Tempting God

171. Notion. 1. Tempting God is defined as: a saying or deed by which someone explores whether God has or exercises some perfection (knowledge, power, mercy).

a. One temptation is called that of seduction to evil, another that of probation. Where there is question of tempting God, temptation of seduction to sin can have no place, neither actively, because God tempts no one in this way,¹ nor passively, because God cannot be induced to sin.

b. Temptation of probation is called active when God tempts man, in order to test his virtue;² and it is called passive when God is tempted by men, who intend to take an experiment concerning His perfections. Concerning this last temptation there is speech here, as is clear from the definition.

2. Tempting God arises especially from two vices: a. from infidelity, when someone, doubting concerning some perfection of God, intends to explore it; b. from presumption, when someone rashly (without a cause of necessity or utility) asks or expects from God an extraordinary effect.

From infidelity, if someone, doubting concerning the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, asks to see Christ hidden under the species. From presumption, if someone, firmly holding the real presence of Christ, asks to see in the consecrated host the divine Child, as several saints saw Him, or if someone for forty days abstains from food and drink while expecting from God the preservation of life. It is clear that in the same fact there can be a diverse intention of the agent.

¹ Jas. 1:13.

² Deut. 13:3; Tob. 2:12.

172. Division. A twofold tempting of God is distinguished: formal or explicit, and virtual or interpretative, according as God is tempted with an explicit intention or only with an implicit one, latent in the mode of acting.

a. Formal temptation can happen in two ways: a. when someone intends to explore some perfection of God, as if someone, doubting concerning the power of God, asks from Him a miracle; b. when someone intends to explore the will of God through an extraordinary sign, as if someone casts himself down from a very high tower with the mind of curiously testing whether God wishes to save him. Formal temptation for the most part proceeds from infidelity, although it can also proceed from presumption.

b. Virtual temptation is had if someone indeed does not intend to tempt God, yet does or omits something which of itself demands a miracle, as if someone expects health in a grave illness from God alone, natural means having been passed over, or if someone exposes himself to danger from which he could be freed by God alone through a miracle. Virtual temptation proceeds from presumption, since it is a rash expectation of divine help.

It belongs to the notion of temptation that something be expected from God, and that it be expected rashly from God.

a. It is not tempting God if someone expects nothing from God, which can happen in two ways: a. when someone exposes himself to danger because he wills the danger, as if someone enters a duel in the way in which today men enter it, without expecting, as formerly used to happen, a special intervention of God in favor of the innocent; or if a sick man rejects all medicines, either so that he may die more quickly or so that he may suffer the troubles of the disease. b. When the effect is expected from imprudence or stupidity contrary to all probability, as if someone without sufficient preparation undergoes an examination, trusting that by some chance he will nevertheless satisfy.

b. It is not tempting God if someone, from a just cause, for example from divine inspiration, or from necessity or great utility, where ordinary means are lacking, expects some effect from God alone. Therefore it is licit to ask a miracle from God from a just cause of necessity or utility, namely for one's own salvation or that of others, or for fulfilling the will of God, and under the condition, if it shall have pleased God. But it is not licit to offer or ask absolutely for a miracle for the conversion of heretics without divine inspiration, because for this end the testimonies of the Christian faith are present and suffice.¹

c. The judgments of God, commonly ordeals (Gottesurteile), which once were in use, such as the trial of fire or water for exploring innocence, are illicit: for in these the sin of interpretative tempting of God is committed by asking a miracle without necessity, wherefore in law they are expressly prohibited.² Nevertheless several prelates of the Church and also particular synods approved the use of ordeals. In this matter they must be excused from their good faith and from the circumstances of the times. Yet the supreme pontiffs never approved them, although it must be conceded that the same pontiffs neither immediately reprobated them nor took care severely enough that this abuse be eliminated. But if it is read that God declared the innocence of certain persons through a miracle, this must be explained from the fact that the purgations were chosen by the innocent themselves either from divine instinct or in good faith, or that the innocent were driven by force by others to the purgations.³

¹ Cf. 3 Kings 18:23, 24.

² c. cura 1, De purgatione vulgari (V. 35).

³ Kirchenlexikon, 2nd ed., "Gottesurteile."

173. Its moral malice. 1. Formal tempting of God is a sin mortal from its whole genus, which does not admit smallness of matter.

a. Formal tempting of God, whether it happens in one way or the other, inflicts grave irreverence upon God, because it is directly opposed to divine wisdom: for he who tempts asks and expects that God by His omnipotence produce an extraordinary effect for a vain and useless end. Therefore Christ answered: Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.¹

b. If formal tempting of God proceeds from infidelity, a twofold malice concurs: one against faith, which consists in doubting whether God is endowed with some determinate perfection; the other against religion, which consists in the irreverence by which someone demands from God Himself that He prove His perfections.

2. Interpretative tempting of God is a sin grave from its genus, admitting smallness of matter; yet for the most part it is a venial sin. It is a grave sin when someone rashly expects from God a miracle; but if he expects only special help from God from curiosity or levity, it does not seem to be a grave sin, unless there is introduced a danger of grave harm to oneself or another.

Therefore he who without a just cause, in danger of death, natural remedies having been omitted, expects divine help, sins gravely, because it is judged to be grave irreverence in so great a danger to expect health from God without necessity. He who in a slight illness, natural means having been rejected, hopes for health from God, sins only lightly; and he does not sin at all if he hopes that, with God helping, he will be freed naturally from such an illness. In like manner he sins only lightly who, through negligence unprepared, proceeds to a sermon hoping for special help from God; but an untaught cleric would sin gravely if he wished to preach without preparation, hoping that the matter would be suggested to him by God.

¹ Matt. 4:7.

In this and the two following chapters we will treat of sins against religion by defect. The first of these is tempting God, which a person commits by saying or doing something by way of experiment to discover whether God is wise, powerful, good, or endowed with some other perfection. There is a formal sin of tempting God when there is a positive intention to make an experiment with God; the sin is virtual when that intention is absent, but something is said or done which can have no other meaning than to find out whether God has some perfection or not. Even in this case there must be some reference to God, some desire or wish to implore his help; otherwise there cannot be any tempting of God.

Formal tempting of God is a mortal sin, as is obvious; for it is a grave insult to the divine Majesty, who has graciously given men all the knowledge about himself that they require, and it contains the malice of unbelief as well.

God is virtually tempted when, contrary to the designs of his Providence, we neglect natural means, trusting that he will give us special help. This too is of itself a grave sin, but it often becomes venial on account of want of knowledge, consideration, or advertence. Thus people are guilty of grave sin who refuse to send for the doctor and will not use the ordinary remedies when they or their children are seriously ill, trusting that God will work a miracle. A preacher who neglected to prepare properly for his sermon, or one who exposed himself to some slight danger through improper trust in the divine help, would only sin venially. After doing what we can, or if we can do nothing, then we may at once with full confidence have recourse to God in our necessities. The trials by ordeal, which were in vogue in the Middle Ages, were in the ninth century condemned by the Church as superstitious,

(St. Thomas, II-II, q. 97; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, lib. III, nn. 29-32; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 4, n. 38.)

I. Notion. The temptation of God is an act by which someone makes trial of God, for example by asking for a miracle in order to test whether God is omnipotent.

II. Division. The temptation of God is distinguished into properly so called and less properly so called.

Properly so called occurs when someone, doubting or distrusting some perfection of God, asks something from God or does something for this end, that he may test whether God possesses that perfection. Less properly so called has place when someone, without doubt about some divine perfection, either a) inordinately asks (or expects) a manifestation of the divine will or perfection, resting in it; as if someone asks for a miracle so that he may be a witness of an extraordinary fact of this kind; or b) inordinately or rashly asks (or expects) something from God, yet not in order to test some divine perfection, nor to obtain a manifestation of the divine will or perfection as such; as if a sick person, neglecting medicines, asks for health (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 97; St. Alphonsus, III, 29).¹

¹ Others distinguish the temptation of God into formal and interpretative. They call it formal when someone explicitly intends to test some divine perfection. They call it interpretative when someone, although he does not explicitly intend that, nevertheless proceeds in such a way that the act must be reduced to an exploration of a divine perfection. Yet not all agree in explaining these things.

III. Morality. The malice of the temptation of God consists in an injurious manner of treating God. Namely, one deals with God as though he were a performer who, without reason, manifests his perfections and wills, or as though, when the ordinary means of obtaining something from him have been neglected, he nevertheless bestows it. Moreover:

1. The temptation of God properly so called is a grave sin from its whole genus. For it is grave irreverence to ask or expect something from God with the mind of testing his perfection. There is added a sin against faith (St. Alphonsus, III, 30).

2. The temptation of God less properly so called is a grave sin from its genus, that is, grave or light according as someone inordinately asks or expects a miraculous or non-miraculous effect of the divine will or perfection (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). The former had place in ordeals, as they are called, which consisted in this: that in a criminal case a request was made of God that he declare the accused either innocent or guilty through a trial of fire or water or through similar experiments. The latter would happen if someone seized by a lighter illness, neglecting every means, asked health from God. Besides, the temptation of God, objectively mortal, not at all rarely is venial because of inconsideration, simplicity, etc. (St. Alphonsus, III, 30).

Corollary. "One sins who absolutely asks from God, or offers, a miracle for the conversion of heretics, since the testimonies of our faith suffice... But if at some time there is a very firm hope of conversion, then a miracle will be able to be asked from God under the condition, if it pleases him" (St. Alphonsus, III, 31).

Temptation of God.—Temptation of God is a word or deed that puts God to the test to discover whether He possesses or will exercise some perfection.

(a) It is a word or deed, such as a prayer whose purpose is to discover whether God is possessed of knowledge, power or goodness, or an act of defiance performed in order to prove that there is no God.

(b) It puts God to the test, that is, the temptation is not seductive (since it is impossible to influence God to sin), but experimental. He who tempts God desires that God give some proof of His attributes.

(c) It is concerned with God, hence there is no temptation of God if one legitimately tests out the character of a human being. God Himself tempted by trial holy men like Abraham, Job, and Tobias in order that their virtue might be manifested and an example given to others. And of spirits St. John says: “Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits if they be of God, because many false prophets are gone out into the world” (I John, iv. 1).

(d) The purpose is to discover, without regard to the ordinary means of instruction and guidance appointed by God, whether God possesses or will exercise an attribute; that is, temptation of God is due to unbelief or to presumption.

Cases Wherein There Is no Temptation of God.—(a) To seek a proof of divine perfections is not temptation of God, if the purpose is only to find new reasons for what one already accepts, or to experience in an affective way what one already admits speculatively. Hence, a theologian may study the attributes of God with a view to further illumination; hence also, one may prove the sweetness of God or the goodness of His will from the spiritual taste or relish for divine things (Psalm xxxiii. 9; Rom., xii. 2).

(b) To seek a sign of God’s will or a manifestation of His perfections is not temptation of God, if this is done, not from curiosity, ostentation or other vain motive, but from some reason of necessity or great utility, as when Gedeon prayed for a sign that the Lord had spoken to him or was with him (Judges, vi. 17, 37), or when Elias called on Jehovah to show His power before the worshippers of Baal (III Kings, xviii. 37). Hence, he does not tempt God who, when ordinary means of direction fail him in some critical affair, asks humbly for a sign of God’s will; or who in a matter of great moment asks for miraculous help if it be pleasing to God to grant it; or who exposes himself to serious danger for some priceless good that cannot otherwise be had, in the trust that God will be with him.

Kinds of Temptation of God.—(a) In relation to its source, temptation of God arises either from unbelief or from presumption. The former, which is temptation of God in the strict sense, exists when one disbelieves or doubts some attribute of God and seeks to put it to the proof, as when the Israelites in the desert called into question the providence and power of Jehovah (Exod., xvii. 7, Psalm lxxvii. 18, 19), or when a person doubting the Real Presence asks for a miraculous sight of Christ in the Eucharist. The latter sin, which is temptation of God in the wide sense, is committed when a believing person asks without a just cause for a miraculous manifestation of God’s will, or powers, or of some other thing, as when a lazy man asks that his work be done in some miraculous way, or a rash man neglects the ordinary care of his health, asking that God supply for his carelessness. But temptation of God is not to be identified with the theological sin of presumption (see 1081).

(b) In relation to its manner, temptation of God is either express or interpretative. It is express when one intends by one’s word or act to put God to the proof in respect to knowledge, power, reliability, or other perfection (as when the Jews demanded that Christ come down from the Cross, if He were the Son of God) or to satisfy a vain curiosity or boldness (as when Herod asked Christ to work some miracles for his amusement). Temptation of God is interpretative when one does not intend to discover God’s perfections or make presumptuous requests, but nevertheless so acts or omits to act that one’s conduct is useful for nothing except temptation of God, as when a believer rashly promises a miracle to convince an unbeliever, a sick man refuses to use any medical care (Ecclus., xxxviii. 4), a lecturer goes entirely unprepared to his lecture, etc. Prayer made without the proper dispositions is a quasi-temptation of God (Ecclus., xviii. 23), because it is disrespectful and presumptuous; but it is not real temptation of God, nor of its nature mortally sinful, the direct end of the act being laziness or some other state of soul unsuitable to prayer.

Causes that Exclude the Interpretative Temptation of God.—There is no interpretative temptation of God strictly speaking if one acts rashly or encounters danger, but does not at all expect miraculous or special intervention from God. This happens as follows:

(a) when one is unconcerned whether evil results or not, or desires that it may result (e.g., when a person who is tired of life seeks a dangerous occupation for the diversion and excitement it affords, or when a person practises abstinence from certain remedies as an act of moderate mortification);

(b) when one does not wish the evil result, but is so stupid or rash as to believe that an imprudent risk can be taken and evil escaped through chance or good luck, as when a student goes up for a difficult examination with slight preparation, trusting that only the things he knows will be asked.

Refusal of Medicine or Hygienic Care.—(a) If there is a sufficient reason for this conduct, no sin is committed. There may be sufficient reasons of a natural kind (e.g., that the remedies are harmful or useless or too expensive), or of a supernatural kind (e.g., St. Agatha refused all medicines because God Himself was her physician, certain Saints were divinely inspired to make no effort to remove bodily maladies on account of the spiritual profit derived from them).

(b) If there is no sufficient reason for this conduct, it is sinful. Thus, one sins against faith, if the reason for the conduct is disbelief in the existence of evil (e.g., Christian Science or Eddyism attributes sickness and pain to imagination, and says that the only cure is “faith”); one sins by temptation of God, if the reason for the conduct is vain expectation of miracles; one is guilty of suicide or homicide, if the purpose is to end life, etc.

The Sinfulness of Temptation of God.—(a) To doubt the perfections of God, or to call upon the extraordinary Providence of God in disregard of the ordinary Providence He has established is the essence of temptation of God. It is sinful, because it includes either unjustifiable doubt or vincible ignorance in the intellect or presumption in the will. Hence the command given in Deuteronomy (vi. 16): “Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.” But invincible ignorance excuses from sin, and hence many of those who in times past resorted to ordeals by painful or dangerous tests (e.g., walking on burning coals, risking death in deep waters), in order that God might settle a doubtful matter, were, on account of their good faith, guiltless of temptation of God. The practice was condemned by the Church in the ninth century.

(b) To doubt about the positive and unknown will of God, or to call upon the extraordinary Providence of God (i.e., the direct intervention of the First Cause), without disregard of the ordinary Providence (i.e., of second causes appointed by God), is not sinful, if it is justified by necessity. Thus, being unable to resist the nations leagued against him, Josaphat prayed: “As we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to Thee” (II Paral., xx. 12). And Our Lord promised the disciples that, when they should be unable to prepare their defense on account of the persecutions to which they were subjected, the Spirit Himself would speak through them (Matt., X. 19), and that He would enable them to do things as difficult as moving mountains when real necessity called for it (Matt., xvii. 19). It is not unbelief to doubt about matters pertaining to God that are really doubtful (i.e., not His perfections, but His positive and unknown will), and hence one does not tempt God who asks for divine guarantees of a religion proposed as divinely revealed (see 795); it is not presumption to ask God for a sign or proof, if God directs one to do this (e.g., Abraham in Gen., xv. 8, was inspired to seek a sign that the promised land would be given his posterity; Achaz in Isaias, vii. 11, was bidden for the sake of others to ask for a sign), or if, when a sign from God seems necessary or very useful, one prays for it prudently and on condition that the request is pleasing to God (e.g., the Apostles in Acts, iv. 30, prayed for signs and wonders in confirmation of their preaching).

The Malice of Temptation of God.—(a) It is a sin directly against religion, for one shows contempt to God when one demands that He prove His perfections, or when one takes the liberty to disregard the ordinary means He has established and to call for others. The sin is less, however, than that of superstition, since temptation of God professes doubt, while superstition professes positive error. Temptation of God offends also against other virtues, such as faith (e.g., when one doubts the perfections of God), hope (e.g., when one presumes that God will do all without one’s cooperation), charity (e.g., when a person exposes his own life to risk or his neighbor to scandal in a vain confidence that the danger will be miraculously averted).

(b) It is a mortal sin from its nature, since it offends religion. But it may be venial on account of the imperfection of the act, as when from weakness of faith or without reflection one asks unnecessarily for a sign (Luke, i. 11-20). It may be venial also from the lightness of the matter, if the temptation is interpretative, as when one presumes on the divine aid in a slight sickness, an unimportant talk, or other small affair.

As a rule temptation of God is only a venial sin, and in an individual case it is rarely mortal, except in the following instances:

(a) when one intends a grave offense against God, as by doubting His goodness, demanding or attempting a miracle to satisfy curiosity;

(b) when one exposes oneself to grave peril, as by leaping from the roof of a high building, refusing all remedies or means of preserving health, neglecting to provide for one’s sustenance, etc., in the expectation that God will miraculously provide;

(c) when one causes grave harm to others, as when a person rashly asking for signs exposes faith to the derision of unbelievers or scandalizes believers.

What is irreligiosity? - Irreligiosity is a vice which is opposed to the virtue of religion by defect, and which tends to inflict irreverence upon God either directly in himself, or indirectly in sacred things or persons. In the first mode it is divided into temptation of God, perjury, infidelity in promises, and blasphemy. In the other mode, into sacrilege and simony. Concerning perjury, infidelity, and blasphemy, in the second precept of the Decalogue; concerning the rest here it will have to be said. Yet S. Thomas treats blasphemy insofar as it is opposed to confession of faith, qq. 13, 14. But cf. q. 13, a. 2 ad 2. Suarez, tr. 3, l. 1, c. 1, n. 8.

What is temptation of God? - Temptation of God is a saying or deed by which someone tests whether God is powerful, wise, merciful, or has some other perfection. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 97, a. 1; L. 29; Suarez, de Relig., tr. 3, l. 1, c. 2, n. 14.

Of how many kinds is temptation of God? - It is twofold: one explicit and formal, the other implicit and interpretative. The first is when someone directly intends the testing of divine perfections, and this generally arises from infidelity, although it can also come from lightness, curiosity, imprudent confidence, etc.; for example, if someone doubting concerning some article of faith should ask from God a miracle, or if someone should throw himself down from a high tower, curiously to test whether God is powerful to preserve him from death.

But the second is when someone does not properly intend that testing, but rashly, without any necessity or utility, says or does something which, the circumstances being considered, by its own nature seems to be referred to it. This happens: 1. when someone tests the divine will concerning some future thing. 2. when someone without just cause neglects ordinary remedies and rashly expects an extraordinary effect from God alone, for example, if someone in a dangerous illness rejects all medicine, wishing to be miraculously healed by God. 3. when someone without any necessity casts himself into such danger that he can scarcely be freed without a miracle of God, for example, if someone through the whole of Lent, without a special instinct of God, should wish to abstain from all food and drink, expecting from God an extraordinary preservation of his life. Here note that if someone acts only rashly, without any respect to God, not trusting certainly in divine providence, but by a certain foolish confidence believing that perhaps by chance he will overcome such or such a danger, he does not sin against religion, but only against the fifth precept of the Decalogue. Suarez, de Relig., tr. 3, l. 1, cc. 2, 3; L. 29; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 97, a. 1.

What kind of sin is temptation of God? - Temptation of God is a mortal sin from its genus. It is proved, because it inflicts grave irreverence upon God; hence it is written: You shall not tempt the Lord your God. Matt. 4:7. And this holds whether the temptation is explicit or implicit. Concerning explicit temptation it is clear, because that explicit intention of testing the divine perfections is an explicit contempt of God himself. But concerning implicit temptation it is demonstrated from this, that even an implicit petition, namely that God work contrary to the order of his providence, from mere curiosity or arrogance, without necessity, very evidently redounds to grave injury to him; for it is to act with God as with a favorer of curiosities.

Temptation of God can be only venial not only on account of ignorance, inadvertence, defect of consent, but also on account of smallness of matter. Thus, for example, he would sin only venially who, laboring under illness, should neglect natural remedies and expect health for himself from God by imprudent confidence, or rather presumption; for that man does not seem to commit a grave disorder, since he does not truly ask a miracle from doubt, or from grave lightness and curiosity of testing divine power. Indeed he is excused even from all fault if he hopes that he will be naturally freed from such a disease, with God helping. Likewise he sins per se only venially who from negligence comes unprepared to preach the word of God, hoping for special help from God. Yet if temptation of God comes not only from an imprudent and presumptuous testing of a divine perfection, or only from an imprudent and presumptuous imploration of divine help, but from doubt concerning the divine perfections, then there will be no smallness of matter. For smallness of matter is not given in deliberate doubt against faith. Therefore then sin will have place against religion and also against faith, mortal from its whole genus. L. 29, 30, 32; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 97, aa. 2, 3, 4.

You will resolve: From what has been said, one can gather what must be thought concerning the tests formerly used, commonly called judgments of God: namely, when witnesses were lacking, various experiments had been instituted to which the accused was subjected; for example, he carried hot iron, walked over burning coals, etc., and if nothing evil happened to him, he was held as innocent. For this is altogether illicit; for it is both a species of divination, since there is no proportion of the means to the end, and temptation of God, since it is to wish indiscriminately to ask from him a miracle by which he may disclose the truth. The Church never approved this. For when a crime cannot be known by natural ways, nor does a special instinct of God otherwise advise, it must be left to the judgment of God, who searches the secrets of hearts. C. Consuluisti 2, qu. 5; tit. de Purgat. vulgari; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 95, a. 8; L. 30; Struggl 6; Muratori, Antiq. Ital., diss. 38, 39.

Is it permitted to ask a miracle from God? - They commonly teach that this is permitted whenever there is a grave utility for our salvation or that of others, or for fulfilling the divine will. For then it would not be to tempt God, but to ask earnestly for God's help in a suitable time. But he would sin who absolutely asked for or offered a miracle for the conversion of heretics or sinners, since the testimonies of our faith suffice. Except the case of a particular inspiration of God. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 97, a. 2 ad 3; L. 31.

Is it permitted to offer oneself to martyrdom? - One must distinguish with St. Thomas. Either a legitimate cause is present or not. If the first, for example, to avoid blasphemies, to procure the glory of God and of faith, to remove in one's neighbor the danger of unbelief, it is certainly permitted, since it is a work of the greatest charity. If the second, it is not permitted, since no one is lord of his own life so that he can squander it at his own pleasure. Whence he sins gravely, when good faith or divine inspiration does not excuse, as we know happened in several Saints. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 174, a. 3; L. 32, l. 6, n. 101. "To sustain martyrdom on account of Christ falls under precept, because namely man ought to have his mind so prepared that he would sooner permit himself to be killed than deny Christ or sin mortally. And thus also to leave one's own goods falls under precept, because the mind of a Christian ought to be prepared rather to sustain the plundering of his goods than to deny Christ or sin mortally." S. Th., Quodl. 4, a. 20.

Macrina, a nun most observant of regular discipline, frequently fasts, rises at night to pray, and exercises other austerities of the body. When Petronia the superior had learned these things, she prohibits all things to Macrina. For she says that sanctity does not consist in these things; and, with attention to Macrina's physical constitution, that this is to tempt God, assuredly a grave sin. Although Macrina is not of robust health, nevertheless she is altogether well. But preferring obedience to her superior, she submits herself altogether to her.

Q. 1. What is temptation of God, and what kind of sin? - 2. What is to be thought concerning Macrina? - 3. What is to be thought concerning Petronia?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 487 seqq. To the second: Macrina indeed is to be praised on account of her virtue of penitence and obedience. That Macrina was led by the good spirit of God in the exercise of that exterior penitence is clear from this, that although she was not of very strong health, nevertheless she was well; whence it can also be gathered that in fact she had not been indiscreet by exercising penances beyond her strength. It is especially clear from the promptitude of her obedience; whence it is also gathered that she was moved not by a certain pursuit of singularity, but by a true desire of virtue.

To the third. Petronia indeed errs when she says that sanctity does not consist in exterior penitence, in order to contemn it. For although sanctity essentially and formally is not in this exterior penitence and mortification, nevertheless it consists in it instrumentally; since several other virtues themselves also do not essentially constitute sanctity; nevertheless they are most valid means and instruments for acquiring sanctity. St. Thomas, Quodl. 4, a. 24. She likewise errs when she affirms that Macrina tempts God. For then Macrina would have tempted God, when Macrina, seeing, for example, that she was being weakened in her powers by those exterior austerities, had still persevered in that manner of acting, for the sake of making trial of the goodness and power of God, expecting from him that she be preserved unharmed. And in such a case she would have sinned not only against the first precept of the Decalogue, but also against the fifth precept, if by acting thus she had exposed herself to grave danger of life, without any necessity or proportionate utility, but only from the rash inclination of her own will. Wherefore Petronia gravely errs when she affirms a grave sin.

Besides, Petronia, in this matter, interferes with the office proper to the confessor, contrary to the Decree of the S. C. EE. and RR., 17 Dec. 1890. For spiritual direction properly pertains to the confessor, which by its nature also embraces the exercise of these penances. Hence, according to the present practice of the Sacred Congregation, for private penances of this sort, which are in no way public, nothing is required except the approval and permission of the confessor; but for those which would in some way be public, the approval also of the superior is required, for preserving the right order of the whole Community.

But in granting or denying exterior penances of this sort, due discretion and prudence must be preserved. "For there are some directors so imprudent that they seem to place every progress of the soul in burdening it with fasts, hairshirts, bloody disciplines, burnings, and similar things. But others seem altogether to reprove external mortifications, as useless for spiritual progress, placing all perfection in interior mortification. But these also err, as the first do, because bodily mortifications aid internal ones, and are in some way necessary, when they can be exercised, for restraining the senses; and therefore we read that they were practiced more or less by all the Saints.... To assert absolutely: External mortifications profit nothing, or little, is the greatest error." St. Alph., H. A., last treatise, App. 1, n. 23. Cf. this whole number and the following ones.

283. • Tempting God is a saying or deed by which someone explores whether God is powerful, wise, merciful, or endowed with another perfection. - Thus the common opinion with St. Thom. 2. 2. q. 97. art. 1.

But it proceeds from a twofold vice, namely either from infidelity, when someone, doubting concerning some perfection of God, says or does something with the intention of obtaining from God a manifestation of that perfection; or from mere presumption, when someone, doubting nothing concerning the perfections of God, without necessity wishes to obtain either a manifestation of the divine will, or special help of God through prodigies ¹.

¹ Certain persons call tempting God arising from infidelity tempting strictly so called; but that arising from mere presumption they call less strictly so called. Others call the former express and formal; but the latter virtual and interpretative. Yet this does not please others; because express temptation does not always proceed from doubt concerning the attributes of God, but can arise from levity, curiosity, imprudent confidence, etc.

It is certain that formal express tempting of God is always a mortal sin against Religion ². - But if it is only implicit, often on account of ignorance, inadvertence, or smallness of matter it can be venial ³. - St. Lig. n. 29., etc.

² Understand this concerning that tempting of God in which doubt concerning the divine perfections intervenes. For smallness of matter has no place in a deliberate doubt against faith. Nor nevertheless ought the sin against faith to be confused with the guilt of tempting God, which formally, on account of irreverence toward God, pertains to irreligiosity. But in this act there is present a twofold sin diverse in species: one against faith, the other against religion. For the rest, if revelation has not been sufficiently proposed to someone, it can happen that without sin a sign is asked from God for exploring the truth. See Suarez, De Relig. Tr. 3. Lib. 1. Cap. 2. n. 9.

³ Formal tempting of God differs from interpretative not only because the latter admits smallness of matter, but the former in no way (for as regards lightness of fault on account of imperfection of the act, that is common to both); but besides, as Suarez warns, the mode of sin in interpretative tempting is far different from formal tempting of God; for formal tempting proceeds from doubt concerning the attributes of God, but interpretative, on the contrary, from too much confidence; the former besides is an exploration of divine perfection, the latter is in no way an exploration, but reductively and implicitly is rather a certain imprudent and presumptuous imploration of divine help. Wherefore Suarez concludes that these two seem to him to be distinguished even by specific malice.

Resolves. - 1º He sins gravely against Religion who asks that his innocence be proved by a duel, by glowing iron, etc. ⁴, or who voluntarily offers himself for martyrdom, unless he is excused by good faith or divine inspiration.

⁴ When someone rashly exposes himself to grave danger, imprudently presuming on divine help, he sins in two ways, namely against the virtue of religion and against the fifth precept, as is said in the following resolution. See Less. lib. 2. C. 45. n. 4.

Yet it is lawful to ask from God a miracle under the condition, if it shall have pleased him, whenever there is present a grave cause for our salvation or that of others, or for fulfilling the divine will, or (as St. Thom. 2. 2. q. 97. a. 2. says) when there is underneath a just necessity or pious utility, and the other things which ought to concur for this; for then it is not to tempt God, but to ask earnestly for God's help at an opportune time.

2º Likewise he sins gravely who without a just cause exposes himself to the danger of death, because he expects divine help; but if he only acts rashly, without certainly trusting in divine Providence, he does not sin against religion, but only against the fifth precept of the Decalogue.

3º He sins only lightly who in a slight illness, remedies having been rejected, hopes for health from God; because there is no grave disorder there. Indeed he is excused from every fault if he hopes that, God helping, he will naturally be freed from such an illness. - St. Lig. n. 3. ⁵.

⁵ St. Alphonsus (h. l.) attributes to Cajetan, Valentia, Lessius, Sayrus, and

Busembaum, that they said that there is a light fault if someone in a light matter and without danger of grave harm were to tempt God from mere curiosity of seeing some supernatural work. But in fact those authors have nothing of this kind; and Busembaum, in St. Alphonsus himself (ibid. n. 29), teaches the opposite with Lessius. But the fallacy of the citations in this passage of St. Alphonsus flowed, as often elsewhere, from the Salmanticenses (Tract. 21. Cap. 12. n. 4).

** If ever at another time, certainly on the occasion of this Note the VV. show themselves vehemently moved; and against those six lines they set up the mass of eight columns (Pag. 187-190). But rather than follow them running about here and there, it will be useful simply to set forth the state of the question, and the manner in which St. Alphonsus treats it.

The resolution of Fr. Gury, as is evident, regards interpretative tempting of God; and St. Alphonsus also treats of interpretative tempting (Lib. 3. n. 30), whose words are these: But this is the question, whether in INTERPRETATIVE tempting of God, as above, there is smallness of matter. Busembaum affirms with Cajetan and Valentia in 2. 2. D. 6. q. 14. n. 2. (Correct: Punct. 2), Lessius Lib. 2. C. 45. n. 4, Sayrus Clav. Reg. Lib. 6. (Correct: Lib. 4) c. 7. n. 14, and Toletus Lib. 4. c. 19. n. 7. These say that if someone in a light matter and without danger of grave harm were to tempt God from the mere curiosity of looking upon some supernatural work, he would sin only venially. But Sanchez more probably, Dec. Lib. 2. c. 34. n. 5, Suarez De Relig. Tom. 1. Tr. 3. c. 3. (Correct: c. 2) n. 16, condemn him of mortal sin, unless he were excused by reason of ignorance or lack of deliberation. Thus far the text of St. Alphonsus, from which the words were taken in the Note described above.

But who does not see that the question is indeed proposed by the Holy Doctor concerning material and interpretative tempting, but that then a case is added which pertains to formal tempting, such as belongs to one seeking to see a supernatural work for the sake of curiosity? And hence is the true cause of the whole confusion. For Busembaum, immediately before the words of St. Alphonsus (Lib. 3. n. 29 in fin.), was indeed saying that the fault can be light because of the smallness of the danger; but he was dealing expressly with interpretative tempting, nor does he have anything about curiosity for seeing a supernatural work, and with due right he cites Toletus, Sayrus, and Cajetan for his purpose. Likewise Valentia (l. c.): It happens that it is venial, if it is material and interpretative tempting, ... unless someone were to expose himself to the greatest danger. But about the curiosity of seeing supernatural works he has nothing at all. So also Sayrus (l. c.): Sometimes, however, it will be only venial, if it is material and interpretative tempting... unless someone were to expose himself to the greatest danger. But nothing occurs there about the aforesaid curiosity. But if Lessius (l. c.) and Toletus (l. c.) introduce mention of him who seeks something supernatural from curiosity, they refer that not to interpretative, but to formal tempting; but when they treat of interpretative tempting, they think the same as Busembaum, and they mix in nothing about the curiosity of seeing supernatural things. Therefore those Doctors are less to the point when cited there by St. Alphonsus.

The VV. take it ill (Pag. 188) that citations derived by St. Alphonsus from the Salmanticenses are sometimes said to be so. - Resp. Not only the citations in this place, but also, what is more to be regretted, St. Alphonsus took the form of the disputation from them. The excellent exploit of the Salmanticenses was this: after they had set forth beforehand (Tr. 21. c. 12. n. 2) the notions of temptation, both formal and interpretative, when afterward inquiring what kind of sin it is (ibid. n. 3. 4), they would distinguish nothing between formal and interpretative. Indeed, when they proposed the example common among the Doctors concerning interpretative temptation, namely of a man who, in a light illness, rejects medicines, trusting that he will obtain health from God, yet not expressly asking for a miraculous cure, or if he prays badly and irreverently, hopes that he will obtain those things which others commonly are wont to obtain, they altogether wish to look into that man, so that they may condemn him of grave fault, vain curiosity of seeing a miracle, and therefore they expressly exhibit him as dealing with God as with a juggler. Hence the true origin of whatever confusion there is also in St. Alphonsus. If the VV. desire a clearer argument of this origin, let them go to St. Alphonsus' edition of the year 1748, where the Holy Doctor speaks thus of this controversy (Lib. 3. Tr. 1. C. 2. Dub. 1. not. A): The question is whether smallness of matter is found in tempting God from lightness of matter? e.g., if in a light illness you reject medicines, expecting health from God, yet not expressly asking for a miracle, and similar things? Toletus, Bonacina, Sayrus, Valentia, AMONG THE SALMANTICENSES Tr. 21. c. 12. n. 3. (correct: 4), affirm. But the SALMANTICENSES deny, as more probable, with Suarez and Palaus. Does not the nucleus here plainly appear, excerpted literally from the Salmanticenses? Nevertheless, already from the edition of the year 1757, as to the case thus proposed, the Holy Doctor had withdrawn from this anomalous opinion of the Salmanticenses. It would also have been desirable that he should discuss interpretative tempting on his own account, and should leave the Salmanticenses to themselves, who in that confusion oppose Sanchez also to Busembaum, although Sanchez, concerning the same case no otherwise than Busembaum, writes (Dec. Lib. 2. c. 34. n. 5 in fin.): Yet it must be confessed that sometimes the matter and danger can be so slight that the fault is venial, as Leonardus (Lessius) well teaches, whose example I set down, as, in a light illness, to be unwilling to use medicines, vainly hoping for health from God, without asking for a miracle. But Suarez, whom St. Alphonsus after the Salmanticenses opposes together with Sanchez, deals not with interpretative, but with formal tempting; and indeed the fact that this second head was cited by St. Alphonsus, and that chapter 3 was written erroneously in his text, is manifest from this, that § 16 is seen precisely in the second chapter, and not in chapter 3, since this has only ten sections.

4. Likewise he sins per se venially who, from negligence, comes unprepared to preach the word of God, hoping for special help from God.

925. 1. Notion. The tempting of God is a saying or deed by which, without a just cause, we rashly expect from God some unusual effect.

For to tempt is to take an experiment concerning someone; this is done by words, deeds, or the omission of some deed. By words we tempt God when we rashly ask something from Him with the intention of testing His knowledge, power, or goodness; by deeds, by doing something with the intention of testing the divine attributes, for example if someone casts himself from a high tower, wishing to try whether God wills to save him or not; by omission of some deed, namely by omitting those things which prudence demands for obtaining the intended effect, for example by rejecting all medicines in a grave illness, or by giving a sermon without any preparation, rashly expecting that thoughts and words are to be suggested to him divinely.

926. The tempting of God arises especially from a threefold cause: (a) from unbelief, when someone truly doubts concerning some perfection of God; for example when the Jews said to the Crucified:⁹ "If Thou be the Son of God, come down from the cross"; or when the impious say: if God exists, now is the time for Him to show His power by killing me; (b) from rashness or curiosity, if someone, not doubting concerning the power of God, wishes to test whether He wills to do it, for example if someone, firmly holding the real presence of Christ under the eucharistic species, nevertheless asks that the divine Infant appear in the consecrated host; (c) from presumption, if someone, although not wishing to test the power or goodness of God, indubitably expects from Him, without sufficient reason, some miracle, for example if one gravely sick rejects a physician, expecting healing from God, or if a priest, in order to convert sinners and unbelievers, promises to perform some miracle (the case of special inspiration being excluded).

⁹ Matt. 27:40.

But the tempting of God is not given in these or similar cases: if in a grave matter, after ordinary means for knowing the will of God have been applied, and doubt remaining, some sign is humbly sought by which the will of God may become known; or if, from a just and grave cause, a miracle is conditionally asked; if someone, in view of a great good, exposes himself to grave danger, hoping that God will be favorable to him: for then, on account of the grave reason, divine help is deservedly hoped for.

927. 2. Malice. (A) The tempting of God which involves unbelief is a mortal sin from its whole genus, since it calls some truth of faith into doubt, and otherwise imports contempt of God, by testing His power or goodness without reason.

