§ 2. On Perfect And Imperfect Contrition

1670. Every act of contrition, as is already clear from what has been said, requires this for itself, that it be elicited from a truly supernatural motive; and in this respect, indeed, all and each of the acts of contrition generically agree. But because the motives from which they are elicited are of unequal order, and because on account of this inequality some are more perfect and efficacious than others, Theologians, relying on this foundation, distinguish two principal SPECIES OR DEGREES of contrition, one of which they call perfect contrition, and the other imperfect contrition. - Of each, separately, we must now treat.

1671. DEFINITION. PERFECT contrition, or contrition simply so called, is that which is elicited from the motive of divine charity, that is, insofar as sin

is an offense of God, the Supreme Good and to be loved above all things. For divine Goodness, just as on account of its supreme lovableness it draws our will to love of itself, so likewise it moves it to detestation of the evil which is opposed to it. - Hence an act of perfect contrition will be, for example, the following: My God, with my whole heart I sorrow for all my sins, and they displease me because I have offended Thee, infinite goodness.

Two things worthy of note must be premised here: 1. Several Theologians probably teach that an act of perfect contrition can be elicited from the motive of any offended divine attribute. For he, they say, who loves divine justice, wisdom, mercy, beneficence, already loves God Himself, since these attributes are God Himself. But others commonly and more probably hold that perfect contrition must proceed altogether from the sole motive of charity, namely from divine goodness contemned through sin, insofar as this is the root and aggregate of all perfections. For, from Trent, contrition must be perfected or informed by charity; but the object of charity is God insofar as He is Infinite Goodness itself, or the infinite Good.¹

2. Perfect contrition admits several DEGREES, among which are distinguished: 1. Contrition in a remiss or lowest degree, by which at least mortal sin is excluded from the motive of predominant charity. - 2. Contrition in a perfect degree, or intense degree of reason, by which in addition any venial sin and any affection for it are excluded. - 3. Contrition in the supreme and most intense degree of reason and sense, such as by special grace was granted to some sinners, who died from the vehemence of sorrow. - Yet these diverse degrees are of the same nature, because more and less do not vary the species.² (cf. n. 465 seq.)

1672. Principles. I. PERFECT contrition, even in the lowest degree, always JUSTIFIES a man before the Sacrament is actually received. This is proved, 1. from Scripture (Prov. 8:17): "I love those who love me." "Charity covers a multitude of sins" (1 Pet. 4:8). - 2. From Trent, which (sess. 14, cap. 4) teaches "that contrition perfected by charity... reconciles man to God before this Sacrament is actually received."³ 3. From the Fathers and Doctors, among whom St. Chrysostom:⁴ "Where charity is, all evils have been taken away"; and St. Thomas:⁵ "Charity cannot be with mortal sin." 4. From the 32nd proposition of Baius, condemned by Gregory XIII: "That charity which is the fullness of the law is not always joined with the remission of sins." But the theological reason is that an act of perfect contrition is a formal act of charity toward God, or an act intrinsically joined with charity, as is clear from the very definition of contrition.

We said, 1. even in the lowest degree. For it suffices that the love of God attain to the notion of charity, which consists in the love of God for His own sake, above all things. "And the reason is evident," says St. Alphonsus,⁶ "because as any aversion from God as from the ultimate end, even in a remiss degree, suffices for losing God's friendship, so any true conversion suffices for recovering it." Hence St. Thomas:⁷ "Any contrition is informed by grace making one pleasing; therefore however small it is, it destroys every fault." And this opinion seems so certain to our Blessed Doctor that he rejects the opposite altogether as improbable and false.⁸

We said, 2. always justifies, that is, even outside the case of necessity. This is likewise certain against Adrian and Cajetan, although the Council of Trent abstained from condemning those authors. It is clear from the condemned 71st proposition of Baius: "Through contrition even joined with perfect charity and with the desire of receiving the Sacrament, guilt is not remitted, outside the case of necessity or martyrdom, without the actual reception of the Sacrament."⁹

1673. II. Perfect contrition of itself does not justify a man except WITH THE DESIRE OF THE SACRAMENT, at least implicit. - 1. This is clear from the very nature of contrition; for, in order that it be true and perfect, there is required the will to fulfill all the precepts of God; but confession is a divine precept; therefore. - To the point Cardinal de Lugo says aptly:¹⁰ "Contrition is said to justify in order to the keys, not because it receives the power of justifying from the Sacrament, but because, when it justifies outside the Sacrament, it has in itself the implicit desire of subjecting mortal sins to the keys; to this a man remains bound even after he has been justified through contrition." - 2. This is further clear from Trent (sess. 14, cap. 4), where it is declared that the desire of the Sacrament is included in perfect contrition.

We said with a desire at least implicit; for it can happen that a sinner elicits an act of perfect contrition without actually thinking about confession, either from inadvertence or from invincible ignorance; but that ignorance or inadvertence detracts nothing from the merit of charity and contrition. Therefore. - Besides, from Trent the desire which is included in contrition suffices; but what is included in another thing is implicit, not explicit. - Yet if the sinner actually thinks about the precept of confession, he certainly must either confess, or elicit the purpose of confessing; otherwise contrition would not be true, as is evident.¹¹

1674. Several things must be noted here: - 1. Perfect contrition is not the very form which justifies the sinner, but is, in the present providence, the final disposition or final preparation for justification. For, when from actual grace there has been placed in the sinner an act of charity or of perfect contrition, habitual grace is immediately infused into him, by which the man loving God and loved by God is rendered just and a friend of God. This is drawn from Trent, sess. 14, cap. 4, and sess. 6, cap. 7.

2. Contrition, whether considered on the part of charity or on the part of sensible sorrow, can increase to such a degree that it suffices for the FULL DESTRUCTION of fault and punishment; as is clear from the example of the good Thief. For charity, which begets displeasure, can be so greatly intensified in act that the contrition following from it merits not only the removal of fault, but also absolution from every punishment. - Likewise, sensible sorrow, which the will excites in contrition, can be so greatly intensified that it suffices for the destruction of the whole punishment, by way of satisfaction.¹²

3. Most vehement contrition can further bring this about, that it removes the very REMAINS OF SIN. "For St. Thomas teaches¹³ that God sometimes removes the remains of sin successively through His cooperating grace, but sometimes immediately through a great commotion, by which man obtains perfect spiritual health... as is clear concerning St. Magdalene."¹⁴

Concerning the NECESSITY of contrition, recall what was said at n. 1647.

1675. DEFINITION. IMPERFECT contrition, or attrition, is detestation of sin which is commonly conceived either from consideration of the turpitude of sin, or from fear of hell and punishments, and which has joined to itself an initial, but not predominant, love of God. - It is elicited, for example, by these words: My God, because on account of my sins I have lost paradise and have deserved eternal hell, I sorrow above every evil that I have displeased Thee.

We said, 1. commonly conceived, so that it may be intimated with Trent (sess. 14, cap. 4) that there are also other motives of attrition, as are sadness over the loss of grace and divine friendship, hope of pardon, hope of eternal beatitude, non-predominant love of God, for example on account of His beneficence and mercy; yet all these motives are inferior to charity.

We said, 2. from consideration of the turpitude of sin: namely one made not only according to the dictate of reason, but according to the light of faith; for example if the sinner considers within himself that through sin he has been despoiled of the beauty of grace, has departed from the rectitude of virtue, and leads a life unworthy of a Christian. For unless a supernatural consideration moves sorrow, attrition is not supernatural.

We said, 3. or from fear of hell and punishments; understand fear: 1. honorable, that is, not formally but only materially servile, by which the will of sinning is excluded, as we noted (n. 457, 2); - 2. supernatural, by which punishment is feared insofar as it is inflicted by God, the supreme judge and avenger of sins. For he who sorrowed from fear of disease or infamy coming to himself from sin would not sorrow as he ought (cf. n. 1667, 2).

Whether attrition conceived from fear of temporal punishments insofar as they are inflicted by God suffices? - "Some deny with Cano, Concina, etc., saying that sorrow must arise from fear of eternal punishments, because, since the punishment of mortal sin is eternal, the penitent must conceive sorrow for sins from fear of an eternal evil. - Others with Lugo, Suarez, etc., more commonly and more probably affirm it, from these words of the Council of Trent: 'Attrition is conceived from fear of hell and punishments.' For here the Council distinguishes other punishments from the punishments of hell, in which assuredly all other punishments are included. But because the first opinion cannot be said improbable, in practice we cannot embrace the second."¹⁵

We said, 4. and some initial love of God. For Trent teaches (sess. 6, cap. 6) that sinners, while they are disposed to justification, "begin to love God as the font of all justice, and therefore are moved against sins," etc. But this beginning of love is already had in attrition, both through fear of divine vengeance, according to that saying (Ecclus. 25:16): "The fear of God is the beginning of His love"; and through hope of pardon and eternal beatitude. Hence St. Thomas:¹⁶ "From this," he says, "that we hope goods can come to us through someone, we are moved toward him as toward our good, and thus we begin to love him." Therefore he who approaches the Sacrament with attrition and hope of pardon already begins to love God as his liberator, justifier, and glorifier.¹⁷

1676. Principles. I. Attrition, OUTSIDE THE SACRAMENT, cannot of itself justify a man. - This is clear from Trent (sess. 14, cap. 4), where it is read: "And although without the Sacrament of Penance it cannot of itself bring the sinner to justification, nevertheless," etc. - The reason is that justification consists in perfect conjunction with God; but the attrite man, although he withdraws from creatures and begins the first steps of conversion to God, is nevertheless not yet perfectly converted to Him and joined by charity.¹⁸

1677. II. Attrition SUFFICES, as the prerequired disposition, for obtaining pardon of sins, even lethal sins, IN THE SACRAMENT of Penance. - This opinion today is morally certain, and the opposite, which requires predominant love, is no longer probable. - It is proved: 1. From Trent (sess. 14, cap. 4), where it is said that attrition disposes to justification in the Sacrament of Penance. These words cannot be understood as though attrition disposes only remotely to justification, as the acts of the other virtues do; for thus it disposes even outside the Sacrament. Therefore it disposes proximately, namely so that grace can be infused through absolution. - 2. From reason: the Sacraments actually work what they signify. Therefore of itself this ought to happen: that when the priest imparts absolution, at that very point of time sins are remitted and the life of grace is conferred on the spiritually dead soul. Now if predominant charity had to be present in sorrow, the Sacrament of itself would never cause grace, because all would approach it already justified, since, according to St. Thomas,¹⁹ every sorrow, however small, proceeding from predominant charity is true contrition justifying of itself; therefore the Sacrament of Penance could no longer be called a Sacrament of the dead, but of the living. The reason of the end for which the Sacrament was instituted is added. "It was necessary," says the Roman Catechism,²⁰ "that the most merciful Lord should provide for the common salvation of men by an easier way." Now, if attrition did not suffice with the Sacrament, the matter would certainly no longer be so.²¹ Therefore. - A penitent who is actually attrite is said to become habitually contrite under absolution, because grace, and therefore charity, are conferred on him through absolution, and thus he is made habitually converted to God.

1678. It is asked: Whether one who, IN THE ARTICLE OF DEATH, has confessed with attrition alone, is also bound to elicit contrition?

Resp. "The first opinion affirms with Suarez, Bonacina, etc. But the second opinion, much more common with Lugo, Laymann, etc., denies it; and Suarez calls it very probable, because, granted that the opinion is certain, as has been shown, that attrition alone suffices for confession, he who has confessed with it is already morally certain of divine grace. - This second opinion is very probable; but it cannot be denied that the first is altogether to be advised to the dying; especially because at the end of life we are bound to an act of love, which cannot be satisfied unless we detest sin when it occurs to memory, as is commonly taught."²²