Who is bound by a law

142. The subject of law generally is only the subjects of the legislator: for to make law is an act of superiority and jurisdiction; but jurisdiction cannot be exercised except over subjects.

The subject of law can be obliged in two ways: either only habitually, or in first act; or habitually and at the same time actually, or in second act. Obligation in first act is called imperfect, but obligation in second act perfect. One who is actually obliged by law and does not observe it sins formally; one who is held by law only habitually and transgresses it sins materially.

143. The subject of law in species. 1. All men are held by natural law by this very fact, that they have rational nature, even if they have not attained the use of reason; for this law is referred to those things which per se and necessarily agree or disagree with rational nature.

Those who have attained the use of reason are held by the law of nature in second act; those who have not attained the use of reason, in first act. Therefore it is not licit to incite children or the perpetually insane to something which is prohibited by natural law, for example to blasphemy, impurity, etc.; for even children, acting against the law of nature, sin materially. But one who induces a child to violating the law of nature, as the principal cause of the violation, sins formally. As soon as children have the use of reason, in transgressing the law of nature they themselves sin formally.

2. By positive divine law which was given by Christ for all men, all are held; but by law which was made for the faithful, only the faithful are held, as soon as they have attained the use of reason. Therefore all are held to enter the Church and receive baptism; but none are held to confess and receive the Eucharist except the faithful.

Therefore if there are divine laws which already fit the age of children, children are held to observe them; thus children too who have committed mortal sin are held to confess, and in death all who have attained the use of reason are held to receive Viaticum.

3. By human law are held all and only subjects who have come to the use of reason, that is, have completed the seventh year and are still habitually self-possessed in reason. The reason for the first: only subjects can be bound by laws made by a superior. The reason for the second is that it belongs to positive law to direct the actions of subjects to the end of the community; but the actions of those who are not yet self-possessed in reason cannot be directed.

a. Unbelievers or the non-baptized are not held by the laws of the Church, because they are not subjects of the Church; therefore per se it is licit to enjoin servile works upon them on feast days.

b. Infants and the perpetually insane are not subject to the laws of the Church, because they do not use reason even habitually; therefore it is licit to provide meats to them on prohibited days.

c. The insane who have lucid intervals, the drunk, those delirious (for a brief time), are subject to the laws of the Church, because they use reason habitually; therefore it is not licit to provide meats to them on prohibited days. For although by eating meats they do not sin formally because of defect of knowledge, nevertheless they sin materially, because they are held by law, since they are habitually self-possessed in reason and only here and now lack its use.

144. Whether heretics are held by the laws of the Church. There is no doubt that heretics, schismatics, and apostates per se are held by the laws of the Church: for through baptism they have been made subjects of the Church. Nevertheless they are for the most part excused from sin, because most are ignorant that they are held by the laws of the Church.¹

There are, however, authors who think that heretics who are born in a sect already established for a long time are not held by those laws which tend immediately to the sanctification of the soul, such as the law concerning sanctification of feasts and fasting; for they judge that the Church does not will to urge these laws, because this would redound more to destruction than to edification. But they are held by laws which intend the protection of public order, such as laws concerning impediments of marriage.² Nevertheless, from the fact that heretics are not held by these laws, it is not licit to infer that Catholics can advise or enjoin the violation of laws upon them, because the Church does not permit them to be induced by Catholics to acting against the law.

Now it is asked in what way the following are held by human laws: a. the legislator himself; b. children; c. clerics; d. regulars; e. travelers; f. vagi.

¹ Greek Catholics are not bound by pontifical laws except in a threefold case: a. in the matter of dogmas; b. if they are implicitly extended to them, namely where the matter itself shows that they are comprehended, because there is question not of a merely ecclesiastical law, but natural and divine law is declared; c. if the laws are explicitly extended to them also.

² G. Marc, Institutiones morales Alphonsianae, 10th ed. (Rome: Guggiani, 1906), I, n. 198. Genicot, Casus conscientiae (Louvain: Polleunis and Ceuterick, 1901), p. 22.

145. On the legislator.

a. First of all, a twofold force of law must be distinguished: preceptive or directive, which obliges only to observing the law and to incurring fault in conscience; and coercive, which also obliges to undergoing the penalty established for transgressors. Besides this, one preceptive force is called direct, if the obligation arises from the law itself and the will of the legislator; another indirect, if the law is only the occasion which, once posited, causes obligation to proceed from another source, for example from natural law. Now it is asked whether a legislator is held by laws made by himself.

b. The legislator is either a college of several persons, which alone can exercise legislative power, as in a republic the college of deputies, or a provincial synod, or a general chapter in certain religious orders; or he is a singular person, as the Pope, a bishop, an emperor, who alone can establish laws.

1. Those who compose a college marked with legislative power are held by laws made by themselves: for the individual members are truly subject to the college which possesses legislative power. Therefore the president of a republic is held by the laws of the republic, a metropolitan by the laws of a provincial synod, a regular prelate by the laws of a general chapter.

The singular relation by which the supreme pontiff is referred to an ecumenical council, namely that he is above the council, brings it about that he himself is not subject to laws made in an ecumenical council.

2. A legislator who alone can make laws is not held by his laws with regard to coercive force, but only with regard to preceptive force, yet only indirectly.

The reason for the first is that no one can oblige himself by coercive force, which all concede; therefore neither the Pope nor a bishop incurs censures made by himself. The reason for the second is that by natural law the legislator is held to conform himself to his subjects in the observance of laws which he himself has established: for the common good, which he is held to procure, is most greatly promoted by good example; besides this, it befits the head of the community to conform himself to the community over which he presides. The reason for the third is that only an inferior can be truly and directly obliged by his superior, but no one by himself, which is commonly conceded by authors.

3. But a legislator who without cause does not observe a law made by himself, with scandal excluded, does not sin gravely; and when a reasonable cause is present, he is altogether excused from the law, even if subjects violating it sin gravely. For he himself is obliged by another law and from another end, namely that he conform himself to the community over which he presides, which equity and fittingness demand.

146. On children.

It must be noted that those are called infants who have not yet completed the seventh year of age; after the seventh year has been completed, they are called impubescent: boys indeed until the completed fourteenth year, but girls until the completed twelfth year of age. When this age has been completed, they are called pubescent.

1. Children before the completed seventh year are not held by ecclesiastical laws, even if they have already attained the use of reason. For human laws do not oblige except those self-possessed in reason; but because human laws attend to things which commonly happen, and it does not commonly happen that children before the completed seventh year have the use of reason, therefore by ecclesiastical law they are not judged to be obliged before the completed seventh year, even if it is established that they already have the use of reason.

a. If it is certain that after the seventh year has been completed they have not yet come to the use of reason, they certainly are not held by laws; likewise, if it is doubtful whether they have arrived at it, they are not held.

b. Therefore children who before the completed seventh year eat meats on prohibited days or do not hear Mass on feast days do not sin, not even materially, even if they have already attained the use of reason. Parents, however, are to be admonished to accustom children even before the seventh year to observing the laws of the Church: for afterward, already accustomed, they will observe them more easily.

2. Children after the completed seventh year are held by ecclesiastical laws which fit their age: for at this age they are capable of obligation; therefore obligation affects them unless the Church determines otherwise. Therefore they are held to hear Mass, to abstain from meats, and to confess at least once in the year; but they are not held to fast, nor immediately after the completed seventh year to receive Paschal communion.

3. The impubescent do not incur ordinary ecclesiastical penalties: for although they can be punished by ecclesiastical penalties, nevertheless they are not yet judged subject to those which are latae sententiae, because at this age they do not yet understand ecclesiastical penalties and their reason. Therefore they do not incur censures, with one exception which is specially expressed in law.¹

¹ The censure made against those violating the enclosure of nuns is signified. Cf. De poenis ecclesiasticis, n. 78. From incurring reserved cases the impubescent are not ordinarily exempted; nevertheless in this diocese of Brixen, from a special disposition of the ordinary, they do not incur reserved cases.

147. On clerics subject to civil laws.¹ 1. The supreme pontiff, even if he were not a secular prince, as the supreme head of the Church of Christ, which is a perfect society diffused through all the kingdoms of the earth, by divine law is immune from any jurisdiction of civil authority, unless he freely wills to subject himself to it for a time, just as the supreme pontiffs of the first centuries were subject to the Roman emperors in fact, not in law.

2. To the supreme pontiff belongs the right of exempting both bishops and clerics from civil jurisdiction. There are some who teach that bishops as princes of the Church are already exempt by that very fact from civil jurisdiction.

The Council of Trent teaches that the immunity of ecclesiastical persons has been constituted by the ordinance of God and by canonical sanctions.² For since the Church from divine institution is a perfect society and, by reason of its end, divine institution, and means, a much nobler society than civil society, it follows that ecclesiastical persons and things sacred to God must be immune from the power of civil princes. Therefore by divine law clerics are exempt from secular power and are subjected solely to ecclesiastical power. At the same time the power has been given to the Church of extending and determining the clerical order, who and in what matters ought actually to be immune from secular jurisdiction.³

3. Clerics are held to observe civil laws which are not opposed to the dignity of the clerical state, with regard to directive force.

a. All agree that clerics are held in conscience to the observance of civil laws, but not all derive the obligation from the same source: for some judge that it descends from the law of nature, others from the civil law itself, and finally others from the will of the Church. In our time Wernz (I, n. 108) defends the second opinion, Lehmkuhl (I, n. 140) the third.

b. Clerics are not held to observe laws which do not befit the clerical state, such as military laws: for the Church does not exact their subjection toward these laws, but rather rejects it; but against the will of the Church civil power cannot subject clerics to its laws. If nevertheless they are forced to observe even laws of this kind against the will of the Church, after a protest against the force inflicted has been premised, if it is judged necessary for preventing scandal, they must yield to force and observe the law.

4. Clerics are not held to observe civil laws with regard to coercive force: for by the privilege of the forum the Church has in fact constituted clerics immune from laws decreeing punishment. Since today, however, civil power no longer recognizes this exemption of clerics, but subjects clerics equally with laymen to all civil laws, it must be seen whether the Church permits or at least tolerates the subjection of clerics under certain penal laws, either expressly through concordats or tacitly through a certain agreement.

¹ The things established here cohere with the doctrine of law concerning personal ecclesiastical immunity. Cf. Suarez, De legibus, l. 3, c. 34. Lehmkuhl I, n. 130 f.

² Sess. 25, c. 20, De reformatione.

³ Ballerini-Palmieri IV, n. 521.

148. On regulars subject to the laws of the bishop. 1. Exempt regulars per se are not held by the laws of the ordinaries in whose dioceses they exist: for the privilege of exemption consists in this very thing, that regulars are exempted from the ordinary jurisdiction of bishops and are immediately subject only to the Roman Pontiff.

2. Nevertheless there are many cases in which exempt regulars are subjected to the jurisdiction of bishops, whether ordinary or delegated.¹

Sometimes per accidens they must also subject themselves to bishops in those matters in which they are per se exempt, namely when subjection is necessary either for avoiding scandal or for promoting the common good.

3. Churches and monasteries of regulars can probably be considered as exempt places, so that non-exempt persons are not subject to diocesan laws so long as they remain in them.²

¹ Ballerini-Palmieri VII, n. 51 f., enumerates these cases.

² Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 156. Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 346 ff.

149. On travelers.

a. A traveler is called one who has a domicile or quasi-domicile somewhere, but is outside it with the intention of remaining there only for a brief time.

b. The principle from which the individual questions pertaining here are solved is this: in order that law oblige, besides knowledge of the law two things are required: a. that someone be a subject of the legislator; b. that he be in the territory which is affected by the law.¹

1. Travelers are not held by the particular laws of their domicile: for laws are territorial, that is, affixed to the territory in such a way that they do not extend themselves outside it; but the traveler is outside the territory which is affected by the law.²

a. One who on the day of a particular fast is outside his territory is not held to observe the fast. One who, leaving in the morning from a place where there is no fast, returns to the place of his domicile, where a fast must be observed, can there in the morning fully refresh himself with meats, even if he knows that at noon he will already be in the place of his domicile; nevertheless at home he must abstain from meats and observe the fast insofar as it can still be observed, namely as to abstinence. One who in the morning leaves his domicile, in which there is a fast, knowing certainly that in the evening he will be in a place in which there is no fast, can already in the morning fully refresh himself, because the fast is commanded as an undivided thing; but in his domicile he must abstain from meats, because abstinence prohibits individual meals.³

b. Nevertheless one who leaves the territory only after the time useful for fulfilling the law has elapsed, and has not satisfied the law, sins against the law; as if someone leaves a place in which a particular feast is celebrated after the time of the last Mass has elapsed, without having heard Mass. But one who leaves it in such a way that before the time of the last Mass he has arrived outside the place where the feast is celebrated does not sin if he hears no Mass; for if he had remained in the place where the precept obliged, he could have deferred fulfillment until that time, but when he arrives at another place, the obligation ceases.⁴

2. They do not enjoy the privileges of their domicile: for privileges are in like manner territorial, and therefore travelers lose them by departure from the place of domicile.

One who comes from the place of his domicile where on ember days it is licit to eat meats and stays in a place where this privilege does not exist cannot licitly eat meats.

3. They are not held by the particular laws of the place in which they are staying: for laws oblige only subjects; but only one who has domicile or quasi-domicile in the territory of the legislator is a subject. But if the same law is in force in each domicile, some, adhering more closely to the principles expounded above, declare travelers immune from the law; others, however, from a certain equity probably oblige them to observing the law.⁵

One who leaves the place of his domicile, in which there is a particular fast, and comes into a place where likewise there is a special fast, is not held to fast: not by reason of the precept of his domicile, because he is outside the territory; not by reason of the precept of this place, because he is not a subject of the legislator.

4. Travelers enjoy the privileges of the place in which they are staying: for they would have to undergo too great an inconvenience if they themselves were held to observe laws which others in the same place do not observe.

One who during the time of Lent is staying in the diocese of Brixen can eat meats twice in a day on days on which the indult has been granted, even if this privilege does not exist in the place of his domicile.

5. Nevertheless travelers are held by common laws which are in force in the place where they are staying, even if in their own domicile they have been abrogated. Thus Germans at Rome must fast on the days of Holy Week according to the Roman manner: for the law affects the territory, and the traveler himself is subject to the common legislator. Besides this, they are held to observe: a. local laws which regard contracts, for concerning these the axiom holds: place (that is, local law) rules the act; b. local laws whose transgression would turn to the detriment of the place in which they are staying, as if it were prohibited to export goods, or, by reason of security, to carry weapons; c. laws which have been made specially for travelers.

For preventing damages and for warding off transgressions of universal laws, it is commanded that travelers produce testimony of their domicile and their state, and that traveling priests who wish to celebrate produce testimony of the state of priesthood and of immunity from irregularities and censures.

6. One who has already satisfied a common law in his own territory is not held to satisfy it again if he comes to a place where the same precept urges later, because there does not exist an obligation of fulfilling the same precept twice.

Thus an Italian who fasted at home on the vigil of St. Peter is not held to fast again in France on the following Saturday, to which the fast is there transferred. If, however, he would be a scandal to others because he does not observe the law from which he is immune, by reason of scandal he would be held to observe it.⁶

¹ If ever elsewhere, certainly in this place it must be warned that moral theology, which by its office treats of licit and illicit things, does not primarily teach to what the spirit of the law moves and induces, but chiefly must determine that which the letter of the law strictly demands from us.

² Laws and statutes of regular superiors oblige even outside the territory, because the jurisdiction of regular superiors affects subjects not by reason of territory, but by reason of the vow of obedience, by which they are personally subjected to superiors.

