The Commandment of Love of Neighbor

The Commandment of Love of Neighbor.—Charity to fellow-creatures, especially to members of the chosen nation, was commanded in the Old Law. (a) Thus, internal love was made obligatory. The Lord forbade hatred, revenge, remembrance of injuries (Lev., xix. 17), and commanded love of fellow-citizens (ibid.) and kindness to foreigners dwelling in the land (Lev., xix. 33). (b) External love was also obligatory. Alms and help were to be given the needy (Deut., xxii. 1, 2, xv. 11), loans were to be made without interest (Deut., xxiii. 19), kindness was to be shown to widows, orphans, the blind, the crippled (Exod., xxii. 22, 23; Lev., xix. 14), part of each harvest was to be left for the poor, and in the third, seventh and fiftieth years special assistance was to be rendered the needy (Lev., xix. 9, xxv. 2-12; Deut., xiv. 28, 29).

In the New Testament, which is the law of love, the precept of charity to neighbors is given with greater clearness and perfection. (a) Thus, internal love must be universal and modelled on the love which Christ had for humanity. Enemies are to be loved as well as friends, the bad as well as the good (Matt., v. 43-45), Gentiles as well as Jews, since there is one Lord of all (Rom., x. 12). The new commandment, whose observance will mark the faithful follower, is an imitation of the charity of Christ (John, xiii. 34, 35). (b) External charity must be practised, even at the cost of self-sacrifice (I John, iii. 16), for it will be regarded by Christ as done to Himself (Matt., xxv. 40), and will be the subject of interrogation and eulogy at the judgment (Matt., xxv. 34-46).

In giving the commandment of love towards fellow-creatures, our Lord indicated both the reason for the love and the mode in which the love should be exercised: “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” (Matt, xxii. 39).

(a) The reason for this love is that a fellow-creature is our neighbor, or, as it is elsewhere expressed, our brother (I John, iv. 20, 21), our friend (Lev., xix. 18). He, like ourselves, is made to the image of God and is destined for the same beatitude.

(b) The mode of this love is that it should be similar, though not equal, to the love one has for oneself. Hence, the end of loving our neighbor should be God, that it may be a holy love; the rule to be followed in loving him should be that we agree with his wishes in good, but not in evil, that the love may be just; the manner of loving him should be that one wishes him well, not that one only seeks pleasure or advantage from him, and so the love will be sincere. For, as love of self must be holy, just and sincere, the same qualities are required in love of the neighbor.

The following conditions must, therefore, be met in the love of neighbor which charity commands:

(a) Love must not be of a covetous or selfish or superficial kind, but must be sincerely benevolent and beneficent (see 1109). Those who wish to retain the companionship or association of a neighbor because this redounds to their own gain, on account of his wealth, influence, etc., while harming the neighbor, love themselves rather than the neighbor. Nor is love of neighbor genuine if it exists only in the emotions, or if it is manifested only in expressions of good will; for true love includes benevolence and will be translated into beneficence when the occasion presents itself (James, ii. 14 sqq.; I John, i. 22). Persons who are most ready to shed tears at the distress of others, or who are most profuse in compliments or good wishes, are frequently most unwilling to assist others, especially if some sacrifice is necessary.

(b) The love of the neighbor must not be a sinful benevolence or beneficence, but must desire for him and confer on him what are real, and not merely apparent goods, such as we ought to desire for ourselves (Matt., vii. 12). Those who secure for others lower and unnecessary goods at the sacrifice of those that are higher and necessary, putting wealth, pleasure, or position above virtue and a good conscience, have not the love of charity, for “what does it profit a man to gain the whole world, and lose his soul?” (Matt., viii. 36).

(c) The love of the neighbor must not be purely natural, but must wish for him and confer on him real goods out of a supernatural motive. This motive is the friendship one has for God, so that the neighbor is loved because God loves him and desires to communicate to him a share in the divine life through grace and glory. The motive of charity is absent, therefore, when one loves only one’s friends, when one is kind to others out of pity, or generosity, or admiration for their good qualities, if there is no thought of God in this philanthropy or humanitarianism.

The commandment of love of neighbor is sufficiently complied with as to its acts by all those who are leading a good Christian life. (a) Thus, the internal acts of sincere affection, peace, joy, and mercy are exercised by prayer for the living and the dead, or a devout recitation of the Lord’s Prayer. (b) The external acts of spiritual and corporal mercy are performed by those who are giving according to their means and the necessities they meet.

The commandment of love of neighbor is sufficiently complied with as to its motive, even though the supernatural motive is not actually present before the mind, or other and natural motives are also present. (a) Thus, the supernatural motive directs our love of neighbor, if it is present virtually, as will be explained in 1590. (b) Natural motives of love that are good in themselves (such as ties of relationship or nationality, common intellectual or other interests, the virtue or ability of a neighbor) do not detract from the supernaturality of love, provided their influence is subordinated to the divine friendship and the desire of beatitude for the neighbor. Even a certain amount of natural repugnance is not inconsistent with charity; on the contrary, charity is seen to be great, if for love of God one does good to implacable enemies, or waits on persons suffering from a loathsome disease.

1. Christina, having several children, desires that her little son, recently born blind, be snatched by death from the miseries of this world and enjoy paradise. She desires the same grace for another son, five years old, deaf and mute, and for a third son, nine years old, lame in both feet. Likewise she makes a vow that her daughter of marriageable age, but unmarried on account of excessive poverty and deformity, depart from the living, lest she remain exposed to the dangers of sinning. But she fervently prays God that her husband, who often beats her and continually vexes her with many imprecations, and daily and at every hour blasphemes God and the Saints, at last be converted to God and rest in peace.

2. Leontia, in frequent conversation with a certain friend, is accustomed often to sadden her with words. And although the friend often shows grave sorrow, nevertheless Leontia has no scruple in this matter; for she says that she does this only for joke and recreation, and to cheer the other friends present.

Q. 1. Is there a precept of charity toward neighbor? - 2. Have Christina and Leontia, in the aforesaid cases, sinned gravely against charity?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 382. To the second: Christina in none of the aforesaid cases sins against charity and piety; for she does not desire evil for her children and husband, but, on the contrary, that they be freed from the evil of punishment and from the evil of sin, and possess the infinite good in heaven. Nor indeed, as appears from the case, is she led by weariness, impatience, or hatred toward the children or toward the husband; but she is impelled only by the motive of faith and piety. Wherefore Christina seems to sin neither gravely nor lightly. G. 213.

But what is to be held concerning Christina? Would she sin gravely if she desired death for her husband, so that at last she might be freed from the husband's most harsh vexation and tyranny? This must certainly be denied, the spirit of inordinate revenge being excluded. For, according to the common opinion of the doctors, it is licit to desire death for oneself in order to escape this most harsh treatment. Why then could someone not, from the same end and without sin, desire death for his neighbor? I. M. 374, 386; Elbel 342.

As regards Leontia, she can perhaps be excused from grave sin on account of an erroneous conscience, or on account of a defect of advertence and due consideration. But the thing in itself is grave, against charity. "It is grave against charity," says D'Annib., ed. 3, p. 2, n. 92, "to affect someone with grave sorrow without a grave cause, even short of injustice; whether he is reasonably saddened, which no one doubts; or irrationally, as for example from games, jokes, perhaps because he is of a small and pusillanimous spirit."

The treatment must be 1º concerning the precept of love of neighbor in itself; 2º concerning the works of charity to be fulfilled from it; 3º concerning the vices opposed to Charity toward neighbor.

1º Toward all in general; 2º toward enemies in particular.

From what was said above, n. 554, it is established that charity toward neighbor is not another virtue than charity toward God, because the same formal object by which is present. "For the reason of loving neighbor is God; for this is what we ought to love in neighbor, that he be in God. Hence it is manifest that the act by which God is loved and the act by which neighbor is loved are the same in species. And on account of this the habit of charity extends itself not only to the dilection of God, but also to the dilection of neighbor."¹

We divide this whole chapter into three articles: 1. on the existence, extension, and order of the precept of charity toward neighbor; 2. on the works of charity; 3. on the sins opposed to this charity.

¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 25, a. 1.

We divide this article into three paragraphs: 1. on the existence of this precept; 2. on the extension of this precept to enemies; 3. on the order of charity.

570. Proposition. There exists a special precept of loving neighbor with supernatural love, both affective and effective.

Preliminary note. Natural love, by which neighbor is loved on account of natural gifts, whether material (e.g. on account of his beauty, goods of fortune, etc.) or spiritual (e.g. on account of his knowledge, talent, art, etc.), is distinguished from supernatural love, by which he is loved on account of God, insofar as the neighbor is a son of God, brother of Christ, temple of the Holy Spirit, etc. For just as we love the son of our friend on account of the friend, so also we ought to love neighbor as the son of God, loved above all things. Even purely natural love, by which we love neighbor, is licit per se, provided it is not disordered; but now we are not speaking about it. - As was already noted above, by the name neighbor we understand all creatures which are capable of heavenly beatitude, namely, all men on this earth (and consequently even sinners, heretics, Jews, etc.), all the blessed in heaven, and the souls in purgatory; but not the damned in Gehenna, as obstinate enemies of God. - Just as the precept of loving God is a special precept and not only a general one, so also the precept of loving neighbor is distinguished from the other precepts. - But the love to be shown to neighbor is not only by interior affection but also by exterior work, if necessity or occasion requires this.

It is proved 1. from Sacred Scripture, which already in the Old Testament inculcated this precept,² and in the New Testament, which is customarily called the law of love, renewed it in many places and explained it more. Thus, e.g., after Christ had brought forward the first and greatest precept of the dilection of God, He adds: "But the second [commandment] is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."³ "A new commandment I give to you, that you love one another. In this all will know that you are My disciples, if you have dilection for one another."⁴ In this place Christ calls the precept of charity a new commandment, not indeed in the sense that previously there had been no obligation at all of loving neighbor, but because these things are new: 1. the exemplar of this dilection (the love of the Savior Himself); 2. its motive; 3. its measure and mode. St. John the Apostle again and again exhorted his disciples to love one another.⁵ - "And now I ask thee, lady, not as writing a new commandment to thee, but that which we have had from the beginning, that we love one another."⁶ That this charity toward neighbor must be shown not only by affection and words but also by work, the same St. John inculcates, saying: "He who has the substance of this world, and sees his brother having need, and closes his bowels from him, how does the charity of God remain in him? My little children, let us not love in word nor with the tongue, but in deed and in truth."⁷ Therefore from Sacred Scripture it is abundantly established that there exists a special precept of loving neighbor by internal and external acts.

It is proved 2. from condemned propositions. Innocent XI proscribed the following two propositions:⁸ "We are not bound to love neighbor by an internal and formal act"; and: "We can satisfy the precept of loving neighbor by external acts alone."

Properties of charity toward neighbor. This charity ought to be 1. affective and effective; 2. universal; 3. well ordered.

1. