What sorrow suffices: contrition and attrition

247. Definition. Contrition, taken generically, is defined by the Council of Trent as sorrow of soul and detestation concerning sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning henceforth.¹

Contrition essentially includes both acts, both sorrow and detestation. Sorrow indeed is the act by which the will is saddened and afflicted concerning a present evil, namely concerning sin; but detestation is the act by which it turns itself away from an evil, namely from sin, hates and condemns it, and, if it could be done, would destroy it, that is, it would will the sin not to have been committed. Moreover, in a wayfarer one of these acts is never separated from the other: for he who hates a sin committed also grieves over it, and he who grieves over a sin committed necessarily also detests it; but from the nature of the acts it is clear that sorrow supposes detestation, from which sorrow necessarily follows (n. 215). With the purpose: from this act of detestation and sorrow there follows another act, the purpose of amendment, which purpose of not sinning any more, at least implicit, belongs to the essence of contrition together with detestation and sorrow. Therefore three acts are essentially contained in contrition: sorrow, detestation, and purpose; the former acts regard the past, but the purpose is concerned with the future.²

Division. A twofold contrition is distinguished, one perfect, which is simply called contrition, the other imperfect, which by its proper name is called attrition. The former is conceived from the motive of charity and justifies the sinner outside the sacrament; the latter is conceived from another, inferior motive and does not justify the sinner except with the sacrament of baptism or of penance. Therefore contrition and attrition differ from one another in a twofold way: in motive and in effect, and under the same twofold respect contrition is more perfect than attrition.

¹ Sess. 14, c. 4.

² Sporer-Bierbaum III, pr. 3, n. 58 ff.

248. On contrition. 1. Definition. Perfect contrition is defined: sorrow of soul and detestation of sin, because sin offends God loved above all things. Therefore perfect contrition contains in itself, at least virtually and implicitly, perfect charity. Hence the Council of Trent says that contrition is perfected by charity.¹

A formal act of charity is not necessary for having perfect contrition: for the sinner considers sin as repugnant to the infinite goodness of God, and from this motive detests it; nevertheless perfect contrition obtains greater excellence if before or after contrition a formal act of charity is elicited. But charity is contained virtually in contrition: for the contrite man detests sin because it is repugnant to God, the highest good, lovable and to be loved above all things; but by that very fact he virtually and implicitly, indeed very often also formally and explicitly, loves the highest goodness of God.

2. Motive. Perfect contrition must proceed from the motive of charity; but the motive of charity is constituted both by the infinite goodness of God, or the complex of all the infinite perfections of God, and also by the several perfections (whether absolute or relative), which, since they are infinite, are not distinguished from the essence of God, but are the very essence of God conceived under some particular aspect. For God is supremely lovable not only because of the infinite fullness of all perfections, but also because of any other perfection, for example power, wisdom, justice, benignity, mercy, etc.

Therefore he who detests sin because it is against the infinite goodness of God to be loved above all things, or because it is against the justice, benignity, mercy, etc., of God, likewise to be loved above all things, elicits perfect contrition.²

Note. Although this formula used by the faithful, especially in Germany: I grieve from my whole heart, that I have so gravely offended the Lord my God, in the rigor of its terms does not express sorrow from the motive of charity, namely on account of the highest goodness of God, but from the motive of penance, namely on account of the offense or injury brought upon God; nevertheless those who seriously and from the heart utter these words usually elicit true contrition, because those who utter these words piously and seriously apprehend the offense of God not so much as an injury inflicted upon God, but as bitterness and displeasure brought by their sins upon God, their best Father, and from this motive they grieve concerning their sins, which is the motive of charity.³

¹ Cf. sess. 14, c. 4.

² Cf. De praeceptis, n. 55.

³ Sporer-Bierbaum III, tract. 9, n. 131.

249. Effects. 1. Perfect contrition justifies a man outside the sacrament, which is clear from Sacred Scripture both of the New and of the Old Testament:

a. If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our dwelling with him.¹ Charity is everywhere so presented in Sacred Letters that it removes sin: Many sins are forgiven her, because she has loved much.² What is true of charity is true also of contrition, since it contains charity at least virtually; but charity, according to John, justifies: for he who loves God above all things is loved in return by God, and God dwells stably in him; but these things are not compatible with the presence of sin.³

b. The impiety of the impious shall not harm him, on whatever day he has turned from his impiety.⁴ When thou shalt seek the Lord thy God, thou shalt find him, if yet thou shalt seek him with thy whole heart.⁵ The conversion spoken of in the cited texts is perfect contrition, which alone can be called conversion from the whole heart; and remission of sins and justification follow upon conversion.

c. Therefore the Council of Trent teaches that through contrition perfected by charity a man is reconciled to God before he receives the sacrament of penance.⁶ Nevertheless contrition does not produce justification as its proper effect, but is the final disposition required by God; when this has been placed, sanctifying grace is infused.

2. Perfect contrition in the new law does not justify without the desire of the sacrament: for the act of perfect contrition, which formerly by itself could justify the impious man, after the sacrament was instituted, by the divine will does not blot out sins except in order to the keys of the Church; therefore the obligation remains of subjecting the same sins, if this can be done, to the keys through sacramental confession. And indeed the Council of Trent teaches that reconciliation must not be ascribed to contrition without the desire of the sacrament, which is included in it.⁷ It is sufficient, however, that this desire or purpose of confessing be implicit in the act of contrition; it is not required that it be explicit.

¹ John 14, 23.

² Luke 7, 47.

³ Cf. De praeceptis, n. 57.

⁴ Ezek. 33, 12.

⁵ Deut. 4, 29.

⁶ Sess. 14, c. 4.

⁷ Sess. 14, c. 4.

250. On attrition. 1. Definition. Imperfect contrition, or attrition, is sorrow and detestation of sin proceeding not from the motive of charity, but from another inferior motive, yet one having relation to God: for without respect to God true attrition, which is conversion to God, cannot be conceived; and for this reason attrition differs from any other detestation of sin insufficient for justification, such as detestation of sin insofar as it harms reputation or health. Therefore every motive of detesting sin on account of God, which is not the proper motive of charity, is a motive of attrition.

2. Motives of attrition. By the Council of Trent the motives of attrition are reduced to these three: to the turpitude of sin and to the fear of hell and of punishments; each of these suffices for conceiving attrition, as it is required in the sacrament of penance.¹

a. By the turpitude of sin the Council of Trent does not understand that by which sin is opposed to rational nature, but that by which sin is opposed to God commanding. But any sin contains in itself manifold turpitude or malice: disobedience, ingratitude, contumely, contempt, etc.; moreover any mortal sin produces most disastrous effects in the sinner himself: it deprives the soul of sanctifying grace and therefore of supernatural life, defiles it before God, and makes it the slave of Satan and hateful to God. But all these motives are comprehended under the name of the turpitude of sin, any one of which is sufficient for conceiving attrition.

b. Fear of hell is fear of supernatural and eternal punishments, which are inflicted by God on account of sin, namely the loss of merits, privation of beatitude, and the punishment of hell.

c. Fear of punishments: by this are understood temporal punishments, whether of the other life or of this life, not insofar as these follow naturally from sin, but insofar as they are inflicted by God offended by sin and as the just avenger of sinners.

¹ Cf. sess. 14, c. 4.

251. Effects. Although attrition cannot justify outside the sacrament, nevertheless it sufficiently disposes for obtaining justification in the sacrament. And indeed the attrite man recedes from creatures and now tends toward God, to whom he desires to be reconciled; but for obtaining justification through sacramental absolution this disposition suffices. This is the clear doctrine of the Council of Trent,¹ so that the opposite opinion must be called improbable, but this one certain; hence not even in the article of death is it necessary that he who has received the sacrament of penance with attrition elicit an act of contrition.²

a. From the doctrine of the Council of Trent it is certain that attrition disposes sufficiently for obtaining justification, whether through baptism or through absolution. Since the same council nevertheless says: those who dispose themselves for justification begin to love God,³ the question is asked, what is that initial love which is required as a disposition for justification. That initial love, first of all, is not required as the motive of sorrow, but as an act accompanying sorrow, which is always contained in due disposition for justification, whether in hope of pardon, or in purpose, or in the sorrow itself.⁴

In the sorrow: for he who grieves concerning his sins wishes to render God propitious to himself; but by this very fact he already approaches charity. In the purpose: for he who grieves concerning his sins wishes to observe all the precepts, in which is contained also the precept of charity toward God; therefore he has charity toward God in purpose and in desire. In hope: for he who grieves concerning his sins hopes for remission of sins unto obtaining eternal life; but eternal life is the most perfect friendship with God; therefore he has charity as the final end toward which he tends.

b. Since attrition with the sacrament justifies the sinner, that axiom has prevailed: through the sacrament the penitent is made contrite from attrite. This axiom must not be understood formally, as if the act of attrition through absolution became an act of contrition, or the attrite person by force of absolution always necessarily elicited contrition; but effectively, insofar as attrition with the sacrament produces the same effect which contrition alone without the sacrament produces, since it reconciles the sinner to God and restores friendship with God.

¹ Sess. 14, c. 4.

² Cf. Pesch VII, n. 159 ff.

³ Sess. 6, c. 6.

⁴ Cf. Lehmkuhl II, n. 289 (n. 391).

A heartfelt sorrow is not quite the same thing as a hatred or detestation of sin. Sorrow is a pain which we feel on account of the presence of some evil or the absence of some good; hatred is an aversion for some evil which is past. Hatred of sin, consequent aversion for it, and a turning away from it is the chief element in contrition; for if we have this hatred we shall have sorrow for sin regarded as a present evil, we shall turn away from it as a past evil, and we shall propose to flee from it in the future. If, then, we have this hatred of sin, we shall have sorrow and a purpose of amendment; we shall have true contrition.

That sorrow for sin which arises from the perfect love of God is called contrition in the full and strict sense; sorrow for sin arising from less perfect motives, as from the fear of hell or the moral turpitude of vice, is called attrition, Ordinarily the word contrition is used indifferently of both kinds of sorrow.

Contrition or penitence or repentance is, as we have already seen, according to the teaching of the Council of Trent, a necessary condition for the forgiveness of sin by God. God will not forgive sin unless the sinner turn from his sin and approach him by sorrow of heart. Contrition, then, is a necessary means of salvation for all who have fallen into grievous sin. It is also matter of divine precept which must be fulfilled at least when the sinner is in danger of death, for then it becomes of supreme necessity, and also sometimes during life. The Church has determined this divine precept by commanding all who have come to the use of reason and have fallen into sin to go to confession at least once a year. Moreover, repentance for sin becomes necessary when any action has to be performed which for its due performance requires the agent to be in the state of grace. Furthermore, inasmuch as one who is deprived by sin of the grace of God cannot long resist temptation and will fall again and again before long, the sinner is obliged to rise from his sin in order to avoid repeated falls.

Of course it is better, and the sinner is to be urged, by all means, to rise at once when he has had the misfortune to fall into sin. He should never sleep while he is conscious of being out of the friendship of God. Still he is not bound under pain of committing a new sin to repent immediately after committing sin. It will be sufficient if he repent at least when repentance becomes necessary according to the doctrine which has just been laid down.

Not every sort of sorrow is sufficient to justify the sinner, even with the help of the sacrament of Penance. Although perfect love of God suffices to reconcile the sinner with God, though it leaves the obligation of confessing the sin it remits, still this love will not serve by itself as a preparation and disposition for the reception of Penance. A material part of the sacrament of Penance is contrition, and contrition is not love. The sinner, then, who wishes to receive the sacrament of Penance must have true and sincere sorrow for his sin; he must detest it and turn away from it in order to be reconciled with God, whom it offends. Mere natural sorrow for sin because of the temporal evils which it causes is not sufficient. I may well be sorry because sin has ruined my good name, or my health, or my fortunes, but such motives are merely natural, and have no relation to God. The sinner in the sacrament of Penance seeks reconciliation with God, and so the motives of his sorrow must have reference to God; they must be supernatural, founded on revelation and on faith. Without faith no act can be of avail for salvation, as ‘‘ without faith it is impossible to please God.”¹ ‘The sinner must regard sin as the greatest of all evils, as in reality it is. He must be prepared to do and to suffer anything rather than commit sin again. Otherwise he cannot be said to fulfil that greatest of all the commandments, which bids us love God with our whole heart, with our whole soul, with all our strength, and with all our mind. Inasmuch as any one mortal sin deprives us of the friendship of God, the sorrow of the sinner must also be universal and embrace all the sins by which he has grievously offended Almighty God. For this it is not necessary that there should be a separate and distinct act of sorrow for every sin committed; it will be sufficient if the motive be universal, so as to embrace all sins. Thus, inasmuch as all mortal sins are directly opposed to charity, and any such sin deserves the punishment of hell, if our sorrow is motived by love toward God, or by fear of hell, it will be universal in the sense required.

Provided that there be sorrow for all mortal sins confessed, a want of sorrow for venial sins will not invalidate the sacrament. For venial sins are compatible with the state of grace and the friendship of God. Still there must be some sorrow for sin confessed; otherwise an essential part of the sacrament of Penance will be wanting. And so if the penitent have only venial sins to confess, for none of which he is sorry, the sacrament would be invalid and sacrilegious. He must at least be sorry for one sin confessed, and he should not confess venial sins for which he is not sorry unless he has some good reason, as if he wishes to ask the advice of his confessor about them, or to make the state of his soul more fully known to him.

¹ Heb. xi 6.

There have been heated controversies in the past as to the sufficiency of attrition to remit sin with the sacrament of - Penance. Although they are not quite settled even yet, nevertheless, since the Council of Trent the common doctrine is fairly clear and certain. The Council, then, seems to teach¹ that sorrow for sin because of the fear of hell, or its moral turpitude, or on account of the punishment with which God afflicts the sinner even in this life, will be sufficient for the remission of sin in the sacrament of Penance, provided that it destroys all affection for sin in the heart of the penitent and converts him from sin to God. The slavish fear of hell, by which a man refrains from sinful acts while preserving his affection for them, is, of course, insufficient even with the help of the sacrament to forgive sin and reconcile the sinner with God. The fear which is salutary and efficacious must be the filial fear by which the sinner turns to God because he neither wants sin nor its evil consequences any more. Such sorrow has all the elements which, as we saw above, are required in contrition.

¹ Sess. xiv, c 4

“Contrition, which holds the first place among the aforesaid acts of the penitent, is sorrow of soul and detestation for sin committed, together with a resolution not to sin thereafter. This movement of contrition was at all times necessary for obtaining the pardon of sins; and in a man who has fallen after Baptism it finally prepares for the remission of sins if it is joined with confidence in the divine mercy and with the desire of performing the other things required for duly receiving this sacrament. The holy Synod therefore declares that this contrition contains not only cessation from sin and the resolution and beginning of a new life, but also hatred of the old life, according to the saying: Cast away from you all your transgressions by which you have transgressed, and make yourselves a new heart and a new spirit. And certainly, he who has considered those cries of the Saints: Against You only have I sinned, and I have done evil before You; I have labored in my groaning; every night I will wash my bed; I will recount to You all my years in the bitterness of my soul; and others of this kind, will easily understand that they flowed from a certain vehement hatred of the former life and an immense detestation of sins. It teaches furthermore that, although it sometimes happens that this contrition is perfected by charity and reconciles man to God before this sacrament is actually received, nevertheless the reconciliation itself is not to be ascribed to the contrition apart from the desire of the sacrament, which is included in it. But that imperfect contrition which is called attrition, because it is commonly conceived either from consideration of the turpitude of sin or from fear of hell and punishments, if it excludes the will to sin and is joined with the hope of pardon, it declares not only does not make a man a hypocrite and a greater sinner, but is even a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit—not indeed as yet dwelling within, but only moving—by which the penitent, assisted, prepares a way for himself to justice. And although by itself, without the Sacrament of Penance, it cannot lead the sinner to justification, nevertheless it disposes him to obtain the grace of God in the Sacrament of Penance. For the Ninevites, profitably struck by this fear, did penance full of terrors at the preaching of Jonah and obtained mercy from the Lord. Therefore certain men falsely calumniate Catholic writers as though they taught that the Sacrament of Penance confers grace upon those receiving it without a good movement, which the Church of God has never taught or believed; and they also falsely teach that contrition is extorted and coerced, not free and voluntary.

“77. By contrition, even when perfected by charity and joined with the desire of receiving the sacrament, sin is not remitted, outside a case of necessity or martyrdom, without the actual reception of the sacrament.” Proposition of Michael Baius condemned by St. Pius V.

2. Defect of contrition in the Sacrament - Angelus, accusing only venial sins in sacramental confession, conceives no sorrow for them. For he says that, in order to blot them out in sacramental confession, their confession itself suffices, which is an act of satisfaction and penance.

It is asked: Whether at least attrition is necessary for the confession of venial sins.

R. Affirmatively. The reason is that Trent absolutely declares sorrow and detestation of sin to be the principal act on the part of the penitent, which with the others constitutes as it were the matter of the sacrament of penance. Cf. La-Croix, l. 6, p. 2, n. 682; Lugo, d. 9, s. 2; Suarez, d. 11, s. 3. Therefore confession of venial sins without sorrow can indeed be of itself an act of satisfaction and penance, but not sacramental. Angelus perhaps is indeed excused by good faith, but he acts badly, for, accusing only venial sins without sorrow, he exposes the sacrament to nullity, which is grave. I. M. 685.

442. Things to be established. I. Either perfect contrition with the desire of the Sacrament, or imperfect contrition with the Sacrament itself, is altogether necessary to the sinner by a necessity of means for obtaining justification and salvation.

1. It is established from Sacred Scripture, Matt. 3:2: Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven has drawn near. - Luke 13:3: Unless you shall have penance, you shall all likewise perish. - And ibid. 5: Unless you shall do penance, you shall all likewise perish. - Ecclus. 2:22: If we shall not do penance, we shall fall into the hands of the Lord and not into the hands of men. - Apoc. 2:5: Do penance and perform your first works; otherwise I come to you and will move your candlestick out of its place, unless you shall do penance. - Acts 3:19: Do penance, therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out.

2. It is established from the Councils, especially from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, ch. 4: At every time this movement of contrition has been necessary for obtaining pardon of sins. And sess. 6, ch. 6, where hatred and detestation for sin are numbered among the chief dispositions for justification.

443. II. Mortal sin being supposed, contrition is necessary by a necessity of precept, at least at some time in life. For this precept is gathered from the words of Sacred Scripture related above, from the words of St. John the Baptist at the beginning of his preaching, and especially from the words of Christ Himself in the Gospel. That contrition which is required for justification is understood to fall under the precept, namely, perfect contrition outside the Sacrament, or attrition with the Sacrament. - St. Lig., no. 337. - Billuart, diss. 4, art. 3, and all others.

III. The precept of contrition obliges sometimes per se, sometimes per accidens.

1. It obliges per se when a grave necessity of reconciling oneself with God presses, namely, in even probable danger of death, and this on account of the precept of attaining the ultimate end; likewise, when someone is in the state of sin, because of the proximate danger of dying in this wretched state ¹, or of falling into graver sins ².

