cannot supply the defect of the necessary part; just as estimated water is not sufficient for Baptism;

3. nor, in order to the sacrament of Penance, is virtual and implicit sorrow in the act of another virtue sufficient, e.g., in an act of charity, although practically love of God above all things can scarcely be had without formal sorrow for sins in one who is thinking about them: namely, an act of charity, which is virtual penance, is sufficient for the remission of sin, but not for the value of the sacrament of Penance, because it was not instituted as the sacramental sign and integral part of the sacrament, just as in the Eucharist virtual bread or virtual wine is not sufficient;

4. nor does the purpose of not sinning for the future suffice: for this can stand with complacency in past sin; nor implicit sorrow in the purpose, because it is not formal;

5. nor does implicit sorrow in the desire of sorrowing suffice, e.g., if you choose to sorrow or sorrow that you do not sorrow, for the part of the sacrament is sorrow itself concerning sin, not the desire of sorrow, nor sorrow concerning the absence of sorrow;

6. nor even implicit sorrow in the desire of absolution, or in the will desiring to receive the fruits of the sacrament, even if there are only venial sins or mortal sins already remitted as matter of confession;

7. nor does sorrow concerning sin in the abstract suffice, but concerning sin as committed by the guilty one confessing.

482. Principle II. Contrition must be supernatural. - And indeed a) both subjectively, by reason of the principle, so that it is elicited from the supernatural help of God, or grace inspiring and assisting, as the Council of Trent defined, sess. 6, can. 3; whence the same Council also explicitly says that attrition is a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit moving (sess. 14, c. 4); b) and objectively, by reason of the object or motive, so that it is elicited on account of a supernatural motive, i.e., one supernaturally known through the light of faith and looking to salvation, such as God Himself under some aspect, or something regarding God, but in such a way that God is considered, not as a natural end, but as the supernatural end known by the light of faith. Whence natural sorrow on account of a merely natural motive without relation to God as supernatural end is not sufficient. Hence Innocent XI condemned prop. 57: It is probable that natural attrition, provided it is honorable, is sufficient.

It is proved: For a means must be proportioned to the end, and the disposition of the same order as the thing to which it disposes. But contrition is a means and disposition to grace altogether supernatural, namely on the part of the principle and of the object. Therefore the act of contrition must be supernatural in both ways, not only on the part of the principle and of grace, but also on the part of the object or motive. And indeed an act essentially, as a whole, depends upon the object, because it is nothing except a tendency to the object, just as motion is to the term; whence it is not an act supernatural in itself unless the object also is supernatural (I, n. 188).

Hence a) sorrow for sin that is only natural does not suffice, namely, on account of a merely natural motive, namely insofar as it is opposed to right reason; just as neither does sorrow on account of the philosophical baseness of sin, on account of its intrinsic unworthiness without relation to God, or on account of infamy or natural punishment without this relation, or on account of an effect of sin, e.g., illness, etc.

b) Nor does sorrow elicited merely on account of God the author of nature, known by the light of reason alone, suffice; but it must be referred to God as the supernatural end known by the light of faith. Concerning this there will not be difficulty in practice, because among the faithful it will of itself be done in this way.

483. Principle III. Contrition must be appretiatively supreme. - Thus by reason of proportion, so that it may be the greatest sorrow of all: according to appreciation, however, by which the penitent by his intellect esteems sin above all evils, and from this estimation detests it by the will more than every other evil; so much so that he is dispositively prepared to lose any good whatever or suffer any detriment rather than perpetrate sin, and for nothing would will to commit it; otherwise the will would not be turned away absolutely and for every case from sin.

It is proved: 1° For contrition must already involve the disposition by which (at least through the mediation of absolution) it becomes possible to please God. But if someone preferred some created good to God, he could not please God, according to that saying of Christ (Mt. X, 37): He who loves father or mother more than Me is not worthy of Me. Therefore contrition must involve the disposition by which someone would prefer to lose every created good rather than offend God.

2° The more something contrary is to please, the more something must be displeasing. But what is opposed to sin, namely the ultimate end, must appretiatively please more than every other good: for all things are to be sought on account of the ultimate end. Therefore contrition, which sorrows over the opposed sin, must be supreme sorrow, or sorrow above all evils (q. 3, a. 1).

This is confirmed: a) From Joel II, 12 and from the Council of Trent (sess. 14, c. 4), according to which contrition must exclude every affection toward sin and every will of sinning; and it cannot accomplish this unless it is appretiatively supreme: for unless someone esteems and detests sin as the greatest evil, at some time he will choose sin rather than an evil which is apprehended as greater.

b) Right reason demands that with appretiatively greatest hatred we pursue that which is truly the greatest evil; but sin, as an offense against God that is in a certain way infinite, and as depriving man of the greatest goods, is the greatest evil of all; therefore.

