Article — Marc, Institutiones Morales
Article II: On Purpose
- DEFINITION. Purpose, which is the other part of contrition, is the fixed and ratified counsel or decree of the will, not to sin any more
in the future. - It is an act of the virtue of prudence. "Penance," says St. Thomas,1 "also regards future sin, according as it has something of the act of prudence joined to it... And because of this, he who is contrite sorrows for past sin and guards against future sin."
DIVISION. A TWO-FOLD purpose is distinguished: one explicit or formal, the other implicit or virtual. - The former is had when someone, thinking of future time, expressly enters upon the counsel of not sinning any more; the latter, when someone actually sorrows for his sins without extending his thought to future time; for in such sorrow the will of not sinning any more is already included.
(1) Suppl., q. 2, a. 4.
- Principles. I. A FORMAL or VIRTUAL purpose of not sinning thereafter is of the essence of the Sacrament of Penance. - This is clear from what was said concerning contrition; for this, in order that it be appretiatively supreme, must exclude every affection for sin and every will of sinning; but this is nothing other than the purpose of not sinning any more in the future; therefore.
It is asked: Whether in the Sacrament of Penance a VIRTUAL or IMPLICIT purpose in sorrow suffices?
Resp. There are three opinions. - The first denies it with Scotus, Cano, Cajetan, etc., because although sorrow necessarily includes purpose, nevertheless Trent seems in fact to require a formal purpose, saying: "with the purpose of not sinning thereafter." - The second, with Lugo, etc., affirms it, namely if sorrow is elicited from a universal motive. This rests likewise on the authority of Trent, saying "that attrition, if it excludes the will of sinning, with hope of pardon, already disposes man to obtain grace in the Sacrament." Finally, the third opinion, which Holzmann holds, distinguishes and says: If the penitent thinks nothing of the future, as is accustomed to happen with the sick near death, an implicit purpose suffices. But otherwise, if he thinks of the future, in which case he must formally propose amendment, because according to Trent each one ought through penance to begin a new life. Thus St. Alphonsus.
"These two last opinions are indeed more probable; but because the first does not lack its probability, in practice before the fact the SAFER is to be followed"; indeed even after the fact, if it is certain that explicit purpose was lacking; for he who certainly committed grave fault is bound to fulfill confession of it, not only probably, but also certainly validly.2 (cf. n. 427, Hence 2.) - Yet, says Scavini,3 "in practice no one ought to be disturbed about this; since it scarcely, and not even scarcely, happens that a truly contrite penitent omits even an explicit purpose, although he does not reflect on this, which is not necessary."4
(2) Note that here there is a doubt of law, and indeed of divine law. (3) Book III, n. 292. (4) Cf. Vindic. Alph., p. 5, q. 6.
- II. There are three conditions of a true purpose, namely that it be FIRM, UNIVERSAL, and EFFICACIOUS. - Thus all.
- The purpose must be FIRM. This imports that the penitent has a will altogether deliberate not to relapse into fault, and is disposed in soul so that he would not wish to admit sin in the future from fear of any evil, or from desire of any good. - Such a disposition is required for true conversion, as is clear; because the will of sinning must be abolished absolutely and for any case whatever.5
It is asked: Whether purpose can be firm with FORESEEING of relapse?
Resp. 1. He who fears relapse because of experienced mutability of his will is not therefore to be judged to lack firm purpose; for theologians commonly say that a serious will of not relapsing can stand with fear of a fall from human frailty. - Hence, a confessor would certainly err who refused absolution to a truly disposed penitent because he foresees that he will relapse. But on the contrary:
Resp. 2. He who certainly believes that he will relapse cannot prudently be held as disposed. "I do not deny," says St. Alphonsus6 against many, "that, speculatively speaking, firm purpose of the will could well consist with knowledge of relapse; but when someone certainly believes that he will relapse, practically he gives a certain suspicion that the purpose of his will is not sufficiently firm; for it is impossible that someone firmly propose to amend himself, knowing that God does not deny His helping grace to one doing what is in him, and nevertheless, these things notwithstanding, believe certainly that he will return to his sins. Hence Croix rightly says that such a penitent, before he is absolved, must be disposed so that he hopes he will be freed from sins, not through his own powers, but through the help of God." (cf. n. 539.) But to prove the firmness of purpose, "it is not necessary, indeed it is NOT EXPEDIENT, to make particular comparisons, for example: I would rather suffer this or that evil than sin mortally; because they are dangerous. And much less is it expedient to choose hell rather; because according to the present providence of God, since hell is destined for those who are confirmed in sin through eternal hatred toward God, man would incongruously choose hell in order to avoid sin, in which he could not remain without sinning."7
- The purpose must be UNIVERSAL, at least concerning mortal sins. Thus all with St. Thomas.8 "Nor are certain authors to be heard who think that, just as particular sorrow is valid, so also particular purpose is valid; for it is answered that particular sorrow is admitted because sorrow regards only sins committed; but particular purpose cannot be admitted, because anyone must be prepared to avoid all mortal sins which he can commit; and therefore Trent, speaking of sorrow, says: 'Sorrow is detestation concerning sin committed'; but speaking of purpose, it says, 'with the purpose of not sinning thereafter.'"
"It was said concerning mortal sins; because with respect to venials, it is certain with St. Thomas that it suffices if the penitent proposes to abstain from some one, saying, for example, I propose not to lie any more, without proposing to abstain from the rest. For the rest, a man can propose to avoid all deliberate venial sins; and as regards indeliberate sins, it suffices to propose to avoid them insofar as human frailty permits, as the same Angelic Doctor says."9 (cf. n. 1667, 4.)
- The purpose must be EFFICACIOUS, that is, have force for doing what is proposed. "Therefore it is necessary that the penitent propose not only to avoid sin, but also to apply the means for avoiding sin, and notably the proximate occasions of sinning, as is commonly taught."10 But concerning these there will be a longer discourse where the office of the confessor is treated (cf. n. 1821).
Meanwhile let it be noted: 1. "It is not always true that only then is purpose efficacious when that which is proposed is carried out; otherwise, as often as the penitent relapsed, so often would he be bound to repeat confessions; for relapse is not always a sign of an infirm purpose, but often only a sign of a changed will. Thus Peter truly proposed rather to die than deny Christ, and nevertheless at the first voice of the maidservant he denied." Thus St. Alphonsus against the Rigorists.11
- A defect of true purpose is discerned more from neglect of the means than from multiple relapse; because it is easier to apply remedies than to abstain from sin, on account of the vehement propensity into it from custom.12 But when relapse into sins is to be held as a morally certain argument of a vicious purpose will be explained below, where Recidivists are treated (n. 1828).
(5) Book VI, 451. (6) Ibid., 451. (7) Ibid., 433, 7. (8) 3, q. 87, a. 1, ad 1. (9) H. A., XVI, 25; Book VI, 451, 2. (10) Ibid., 451, 3. (11) Ibid., 3. (12) Cf. Billuart, De Poenit., diss. 6, art. 10, § 6, Obj. 7.