³ What is said of a traveler, namely that he stays outside the territory, holds also of one who is found in an exempt place: for an exempt place can be considered as a place positioned outside the territory of the legislator. Moreover, exempt places certainly are parishes or towns which are subject to another ordinary, and probably also churches and monasteries of regulars. Hence if a bishop under excommunication prohibited dice-playing to clerics, clerics playing in an exempt place would not incur the excommunication. Cf. De praeceptis, n. 663, n. 670.

⁴ St. Alphonsus, n. 157.

⁵ By precept of the Church, prayers (collects) commanded by the bishop of the place must be recited by absolutely all priests celebrating Mass in the diocese, both by regulars and by travelers. S.C.R., April 3, 1821, n. 2613; March 5, 1898, n. 3985.

⁶ Case. In place S., the feast of the holy Apostles Peter and Paul has been transferred to the following Sunday, and on Saturday the fast of the vigil is to be observed; in place U., the feast of the princes of the Apostles is kept on the very day, June 29, and on the preceding day the fast is observed, which day in this year is supposed to fall on Wednesday. a. If a citizen of place S. is staying on Wednesday in place U., knowing certainly that on the next Saturday he will be in the place of his domicile, in rigor of law he must fast in U., because the obligation of the universal law urges. If, however, he had a just cause of fasting rather at home on the following Saturday, he can transfer the fast to this day, provided that he observes the universal law of the Church once. But if in place U. he is not legitimately excused from the fast, he is held to fast at home on Saturday. b. If a citizen of place U. is staying on Wednesday in S., and on Saturday, the day on which they fast in S., is again found at home, in rigor of law he must fast once: for no dispensation from the fast is granted, neither in place S. nor in place U.; therefore he cannot use the privilege of dispensation which is granted nowhere. Nevertheless, since in place S. there exists the privilege of deferring the fast to the following Saturday, he can use this privilege. But if by fasting on that day on which otherwise no one fasts he must undergo great inconvenience, per accidens in that year he is excused from the fast because of this inconvenience.

150. On vagi. A vagus is called one who has neither domicile nor quasi-domicile anywhere. a. There are some (Suarez, Sanchez, and others) who say that vagi are held to the laws of the place in which they are staying. But others (Lessius, Laymann, etc.) teach that they are not held to any particular laws of places, except in the threefold case of which above (5) it is said, but only to the universal laws of the Church. Since this opinion is probable, it is licit to follow it. b. All concede that vagi can be punished where they commit offenses, lest their crimes remain unpunished.

Note. A personal precept, likewise a personal privilege, follows the one to whom it has been given everywhere. Therefore everywhere he can use the dispensation, just as everywhere he is bound by the precept.

151. Notions. 1. Someone becomes the subject of a particular legislator by the fact that he acquires domicile or quasi-domicile in his territory. Therefore in this place, as far as can be done, it must be accurately determined: a. how someone acquires and loses domicile in a parish; b. how he acquires and loses quasi-domicile in a parish.¹ Domicile in a diocese can be acquired only by means of domicile in some parish of the diocese.

2. Domicile is habitation in a parish with the intention of remaining there perpetually, if nothing calls one away from there; quasi-domicile is habitation in a parish with the intention of remaining there for the greater part of the year.

3. A twofold domicile is distinguished: voluntary domicile, which is acquired of itself, i.e. by one's own choice, and legal or necessary domicile, which is acquired through another or from the disposition of law.

It is clear that one must attend not to civil laws, but to the statutes of ecclesiastical law, where there is question of acquiring or losing ecclesiastical domicile. Therefore the place of domicile is the parish, not a city or town, and the conditions required for acquiring or losing domicile are to be sought from canon law, not from civil law, unless canon law adopts them.

¹ Cf. Laurin, Wesen und Bedeutung des Domizils (Archiv f. k. Kirchenrecht: Bd. 26. S. 165).

152. How it is acquired or lost.

I. On acquiring domicile.

1. For acquiring voluntary domicile two things must concur at the same time: a. the fact of habitation, i.e. that someone actually begins to dwell in some place; and b. the intention of remaining there perpetually, unless some new reason calls him away.

a. Domicile is acquired from the day on which these two are present at the same time; it is not necessary that someone already have dwelt there for some time.

b. If the intention of remaining there perpetually is not established, it must be concluded from various indications which produce moral certitude. Indications of this kind are: constant habitation, the transfer of the greater part of one's goods, the acquisition of immovable goods, an assertion especially confirmed by oath.

c. By ecclesiastical law nothing prevents someone from having several domiciles; however, it is required that he dwell in those places in an almost equal manner, e.g. in wintertime in one place, in summertime in another.

2. The persons determined in law acquire legal domicile: a. a wife acquires the domicile of her husband and, if she has become a widow, retains it until she has acquired another; b. children have the domicile of their parents, so long as they are under their power; a son of the family who has become of age retains domicile in the paternal (maternal) house until, having left it, he has acquired another; c. wards have the domicile of their guardians.

a. Where minors and wards have domicile must be taken from civil law (provincial, not Roman), since canon law disposes nothing concerning this matter. Now by civil law minors and wards can acquire quasi-domicile, but they have and retain the domicile of the father (and, he being deceased, of the mother) or of the guardian.¹

b. The distinction between minor and adult children as regards domicile in the paternal house is this: minors have necessary domicile there, so that they cannot abandon it by their own will, whereas adults have free domicile, so that they can abandon it at will.

II. On losing domicile:

Domicile is lost if these two things concur at the same time: a. actual departure from the place of domicile; and b. the intention of not returning. Just as departure alone from the place of domicile does not suffice for losing domicile, so neither does the intention alone of no longer remaining in that place suffice.

Domicile is lost from the day on which these two things are present at the same time, nor is it necessary that domicile or quasi-domicile have been acquired elsewhere.

III. On acquiring quasi-domicile.

Quasi-domicile is acquired if these two things concur at the same time: a. the fact of habitation in some place; and b. the intention of remaining there for the greater part of the year, i.e. for six months.

a. Quasi-domicile also is acquired from the day on which these two things are present at the same time, nor is it required that someone already have dwelt there for some time.

b. Authors do not agree how long it is necessary, for acquiring quasi-domicile, that someone wish to remain in the place: for some say that it is required that he have the intention of remaining for the greater part of the year and therefore for six months; others judge it sufficient if he have the intention of remaining there for a notable part of the year and therefore for four or five months. Nevertheless, the more recent decrees of the sacred congregations require habitation for the greater part of the year.²

c. For acquiring quasi-domicile in some place, true and properly so-called habitation in that same place is required; it does not suffice that someone migrate in some region, after the manner of an itinerant, from place to place.

d. Therefore public officials, judges, professors, students, male servants, female servants, etc., who by reason of office, study, or business to be carried on stay in some place with the intention of remaining there for a longer time (six months), have quasi-domicile in that place. If the intention of remaining for a longer time in some place is not established, it must be presumed from various indications.

IV. On losing quasi-domicile.

Quasi-domicile is lost if these two things concur at the same time: a. actual departure from the place of quasi-domicile; and b. the intention of not returning.

¹ German Code § 8. 11.

² S. Officium, 7 June 1863.

339. Assertions. 1. Jurisdiction, since it is a power over a subject, cannot be exercised except over a subject;¹ but now, if we set aside the supreme pontiff, whose subject one becomes by entering the Church of Christ, someone can become the proper and ordinary subject of some ecclesiastical superior in only two ways: by domicile and by cooptation.

a. Domicile or quasi-domicile within the limits of the territory in which the ecclesiastical superior exercises jurisdiction is the chief manner by which almost all those who are subject to one having ordinary jurisdiction (pastor, bishop) are subjected.

b. By cooptation into a certain family, regulars, religious novices, boarder pupils, and domestic servants of monasteries are subjected to religious superiors.

Note. With respect to the exercise of sacramental jurisdiction, according to the new law all penitents are considered and treated as inhabitants of the place in which they make confession, and therefore by the very act of confession they are subjected to the confessor and become his subjects.

2. For validly hearing confessions there is required ordinary or delegated jurisdiction, and that granted expressly by writing or by words.²

a. Therefore tacit conferral of jurisdiction does not suffice, nor does presumed jurisdiction suffice, even if it is foreseen that it certainly would be granted if it were sought: for it must be granted expressly. Moreover it is not lawful to presume a condition on which the validity of an act depends.

b. Therefore also for absolving from venial sins and from mortal sins already remitted, jurisdiction is required, since the remission of venial sins also in the sacrament of penance is made in the manner of a judgment. Moreover no jurisdiction is granted in ordination itself, but only outside ordination through an act of the will of the ecclesiastical superior.

3. He who has jurisdiction, whether ordinary or delegated, can in that territory absolve all who approach, whether seculars or religious, whether pilgrims or wanderers, or the faithful of Oriental rites.³

¹ Cn. 201, 1.

² Cn. 879.

³ Cn. 881.

364. When Reservation Ceases. 1. Reservation ceases by the law itself:

a. In the confession of the sick, who cannot leave the house.

b. In the confession of spouses, who confess for the sake of entering marriage.

c. If the superior has denied the requested faculty of absolving for some determined case.

It had already been established long ago that, if a regular superior denies to a confessor who asks it the faculty of absolving from a case reserved in his order, the confessor can absolve, unless scandal or common harm is feared which cannot be removed without the matter being manifested to the superior.¹

d. If, in the prudent judgment of the confessor, the faculty cannot be sought from the superior without grave inconvenience of the penitent, or without danger of violating the seal.

Grave inconvenience of the penitent is considered to be present: a. if otherwise the penitent would give scandal; b. if he would incur infamy; g. if otherwise he would have to remain long in mortal sin and this would be hard for him; d. if the precept of paschal communion, or in a priest the necessity of celebrating, urges.

e. Outside the territory of the one reserving, even if the penitent departed from it only in order to obtain absolution.

Therefore travelers can be directly absolved by any confessor from sins and censures reserved in their own diocese, but not likewise from sins and censures reserved in the diocese in which they confess, where they are treated as inhabitants of the place.

f. In danger of death. See n. 366, 5.

2. Reservation ceases by absolution:

a. By valid absolution given by him who has ordinary or delegated power of absolving from reserved sins.

Therefore any confessor can absolve from reserved sins from which the penitent has already once been directly absolved, if they are again submitted to the keys.

b. By confession, even invalid or sacrilegious, before a confessor having power over reserved matters, in which the reserved sin is accused; for the legitimate superior has already judged concerning the reserved sin, and the penitent has already received a congruous penance, which indeed in this case he is bound to fulfill, even if the confession was null.

c. By a valid confession before a confessor having power over reserved matters, in which the reserved sin is not accused through forgetfulness; this opinion is probable and therefore practically safe.

The reason for this opinion is this: reservation can be removed by indirect absolution if the confessor, furnished with due power, wills this; but it is to be presumed that the confessor wills to free a rightly disposed penitent from reservation, since he wishes to help him as much as he can (in quantum possum et tu indiges). Wherefore the penitent afterward can be duly absolved by a simple confessor from that sin which, equally as in the former case, remains necessary matter of confession.²

d. By confession of a doubtfully reserved sin before a simple confessor, even if afterward it is known to be certainly reserved; for this sin has already been directly remitted, the Church supplying jurisdiction.

What is to be done if a simple confessor, through inadvertence or ignorance, absolves from a reserved case:

a. If he absolves from a censure and sin reserved to the pope, the absolution of the censure is valid, provided it is not a censure ab homine or a censure reserved in a most special manner.³

b. If he absolves from an episcopal case, he should attend to the statutes of the diocese; for in many dioceses jurisdiction is conferred on the confessor in this case, so that he can directly absolve a penitent existing in good faith. But if nothing of this kind has been established:

a. The penitent who afterward knows that he was only indirectly absolved from a reserved sin should either return to the confessor and ask him to obtain for him the faculty of absolving, or approach another confessor having power over reserved matters and confess again the sin only indirectly remitted.

b. The confessor should admonish the penitent about the error committed, if this can easily be done, e.g., if he returns to confession, so that that error may be repaired. Or better, he should at once seek the faculty of absolving from that sin and see to it that the penitent returns again to confession and accuses himself at least in general of that sin, and he should absolve him, even if the penitent has not been warned about the error. But if he cannot easily either admonish or absolve the penitent, he should leave him in good faith.

¹ Thus Clement VIII established, as Urban VIII testifies in the constitution Sanctissimus, September 21, 1624. Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 456.

² It is certain that in the time of jubilee even those who do not confess through forgetfulness a reserved sin or a censure incurred are freed from reservations and censures. For in this case the privilege of absolving is certainly granted, so that all penitents may be freed from their reservations and censures, provided they have duly fulfilled the works prescribed for gaining the jubilee (n. 332).

³ Cn. 2247, 3.

463. Who Is the Proper Bishop. 1. As regards the ordination of seculars, from a threefold title a bishop can be the proper bishop of the bishop to be ordained:

a. If the ordinand in the diocese has domicile together with origin.

alpha. He who was born by chance in some diocese on the occasion of a journey or another temporary, even lengthy, stay of the father in that place must be ordained by the bishop of the place where the father then had domicile; and if he then had no domicile, where the father was born. Therefore the bishop of the domicile or, this failing, of the origin of the father is the bishop of origin of the son who by chance was born in some diocese, unless afterward the father acquired domicile where the son was born by chance. For in this case the bishop of that place is the proper bishop of the son by reason of origin.

beta. If the ordinand is illegitimate, his domicile is the domicile of the mother; if he is exposed, his domicile is the place where he was found; if he is a baptized infidel, a neophyte, his place of origin or domicile is not, as up to this point, the place of baptism, but the place in which at the time of baptism the father had domicile or quasi-domicile, Cn. 90, 1.

b. If the ordinand in the diocese has domicile without origin and confirms by oath that he has the intention of remaining perpetually in the diocese.

Nothing prevents someone from having two domiciles in different dioceses and therefore being able to be ordained by either bishop; but once an order has been received by one bishop, he cannot more broadly pertain to each diocese. For by ordination received from his proper bishop he is incardinated into that diocese; but it is repugnant that someone be incardinated into two dioceses.¹

c. If in the diocese he is incardinated,² either alpha. by first tonsure,³ or beta. by a residential benefice which he obtained in the diocese.⁴

Note a. If the ordinand has only a diocese of origin, he ought to be incardinated so that he can be ordained by the bishop of origin.

b. A non-proper bishop can ordain someone who is his subject by reason of domicile, although for the future he is destined for the service of another diocese.

2. Religious who have been legitimately dismissed by their superiors to a bishop can licitly be ordained by this bishop.⁵

Note. Concerning those dismissed from a seminary or from a religious institute. a. A bishop may not admit to his seminary an alien subject unless first by secret letters from the bishop of the petitioner he has learned whether he was dismissed from his own seminary. He is altogether forbidden to admit a dismissed man unless he has found that there is nothing in him which is less fitting to the priestly state.⁶ But if in good faith he admits him and retains him after having known his condition, he is judged ascribed to this diocese, while nevertheless the canonical rules for his incardination and ordination are preserved.

b. Nor can he admit a man dismissed from some religious institute unless first by secret letters from the superiors of the institute he has inquired and established that there is nothing in the dismissed man which is less fitting to the priestly state.

c. Those dismissed from a seminary, if afterward in another diocese they are enriched with sacred orders, are forbidden to return to the diocese from whose seminary they had been dismissed and to have a stable domicile there. The same must be held if those dismissed from a religious institute are ordained and afterward depart from there.⁷

¹ Cf. Gasparri II, n. 857.

² Concerning the nature of incardination and the manner of carrying it out, see the canonists.

³ Cn. 111, 2.

⁴ Cn. 114.

⁵ Cn. 965, 966.

⁶ Cn. 1363, 3.

⁷ S. C. C., December 22, 1905.

ALL those are subject to the law and bound to yield it obedience who live under the authority of the legislator. And so, inasmuch as the natural law is derived from the eternal law of God, and is nothing else than the rule of action suited to human nature as such, all who participate in human nature are subject to the law of nature. Infants and madmen who do something forbidden by the law of nature are indeed excused from formal sin for want of knowledge, but anyone who wilfully provokes them to such actions commits sin by their means in so doing.

Human law is intended to be a guide for reasonable human beings, and so the habitual use of reason is required in order to be subject to human law. Imbeciles and children who have not yet attained the use of reason are not subject to positive law. Regularly the Church presumes that at seven years of age children attain the use of reason, and inasmuch as the law provides for what ordinarily happens we may say that at seven years children begin to be obliged to hear Mass and to fulfil the other duties of the Christian life (Can. 12). It is well that they should be accustomed to obey such laws as those of hearing Mass and abstaining even earlier. There are special reasons for deferring the obligation of fasting, and sometimes for deferring for a time that of receiving Holy Communion (Can. 859).

Drunken people remain subject to the Church’s law, for habitually they have the use of reason.

Men become subject to the Church by Christian baptism, and so all baptized persons, and these alone, are subject to the laws of the Church. Heretics and schismatics who are validly baptized are per se subject to the Church’s laws, but a probable opinion teaches that it is not the Church’s intention to bind them by such of her laws as proximately regard the sanctification of individual souls rather than the public good. Such are the laws of keeping certain days holy, of abstaining, of fasting, of hearing Mass on Sundays. Harm rather than good would follow from intending these laws to bind heretics and schismatics.

Particular ecclesiastical laws are made for particular countries, or provinces, or dioceses, by the competent authority, and bind all subjects living within the territories in question. One is subject to local law by having a domicile or quasi-domicile in the territory for which the law is made. To constitute a domicile in ecclesiastical law, two conditions are required. The person domiciled must have taken up his abode in a parish, or quasi-parish, or at least in a diocese, vicariate apostolic, or prefecture apostolic; and this abode must be joined either with the intention of perpetually remaining there, if they are not called away, or with the actual dwelling there for ten years.

A quasi-domicile is acquired by taking up his abode in the place as above, joined with the intention of remaining there for the greater part of a year if not called away, or with the actual dwelling there for the greater part of a year.

A domicile and a quasi-domicile are lost by those who have them leaving their abode with the intention of not returning there; but wives always retain the domicile of their husbands unless they are lawfully separated from them, and minors that of their guardians (Can. 13, 92, 93, 95).

Whoever, then, resides in a place, having therein a domicile or quasi-domicile is subject to the particular laws of that place. Contracts, too, are governed by the law of the place where they are made, and whoever commits a crime is amenable to the law of the country where it is committed.

While outside the limits of the territory in which one is domiciled, there is no obligation to obey the particular laws of that territory, for the law is territorial and does not bind beyond the limits of the territory for which it was made.

A stranger (peregrinus), or one who has a domicile in another place, but at present is staying elsewhere, is not bound by the particular laws of the place where he is staying; for he is not subject to their authority by having either a domicile or a quasi-domicile in the place, And so, if an English Catholic happened to be in Dublin on the feast of St Patrick, which is kept there as a day of obligation, he would not be bound to hear Mass; nor would a Dublin man who happened to be staying on that day in England. However, a stranger staying in a place where the common law of the Church is observed is bound to act according to its provisions, though there may be a dispensation from its observance in the place where he has his domicile. And so an English Catholic staying in Rome should abstain from flesh meat on Saturday as well as on Friday in Ember week. Moreover, any contracts that he may enter into or crimes that he may commit subject him to the laws of the country where he is staying in those respects (Can. 14).

Homeless people (vagi) are bound by the general and particular laws which are in force in the place where they are staying (Can. 14, sec. 2).

Regulars and their monasteries are exempt from episcopal authority, and so in general are not subject to the laws made by the Bishops for their dioceses. There are, however, many exceptions to this general rule, for in spite of their exemption regulars have in special cases been subjected by the Holy See to the ordinary or else delegated authority of diocesan Bishops. The special cases are treated of by canonists (Can. 615).

Subjection to law is distinguished as twofold, namely, subjection in first act and subjection in second act, according as the one subject to the law is ignorant of the law or knows it. One who, while ignorant or inattentive, transgresses a law to which he is subject sins materially; one who violates a known and actually obliging law sins formally. Our discussion is about subjection in first act. And first we shall set forth some notions necessary to know; then we shall speak of the subjects of law generally, then of some subjects specifically; finally, we shall investigate how far it is licit to withdraw oneself from the dominion of law, or to place causes exempting from it.

The preliminary notions to be presented here are contained chiefly in book 2 of the Code, which is entitled On Persons.

I. Christian. By Baptism a human being is constituted a person in the Church of Christ with all the rights and duties of Christians, unless, as regards rights, there stands in the way an obstacle impeding the bond of ecclesiastical communion, or a censure imposed by the Church (can. 87).

II. Major, minor, infant.

1. A person who has completed the twenty-first year of age is a major (can. 88, § 1).

2. One who has not yet completed the twenty-first year of age is a minor (can. cit.). A minor, if male, is considered pubescent from the completed fourteenth year; if female, from the completed twelfth year (can. 88, § 2).

3. One who is impubescent, before the full seventh year, is called an infant, or child, or little one, and is considered not master of himself; but when the seventh year has been completed, he is presumed to have the use of reason. All who are habitually destitute of the use of reason are assimilated to an infant (can. 88, § 3).

III. Inhabitant, temporary resident, traveler. A person is called an inhabitant in the place where he has domicile; a temporary resident, in the place where he has quasi-domicile; a traveler, if he is staying outside the domicile and quasi-domicile which he still retains; a vagus, if he nowhere has domicile or quasi-domicile (can. 91).

IV. Place of origin. The place of origin of a child, even a neophyte, is that in which, when the child was born, the father had domicile, or, in the absence of domicile, quasi-domicile; or, if the child is illegitimate or posthumous, the mother had it (can. 90, § 1). If there is question of a child of vagi, the place of origin is the very place of birth; if of an exposed child, it is the place in which he was found (can. 90, § 2).

V. Domicile, quasi-domicile. These imply a certain stable residence in some territory, and are distinguished: 1. into proper or voluntary, and legal or necessary, according as it is constituted by personal residence or by the residence of another; 2. into parochial and diocesan, according as it is had in a parish or quasi-parish, or in a diocese, vicariate, or prefecture, but not in a parish or quasi-parish (can. 93, § 1). These things noted, let there be:

1. Acquisition of domicile and quasi-domicile:

a) Proper domicile is acquired by residence in some parish or quasi-parish, or at least in a diocese, apostolic vicariate, or apostolic prefecture; and this residence is either joined with the intention of remaining there perpetually, if nothing calls one away from it, or has been prolonged to a completed ten years (can. 92, § 1). Therefore proper domicile is acquired: 1. when both the fact of residence and the intention described are simultaneously present; 2. by the very fact that someone has resided somewhere for ten completed years. The intention of remaining perpetually can be evident both from the declaration of the inhabitant and from facts disclosing the intention, for example, from the transfer of family, the transfer of the greater part of goods, etc.

b) Proper quasi-domicile is acquired by residence as above, which is either joined with the intention of remaining there at least for the greater part of the year, if nothing calls one away from it, or has actually been prolonged to the greater part of the year (can. 92, § 2), that is, as the Instruction of the Holy Office¹ signified, for at least six months. Therefore quasi-domicile is acquired: 1. as soon as both things concur simultaneously, namely, both the fact of residence and the described intention; 2. by the very fact that someone has resided somewhere for the greater part of the year.

c) As regards legal domicile, these things hold: "A wife not legitimately separated from her husband necessarily retains the domicile of her husband; an insane person, the domicile of the curator; a minor, the domicile of the one to whose power he is subject" (can. 93, § 1). A professed religious acquires domicile in the place of the religious house to which he is ascribed.

Note. A minor who has passed beyond infancy can obtain proper quasi-domicile; likewise a wife not legitimately separated from her husband can obtain it, and one legitimately separated can obtain even domicile (can. 93, § 2). A wife maliciously deserted by her husband cannot obtain a proper and distinct domicile unless she has obtained perpetual separation, or separation for an indefinite time, from an ecclesiastical judge.²

2. Effects of domicile and quasi-domicile:

a) By either domicile or quasi-domicile each person obtains his own pastor and Ordinary (can. 94, § 1).

b) The proper pastor or Ordinary of a vagus is the pastor or Ordinary of the place in which the vagus is actually residing (can. 94, § 2).

c) Of those also who have only diocesan domicile or quasi-domicile, the proper pastor is the pastor of the place in which they are actually residing (can. 94, § 3).

3. Loss of domicile and quasi-domicile: domicile and quasi-domicile are lost by departure from the place with the intention of not returning (can. 95).

These things suffice here; more in the treatise on marriage.

¹ June 7, 1867.

² Commission for the Interpretation of the Code, July 14, 1922 (A.A.S. 1922, p. 526).

V. Travelers and vagi. Considering can. 14:

1. Travelers:

a) They are held by the general laws of the Church, even by those which do not have force in their own territory by reason of abrogation or dispensation. Likewise they are held by laws established by a provincial or national Council, provided that they are staying in the territory of the province or nation.

b) Generally, they are not held by the particular laws of their own territory, from which they are absent; and this holds even if they departed with the intention of being exempted from the law. The reason is that they are not in the territory of the law (n. 125, VI; St. Alphonsus, I, 157). I said generally, because they are held by laws whose transgression does harm in their own territory. Thus, for example, a pastor who is illegitimately absent and omits those things which he ought to perform by office in his own territory becomes a transgressor of the law.

c) Generally, they are not held by the particular laws of the territory in which they are staying. The reason is that they are not of the territory of the law (n. 126, VI; St. Alphonsus, I, 156). The doctrine handed down holds also in the case in which the particular law has force both in the territory in which the traveler is staying and in his own territory. The reason is that in the supposed hypothesis the traveler is not held to observe the law of the place in which he is staying: neither by force of the law having force in his own territory, since he is outside that territory; nor by force of the law having force in the foreign territory, since he is not of the foreign territory. I said generally, because they are held by laws "which provide for public order or determine the solemnities of acts" (can. 14, § 1, 2°). Considering these words of the cited canon, and the particular dispositions of the Code or other dispositions, travelers are held by laws:

alpha) Which determine the solemnities of acts, for example, contracts, including transactions and testaments (cf. can. 1529, 1301, 1926).

beta) Which regulate external order, for example, as regards places in churches and processions.

gamma) Which have been made for travelers as such.

delta) Which regard the reservation of sins (can. 893, compared with the response of the Commission for the Interpretation of the Code),¹ or approved customs as regards the quantity and quality of foods on days of fasting and abstinence (can. 1251, § 1, compared with the Sacred Congregation of the Council), or a local interdict (can. 2269, § 2), or the license of celebrating, or celebret as it is called (can. 804, § 3), or certain rubrics in force in the territory, for example, the calendar to be followed, the prayer commanded.

Note. Nevertheless, as regards liturgical laws, can. 2 is to be noted: "The Code, for the most part, decrees nothing concerning the rites and ceremonies which the liturgical books, approved by the Latin Church, prescribe to be observed in the celebration of the Sacraments and sacramentals and in the performance of other sacred things. Wherefore all liturgical laws retain their force, unless some one of them is expressly corrected in the Code." Hence, for example, a law or precept by which the bishop of the place has prescribed a collect must be observed by all celebrating there, both regulars and seculars (S.R.C., April 3, 1821, n. 2613; March 5, 1898, n. 3985). Note also that in the Canon of the Mass the name of the bishop of the place must be named.

epsilon) Finally, they are held by accident to observe laws if the avoidance of scandal requires this. Indeed, the Sacred Congregation of the Council, in circular letters² concerning priests staying in the countryside outside the diocese, established: "The Ordinaries of places to which priests are accustomed to betake themselves for reasons of health... should establish suitable penalties by which they will be affected if they give scandal... They can also threaten suspension to be incurred by the very fact, if they go to public theaters, cinemas..." (n. 6).

d) They are held to either one if a universal law has been modified in the territory in which they are staying, that is, they are held either to the universal law as it has force of itself, or to the modified law. This is deduced from a response of the Holy Office to the question: "Whether and on what day, in the time of Lent, travelers are held to observe the Saturday abstinence in places where, by a special disposition of the Holy See, the same abstinence must be observed on Wednesday"; the response was: "They are held on either day at will, scandal however being removed."³

e) They can use the privileges and dispensations, for example from the law of fasting, of the place in which they are staying; but they cannot use privileges or dispensations which perhaps have force in their own territory.

2. Vagi are obliged by both general and particular laws which have force in the place in which they are staying (can. 14, § 2).

3. Travelers and vagi are everywhere held by personal precepts which have been imposed upon them, unless the superior does not wish, or even, which has place in some orders in some cases, cannot oblige outside the convent or convents.

Corollary I. One who, in the case in which a universal law has been affixed in different places to different days, twice stays in a place where the law is observed, scandal excluded, satisfies by fulfilling the law once; for this must be considered the mind of the Church. Hence one who, for example, fasted on the vigil of the feast of Saints Peter and Paul is not held to fast again in a territory where the obligation of fasting has been transferred to the following Saturday.⁴

Corollary II. One who, in the hypothesis just supposed, never stays in a place where the law is observed, scandal excluded, seems immune from the observation of the law, since it does not urge in the place where he is actually staying.⁵ There is added the fact that, if this solution were rejected, he would have to observe the law on the day on which the inhabitants of the place in which he is staying would not be held to it; this is not considered to be required by the Church. Nor does it seem that one who acted thus deliberately is to be excepted.

Corollary III. One who is in the place of domicile where a particular feast is celebrated is not held before departure to assist at Mass, provided that he has arrived at a place where the law does not have force before the only Mass, or, if several Masses are celebrated, the last Mass, has begun in the place of domicile. Nor object: if several Masses occur and one of them is celebrated before departure, he ought to assist at this one, because one who foresees an impediment to fulfilling an obligation is bound to anticipate it. For that is true only when someone foresees that he will be impeded while he remains subject to the law; this does not obtain in our case (St. Alphonsus, I, 157, 157, 6°).

¹ November 20, 1920 (A.A.S. 1920, p. 575).

² November 15, 1924.

³ Holy Office, February 9, 1924 (A.A.S. 1924, p. 94).

⁴ Cf. Beyersbergen in N. K. St., 1931, p. 80.

⁵ July 1, 1926 (A.A.S. 1926, p. 312).

Those Bound by General Laws.—The general laws of the Church oblige all and only such persons as are at once subjects of the Church and capable of receiving a law (Canon 12).

(a) By Baptism one becomes a member of the Church, and hence it is the baptized who are subject to ecclesiastical laws; (b) by her laws, the Church commands only human and deliberate acts or omissions, and hence it is only those who can reason that are subject to those laws. (c) Moreover, unless the law expressly rules otherwise, those who, although they have attained the use of reason, have not yet completed their seventh year are not bound by purely ecclesiastical law. Specific exceptions are stated in the law. Thus: (1) Canons 854, Sec.2, and 940, Sec.1, regarding the reception of the sacraments in danger of death, Canon 859, Sec.1, stating the precepts of Easter Communion, and Canon 906, containing the precepts of annual confession, declare that the law in these matters is binding on persons having the use of reason, regardless of the actual completion of the seventh year, The law of fasting in Canon 1254, Sec.2 binds after the completion of the twenty-first year. (2) Canon 1099 explicitly exempts non-Catholics, in their own marriages, from the ecclesiastical form of marriage; also Canon 1070 exempts them from the impediment of disparity of cult. (3) The habitually insane are considered as infants under seven (Canon 88, Sec.3). Accordingly, although they are bound by the Divine Law during lucid moments, they are not usually bound by purely ecclesiastical laws during this period.

By the unbaptized are here understood, not only those who have never received Baptism (such as infidels, pagans, Mohammedans, Jews, catechumens), but also those who were baptized invalidly. The divine law of receiving Baptism and entering the Church applies to these persons, but, as long as they are unbaptized, they are not subjects of the Church. Thus: (a) directly they are not obliged by any ecclesiastical law, and hence it is not sinful in itself to ask them to do what is forbidden by such laws (e.g., work on a holyday); (b) indirectly they become subject to ecclesiastical law when they enter into law-governed relations with the baptized who are subject to church law. Example: An unbaptized person who marries a Catholic is married invalidly, unless the law on dispensation has been observed.

Baptized non-Catholics include heretics and schismatics. Thus: (a) objectively, these persons are obliged by ecclesiastical laws, unless they are excepted by the law itself, and hence it is not lawful directly to induce them to transgress a Church law (e.g., to eat meat on Friday); (b) subjectively, they are generally excused from formal sin in the non-observance of Church laws, and it is not a sin to co-operate materially in such non-observance (e.g., by giving meat on Friday to a Protestant in good faith who requests it or wishes it).

It is held that the Church is more lenient as regards those baptized as non-Catholics, that is, those who were born and brought up in some non-Catholic sect. Thus: (a) laws that have for their object the sanctification of the individual (such as fasting and abstinence, Sunday Mass, etc.), are not insisted on for them, since this would hurt rather than help their spiritual interests; (b) laws that have for their object the protection of the public welfare (such as the laws regarding mixed marriage), apply also to baptized non-Catholics.

Other authors do not admit this distinction and hold that these non-Catholics are bound by the laws of the Church, since Canon 87 expressly states: By Baptism man is constituted a person in the Church of Christ with all the rights and duties of Christians.

Apostates and excommunicated persons are certainly bound by all ecclesiastical laws.

Oriental Catholics are not bound by pontifical laws (Canon 1) except in the following cases: (a) when the matter is dogmatic; (b) when the law implicitly extends to them, since it contains a declaration of natural or divine law; (c) when the law is explicitly extended to them. An example of (a) is Canon 218; of (b) Canon 228,2; of (c) Canons 622, Sec.4 and 1099, Sec.1, 3.

It is a general rule that all persons baptized, as just explained, are subject to ecclesiastical laws, if they are habitually able to reason; but that they are not subject to those laws, if they are not habitually able to reason.

First Rule.—Persons habitually able to reason are all those who in their normal state are able to understand the difference between right and wrong, that is, the majority of those who have completed seven years of age. Such persons are subject to ecclesiastical laws, even when actually they are unable to reason on account of temporary intoxication, delirium, derangement, unconsciousness, etc. Hence, one who would offer meat on Friday to a person momentarily unbalanced on the plea that his condition excused him from the law, would do wrong; for the state of passing irresponsibility excuses from formal sin (see 249), but not from the law.

Second Rule.—Persons habitually unable to reason are all those who have not yet learned the difference between right and wrong (e.g., infants and idiots), or who have permanently lost all knowledge of right and wrong (e.g., the hopelessly insane). These persons are not bound by ecclesiastical laws, at least not by those that are directive. Hence, in itself it is not wrong to give meat on days of abstinence to such persons, even when they are Catholics.

Exceptions to the first rule just given are as follows:

(a) According to Canon Law, the age of reason comes legally when one has completed seven years (Canon 12). If a boy or girl is able to reason before that age, he or she is not obliged by laws that are purely ecclesiastical, although it is advisable that parents accustom their children to the hearing of Mass, to abstinence, etc., as soon as this can be conveniently done. If a child has passed the seventh year and does not appear able to reason, he is not bound by ecclesiastical laws.

(b) According to Canon Law, the age of puberty is fixed for males at the completion of fourteen years of age, for females at the completion of twelve years of age (Canon 88, Sec.2). These who have not attained this age are excused from all penal laws, unless a law expressly states the contrary; for on account of the want of mature judgment they deserve leniency (Canon 2230).

(c) The age of majority in Canon (as in Civil) Law is reached when one has completed twenty-one years (Canon 88, Sec.1). Minors in the exercise of rights are subject to the power of parents or guardians, except where the contrary is declared by the law, as is the case for the reception of the Sacraments and the choice of a religious life (Canon 89). They are not obliged by the law of fast (Canon 1254, Sec.2).

There are some exceptions to the second rule given in 432. Thus, those laws of the Church that grant favors or that invalidate acts can apply even to those who are habitually unable to reason (such as infants and the perpetually demented); for laws of this kind are not directive of the acts of subjects.

1. A certain archbishop, when various means had been tried and other penalties imposed, could not root out an abuse which had crept too much into his diocese, by which some, for various reasons, wishing to contract marriage secretly, under pretext of infirmity or some similar thing, called the parish priest to themselves, and, with him present and two witnesses, suddenly contracted marriages before the parish priest could flee. From these marriages many scandals and dissensions arose. Therefore, by law and public edict, he not only prohibited this, but removed from parish priests, and from other priests with their license, the faculty of assisting at marriages of this sort when denunciations had not first been made; and he suspended them all as to this act of assisting and declared that marriages, if any thereafter were made in this way, would be invalid, on account of defect of the power of assisting on the part of the parish priest, or of another priest, which had now been taken away by this law.

Q. 1. Can bishops make laws? 2. Could the archbishop validly do this?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 181. To the second, negatively. The first reason is because, since "the Council of Trent requires for the validity of marriage only the presence of the parish priest and of two witnesses, the archbishop could not invalidate marriages made before the parish priest and witnesses, such as are those of which there is question, since he truly still remains the true parish priest, retaining the title of his parish, especially since that assistance is not an act of jurisdiction in the parish priest; wherefore, even if, on account of excommunication or some other censure, he were suspended from all jurisdiction, he would still validly assist at marriage, as Sanchez teaches with the common opinion, l. 3, d. 21, n. 4." Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 1, d. 45, n. 5. The second reason is because, "whatever may be the case concerning other matters, nevertheless in this matter the bishop cannot by his law introduce an impediment invalidating marriage beyond those which have been introduced by common law; for this, as being a most grave affair, and one from which most grave inconveniences follow, the Supreme Pontiff has deservedly reserved to himself alone, as the doctors commonly admit, whom Thomas Sanchez, l. 7, De Matr., d. 1, n. 9, Basilius Pontius, and all others follow." Lugo l. c., n. 6. It is confirmed from the response of the Sacred Congregation of the Council in the same Lugo, l. c., n. 4.

2. Cunegunda, abbess of nuns, commands her professed nuns and novices certain exterior exercises of mortification and penance, and decrees that these are always to be observed in the future. Exterior mortification, she says, is very useful for spiritual perfection; and it was omitted in the Constitutions approved by the Holy See, and so was left to the power and discretion of the Abbess. Moreover, she commands all equally that each one exhibit to her in writing all her virtues and all her sins, every month. The rendering of conscience, she says, was always in use among the Saints and the ancient Monks; and it is a salutary and best means of holiness and perfection, indeed to be counseled to all.

Q. 1. Can the Abbess or Superior of nuns make laws? 2. What must be thought concerning Cunegunda?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 182. To the second: the abbess or superior of nuns can indeed, in particular cases and to particular or individual professed nuns, impose precepts in virtue of holy obedience, by force of the vow of obedience, obliging gravely or lightly, with respect to those things which pertain to regular discipline, according to the Rule and Constitutions approved by the Holy See. For otherwise nuns would profess obedience by vow in vain. To professed nuns: for precepts of this sort cannot be imposed on novices, since they have not yet emitted the vow of obedience. But since she does not have spiritual and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, she does not have the power of making laws; and so Cunegunda cannot impose on the whole Community, and in perpetuity, those exterior exercises of mortification and penance. And since they are not found prescribed in the Constitutions approved by the Holy See, they would be imposed not according to the Constitutions, but beyond the Constitutions; whence also under this head Cunegunda lacks the aforesaid faculty. For she herself cannot establish a new Constitution beyond the approved ones. - But, although the superior of nuns, as being a woman, lacks ecclesiastical jurisdiction, nevertheless she has economic power, which in itself does not depend on the Keys of the Church or on sacred Orders, but is annexed by natural law itself to any superiority, and is found in any community or society which is ruled by some superior. Hence, by force of this power, a superior can also command something to novices, and correct them, or restrain them by some moderate penalty; but this power, as is clear, is very limited and restricted. Therefore the first precept of Cunegunda is of no force.

The same must be said of the other precept of Cunegunda; which "is no less imprudent than iniquitous. Iniquitous, because she wishes to bind subjects to defame themselves concerning their offenses, however hidden, and indeed before a woman, to whom neither God nor any mortal ever wished to entrust the power of discussing the hidden places of consciences. But it ought to be judged imprudent from the fact that, for the simpler ones, it can easily become a stone of offense, and give occasion to innumerable sacrileges, while they persuade themselves that they are held to put all their offenses, however hidden, on paper, which nevertheless, shame prevailing, they will not do; nor even will they expose more to the confessor than they have noted down in writing. Indeed such superiors, by their damnable curiosity, will expose themselves to dangers of temptations while they attempt to penetrate the hidden things of consciences, which God willed to reserve to himself alone and to his vicars, namely priests." Elbel 284. - Elbel 281-284; G. 97, 98.

This is confirmed from the general Decree of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, 17 December 1890, in which rendering of account of conscience of this sort is prohibited, both for monasteries of nuns, even of solemn vows, and for Institutes of simple vows of either sex, only those Institutes of men excepted which are altogether ecclesiastical in nature and governance. And in the same Decree it is declared to be an abuse that "sometimes in their Constitutions manifestation of conscience had been permitted, that the pupils might more easily learn from experienced superiors, in doubts, the arduous way of perfection, and, contrary to this, by some of these an intimate scrutiny of conscience, which is reserved uniquely to the sacrament of penance, was introduced."

3. Amalia has sons of five, seven, and nine years, to all of whom she is accustomed to give meat on Friday, because, she says, they are not bound by the law of fasting; and because, since the meat was left over from Thursday, it could not conveniently be preserved until Sunday.

4. Exuperius, very early in the morning, departs from the place of his domicile, where a special and obligatory feast of the Patron of the place is celebrated; and he comes to a nearby place, where there is also celebrated a special and obligatory feast of the Patron of the place. In neither place does Exuperius hear Mass that day. Having returned to his homeland after some days, he finds a special fast observed there. But, since before he began the journey he had already in the morning and at midday fortified his stomach with a solid breakfast and an abundant dinner, and with meats, in the evening in his homeland he is refreshed with the customary whole supper and with meats.

Q. 1. What is the subject of law? 2. What concerning Amalia and Exuperius?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 192 seqq. To the second: Amalia could give meat to the five-year-old son, because he is not yet habitually master of reason. But she could not give meat to the seven-year-old son, the seventh year already completed, and to the nine-year-old son; because, although these are not yet held by the law of fasting, nevertheless they are held by the law of abstinence. For they are held to observe those ecclesiastical laws whose observance is proportioned to their powers. Nor indeed, speaking in itself, is it an excusing reason that the meats are left over from Thursday and could not be preserved until Sunday.

Exuperius is exempted from grave sin because he did not hear Mass; because absent from his homeland, he could not be held by the law of his homeland, nor was he bound by the law of the place in which he was staying, because in that place he was a traveler. But having returned to his homeland, although he was excused from the law of fasting on that day on which he had returned to it, because fasting was no longer possible after several meals had been taken, he was nevertheless still held, during the remaining part of the day, to observe abstinence from meat. - G. 79-87; Elbel 367-472.

5. Paphnutius, a monk dwelling in Rome, on the vigil of the feast of the Purification, on which, by vow, one fasts in the City, does not fast, because, he says, Regulars by force of the privilege of exemption are not held to fasts prescribed by the authority of the Ordinary of the place.

Q. What as to the case?

R. La-Croix, l. 3, p. 2, n. 1274, speaking of religious, says: "Religious are held to ecclesiastical fasts of common law, as is clear in itself; but they are not held to those which are introduced by special custom or vow of the townspeople among whom they reside, because they are not judged part of the profane community; thus Diana, who nevertheless had said that they are obliged by a general custom received in some city. Nor are exempt religious held to those things which are introduced by Ordinaries of places, although by new law they are held to observe diocesan feasts and cessation from divine offices in time of interdict; thus Sanchez, Bonacina, Castro Palao, and others commonly with Diana."

Nevertheless Paphnutius is bound at Rome to the aforesaid fast, both because at Rome there is already such a custom that religious also observe that fast, and because otherwise wonder and scandal could easily exist for the people, especially if other monks also, led by the same reason, should themselves not observe the fast.

"If in some community of Regulars," says Benedict XIV, De Syn., l. 13, c. 4, n. 7, "an ancient custom of observing fasts which the bishop, whether in synod or outside synod, appoints had prevailed, no one doubts that the same community can be compelled thereafter to observe them: for then the obligation of fasting does not arise from the jurisdiction of the bishop, but from the custom itself, which has force for inducing the obligation of law.... similarly, not by the precept of the bishop, but by natural law, Regulars are compelled to fast on those days which the bishop has ordered to be days of hunger, if by not fasting they give scandal to others." And after he had affirmed that the fast on the vigil of St. Apollinaris, prescribed in the diocesan Synod in the year 1627, is observed in the whole diocese of Ravenna both by seculars and by regulars, he adds: "Clement XI, so that every year there might be celebrated the memory of liberation from the danger of the earthquake by which the Roman City was afflicted, established that a fast was to be observed yearly on the day before the feast day of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin Mary; and although this fast was commanded by the said Pontiff as bishop of the City, it is observed up to the present day by seculars and by regulars."

6. Zephirina, her husband having died, remained in her parish. Civilly married to Lucretius, who lived in another parish, she was led into his house. After a week they contract marriage before the parish priest of the former parish of Zephirina. Is it valid?

R. A woman has the domicile of her husband, and having become a widow she preserves it until she acquires another. C. I. 18; C. G. 108. But when other marriages intervene, the domicile of the woman is changed. L. 22, Ad Municip. Therefore Zephirina, although only civilly married, having been led into the house of the man living in another parish, first lost her domicile and acquired a new one. Therefore even if she had contracted marriage not after a week, but on the same day, before the parish priest of the former domicile, the marriage would have been null. - I. M. 199.

7. A girl, bereft of parents, left the domicile of the family, not with the mind of not returning, but so that she might be a servant for some time. Meanwhile she completed majority. - Soon, intending to enter marriage, she goes to the parish of the domicile of the parents, or of the family. - The parish priest says: Now I have no jurisdiction, and he requires delegation from the parish priest of the preceding quasi-domicile. - Had the aforesaid parish priest lost all jurisdiction?

R. Negatively. For the parish priest did not lose jurisdiction in the case, if that girl did not lose her first domicile. But in fact she did not lose the domicile. For first, children of the family follow the domicile of the parent under whose paternal power they are. L. 3, C. de Municip. But domicile is not lost without intention and fact, just as it is not acquired without intention and fact. Therefore domicile is not lost by the intention only of departing, as, for example, if someone resolves to depart from such a place and then does not depart. Nor likewise is it lost by simple departure, if someone, for example, goes off elsewhere for some time and then returns to the place of his own domicile. Therefore, in order that domicile be lost, it is required that he depart with the intention of not returning, or as one not going to return. But the aforesaid girl departed not with the mind of not returning, but only so that she might be absent for some time, and then in fact she returned. Therefore she did not lose the domicile.

Nor indeed should it be said that in the case the domicile was lost by the very acquisition of a new quasi-domicile through service in another parish. For first, from the case this acquisition of quasi-domicile is not established. For for it there is required intention and fact: the intention of remaining somewhere for at least the greater part of a year, and the fact, namely that one has truly come there. Concerning intention, nothing is established in the case. Rather the contrary is established, because she seems to have come wholly by her own will, as if precariously, and to have come only for the sake of finding service, and, this not having been found, intending to depart. Whence it is that although she remained in that place, contrary to her opinion, both for the greater part of a year and even for an entire year, as appears from the difficulty made by the parish priest, nevertheless she more truly did not acquire a quasi-domicile. And although she acquired this new quasi-domicile, she did not thereby lose the prior domicile. For if someone can have a double domicile, why will he not be able to have at the same time both a domicile and a quasi-domicile, as in fact is verified in students who for several years study, for example, in some University and afterwards return to their homeland?

Nor likewise can any difficulty be had from the fact that that girl had in the meantime attained majority,

For first, since, as long as a child of the family is under paternal power, it is not permitted to her to transfer her domicile elsewhere; therefore meanwhile the aforesaid girl retained the paternal domicile. Then from the majority which she attained, it does not follow that she had previously lost the domicile of her parents or of the family, but it follows only that, according to modern laws, she can, if she wishes, transfer her domicile elsewhere. C. I. 220, 221; C. G. 372, 374.

Lastly, from the fact that this girl had been bereaved of her parents, it does not follow, first, as is clear, that by the death of her parents she lost her domicile; nor, as is clearly gathered from the case, did it happen that that girl had in reality stayed outside the domicile of her parents or family, except for that last and brief time of service, of which there is question. - I. M. 199.

What is the subject of law? - The subject of law and obligation are all and only subjects for whom the law has been made. For the whole force of obliging is in the superior. But only a subject corresponds to a superior. But laws are not always made for all subjects, as military laws, laws of clerics, etc. - General local laws are made for any place, and particular laws for a particular territory; those are held by them who dwell in the same territory, and have domicile or quasi-domicile there, or are staying there. Cf. 199. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 93. a. 5, q. 96. a. 5; L. 153; Wirceburg. c. 4. a. 4.

You will resolve: Every man is subject to natural law. For natural law is the very reason and divine will commanding the order to be preserved and forbidding it to be disturbed, promulgated through the very light of reason, namely insofar as God inserted it into the mind of men to be known naturally. But every man enjoys reason. Therefore it is not licit to provoke infants, drunkards, and the insane to intrinsically evil actions. L. 153. 155. - All and only those habitually possessed of reason, who exist under the jurisdiction of the legislator, can be subject to a positive law commanding or prohibiting human action. For law is a rational and stable rule for the common good. But men habitually lacking the use of reason cannot be directed by a rational and stable rule to the common end of society. Hence meats are licitly given to infants not yet having obtained the use of reason, and to the perpetually insane, on prohibited days. They are illicitly given to those insane for a short time and to drunkards. L. 153. 155; Elbel n. 355 seq.; Struggl q. 3. n. 8 seq.

The legislator is not bound directly by his laws as such, that is, as regards the obliging and coercive force; nevertheless indirectly, as regards the merely directive force, from a certain equity he is bound to conform himself as head to the members, namely as regards those laws which befit his state. Hence "it is probable, scandal being excluded, that he is bound only under light fault, because he is bound to the law only from honorableness." L. 154. Scandal being excluded: for if scandal were present in a public transgression of the law, he would be bound to observe it; by no means however in that case would he also be subject to the penalties which he himself imposed on transgressors. Likewise he is also bound to use equal condition in contracts. C. Iustum Dist. 9; L. 154; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 96. a. 5; Struggl q. 3. n. 1; Lessius De Iur. et Iustit. l. 2. c. 35. dub. 5. n. 33; Suarez De Legib. l. 3. c. 35.

Infidels, not yet baptized, are not obligated by the laws of the Church, although they are bound to enter the Church. 1 Cor. 5:12. On the contrary, heretics, schismatics, and the excommunicated are of themselves held by ecclesiastical laws. This must be understood of the excommunicated as regards acts not interdicted by the excommunication itself. But as regards heretics, in places where they are tolerated, penal laws have no effect. Trent sess. 7. c. 8 de Bapt.; Schmalz. l. 4. t. 1. n. 378-380, t. 3. n. 99, l. 5. t. 7. n. 171-174; Reiffenst. l. 1. t. 2. n. 274; L. 154.

Greek Catholics, and generally Orientals, although they are held by definitions of catholic doctrine concerning faith and morals, nevertheless are not bound by disciplinary laws of the universal Church, unless something is established concerning them, either by express mention made of them, or by reason of the matter implicitly extended to them by the law. Indeed Constitutions of Roman Pontiffs made for one oriental rite are not extended to other rites without express extension. Nor indeed is it licit for Catholics to depart from the custom and observance of their own rite approved by the Holy Roman Church. E. M. de Stat. partic. 213; Bened. XIV, C. Etsi pastoralis, May 26, 1742, § 9. n. 24, C. Allatae, July 26, 1755; Collect. S. C. de P. F. n. 113. 1999.

Practically speaking, are heretics excused from the observance of the laws of the Church, although of themselves they are bound? - R. Affirmatively, 1. by reason of ignorance in which they are involved. 2. Because it is not presumed that the Church wishes to urge this obligation, lest sins be multiplied in vain, at least as regards merely preceptive laws, which regard the spiritual good of souls. As regards merely preceptive laws; for one is not excused as regards universal laws commanding human action, invalidating laws; because these directly regard public good and order, such as the laws of impediments of marriage, unless the Church positively excepts them, as was done by the Decree Ne temere as regards the form of marriage, which, if they enter marriage among themselves, they are not bound to observe.

Are children held by ecclesiastical laws as soon as they have obtained the use of reason, although they have not yet completed seven years? - More probably this must be denied, because human laws attend to those things which commonly happen. But the use of reason does not commonly happen before the completion of seven years. Moreover, all admit that children before seven years do not incur penalties imposed on transgressors, unless this is expressly declared. Indeed they do not incur ordinary penalties, those which have their effect after the sentence of a judge and even those before the sentence of a judge, unless they are puberes, such as males after the 14th year is completed, girls after the 12th year, or unless express mention is made of them.

Also by civil law they incur milder penalties. C. I. pen. 53 seq.; C. G. pen. 66 seq. Moreover it must be noted that children, after completing seven years, are not obligated by human laws unless they are concerning matter accommodated to their age. Hence they are not obligated by the law of ecclesiastical fast. But they are held by the laws of annual Confession, of hearing Mass, of abstinence from meats; and therefore parents sin who neglect their fulfillment on the part of their own children.

Whether they are also held by the paschal Communion was a controverted matter among theologians. But the S. C. on the Sacraments affirmed that they are held both to Confession and to Communion, Decree Quam singulari, Aug. 8, 1910: "The age of discretion, both for Confession and for Holy Communion, is that in which the child begins to reason, that is, around the seventh year, whether above it, or even below it. From this time begins the obligation of satisfying each precept of Confession and Communion." - L. 155, l. 3. n. 270; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 147. a. 4; La-Croix 676; Struggl q. 3. n. 11. 12; Elbel 367 seq.; E. M.

Are clerics held by civil laws? - R. Affirmatively, at least indirectly, unless they are opposed to the still-prevailing rights of the Church; because they too are members of the republic, and natural equity demands that in those things which are not opposed to their state, they conform themselves to the remaining members. Besides, the Church commands this. Rom. 13:1. Still prevailing: for Concordats are to be attended to, and also legitimate customs. Indirectly: whether they are also held directly, by virtue of the civil law itself, is controverted. - Syll. of Pius IX prop. 30. 31. 32; La-Croix 674. 678; Molina De Iust. tr. 2. d. 31. n. 15; Struggl q. 3. n. 2 seq.; Elbel 275-277; Laymann l. 1. tr. 4. c. 13; Suarez l. 3. c. 34 n. 13. 15. 16; Wirceburg. c. 4. a. 4; Wernz Ius Decr. ed. 1. t. 1. n. 108; Trent sess. 25. C. 20 de R.

How ought clerics conduct themselves if they are compelled to observe some civil law harming the rights of the Church? - A protest must be made against compulsion and law of this kind, if otherwise scandal would follow; or if legislators of this kind would become more daring against the rights of the Church. Once the protest has been made, force must be yielded to, and force is not to be opposed to force, nor are acts of violence, especially public, to be stirred up and provoked; they obtain only this, that more and greater sins are multiplied, and the ecclesiastical state is exposed to greater disgrace and injury. In a case of doubt, recourse must be had to the Bishop or to the Holy See.

Are Senators and Deputies in representative Governments obligated by their own laws? - R. Affirmatively. The reason is that the legislator is not each singular person, but the whole moral Body. The same must consequently be said of the President of the republic, of the Metropolitan and fellow Bishops in provincial synod, of a regular Prelate and other capitulars in a general chapter, etc. - L. 31 de Legib.; Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 6. d. 20.

Are travelers held by the special laws of their own territory, or of the place in which they are staying? - A traveler is said to be one who, having a domicile or quasi-domicile somewhere, comes to some place with the intention not of remaining perpetually, but only of staying for some hours, or days, or at most for the lesser part of a year, which can extend even up to six months. A traveler is distinguished from a newcomer and a wanderer. - A newcomer is one who outside the territory of his own origin or prior domicile has placed his domicile or quasi-domicile. If he transferred his domicile, he is already an inhabitant, L. 239 de Verb. sign., and therefore some inhabitants are original, others newcomers. L. 4. 5 de Incol. C. One acquires domicile, even from the first day, who dwells somewhere with the intention of remaining perpetually, and "where someone has constituted the hearth and the sum of his affairs and fortunes, whence he is not going to depart again, if nothing calls him away from there." L. 7 C. de Incol. Somewhere: that is, in a parish or quasi-parish, by ecclesiastical law; in a municipality, by civil law. Intention in the external forum is presumed if the habitation is of ten years, or if a house has been built there, or the greater part of goods transported there. But a wife follows the domicile of her husband; a son in the household that of the parent under whose paternal power he is; and he who exercises some perpetual office somewhere has domicile there. L. 2. 8. 9 de Incol. C.

But quasi-domicile is acquired by one who remains somewhere, or by arriving there immediately stays there, with the intention of remaining for the greater part of a year; such are servants and students, who consequently besides legal domicile can have quasi-domicile, introduced by canon law. Quasi-domicile is no longer attended to as regards marriage. Someone can also from Roman Law have a double domicile, L. 5 and 6 Ad Municipalem et de Incolis. C. Ne. 22 seq. expressly establishes that no one can have several domiciles at the same time. From the Italian Code, a. 16, the civil domicile of a person is in the place in which he has the principal seat of his affairs and goods (interessi). But residence is in the place where the person habitually stays, ib.

Finally a wanderer is one who nowhere has a fixed and determinate domicile, but transfers himself from one place to another. Innoc. XII, C. Speculatores; L. 156, l. 6. n. 115 par. Secunda; C. I. preliminary dispositions 6 seq., and l. 1. a. 16 seq.; C. G. 102 seq.; C. H. 40 seq.; C. A. 29; C. B. 7-11; C. L. 40 seq. By the name of wanderers, as regards marriage, come all and only those who nowhere have a proper pastor or Ordinary by reason of domicile or monthly stay. A wanderer can contract marriage before any pastor, even if the other party is not wandering. Nevertheless the pastor is bound to make diligent inquiry concerning their free state. As regards wanderers, outside a case of necessity, let it not be licit for the pastor to assist at their marriages unless, the matter having been referred to the Ordinary or to a Priest delegated by him, he has obtained permission. Cf. v. 2. n. 1026.

Now a traveler is not held by the laws of his own territory; for law affects the territory, and he is outside it. C. 2 de Constit. in 6. - Except laws which regard the state of persons. For they adhere to the person. Hence he who is of age in his own homeland is of age everywhere. And thus also a private act everywhere retains its value; and therefore if an Italian or Frenchman has made a holographic testament, wherever he has made it, it is valid; because it is a private act, for which no public form has been constituted by the laws. Except also laws local and personal at the same time, as from the Decree of the Holy Office was the law of the Tridentine form to be observed in marriage. - Likewise except unless someone by fiction of law is judged still to be in his own territory. Thus, for example, if someone outside his own territory were to sell his own thing, existing in that same territory, he is bound to observe its laws in such a sale. Thus also a beneficed cleric who does not reside incurs penalties made there against non-residents. For the thing is judged to be consummated where it ought to have been done; whence the delinquent is held as morally present there where he harms by his action. - Laws: for if the discussion concerns precepts which immediately affect persons, it is certain that they oblige travelers, newcomers, and wanderers everywhere. Hence a priest, for example, suspended in his own diocese by particular sentence from priestly functions, cannot celebrate Mass in another diocese either. Cf. 171. 6; Suarez De Legib. l. 3. c. 32. n. 47; E. M. de Matr. 1026.

A traveler is indeed held by the laws of the place in which he is staying as regards contracts, as regards the form of judgments, and as regards other things necessary for the common good, whose violation namely would yield to the damage and injury of that place in which he is staying. Common and natural right demands this, by which travelers are by no means exempted. The same must be said as regards crimes, because it is equitable that crimes be punished everywhere. But as regards other things, unless scandal is present, a traveler is not held by the particular laws of the place, because law obliges only subjects. L. 1. 3. n. 332. And this probably has force even if the particular law prevails at the same time both in that place and in the homeland. For he is not held by the laws of the homeland, because absent, nor by the laws of this place, because a traveler. Now from C. Licet ult. de For. comp., no one is subjected to the power of another except by reason either of crime, or contract, or domicile or quasi-domicile, or by reason of a thing situated in the territory, or finally by reason of origin. L. 156. 159. - Traveler: for the common opinion teaches that it suffices that someone has contracted quasi-domicile, so that he is held by the laws of the place, even from the first day on which he arrived there with the intention of dwelling for the greater part of a year. L. 156; C. I. beginning, Dispos. etc. a. 6 seq. Traveler: the same must be said of a wanderer, who is not held by local laws as a traveler is not; and is held like him by general laws. Laws: he can use the favors of the place, for he can count himself among the inhabitants. If someone has already satisfied a common law in his homeland, more probably he is not bound to satisfy again when arriving in a place where by special privilege it urges later. Nor indeed is someone bound to satisfy the law if, before the law urges in that privileged territory, he departs from it and goes to a place where the time of the obligation of the law has already passed. The first reason is that there is no obligation of fulfilling the same precept again, since it has already been fulfilled in its own time. The second reason is that outside that privileged territory no obligation any longer urges. - Wirceburg. c. 4. a. 4.

By reason of public order, travelers are often held to exhibit testimony of their state, and permission of departure from the former domicile or quasi-domicile; and thus also from traveling priests wishing to celebrate Mass, a document of immunity from canonical penalty and irregularity is required. But from Decrees of the S. R. C., Apr. 3, 1821, n. 2613, Mar. 5, 1898, n. 3895, prayers or collects commanded by the Ordinary of the place are to be recited also by regulars and travelers.

Note: An exempt place is equated with a place situated outside the territory. Hence a traveler in an exempt place is also not held by the common law to fulfill it. On the contrary, he is held by a common law prevailing in the place where he is, even if in his homeland it no longer obliges; since he too is then under the common legislator, and law affects the territory. L. 160. 161.