Nevertheless, there is not required:

1. That contrition be intensively supreme, so that in vehemence it surpasses all other sorrows and that one sorrow with the whole or greatest effort of the soul.¹

¹ Several have said that contrition is required to be not only appretiatively but also intensively supreme. This was explained by a threefold different opinion: 1) some required the supreme intensity absolutely possible, as Adrian VI, in IV, on Penance, q. 2; - 2) others, supreme relatively to other goods loved, as Peter de Soto, De Inst. Sacr., lect. 14-15; - 3) others finally the supreme intensity which God knows, namely relative to the powers of grace, as Lupus, Ledrou, Berti, Juenin, Morinus, Witasse, Gazzaniga.

a) For thus contrition would be most difficult and morally impossible for many, which would cast them into scruples, because penitents quite often cannot distinguish either intensity or the grade of intensity; whence also the practice of confessors is not accustomed to require such contrition from the faithful.

b) Intensity, vehemence, bitterness does not pertain to the essence of sorrow, nor does it vary the species: contrition even less intense is sorrow above all things, namely appretiatively. Any grade of charity, because it is total conversion to God, excludes sin; whence also any grade of contrition. Whence St. Thomas (q. 5, a. 3): "however small the sorrow may be, provided it suffices for the notion of contrition (i.e., it detests sin above all things), it blots out every guilt."

c) Indeed, intensively supreme sorrow does not seem possible; neither a) supreme simply and absolutely, since the grace of God can always be increased more and more; - nor b) supreme relatively to the evils of this life, for this is not always in our power, because in the present state we are moved more vehemently by sensible things and by objects nearer and proper to our faculties than by the goods of reason and spiritual goods, which are not our proper objects nor so near to us. And then too the absurdity would follow that, from two who sorrow with equal intensity, one would be justified and the other not; e.g., if one sorrows intensely for sin but more intensely for the death of his father, he would not be justified, while one who sorrowed more remissly over this would be justified; - nor c) supreme relatively to the powers of grace here and now granted by God, because no one can know how great that intensity is which is required, and because God would altogether arbitrarily demand greater contrition for a lesser sin.

2. A fortiori, sensible contrition is not required, or sorrow which overflows into the sensitive appetite and bursts forth into tender affections of heart, sighs, and tears; nor consequently a sorrow more sensible than that which we often feel on account of temporal losses or the death of relatives and friends.

For contrition does not reside in the sensibility, but in the will, as being rational sorrow; nor is sensible sorrow always in our power, since the sensitive appetite does not obey reason at a nod; finally, it can happen that someone, without sensible sorrow, sorrows more vehemently than another who is prone to emotions of this kind.

3. Nor is it required that an explicit comparison be instituted between sin and other evils (for a virtual and implicit comparison suffices), nor would it sometimes be useful, because not rarely it will be dangerous if it is proposed explicitly to the weaker.

"For it is manifest," says St. Thomas, Quodl. I, 9, "that just as delightful things move more when considered in particular than in common, so terrible things terrify more if they are considered in particular; and there are some who do not fall in a lesser temptation, who perhaps would fall in a greater one. Just as... someone would not refuse to suffer death with Christ; but if he descended to considering the individual punishments, he would be more drawn back. And therefore to descend in such matters to individual things is to lead a man into temptation and to provide an occasion of sinning" (cf. q. 3, a. 1, ad 4).

But it is enough if the will is prepared to bear all evils rather than commit sin; - nor will it be necessary that one weigh individual evils, but it suffices to trust that grace will be given to him for bearing even the extreme thing, if it were necessary, rather than offend God. Indeed, it will be enough if, on account of God, the sinner detests sin, sorrows over it, and consequently now does not will to sin.

Yet for the more perfect such comparisons can be useful, because in this way they expressly detest sins supremely, show affection toward God, and render the will more prepared for such cases, if they should occur.

4. Nor is equal sorrow required for all sins, although it is always above all other evils.

But it can be greater and lesser estimatively, indeed it ought to be, according to the gravity of the sin: for the greater the evil is, the greater the sorrow can be (a. 3).

484. Principle IV. Contrition must be universal. - Thus by reason of matter, with regard to mortal sins committed and not yet duly subjected to the keys, even unknown ones and those not occurring to the memory. For:

a) No mortal sin can be remitted without the sacrament of Penance, and a sin concerning which sorrow is not had is a sin not subjected to penance; therefore.

b) We must sorrow for sins insofar as they are an offense against God, turning away from God and depriving one of divine friendship; but this reason extends itself to each and all mortal sins; therefore we must sorrow for all and each: namely, each one requires contrition.1

c) Without contrition no sin is remitted; but one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another, because one cannot be a friend of God and an enemy, turned away from God and turned toward God; therefore no mortal sin is remitted without contrition for all.²

² Ibid.

d) Whence the Scriptures urge sinners to retract all sins, so that they may be able to obtain pardon (Ezek. XVIII, 30-31).