¹ These things are not to be understood so generally as though a man were obliged to this immediately after sin; for that, as the Author himself teaches a little below, is contrary to the common opinion of Theologians after St. Thomas, and is excluded by the same reasons by which St. Thomas (In IV Sent., dist. 17, q. 3, art. 1, q. 4) rejects the necessity of confessing immediately after sin. Apart from the point of death, however, the more common opinion, as Palaus says (De Poenitentia, disp. un., punct. 3, no. 9), admits at least that delay which the precept of the Church concerning annual confession also admits (see Laymann, De Poenitentia, ch. 2, no. 6); and St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 473) attributes this doctrine even to St. Thomas.

² This obligation also of eliciting an act of contrition for warding off other sins is a mere opinion of certain authors. Therefore, the statement of Cardinal de Lugo (De Poenitentia, disp. 15, nos. 55-56) is to be observed: Because of the variety of opinions, we cannot impose upon him (namely, the penitent) a certain obligation.

On this argument, the things which Suarez has (De Poenitentia, disp. 15, sect. 6, nos. 7-8) and Cardinal de Lugo (loc. cit. and disp. 7, nos. 240, 242) are to be seen; from these it may be concluded either that no necessity of eliciting contrition for this reason is proved, or that its omission is not a sin distinct from that into which one falls because that means was omitted.

2. It obliges per accidens when another precept presses which cannot be fulfilled without contrition, especially in the following cases: namely, when the precept of annual confession presses; when the precept of an act of charity presses; when one guilty of grave sin is about to receive or administer a Sacrament; whenever the Sacrament of Penance is received, even for the sake of devotion. - St. Lig., ibid.

445. QUESTION 3. Is one who at the point of death receives the Sacrament of Penance with attrition bound, in addition, to elicit an act of perfect contrition?

Reply 1. He does not appear to be bound to an explicit act of contrition, since he is morally certain that he has been justified by attrition alone with the Sacrament. - Thus Lugo and others commonly, against some.

Reply 2. According to some, however, he is bound, for they say that the precept of perfect charity presses especially at the point of death. Whatever may be the case, it is expedient that the dying be excited, as far as can be done, both to an act of charity and to an act of perfect contrition. - St. Lig., no. 437 ⁷.

⁷ ** The VV. here produce (p. 935, no. 107) the things which St. Alphonsus has (bk. 6, no. 437): Each opinion, says the holy Doctor, is probable; but the first (the second here in Gury) is altogether to be counseled.... Indeed, I say that it is altogether to be followed by one who is at the actual point of death. For then everyone is bound to elicit an act of charity ..., which no one can satisfy if, when the memory of sin occurs, he does not detest the sin from the same motive of charity.

Reply. If each opinion, as the holy Doctor testifies, is probable, therefore the obligation of either one can by no means be imposed. For obligation is so called from binding. But a doubtful law does not bind, as the holy Doctor repeats a hundred times. Therefore, a merely probable law does not bind.

But what is added concerning the obligation of an act of charity at the point of death requires a distinction. For if the discussion concerns a man in the state of sin who has no other means of justification, it is conceded that there is an obligation of obtaining justification through contrition perfected by charity; otherwise, it is denied. See what is said concerning this argument in vol. 1, no. 219, resolution 2, in the Note.

QUESTION 4. For obtaining grace in the Sacrament, are explicit acts of Faith and Hope required in addition to sorrow?

Reply. Negative. The reason is that it cannot be proved by any probable argument that these acts are explicitly required ⁸. Moreover, a penitent eliciting an act of sorrow also in some way explicitly and exercitively elicits these acts, although not reflexively; because he then without doubt exercitively believes and hopes that his sins are to be remitted through the Sacrament of Penance by virtue of the merits of Christ. - St. Lig., no. 439, and others commonly, against some.

⁸ Some required these acts because they are expressly mentioned by the Council of Trent where the process of justification is described (sess. 6, ch. 6). This reason would also prove the necessity of hearing a preacher of the faith, since it is said there: conceiving faith from hearing; and, moreover, the insufficiency of sorrow perfected by charity without imperfect sorrow, because it is added there: they are struck by fear of divine justice!

Suarez speaks to the matter (De Poenitentia, disp. 4, sect. 2, no. 7): Finally, in sess. 6, ch. 6, the Council numbers several acts in the disposition of the sinner, all of which need not always concur formally, but it suffices that they concur virtually or implicitly, as an act of hope.

And yet there are confessors who, led by that prejudice, require penitents before the confession of sins to recite the customary formulas of the acts of the theological virtues, unless perhaps they even dismiss them so that they may first satisfy this supposed necessity. This is all the more remarkable because in the customary formula of the act of faith you will not find the things which the Council said must be believed, namely, that God through Christ will be propitious to him, etc.

452. QUESTION 6. Does attrition from fear of the punishments of Purgatory suffice for venial sins?

Reply. Affirmative, according to the most common and morally certain opinion; because all the reasons adduced above for the sufficiency of attrition from fear of hell also hold here.

QUESTION 7. Does attrition from fear of the temporal punishments of this life to be undergone for sin, insofar as they are inflicted by God, suffice?

Reply. Affirmative, more probably, provided that it is supernatural ⁷. The reason is:

⁷ When supernatural attrition is required, the opinion of those who said that natural attrition suffices is excluded; that is (as Suarez indicates, De Poenitentia, disp. 20, sect. 2, no. 7), attrition elicited by the powers of nature alone, whether it is conceived from an eternal and honorable motive, such as fleeing the punishments of hell or the turpitude of sin, or from a temporal and indifferent motive, such as avoiding infamy or temporal loss, because these temporal harms also are given by God on account of our sins. Suarez then opposes to this false opinion (ibid., no. 8) the thesis that attrition must be elicited with the help of grace. See the same Suarez, disp. 4, sect. 1, nos. 3-4.

Moreover, although St. Alphonsus (no. 443) does not deny that this opinion is judged most probable by some and even morally certain by others (from Croix, from whom he took it, it could be added that others call the same altogether certain), nevertheless he notes three things to the contrary: 1. that Cardenas doubts whether it is morally certain; 2. that Cano, Pasqualigus, and Hurtadus, in Diana, held the contrary; 3. that the Council of Trent speaks copulatively of hell and punishments, and does not distinguish disjunctively between hell or punishments. Hence he concludes: Since the second (opinion) does not lack its own probability, at least extrinsic, I think it is better that it be observed in practice. Hence the Author also calls the opinion which he proposes only more probable.

But in reality these reasons of St. Alphonsus neither detract anything from the firmness of the doctrine which the Author relates from the common opinion of the Doctors, nor can confer any, even slight, probability upon the opposite.

As regards the first, therefore, it was said in the preceding edition, because of an inexact citation, that Cardenas was wrongly cited, inasmuch as, cohering badly with himself, he confused everything indiscriminately. Now, more aptly to the matter, Reply. Cardenas himself gives this reason why he doubted whether the affirmative opinion was morally certain (Crisis, pt. 4, on Prop. 1 of Innocent XI, disp. 2, q. 2, no. 69): because there are not lacking, he says, authors who deny that this manner of attrition is sufficient; and the affirmative opinion does not rest upon an infallibly certain foundation, but only upon a probable one. But: 1. it is false that these authors existed;

2. likewise, that a sufficient foundation of moral certainty is lacking is found false by the common judgment of the gravest Doctors. Therefore, that suffrage of Cardenas profits the cause nothing.

As regards the second, it is very well known that Cano (see Faure, Dubitationes Theologicae, dub. IV, sect. IV) and Hurtadus held the contrary opinion to that which St. Alphonsus says, so much so that Diana, to whom he refers, uses the very doctrine of Hurtadus to confirm the common opinion (see vol. 1, tr. 3, res. 108, no. 2). Diana does not even name Pasqualigus, nor does Pasqualigus, insofar as it was possible to know from inspection of his writings, have any word concerning this controversy. Therefore, the whole foundation upon which that extrinsic probability was built is altogether wanting. Moreover, St. Alphonsus did not produce these false citations from himself, but in good faith took them from Croix (bk. 6, pt. 2, no. 884); whether Croix himself noted them carelessly or unfortunately borrowed them from elsewhere matters little to us now.

As regards the third, finally, it is plain that this reason also is deprived of all efficacy; and, contrary to the common sense of all, it would prove of itself that fear of hell does not suffice for attrition unless fear of temporal evils also accompanied it.

But what St. Alphonsus intimates (ibid.), that in the context of the Council of Trent the word punishments signifies only the punishments of hell, manifestly contradicts the same context; for there immediately follows the example of the fear by which the Ninevites, struck by Jonah's preaching full of terrors, did penance. But Jonah's preaching full of terrors, according to Sacred Scripture (Jonah 3:4), was this: Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown.

** The twenty-eight columns which the VV. opposed to this Note (pp. 426-440) must now be answered. First (pp. 427-428), they note that the holy Doctor said the negative opinion must be observed more safely in practice because it does not lack its own probability, at least extrinsic. Therefore, since validity is at issue, Proposition 1 among those condemned by Innocent XI pertains here. Reply. Here again it must be denied that either intrinsic or extrinsic probability, even slight, supports this negative opinion; and this will be more apparent below. Therefore, that condemned Proposition has no place here.

The VV. then undertake (pp. 428-433) to vindicate the Authors whom St. Alphonsus cited for the negative: Pasqualigus, Hurtadus (the VV. add Diana, but neither the holy Doctor nor the Note has anything concerning the opinion of Diana), Cano, Cardenas, and Concina. Reply. It is difficult to know what the VV. mean when they write, They are vindicated. For: 1. they concede that Pasqualigus has not even one word concerning this matter, but was cited by St. Alphonsus because of a typographical error which had crept into the book of Croix, from which the holy Doctor took his citations. Does this produce probability for the opinion of St. Alphonsus? 2. The VV. themselves (p. 430) relate these words of Hurtadus, in Diana: Some teach, AND RIGHTLY, that attrition on account of a temporal evil with reference to God ... suffices for the effect of the Sacrament; St. Alphonsus, on the contrary, says that Hurtadus in Diana denies that this attrition suffices. Is the citation of St. Alphonsus thus vindicated as correct? 3. From Concina the VV. (p. 433) adduce this judgment: I consider this opinion (namely, the affirmative) not only false and lax, but contained in the Decree of Innocent XI. Reply. Excellent indeed! But does not St. Alphonsus say that this affirmative opinion appears to him more probable? Nor is this enough. Concina (Manuale, bk. 11, ch. 7, sec. 5), concerning the sufficiency of attrition which St. Alphonsus also defends as morally certain, judges thus: This boasted moral certainty is a falsity of fact clearer than midday light; it is a fiction, an imaginary and manifest chimera, condemned by Alexander VII. I now ask the VV.: Is this a patron of such a kind that his judgments can add or take away any probability from opinions? Hence let the VV. understand why no account was taken in the Note of the suffrage of Concina.

4. As regards Cano, we said in the Note that it is established from the things which Faure has that he is cited in vain. Thus briefly: Cano (Relectio De Poenitentia, pt. 6) has these words: If you ask when one who is attrite becomes contrite by virtue of the Sacrament, I reply that this first occurs, by whatever kind of attrition a man is attrite, if he thinks that he has performed what was necessary and is invincibly ignorant that he does not have a sufficient disposition. Moreover, ibid., among the species of attrition he also mentions that which proceeds from fear of infamy, or of any temporal evil, as when one detests sin and purposes to confess lest he be cast out of the Church or fined money, etc. Hence it is argued thus: Cano here teaches that attrition from a merely human motive suffices. Therefore, a fortiori, he admits that attrition from fear of punishments which elsewhere (pt. 3) he calls spiritual or supernatural suffices, punishments which require the help of God in order to be believed and which are known by the light of faith. The VV. object here that this doctrine is false. Reply. It is not asked here whether this doctrine of Cano is true or false, but what his doctrine is, and whether he was aptly cited by St. Alphonsus for the matter. See Dicastillo, De Poenitentia, tr. 8, disp. 6, no. 6, and Candidus, disp. 24, art. 11, no. IV.

5. Finally, what force the opinion of Cardenas has was stated in the Note and will be apparent from what is to be said.

The VV. add (pp. 437-438) an article with the title: The solid reasons favoring the negative opinion are set forth. Reply 1. If solid reasons had not been lacking, St. Alphonsus would not have said that at least extrinsic probability inheres in this opinion. For solid reasons also produce intrinsic probability. 2. All those reasons which the VV. gather from Croix come to this: that the force of the argument which the Doctors take against them from the Council of Trent may in some way, if possible, be broken. But this is by no means to adduce solid reasons for the thesis. Therefore, in that entire article no reason in reality is contained, either solid or less solid. Moreover, if Croix had had at hand some solid reason for the negative opinion, he certainly would not have written concerning the affirmative (bk. 6, pt. 2, no. 884): IT IS MOST PROBABLE that ... it suffices, etc.

And let these things suffice so that the truth of what had been said in the Note may be established, namely, that the reasons adduced by St. Alphonsus confer no probability, not even slight, upon the negative opinion. Two things now remain: 1. that the scruple which the doubt of Cardenas concerning the moral certainty of the affirmative opinion cast upon St. Alphonsus be removed; 2. that the weight of the citations which the VV. added (pp. 433-438) be weighed.

Therefore, to the scruples of Cardenas we shall oppose Cardinal Toletus, who (In S. Thomam, pt. 3, q. 85, art. 5), disputing concerning fear of punishment, and indeed, as he says, not only when one fears the punishment of hell, but the turpitude of sin and the loss of temporal goods, after establishing against Luther that this fear and detestation is good and useful, and that through it grace is given with the Sacrament, concludes: This doctrine is Catholic, and the contrary is heretical. To Toletus let Suarez be added, who writes (De Poenitentia, disp. 5, sect. 2, no. 15): This opinion is true. - Illsung, according to whom (tr. 6, disp. 6, q. 3, nos. 29 and 39): This conclusion is of faith. - Jerome Llamas, who (Methodus Curae, pt. 2, ch. 2, sec. 6) says that it is certain, and that it is heretical to deny it. - Seraphinus a Conceptione, who (De Poenitentia, bk. 1, disp. 3, dub. 2, nos. 461, 462, and 485) affirms that it is a Catholic truth. - Elbel, who (conf. 3, no. 59) calls this opinion most common and morally certain. - George Gobat, who writes (tr. 6, no. 47) that it must by no means be doubted that it is true and supernatural attrition, proportioned to obtaining the effect of the Sacrament. - Arriaga, who (in Croix, loc. cit.) defends the same doctrine as certain.

Paul de Palacio, who writes (In Cap. 16 S. Matthaei): The opinion is most certain. - Michel Augustinus, Canon Regular, who (Theologia Canonico-moralis, vol. 4, tr. 4, pt. 2, q. 1, punct. 1, sect. 2, no. 18) aptly refutes Cardenas as though this doctrine were contained within the limits of probability. - Aversa, who (De Poenitentia, disp. 2, sect. 14) says that it is most manifest from Sacred Scripture. - Holzmann, who (tr. 4, no. 532) says: This doctrine is pronounced morally certain by Fathers Gobat and Elbel, to whom I also assent. - And Martinonus too hands it down as certain (disp. 48, sect. 7, no. 82). - Likewise, James Granadus (Controversiae 7, De Poenitentia, tr. 2, disp. 8, sect. 1, no. 5) teaches it as certain. - Ithuriaga, whose words are these (Dissertatio Moralis XI, no. 19): This opinion is not merely probable, but true and morally certain, just as certain as the opinion concerning attrition conceived from fear of hell. - Dominic Viva, who (on Prop. 1 of Innocent XI, no. 26) affirms that we can licitly follow the same opinion as morally certain. - Mazzotta, who (tr. 6, disp. 1, q. 3, ch. 3, sec. 1, no. 2) says: This opinion is most probable by authority and reason, so that Gobat calls it indubitable and Arriaga altogether certain; wherefore it is not subject to Prop. 1 condemned by Innocent XI, whatever Croix may have said....

To these are to be added the very many who teach the same doctrine absolutely and without introducing any doubt, but as beyond controversy, and indeed hold it as handed down by the Council of Trent. Concerning this Ithuriaga says (loc. cit., no. 18): It is more certain than certain to me that the Council of Trent, in describing attrition which is conceived from fear of hell and punishments, used this manner of speaking lest it should appear to wish to restrict the things which it there teaches concerning attrition to attrition from fear of hell; therefore, I think these things must be extended to attrition which is conceived generally from fear of other punishments also.... Thus the example of the Ninevites also fits more suitably, etc. Thus also Ferraris (s.v. Poenitentia, art. 2, no. 13), Moya (disp. 5, q. 4, nos. 2-3), Giribaldi (tr. 6, ch. 3, dub. 7, no. 43, and tr. 7, ch. 4, dub. 5, no. 29), Dominic Soto (In IV Sent., disp. 17, q. 2, art. 5, and De Natura et Gratia, bk. 2, ch. 14), in which latter place he expressly teaches that this attrition is informed by grace, contrary to what some have attributed to him; Fagundez (De Secundo Ecclesiae Praecepto, bk. 2, ch. 4, no. 9); Navarrus (Enchiridion, ch. 1, no. 8, and ch. 2, no. 38); John Medina (q. 4); Villalobos (tr. 9, diff. 22); Stoz (bk. 1, ch. 2, q. 1, art. 5, no. 8); Reiffenstuel (De Poenitentia, dist. 6, q. 4, nos. 42-43); Escobar (Theologia Moralis, tr. 7, exam. 4, ch. 7, no. 35); Nicholas Muszka (De Sacramentis, sec. 2, no. 29); Marin (tr. 22, disp. 7, sect. 4, no. 55); Reginaldus (bk. 5, ch. 3, no. 28); Anthony of the Holy Ghost (Directorium Confessariorum, tr. 5, disp. 3, sect. 2, no. 69); Babenstuber (tr. 8, pt. 6, disp. 4, art. 3, no. 13); De Blanchis (disp. 6, pp. 267 and 271); Thomas Hurtadus (De Poenitentia, disp. 6, diff. 5); Francis Suarez (De Poenitentia, tr. 3, disp. 1, sect. 3, sec. 2, no. 92); Candidus (Disquisitiones Morales 24, art. 11, dub. 3, no. 5); Cardinal Brancatus (In IV Sent., De Poenitentia, disp. 9, art. 3, sec. 10); Crescentius Krisper (Theologia Scholastica Scotica, tr. 12, dist. 3, q. 1, no. 2); Mastrius (De Poenitentia, disp. 5, q. 6, no. 138, and Theologia Moralis, disp. 21, q. 2, no. 40); Voit (vol. 2, nos. 493 and 495); Honoratus Faber (De Poenitentia, ch. 1, no. 17); Clericatus (De Poenitentia, decis. 14, no. 5 ff.); Ulloa (disp. 6, ch. 1); Dicastillo (tr. 8, disp. 6, nos. 6-8); Sporer (pt. 3, ch. 2, nos. 227 and 259); Bonacina (De Sacramentis, disp. 5, q. 5, sect. 1, punct. 3, no. 1); Peter de Fay (De Poenitentia, q. 9, art. 1, disp. 3); Marchant (tr. 4, tit. 2, q. 4); Becanus (pt. 5, tr. 2, ch. 35, q. 1, no. 6); Maurus Berardusius (Summa Coronae, ch. 3); Roncaglia (tr. 19, ch. 1, q. 2, rule 1); Potestas (no. 5063); Ochagavia (De Poenitentia, tr. 1, no. 18). To these add Nugnus (in Candidus, loc. cit.), Madernus (in Giribaldi, loc. cit.), and Gaspar Hurtadus (in Escobar, loc. cit., and Diana, vol. 1, tr. 3, res. 108, no. 2).