(B) The tempting of God arising from rashness, curiosity, or presumption is a sin grave from its genus, because it supposes some contempt of God; but it often admits smallness of matter, on account of the smallness of the danger to which the agent exposes himself, for example if in a light illness someone rejects medicine; it is also often excused from mortal sin on account of ignorance, inconsideration, good faith, etc.

In practice, in order to avoid a sin of this kind, it must be inculcated upon the faithful that God helps those who strenuously and unceasingly exercise their own powers, and at the same time humbly and confidently implore divine help. Therefore let us act with all our strength, using means both natural and supernatural, and place our whole hope in God: He will provide.

928. 3. Corollary. From this it follows that, the case of divine inspiration being excluded, those trials which formerly were called judgments of God are by no means to be approved, as passage through fire for proving the innocence of someone: for then a miracle is asked without necessity. Formerly indeed they had been used in good faith; but afterward they were prohibited by canon law, and deservedly indeed, since there are other means of detecting truth.¹⁰

¹⁰ Vacandard, Etudes de critique, Paris, 1905, ch. 4.

What it is to tempt God. 1. The reverence owed to God requires that we have recourse to the special help of God and to His attributes modestly, discreetly, and humbly. To will that He should exhibit Himself as if on a stage is gravely injurious to God. Whoever, therefore, without cause, asks for the intervention of God commits this malice. Therefore the proper ratio of tempting God is in the rash demand for divine intervention. To this malice there can be added a sin against faith and hope, if someone, as if doubting, formally wishes to explore the divine truth or attribute, and thus thinks of tempting God more strictly, or of proving Him by experience.

Various concepts. Theologians do not all conceive tempting God in the same way. For some it is rash exploration of the divine perfection; for others, however, rash exploration of the divine good pleasure. They distinguish express temptation, which intends exploration, and interpretative temptation, which lies hidden in the manner of acting. Each is formal when, whether doubting or not, someone with conscious rashness asks that God come to his aid or manifest Himself.

Who are guilty of tempting God. He tempts God who, without a special divine instinct, absolutely wills or promises a miracle; or who, without sufficient cause, wills a miracle conditionally, if it please God, as if someone offers a miracle to prove the truth of faith; if someone, in a slight matter, or when other means are at hand, asks for a miraculous sign. The former will of itself be a mortal sin; the latter in practice will generally be excused from grave sin by some simplicity and slight insistence.

Common use. In common speech he is said to tempt God who rashly exposes his health, who preaches or teaches without preparation, insofar as he seems to demand an undue divine help. But this is rather presumption, which is opposed to another precept, for example the fifth. For where expectation of divine help is lacking, temptation of God is necessarily absent. - The gravity of the guilt must be judged from the importance of the foreseen harm.

575. DEFINITION. Tempting God is a word or deed directed to taking experiment concerning God through an extraordinary effect rashly expected from him.

We say: 1. Through an effect expected, because temptation requires that, by desire and intention, divine help be at least tacitly implored. 2. Rashly, that is, without just cause; for if a grave cause is added, namely necessity, or pious utility, or divine inspiration, humbly to ask such an effect will not be to tempt God, but rather to honor him by an act of confidence (III, 29 and 31).

DIVISION. Tempting God, by reason of the perfection of the act, but not by reason of species, is twofold: 1. Formal (or explicit), when someone, expressly doubting concerning some perfection of God, wishes to try it: for example if someone from

from a tower casts himself down headlong, that he may test whether God is merciful and powerful, by preserving him immune from injury. 2. Interpretative (or implicit), when someone, even if he does not expressly intend to tempt God, nevertheless asks or does that which of its own nature seems to be referred to this: as if someone commits himself to a danger from which either in no way, or scarcely, he can be rescued unless miraculously; or if he omits natural means, hoping for the effect from God alone (III, 29, 32; cf. H. Ap., IV, 38).

576. PRINCIPLES. I. Formal tempting of God is a mortal sin from its whole genus. For it includes doubt concerning the divine perfections, which redounds to grave contempt of God; indeed it has the malice of heresy, if the doubt is positive; or at least it deals with God too curiously, as with a juggler: which is a great irreverence toward God (III, 29, 1).

II. Interpretative tempting of God is a mortal sin from its genus. The reason is that he who thus tempts God also denies him, of itself, reverence and due subjection. Yet it can happen that the disorder in one expecting the help of God without a just cause is not grave. This is established from those words (Ecclus., 18, 23): Before prayer prepare thy soul: and be not as a man that tempteth God. For thus one praying is considered to wish to test whether God also can and will assist one praying badly: which nevertheless the Doctors commonly judge to be only venial, on account of lightness of matter.

Many authors also teach this, that if someone, in a light matter and without danger of grave harm, should tempt God from mere curiosity of seeing some supernatural work, he likewise would sin only venially (cf. III, 30; ed. G., I, p. 389).

577. From these things you will resolve: 1. He sins gravely who absolutely asks from God, or offers, a miracle for the conversion of heretics, since the testimonies of our faith suffice. But otherwise, if he asks under the condition if it shall please God, on account of grave utility, for his own or others' salvation, or for fulfilling the divine will.

2. Likewise he sins who without just cause offers himself to martyrdom, to danger of death or mutilation. Otherwise, in a case of necessity, for example if otherwise the faith or the salvation of many would be endangered, or for avoiding blasphemies; and in a case of utility, for exalting the faith or promoting the glory of God.

3. He sins only lightly who, in a light illness, the remedies having been rejected, hopes for health from God; because there is not grave disorder there. Indeed, he is excused from every fault, if he hopes that he will be freed from a light illness of this sort without remedies, naturally, with God assisting (H. Ap., IV, n. 38).

4. A priest sins venially who, outside a case of necessity, wishes to preach without preparation, trusting in the help of God (III, 32); but he does not sin who, trusting in good fortune, subjects himself to an examination; because he expects nothing from God.

345. • Temptation of God is a word or deed for taking an experiment about God through an extraordinary effect rashly expected from Him. - Thus the common doctrine with St. Thom.³

But it proceeds from a twofold vice, namely either from infidelity, when someone doubting about some perfection of God says or does something with the mind of obtaining from God a manifestation of that perfection, and this is called formal or express; or from mere presumption, when someone, doubting nothing about the perfections of God, without necessity wills to obtain either the manifestation of the divine will or special help of God through wonders, and this is called implicit or interpretative.

It is certain that formal or express temptation of God is always a mortal sin against Religion. - But if it is only implicit, often because of ignorance or inadvertence it can be venial, although of itself it is more probably mortal.¹

You will resolve. - 1° Those formerly sinned gravely against Religion who demanded that their innocence be proved by duel, by burning iron, etc., or who without a just cause freely offered themselves to martyrdom, unless they were excused by good faith or divine inspiration. - Nevertheless it is licit to ask from God a miracle under the condition, if it has pleased Him, as often as there is a grave cause for our own or others' salvation, or for fulfilling the divine will, or, as St. Thom.² says, when there underlies a just necessity or pious utility and the other things which ought to concur for this. For then it is not to tempt God, but to request the help of God at an opportune time.

2° Likewise he sins gravely who, without a just cause, exposes himself to danger of death because he expects divine help; but if he acts only rashly, without certainly trusting in divine Providence, he does not sin against Religion, but only against the fifth precept of the Decalogue.

3° He sins only lightly who in a light illness, with remedies rejected, hopes for health from God; because there is not a grave disorder there. Indeed he is excused from all fault if he hopes that he will be freed naturally from such an illness with God's help.³

4° Likewise he sins of himself venially who from negligence approaches unprepared to preaching the word of God, hoping for special help from God.

526. Preliminary note. Thus far there has been discussion of sins against religion by excess; now irreligion strictly so called must be treated, which is opposed to religion by defect, insofar as from its own nature it contains something contrary to divine worship, namely, irreverence and contumely. Certainly superstition and its species also inflict irreverence upon God, but not so immediately and directly as irreligion strictly so called, which is directed immediately either against God Himself or against sacred things (at least if one excepts idolatry). Against God are temptation and blasphemy; against sacred things are sacrilege and simony. Each must be treated separately.

527. Notion. The tempting of God is a word or deed by which someone explores whether God has or exercises some perfection, for example, knowledge, power, or mercy.⁸⁰² Therefore, to tempt God is nothing other than to make a trial, without sufficient cause, of some divine attribute, or to expect an unusual manifestation of God.

Division. The tempting of God is distinguished as formal (express, explicit) and virtual (interpretative).

The former is present if someone, through those things which he does or says, expressly intends to explore some perfection of God or His will. In this sense we read concerning the Israelites: "They tempted the Lord, saying: Is the Lord among us or not?"⁸⁰³ And in the Psalms it is said: "They tempted God in their hearts, ... can God furnish a table in the desert?"⁸⁰⁴ Such formal temptation is also present if someone, doubting God's power, asks a miracle from Him; or if someone casts himself into a well with the intention of testing whether God wills to save him miraculously.

The latter temptation is present when someone does not indeed directly intend to make a trial of God, but nevertheless does or omits something useful for nothing else than proving either God's power or His goodness; as if someone does not indeed doubt God's power and goodness, but frivolously exposes himself to danger of death, hoping for God's miraculous assistance. The former temptation, namely, formal temptation, is accustomed to proceed from infidelity or at least from doubt concerning some perfection of God; the latter temptation, namely, virtual temptation, arises for the most part from presumption or excessive confidence. To explain the nature of this temptation, the Angelic Doctor writes:⁸⁰⁵ "He tempteth God as it were interpretatively who, although he does not intend to make trial of God, nevertheless asks or does something which is useful for nothing else than proving God's power or goodness or knowledge. Thus, when someone makes a horse run in order to escape enemies, this is not to make trial of the horse; but if he makes the horse run without any utility, this seems to be nothing other than to make trial of the horse's speed. Therefore, when someone for some necessity or utility commits himself to divine assistance in his petitions or deeds, this is not to tempt God; for it is said: 'Since we know not what we ought to do, we have only this left, that we direct our eyes to thee.'⁸⁰⁶ But when this is done without utility and necessity, this is to tempt God interpretatively."

⁸⁰² Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 97, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 29.

⁸⁰³ Ex. 17:7; cf. Heb. 3:9.

⁸⁰⁴ Ps. 77:18ff.

⁸⁰⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 97, a. 1.

⁸⁰⁶ 2 Chron. 20:12.

528. Moral malice. Formal temptation of God is a mortal sin in its whole genus; interpretative temptation, however, is a mortal sin from its genus.

Explanation. Formal temptation includes a twofold grave sin, namely, of infidelity and of grave irreligion; for it supposes at least a doubt concerning some perfection of God, and then expects God miraculously to produce a vain and useless effect, which certainly is very irreverent toward His majesty. Hence Christ also indignantly responded to the devil asking a miracle: "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God."⁸⁰⁷

Interpretative temptation also is directly contrary to the virtue of religion and therefore is a mortal sin from its genus. Added to this is that it is often joined with a grave injury to charity toward oneself, as if someone casts himself into a well with danger to his life, hoping for miraculous salvation. For the most part, however, such interpretative temptation is only a light sin, because only light matter and a light danger are involved. Hence, for example, one sins lightly who in a light illness refuses to take medicine and expects health from God. Whether a cleric sins gravely who through negligence approaches the pulpit wholly unprepared, hoping for special assistance from God, is to be weighed not only from the tempting of God committed, but especially from the scandal which sermons of this kind, not prepared, are accustomed to cause if the hearers perceive the negligence of the sacred orator.

⁸⁰⁷ Matt. 4:7.

S. Th. II-II, q. 97.

791. Sinful tempting of God (beproeving of proefstelling Gods) is a saying or deed by which someone rashly makes trial of God, so that something may be known concerning Him, or by which rashly and without utility he demands the intervention of God.

It is twofold:

1. Formal, when someone by express intention explores something in God and, by doubting, intends to prove either a) an absolute attribute (power, knowledge, goodness), and this is tempting strictly so called; or b) a relative attribute, namely, His good pleasure toward a creature, or His free operation, and this is less strict.

Examples are: to expose someone to beasts to see whether God can or wills to deliver him; not to cultivate a field as an experiment of God's providence toward oneself; to ask that Christ appear in the Eucharist, to see whether He is present or whether He wills to manifest His presence.

2. Interpretative or material, when someone intends to make no proof, but asks or does something which can be useful for nothing except for making an experiment concerning God. "As when someone makes a horse run in order to escape enemies, this is not to make an experiment concerning the horse; but if he makes a horse run without any utility, this seems to be nothing other than to make an experiment concerning the horse's speed." Thus he who rashly rejects ordinary means, or without cause puts himself into dangers, implicitly asks special or miraculous aid from God, and interpretatively tempts God.

Such were formerly the judgments of God; in such a way acts he who rejects medicine and asks health from God; or an unlearned cleric who, wishing to preach without preparation, hopes for thoughts from God; likewise he who exposes himself to danger of death or mutilation for bearing martyrdom without a just cause (a. 1).

792. Sinful tempting of God is a mortal sin from its genus. - It is proved:

a) From Scripture: Deut. VI, 16 together with Ex. XVII, 7; Ps. LXXVII, 18, 19, 56; Mt. IV, 7.

b) By reason: One tempting arises from doubt in a matter of faith and therefore is supremely injurious to God, and is always mortal (Mt. XXVII, 40); another arises from vain curiosity or presumption and temerity, and this provokes God to show His power uselessly or to foster curiosity; which is very injurious to God and therefore of itself mortal.

Yet often it will be venial because of imperfection of the act, even sometimes because of lightness of matter, that is, because of smallness of aid or danger, as if someone by excessive confidence expects a special aid of God but not a miraculous one. Thus if someone not prepared for praying hopes to obtain ordinary things, or if in a light illness he hopes for health without remedies and without a miracle (a. 2 and 3, and ad 2).

It is a sin against religion, because it includes irreverence toward God.

The various modes of tempting God seem to be of one species under the account of tempting; but they always have diverse adjoined sins of infidelity, curiosity, or presumption, and often sins against charity toward oneself or another, on account of which those circumstances must be declared in confession.

793. Corollaries. - A. The tempting of God is not sinful if someone, with due reverence and submission,

a) asks from God a special sign, while he inculpably doubts concerning a divine attribute, or a truth of faith, or divine goodness;

b) or from just necessity asks a sign for the instruction of others, for convincing infidels and confirming the faithful (a. 1, ad 2; a. 2);

c) or asks the manifestation of the divine good pleasure, when he altogether needs such knowledge and cannot gather it from elsewhere (a. 2, ad 3).

B. On the contrary, he who rashly seeks danger or rejects ordinary means, but expects no special aid from God and only commits himself to fortune, does not tempt God, although he sins. Thus one preaching or undergoing an examination without being prepared, or exposing his life without reason.

794. Observation. - Superstition is graver, other things being equal, than tempting God. For "in sins which are opposed to religion, something is so much the graver, the more it is opposed to divine reverence. But that someone doubt concerning divine excellence is less opposed to this than that he think the contrary with certitude. For just as he who is confirmed in error is more an unbeliever than he who doubts concerning the truth of faith, so also he who by his deed protests an error against divine excellence acts more against reverence for God than he who protests doubt. But the superstitious man protests error... But he who tempts God by words or deeds protests doubt concerning divine excellence... And therefore the sin of superstition is graver than the sin of tempting God" (a. 4).

Tempting God is a saying or deed by which someone explores whether God is powerful, wise, merciful, or endowed with another perfection. - But it proceeds from a twofold vice, namely either from infidelity, when someone, doubting concerning some perfection of God, says or does something with the intention of obtaining from God a manifestation of that perfection; or from mere presumption, when someone, doubting nothing concerning the perfections of God, without necessity wishes to obtain either a manifestation of the divine will or special help of God through prodigies. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 97, art. 1.

The temptation of God is distinguished into formal or express, and virtual or interpretative. The former is had when the manifestation of divine perfections is directly intended, and this for the most part arises from infidelity, although it can also proceed from mere curiosity or presumption. But the latter is that by which a manifestation or exploration of this kind is not properly intended, but something is said or done which, with the circumstances considered, of its own nature seems to be referred to it. Thus he interpretatively tempts God who in a dangerous illness rejects all remedies, wishing to be healed by God alone.

I Say. Express temptation of God, if it proceeds from infidelity, is a mortal sin from its whole genus; but if it proceeds from curiosity or imprudent confidence, it is indeed mortal, but not from its whole genus. The reason of the first is that then there are properly two sins, one against the virtue of religion, and the other against faith, which does not admit smallness of matter. But the reason of the second is taken not only from the general doctrine that sins against religion alone are indeed mortal, but can become light by reason of matter, but also from this, that in that case properly there is not had an exploration of some divine perfection, but rather a presumptuous imploration of divine help, which certainly admits smallness of matter. But a fortiori smallness of matter must be admitted in interpretative temptation of God. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 29 and following. - Baller., note (a) and (b), p. 255. - Hence:

1st. He sins gravely against religion who demands that his innocence be proved by duel, glowing iron, etc., or who offers himself spontaneously for martyrdom, unless he is excused by good faith or divine inspiration. Yet it is licit to ask a miracle from God under condition, if it shall have pleased him, whenever a grave cause is present for our salvation or that of others, or for fulfilling the divine will; for then it is not to tempt God, but to demand the help of God at an opportune time. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 97, art. 2.

2nd. Likewise he sins gravely who without just cause exposes himself to danger of death because he expects divine help; but if he acts only rashly, without trusting certainly in divine Providence, he does not sin against religion, but only against the fifth precept of the Decalogue.

3rd. He sins only lightly who in a light illness, having rejected remedies, hopes for health from God; because there is not a grave disorder there. Indeed he is excused from every fault if he hopes to be freed naturally from such an illness, with God's help. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 30.

I. Theologians give this definition of tempting God: it is an inordinate test, or experiment, of some divine perfection, by word or by deed. This word "inordinate" distinguishes lawful from unlawful temptation. For if this experiment, or test, is inordinate — that is, made without necessity — it is unlawful and irreverent toward God; but if it is ordinate, it is lawful. It is considered ordinate, either if a just cause presses; or if it proceeds from a divine instinct, for the honor and benefit of the Church. In this manner Abraham, Gideon, Elijah, and several other Israelites tempted God. St. Thomas (II-II, q. 97, art. 1) defines temptation absolutely in these words: "To tempt is to take a trial of some quality in the one tempted. This trial, however, is taken by both words and deeds: by words, as when we ask whether he knows a thing, or whether he can, or wills, to do it; by deeds, as when, by what we do, we test another's prudence, will, or power. Each of these, moreover, can occur in two ways: in one way, openly, as when someone professes to be tempting, as Samson (Judges 15) proposed a riddle to those he wished to test; in another way, secretly — as the Pharisees tempted Christ, as is read (Matt. 22)." It is added in the definition, "of some divine perfection," because whenever God is tempted, it is always to test some attribute of his — either his mercy, or his justice, or his omnipotence — which men who wish to test one of these divine attributes are in need of; and this occurs by words, or by deeds.

II. From St. Thomas's teaching it is gathered that this temptation is twofold: explicit, and tacit, or interpretive. The explicit kind expressly intends to test one of God's attributes — as when someone throws himself headlong from a window with this very intention, testing whether God will wish to deliver him, and preserve him from harm. This person tempts God expressly. The interpretive kind is when someone does not intend to make a trial of any attribute of God, yet acts in such a way that he really does tempt God nonetheless. The same must be said of one who exposes himself, without necessity, to manifest and evident danger, hoping that he will be delivered by God. Hence the Angelic Doctor concludes: "When, therefore, someone, on account of some necessity or usefulness, seeks a trial of divine aid, by words or by deeds, without a lack of due reverence — this is not tempting God, especially since such a trial proceeds from divine instinct." This is said in 2 Chronicles 20: "As we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to thee." But when someone exposes himself to grave and evident danger, without necessity, in order to test whether God will wish to preserve him, he sins both against charity toward himself, and against religion, tempting God. But if, without such expectation of preservation, but simply out of contempt of life, one acts, all such actions are, by their very kind, mortal sins. Man, indeed, would in that case wish to bind God to some attribute of his for a vain end, or so as to indulge the tempter's curiosity — all of which is unbecoming to the divine majesty.

III. This temptation of God is, by its very kind, a grave sin. The difficulty is this: whether this temptation of God is always a mortal sin when the deliberation and consent are complete.

IV. Question I. Is it a light fault to tempt God in a matter of slight consequence? Response: This depends on whether the temptation arises out of doubt, and thus carries with it the malice of heresy — for to doubt is grave. If it occurs without such doubt, it is nevertheless a grave sin. If, however, it arises from an imperfect deliberation, with only a slight consent, the temptation of God can be venial, when the matter concerning which God is tempted is itself trifling — as if, in a light illness, you refused medicine, hoping to be freed by God, or acting with a divided mind, hoping nonetheless to obtain from God what you ask. Some authors affirm that only a venial fault is committed in this case, since, they say, in such cases there does not appear to be a grave disruption of order, nor an injury to the divine majesty. But the more probable opinion is that this is always a grave fault: since the divine majesty is offended whenever God is tempted; and however slight or grave the matter for which one seeks to be freed, the divine majesty is injured by this very means — the temptation of God — always in the same way, however light or grave. So, then, the measure of gravity of the fault is not to be judged, more or less, from the natural triviality or gravity of the illness or affliction, but rather from the injury done to God's majesty, which is the same regardless. Let us set out this example more clearly, that it may seem lighter. You suffer from a slight illness; you reject every natural remedy, spurning all such help, and ask God to restore your health by a miracle. Do you not, then, wish God to work a miracle, to indulge your curiosity, and to expel a slight illness from you? Who does not see that you then tempt God more gravely than if you asked him to cure you of a mortal illness? For in this hypothesis you demand that God exercise his omnipotence in the most trifling of matters, working miraculous deeds. Whether the affliction, then, for which you ask, without any necessity, that God work a miracle to remove it — an affliction which could easily be removed by means provided by nature — be light or grave, you gravely tempt God, and gravely sin. This opinion is defended by Suárez (Vol. I, On Religion, tract. 3, Bk. 1, ch. 2, n. 16), Sánchez (Bk. II, ch. 34, n. 5), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 12, punct. 1, n. 4), and many others. Yet in practice this formal temptation of God scarcely occurs. For who, unless a fool, would wish God to work a miracle merely because he refuses customary remedies? But in practice, many spurn the use of medicine, especially in lighter illnesses, trusting in the divine physician, who is able, if he wills, to cure them without such means. They do not intend that God work miracles, but with a humble spirit hope that God will dispose things so that whatever happens will redound to his greater glory.

V. Question II. Does one tempt God who seeks to demonstrate his innocence by the trial of red-hot iron, or of boiling water? Response: The common opinion says yes, since natural means are available by which the truth can be made manifest — namely, the testimony of witnesses, or a spontaneous confession. Let us hear St. Thomas answer this question (II-II, q. 95, art. 8, ad 3): "The judgment by red-hot iron, or of boiling water, is indeed ordered toward the investigation of some hidden sin through something done by man; and insofar as some miraculous effect is expected from God, it agrees in this respect with the casting of lots. But such a judgment is rendered unlawful: both because it is directed toward judging hidden things, which are reserved to divine judgment, and also because such a judgment has not been sanctioned by divine authority. Whence, in the Decree of Pope Stephen V, it is said: 'The extortion of a confession from anyone by the trial of red-hot iron, or of boiling water, is not sanctioned by the sacred canons; nor is it to be presumed, since it has not been sanctioned by the teaching of the holy Fathers, being a superstitious invention. Public crimes, once a spontaneous confession or the testimony of witnesses has established them, having the fear of God before our eyes, are granted to our own governance to judge. But hidden and unknown things are to be left to him alone who knows the hearts of the sons of men.' The same reasoning seems to apply to the law concerning duels — except that it approaches more closely to the common reasoning of lots, insofar as no miraculous effect is expected there, except perhaps when the combatants are very unequal in strength or skill." All this is clear. Nor are the examples commonly adduced against it any obstacle — namely, that God prescribed (Num. 5) that an adulterous woman be tested by bitter waters; and that it is decreed (2, q. 5, ch. Saepe) that a monk suspected of theft is to be given the Eucharist, to be cleared by receiving it. As to the first example, the answer is clear: that this ceremonial precept concerning the trial of an adulterous woman was proven lawful because God himself so prescribed it; but that precept has since been abrogated. As to the second authority, St. Thomas responds (III Part, q. 80, art. 6, ad 3): "That decree has been abrogated by the contrary teaching of the Roman Pontiffs. For Pope Stephen says: 'Of red-hot iron,'" etc. And the same is held in the Extra, on purifications, ch. Ex tuarum: "In all such matters there appears to be a tempting of God. Whence they cannot be done without sin. And it would seem graver still, if in this sacrament, which was instituted as a remedy of salvation, someone should incur a judgment of death. Whence it is decreed that the body of Christ not be given to one suspected of a crime, by way of examination." If, at times, miracles have been seen in such trials, God worked them for the defense of the accused's innocence, the sin of temptation on the part of those men being permitted [but not the cause of the miracle].

VI. Question III. Does one who, in order to convert a heretic, asks God for a miracle in confirmation of Catholic truth, tempt God? Response: The common opinion affirms this, since such miracles are asked without necessity. For there are ready at hand the most splendid arguments by which the truth of the Catholic religion can be shown; and it is granted that such a request for miracles is, for the most part, useless. How many myriads of miracles did God not work in the deaths of the Martyrs, and yet tyrants and Jews, though beholding them with their own eyes, were not converted to the true religion! They saw Lazarus, four days dead, raised by Christ, and even sat at table with him afterward — yet they did not for that reason embrace the faith of Christ. If holy men have sometimes shown such miracles to heretics, they did so from a particular divine instinct. Nothing, however, prevents one, having employed the usual means — arguments both explicit and, in another respect, tacit — from also asking God, at times, for a miracle, should it seem good to God's glory that this be granted, and may it please him.

VII. Theologians dispute on both sides whether this temptation of God, when explicit, is a distinct sin from that committed when it is tacit — namely, whether explicit temptation and implicit temptation differ in species; for explicit temptation arises from a different cause than that from which implicit temptation arises. Suárez affirms this (Vol. I, On Religion, tract. 3, Bk. 1, ch. 3, n. 6). If it were true that a doubt concerning some divine attribute were involved in explicit temptation of God, it would undoubtedly differ in species from the interpretive kind, since the sin would then also be, in addition, against faith. It does not, however, seem that doubt concerning some divine attribute is so bound up with the temptation of God, such that God cannot be tempted without simultaneously doubting his omnipotence, justice, and so on. And so the contrary opinion teaches that, if the discussion concerns explicit temptation alone, it does not differ in species from the interpretive kind, but only adds a greater gravity of malice — since explicit temptation, properly speaking, does not differ from implicit. The theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 12, punct. 1) contend that this opinion is confirmed by the authority of St. Thomas (II-II, q. 95, art. 3, ad 1), where they wish the Angelic Doctor to teach that an explicit pact with a demon does not differ from an implicit one. But St. Thomas there rather teaches the contrary. Here are his words: "It must be said that in all the aforesaid cases the reason for sinning is generically the same, but not specifically the same. Many demons insinuate themselves, without being invoked, into certain actions men perform, whereby they render themselves worthy of being subject to such insinuation." From this teaching it follows that explicit and tacit temptation, or explicit and implicit pacts, agree in their general nature, but not in their specific character... That, however, this particular distinction reveals a difference of species is not, in our judgment, established by the aforesaid authors. It seems rather consistent with the other words added — namely, that the sin of tempting God is committed — without any indication of whether it was explicit or implicit temptation of God. For it is certain among all that explicit temptation of God is a considerably graver crime than the interpretive kind. The dispute, however, is whether this difference is specific or merely one of degree. Neither opinion is evident. It is safer, therefore, in confession, to follow the more grave opinion — the one I hold to be true — since aggravating circumstances within the same species are, in any case, to be disclosed in confession. For this reason, everyone is bound to disclose, in sacramental confession, both an explicit or implicit pact, and an explicit or interpretive temptation of God.

I. Question I. What is the temptation of God? Answer. It is a disordered proof, or experiment, of some divine perfection, by words or deeds. The word disordered distinguishes licit temptation from illicit. It is licit when, urgent necessity pressing, it is done by God's instinct — as when Abraham, Gideon, Elias, and several other holy men obtained a pledge that God would be propitious to them in arduous trials. But it is illicit and disordered when, without necessity and from mere caprice, an experiment is made of some divine perfection — of justice, of mercy, of omnipotence. This temptation is twofold: express, as when someone throws himself headlong from a window with the intention of testing whether God is willing to free him. The other is tacit, and interpretative, when someone acts in such a way that from the deed it is gathered that he wills to tempt God. By this reasoning, he tempts God who, without necessity, exposes himself to grave danger, hoping to be freed by God. When someone tempts God with deliberate mind, it is a grave fault; if with a half-deliberate mind, for the most part light.

II. Question II. Does he tempt God who contends to manifest his innocence by the proof of hot iron or boiling water? Answer. The true and common opinion affirms it. For natural means are at hand by which innocence can be manifested — namely spontaneous confession, and the proof of witnesses — as St. Thomas proves, II-II, q. 95, art. 8, ad 3. The examples of the adulterous woman to be tested by bitter waters, as is had in Numbers 5, and of the Monk suspected of theft, commanded to manifest his innocence by receiving the Eucharist, as is established in the chapter Saepe, question 2, cause 5, are of no weight. For the precept concerning the adulterous woman was ceremonial, which has been abrogated. To the second authority St. Thomas answers, III, q. 80, art. 6, ad 3, that those decrees have been abrogated by the contrary documents of the Roman Pontiffs. For Pope Stephen says: "of hot iron," etc., and the same is had extra, On purgations, chapter Ex tuarum: "For in all such things there seems to be a temptation of God. Whence they cannot be done without sin." That if miracles were sometimes seen in these proofs, God worked them for the defense of the innocence of the accused, the sin being permitted in the men making the trial.

III. He who offers a miracle to be worked by God, that he may convert a Heretic, tempts God: because there are readily available most luminous arguments of truth by which the catholic Religion can be confirmed. That if holy men have sometimes shown these miracles to Heretics, this happened by a singular instinct of God. Nothing, however, forbids that with humble obedience and due submission such miracles sometimes be sought from God.

IV. Question III. What is sacrilege, and of how many kinds? Answer. Sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing. A thing is called sacred which is deputed to divine worship. And therefore everything that pertains to irreverence toward sacred things pertains to injury against God, and has the character of sacrilege, says the Angelic Doctor, II-II, q. 99, art. 1.

V. St. Thomas distinguishes a threefold sacrilege, in the same place, article 3. The first is an injury inflicted upon a sacred person, such as a Cleric, a Monk, a Nun, or fornication with a person bound by a vow of chastity. The second regards a sacred place, such as a Church or a Cemetery. The third is committed against sacred things, singularly dedicated to divine worship, such as the sacraments, chalices, vestments destined for the performance of sacred rites, images of the Saints, relics, etc.

VI. The first sacrilege against sacred persons can be committed in four ways: 1. If such sacred persons are forcibly detained and struck. 2. If they are brought before a lay tribunal. 3. If, without legitimate authority, tributes and taxes are imposed upon them...

upon them. 4. If fornication or unchastity is committed with persons bound by a vow of chastity. To this species of sacrilege is also reduced unchastity committed by a Confessor with a spiritual daughter.

VII. The second species of sacrilege is committed in many ways as well. 1. If someone burns, breaks, or tears down a sacred place, or demolishes altars. 2. If, from a Church even threatening ruin, or polluted, or interdicted, and from its cemeteries, courtyards, cloister, and any place not separated from it — likewise from Oratories founded by legitimate authority, from Bishops' palaces, from the Convents of Regulars and their enclosed precincts — someone forcibly drags out a man. 3. If someone kills a man there, or forcibly sheds human blood there; if someone commits voluntary pollution, either openly or secretly. 4. If someone conducts trade and markets in a Church, opens banquets, games, shameful conversations, and theatrical scenes. 5. If someone steals in a Church a sacred thing from a sacred place, or a non-sacred thing from a sacred place, or a sacred thing from a non-sacred place.

VIII. The third species is real sacrilege, by which a sacred thing is treated unworthily. Sacred things are distinguished into four classes, as it were. 1. There come the sacraments. 2. Sacred vessels, sacred images, the relics of Saints. 3. The ornaments of the Church, or of the Ministers, such as chasubles, veils, and other things of this kind. 4. Movable or immovable goods deputed to the sustenance of ministers, such as Tithes, First-fruits, etc.

IX. To this too are referred the abuses of the words of sacred Scripture. Those who twist sacred words to spread heresies, who mix them into profane sermons, or abuse them to compose scurrilous pamphlets, or to express profane things, are sacrilegious, as is had in the Council of Trent, session 4.

X. Sacrilege can also be committed by omission. Guilty of this sacrilege are sacristans who neglect to guard, with due vigilance, the sacred chrisms and the Eucharist, with locks applied according to the prescriptions of the sacred canons; likewise while they do not keep the Corporals, sacred vessels, altars, and ecclesiastical vestments clean and neat, but offer them stained, soiled, and filthy for performing the unbloody sacrifice. They are also sacrilegious, if they negligently allow the sacred particles to spoil in the pyx.

XI. Sacrilege is by its nature a deadly crime. It can be venial on account of either lack of deliberation or parvity of matter. There are penalties of two kinds enacted against the sacrilegious. Some are pecuniary, which are not inflicted before the judge's sentence; others are spiritual, which the sacrilegious undergo by the very fact, and are as follows: excommunication enacted against strikers of Clerics; likewise against those who violate ecclesiastical immunity, usurp the immovable goods of the Church, impose tributes on ecclesiastical persons, and bring them before a lay tribunal; and against those who break down the doors of a Church to steal sacred things.

SINCE God has bestowed prudence, and the other virtues together with their due instruments, on man for this end, that he not commit himself to divine providence drowsily, but that he himself also diligently cooperate, he will be accused of tempting God if he presumes that he shall attain his end without those means: Hence the Archontici were held as Heretics, because they believed that grace was to be infused into themselves without the sacraments, and other means; as Baronius has, anno 175.

I shall now treat of the vices failing from Religion on the other extreme. Among these however the first is, to Tempt God. It is an Irreligiosity, whereby, from doubt of some divine perfection, something is done, or an experiment is made, whether God has that perfection. It is defined thus from D. Thom. art. 1. and common sense, as Valencia notes disp. 6. quaest. 14. puncto 1. Fagundez in primum praeceptum, Decal. cap. 31. n. 30. Sanchez tract. 1. Decal. lib. 2. cap. 34. Tanner. disp. 5. quaest. 8. dub. 1. after D. Bonavent. ad 4. Lucae, in those words: Non tentabis Dominum Deum tuum, which is found in Deuter. 6. and Eccl. 18. where it is said: Noli esse quasi homo, qui tentat Deum. Whence God exclaims, Numer. 14. Tentaverunt me iam decem vices; by which testimonies the holy Doctor proves that this is a grave sin, as the Doctors commonly assert, in those cited.

It will be however venial, either from inadvertence, or from ignorance, or undeliberation, or if it be done from levity of mind, without the intention of tempting God, as those cited note.

Much less, if the cause is reasonable to await the help of God in necessity, will it be a wicked temptation, just as if someone, with enemies pursuing and mounted on a horse, should apply the spurs, he does not tempt the horse; but if without necessity he wished to test whether he make ten miles in one hour, he will tempt the horse. Therefore one must look to the cause, and the end, that we may see whether it is a wicked temptation. See Suarez Tom. 1. de relig. lib. 1. de irreligiosi- irreligiositate, cap. 2 Sanchez Tom. 1. Decal. lib. 2. cap. 34. Fagundez numero citato. It is said also to be against hope, because from it one hopes for a miracle from Him in an undue manner, as Azor teaches Tom. 1. lib. 9. cap. 2. quaest. 7. Sanchez in the place cited. num 4. Fagundez num. 41.

But if it arise from mere curiosity of seeing a miracle, or from doubt of some divine attribute; some say it is venial, unless the matter be most grave. So Sayrus lib. 4. cap. 7. and Valencia puncto 2.

Others think that from its nature it is grave, because it is a notable irreligion to make sport of God; Suatez num. 16. Sanchez num. 5.

Yet the matter can be so small that it becomes venial, as Lessius notes lib. 2. cap 45. dubio 1.

Besides the formal temptation of God there is given an interpretative one, which in some doubt explores the power, or the love of God, as if someone abstain from food for forty days. So D. Thom. art. 1. Fagundez n. 36. Toletanus lib. 4. summae, cap. 19. Sanchez num. 12. Suarez cap. 3. Nauar. sum. lat. cap. 11. num. 40. says that he commits a similar mortal sin who preaches voluntarily without previous meditation. Which is not true, if there does not also intervene the disposition of tempting God, nor scandal impend. So Sanchez num. 14. Caietanus quaest. 97. art. 1. Fagundez num. 37. Similarly it will be to tempt God to wish to prove one's innocence by a miracle, for instance with heated iron, or by some other similar means, unless one feel himself divinely excited to apply such a means.

You will say: in Numer. 5. the temptation of the innocence of the wife was made by water, etc.

It is answered that it was commanded by God, and therefore was not a tempting of God. And it was rightly ordered to removing uxoricides in that stiff-necked people.

Temptation however seems to be specifically distinguished into tacit and express, as Suarez says num. 6. Fagundez num. 42. because the one has a motive from doubt of a divine attribute, the other not, which are two different malices.

Hence Fagundez deduces num. 44. that he tempts God who wishes miracles without a special motion of God for proving the faith; for the testimony of the Church suffices. So Toletanus lib. 4. cap. 19. Suarez num. 13. Sanchez num. 10.

Likewise, if anyone offer himself to Martyrdom without cause. So D. Thom. art. 3. ad 1. Sanchez num. 15. Fagundez num. 45.

Whence St. Thomas warns that occasion of acting unjustly is not to be offered to infidels, but only to be borne patiently, and that it is not necessary to go to the infidels rashly, from curiosity, from boldness, but moved by holy inspiration, as St. Francis teaches in the last chapter of the Rule, and St. Bonaventure explains.