Hence 1) it is not sufficient that someone sorrow for many diverse sins from a motive which is special to some one of them, namely, on account of its own proper baseness; e.g., if someone hates theft on account of a special baseness, he does not thereby detest luxury.

2. Nevertheless it is not required that the penitent run through individual mortal sins and formally and distinctly sorrow over each; but it suffices that he virtually and implicitly detest them from a motive common to all. Namely, contrition can be explicitly universal, or explicitly extend itself to all mortal sins, in two ways: a) if the penitent, thinking of each, elicits so many distinct sorrows; b) if by one act of sorrow he repents for all which he distinctly has in memory. Likewise it can become implicitly universal also in two ways: a) formally implicitly, if the penitent in a confused way knows that he has committed several mortal sins and from a universal motive sorrows over all his sins; b) virtually, if the penitent thinks distinctly of one or another sin and sorrows only over that one, but from a motive common to all (in the same way as one who believes one article of faith on account of the authority of God revealing virtually and implicitly admits all revealed truths concerning which the formal motive has force). Thus, for example, if he sorrows because sin is opposed to infinite good, or because it deprives one of eternal beatitude, or because it merits the eternal punishment of Gehenna, or has a common baseness as being against God the supreme legislator or benefactor. This contrition suffices; nevertheless the penitent must know all sins distinctly, not for contrition, but that confession may be integral.

3. Nor is it required that at the same time he sorrow for all or some venial sins, which do not turn one away from the final end nor destroy divine friendship, because mortal sins can be remitted without venial sins, and one venial sin without another. Whence, just as we are not bound to confess them, and can confess one without another, so neither in the sacrament are we bound to sorrow for them, and we can sorrow for one without another. Nevertheless,

a) if someone accuses himself of venial sins alone, he is bound under grave obligation to have contrition at least for one (considered numerically), because otherwise the matter of the sacrament would be lacking and the sacrament would be null;

b) if someone, together with others concerning which he sorrows, declares venial sins concerning which he does not sorrow, and it appears that he acts thus solely on account of a good end, e.g., that he may be better known by his director, or for the sake of humility, or for promoting sorrow, etc., without willing to subject them to absolution, he does not sin;

c) but if he declares them as matter of the sacrament, he sins at least venially, because it is a disorder, as matter of the sacrament, to place together with suitable matter other unsuitable matter, and it is a simulation to seek pardon for that concerning which he does not sorrow. But if he acts thus from inconsideration or negligence, it is light; if from contempt, it seems a grave sin.³

³ Let it not be said: to place something as matter of the sacrament which cannot be placed always includes simulation and falsity in a grave matter; as is clear in him who would place among several wheaten hosts, for a priest about to consecrate, some paper hosts. For, as Haine notes, Th. M., III, on Penance, q. 28, "the parity does not hold; because the form of consecration directly falls upon the matter to be consecrated, and therefore if some false matter is placed, the form would be falsified; but the form of absolution directly falls upon the person himself to be absolved, who even in that case is capable of absolution. And therefore, granted that someone mixes into confession some venial sins concerning which he does not sorrow, he does not on this account sin gravely," at least necessarily and always.

1. III, q. 86, a. 3.

485. Observations. - 1. Except in the case in which someone has lost faith or hope, it is not required that acts of faith or hope be distinctly elicited, just as neither the desire of the sacrament; but it suffices to form them insofar as they are contained in every sincere contrition, which cannot exist without them.

2. For venial sins sorrow concerning their frequency suffices, because this includes a special deformity.

3. It will be best if, for individual mortal sins of diverse species, at least the graver ones, there is had a proper and distinct sorrow of contrition; likewise, with venial sins, to accuse oneself and sorrow concerning a grave sin of one's past life, or concerning some venial sin but one of greater gravity.

4. For the sorrow of contrition duration or a delay of time is not required, because it is a spiritual act which can be exercised in an instant; nevertheless ordinarily a delay of time is required in preparation for it (III, q. 84, a. 8, ad 1). One instant suffices for a man from just to become a sinner; likewise, for one from sinner to become just. Hence the axiom: A man is amended by grace in a moment. Cf. II Kings XII, 13; Ezek. XVIII, 21-24, 26-27, 31-32; II-II, q. 45, a. 4.