To these add also those who call the same doctrine most probable, such as Tamburini (Methodus Confessionis, bk. 1, ch. 1, no. 11), Reuter (pt. 4, no. 283), Gormaz (De Poenitentia, sect. 5, no. 454), Mazzotta (loc. cit.), etc.

But now it comes to mind to ask: will all these things lose their force solely for this reason, that, as St. Alphonsus said, Cardenas doubts whether this opinion is morally certain? But from an inspection of that paragraph of the holy Doctor (bk. 6, no. 443), it sufficiently appears that he did not labor very extensively upon this question; but, apart from the fact that he employed the opinion of Concina, he had at hand no other apparatus except what he excerpted from Lacroix. Yet neither that apparatus for the holy Doctor, nor that paragraph of the holy Doctor for others, could have been equal to furnishing a full knowledge of this controversy. But let us come to the things which are objected.

Cardenas (Crisis, pt. 4, diss. 2, ch. 6, no. 70) regards it as of great moment that Lessius (In III Partem S. Thomae, q. 1, dub. 5, no. 18) said concerning the sufficiency of this attrition, this is sufficiently probable. But the VV. (p. 434) say that the same doctrine was called probable also by Diana (vol. 1, tr. 3, res. 108), and by Tanner (De Poenitentia, q. 6, dub. 4, no. 21), and indeed also by Lugo, who (disp. 5, no. 137) employs the word appears, which is the word of one opining. Therefore, they conclude (pp. 434-435), even the opposite opinion is judged probable by these, and by Tanner as more probable. Reply with Cardenas: I deny the consequence. Of two contradictory propositions, says Cardenas (tr. 1, disp. 2, ch. 2, no. 10), one can be probable without the other being probable; I maintain this conclusion as altogether certain. This conclusion is common among the Authors. For then each proposition will be probable when some equal authority or intrinsic reason militates on each side. But in the case neither any intrinsic reason nor any authority can be cited for the negative opinion. Therefore. And in fact, neither Lugo, Tanner, nor Diana adduces anything to the contrary. Concerning the Authors, some of whom Cardenas boasts of in vain, a little below. Meanwhile note that, concerning our thesis, Lugo does not say it appears, but I JUDGE.

The VV. insist and (pp. 437-438) adduce these words from Billuart (De Poenitentia, diss. 4, art. 1): Contrition must be supernatural.... Hence you will infer that one who grieves over sin ... because from it follows loss of reputation or temporal goods, and from similar natural motives, is insufficiently ... contrite; otherwise, if he grieves over sin ... as productive of the punishments of purgatory, hell, the loss of grace, glory, etc. Although the VV. attach no conclusion here, nevertheless in the Additional Summary (col. 83) they concluded thus: Billuart therefore does not admit attrition from fear of the temporal punishments of this life, even if they are considered as inflicted by God, ... because attrition of this kind is not supernatural. Reply 1. It is false, as is plain from the context, that Billuart there discusses loss of reputation, etc., as punishments considered to have been inflicted by God. It is therefore false that these are excluded there by Billuart. Reply 2. Nor ought they to be thought excluded because they are not expressly indicated in the latter part of the text. And here the manner of proceeding of the VV. is somewhat displeasing. Let the etc. in the text of Billuart be noted. In the VV. it does not appear whether it belongs to Billuart or to the VV.; but in the Additional Summary it is written in letters different from those of the text of Billuart, and thus you would believe that it does not belong to Billuart, but to the Writers indicating that they omit the rest. Yet in reality it belongs to Billuart. And since it must not be called idle, is the conjecture empty that the Author tacitly indicated there that he also intended temporal punishments as inflicted by God? But there is no need for conjectures; for Billuart himself afterward expressly sets forth his opinion thus (loc. cit., art. 4): To grieve over sin, ... charity being excluded, either because ... it produces temporal evil, or because it produces hell, or because it excludes glory, or because it is an evil and an offense against God, are so many modes of attrition. Therefore, Billuart does not confirm, as the VV. say (p. 433), the opinion of St. Alphonsus, but departs from it.

The VV. object (p. 438): Amort (tr. 13, sec. 2, q. 6) does not hold as sufficient sorrow from fear of temporal punishment, even if it is known by faith as sent by God, because this sorrow is not supernatural. Reply. Let all of it pass. Amort holds it as a merely natural motive even if someone grieves from fear of punishments in the other world (which words the VV. would have done better not to omit), and gives as the reason that this motive does not befit a son of God; immediately afterward, moreover (q. 7), he denies that attrition from fear of the punishments of hell suffices, because this fear indicates not the soul of a friend or son, but of a servant, and does not exclude the will to sin. But what weight, I ask, will finally appear to be attributable to the authority of a Writer who declines into these anomalies? Therefore, let the VV. have this man together with Concina for themselves.

The VV. insist (p. 435) that according to Coninck (De Poenitentia, disp. 4, dub. 5, no. 39), attrition of this kind can be suspect; these words of Coninck also somewhat disturbed Reuter. Reply. Did Coninck call it suspect as though it did not suffice per se? I deny it; for he expressly affirms that it is sufficient. Did he call it suspect because of an extrinsic motive which might be present per accidens? Let it pass. The same is said even of fear of hell, which per accidens can decline into servilely servile fear; much more can this hold with regard to attrition on account of the turpitude of sins, in which the quality of universality can more easily be lacking. But these things pertain not to the hinge of the question, but to opportune admonitions for those who explain catechesis to the people, that they may hand down the genuine notion of attrition.

Finally, to confirm, as they say, the opinion of St. Alphonsus, the VV. produce other authors (pp. 433-438), and especially Toletus, Vasquez, and Leonard Jansen. I said especially these, for the many things which they adduce from Suarez, Tamburini, Roncaglia, and Henno have nothing to do with the matter and serve merely to increase the bulk of the book.

1. because it appears established from the words of the Council of Trent, where it says: Attrition is conceived from fear of hell and punishments; for it distinguishes between the punishments of hell and other punishments; 2. because in fear of this kind all the conditions of true attrition can be present. - St. Lig., no. 443.

453. QUESTION 8. For obtaining justification in the Sacrament of Penance, is a beginning of love also required with attrition? Reply. Negative, if by a beginning of love is understood some degree of perfect charity by which God is loved above all things. The reason is that an act which essentially justifies outside the Sacrament is not necessarily prerequired for rightly receiving the Sacrament. But every act of charity, and therefore sorrow which suffices for the nature of contrition, however small it may be, blots out every fault, as St. Thomas says, Supplement, q. 5, art. 3. Therefore, etc. St. Lig., no. 440, says that this is morally certain.

It can, however, be conceded that some beginning of love is required insofar as attrition, in order to dispose toward the Sacrament, must exclude, as the holy Council speaks, the will to sin; but otherwise, as St. Thomas says (II-II, q. 17, art. 8), someone is introduced to loving God through this, that, fearing to be punished by Him, he ceases from sin, as Augustine says ⁸.

⁸ In the same sense St. Thomas (ibid.) finds some beginning of charity in hope. For the entire cited text reads thus: In the way of generation hope is prior to charity. For just as someone is introduced to loving God through this, that, fearing to be punished by Him, he ceases from sin, as Augustine says; so also hope introduces one to charity insofar as someone, hoping to be rewarded by God, is kindled to love God and to observe His precepts. But in the penitent there must at least be hope of pardon, as the Council of Trent expressly declares. Yet, as is plain, charity is treated here, not as included in acts either of fear or attrition or hope, or as necessarily accompanying these acts, but as that which can arise from those affections.

There were others who imagined an inchoate charity of such a kind that it loved God, but not above all things. But this is a charity which prefers the creature to the Creator; because this altogether destroys the essence of the Purpose necessary for true penance, rather than disposing the penitent more aptly to receive the grace of justification, it renders him altogether unfit of itself for obtaining this benefit.

Finally, there are those who require that beginning of love or inchoate charity which is necessary for the true (as they say) conversion of the sinner to God. But unless they explain what this inchoate charity is, they assuredly sell us words empty of meaning. Meanwhile, let this be noted: that ambiguous phrase true conversion to God is an artifice which Juvenin employs in his condemned Institutions (loc. cit., sec. IV) to infer from it the necessity of love of God above all things, concerning which we spoke in the preceding note. Thus a true conversion to God can and must be admitted, which consists, as St. Thomas says, in the will to observe the precepts of God. But unless this will is supposed to proceed from the motives of mere attrition, we fall back again into that necessity of perfect charity or contrition which, otherwise, the Catholic schools do not admit, not as though the affection of the penitent positively excluded that perfect love, but insofar as he can be sufficiently aroused to the will to observe the law of God by other honorable motives.

Moreover, the reason why St. Alphonsus says that the thesis set forth is morally certain is manifest. For the question ultimately comes down to whether contrition perfected by charity is prerequired in the penitent. But that it is not prerequired is an opinion most commonly received in the schools after the Council of Trent as morally certain. Furthermore, the thesis directly and immediately attacks the opinion of certain men who maintained as necessary a certain charity that was indeed predominant (by which, namely, God is loved above all things), but which nevertheless would not suffice to justify a man, and thus could coexist with the state of mortal sin. Thus, for example, Gaspar Juvenin in his condemned Theological Institutions (pt. 8, diss. V, ch. 4, art. 2); who afterward (sec. V) does not hesitate to assert that this contrition conceived from merely inchoate charity of God above all things, in a case of necessity, suffices for the justification of the impious with the desire of the Sacrament alone; but that outside a case of necessity it does not suffice with the desire of the Sacrament alone for someone to receive sanctifying grace. These things, moreover, fall back into those paradoxes of Baius and Francis Sylvius of which we shall speak a little later (in the note to the following no. 454).

455. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Must the desire of confession be explicit in contrition?

Reply. Negative, with the common opinion, which Billuart, diss. 1, art. 4, sec. 2; the Salmanticenses, ch. 2, no. 23, hold. The reason is that, for remission, it suffices that someone be truly united with God with his whole heart through perfect contrition; for God, as is plain from what has been said, cannot reject a sinner approaching Him with his whole heart and from the most perfect motive; but it can sometimes happen that a sinner elicits an act of perfect contrition without thinking of confession, whether from inadvertence or natural forgetfulness, or from invincible ignorance ⁴. Therefore, for the remission of sin through contrition, it is not essential that the desire of confession be explicit.

⁴ That is, the desire or will of confession is necessary, no differently than the will to fulfill all the precepts of God is required for perfect contrition. But this desire or implicit will can be present even if someone does not actually think of certain precepts, or even invincibly is ignorant of them.

342. 1. Attrition cannot justify with the desire for the sacrament alone, but requires the sacrament actually received.

Hence arose the adage: A man from being attrite is made contrite through the sacrament of penance. This, however, is not to be understood as though attrition became contrition¹⁰⁷ in the sacrament of penance; rather, an attrite man receiving sanctifying grace through sacramental absolution at the same time receives the habit of charity which causes contrition.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Suppl., q. 1, a. 3.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. R. Schultes, Reue u. Bußsakr., nn. 19, 36 ff., 91.

343. 2. True attrition suffices for obtaining justification in the sacrament of penance.

This proposition is now altogether certain and admitted by all, so that the contrary opinion, which many theologians before the Council of Trent held, is rash. St. Thomas¹⁰⁹ already taught: "When someone approaches confession attrite, not fully contrite, if he places no obstacle, in the confession and absolution themselves grace and the remission of sins are given to him." The same is elicited not obscurely from the Council of Trent,¹¹⁰ which says: "Although [attrition] without the sacrament of penance cannot of itself lead the sinner to justification, nevertheless it disposes him to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of penance." The Council indeed employs the word "disposes," but this word is to be understood of a sufficient proximate disposition and signifies the same as suffices. This is evident from the context and from the comparison of attrition with contrition. For the Council wished to teach that contrition justifies even without the sacrament, but attrition only when sacramental absolution supervenes. Moreover, the same thing is manifestly evident from the universal practice of the Church, which admonishes that absolution be given to dying persons deprived of their senses whose disposition can rightly be presumed. Now this practice would not be reasonable if attrition did not suffice for valid absolution. For then, if true contrition were lacking, sacramental absolution would be invalid; but if contrition existed, absolution would be almost superfluous, since contrition justifies even without sacramental absolution actually received.

It is remarkable how many and how great ancient theologians thought true contrition to be necessary for every remission of sins, even in the sacrament of penance.¹¹¹ There are cited for this opinion: Hugh of St. Victor,¹¹² Richard of St. Victor,¹¹³ Robert Pullen,¹¹⁴ the Master of the Sentences,¹¹⁵ Innocent III,¹¹⁶ William of Auxerre,¹¹⁷ Blessed Albert the Great,¹¹⁸ Alexander of Hales,¹¹⁹ St. Raymond of Peñafort,¹²⁰ St. Bonaventure,¹²¹ and several others, for example, Vincent of Beauvais, St. Bernardine of Siena, and Gabriel Biel.¹²² Nevertheless, Harnack errs in saying that before the thirteenth century contrition was always held to be necessary, since ancient authors often take the word contrition in a different sense from modern theologians; for under contrition they also include attrition.

There are some celebrated controversies concerning attrition which it is useful to touch upon briefly here:

¹⁰⁹ In IV Sent., dist. 22, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 3; cf. Suppl., q. 10, a. 1; q. 18, a. 1.

¹¹⁰ Session 14, c. 4, On Penance (Denz., n. 898).

¹¹¹ Cf. M. Buchberger, Die Wirkungen des Bußsakr. nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas (Friburgi 1901), § 4.

¹¹² De sacr. l. 2, P. 14, c. 8.

¹¹³ De potestate solvendi ac ligandi, cc. 7 and 19.

¹¹⁴ De sacr. P. 3, c. 13.

¹¹⁵ In IV Sent., dist. 17 and 18.

¹¹⁶ In Ps. 2 poenitentialem.

¹¹⁷ Summa IV, De sacr. poenit.

¹¹⁸ In IV Sent., dist. 17 and 18.

¹¹⁹ Summa, l. 4, q. 8, membr. 1.

¹²⁰ Summa, De poenit. l. 3, § 11.

¹²¹ In IV Sent., dist. 18, P. 1, a. 2, q. 1.

¹²² Cf. Drouven, De re sacr. l. 6, c. 2, a. 2.

344. 1. Is attrition conceived from the fear of Gehenna alone good?

Luther contends that attrition conceived from fear is forced and evil, and that it renders a man worse and a true hypocrite. The Jansenists, Quesnel, and the Synod of Pistoia taught similar things.¹²³ Before the proposed question is answered, it is necessary to attend to the doctrine of St. Thomas¹²⁴ concerning the four species of fear, namely: worldly, servile, initial, and filial.¹²⁵ Servile fear is subdivided: for it is either servilely servile, when, namely, someone indeed avoids sins because of the punishments to be inflicted, but is so disposed that he would continue sinning if punishment were not present; or, in other words, he still loves sin and is like a dog that would wish to devour the meat but is deterred from it by the master's threatening staff. Or fear is simply servile, which indeed detests sin because of the punishments that threaten, but at the same time truly puts away affection for sin. Servilely servile fear is certainly evil because it retains affection for sin; worldly fear is likewise evil, as is evident of itself. Filial fear is certainly good, and initial fear likewise. But is simply servile fear good? The affirmative answer is of faith and was indeed defined in the Council of Trent:¹²⁶ "If anyone says that the fear of Gehenna, through which, grieving over sins, we flee to the mercy of God or abstain from sinning, is a sin or makes sinners worse, let him be anathema." Alexander VII condemned proposition 15: "Attrition, which is conceived from fear of the punishments of Gehenna without the love of benevolence toward God for His own sake, is not a good and supernatural motion."¹²⁷ Leo X condemned proposition 6 of Luther: "Contrition, which is prepared by the discussion, comparison, and detestation of sins, by which someone recollects his years in the bitterness of his soul, weighing the gravity, multitude, and foulness of his sins, the loss of eternal beatitude, and the acquisition of eternal damnation, this contrition makes a hypocrite, indeed, rather, a sinner."¹²⁸

Theological reason manifestly shows the goodness of such attrition. For three elements concur in attrition, and all of them are good:

a) The inducing motive, namely, fear and flight from the punishments of Gehenna.

b) The means for obtaining this end, namely, detestation of sin.

c) The ordering of this means toward obtaining the end.

But if these three elements are good, the whole is also good, since there is question of a moral act in which nothing evil is found. Moreover, simply servile fear is a true detestation of sin, the affection for which is altogether removed from the soul, and therefore it includes a good purpose of serving God.¹²⁹

¹²³ Hence attrition has been called the sorrow of one hanging upon the gallows (Galgenreue).

¹²⁴ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 19, a. 2 ad 4.

¹²⁵ Cf. above, I, n. 542.

¹²⁶ Session 6, can. 8, On Justification (Denz., n. 818).

¹²⁷ Denz., n. 1146.

¹²⁸ Denz., n. 746; cf. proposition 25 of the Synod of Pistoia (Denz., n. 1525).

¹²⁹ Cf. Billuart, De poenit., diss. 4, a. 5.

345. 2. Does attrition from the fear of Gehenna alone, without initial love, suffice for the sacrament of penance?

