Chapter I — What the tempting of God is

I. Theologians give this definition of tempting God: it is an inordinate test, or experiment, of some divine perfection, by word or by deed. This word "inordinate" distinguishes lawful from unlawful temptation. For if this experiment, or test, is inordinate — that is, made without necessity — it is unlawful and irreverent toward God; but if it is ordinate, it is lawful. It is considered ordinate, either if a just cause presses; or if it proceeds from a divine instinct, for the honor and benefit of the Church. In this manner Abraham, Gideon, Elijah, and several other Israelites tempted God. St. Thomas (II-II, q. 97, art. 1) defines temptation absolutely in these words: "To tempt is to take a trial of some quality in the one tempted. This trial, however, is taken by both words and deeds: by words, as when we ask whether he knows a thing, or whether he can, or wills, to do it; by deeds, as when, by what we do, we test another's prudence, will, or power. Each of these, moreover, can occur in two ways: in one way, openly, as when someone professes to be tempting, as Samson (Judges 15) proposed a riddle to those he wished to test; in another way, secretly — as the Pharisees tempted Christ, as is read (Matt. 22)." It is added in the definition, "of some divine perfection," because whenever God is tempted, it is always to test some attribute of his — either his mercy, or his justice, or his omnipotence — which men who wish to test one of these divine attributes are in need of; and this occurs by words, or by deeds.

II. From St. Thomas's teaching it is gathered that this temptation is twofold: explicit, and tacit, or interpretive. The explicit kind expressly intends to test one of God's attributes — as when someone throws himself headlong from a window with this very intention, testing whether God will wish to deliver him, and preserve him from harm. This person tempts God expressly. The interpretive kind is when someone does not intend to make a trial of any attribute of God, yet acts in such a way that he really does tempt God nonetheless. The same must be said of one who exposes himself, without necessity, to manifest and evident danger, hoping that he will be delivered by God. Hence the Angelic Doctor concludes: "When, therefore, someone, on account of some necessity or usefulness, seeks a trial of divine aid, by words or by deeds, without a lack of due reverence — this is not tempting God, especially since such a trial proceeds from divine instinct." This is said in 2 Chronicles 20: "As we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to thee." But when someone exposes himself to grave and evident danger, without necessity, in order to test whether God will wish to preserve him, he sins both against charity toward himself, and against religion, tempting God. But if, without such expectation of preservation, but simply out of contempt of life, one acts, all such actions are, by their very kind, mortal sins. Man, indeed, would in that case wish to bind God to some attribute of his for a vain end, or so as to indulge the tempter's curiosity — all of which is unbecoming to the divine majesty.

III. This temptation of God is, by its very kind, a grave sin. The difficulty is this: whether this temptation of God is always a mortal sin when the deliberation and consent are complete.

IV. Question I. Is it a light fault to tempt God in a matter of slight consequence? Response: This depends on whether the temptation arises out of doubt, and thus carries with it the malice of heresy — for to doubt is grave. If it occurs without such doubt, it is nevertheless a grave sin. If, however, it arises from an imperfect deliberation, with only a slight consent, the temptation of God can be venial, when the matter concerning which God is tempted is itself trifling — as if, in a light illness, you refused medicine, hoping to be freed by God, or acting with a divided mind, hoping nonetheless to obtain from God what you ask. Some authors affirm that only a venial fault is committed in this case, since, they say, in such cases there does not appear to be a grave disruption of order, nor an injury to the divine majesty. But the more probable opinion is that this is always a grave fault: since the divine majesty is offended whenever God is tempted; and however slight or grave the matter for which one seeks to be freed, the divine majesty is injured by this very means — the temptation of God — always in the same way, however light or grave. So, then, the measure of gravity of the fault is not to be judged, more or less, from the natural triviality or gravity of the illness or affliction, but rather from the injury done to God's majesty, which is the same regardless. Let us set out this example more clearly, that it may seem lighter. You suffer from a slight illness; you reject every natural remedy, spurning all such help, and ask God to restore your health by a miracle. Do you not, then, wish God to work a miracle, to indulge your curiosity, and to expel a slight illness from you? Who does not see that you then tempt God more gravely than if you asked him to cure you of a mortal illness? For in this hypothesis you demand that God exercise his omnipotence in the most trifling of matters, working miraculous deeds. Whether the affliction, then, for which you ask, without any necessity, that God work a miracle to remove it — an affliction which could easily be removed by means provided by nature — be light or grave, you gravely tempt God, and gravely sin. This opinion is defended by Suárez (Vol. I, On Religion, tract. 3, Bk. 1, ch. 2, n. 16), Sánchez (Bk. II, ch. 34, n. 5), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 12, punct. 1, n. 4), and many others. Yet in practice this formal temptation of God scarcely occurs. For who, unless a fool, would wish God to work a miracle merely because he refuses customary remedies? But in practice, many spurn the use of medicine, especially in lighter illnesses, trusting in the divine physician, who is able, if he wills, to cure them without such means. They do not intend that God work miracles, but with a humble spirit hope that God will dispose things so that whatever happens will redound to his greater glory.