It is also probable and safe in conscience that a traveler before departing from his own territory is not bound to hear Mass prescribed there, provided he will arrive outside the place where it urges before the time of obligation ceases; for example, before noon, if then the last Mass is celebrated. The reason is that the precept does not oblige you to wait. L. 157; Elbel 374. 375.

You will resolve: If there is a fast in your territory, and on the same day you go to a place where there is no fast, you can eat supper in the evening; indeed also breakfast in the morning, since fast is something indivisible. Existing in the morning in a place where there is no law of abstinence, you can eat meats, even if on the same day you are going to return home where there is fast. At home, however, you are certainly bound to abstain from meats, since abstinence is something divisible. L. 157; Elbel 372.

380. 3° The Ordinary should not revoke approval from one who truly remains suitable, since in this matter he acts as judge, who is bound to pass judgment according to truth; therefore he sins if he revokes or suspends it without cause.² Nevertheless one to whom approval has been denied even unjustly cannot validly absolve, since jurisdiction also has been denied to him, without which absolution is invalid.³ - Besides, the Bishop is not bound to confer jurisdiction on every suitable person: for this is left to his judgment.

² Code, c. 880.

³ From the old law it was clear from the condemnation of proposition 13 by Alexander VII, 24 Sept. 1665, apud Denzing., n. 984; cf. Viva, op. cit. on proposition XIII; Vacant, Dict. de Theol., t. I, p. 736-737.

394. (B) From law, or from the Code: (a) Cardinals and Bishops, whether residential or titular, from the accepted authentic notice of canonical provision having been completed, can choose for themselves and their families a priest for receiving confessions; if he lacks jurisdiction, he obtains it by the law itself, even with respect to reserved sins and censures also, with the sole exception of censures reserved to the Apostolic See in the most special manner and those which are attached to the revelation of the secret of the Holy Office.²

² Code, c. 239 and 349.

(b) Any priests undertaking an overseas journey, provided they have from their own Ordinary, or from the Ordinary of the port, whether initial or intermediate, the faculty of receiving confessions, can during the whole journey validly and licitly absolve both the faithful sailing with them, and the faithful who for any reason come to the ship, and those who, when they themselves call at land in passing, ask to confess to them, and can validly and licitly absolve them even from cases reserved to the Ordinary of the place.³

³ Code, c. 883.

447. (a) When the penitent accuses a reserved sin (reserved by the Pope or by the bishop), the confessor should immediately weigh whether or not all the conditions necessary for incurring the reservation are present. If it is established that the sin is truly reserved, and at the same time the confessor lacks the due faculties, then, unless there is urgency, he should admonish the penitent either to approach the Superior, or to return after a few days, when, namely, the necessary faculties will have been obtained: penitents will generally choose this latter; in which case they can be permitted to declare the other sins.

854. 1° Notion. Matrimonial banns (from the German word bann, public promulgation) are public promulgations which are sent before a future marriage, especially for this end, that impediments, if there are any, may be detected.

Already in antiquity the practice prevailed of approaching the pastor before the nuptials, so that he could inquire whether there was any impediment or not. Thus Charlemagne, in the year 802, ordered that nuptials not be celebrated before the priests, with the elders of the people, had diligently inquired into the consanguinity of those being joined. Likewise in many places espousals were contracted publicly, so that the future marriage might become known to all: which was equivalent to banns.

But the manner of publicly announcing marriage in churches took its beginning in Gaul,¹ then in England; afterwards it was extended to the whole Church by the decree of the Fourth Lateran Council (1216), which the Council of Trent confirmed and enlarged. According to the Lateran Council, it suffices that the publications be made once; but three are required according to Trent. Therefore where Trent has not been promulgated as to the part which regards the banns, one publication strictly speaking suffices, although a threefold one often is more prudent.

¹ Thus Odo de Subiaco, Bishop of Paris, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, ordered that marriages be published in church, so that all the faithful could denounce to the episcopal court impediments which they knew.

860. Here, however, it is asked whether banns must be promulgated in several parishes.

(A) General rules. (a) If each betrothed person has domicile or quasi-domicile in the same parish, and in that parish only, the publications must be made there only.

(b) But if the betrothed have domicile or quasi-domicile in different parishes, banns must be promulgated in each.

(c) If one or each betrothed has several domiciles, or domicile in one parish and quasi-domicile in another, announcements must be made in all these parishes, unless nevertheless the Bishop dispenses, or one domicile is principal and the other wholly secondary.

(d) "If a party has dwelt in another place for six months after attaining puberty, the pastor is to set forth the matter to the Ordinary, who according to his own prudence either shall require publications to be made there, or shall prescribe that other proofs or conjectures concerning freedom of state be gathered. If there is some suspicion concerning an impediment contracted, the pastor even for a shorter stay shall consult the Ordinary, who is not to permit the marriage unless first the suspicion is removed."¹

¹ Code, c. 1023.

(e) If the contracting parties, after the proclamations have been begun, leave their prior domicile and acquire a new one (which can happen especially as regards servants), it seems more consonant with the end of the law not to interrupt the announcements begun in the former place where the betrothed are known; nor will they have to be made in the new domicile, where they are scarcely known at all. Nevertheless the pastor of the new domicile has the right of assisting at the nuptials, as is said below.

Notion. From the Tridentine law, namely the decree Tametsi, in order that marriage be valid, a certain solemnity is required which consists in the presence of the pastor and of at least two witnesses. Hence a marriage is called solemn which is contracted according to the form of law; on the contrary, clandestine, which is contracted outside the form of law. Since, however, the Tridentine form was notably changed by the decree Ne temere³ and by the Code, we shall speak: 1° of the Tridentine form; 2° of the form of the new law.

² For the ancient discipline: Decret. Gratiani, C. XXX, q. 5; Decretals, lib. IV, tit. 3, de Clandestina Desponsatione; Trent, sess. XXIV, cap. 1 de reformat. Matrim.; Sanchez, lib. III; St. Alphonsus, n. 1078-1094; Gasparri, n. 871-999; Deshayes, Questions sur le Mariage, q. 91-150. - For the form of the new law: De Smet, ed. 3, n. 103-150; Vlaming, ed. 3, n. 561-609; Fourneret, p. 140 sq.

³ Which began to be in force on April 19, 1908, for the whole world, except the empire of China, in which it is in force from April 11, 1909. - Hence marriages entered before this time must be judged according to the discipline of the decree Tametsi.

I. On the Tridentine Form.

Trent had established this law: "Those who shall attempt to contract marriage otherwise than in the presence of the pastor, or of another priest with the permission of the same pastor or of the Ordinary, and of two or three witnesses, the holy Synod renders altogether incapable of so contracting: and it decrees that contracts of this kind are invalid and null, just as by the present decree it makes them invalid and annuls them."

Yet lest that decree (which is called Tametsi, because it begins with this word) should affect heretics, who were not going to receive it, the Council willed that the decree not have the force of law except after thirty days from the first publication in each parish; for thus an opportunity was furnished to heretics, who formed separate communities, of evading the law.

Concerning that discipline, now antiquated, we shall hand down only a few things, nevertheless necessary to know for judging the validity of marriages entered before April 19, 1908; if perhaps more difficult cases occur, let the authors cited above be consulted.

1028. (B) But in the Latin Church, can. 1099 declares who are subject to this law, namely:

(a) All baptized in the Catholic Church, when they contract among themselves, even if afterwards they have fallen away from the faith; - that is, all who by Baptism itself are freely enrolled in the Catholic Church, if adults are in question; with parents consenting, if little children are in question; but not those who are baptized by a heretical or schismatic minister by the will of the parents, even if the parents were Catholic; nor, at least more probably, the children of non-Catholics who, with the parents unaware and unwilling, were baptized by a Catholic maidservant. But the doubtfully baptized, with respect to marriage, are presumed validly baptized.

(b) All also who have been converted from heresy or schism and already baptized; but not the children of converts, unless they themselves also embrace the Catholic faith. - This holds good even if afterwards they fall away from the faith, because it is not fitting that this defection profit them.

(c) All likewise the aforesaid Catholics or converts, when they contract with non-Catholics, even after a dispensation has been obtained from the impediment of mixed religion or disparity of cult¹. Likewise Catholics who contract with Orientals. - Thus the discipline is reformed by which an immune party communicated his immunity to the other, while on the contrary today the bound party communicates his bond to the other.

¹ By the Constitution Provida (January 18, 1906), Pius X had exempted any mixed marriages to be contracted in Germany from the decree Ne temere. But that exemption is to be considered abrogated according to the mind of can. 6, 1° (Pontifical Commission, December 9, 1917).

(d) But non-Catholics, whether baptized or not baptized, are by no means subject to the law of clandestinity when they contract among themselves; therefore under this head the marriages of non-Catholics will not be invalid, which, as regards form, are subject only to natural and civil law. But if a baptized non-Catholic party contracts with an infidel, the marriage will be null from the impediment of disparity of cult, which has by no means been removed (above, n. 924).

1141. For the validity of ordination: a) the ordinary minister is every and only consecrated bishop; b) the extraordinary minister is he who, although he lacks episcopal character, has received from law or from the Apostolic See, by indult, the power of conferring some orders¹.

¹ Codex, c. 951, 957.

For the liceity of ordination: a) for the Episcopate, the only minister is the Roman Pontiff, or a bishop by pontifical mandate²; b) for the other orders: 1) as regards a cleric ordained by the Roman Pontiff, the minister is he who obtained from the Holy See the faculty of ordaining³; 2) as regards seculars, it is the proper bishop by himself, or through another who has obtained legitimate dimissorial letters⁴; 3) as regards privileged religious, regularly it is the bishop of the diocese in which is situated the religious house to whose family the one to be ordained belongs⁵.

² Codex, c. 953.

³ Codex, c. 952.

⁴ Codex, c. 955.

⁵ Codex, c. 965.

That an ordination may be licit, 1° it must be conferred by the proper Bishop, or with his license; 2° and indeed with the canonical rules observed.

I. On The Proper Bishop.

The former law partly abrogated

114. 1. By the former law, by order of Alexander VII, those dwelling in the Pontifical State had to offer their books to be approved by the previous censure of the Cardinal Vicar of the City and of the Master of the Sacred Palace. Now the special obligation, if any remains, is circumscribed to the City alone.

Force of the present article. It imposes an obligation

2. Proceed now: the obligation seems to remain. For although the sentence of the law is in itself ambiguous and can be taken of a mere privilege,¹ nevertheless the reason of the former disposition remains in such a way that a correction of that law, which would be inexplicable, does not seem to have to be admitted. The usage of the City agrees, in which the Masters of the Sacred Palace urge their right in this way.²

But the reason of this sanction is drawn from a certain peculiar authority with which books that are considered to have been written under the eyes of the Holy See are vested, so that they seem to have to be fortified by the caution of Roman censure.

And it confers a privilege

3. At the same time, however, the article confers a most equitable privilege, by which these books, even if they are published elsewhere, need have no other approval. Thus the law is not made harsher for the inhabitants of the City, and fitting honor is given to Apostolic censure.

Whom it affects

4. Those properly dwell in the City who there have at least a quasi-domicile.³ Those, however, who actually stay at Rome even for a shorter time will be able, as pilgrims, to share in the privilege of the inhabitants.

¹ Cf. Palmieri, in this place; Ojetti, Analecta Eccl., 1898, pp. 383, 384.

² Cf. Wernz, n. 121, note 104.

³ Quasi-domicile is acquired by real habitation joined with the intention of staying in some place for the greater part of the year. Thus the opinion received in the curia, although some, as Lehmk. II, 775, are content with staying through a notable part of the year: as, for instance, through 4 months. Penn., A. S. S., cited place, n. 74, p. 495, judges that no space of stay is required for the use of that privilege.

A particular law is one made for a limited class of persons or for a particular territory only. Particular laws of the latter kind bind those for whom they are made, who have a domicile or quasi-domicile in the territory concerned and actually reside there.

— All those are obliged by law for whom it has been justly made. A transgression committed by them is, objectively, a material injury of the right order. Yet only those who are actually masters of reason can actually sin against law. By others, however, law can be violated in them, in the manner which will be explained later.

Here the question is only concerning the Author of law himself.

— God, the Best and Greatest, is not properly bound by his laws: since he is outside and above the world of creatures, he is not part of the community for which laws have been made.

The human legislator is part of the community over which he presides. Yet by the coercive force of his law, if we suppose the Prince absolute or endowed with full power, he cannot be coerced: no one coerces himself. But from natural law itself, which sanctions this right order, that the part agree with the whole and the head with the members, he is constrained to observe his own law, insofar as, attention being given to the universality or reason of the law, the law is applicable to him ¹.

And from the same motive by which the law obliges the others, that natural law seems to urge him. Yet the obligation is not judged grave of itself.

Today, however, in civil society, the matter is scarcely practical. For the legislator is not one person, but laws are proposed by the consent of many, who, taken separately, are subjects of the law, so that the consent itself in some manner can be called the legislator. Yet it happens that some immunity from personal coercion is conceded to the Prince: which immunity is called his personal inviolability.

¹ Cf. 1, 2, q. 96 art. 5 ad 3.

— All are obliged by law for whom the law has been made. God, since he is outside the community, is not obliged by his law; but the human legislator is obliged, not as to coercive force, if he is an absolute king, but as to directive force, from the natural law itself urging the obligation of the law, though not of itself under grave matter. Today often nothing remains to the Prince except personal inviolability.

185. Preliminary Note. The subject of law is called those persons for whom the legislator has made the law. But St. Alphonsus wisely observes⁵⁰ that it is one thing not to be held to a law, and another to be excused from a law. He who is not held to a law, or, what is the same thing, he who is not subject to a law, can act freely and absolutely, without in any way caring about the law. On the contrary, he who is only excused from a law ordinarily must observe the law, but on account of extraordinary circumstances here and now does not sin by acting against the precepts of the law. For example, a man lacking the actual use of reason is excused from the precept of any law, so that he cannot sin formally by transgressing it; but by no means does he cease to be the subject of natural, divine, or human law. Hence also it is licit to induce someone not subject to a law to an act prohibited by the law; for example, it is licit to give meat to be eaten on Friday to a child not yet seven years old. On the contrary, it is not licit to induce the same child to do something obscene, because, although he does not sin formally on account of the defect of the use of reason, nevertheless he sins materially by transgressing the natural law, to which he is subject.

It was said above, nn. 153 and 163, that the subject of the natural law and of the positive-divine law of the New Testament is absolutely every man. Concerning the subject of human civil law there is no reason for us to inquire specially. For to such law are subject all those who are legitimately designated by their legislator. Therefore there remains only the question: what is the subject of ecclesiastical law?

⁵⁰ Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 153.

186. Principle. To merely ecclesiastical laws are subject all and only baptized men habitually enjoying the use of reason, and this after the seventh year of age.⁵¹

It is explained. It is said, 1. All baptized men are subject to ecclesiastical laws. For the Council of Trent⁵² defined: "If anyone says that the baptized are free from all the precepts of holy Church, whether written or handed down, so that they are not bound to observe them unless they have wished of their own accord to submit themselves to them, let him be anathema." But the reason is that man, through baptism validly received, becomes a member of the Church, and therefore is bound to obey her laws. - Since these things are so, even all heretics and schismatics validly baptized are subject to the laws of the Catholic Church (at least speaking in itself). Therefore in the Decretals⁵³ there are several laws concerning heretics, schismatics, and apostates; therefore also it has been declared several times⁵⁴ that heretics are bound by matrimonial impediments of ecclesiastical right (except now the impediment of disparity of cult). But I said: speaking in itself, heretics are bound by ecclesiastical laws; for accidentally they are sometimes not subject, namely, when the Catholic Church explicitly or implicitly does not will to oblige them. Thus, for example, the Code of Canon Law, c. 1099, § 2, expressly exempts heretics from the obligation of contracting marriage before the pastor as to the validity of the sacrament. There are not lacking grave authors⁵⁵ who judge that in all matters which chiefly regard individual sanctification, for example, in fasting, abstinence, assistance at Mass, etc., the Church does not will to oblige heretics, at least those who were born and educated in a non-Catholic sect. Nevertheless it is not licit directly to induce heretics to the transgression of such ecclesiastical commands, for example, to eating meat on prohibited days; but from just causes it is licit materially to cooperate in a transgression of this kind of an ecclesiastical precept. Therefore, for example, it is licit on a forbidden day to place meat on the table, which it is foreseen a heretic will eat, provided that at the same table there are also other sufficient foods, so that the heretic who is going to eat is not compelled, but takes the meat of his own accord. But if the heretic from the beginning explicitly or implicitly demands meat to be eaten, it is no longer necessary to place fasting foods on the table.

⁵¹ Some, namely the Antinomians and Quietists, falsely understanding certain texts of Sacred Scripture, for example, that those who are led by the spirit are not under law (Gal. 5:18), that the law is not set down for the just man (1 Tim. 1:8), taught that perfect and spiritual men are not subject to ecclesiastical laws, indeed even to moral laws. Their opinions were condemned several times by the Church, for example, by Clement V, who condemned the propositions: "That a man ought not to fast, nor to pray, after he has attained the degree of perfection ..., that those who are in the aforesaid state of perfection and spirit of liberty are not subject to human obedience, nor are they obliged to any precepts of the Church; because, as they assert, where the spirit is, there is liberty" (c. 3, l. 5, tit. 3 in Clement.). Innocent XI condemned the Quietism of Michael de Molinos (Const. Coelestis Pastor; Denz., Enchir. n. 1221 sqq.). Cf. Wetzer and Welte, Kirchenlexikon, s. v. "Antinomismus" and "Quietismus."

⁵² Sess. 7, can. 8, on baptism (Denz. n. 864).

⁵³ Cf. tit. 7 and tit. 21, l. 5, of the Decretals of Gregory IX.

⁵⁴ Cf. Benedict XIV, const. Singulari nobis, § 14, February 9, 1749; Holy Office, March 30, 1860.

⁵⁵ Cf. Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund. n. 154, n. 4; Marc-Raus, Inst. mor. n. 198; Pruner, Moraltheol. n. 105; Noldin, De principiis n. 144; Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, 228; Génicot, Casus conscientiae I, 22.

187. It is said, 2. Only baptized men are subject to ecclesiastical laws. For this reason the Council of Trent⁵⁶ teaches that the Church exercises judgment over no one who has not first entered into her through the gate. Indeed the Pontiffs expressly acknowledge⁵⁷ that those who have not received baptism are not held to merely ecclesiastical laws. But the reason is that the end of ecclesiastical laws is to lead the faithful to eternal salvation. But now no one can arrive at eternal salvation unless he first has been regenerated in Christ through baptism (of water, desire, or blood). Therefore the Church does not make laws for men not yet regenerated, or not yet baptized; and therefore unbelievers, Jews, Mohammedans, and others not baptized are by no means held to ecclesiastical laws (at least in itself). Therefore all these can, for example, licitly eat meat on Friday and throughout Lent; they can validly contract marriage, even if those about to marry are blood relatives or relatives by affinity in the third or even in the second degree; they can do servile works on Sundays and feast days (provided that on another day they worship God and do not publicly disturb the festive rest). - Accidentally, however, even unbelievers are sometimes held to ecclesiastical laws; namely, whenever they enter into a relation with some baptized person. Thus, for example, a pagan contracting marriage with a Catholic woman is held to observe the ecclesiastical law concerning the diriment impediment of disparity of cult; and therefore such a marriage is invalid unless a dispensation upon this impediment has first been obtained.⁵⁸

It is said, 3. Habitually enjoying the use of reason. For if someone lacks the habitual use of reason, as the perpetually insane and infants do, he can elicit no truly human act. Moreover ecclesiastical law commands only truly human and deliberate acts. On the contrary, he who habitually is possessed of reason, although here and now he lacks the use of reason, as one drunk or sleeping, is subject to ecclesiastical law. Cf., however, what was said above in n. 185.

The doctrine set forth is confirmed from the Code of Canon Law, c. 12: "To merely ecclesiastical laws are not held those who have not received baptism, nor baptized persons who do not enjoy sufficient use of reason, nor those who, although they have attained the use of reason, have not yet completed the seventh year of age, unless something else is expressly provided by law."

On account of special doubts arising, it must also be answered specially to the questions: How are subject to human law 1. infants and impuberes; 2. the legislator himself; 3. peregrini and vagi?

⁵⁶ Sess. 14, c. 2.

⁵⁷ Cf. c. 8, X, 4, 19; Cod. iur. can. c. 12.

⁵⁸ Cf. below in the treatise on marriage III, 835.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 96, a. 5 and 6.

290. Principle. To civil laws are obligated all and only the subjects of the power bearing the law, habitually endowed with the use of reason, for whom the law was borne. - Hence according to St. Thomas: a) the perfect also are subject to human law insofar as it is the rule of human acts, because thus natural and divine law also establishes, as the Church defined against the Beghards and Beguines, condemned in the Council of Vienne (a. 3); b) nevertheless, as to the coercive force of law, the just and virtuous whose will is consonant with law are not subject, but only the wicked whose will is discordant from the law.

291. Personal and territorial laws.

Some laws are personal, which immediately affect persons and are concerned principally with their state and capacity (lois qui composent le statut personnel: nationalite, capacite, majorite, filiation, etat civil), and accessorily with goods: to these probably pertain laws concerning movable goods, which are judged to adhere to persons. Others are territorial, which immediately affect the territory of society and mediately persons insofar as they pertain to the territory; among these are numbered real laws, which are concerned principally with immovable goods and accessorily with persons, laws which determine the forms and execution of acts, because acts are to be constituted and executed according to the laws of the place in which they are constituted or committed to execution, according to the principle: place rules the act; laws regarding the external order and public tranquility of the territory and the security of persons and dominions (lois de police et de surete), to which pertain laws which punish delicts.

292. Various persons are subject to laws in various ways.

In the territory there can be:

1. Citizens or nationals, who are members of society, whether by birth, by law, by adoption, or by annexation: a) those present in the territory are held by all laws; b) those absent are held by personal laws (Civil Code, a. 3, § 3), but are not held per se by territorial laws, for example, concerning public order or the form of contracts; c) nevertheless they are held per accidens, if they are morally present by reason of goods which they possess in the territory for real laws, or by reason of an action or omission which they exercise there, for example, for fulfilling offices toward society, or if by fiction of law they are present by reason of a delict exercised against a fellow citizen: for this is judged to be done in the territory of the community.

2. Strangers, who are not members of the community, but have domicile or residence in the territory or pass through it. Now, because they are not members of the community, a) they are not held by personal laws; b) nor per se by territorial laws; c) nevertheless per accidens they are held, either 1) by reason of the common good, to laws which regard order (Civil Code, a. 3, § 1) or which have been specially borne for them, or 2) by reason of goods which they possess there for real laws (Civil Code, a. 3, § 2), or 3) by reason of an act which they exercise, do, or execute there, for laws which determine the form or execution of contracts (place rules the act), or 4) by reason of a delict which they commit there, for laws which establish penalty; d) if they are absent they are held only by laws which are concerned with goods possessed by them, or by reason of a crime perpetrated against society (at least if they are not sufficiently punished by their own superior).

3. Exempt persons, who by fiction of law are judged outside the territory and are withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the place. They are a) by human right: princes of other nations dwelling in it for any cause whatsoever; likewise their ambassadors with their attendants and domestics; b) from divine and ecclesiastical right: the Roman Pontiff as to all; clerics and religious for those things which are opposed to their dignity and office (concerning which it pertains to the Church to judge); for other things today they are held even directly by force of the laws themselves.

4. Whether the legislator himself is subject to law is no longer a practical question, because there is not a singular legislator; whence all who have concurred in the making of the law are subject to it. Nevertheless, as to the coercive force, the person of the king himself is exempt, and for that reason is declared inviolable (Belgian Constitution, a. 63).

356. Is a superior bound by his own laws? - The rector of a community, who alone exercises legislative power, such as the Pope, or a bishop for a diocese, 1) is not bound by his own laws as to coercive force: for no one is properly compelled by himself, nor can he be compelled by others, because he alone has supreme power; 2) as to directive force: a) he is not bound directly, that is, by force of the ecclesiastical law itself: for no one obligates himself, nor can someone at the same time be superior and inferior to himself; b) nevertheless indirectly he is obligated by force of natural law, that is, from honesty, fittingness, and natural equity, which demands both that the head be conformed to the members, and that the legislator concur for the common good by enticing subjects by his example, and also lest his authority become cheap among subjects; yet this obligation, as being from fittingness alone, is light, unless there is danger of scandal, great harm for the community, notable injury of a third party as can happen in contracts, etc.; c) he is not obligated even indirectly if his laws do not suit his condition, such as a law concerning pontifical vestments not to be worn, or a law imposing taxes.

It is said: who alone is legislator, for those who exercise legislative power with others in an assembly, e.g., in a council or chapter, are obligated to the laws: distributively, considered singularly and individually, they are inferiors to the assembly itself or to the collection of all, which alone has supreme authority.

Every man is born and remains subject to the natural law; but by human law only subjects are bound, provided they are habitually possessed of reason. The reason for the first is that, as St. Thomas says, 1-2, q. 91, art. 2, "the natural law is nothing other than the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature"; therefore wherever a rational creature is found, there is present there a subject of the natural law. But the reason for the second is that human law cannot be made except through an act of jurisdiction, which can be exercised only over subjects. Finally, the reason for the third is that men habitually lacking the use of reason cannot be directed by laws.

You Will Resolve. 1st. It is not licit to provoke infants and the insane to a thing intrinsically evil, because, since they have a rational nature, they are bound by the natural law in first act or radically; and therefore those formally sin who induce them to blasphemies or indecent things. Cf. Sanchez, lib. 1, Decal. cap. 10. - Reuter, n. 167.

2nd. It is licit, on prohibited days, to give flesh-meat to be eaten by the perpetually insane, or by infants who have not yet attained the use of reason; but not to those insane for a short time, nor to the drunk or sleeping. The reason for the distinction is that the former are in no way subject to human law, but the latter are subject. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 155.

3rd. Those who have not received baptism are not held by merely ecclesiastical laws, nor baptized persons who do not enjoy sufficient use of reason, nor those who, although they have attained the use of reason, have not yet completed the seventh year of age, unless something else is expressly provided by law (Can. 12).

See also can. 859, § 1; 906; 1099, § 2; 1254, § 1.

4th. Heretics, schismatics, and all other baptized persons whatsoever, even if not Catholics, are of themselves held by ecclesiastical laws, because the foundation of subjection endures in them, which is the character of baptism; nevertheless, accidentally, in practice they do not seem to sin, because they commonly do not know that by their condition they are held to observing these laws, even if perhaps they already know the necessity and obligation of entering the Catholic Church. Indeed it also seems probable that material heretics, such as very many among our own are judged to be, are in no way bound by at least certain ecclesiastical laws, namely those which regard the sanctification of souls, such as the laws of feasts and fasting; not because the Church cannot bind them, but because she is reasonably thought not to wish to bind them. - Cf. Mazzella, de Eccles. disp. 3, art. 10, n. 567. - Tarquini, Jur. Eccl. Publ. Inst. nn. 63 and 65. - Kenrick, tract. 3, part. 1, n. 28.

5th. The excommunicated, although they have been cast out of the Church, are bound by the laws of the Church as regards acts which are not interdicted to them; otherwise they would gain an advantage from their own malice.

6th. § 1. By general laws all persons everywhere on earth are held for whom they were made.

§ 2. To laws established for a particular territory those persons are subject for whom they were made and who have a domicile or quasi-domicile there and at the same time actually reside there, with the prescription of can. 14 remaining firm (Can. 13).

Here, by reason of the necessity of the matter, we place those things which are had in the Code concerning domicile. For very many things depend on the well-understood notion of it.

7th. § 1. Domicile is acquired by residence in some parish or quasi-parish, or at least in a diocese, apostolic vicariate, or apostolic prefecture; which residence is either joined with the intention of remaining there perpetually, if nothing calls one away from there, or has been prolonged for a completed decade.

§ 2. Quasi-domicile is acquired by residence as above, which is either joined with the intention of remaining there at least for the greater part of the year, if nothing calls one away from there, or has in fact been prolonged for the greater part of the year.

§ 3. A domicile or quasi-domicile in a parish or quasi-parish is called parochial; in a diocese, vicariate, or prefecture, but not in a parish or quasi-parish, diocesan (Can. 92).

Diocesan domicile is now already admitted. The difficulty formerly connected with the condition concerning intention now vanishes, once the clause has been posited, or it has been prolonged for a completed decade or for the greater part of the year.

8th. The Code also determines the domicile of diverse persons:

§ 1. A wife, not legitimately separated from her husband, necessarily retains the domicile of her husband; the insane person, the domicile of the curator; the minor, the domicile of him to whose power he is subject.

§ 2. A minor who has passed out of infancy can obtain a quasi-domicile proper to himself; likewise a wife not legitimately separated from her husband; but one legitimately separated can obtain even a domicile (Can. 93).¹

9th. In the same way it is determined through domicile, etc., who is the pastor.

§ 1. Whether by his domicile or by his quasi-domicile, each person obtains his own pastor and Ordinary (Can. 94).²

Domicile and quasi-domicile are lost by departure from the place with the intention of not returning, saving the prescription of can. 93 (Can. 95).

There is a manifold application of these canons to diverse cases, especially matrimonial ones.

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1087, n. 1; p. 1106, n. 48.

² Cf. Addenda, p. 1087, n. 1; p. 1106, n. 48.

Question 1. Are clerics held by civil laws?

Response. Affirmatively, excepting those which are repugnant to their state, or to some ecclesiastical immunity still in force. The reason is that clerics are part of the political community, and receive many advantages from it. Wherefore the Apostle says, Rom. xiii, 1: "Let every soul be subject to higher powers." - To these words St. John Chrysostom adds: "Therefore even if you were an Apostle, even if an Evangelist, even if a Prophet, even if anyone else whatever; for this subjection does not overturn piety." - Cf. Scav. n. 221.

I have said, 1st, excepting those which are repugnant to their state; for the state is of divine right, and laws which are opposed to the stronger right cannot oblige.

I have said, 2nd, or to some ecclesiastical immunity still in force. Immunity is a certain exemption granted by the Church either to a person, or to a place, or to a sacred thing. Therefore civil laws which are opposed to this exemption do not of themselves oblige, because they injure the right of a superior order. But often the Church either expressly or tacitly does not urge these immunities, and then civil laws obtain their native efficacy. In this region very few immunities can be urged; the principal ones are: local, by which certain profane acts are not permitted to be exercised in sacred places; and real, by which, only in some places, ecclesiastical goods are exempted from taxes. - In relation to immunity of forum, those things are to be attended to which the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore has, n. 155, but especially canons 120 and 2343 of the Code.

Question 2. Are children held to ecclesiastical laws as soon as they have attained the use of reason, although they have not yet completed seven years?

Response. Negatively. They are not held by merely ecclesiastical laws unless something else is expressly provided by law. Cf. Can. 12. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, de tertio praec. Decal. n. 270. - Lacroix, 676. - Reuter, n. 167.

Question 3. Are pilgrims held by the laws of their own territory?

Before the question is answered, it must be said what comes under the name of inhabitant, newcomer, pilgrim, and vagus:

A person is called: an inhabitant, in the place where he has domicile; a newcomer, in the place where he has quasi-domicile; a pilgrim, if he is staying outside the domicile and quasi-domicile which he still retains; a vagus, if he has no domicile or quasi-domicile anywhere (Can. 91).

Response. Negatively, generally speaking:

§ 1. Pilgrims;

1st. Are not bound by the particular laws of their own territory so long as they are absent from it, unless either their transgression harms in their own territory, or the laws are personal (Can. 14).

Moreover, a law is not presumed personal but territorial, unless something else is clear, Can. 8, § 2. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 156; and Hom. Ap. n. 39. - Lacroix, n. 683. - Elbel, n. 370. - Scav. n. 222.

Question 4. Are pilgrims held by the laws of the place in which they are staying?

Response. Pilgrims are not bound by the laws of the territory in which they are staying, excepting those which provide for public order, or determine the solemnities of acts (Can. 14).¹

3rd. But they are held by general laws, even if these do not have force in their own territory, but by no means if they do not oblige in the place in which they are staying (Can. 14). They are also held by laws as regards contracts, as regards delicts, and as regards those things which are necessary for the common good. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 156.

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1087, n. 2; p. 1094, n. 27.

Question 5. By what laws are vagi held?

Response. § 2. Vagi are obliged by both general and particular laws which are in force in the place in which they are staying (Can. 14).

You Will Resolve. 1st. If in your territory there is fasting, and on the same day you go on to a place where there is no fasting, you can eat supper in the evening. Indeed, probably you can also breakfast, and the reason is that fasting is something indivisible.

2nd. Existing in the morning in a place where there is no fasting, you are not bound to fast, even if around midday you are going to return home, where there is fasting. Yet at home you are bound to abstain if it is also a day of abstinence.

3rd. If in your territory there is a special feast of precept and you are about to depart to another place where there is no feast, you are not bound to hear Mass before departure, provided you will arrive outside the place where the precept is in force before the time of obligation ceases. The reason is that the precept does not oblige you to wait.

4th. Pilgrims are held by all common laws in force in that place, even if in their own territory they had been abrogated, or by dispensation did not oblige here and now. The reason is that they are subject to the common legislator, and while absent they do not enjoy the privilege of their own territory. Thus a Cuban staying in this region is held to abstinence on Friday.

5th. Probably pilgrims are not held to observing the particular law of some place, even if the same particular law is in force in their own territory. The reason is that they are held neither by the laws of their homeland, because they are absent, nor by the laws of the place in which they are staying, because, as pilgrims, they are not subject to them. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 156 and 157; and Hom. Ap. nn. 39 and seq. - Lacroix, n. 686.¹

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1087, n. 2; p. 1094, n. 27.

Lucius, an Englishman, having been ordered by his doctor to seek southern regions because of the mildness of the climate, determines within himself to go to Rome and spend the winter there. A man of timorous conscience, he first asks his usual confessor to resolve certain doubts concerning the manner of life to be adopted at Rome. For he doubts whether he will be bound with the Romans to abstain from meat not only on Friday but also on Saturday; whether he can eat meat with them on Wednesday during Advent; whether, notwithstanding a certain decree of the Cardinal Vicar of the City, it is lawful for him to visit Protestant churches there even when offices, or “services” as they are called, are being celebrated; whether he is bound to observe all the holy days of obligation, several of which are not obligatory in England; and finally whether the same answer is to be given even if he remains there for six or seven months. The confessor replies that the simplest rule is to be observed: “When you are at Rome, live according to the Roman manner,” and dismisses him. Hence it is asked:

1. Who is called an inhabitant, a traveler, and a vagrant?

2. By what laws are travelers bound?

3. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. Define the terms inhabitant, traveler, vagrant. A person is called an inhabitant of the place where he has his domicil. A domicil is acquired in a place by actually taking up one’s abode there with the intention of living there perpetually. By ecclesiastical law a quasi-domicil renders a person subject to most ecclesiastical laws like a true domicil. This quasi-domicil is acquired by living in a place with the intention of remaining there for the greater part of a year.

A traveler is one who for a short time, less than six months, takes up his abode in a place other than that in which he has his domicil or quasi-domicil.

A vagrant is one who has no fixed abode, neither domicil nor quasi-domicil, anywhere.

2. To what laws are travelers subject?

Travelers, or strangers, are subject to the common ecclesiastical law which is observed in the place where they stay. They are also subject in the matter of contracts to the law of the place where they conclude them, and if they commit crimes there, they can be punished according to the law of the place where they commit them. Unless required for the avoidance of scandal, a stranger is not bound by the special laws of the place where he is staying, probably not even if there is a similar special law in his own country; for laws only bind subjects, and a stranger is not a subject. Neither is a stranger bound by the special laws of his own country while he is out of their jurisdiction, for a law is restricted to the territory of the legislator.

3. The case. Lucius, an Englishman, determines for reasons of health to pass the winter in Rome. As he is a man of delicate conscience he asks his confessor, before starting, to settle certain doubts as to what he may or should do while staying in Rome. First of all he wants to know whether he will be obliged to abstain from flesh-meat not only on Fridays but on Saturdays as well, as they do in Rome. Inasmuch as Saturday abstinence is part of the common law, though in England and in many other countries a dispensation has been granted, and a stranger is bound by the common law wherever it is observed, Lucius should abstain on Saturdays while he is in Rome, if his health permits him. He may, however, eat meat on the Wednesdays in Advent, for the fast and abstinence observed on those days in England is not part of the common law. By an Instruction of the Cardinal-Vicar of Rome, July 12, 1878, approved by Leo XIII, all were strictly prohibited from visiting Protestant places of worship in Rome during service, and Lucius wishes to know whether he is bound by this law. If this were a merely positive precept, Lucius would not be bound by it, but in the circumstances which exist in Rome it is a precept whose observance is required by the necessity of avoiding scandal and of showing no approbation of heresy. Lucius would therefore be bound by it. With regard to days of obligation he is bound to observe all those which belong to the common law, though they may be suppressed and observed only as days of devotion in England. He is not bound to observe those which are merely local. If he had the intention of staying in Rome for six or seven months, he would become subject to the local law, and would therefore be under the obligation of keeping the local days of obligation. From what has been said it is clear that there are exceptions to the generally wise rule: “When you are in Rome, do as Rome does.”

Henrietta, the daughter of Caia, who was French by nationality and retained her domicile in London throughout the entire time to which the case extends, lived for the sake of education in a certain convent of nuns in Paris. A German foreigner who fell in love with her there sought her in marriage. Henrietta promised him marriage and, immediately after her education was finished, left the convent; until the marriage could be celebrated after some weeks, she lived in rooms in a certain inn with her mother, who had come from London for this purpose; finally, the marriage was celebrated before the parish priest of that place. The outcome, however, was unhappy, for because of her husband’s adulteries and cruelty she sought and obtained in a civil court a divorce from the bond. Now, however, Henrietta would like to marry Julius if this is permitted to her by ecclesiastical laws. Hence it is asked:

Titius and Caia, Catholics, had duly contracted betrothal and wished to enter marriage within a few weeks. Titius, twenty-two years of age, was numbered among the members of a certain theatrical company who wandered from place to place, and was not accustomed to remain in one place beyond a month. For about one month each year Titius returned to his father’s home in Scotland; at other times he was always wandering with his companions. Caia lived with her parents in Manchester. Titius fixed his residence for three weeks near the city of Liverpool, where he approached Lucius, a priest, and, after relating the aforesaid circumstances, asked him where he could celebrate the marriage and what must first be done according to ecclesiastical and civil laws. Hence it is asked:

Miss X., a non-Catholic young lady, being convinced of the truth of the Catholic Church, and desirous of becoming a Catholic, meets with so much opposition from her parents that she decides to postpone her conversion until she reaches her majority. In the meantime, however, she is in doubt as to the line of conduct she ought to follow in regard to hearing Mass on Sundays and abstaining from the use of flesh meat on Fridays and other days of abstinence. Being conscientious about the matter, she consults a priest as toher duty under the circumstances. The priest informs her that she will have to hear Mass on Sundays and holydays of obligation and abstain from meat on Fridays and other forbidden days, just as if she were already a Catholic. His reason for this decision is that baptized non-Catholics are subject to the laws of the Church just like Catholics. The disobedience of heretics does not destroy the jurisdiction of the Church over them, neither does the Church "de facto" exempt them from the observance of her laws. Therefore he concludes that Miss X. is obliged to keep the laws of the Church regarding the hearing of Mass on Sundays and holydays of obligation and abstaining from the use of flesh meat on Fridays and other days of abstinence. From this latter obligation, however, namely, the obligation of abstaining, the priest dispenses her, by virtue of the general faculties he holds from the bishop.

Now it is asked: Is the position taken by the priest absolutely correct? At first sight it might seem to be correct. However, upon examination, it will be found to be incorrect in some points, and in others only probably correct, and therefore not a sufficient basis upon which to found a sure and certain obligation, binding in conscience.

1. Practically speaking, before inquiring further into the duty of Miss X. in her present circumstances, we should first of all endeavor to establish the validity of her non-Catholic baptism. Was Miss X. ever validly baptized? Because if there is reasonable ground for doubting the validity of her non-Catholic baptism, then she was only probably baptized, and therefore probably also never subject to the laws of the Church.

For although "in foro externo" those who have been doubtfully baptized are looked upon as having been validly baptized, as far as the obligations consequent on baptism are concerned, still this does not hold good "in foro interno," where there is question of an obligation binding in conscience.

2. If, however, there are no good grounds for questioning the validity of Miss X.'s non-Catholic baptism, then we find theologians divided as to her obligation to obey the laws of the Church before making her submission to the Church.

Although there are very good theologians who hold that Miss X. is bound by the laws of the Church in the present circumstances, still there are other good theologians and canonists who contend that she is not bound by these laws. All the theologians are agreed that the Church's jurisdiction extends to all baptized persons, including heretics and schismatics, so that the Church may legislate even for baptized non-Catholics, though they be cut off from external communion with her.

The only question which divides the theologians is this: Does the Church actually intend that all her laws shall be binding on all her baptized children, including heretics and schismatics? Or is there reasonable ground for distinguishing between some laws of. the Church and others, and saying that the Church desires that some of her laws should bind all alike, Catholics and non-Catholics, provided they are baptized, and that others of her laws she makes binding on Catholics alone?

The theologians who contend that all the Church's laws are binding on all baptized persons, advance the reason that it can not be the intention of the Church that her disobedient children should profit by their sin of heresy or schism by being exempted from laws that are binding on the faithful and obedient.

The theologians who hold that not all laws of the Church are binding on heretics and schismatics, make the following distinction: Some laws of the Church aim directly at the removal. of abuses, at promoting the public good and safeguarding Christian society, as, for instance, the laws concerning marriage impediments and others, which the Church has repeatedly declared to be binding on all baptized persons. Other laws of the Church aim directly at the sanctification of souls, as, for example, the laws of hearing Mass on Sundays, and abstaining from flesh meat on Fridays, and these laws the Church does not wish to be binding on baptized non-Catholics, because the only result of such an intention on the part of the Church would be to multiply sin.

Thus De Angelis, Prael. jur. can. l. I. tit. 2, n, 13, says that the whole question resolves itself into this: Does the Church wish to hold heretics and schismatics to her laws?

“And if it is permissible to offer any opinion in this matter, our judgment is that they are especially bound to observe those laws which have been enacted to curb abuses or to safeguard public order and honorable conduct in Christian society, such as the laws concerning impediments to marriage, especially diriment impediments, and others; for more than once, when the Ecclesiastical Authority was consulted, it asserted expressly or equivalently that they are bound.

But if the discussion concerns other ecclesiastical laws which tend directly to the sanctification of persons, it must be said that they are not bound by the Church, since the Church perceives that they would resist obstinately, and this would be nothing other than multiplying sin.”

Those who affirm that it is the Church's intention to hold even her rebellious children to all her laws appeal to the marriage legislation of the Church, which legislation Benedict XIV and Pius VII affirm to be binding on all baptized persons, because the Church has jurisdiction even over heretics and schismatics. But no one calls this general principle into question. The question is, Does the Church actually intend that every exercise of her jurisdiction should affect Catholics and non-Catholics alike? Does she make some laws for Catholics only, and others for all baptized Christians? We think that there are reasonable grounds for holding that the Church does not intend that laws like the law of hearing Mass on Sunday, and abstaining from the use of flesh meat on Friday, should be binding on baptized non-Catholics. Even from the law of clandestine marriage, the Church expressly exempted such heretics as had already set up a separate religious establishment, when the Tridentine decree "Tametsi" was promulgated in their territory. The opinions of the earlier post-Reformation theologians on this matter must be read in the light of the religious conditions prevailing in the world to-day.

Thus the danger that de Lugo (de Poenit. disp. 15, n. 144) foresaw for Catholics, if the opinion exempting baptized non-Catholics from the observance of some laws of the Church prevailed, has entirely disappeared in our day. He thought that it would be holding out an inducement to weak Catholics to leave the Church in order to be freed from the obligations of her laws, “by this an opportunity would be given for many maliciously to withdraw themselves from the obligation of the laws by placing themselves in such a state that, because of their perversity, they would not be believed likely to observe the law and thus would not be understood to be bound.”

3. It was a mistake to dispense Miss X. from the law of abstinence by virtue of Apostolic faculties. "In foro externo," Miss X. is a heretic, and therefore cut off from the visible communion of the Church. The faculties granted by the Holy See may not be used in favor of any one outside the body of the Church.

“Faculties can be applied only to those who are members of the Church through baptism and have not been rendered incapable of them by some penalty or censure, especially excommunication.” Putzer, Com. in Facul. Apost. n. 46.

Justinian, a Catholic, has a Protestant servant and believes that he may provide meat for him on Friday, as, being a Protestant, he is not bound by the Catholic law of abstinence.

Justinian is, however, in the wrong.

The law of abstinence is a human law binding upon all who are the subjects of the lawgiver and have attained to the use of reason. Now all persons validly baptized belong to the Catholic Church and so are bound by her laws. There is, therefore, no doubt that Protestants are strictly called upon to observe the Catholic law of abstinence.

According to the teaching of theologians (cf. Müller, ed. 9, I. § 53, n. 5; Noldin, ed. 7, I. n. 143; Lehmkuhl, ed. 11, I. n. 228), the Church does not impose rules laid down for the personal sanctification of men upon Protestants, ne augeantur peccata; they regard themselves, generally, bona fide, as free from the commandments of the Catholic Church; they violate them, it is true, when they disregard them, but they commit no sin; their action is bad, a peccatum materiale, but not evil, not a peccatum formale.

With regard to the laws of the Church laid down for the maintenance of public order, as e. g., in those relating to impediments to marriage, Protestants are obliged to conform to the decisions of the Catholic marriage law. This point should be borne in mind when any question arises as to the validity of a Protestant marriage.

A Protestant does not sin formally by eating meat on Friday, but his action, viewed from the Catholic standpoint, is bad, and therefore no Catholic should encourage him to do so. Justinian ought not to give his Protestant servants meat on Friday, although there might be a reason for his giving meat to them rather than to Catholic servants. The same remark applies to all the laws of the Church. A good Catholic ought in such cases to display his Catholic convictions, and, by setting a good example to his non-Catholic servants, do his best to bring them to the true faith.