It is remarkable how very bitter disputes concerning this question have blazed forth since the sixteenth century. According to the testimony of Benedict XIV,¹³⁰ Francis de Vitoria and Dominic Soto, both of the Order of Preachers, were the first of all to teach that, for the remission of sins in the sacrament of penance, merely servile attrition suffices, provided that in good faith the penitent judges it to be contrition. Melchior Cano, proceeding further, no longer requires contrition thought in good faith to be present, but true attrition alone. Nevertheless, he still speaks hesitantly: "Contrition is set down as a part of the sacrament because it is certain and indubitable matter. But that attrition suffices, although it is true, is not so certain and indubitable; and therefore the Council of Florence and the common opinion, holding what is certain and leaving aside what is uncertain, set down contrition as a part of this sacrament."¹³¹ Several other authors followed Melchior Cano, at first indeed timidly, such as Suarez, Vasquez, Comitolus, and so forth; but afterward, having become bolder, they advanced so far that they called the opposite opinion, which requires at least initial love, altogether improbable, dangerous, and contrary to the mind of the Council of Trent. Authors requiring some initial love were called Contritionists;¹³² but the adversaries denying the necessity of this initial love are called Attritionists. The dispute reached such a point that Alexander VII, on May 5, 1667, had to impose silence upon the disputants. These are the words: "Our Most Holy Lord Pope Alexander VII, having learned, not without grave sorrow of mind, that certain Scholastics dispute among themselves too sharply, and not without scandal of the faithful, whether that attrition which is conceived from fear of Gehenna, excluding the will to sin together with the hope of pardon, requires in addition some act of love of God for obtaining grace in the sacrament of penance, some affirming it, others denying it, and mutually branding the adverse opinion with a censure: His Holiness, earnestly desiring to preserve the bond of peace among the faithful and to extinguish every tinder of division, ... by this present decree, in virtue of holy obedience and under pain of excommunication latae sententiae reserved to this Holy See, and other penalties to be determined at the judgment of that Holy See, commands each and every one of the faithful, of whatever rank and dignity ... they may be, that if henceforth they write on the matter of the aforesaid attrition, or publish books or writings, or teach, or preach, or in any other manner instruct penitents or students or others, they shall not dare to brand either opinion with the mark of any theological censure or other injury or insult, whether the opinion denying the necessity of some love of God in the aforesaid attrition conceived from fear of Gehenna, which today seems more common among Scholastics, or the opinion affirming the necessity of the said love, until something in this matter shall have been defined by this Holy See."¹³³

The dispute seems to be about words rather than things, because different men understand initial love differently. Initial love certainly is not the love of charity, because then there would no longer be attrition but contrition, since even the least charity suffices for justification.¹³⁴ Therefore initial love is either the love of benevolence alone or the love of concupiscence. Although in human matters the love of benevolence differs greatly from the love of concupiscence, nevertheless a true and upright love of concupiscence, which regards God as our ultimate beatitude, seems in some manner to be a love of benevolence. For a man who is truly attrite detests sin and must put away his affection for it; moreover, he must purpose the voluntary observance of God's commandments. But among these commandments there is found, as the principal one, that of loving God above all things. Moreover, he wishes to attain eternal life, which is most perfect friendship with God. From all these things it manifestly follows that true attrition is logically and psychologically altogether impossible without some initial love of God. Attrition which excludes every love of God is now nothing other than servilely servile fear, which assuredly does not suffice for obtaining justification in the sacrament of penance.

Since these things are so, today almost all theologians admit the necessity of some initial love in attrition. Therefore that opinion which in the time of Alexander VII seems not to have been so common is now far more common.¹³⁵ St. Thomas¹³⁶ already taught briefly and clearly: "Just as someone is introduced to loving God by the fact that, fearing to be punished by Him, he ceases from sin, as Augustine says; so also hope introduces charity, inasmuch as someone, hoping to be rewarded by God, is enkindled to love God and to keep His precepts." In this sense the text of the Council of Trent¹³⁷ also seems to be understood, which requires that sinners "begin to love God as the fountain of all justice." In almost the same manner St. Francis de Sales¹³⁸ and St. Alphonsus¹³⁹ explain the initial love required in attrition.

¹³⁰ De syn. dioec. l. 7, c. 13, n. 6.

¹³¹ Relect. de poenit. P. 6.

¹³² All those ancient Scholastics who attributed the remission of sins to perfect contrition alone and not to priestly absolution are also sometimes called Contritionists.

¹³³ Denz., n. 1146.

¹³⁴ Cf. St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 5, a. 3.

¹³⁵ Cf. Schanz, Die Lehre v. d. Sakr. I, § 40; Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. II, n. 391.

¹³⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 17, a. 8.

¹³⁷ Session 6, c. 6, On Justification (Denz., n. 798).

¹³⁸ De amore Dei l. 2, c. 17.

¹³⁹ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 442 at the end.

The qualities of contrition are those conditions which are required for the validity of contrition, whether perfect or imperfect. Four are customarily enumerated: 1. that it be true and formal; 2. supernatural; 3. appreciatively supreme; 4. universal.

346. 1. True and formal contrition or attrition is required, as has thus far been explained in the preceding paragraph.

It is therefore required, a) that contrition be true or internal, and consequently there does not suffice: a) the merely external recitation of a formula of contrition, unless true internal sorrow and detestation of sin are at the same time present. b) Supposed sorrow does not suffice, but true sorrow is required. The reason is that, just as supposed water does not suffice for baptism, so supposed sorrow is insufficient for the sacrament of penance. But if certain older theologians seem to have taught the contrary, either they must be abandoned or benignly interpreted in this sense: that they thought at least supposed contrition necessary; if this is not truly present, true attrition which exists and is in good faith held by the penitent to be perfect contrition suffices. c) Nor does a desire for sorrow and absolution suffice; nevertheless, in practice the faithful of timorous conscience who sincerely desire to have true sorrow for sins committed are not to be disturbed, even if they say that they feel no sorrow at all. For since contrition is an act of the will, it is not always felt.

b) Formal contrition is required, that is, a positive act by which a man truly and explicitly sorrows over sins committed. Therefore implicit or virtual contrition, such as is included in an act of charity, does not suffice, as very few after Lugo¹⁴⁰ have taught; for although an act of perfect charity justifies outside the sacrament of penance, nevertheless, speaking per se, it does not suffice in the sacrament, because formal contrition pertains to the proximate matter of this sacrament. Nevertheless, in practice it is scarcely possible that a sinful man eliciting an act of perfect charity should not at the same time sorrow over his sins and detest them. Still less does that implicit sorrow suffice which is included in the will not to sin henceforth; because it is absolutely possible for someone to have complacency in past sins but nevertheless no longer to wish to sin.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ De poenit., diss. V, n. 92 ff.

¹⁴¹ Council of Trent, session 14, c. 4 (Denz., n. 897).

347. 2. Sorrow must be supernatural, and this in two ways: a) by reason of the principle, inasmuch as it must be elicited with the aid of supernatural grace;¹⁴² b) by reason of the motive, which is in some manner referred to God.

Hence a merely natural motive for sorrowing over sins is insufficient, and Innocent XI condemned proposition 57: "It is probable that natural attrition suffices, provided that it is upright."¹⁴³ Insufficient natural motives are, for example, the punishment of imprisonment inflicted for sin, misfortune arising from it, infamy, and so forth. Suitable motives, however, can be reduced to four: 1. fear of punishment to be inflicted or already inflicted by God; 2. hope of reward in eternity; 3. the supernatural turpitude of sin; 4. the goodness of God. In a word: all those motives are suitable which are apprehended by the light of supernatural faith, but not those which are known by the light of reason alone.

¹⁴² Thus, after the Council of Orange, the Council of Trent defined, session 6, can. 3 (Denz., n. 813).

¹⁴³ Denz., n. 1207.

348. 3. Contrition must be supreme, not indeed intensively, but appreciatively.

Contrition supreme in intensity is not only not required, but is not even possible, since the bitterness and intensity of sorrow can always be increased more and more through the grace of God. Contrition, however, must be appreciatively supreme, inasmuch as sin is judged to be an evil more detestable than any other evil; and therefore the sinner must be prepared to lose any good and to suffer any evil rather than to commit sin. In practice, however, both the confessor and the penitent should abstain from expressly instituting comparisons between a sin to be avoided and some atrocious evil to be undergone. St. Thomas¹⁴⁴ wisely observes concerning this matter: "A contrite man is bound in general to will to suffer any punishment rather than to sin; ... but he is not bound to descend in particular to this punishment or that. Indeed, he would act foolishly if someone were to trouble himself or another concerning particular punishments of this kind. For it is manifest that, just as delightful things move more when considered in particular than in common, so terrible things terrify more if they are considered in particular; and there are some who do not fall in a lesser temptation who perhaps would fall in a greater one. Thus someone hearing of adultery is not incited to lust, but if by consideration he descends to each enticement, he would be moved. And similarly someone would not refuse to suffer death for Christ; but if he descended to considering each punishment, he would be more withdrawn. And therefore to descend to particulars in such things is to lead a man into temptation and to furnish an occasion of sinning." Hence certain customary formulas of contrition are altogether unsuitable, for example: "I would rather die a thousand times than offend You again, O God."

Since intensity does not pertain to the essence of sorrow in penance, it follows: a) that sensible sorrow, which manifests itself by sighs and tears, is in no way required; b) that no delay of time is necessary for eliciting contrition, since, as a spiritual act, it can be exercised in an instant. Nevertheless, in practice the faithful are earnestly to be admonished to consider the eliciting of contrition more necessary than oral confession, and therefore to spend some time in eliciting true and sincere contrition.

¹⁴⁴ Quodl. 1, a. 9.

349. 4. Contrition must be universal, inasmuch as it extends to absolutely all mortal sins not yet remitted.

The reason is that every mortal sin is a total aversion from God. Now contrition is conversion to God and must destroy every aversion from God, and therefore one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another. It is not strictly required, however, although it is generally better, that special contrition be elicited for each mortal sin. It suffices that the penitent, from a universal motive, namely, because he has offended the most good God and has merited the punishments of Gehenna, sorrow over all mortal sins committed, whether known or here and now unknown.

Since venial sins need not necessarily be accused in confession, it is not required that contrition be universal concerning them. But if someone confesses only venial sins, he must under grave obligation elicit true and formal contrition for at least one, or for other free matter consisting of sins already remitted, because otherwise he would not furnish sufficient proximate matter for the sacrament, which would therefore be frustrated; and this is certainly a grave sacrilege.

350. Corollaries. From the fact that contrition pertains to the proximate matter, while absolution is the form of the sacrament of penance, the following are deduced:

1. Contrition must be manifested by a sensible sign. For the matter of a sacrament pertains to a sensible sign. This sensible manifestation, however, is sufficiently had through the sorrowful confession of sins or through a devout petition for absolution. Nevertheless, children and the uneducated are to be counseled to elicit contrition also in express words, because these words are accustomed to help them greatly toward sincere internal contrition.

2. Contrition must necessarily be elicited before absolution and coexist with it. The reason is that contrition is the matter, while absolution is the form of the sacrament of penance. But the matter must be present when the form arrives. Of itself, indeed, it is not required that contrition be elicited before confession; but in practice this is altogether to be counseled and done, since it is sufficiently difficult to elicit contrition during confession or in that short interval between confession and absolution. Contrition must coexist with absolution, and therefore it cannot be elicited so long before absolution or confession that it no longer virtually perseveres. But how long contrition is judged to persevere virtually cannot be determined by a general rule, since this depends upon its intensity and upon the disposition of the penitent. Certain theologians think that contrition perseveres virtually for three or four hours; others, for one day and night; others, for several days.¹⁴⁵ In practice it is to be counseled that contrition elicited long before confession be renewed again before absolution. But it is evident of itself that contrition is altogether to be renewed when a new mortal sin has afterward been committed.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 446.

351. 3. Contrition elicited must have some ordering toward absolution; or, in other words, it must be sacramental. St. Alphonsus¹⁴⁶ indeed calls more probable the opinion which denies the necessity of this ordering, but he urges that the opposite opinion, since it is safer, be observed in practice. This opinion, however, seems to be not only safer but also truer. For if even in perfect contrition the desire to confess and to receive sacramental absolution must be included, a fortiori this is necessary in attrition. This desire is the same as an intention or ordering toward the sacrament of penance. But it is by no means required that the penitent first have the intention of receiving the sacrament of penance and, moved by this intention, elicit contrition. Hence without doubt a member of the faithful who, for example, is accidentally aroused to contrition while hearing a sermon and afterward confesses is validly and licitly absolved. But if the preceding sorrow is in no way referred to confession, the absolution seems to be invalid; and thus if the same member of the faithful today is most vehemently aroused by a sermon to sorrow for sins while thinking nothing of confession, but on the following day, thinking nothing of the contrition had yesterday, confesses his sins, he seems to receive absolution invalidly. Contrition and confession, therefore, must mutually influence one another. Contrition renders confession sorrowful and not merely narrative; confession, however, joins contrition with absolution and thus constitutes the whole sacrament.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 447.

352. 4. Contrition need not necessarily be elicited anew when the penitent, immediately after absolution, confesses a mortal sin omitted through forgetfulness and is absolved again. Thus Billuart,¹⁴⁷ who thinks this opinion more probable; Roncaglia holds it morally certain, while Sporer, Elbel, and many others hold it most probable, according to the testimony of St. Alphonsus.¹⁴⁸ The reason is that the contrition previously and universally had virtually perseveres and also extends itself to that sin omitted through forgetfulness. Nor should anyone say that in this case there are two sacraments and a twofold absolution or form, and therefore that a twofold contrition is also required as proximate matter. For, supposing that the virtually persevering contrition extends itself to the omitted sin, sufficient proximate matter for confession is truly present. Moreover, this second absolution does not remit the omitted sin, since it has already been remitted through the first absolution. Therefore the second absolution is nothing other than the complement of the first, and both seem to be one sacrament. For if the penitent then truly received two sacraments, he would be in a better condition than if he had forgotten nothing and had declared all his sins integrally in the first accusation. This certainly seems unsuitable.

Nevertheless, in practice authors are accustomed to counsel that in this case the confessor invite the penitent to a new act of contrition, and that he also impose upon him a new satisfaction, or impose again the penance already imposed. The reason is that this practice is safer, indeed, according to a probable opinion of certain authors, necessary.¹⁴⁹ Certain authors, for example Noldin,¹⁵⁰ teach generally that one and the same act of sorrow suffices for several confessions; for example, if on the following day the penitent again submits to the keys sins already duly accused and remitted, the sorrow elicited yesterday suffices for absolution to be validly granted again, provided that yesterday's universal sorrow still virtually perseveres. But this opinion does not seem licit in practice if such an interval exists between the two sacramental judgments. For then there are certainly two sacraments, and therefore two acts of contrition are also required. Habitual contrition does not suffice for valid reception, but an act of contrition, at least virtually enduring, is required as the partial proximate matter.

¹⁴⁷ De poenit., diss. 4, a. 8.

¹⁴⁸ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 448.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. ibid.

¹⁵⁰ De sacr. n. 258.

353. Scholion. Can the sacrament of penance be valid but unformed? This question has no practical moment, because this case scarcely ever occurs. According to the opinion of those authors who think that the whole essence of the sacrament of penance consists in absolution, nothing prevents the sacrament of penance from being valid but unformed. But this opinion is scarcely probable. Supposing, however, that the three acts of the penitent are the proximate matter of the sacrament, if they are not truly present with all their essential qualities, even inculpably, the sacrament is null because of a defect of matter. Therefore the opinion denying that the sacrament of penance can be unformed seems better.¹⁵¹ Nor does the authority of St. Thomas,¹⁵² who admits an unformed confession, stand in the way; for the Angelic Doctor manifestly treats only of confession and not of the whole sacrament of penance, because it is certain that the sacrament of penance without contrition is not only unformed but also invalid.

Moreover, even those who admit an unformed sacrament of penance say that this cannot occur except in a twofold case, namely: 1. If someone guilty of two mortal sins, through invincible forgetfulness, sorrows only over one from a particular motive and confesses this alone. For then the other sin remains, which was neither accused nor affected by contrition, and therefore could not be remitted. But in this case the sacrament seems to be invalid, because the essential quality of universality is lacking in the contrition, and therefore the contrition is insufficient. 2. If someone through invincible ignorance believes that it is not a mortal sin to approach the sacrament without sorrow for all sins, provided that sorrow for some sin is present. This case is truly chimerical, and, if it occurred, the sacrament would be invalid, since invincible ignorance cannot render valid a sacrament which otherwise would be invalid. Thus also someone would contract marriage invalidly with a blood relative in the second degree, although through invincible ignorance he thought such a marriage valid and licit.

¹⁵¹ Cf. Billuart, loc. cit., diss. 7, a. 1, and, among modern writers, P. Galtier, De poenitentia, tractatus dogmatico-historicus (Paris 1923), n. 405 ff.

¹⁵² Suppl., q. 9, a. 1. Commentators agree very little in the explanation of this truly difficult text, which Capreolus, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, the Salamancans, and, among modern authors, Billot (De poenit., thesis 16, p. 162) subtly explain. Perhaps it is better and simpler to say with Dominic Soto (In IV Sent., dist. 18, q. 3, a. 3): "St. Thomas was speaking with the common populace, that is, as a commentator he handed down the opinion of Peter Lombard, which was then common in the schools." Cf. Jos. Göttler, Der hl. Thomas ... über die Wirkungen des Bußsakr. (1904), p. 23.

1666. Principles. I. Contrition is absolutely NECESSARY, both for the VALIDITY and for the LICEITY of the Sacrament of Penance, as often as it is received. The reason is that contrition is the proximate matter and an essential part of the Sacrament; therefore a Sacrament received without contrition is null, and consequently illicit. - Hence, although diligent labor is to be placed in the examination of conscience, more diligent labor must nevertheless be placed in exciting sorrow of soul. And although a brief space of time can suffice for conceiving this sorrow, it is nevertheless safer to prolong a little, or to repeat, the act of contrition, lest by too much haste it be extinguished in its very beginning.

We said: As often as it is received, namely lest the confession of venial sin be excluded. "For it is certain that, although outside the Sacrament some motion of grace or charity suffices for its remission, as St. Thomas teaches, nevertheless in the Sacrament FORMAL sorrow is altogether required, nor does virtual sorrow suffice, as the Doctors commonly teach with Roncaglia, Concina, and Croix, against a few."¹ - But:

It is doubted, 1. Whether he sins mortally who confesses venials without sorrow? "Genettus, Juveninus, and Natalis Alexander deny it; they say that as often as the mind of profaning the Sacrament is absent, to frustrate it in light matter does not exceed a light irreverence. But other Doctors commonly and rightly affirm it, and Lugo calls the former opinion altogether false, saying that the gravity of the injury does not consist in the matter, but in the frustration of the Sacrament, by not placing suitable and essential matter, as sorrow is. Hence, whether it is frustrated on account of grave matter or on account of light matter, the irreverence is always grave."²

It is doubted, 2. Whether in the confession of venials it suffices to sorrow for one without another? - "Some deny this; but Suarez, Lugo, and others commonly and rightly affirm it. And the reason is clear, because venials are not necessary matter, but sufficient matter. But Castropalaus, Lugo, Sporer, Tamburini, etc., say that it suffices to repent of a multitude of venials, without repenting of any one in particular; but Arriaga and Dicastillo contradict them, saying that sorrow concerning at least one of them is necessary. But these opinions are easily reconciled, because it is impossible that he who repents of a multitude should not sorrow for the last things which constitute the multitude."³ Likewise, it suffices to sorrow for a certain species of venials, or for deliberate ones alone.

1667. II. Contrition, in order to obtain pardon, must be TRUE, SUPERNATURAL, APPRETIATIVELY SUPREME, UNIVERSAL at least with respect to mortal sins, EFFICACIOUS, and finally must have joined to itself CONFIDENCE of pardon. We say in order to obtain pardon, and this both in the Sacrament and outside the Sacrament; because the aforesaid qualities or CONDITIONS also pertain to the virtue of penance (cf. n. 1644 and 1645).

1. It must be TRUE. "It is necessary," says St. Alphonsus,⁴ "that the soul conceive true sorrow, true displeasure, true bitterness concerning sin committed, and that it detest and abhor it." For contrition is called sorrow of soul or of heart, that is, of the will. Therefore contrition, or attrition, which is only thought to exist, even inculpably, does not suffice; nor does the desire of absolution without affection concerning sins, as some wish against the common opinion. And the reason is that true sorrow of the will is an essential part of the Sacrament.⁵ - Nor does it suffice to sorrow that you do not sorrow, nor a mere wish of not sinning. Yet Bonacina rightly notes that with the act by which someone sorrows that he does not sorrow for sins, there is usually joined sorrow for the sins, even if the penitent does not discern it.⁶

2. It must be SUPERNATURAL, both by reason of the motive from which it is elicited, which must be proposed to the mind by faith, and also by reason of the principle from which it proceeds, which is divine grace, without which no one can repent as he ought. - Hence, if someone sorrowed even most intensely, or in good faith, because his sin is repugnant to reason, or because it deprives him of reputation, health, or some temporal good, he would have merely natural sorrow, of itself plainly inept for obtaining justification, which is of the supernatural order. Hence this 57th proposition was condemned by Innocent XI: "It is probable that natural contrition, provided it is honorable, suffices." Yet the occasion of penance can be natural, as is clear from the example of the Ninevites.

3. It must be APPRETIATIVELY SUPREME, namely so that the offense of God displeases more than any other evil which could have happened to us. The reason is that "as God is the supreme good among all things which are to be loved, so also sin is the supreme evil among all things which men ought to hate."⁷ And the same reason runs concerning VENIAL sin; wherefore one must also sorrow supremely for it, that pardon may be obtained from God. We say appretiatively supreme, not intensively; because although it is fitting and to be desired that no end or measure be placed in the detestation of sin, this nevertheless is not required, nor is it in the common power of men.⁸

4. It must be UNIVERSAL, at least with respect to mortal sins. For the Lord says (Ezek. 18:21-22): "If the wicked man shall do penance for all his sins... I will not remember all his iniquities." The reason is clear: for it cannot be that he who truly sorrows for his sins detests one and takes complacency in another, since he knows that divine friendship is altogether extinguished by every mortal sin. - Yet there are not required, as is more commonly held, individual acts of sorrow for individual sins, which would often be impossible; but it suffices to sorrow for all universally, from a motive common to all, because universal sorrow virtually extends itself to all sins.⁹ (cf. n. 1397, 3.)

5. It must be EFFICACIOUS, namely so that it turns the will away from sin and disposes it to doing all things by which relapse is avoided. And to this pertain the words of Ezekiel (18:31): "Cast away from you all your transgressions... and make for yourselves a new heart and a new spirit." (cf. n. 1680, on formal purpose.)

6. It must have joined to itself CONFIDENCE OF PARDON; otherwise it would be similar to the sorrow of the damned in hell, who also repent of their sins, but without hope of remission. But the sorrow of the truly penitent is filled with hope and consolation; because the more a man repents of having displeased God, the more he trusts in divine mercy, and the more his consolation is increased. Hence St. Bernard thus addressed the Lord: "Lord, if it is so sweet to weep concerning Thee, what will it be to rejoice concerning Thee?"¹⁰

But are EXPLICIT acts of faith and hope required for obtaining grace in the Sacrament of Penance? Some indeed affirm, because sinners are said by Trent to prepare themselves for justification by these acts. But others more commonly deny it, because the necessity of those acts cannot be demonstrated by any sufficient reason. - Yet these opinions can be reconciled very well; for the penitent, by eliciting an act of sorrow, also explicitly elicits, not now reflexively but exercitively, acts of faith and hope; because then without doubt he exercitively believes that his sins will be remitted to him by the power of the Sacrament, and explicitly hopes that pardon will be granted to him through the Sacrament and on account of the merits of Christ.¹¹

1668. III. Contrition, which is a part of the Sacrament of Penance, must be SENSIBLE in some way, and must be MORALLY UNITED to the other essential parts of the Sacrament. - This is clear from what was said concerning the Sacraments in general (n. 1402 and 1434).

1. It must be SENSIBLE, not indeed so that it redounds into sense or the sensitive appetite; for such sorrow, although it often arises from sadness of the will, is not necessary; but so that it is manifested by some sign, for example through sorrowful confession, through petition for pardon, etc.; otherwise the confessor could not rightly judge concerning the disposition of the penitent (cf. n. 1817, q. 1).

2. It must be MORALLY UNITED to confession and absolution, so that from the diverse parts there may be one Sacrament. Wherefore the following things come to be discussed.

1669. Questions. Q. 1. Whether contrition must PRECEDE absolution?

Resp. Yes; otherwise absolution, which is the form of the Sacrament, would not be applied to its matter and would be invalid. Indeed, neither is contrition altogether safe when it is put off to the point of absolution; because it can easily happen, especially in the confession of the rude, that the form of absolution ends before the act of contrition has been elicited.

Q. 2. Whether contrition must also PRECEDE the ACCUSATION of sins?

Resp. The first opinion affirms it, both because sorrow, as the matter of this Sacrament, must be sensible and is not made sensible except through confession, and because confession ought not to be a simple narration, but a sorrowful accusation. The second and more common opinion denies it, and the Ritual greatly favors this, saying: "The confession having been heard, he will try to lead him to sorrow by efficacious words," namely the confessor. To the first contrary reason it is answered that sorrow is made sensible not only through confession, but also by other signs and words; but to the second it is answered that only this is required: "that confession not be a mere narration of sins, but have the character of a sacramental accusation; and for this it suffices that the confession be made with the mind of obtaining absolution, and that afterward sorrow be manifested at least through petition for, or expectation of, absolution; for thus the confession becomes well sacramental." And the very defenders of the first opinion concede this; whence it is clear that the two opinions differ more in words than in reality, and that the second, understood in the way we have said, is altogether safe.¹² "To calm scruples, confessors are accustomed, if they doubt concerning the internal disposition of the penitent, to excite him to sorrow concerning the sins just explained. This is done if it is said: I sorrow for and accuse myself of the sins narrated."¹³

Q. 3. Whether the act of contrition must be elicited IN ORDER TO THE SACRAMENT?

Resp. No, from the more probable opinion; "both because from Trent attrition, however had, suffices, and because sorrow is ordered at least to absolution when it is manifested through confession."¹⁴ - Yet the opposite opinion, which says that an act of contrition, when it was not elicited in order to the Sacrament, must be renewed in confession, is also probable, and therefore is to be held in practice.¹⁵ (cf. n. 1659, end.)

Q. 4. For how much time does an act of sorrow morally ENDURE for receiving the Sacrament validly?

Resp. According to the various circumstances, a longer or shorter space of time must be assigned: 1. If confession is made solely from sorrow for sins, sorrow endures virtually at least for one, or even another, day. - 2. But if it is made from mere devotion, or from precept, from vow, or from the mandate of a rule, a shorter space, for example from morning to evening, ought to intervene. For the rest, in practice it is counseled that the act of contrition always be renewed before absolution.¹⁶

Q. 5. Whether he is bound again to elicit an act of sorrow who immediately after ABSOLUTION confesses a sin omitted through forgetfulness?

Resp. According to the more common opinion, he is not bound; because the prior sorrow, since it is universal, extends itself also to the forgotten sins and perseveres up to the second absolution. - But according to another opinion, still probable and therefore to be followed as safer, a new Sacrament must be confected; because through the first absolution the judgment has already been completed, and therefore a new act of sorrow must be elicited, a new penance imposed, and a new absolution imparted.¹⁷

1670. Every act of contrition, as is already clear from what has been said, requires this for itself, that it be elicited from a truly supernatural motive; and in this respect, indeed, all and each of the acts of contrition generically agree. But because the motives from which they are elicited are of unequal order, and because on account of this inequality some are more perfect and efficacious than others, Theologians, relying on this foundation, distinguish two principal SPECIES OR DEGREES of contrition, one of which they call perfect contrition, and the other imperfect contrition. - Of each, separately, we must now treat.

1671. DEFINITION. PERFECT contrition, or contrition simply so called, is that which is elicited from the motive of divine charity, that is, insofar as sin

is an offense of God, the Supreme Good and to be loved above all things. For divine Goodness, just as on account of its supreme lovableness it draws our will to love of itself, so likewise it moves it to detestation of the evil which is opposed to it. - Hence an act of perfect contrition will be, for example, the following: My God, with my whole heart I sorrow for all my sins, and they displease me because I have offended Thee, infinite goodness.

Two things worthy of note must be premised here: 1. Several Theologians probably teach that an act of perfect contrition can be elicited from the motive of any offended divine attribute. For he, they say, who loves divine justice, wisdom, mercy, beneficence, already loves God Himself, since these attributes are God Himself. But others commonly and more probably hold that perfect contrition must proceed altogether from the sole motive of charity, namely from divine goodness contemned through sin, insofar as this is the root and aggregate of all perfections. For, from Trent, contrition must be perfected or informed by charity; but the object of charity is God insofar as He is Infinite Goodness itself, or the infinite Good.¹

2. Perfect contrition admits several DEGREES, among which are distinguished: 1. Contrition in a remiss or lowest degree, by which at least mortal sin is excluded from the motive of predominant charity. - 2. Contrition in a perfect degree, or intense degree of reason, by which in addition any venial sin and any affection for it are excluded. - 3. Contrition in the supreme and most intense degree of reason and sense, such as by special grace was granted to some sinners, who died from the vehemence of sorrow. - Yet these diverse degrees are of the same nature, because more and less do not vary the species.² (cf. n. 465 seq.)

1672. Principles. I. PERFECT contrition, even in the lowest degree, always JUSTIFIES a man before the Sacrament is actually received. This is proved, 1. from Scripture (Prov. 8:17): "I love those who love me." "Charity covers a multitude of sins" (1 Pet. 4:8). - 2. From Trent, which (sess. 14, cap. 4) teaches "that contrition perfected by charity... reconciles man to God before this Sacrament is actually received."³ 3. From the Fathers and Doctors, among whom St. Chrysostom:⁴ "Where charity is, all evils have been taken away"; and St. Thomas:⁵ "Charity cannot be with mortal sin." 4. From the 32nd proposition of Baius, condemned by Gregory XIII: "That charity which is the fullness of the law is not always joined with the remission of sins." But the theological reason is that an act of perfect contrition is a formal act of charity toward God, or an act intrinsically joined with charity, as is clear from the very definition of contrition.

We said, 1. even in the lowest degree. For it suffices that the love of God attain to the notion of charity, which consists in the love of God for His own sake, above all things. "And the reason is evident," says St. Alphonsus,⁶ "because as any aversion from God as from the ultimate end, even in a remiss degree, suffices for losing God's friendship, so any true conversion suffices for recovering it." Hence St. Thomas:⁷ "Any contrition is informed by grace making one pleasing; therefore however small it is, it destroys every fault." And this opinion seems so certain to our Blessed Doctor that he rejects the opposite altogether as improbable and false.⁸

We said, 2. always justifies, that is, even outside the case of necessity. This is likewise certain against Adrian and Cajetan, although the Council of Trent abstained from condemning those authors. It is clear from the condemned 71st proposition of Baius: "Through contrition even joined with perfect charity and with the desire of receiving the Sacrament, guilt is not remitted, outside the case of necessity or martyrdom, without the actual reception of the Sacrament."⁹

1673. II. Perfect contrition of itself does not justify a man except WITH THE DESIRE OF THE SACRAMENT, at least implicit. - 1. This is clear from the very nature of contrition; for, in order that it be true and perfect, there is required the will to fulfill all the precepts of God; but confession is a divine precept; therefore. - To the point Cardinal de Lugo says aptly:¹⁰ "Contrition is said to justify in order to the keys, not because it receives the power of justifying from the Sacrament, but because, when it justifies outside the Sacrament, it has in itself the implicit desire of subjecting mortal sins to the keys; to this a man remains bound even after he has been justified through contrition." - 2. This is further clear from Trent (sess. 14, cap. 4), where it is declared that the desire of the Sacrament is included in perfect contrition.

We said with a desire at least implicit; for it can happen that a sinner elicits an act of perfect contrition without actually thinking about confession, either from inadvertence or from invincible ignorance; but that ignorance or inadvertence detracts nothing from the merit of charity and contrition. Therefore. - Besides, from Trent the desire which is included in contrition suffices; but what is included in another thing is implicit, not explicit. - Yet if the sinner actually thinks about the precept of confession, he certainly must either confess, or elicit the purpose of confessing; otherwise contrition would not be true, as is evident.¹¹

1674. Several things must be noted here: - 1. Perfect contrition is not the very form which justifies the sinner, but is, in the present providence, the final disposition or final preparation for justification. For, when from actual grace there has been placed in the sinner an act of charity or of perfect contrition, habitual grace is immediately infused into him, by which the man loving God and loved by God is rendered just and a friend of God. This is drawn from Trent, sess. 14, cap. 4, and sess. 6, cap. 7.

2. Contrition, whether considered on the part of charity or on the part of sensible sorrow, can increase to such a degree that it suffices for the FULL DESTRUCTION of fault and punishment; as is clear from the example of the good Thief. For charity, which begets displeasure, can be so greatly intensified in act that the contrition following from it merits not only the removal of fault, but also absolution from every punishment. - Likewise, sensible sorrow, which the will excites in contrition, can be so greatly intensified that it suffices for the destruction of the whole punishment, by way of satisfaction.¹²

3. Most vehement contrition can further bring this about, that it removes the very REMAINS OF SIN. "For St. Thomas teaches¹³ that God sometimes removes the remains of sin successively through His cooperating grace, but sometimes immediately through a great commotion, by which man obtains perfect spiritual health... as is clear concerning St. Magdalene."¹⁴

Concerning the NECESSITY of contrition, recall what was said at n. 1647.

1675. DEFINITION. IMPERFECT contrition, or attrition, is detestation of sin which is commonly conceived either from consideration of the turpitude of sin, or from fear of hell and punishments, and which has joined to itself an initial, but not predominant, love of God. - It is elicited, for example, by these words: My God, because on account of my sins I have lost paradise and have deserved eternal hell, I sorrow above every evil that I have displeased Thee.

We said, 1. commonly conceived, so that it may be intimated with Trent (sess. 14, cap. 4) that there are also other motives of attrition, as are sadness over the loss of grace and divine friendship, hope of pardon, hope of eternal beatitude, non-predominant love of God, for example on account of His beneficence and mercy; yet all these motives are inferior to charity.

We said, 2. from consideration of the turpitude of sin: namely one made not only according to the dictate of reason, but according to the light of faith; for example if the sinner considers within himself that through sin he has been despoiled of the beauty of grace, has departed from the rectitude of virtue, and leads a life unworthy of a Christian. For unless a supernatural consideration moves sorrow, attrition is not supernatural.

We said, 3. or from fear of hell and punishments; understand fear: 1. honorable, that is, not formally but only materially servile, by which the will of sinning is excluded, as we noted (n. 457, 2); - 2. supernatural, by which punishment is feared insofar as it is inflicted by God, the supreme judge and avenger of sins. For he who sorrowed from fear of disease or infamy coming to himself from sin would not sorrow as he ought (cf. n. 1667, 2).

Whether attrition conceived from fear of temporal punishments insofar as they are inflicted by God suffices? - "Some deny with Cano, Concina, etc., saying that sorrow must arise from fear of eternal punishments, because, since the punishment of mortal sin is eternal, the penitent must conceive sorrow for sins from fear of an eternal evil. - Others with Lugo, Suarez, etc., more commonly and more probably affirm it, from these words of the Council of Trent: 'Attrition is conceived from fear of hell and punishments.' For here the Council distinguishes other punishments from the punishments of hell, in which assuredly all other punishments are included. But because the first opinion cannot be said improbable, in practice we cannot embrace the second."¹⁵

We said, 4. and some initial love of God. For Trent teaches (sess. 6, cap. 6) that sinners, while they are disposed to justification, "begin to love God as the font of all justice, and therefore are moved against sins," etc. But this beginning of love is already had in attrition, both through fear of divine vengeance, according to that saying (Ecclus. 25:16): "The fear of God is the beginning of His love"; and through hope of pardon and eternal beatitude. Hence St. Thomas:¹⁶ "From this," he says, "that we hope goods can come to us through someone, we are moved toward him as toward our good, and thus we begin to love him." Therefore he who approaches the Sacrament with attrition and hope of pardon already begins to love God as his liberator, justifier, and glorifier.¹⁷

1676. Principles. I. Attrition, OUTSIDE THE SACRAMENT, cannot of itself justify a man. - This is clear from Trent (sess. 14, cap. 4), where it is read: "And although without the Sacrament of Penance it cannot of itself bring the sinner to justification, nevertheless," etc. - The reason is that justification consists in perfect conjunction with God; but the attrite man, although he withdraws from creatures and begins the first steps of conversion to God, is nevertheless not yet perfectly converted to Him and joined by charity.¹⁸

1677. II. Attrition SUFFICES, as the prerequired disposition, for obtaining pardon of sins, even lethal sins, IN THE SACRAMENT of Penance. - This opinion today is morally certain, and the opposite, which requires predominant love, is no longer probable. - It is proved: 1. From Trent (sess. 14, cap. 4), where it is said that attrition disposes to justification in the Sacrament of Penance. These words cannot be understood as though attrition disposes only remotely to justification, as the acts of the other virtues do; for thus it disposes even outside the Sacrament. Therefore it disposes proximately, namely so that grace can be infused through absolution. - 2. From reason: the Sacraments actually work what they signify. Therefore of itself this ought to happen: that when the priest imparts absolution, at that very point of time sins are remitted and the life of grace is conferred on the spiritually dead soul. Now if predominant charity had to be present in sorrow, the Sacrament of itself would never cause grace, because all would approach it already justified, since, according to St. Thomas,¹⁹ every sorrow, however small, proceeding from predominant charity is true contrition justifying of itself; therefore the Sacrament of Penance could no longer be called a Sacrament of the dead, but of the living. The reason of the end for which the Sacrament was instituted is added. "It was necessary," says the Roman Catechism,²⁰ "that the most merciful Lord should provide for the common salvation of men by an easier way." Now, if attrition did not suffice with the Sacrament, the matter would certainly no longer be so.²¹ Therefore. - A penitent who is actually attrite is said to become habitually contrite under absolution, because grace, and therefore charity, are conferred on him through absolution, and thus he is made habitually converted to God.

1678. It is asked: Whether one who, IN THE ARTICLE OF DEATH, has confessed with attrition alone, is also bound to elicit contrition?

Resp. "The first opinion affirms with Suarez, Bonacina, etc. But the second opinion, much more common with Lugo, Laymann, etc., denies it; and Suarez calls it very probable, because, granted that the opinion is certain, as has been shown, that attrition alone suffices for confession, he who has confessed with it is already morally certain of divine grace. - This second opinion is very probable; but it cannot be denied that the first is altogether to be advised to the dying; especially because at the end of life we are bound to an act of love, which cannot be satisfied unless we detest sin when it occurs to memory, as is commonly taught."²²

480. Matter to be treated. - Contrition, as passing into an external act, is part of the matter of the sacrament and thus concurs in the constitution of the sacramental sign; as it is internal in the heart, it is a disposition necessary for the grace of the sacrament. Whether perfect or imperfect, in order that it may produce its effects, it must:

1. be clothed with certain conditions, namely, be a) true and internal, b) supernatural, c) supreme, d) universal;

2. include the purpose of not sinning for the future, which is a) true or absolute, b) firm, c) efficacious, d) universal;

3. besides this, be ordered to the sacrament of Penance, if one intends to receive it and to obtain in it the remission of sin.