V. Question II. Does one tempt God who seeks to demonstrate his innocence by the trial of red-hot iron, or of boiling water? Response: The common opinion says yes, since natural means are available by which the truth can be made manifest — namely, the testimony of witnesses, or a spontaneous confession. Let us hear St. Thomas answer this question (II-II, q. 95, art. 8, ad 3): "The judgment by red-hot iron, or of boiling water, is indeed ordered toward the investigation of some hidden sin through something done by man; and insofar as some miraculous effect is expected from God, it agrees in this respect with the casting of lots. But such a judgment is rendered unlawful: both because it is directed toward judging hidden things, which are reserved to divine judgment, and also because such a judgment has not been sanctioned by divine authority. Whence, in the Decree of Pope Stephen V, it is said: 'The extortion of a confession from anyone by the trial of red-hot iron, or of boiling water, is not sanctioned by the sacred canons; nor is it to be presumed, since it has not been sanctioned by the teaching of the holy Fathers, being a superstitious invention. Public crimes, once a spontaneous confession or the testimony of witnesses has established them, having the fear of God before our eyes, are granted to our own governance to judge. But hidden and unknown things are to be left to him alone who knows the hearts of the sons of men.' The same reasoning seems to apply to the law concerning duels — except that it approaches more closely to the common reasoning of lots, insofar as no miraculous effect is expected there, except perhaps when the combatants are very unequal in strength or skill." All this is clear. Nor are the examples commonly adduced against it any obstacle — namely, that God prescribed (Num. 5) that an adulterous woman be tested by bitter waters; and that it is decreed (2, q. 5, ch. Saepe) that a monk suspected of theft is to be given the Eucharist, to be cleared by receiving it. As to the first example, the answer is clear: that this ceremonial precept concerning the trial of an adulterous woman was proven lawful because God himself so prescribed it; but that precept has since been abrogated. As to the second authority, St. Thomas responds (III Part, q. 80, art. 6, ad 3): "That decree has been abrogated by the contrary teaching of the Roman Pontiffs. For Pope Stephen says: 'Of red-hot iron,'" etc. And the same is held in the Extra, on purifications, ch. Ex tuarum: "In all such matters there appears to be a tempting of God. Whence they cannot be done without sin. And it would seem graver still, if in this sacrament, which was instituted as a remedy of salvation, someone should incur a judgment of death. Whence it is decreed that the body of Christ not be given to one suspected of a crime, by way of examination." If, at times, miracles have been seen in such trials, God worked them for the defense of the accused's innocence, the sin of temptation on the part of those men being permitted [but not the cause of the miracle].

VI. Question III. Does one who, in order to convert a heretic, asks God for a miracle in confirmation of Catholic truth, tempt God? Response: The common opinion affirms this, since such miracles are asked without necessity. For there are ready at hand the most splendid arguments by which the truth of the Catholic religion can be shown; and it is granted that such a request for miracles is, for the most part, useless. How many myriads of miracles did God not work in the deaths of the Martyrs, and yet tyrants and Jews, though beholding them with their own eyes, were not converted to the true religion! They saw Lazarus, four days dead, raised by Christ, and even sat at table with him afterward — yet they did not for that reason embrace the faith of Christ. If holy men have sometimes shown such miracles to heretics, they did so from a particular divine instinct. Nothing, however, prevents one, having employed the usual means — arguments both explicit and, in another respect, tacit — from also asking God, at times, for a miracle, should it seem good to God's glory that this be granted, and may it please him.

VII. Theologians dispute on both sides whether this temptation of God, when explicit, is a distinct sin from that committed when it is tacit — namely, whether explicit temptation and implicit temptation differ in species; for explicit temptation arises from a different cause than that from which implicit temptation arises. Suárez affirms this (Vol. I, On Religion, tract. 3, Bk. 1, ch. 3, n. 6). If it were true that a doubt concerning some divine attribute were involved in explicit temptation of God, it would undoubtedly differ in species from the interpretive kind, since the sin would then also be, in addition, against faith. It does not, however, seem that doubt concerning some divine attribute is so bound up with the temptation of God, such that God cannot be tempted without simultaneously doubting his omnipotence, justice, and so on. And so the contrary opinion teaches that, if the discussion concerns explicit temptation alone, it does not differ in species from the interpretive kind, but only adds a greater gravity of malice — since explicit temptation, properly speaking, does not differ from implicit. The theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 12, punct. 1) contend that this opinion is confirmed by the authority of St. Thomas (II-II, q. 95, art. 3, ad 1), where they wish the Angelic Doctor to teach that an explicit pact with a demon does not differ from an implicit one. But St. Thomas there rather teaches the contrary. Here are his words: "It must be said that in all the aforesaid cases the reason for sinning is generically the same, but not specifically the same. Many demons insinuate themselves, without being invoked, into certain actions men perform, whereby they render themselves worthy of being subject to such insinuation." From this teaching it follows that explicit and tacit temptation, or explicit and implicit pacts, agree in their general nature, but not in their specific character... That, however, this particular distinction reveals a difference of species is not, in our judgment, established by the aforesaid authors. It seems rather consistent with the other words added — namely, that the sin of tempting God is committed — without any indication of whether it was explicit or implicit temptation of God. For it is certain among all that explicit temptation of God is a considerably graver crime than the interpretive kind. The dispute, however, is whether this difference is specific or merely one of degree. Neither opinion is evident. It is safer, therefore, in confession, to follow the more grave opinion — the one I hold to be true — since aggravating circumstances within the same species are, in any case, to be disclosed in confession. For this reason, everyone is bound to disclose, in sacramental confession, both an explicit or implicit pact, and an explicit or interpretive temptation of God.