Chapter — Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis

Chapter VII: The Subject of Law

191.

— All those are obliged by law for whom it has been justly made. A transgression committed by them is, objectively, a material injury of the right order. Yet only those who are actually masters of reason can actually sin against law. By others, however, law can be violated in them, in the manner which will be explained later.

Here the question is only concerning the Author of law himself.

192.

— God, the Best and Greatest, is not properly bound by his laws: since he is outside and above the world of creatures, he is not part of the community for which laws have been made.

The human legislator is part of the community over which he presides. Yet by the coercive force of his law, if we suppose the Prince absolute or endowed with full power, he cannot be coerced: no one coerces himself. But from natural law itself, which sanctions this right order, that the part agree with the whole and the head with the members, he is constrained to observe his own law, insofar as, attention being given to the universality or reason of the law, the law is applicable to him 1.

And from the same motive by which the law obliges the others, that natural law seems to urge him. Yet the obligation is not judged grave of itself.

Today, however, in civil society, the matter is scarcely practical. For the legislator is not one person, but laws are proposed by the consent of many, who, taken separately, are subjects of the law, so that the consent itself in some manner can be called the legislator. Yet it happens that some immunity from personal coercion is conceded to the Prince: which immunity is called his personal inviolability.

1 Cf. 1, 2, q. 96 art. 5 ad 3.

193.

Summary

— All are obliged by law for whom the law has been made. God, since he is outside the community, is not obliged by his law; but the human legislator is obliged, not as to coercive force, if he is an absolute king, but as to directive force, from the natural law itself urging the obligation of the law, though not of itself under grave matter. Today often nothing remains to the Prince except personal inviolability.