Hence three articles.

S. Th., Suppl., q. 2, a. 6; q. 3, a. 3 and 4.

481. Principle I. Contrition must be true and internal, i.e., truly conceived in heart and soul. - Thus by reason of essence: for it is sorrow of soul and detestation of sin, which indicate an act of the will (Joel II, 12-13; Ezek. XVIII, 31). And indeed contrition, as a reparation of sin, ought to proceed from that source from which sins proceed, i.e., from the heart or will (Mt. XV, 19); whence it is a retraction of the depraved will, by which the sinner sincerely says within himself: I would that I had not committed the sin, and I will that it be uprooted in its consequences, and, if I could act anew, I would that I had not sinned, and I am prepared to do so here and now.

Moreover, in the sacrament of Penance, in order that it may be part of the sacrament, sorrow must in some way be external and sensibly manifested; and what is required, not only of itself, but altogether and always, is formal and explicit, as is clear from the Council of Trent, which requires for the sacrament contrition itself or sorrow (sess. 14, c. 3 and 4), which alone is the act of penance: namely, it is a positive act by which the will truly and explicitly sorrows over and detests sin as it is an offense against God. Therefore such an act is a necessary condition in order that absolution be a judicial act and be valid.

Hence there does not suffice: 1) the mere external recitation or reading of a formula, without the internal affection of the will;

2. nor estimated contrition, by which someone in good faith thinks he is contrite, while in reality he is not: this can excuse the penitent from sacrilege, but cannot supply the defect of the necessary part; just as estimated water is not sufficient for Baptism;

3. nor, in order to the sacrament of Penance, is virtual and implicit sorrow in the act of another virtue sufficient, e.g., in an act of charity, although practically love of God above all things can scarcely be had without formal sorrow for sins in one who is thinking about them: namely, an act of charity, which is virtual penance, is sufficient for the remission of sin, but not for the value of the sacrament of Penance, because it was not instituted as the sacramental sign and integral part of the sacrament, just as in the Eucharist virtual bread or virtual wine is not sufficient;

4. nor does the purpose of not sinning for the future suffice: for this can stand with complacency in past sin; nor implicit sorrow in the purpose, because it is not formal;

5. nor does implicit sorrow in the desire of sorrowing suffice, e.g., if you choose to sorrow or sorrow that you do not sorrow, for the part of the sacrament is sorrow itself concerning sin, not the desire of sorrow, nor sorrow concerning the absence of sorrow;

6. nor even implicit sorrow in the desire of absolution, or in the will desiring to receive the fruits of the sacrament, even if there are only venial sins or mortal sins already remitted as matter of confession;

7. nor does sorrow concerning sin in the abstract suffice, but concerning sin as committed by the guilty one confessing.

482. Principle II. Contrition must be supernatural. - And indeed a) both subjectively, by reason of the principle, so that it is elicited from the supernatural help of God, or grace inspiring and assisting, as the Council of Trent defined, sess. 6, can. 3; whence the same Council also explicitly says that attrition is a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit moving (sess. 14, c. 4); b) and objectively, by reason of the object or motive, so that it is elicited on account of a supernatural motive, i.e., one supernaturally known through the light of faith and looking to salvation, such as God Himself under some aspect, or something regarding God, but in such a way that God is considered, not as a natural end, but as the supernatural end known by the light of faith. Whence natural sorrow on account of a merely natural motive without relation to God as supernatural end is not sufficient. Hence Innocent XI condemned prop. 57: It is probable that natural attrition, provided it is honorable, is sufficient.

It is proved: For a means must be proportioned to the end, and the disposition of the same order as the thing to which it disposes. But contrition is a means and disposition to grace altogether supernatural, namely on the part of the principle and of the object. Therefore the act of contrition must be supernatural in both ways, not only on the part of the principle and of grace, but also on the part of the object or motive. And indeed an act essentially, as a whole, depends upon the object, because it is nothing except a tendency to the object, just as motion is to the term; whence it is not an act supernatural in itself unless the object also is supernatural (I, n. 188).

Hence a) sorrow for sin that is only natural does not suffice, namely, on account of a merely natural motive, namely insofar as it is opposed to right reason; just as neither does sorrow on account of the philosophical baseness of sin, on account of its intrinsic unworthiness without relation to God, or on account of infamy or natural punishment without this relation, or on account of an effect of sin, e.g., illness, etc.

b) Nor does sorrow elicited merely on account of God the author of nature, known by the light of reason alone, suffice; but it must be referred to God as the supernatural end known by the light of faith. Concerning this there will not be difficulty in practice, because among the faithful it will of itself be done in this way.

483. Principle III. Contrition must be appretiatively supreme. - Thus by reason of proportion, so that it may be the greatest sorrow of all: according to appreciation, however, by which the penitent by his intellect esteems sin above all evils, and from this estimation detests it by the will more than every other evil; so much so that he is dispositively prepared to lose any good whatever or suffer any detriment rather than perpetrate sin, and for nothing would will to commit it; otherwise the will would not be turned away absolutely and for every case from sin.

It is proved: 1° For contrition must already involve the disposition by which (at least through the mediation of absolution) it becomes possible to please God. But if someone preferred some created good to God, he could not please God, according to that saying of Christ (Mt. X, 37): He who loves father or mother more than Me is not worthy of Me. Therefore contrition must involve the disposition by which someone would prefer to lose every created good rather than offend God.

2° The more something contrary is to please, the more something must be displeasing. But what is opposed to sin, namely the ultimate end, must appretiatively please more than every other good: for all things are to be sought on account of the ultimate end. Therefore contrition, which sorrows over the opposed sin, must be supreme sorrow, or sorrow above all evils (q. 3, a. 1).

This is confirmed: a) From Joel II, 12 and from the Council of Trent (sess. 14, c. 4), according to which contrition must exclude every affection toward sin and every will of sinning; and it cannot accomplish this unless it is appretiatively supreme: for unless someone esteems and detests sin as the greatest evil, at some time he will choose sin rather than an evil which is apprehended as greater.

b) Right reason demands that with appretiatively greatest hatred we pursue that which is truly the greatest evil; but sin, as an offense against God that is in a certain way infinite, and as depriving man of the greatest goods, is the greatest evil of all; therefore.

Nevertheless, there is not required:

1. That contrition be intensively supreme, so that in vehemence it surpasses all other sorrows and that one sorrow with the whole or greatest effort of the soul.¹

¹ Several have said that contrition is required to be not only appretiatively but also intensively supreme. This was explained by a threefold different opinion: 1) some required the supreme intensity absolutely possible, as Adrian VI, in IV, on Penance, q. 2; - 2) others, supreme relatively to other goods loved, as Peter de Soto, De Inst. Sacr., lect. 14-15; - 3) others finally the supreme intensity which God knows, namely relative to the powers of grace, as Lupus, Ledrou, Berti, Juenin, Morinus, Witasse, Gazzaniga.

a) For thus contrition would be most difficult and morally impossible for many, which would cast them into scruples, because penitents quite often cannot distinguish either intensity or the grade of intensity; whence also the practice of confessors is not accustomed to require such contrition from the faithful.

b) Intensity, vehemence, bitterness does not pertain to the essence of sorrow, nor does it vary the species: contrition even less intense is sorrow above all things, namely appretiatively. Any grade of charity, because it is total conversion to God, excludes sin; whence also any grade of contrition. Whence St. Thomas (q. 5, a. 3): "however small the sorrow may be, provided it suffices for the notion of contrition (i.e., it detests sin above all things), it blots out every guilt."

c) Indeed, intensively supreme sorrow does not seem possible; neither a) supreme simply and absolutely, since the grace of God can always be increased more and more; - nor b) supreme relatively to the evils of this life, for this is not always in our power, because in the present state we are moved more vehemently by sensible things and by objects nearer and proper to our faculties than by the goods of reason and spiritual goods, which are not our proper objects nor so near to us. And then too the absurdity would follow that, from two who sorrow with equal intensity, one would be justified and the other not; e.g., if one sorrows intensely for sin but more intensely for the death of his father, he would not be justified, while one who sorrowed more remissly over this would be justified; - nor c) supreme relatively to the powers of grace here and now granted by God, because no one can know how great that intensity is which is required, and because God would altogether arbitrarily demand greater contrition for a lesser sin.

2. A fortiori, sensible contrition is not required, or sorrow which overflows into the sensitive appetite and bursts forth into tender affections of heart, sighs, and tears; nor consequently a sorrow more sensible than that which we often feel on account of temporal losses or the death of relatives and friends.

For contrition does not reside in the sensibility, but in the will, as being rational sorrow; nor is sensible sorrow always in our power, since the sensitive appetite does not obey reason at a nod; finally, it can happen that someone, without sensible sorrow, sorrows more vehemently than another who is prone to emotions of this kind.

3. Nor is it required that an explicit comparison be instituted between sin and other evils (for a virtual and implicit comparison suffices), nor would it sometimes be useful, because not rarely it will be dangerous if it is proposed explicitly to the weaker.

"For it is manifest," says St. Thomas, Quodl. I, 9, "that just as delightful things move more when considered in particular than in common, so terrible things terrify more if they are considered in particular; and there are some who do not fall in a lesser temptation, who perhaps would fall in a greater one. Just as... someone would not refuse to suffer death with Christ; but if he descended to considering the individual punishments, he would be more drawn back. And therefore to descend in such matters to individual things is to lead a man into temptation and to provide an occasion of sinning" (cf. q. 3, a. 1, ad 4).

But it is enough if the will is prepared to bear all evils rather than commit sin; - nor will it be necessary that one weigh individual evils, but it suffices to trust that grace will be given to him for bearing even the extreme thing, if it were necessary, rather than offend God. Indeed, it will be enough if, on account of God, the sinner detests sin, sorrows over it, and consequently now does not will to sin.

Yet for the more perfect such comparisons can be useful, because in this way they expressly detest sins supremely, show affection toward God, and render the will more prepared for such cases, if they should occur.

4. Nor is equal sorrow required for all sins, although it is always above all other evils.

But it can be greater and lesser estimatively, indeed it ought to be, according to the gravity of the sin: for the greater the evil is, the greater the sorrow can be (a. 3).

484. Principle IV. Contrition must be universal. - Thus by reason of matter, with regard to mortal sins committed and not yet duly subjected to the keys, even unknown ones and those not occurring to the memory. For:

a) No mortal sin can be remitted without the sacrament of Penance, and a sin concerning which sorrow is not had is a sin not subjected to penance; therefore.

b) We must sorrow for sins insofar as they are an offense against God, turning away from God and depriving one of divine friendship; but this reason extends itself to each and all mortal sins; therefore we must sorrow for all and each: namely, each one requires contrition.1

I say. Contrition, either perfect with the desire of the sacrament or imperfect with the sacrament itself, is necessary for the sinner, both by necessity of means for obtaining justification and also by necessity of precept at least sometimes in life. The reason for the first is taken from the words of Christ, Luke xiii, 3: "Unless you shall have penance, you shall all likewise perish," and also from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, chap. 6, where hatred and detestation for sin are counted among the principal dispositions for justification. But the reason for the second is both because there is frequent speech in the Scriptures concerning such a precept, especially Matt. iii, 2, where it is expressly said: "Do penance"; and because there exists a natural precept of doing whatever is necessary by necessity of means for salvation. - Cf. St. Thom. 3, q. 86, art. 2. St. Alphonsus, n. 334.

Question 3. Whether he who in the article of death receives the sacrament of Penance with attrition known as such is bound besides to elicit an act of perfect contrition? Resp. Negatively, probably; for he would chiefly be bound on this account, because there is present an absolute necessity of attaining the ultimate end: but this reason cannot be urged, because it is morally certain that justification is obtained through attrition alone with the sacrament; from another source, no one is bound to use the safer means when he has already employed a means simply safe. Therefore ... Yet some affirm that there is present an obligation of eliciting an act of contrition, but per accidens, namely if the memory of a past sin occurred to the dying person; for, they say, he would not then satisfy the obligation of eliciting an act of perfect charity if, when the memory of sin occurred, he did not detest this sin from that motive. But because concerning the obligation of eliciting an act of perfect charity in the article of death, when someone has already obtained justification, there is probable dispute on both sides, neither does this argument settle the matter. Whatever may be the case, it is plainly expedient that the dying be stirred, as far as can be done, to eliciting and repeating acts of perfect charity and contrition. - Cf. Baller. note (b) p. 314.

Question 4. Whether it is necessary for the value of the sacrament that contrition precede the accusation itself of sins? Resp. Negatively, and the reason is that according to the Roman Ritual the priest is indeed bound to bring the penitent to sorrow by efficacious words, but only after the confession has been heard. But although the practice of some faithful is that, when they have completed the accusation, they use this or a similar formula: I grieve greatly for these sins and I accuse myself; nevertheless only scrupulous penitents, instructed by scrupulous confessors, think a formula of this kind obligatory. - I said instructed by scrupulous confessors; for these alone, relying on an empty foundation, demand these formulas for the value of the sacrament. This empty foundation is twofold; for they object 1°. that contrition must be sensible, and that the manifestation of this sensibility is obtained through accusation; but it is answered that the sensibility of contrition can be manifested, and in fact is manifested, in many other ways, especially through the petition and expectation of absolution. They object 2°. that according to theologians confession must be sorrowful; but it is answered that theologians by that word sorrowful require only that confession not be a mere narration of sins, but rather an accusation of oneself in order to receive absolution. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 445. Lugo, disp. 14, nn. 13 and 18. - Salmant. tract. 6, chap. 5, n. 22. - Baller. note (a) p. 316.

I say. The qualities necessarily required for the validity of both perfect and imperfect contrition are numbered as four; namely it is required that it be internal, supernatural, supreme, and universal. Therefore 1°. it must be internal or true, that is, truly conceived in heart and soul, according to that saying of Joel ii, 13: "Rend your hearts, and not your garments"; 2°. it must be supernatural, that is, elicited through the help of grace and from a motive which in some way is referred to God, because otherwise it could in no way dispose toward obtaining justification; 3°. it must be supreme, insofar namely as the sinner appreciatively detests his crime more than every other evil and is prepared in soul rather to lose and suffer all things than to commit sin; 4°. it must be universal, namely it must extend to all grave sins either from one universal motive or from several particular motives which, at least taken together, extend to all mortal sins committed, even those not occurring to memory; for no actual sin is remitted without sorrow, but one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another, since remission occurs through the infusion of grace, which cannot stand together with mortal sin. - Cf. Lehmkuhl, nn. 283 and seq.

Question 1. Whether contrition must be supreme not only APPRECIATIVELY, but also INTENSIVELY? Resp. Negatively, because the intensity of sorrow or of affection or greater or lesser effort is something merely accidental in contrition. Besides, if that intensity were required, it would have to be either absolutely supreme or relatively; if the first, contrition would be impossible, because we can always conceive a greater degree of intensity; if the second, it would follow that contrition which today is good and sufficient could tomorrow be found insufficient, which is surely repugnant. Therefore it suffices that contrition be appreciatively supreme, that is, that sin be held in hatred before other things by estimation or serious will; and consequently all anxiety is to be cast away from those who experience a more vehement sense of sorrow from the death of some friend than from the offense of God. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 441 and 442. - Lugo, disp. 5, nn. 84 and 87. - De Augustinis, part. 1, Thes. 6, p. 64.

Question 2. Whether a FORMAL comparison is required in appreciation between various evils and sin, or God? Resp. Negatively, for it suffices that the sinner sincerely and truly detest sins and be unwilling to sin further. Therefore confessors would act very imprudently who, in order to explore whether sorrow is supreme, proposed certain very dangerous comparisons to penitents, for example: would you rather be burned alive, or undergo all the torments of the martyrs, or eat venomous reptiles, than sin again? For such comparisons move the imagination more vividly, and when a strong temptation approaches, the true disposition which existed before is easily lost. Indeed St. Thomas accuses confessors of this kind not only of imprudence but also of foolishness. Besides, since for some persons the very idea of death is wont to disturb the imagination too much, generally speaking it is not fitting to ask a penitent whether he is prepared rather to die and to die a hundred times than to offend God. - Cf. St. Thom. Quodlib. 1, art. 9. - St. Alphonsus, n. 433. - Baller. note (a) p. 328.

Question 3. What duration of time is required for conceiving true and supreme contrition? Resp. None per se, because duration does not pertain to the essence of the act, but is merely accidental to it; wherefore it is enough that the act be substantially fulfilled; and this can happen even in the smallest moment of time. Yet it is safer to elicit an act of contrition more intense and more prolonged, lest perhaps from lightness or excessive haste none be conceived as to substance. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 433.

Question 4. Whether contrition for venial sins must enjoy the same four qualities? Resp. It must necessarily enjoy the first three; namely 1°. it must be internal, because contrition which is not elicited from the innermost heart is not true; 2°. it must be supernatural, because, as was said, natural contrition cannot be a means to a supernatural effect; 3°. it must also be supreme, or the sinner must detest venial sin more than all natural evils. But it does not necessarily have to be universal, whether in the sacrament or outside the sacrament. The reason is that, since venial sin is not incompatible with sanctifying grace, one venial sin can be remitted without the others. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 449.

Question 5. Whether fearful attrition, or attrition conceived from fear of gehenna, suffices for justification in the sacrament of Penance? Resp. Affirmatively, provided that it is truly supernatural, absolutely efficacious, and only materially, but not formally or servilely, servile. The reason is both because attrition of this kind is a true conversion to God and a true aversion from sin, and because this is clearly drawn from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, chap. 4, where attrition conceived from fear of gehenna and punishments is said to be honorable and to dispose the sinner toward obtaining justification in the sacrament of Penance. Moreover attrition is called formally or servilely servile when someone indeed grieves for sin and wishes to avoid it because of the punishments which he knows are to be inflicted by God; yet he would still be prepared to sin if those punishments did not subsist. But it is called materially or simply servile when someone indeed abstains from sin because of fear of punishments, yet is not so disposed that he would wish to sin if those punishments did not exist. Cf. De Augustinis, part. 1, Thes. 8, p. 90. - Lehmkuhl, n. 285.

Question 6. Whether attrition from fear of the punishments of Purgatory suffices for venial sins? Resp. Affirmatively, with the most common and morally certain opinion; because all the reasons adduced above for the sufficiency of attrition from fear of gehenna also have force here.

Question 7. Whether attrition from fear of temporal punishments of this life to be undergone for sin, insofar as they are inflicted by God, suffices? Resp. Affirmatively, with the opinion which seems morally certain, provided such attrition is supernatural. The reason is both because in the Council of Trent it is said: "Attrition from fear of gehenna and punishments," and consequently just as the fear of gehenna alone certainly suffices, so the fear of punishments alone must suffice; and because in fear of this kind all the conditions of true attrition can be present. Yet St. Alphonsus attributes some probability to the negative opinion; if anyone admits this, he cannot in practice and before the fact be content with that attrition. - Cf. Baller. note (a) p. 331.

Question 8. Whether, for obtaining justification in the sacrament of Penance with attrition, a beginning of love is also required? Resp. Negatively, if by beginning of love there is understood some degree of perfect charity, by which God is loved above all things. The reason is that, for rightly receiving the sacrament, an act is not necessarily presupposed which outside the sacrament justifies essentially. But it can be conceded that some beginning of love is required, insofar as attrition, in order that it dispose toward the sacrament, must exclude, as the Tridentine Synod speaks, the will of sinning; and it must also have joined to it the hope of obtaining pardon or justification from God, by which the sinner begins to love God as the font of all justice. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 440. - De Augustinis, part. 2, Thes. 19, p. 238.

I say 1°. Perfect contrition justifies a man even outside the sacrament of Penance, but not without the desire of this sacrament. The reason for the first is that perfect contrition includes perfect charity, which imports conjunction with God. The reason for the second is that the sacrament of Penance is the one means instituted by Christ for the remission of sins. - Cf. De Augustinis, part. 1, Thes. 5, p. 45.

I say 2°. Attrition outside the sacrament of Penance cannot justify a sinner; but if it is joined with the sacrament as a prerequisite disposition, it suffices for obtaining pardon of sins. The reason for the first is that the attrite man, although he withdraws from creatures and begins the first steps of conversion to God, nevertheless is not yet perfectly converted to Him and joined by love. But the reason for the second is that then nothing is lacking to prevent the sacrament from producing its effect. Therefore attrition in the sacrament does not justify by its own power, but only together with the other parts, especially with the absolution of the priest. But in this case the penitent is said to become contrite from attrite, not properly and formally, but as to equivalence and effect. Cf. De Augustinis, part. 1, Thes. 9, p. 90; and part. 2, p. 249, Scholion 11.

Question 1. Whether the desire of confession must be explicit in contrition? Resp. Negatively, with the common opinion. The reason is that for remission it suffices that someone be truly joined with God with his whole heart through perfect contrition; for God, as is clear from what has been said, cannot reject a sinner approaching Him with his whole heart and from the most perfect motive; but it can sometimes happen that a sinner elicits an act of perfect contrition without thinking of confession, whether from inadvertence or natural forgetfulness or from invincible ignorance. Therefore for the remission of sin through contrition it is not essential that the desire of confession be explicit. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 437. - Salmant. chap. 2, n. 23.

Question 2. Whether contrition remits not only the fault, but also the punishment due to fault? Resp. It certainly remits eternal punishment, because a man justified through contrition cannot remain guilty of eternal damnation. Besides, according to the greater or lesser intensity of the same contrition, it also remits part of the temporal punishment due to mortal or venial sins that have been destroyed. Consequently very intense perfect contrition can also abolish all punishment; but it does not necessarily have this efficacy from its nature. This is drawn from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, chap. 14; and sess. 14, on Penance, chap. 8 and can. 12.

Question 3. Whether attrition remits venial sins outside the sacrament? Resp. It is controverted, but more probably it seems that one must answer affirmatively. The reason is, 1°. because from the Council of Trent venial sins can be remitted in various ways: therefore they are not remitted by perfect contrition alone; 2°. because in the opposite opinion venial sins would not be remitted more easily than mortal sins: but this is opposed to the sense of the faithful; 3°. because the power of remitting venial sins is commonly attributed to sacramentals; but it would be attributed falsely if contrition were required for destroying them. Yet not a few deny this, because from Trent, sess. 14, chap. 5, venial sins are usefully accused in confession; but they would not be usefully accused if they could be remitted by attrition. Therefore. But it is rightly replied that venial sins are usefully exposed in confession also for other causes, namely for the remission of punishment, for the merit of confusion, for the advantage of direction, etc. - Cf. De Augustinis, part. 1, art. 9, p. 105.

57. It is probable that a natural attrition suffices, provided it be honourable.

15. Attrition which is conceived by the fear of hell and of punishments, without a love of benevolence toward God for his own sake, is not a good and supernatural motion.

II. Fr. Patrick Sporer, On the Sacraments, part 3, chapter 2, section 2, § 2, no. 174: “The precept of contrition, even in the article of death, does not oblige a sinful man justified by the use of the sacrament with attrition; but that attrition itself with the sacrament of Baptism or of Penance is universally and always a sufficient disposition for justification, and consequently even in the article of death. So Henríquez, Vásquez, Cano, and Cardinal de Lugo, citing many, here disputation 11, section 15; Dicastillo here disputation 6; Munito, tract 6, chapter 2, no. 7.”

III. The same Fr. Sporer in the place cited, no. 175: “The precept of contrition does not oblige those who by the use of the sacrament with attrition are justified, or who wish to be justified. So most commonly the authors to be cited below. The reason is, because Christ in the new law by a singular privilege instituted also another means of justification, namely the sacraments of the dead, Baptism and Penance, so that consequently THE NECESSITY of perfect contrition alone MIGHT CEASE: otherwise assuredly Christ, instituting and commanding sacramental confession, a means in itself hard enough and difficult, IF BESIDES THERE WERE STILL REQUIRED PERFECT CONTRITION, itself difficult enough to a sinner, would not have lightened but much aggravated the burden of the law; and Christians would now be of a worse condition than the ancients of old, who, being obliged to contrition alone, were justified by it.”

XII. Fr. Tamburini, Book 1, Method of Confession, chapter 1, § 4, no. 2: “Among the motives of attrition, of which we spoke at no. 4, although some do not admit that other fourth one — that is, the fear of a temporal evil — and consequently one who should execrate his sins on account of the fear of infamy, of prison, of sickness, and the like, which are wont to be incurred on account of sins, would not by these Doctors obtain a lawful sorrow for the sacrament of Confession, because sorrow of this kind is natural (they say) and not supernatural, as is required for obtaining supernatural grace: nevertheless in the MOST PROBABLE opinion this also is a sufficient motive, if evils of this kind be feared as inflicted or to be inflicted by God.”

LVII. The same Sporer in the same place: “Gobat well observes, deservedly judging that a regular confessor would not be faithful to his prelate if, having found a penitent implicated in a reserved sin but ignorant of the reservation, he should not say expressly: "I absolve you indeed this once (namely from a probable opinion and a kindly interpretation of the superior's mind, lest, proceeding in good faith, you should have to confess the same mortal sin twice); but know seriously that I could not have absolved you without the express will of the superior": and that he himself is wont to counsel this to parish priests and vicars solicitous concerning episcopal reserved cases.”

LX. The same Torrecilla, Vol. III, Considerations, Consultation 11, Miscellany, no. 1, folio 454: “When the confession is only of venial sins, there is not required that grief or attrition of which Trent speaks, session 14, chapter 4; but it suffices that the penitent approach confession with a desire and will of confessing, without an actual complacency of sinning.”

II. Francolino: “Although he afterwards says that an initial or inchoate love of God, not a perfect one, suffices, he signifies that an intense love is precisely not required; but for the rest he requires a true theological charity. For it is established that charity, even remiss, is true theological charity, just as remiss heat is true heat.”

III. Merbesius. For true contrition there is required not only a grief for all mortal sins conceived generally and confusedly, but also one conceived specially and distinctly of individual sins, both as to number and as to species. Page 54, column 1.

II. Francolino, page 126, no. 3: “And he adds that this is under precept according to some, although according to some it is not. He nevertheless already brings in a scruple, when he wills that for the removing of a scruple we ask of God the intensity of contrition due to each sin.”

III. Juvenin: He who grieves from fear of punishment alone will doubt with foundation of the supernaturality of his contrition. Page 509, column 2.

II. Francolino, Book 2, disputation 10, no. 26, page 99, Venice edition: “But they perchance do not see the consequences of their own doctrine, as certainly Francis Gennet is to be said not to have seen them in his most recent Moral Theology published at Paris in the year 1703. Out of several examples of his most rigid doctrine, whence grave absurdities follow, I shall bring forward one from Vol. 4, tract 6, On the Sacrament of Penance, where, chapter 5, question 19, he teaches that for true contrition in this Sacrament there is required as necessary a constant purpose: he does not say a purpose, but a constant purpose; and that this must be made known to the confessor.”

III. Behold the rigorism of Gennet. For a sinner's true conversion to God he requires not merely a purpose of any sort, as is wont to be done, but a firm and constant, or not wavering, one. But this doctrine, cries Fr. Francolino, is not only rigid but most rigid. St. Paul therefore is a rigorist, who, 2 Corinthians 7, teaches: For the sorrow that is according to God worketh penance, steadfast unto salvation. And yet this is chiefly the example which Fr. Francolino brings forward, that he may demonstrate the doctrine of Gennet to be most rigid, not merely rigid. If anyone should say that the opposite doctrine of Fr. Francolino — namely that for true sacramental penance an inconstant and wavering purpose is enough — is most lax, would he be wide of the truth?

VII. QUESTION IV. What is to be thought of the following opinion of Fr. Sporer? ANSWER. Fr. Sporer, part 3, chapter 1, section 2, § 2, no. 174, says: “The precept of contrition, even in the article of death, does not oblige a sinful man justified by the use of the sacrament with attrition. … So Henríquez, Vásquez, Cano, with very many alleged by Cardinal de Lugo. … Dicastillo, Layman.” This opinion is false, and, as it seems to my weakness, most pernicious to the eternal salvation of Christians. For the precept of charity cannot be fulfilled without contrition either implicit or explicit. Therefore the reported opinion seems to be contained in thesis 7 proscribed by Innocent XI.

VIII. QUESTION V. Has the precept of contrition conceived out of charity CEASED in the evangelical law, the use of the sacraments being admitted? ANSWER. Fr. Sporer affirms it in the place cited, no. 175, in these words: “The precept of contrition does not oblige those who by the use of the sacrament with attrition are justified, or wish to be justified. Most common, among those to be cited below. The reason is, because Christ in the new law by a singular privilege instituted another means also of justification, namely the sacraments of the dead, Baptism and Penance, so that thereupon the necessity of perfect contrition alone should cease: otherwise assuredly Christ, instituting and commanding sacramental confession — a means of itself sufficiently hard and difficult — if besides there were still required perfect contrition, and that itself not easy but very difficult to a sinner, would not have lightened but much aggravated the burden of the law, and we should be of a worse condition than the ancients of old, who were bound to contrition alone.”

We approach the discussing of a question of the highest moment; and therefore, that we may clearly, plainly, and in full light establish the truth, we shall divide this chapter into the following six sections.

I. Fear-born or servile attrition is that which is conceived from fear of hell and from the baseness of sin. Under this fear of hell there is comprehended also the loss of beatitude. Others add the necessity of a love of hope, or of concupiscence, by which God is loved as good to us, or as our beatitude. That this attrition, destitute of any love of charity even inchoate, suffices for the sacrament of Penance, very many defend; but other grave theologians deny it, and I with them. For the deciding of the controversy, first of all the prejudices of our adversaries are to be torn up.

It is evidently false that Trent defined that servile attrition suffices for the sacrament of Penance; nay, it openly repugns such an opinion.

I. In two sessions, namely the sixth and the fourteenth, discourse is had in the Council concerning the dispositions for Baptism and Penance. In the former the necessity of an inchoate love of charity is asserted, as I shall show below. In the latter it in no way favours our adversaries.

II. Cardinal Pallavicino in his History of the Council of Trent, Book 12, chapter 10, narrates that into the decree first framed the word suffice had been inserted; and that, the bishops contradicting, the word dispose was substituted. This fact is beyond controversy. Therefore Trent not only did not declare that fear-born attrition suffices, but abrogated this opinion, and substituted the contrary, which teaches that servile attrition indeed disposes, but does not suffice.

III. Innumerable are the sophisms by which the attritionists attempt to entangle and to bark at this decree. Hither almost all come back. Disposes, they say, sounds the same as suffices, because servile attrition disposes even outside the sacrament. Therefore Trent speaks of a proximate disposition, which is worth the same as it suffices.

IV. Therefore the reformation of the decree is illusory. Therefore when Trent deleted the word suffices and substituted the word disposes, it cast a mist over Catholics and deluded them, if both words signify the same. Outside the sacrament servile attrition disposes remotely; in the sacrament less remotely, or more nearly. Therefore proximately? Therefore it suffices? These are trifles.

Many falsely reckon that charity in any degree whatsoever, even remiss, justifies the wicked outside the sacrament.

I. That I may utterly overthrow this prejudice, I bring forward into the midst the doctrine common among all scholastic theologians, as the most celebrated Salmanticenses Scholastici testify, Vol. II, tract 14, disputation 7, doubt 1, § 1, no. 5. It is moreover of this kind. All acts, both natural and supernatural, attaining altogether the same formal object, or under the same formal motive — whether of faith, or of hope, or of charity, or of temperance, or of justice, or of chastity, and so forth — some are perfect, others imperfect; some produce the ultimate effect, others dispose but do not produce the ultimate effect. Therefore by the common sense of the theologians our cause is finished. Therefore imperfect charity, and in a remiss degree, does not expel the stain of sin, since this expulsion is the ultimate effect of the work of justification, consisting of several acts.

II. This doctrine the Catechism of the Council of Trent confirms, part 2, chapter 5, where at §§ 56 and 79 it examines this matter, and has not a word concerning servile attrition. But it writes these things: First therefore it is to be said that the institution of Confession is exceedingly useful to us, nay necessary. Why? Attentively weigh it. For that we may grant that sins are blotted out by contrition, who is ignorant that it must be so VEHEMENT, SHARP, AND BURNING that the bitterness of grief can be equalled and compared with the magnitude of the crimes? But since VERY FEW would arrive at this degree, it came about also that by VERY FEW indeed was pardon of sins to be hoped for in this way. Wherefore it was necessary that the most clement Lord should consult by an easier reason for the common salvation of men: which indeed he effected by an admirable counsel, when he delivered the keys of the kingdom of heaven to the Church. § 57: Confession perfects contrition. For from Catholic doctrine it is to be believed and constantly affirmed by all, that if a man be so affected in mind that he detest the sins committed, and at the same time constitute a purpose of not sinning, even though he be not affected with such a grief as could be enough for obtaining pardon, yet nevertheless, when he shall have rightly confessed his sins to a priest, all his crimes are remitted and pardoned by the power of the keys.

III. These things are so clear that they seem to me utterly to stop the mouths of the attritionists. The Catechism explains contrition, which is the principal part of the matter of the sacrament. It teaches that this contrition is an act of charity, § 27. It distinguishes the degrees of that contrition, and declares that very few arrive at this degree of fervour necessary for justification outside the sacrament. Wherefore, it subjoins, it was necessary, and so forth. What does this sacrament perform? It perfects contrition. How? Because if a sinner be not affected with such a grief as could be enough for obtaining pardon, yet nevertheless, when he shall have rightly confessed his sins to a priest, all his crimes are remitted and pardoned by the power of the keys.

IV. Very many testimonies of the Fathers, especially of St. Augustine, being passed over, let one come forth into the midst — St. Thomas, who in Book 2, distinction 1, question 4, reply 1, writes these things: “It must be said that an act of charity can be called such in two ways: either that which is from charity, and this is not save in one having charity; or that which is toward charity, not as meritorious or generative, but as PREPARATIVE; and thus an act of charity can be had BEFORE THE HABIT OF CHARITY, just as to do a just act can be said to be before the habit of justice; because in the friendship of charity the soul is moved to love God by that likeness of grace; but in natural love from that good of nature which is also a likeness of the highest goodness. And therefore it is to be held that when it is said that one who has charity loves God FOR HIS OWN SAKE, the "for" denotes a relation of end and of efficient cause, because God himself superadds to nature that whence it tends into love of him. But when it is said of one LACKING CHARITY, that he loves God for his own sake, the "for" denotes a relation of end, not of efficient cause.”

V. This same doctrine he explains in the same place, distinction 28, question 1, article 4, reply 2, in these words: “It must be said that, as the acts of other virtues can be considered in two ways, either according as they are from virtue, or according as they precede virtue, so also is it of charity: for a man NOT HAVING charity can also love his neighbour and God, and even above all things, as some say. And this is to be understood of the love which falls directly under precept, AN ACT OF CHARITY, and not only according as it proceeds from (habitual) charity.”

VI. Again, 2-2, question 19, article 8, he teaches thus: “The perfect and the imperfect do not diversify the substance of a thing; but initial and filial fear differ according to the perfection and imperfection of charity, as is plain through Augustine.” Then in the body of the article he resolves these things: “Thus initial fear is not taken according as it is distinguished from servile and filial fear; but it is taken according as it belongs to the state of beginners, in whom is begun a certain fear through the inchoation of charity. Yet filial fear is not in them PERFECTLY, because they have not yet arrived at the perfection of charity. And therefore initial fear is related to filial fear in this manner, as imperfect charity to perfect. But perfect and imperfect charity do not differ according to ESSENCE, but only according to STATE.”

VII. More clearly does he confirm this doctrine, 1-2, question 113, article 10, in this fashion: “This is the common and accustomed course of justification, that, God moving the soul inwardly, a man be converted to God, first indeed by an imperfect conversion, that afterwards he may come to a perfect one; because inchoate charity merits TO BE INCREASED, that, being increased, it may merit to be perfected, as Augustine says (tract 5 on the epistle of John). Sometimes indeed God so vehemently moves the soul that it at once attains a certain perfection of justice, as was in the conversion of Paul, with miraculous things applied outwardly; and therefore the conversion of Paul is celebrated as miraculous in the Church.”

VIII. At last, 3, question 86, article 3, he declares this same doctrine, saying: “Mortal sin cannot be remitted without true penance, to which it pertains to forsake sin inasmuch as it is against God, which indeed is common to all mortal sins; but where the reason is the same, the effect is the same. Whence a man cannot be truly penitent of one sin who is not contrite of another. For if the sin displeased him because it is AGAINST GOD LOVED ABOVE ALL THINGS (which IS REQUIRED FOR THE CHARACTER OF TRUE PENANCE), it would follow that he would repent of all. Whence it follows that it is impossible for one sin to be remitted without another.” For the character of penance therefore there is necessarily required a displeasure at sin, because it is against God loved above all things. And the Angelic speaks of penance with the sacrament as necessary, as is established from the preceding article, to which he here refers himself.

IX. These things are so well known and decisive that we must confess that those Thomists who teach the opposite have not touched the fount of the Angelic doctrine, but have derived their waters from corrupted streams. What they object out of Book 4, distinction 17, or in the Supplement, question 5, article 3, where he says that however small the grief be, provided it suffice for the character of contrition, it blots out the whole fault, arises from the ignorance of the one objecting. For there the Angelic speaks, as is established from the prefatory argument, of contrition informed by sanctifying grace, which, even if remiss, blots out every fault. Vain therefore is the figment that every actual charity in a remiss degree blots out sins.

By which the attritionists brand with the note of Rigorism evangelical charity, and clothe fear-born attrition with the garb of kindliness

I. In the old Testament, say the attritionists, contrition alone blotted out sins. In the new law the sacrament of Confession was instituted. If contrition conceived from inchoate charity were necessary in this law, Christ would not have lightened but aggravated the yoke, which cannot be, since he himself testifies: My yoke is sweet.

II. This paradox of our adversaries fights point-blank with the Gospel. Paul cries out, Romans 8: For you have not received the spirit of bondage again in FEAR; but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba, Father. St. Augustine cries out, tract 17 on John: It is true which he himself says: My yoke is sweet. For whatever is hard in the precepts, charity makes light. And again on the epistle to the Romans the same Augustine teaches: Most evidently are the times of the two Testaments distinguished: for the former pertains to fear, and the new to charity. St. Thomas on Matthew 4 says: The old law was a law of fear, but the new of love. This is the doctrine of all the Fathers. The yoke of Confession is hard, but sweet if it be done in all things through charity. Our adversaries take away charity from this yoke. Therefore the yoke remains hard and most hard. They reckon that the yoke is made sweet if the wing of charity, as Augustine says, be cut off from it. But they are deceived in a marvellous manner, as all the Fathers teach. They contend that the yoke is made sweet if it be accommodated to flesh and blood, and if the precepts be diminished; but in this they gravely err: and they err more gravely while they burn our opinion with the note of Rigorism, of Jansenism, and of Baianism. The Jansenists defend the first precept of charity, the necessity of contrition, the necessity of inchoate charity for the sacrament. The Jansenists defend the mysteries of the Trinity, of the Incarnation, of the Eucharist, and so forth. Are all these therefore to be denied? The errors of the Jansenists and of the Protestants are strenuously to be refuted. But that victory may be obtained, evangelical Morals must be purged of the figments of lax opinions, whence the heretics receive scandal. Otherwise all outcry against the Jansenists and Baianists will be empty.

I. Fear is threefold. First, natural, by which a man, nature leading, dreads temporal evils. Second, worldly, by which a man abstains from evil only out of respect of men. Third, divine, which looks to God. This divine fear is twofold: one servile, by which a man abstains from evil not out of love of justice but out of fear of hell; the other chaste, by which a man reverences God as supreme Lord, and restrains himself from sin lest he displease him. This last is twofold: initial, which is fear of fault conjoined with dread of punishment; and filial, by which a man is converted to God, not from dread of punishment, but from love of justice and of charity, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 19, art. 2.

II. Natural fear receives malice or goodness from the good or depraved affection of the will. Worldly fear is by its own nature evil.

III. In servile fear two things are to be distinguished: the fear itself, and its servility. The fear of punishment is good. The servility is evil, since it is an affection of sin lying hidden in the soul, by which, unless punishment threatened, sin would be chosen. Hence a twofold servile fear is wont to be distinguished by theologians: one which is called absolutely servile; the other which is named servilely servile. The former is good, the latter evil.

IV. It is of faith that attrition conceived from fear of hell and of punishments is good and useful for justification, as Trent defined, session 6, canon 8. At last, attrition conceived from fear of hell, faith going before, is supernatural, since it disposes to justification.

I. Fear sufficient for the sacrament of Penance ought utterly to exclude every will of sinning, as all confess: servile fear does not utterly exclude this will: therefore it is insufficient. The second proposition is demonstrated. The will of sinning, or sin, cannot be excluded save through its opposite. Between fear of punishments and sin absolutely regarded, as it is an offence of God, there is no direct opposition. For fear directly regards the punishments to be inflicted by a judge. Fear restrains the contumacy of the soul spurning torments, and to this contumacy it is directly opposed. Therefore it cannot exclude sin absolutely and of itself, as it is an offence of God, since under this consideration it does not regard sin. Nor is this a vice of fear, because this does not pertain to the office of fear.

In attempting to give an answer to this question I presuppose certain doctrines of Catholic faith. I presuppose that contrition is of such efficacy with God that an act of perfect contrition elicited from the motive of God’s infinite goodness at once reconciles the sinner with God. This it does by virtue of perfect charity which contrition implicitly contains. I also presuppose that God seriously desires the salvation of all men, and in His Providence furnishes all with the means to obtain it. The question, then, is not merely one of speculative theology; it is exceedingly practical. For such as cannot receive the sacrament of Penance and yet have committed mortal ' sin an act of perfect contrition, or of perfect love of God, is the only means of salvation. Thus the question, whether an act of contrition is difficult or not is practically the same as the question whether it is difficult or not for the innumerable multitudes to obtain salvation who, for one reason or another, cannot receive the sacrament of Penance before death.

Some Catholic writers hold that it is not difficult, especially for Catholics, to make an act of perfect contrition. Among these is a German writer, the Rev. J. von den Driesch, whose little book on Perfect

Contrition I was instrumental in putting into the hands of English readers some years ago. However, this consoling doctrine seems to be contrary to the Catechism of the Council of Trent. This authoritative source of Catholic doctrine has the following passage concerning Contrition : —

Contrition, it is true, blots out sin; but who is ignorant that to effect this it must be so intense, so ardent, so vehement, as to bear a proportion to the magnitude of the crimes which it effaces? This is a degree of contrition which few reach, and hence through perfect contrition alone very few indeed could hope to obtain the pardon of their sins.¹

¹ On the Sacrament of Penance,” Donovan’s translation, p. 271.

So, then, according to this authoritative source of Catholic teaching it is so difficult to make a perfect act of contrition that few make it, and very few, indeed, could hope to obtain the pardon of their sins by perfect contrition alone. However great the authority of the Catechism of the Council of Trent may be, it is well known that there are in it points of doctrine which have no greater weight than has a theological opinion. I may instance what the Catechism ‘says about the necessity of confessing the circumstances of sin which only aggravate its malice, but do not change its nature. Is the above extract another such point in which one theological opinion is followed without depriving Catholics of the liberty to follow other and more consoling opinions if they choose to do so? Yes, it is, unless I am mistaken.

In proof of this contention I may observe, in the first place, that in the above extract the Catechism seems to require more than the common teaching of Catholic schools requires. If the words be taken in their obvious sense they seem to require that an efficacious act of perfect contrition should be not only a detestation of sin above all other evils, but that it should also be in the highest degree intense. On the contrary, the common teaching nowadays is that no special degree of intensity is required in the act of contrition provided that it be a detestation of sin above all other evils for the love of God.² Indeed, the Catechism of the Council of Trent itself seems to teach the milder opinion in another place. There it says : —

² See C. Pesch, Praelectiones Dogmaticae, vii., n. 137.

If, however, our contrition be not perfect, it may, nevertheless, be true and efficacious; for as things which fall under the senses frequently touch the heart more sensibly than things purely spiritual, it will sometimes happen that persons feel more intense sorrow for the death of their children than for the grievousness of their sins.³

³ Donovan’s translation, p. 266.

So that, although supernatural contrition for sin may not be so intense as natural sorrow for the loss of a parent or husband or child, and so does not bear a proportion to the magnitude of the crimes which it effaces, nevertheless, it may, according to this extract, be true contrition and efficacious for the forgiveness of sin.

The presumed necessity of so great intensity, ardor, and vehemence is the reason why the Catechism teaches that very few indeed could hope to obtain the pardon of their sins through perfect contrition alone. If that reason is not well grounded it may still be difficult on account of the nature of the act of contrition or of the act of love which contrition implies. Of course both contrition and charity are acts of supernatural virtue, and as such they are not only difficult but utterly impossible without the help of God’s grace. God must move the intellect and stir the will with His grace to make the least act of supernatural virtue possible to man. But this being supposed, is it difficult to make acts of contrition and charity, either because God rarely grants the requisite grace, or for some other reason?

To prepare the way for an attempted solution of this question, I would ask the reader to call to mind the close connection that exists between an act of contrition and an act of charity or love of God. The motive of contrition is God’s infinite goodness, which is loved above all things, and which excites the sinner to hate sin above all other evils. So that wherever there is perfect contrition there is also perfect love. On the other hand, wherever there is perfect love and the consciousness that sin has been committed, it cannot be but that the love of God will move the sinner to detest sin above all things as being an offense of God whom it sovereignly loves. Contrition, then, and charity intermingle, as St. Francis of Sales teaches in his own inimitable way. He writes: —

But I do not mean to say that the perfect love of God, by which we love Him above all things, always precedes this repentance, or that this repentance always precedes this love. For though it so often happens, still, at other times, as soon as divine love is born in our hearts, penitence is born within the love, and oftentimes penitence entering into our hearts, love enters in penitence. And as when Esau was born, Jacob, his twin brother, held him by the foot, that their births might not only follow the one the other, but also might cleave together and be intermingled ; so repentance, rude and rough in regard of its pain, is born first, as another Esau; and love, gentle and gracious as Jacob, holds him by the foot and cleaves unto him so closely that their birth is but one, since the end of the birth of repentance is the beginning of that of perfect love. Now as Esau first appeared, so repentance ordinarily makes itself to be seen before love, but love, as another Jacob, although the younger, afterwards subdues penitence, converting it into consolation.⁴

⁴ The Love of God, Bk. II., c. 20.

It would seem to follow from this that if contrition is difficult, an act of charity must be difficult; and if love is easy so must contrition be. The question, then, whether it is difficult to make an act of perfect contrition may be put in another way. We may ask: Is it difficult to make an act of the perfect love of God?

By the light of natural reason we can see in creation, and in ourselves, plenty of indications that our Creator is a good God who pours Himself out in loving goodness upon all things that He has made. He has given us the capacity to know and love Him, and He cannot but desire that we should do so. Indeed, we have a natural inclination to love God above all things. As St. Francis of Sales teaches:

Although now our human nature be not endowed with that original soundness and righteousness which the first man had in his creation, but on the contrary be greatly depraved by sin, yet still the holy inclination to love God above all things stays with us, as also the natural light by which we see His sovereign goodness to be more worthy of love than all things; and it is impossible that one thinking attentively upon God, yea even by natural reason only, should not feel a certain movement of love which the secret inclination of our nature excites in the bottom of our hearts by which at the first apprehension of this chief and sovereign object, the will is captured, and perceives itself stirred up to a complacency in it.⁵

⁵ The Love of God, Bk. I., c. 16.

In another place of the same treatise the Saint teaches that unbaptized pagans are quite capable of repentance for sin, because it offends God. He says: —

There is yet another penitence which is indeed moral, yet religious too, yea in some sort divine, proceeding from the natural knowledge which we have of our offending God by sin. For certainly many philosophers understood that to live virtuously was a thing agreeable to the divinity, and that consequently to live viciously was offensive to Him.⁶

⁶ Ibid., Bk. II, c. 18.

But we must have recourse to revelation if we want to know the truth about divine love in all its fulness, beauty, and consoling sincerity. In innumerable passages of the Old and New Testaments God makes known His love for us in the most endearing expressions of human affection. In the most plaintive accents of wounded affection He pleads for our love in return. Almost in despair He tells us that the sum and substance of the Law and the Prophets is that we should love Him. This is the first and the greatest commandment. Foreseeing a possible excuse He assures us on His own divine authority that it is not difficult to love Him: —

This commandment, that I command thee this day, is not above thee, nor far off from thee; nor is it in heaven, that thou shouldst say: Which of us can go up to heaven to bring it unto us, and we may hear and fulfil it in work? Nor is it beyond the sea, that thou mayest excuse thyself and say: Which of us can cross the sea, and bring it unto us, that we may hear and do that which is commanded? But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it... . That thou mayest love the Lord thy God.⁷

⁷ Deuteronomy 30: 11-16,

Before the institution of the sacrament of Penance, while perfect contrition was still the only means by which the sinner could be saved, God sent this message by His prophet: —

Thus you have spoken, saying: Our iniquities and our sins are upon us, and we pine away in them: how, then, can we live? Say to them: As I live saith the Lord God, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way, and live. Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; and why will you die, O house of Israel?⁸

⁸ Ezechiel 33: 10, 11.

All this is from the Old Testament, the law of fear, and much more could be quoted to the same effect. It would be unmeaning if an act of contrition and of love were so difficult that few could reach it, and if very few, indeed, could hope to obtain the pardon of their sins through perfect contrition alone. That was the only means available for obtaining forgiveness of sin under the Old Law. Under the New Law, the law of love cast out the law of fear, and it became much easier to love God and to be reconciled with Him. We have far more abundant grace, and in the easy task of knowing and loving Jesus Christ we fulfil the precept of knowing and loving God. As St. Francis of Sales says: —

The sweet Jesus, who bought us with His blood, is infinitely desirous that we should love Him, that we may eternally be saved, and desires we may be saved that we may love Him eternally; His love tending to our salvation, and our salvation to His love. Ah! said He: I came to cast fire on the earth and what will I but that it be kindled. . . . That the commandment of love may be fulfilled, He leaves no living man without furnishing him abundantly with all means requisite thereto. God not only gives us a simple sufficiency of means to love Him, and in loving Him to save ourselves, but also a rich, ample, and magnificent sufficiency, and such as ought to be expected from so great a bounty as His.⁹

⁹ The Love of God, Bk. II, c. 8

According to the same great Doctor of Divine Love, when Our Lord sees a soul fall into sin He runs to its assistance : —

Seeing it is not now necessary that He should employ His love in dying for us, when He sees the soul overthrown by sin He commonly runs to her succor, and by an unspeakable mercy lays open the door of her heart by the stings and remorses of conscience which come from the divers lights and inspirations which He puts into our hearts, with salutary movements, with which He makes the soul return to herself, and brings her back to good sentiments. And all this God works in us without our action, by His all amiable goodness, which prevents us with its sweetness. . . . The soul would remain lost in her sin, if God prevented her not. But if the soul thus excited add her consent to the solicitation of grace, seconding the inspiration which prevents her, and accepting the required helps provided for her by God, He will fortify her, and conduct her through various movements of faith, hope, and penitence, even till He restore her to her true spiritual health, which is no other thing than charity.¹⁰

¹⁰ The Love of God, Bk. III., c. 3.

The bold metaphor of the poet in the Hound of Heaven is amply justified by Catholic theology : —

Nigh and nigh draws the chase, With unperturbèd pace, Deliberate speed, majestic instancy ; And past those noised Feet A voice comes yet more fleet— *‘Lo! naught contents thee, who content’st not Me!’’

All that the human soul, even though stained with sin, has to do in order to be again united to God by love and contrition, is to yield her consent to the insistent pleadings of her divine Lover.

At the request of His apostles, Our Lord furnished them and us with a set form of prayer suitable for ordinary and common use. The very first petition of the Our Father is an act of perfect love of God, as St. Thomas of Aquin and other theologians teach. Would not the Our Father be unsuited for common and ordinary use if so few could mean what they say while using it? And yet few could mean what they say, if few can make an act of love and contrition. No wonder, then, if Saint Jure, in his classical work on the Knowledge and Love of Jesus Christ asserts that it is easy to love God above all things. He writes: —

Since it is commanded it is possible. We will go further and we will say that it is not only possible but that it is easy. If it was easy for the Jews under the law of fear and severity, is it not still more easy for Christians under the law of grace and love?¹¹

¹¹ De la Connaissance et de Vamour de Notre Seigneur Jesus Christ, liv. i., c. 14.

The Ven. Robert Southwell, S.J., the martyr, holds that it is so easy to practise divine love that no one can excuse himself from practising it: —

All men are able to love Thee, O Lord, wise men and fools, rich and poor, little and great, young and old, men and women, and to every estate and to every age, love is common ; no man is weak or feeble, no man is poor, no man is old to love. . . . If any man should say that he cannot fast, or that he cannot give alms, or that he cannot go to Mass, we ought to believe him, but can any man say that he cannot love? This is impossible.’¹²

¹² A Hundred Meditations on the Love of God, p. 298.

The Rev. J. von den Dresch maintains that Catholics often have perfect contrition without knowing it or thinking of it; for example, while devoutly hearing Mass, while making the Stations of the Cross, while piously contemplating a crucifix, or a picture of the Sacred Heart, while listening to a sermon, and so forth.¹³ Many priests, I think, especially if they work among the poor of Christ, would maintain the same. Finally, St. Francis of Sales writes: —

¹³ Perfect Contrition, p. 15.

While we are little children, we are wise like little children, we speak like little children, we love like little children; but when we shall come to our perfect growth, there above in heaven, we shall be freed from our state of infancy, and love God perfectly. Yet we are not for all this, during this infancy of our mortal life, to omit to do what in us lies according as we are commanded, since this is not only in our power, but is also very easy; the whole commandment being of love, and of the love of God, who as He is sovereignly good, so is He sovereignly amiable.¹⁴

¹⁴ The Love of God, Bk. X., c. 2.

So that when the Catechism of the Council of Trent teaches that few reach the intensity required for a perfect act of contrition, and that very few, indeed, could hope to obtain the pardon of their sins by perfect contrition alone, it does not teach what is of faith but of opinion only. Catholics, then, are free to follow other opinions which are more consoling, and, as it seems to us, redound more to the honor and glory of God.

Nor do I feel that my withers are wrung by what Father Faber says in his work on the Blessed Sacrament. He gives the quotation from the Catechism of the Council of Trent on which I have been commenting in a footnote, and on this he supports the following sentences in the text: —

Earth has no privilege equal to that of being a member of His Church; and they dishonor both it and Him who extenuate the dismal horrors of that outer darkness in which souls lie that are aliens from the Church. The greatness of our privilege, and, therefore, of the glory of the Sacraments, is necessarily diminished by anything that makes less of the unutterable miseries, and most appalling difficulties of salvation outside the Church. This is the reason why the Saints have ever been so strong in the instincts of their sanctity, as to the wide, weltering, almost hopeless deluge which covers the ruined earth outside the ark. Harsh, to unintelligent, uncharitable kindness, intolerably harsh, as are the judgments of stern theology, the saints have ever felt and spoken more strongly and more peremptorily than the theologians.’¹⁵

¹⁵ The Blessed Sacrament, Bk. IV., c. 5.

The judgments of stern theology without doubt may sometimes appear harsh, especially to unintelligent and uncharitable kindness. But, before teaching that any particular doctrine which has the appearance even of harshness is a judgment of stern theology we should make sure of the fact. Unless we do this we shall be in danger of dishonoring God and hindering the salvation of souls by mistaking an opinion for the truth. The truth cannot diminish the glory of the sacraments nor the value of the privilege of belonging to the True Church. It is a truth that God seriously desires the salvation of all men, and that, therefore, He has provided sufficient means for all men to be saved. It is a truth that no one is lost except by his own fault. Contrition and perfect charity are the only means of salvation for such as cannot receive the sacraments. The dismal lot of those outside the Church should never be extenuated, but we must never forget that all those who are lost are lost because they would not make use of their free will to be saved, not because God has not provided sufficient and superabundant means of salvation for all. Copiosa apud eum redemptio.

It would hardly be just to the memory of Father Faber to leave the reader under the impression that the above extract expresses his settled conviction on the matter. It is true that I do not remember any passage in his writings which expressly contradicts the extract given above. But in All for Jesus he lays stress on the necessary connection between love and sorrow for sin in these words: —

What I mean is this, that to sorrow over the sins of others is no far-fetched devotion, or subtle refinement of religious feeling; but that it follows inevitably upon the love of God. Where there is no such sorrow for sin, either in ourselves or others, there is no love of God; and in proportion to the amount of love will the degree of sorrow be.¹⁶

¹⁶ Op. cit., p. 58.

In his Creator and Creature and elsewhere he treats of God’s infinite love for us, and of our obligation to love Him in return. He shows at length, with his usual eloquence and unction, how this obligation may be fulfilled, and he teaches that its fulfilment is easy. He says: —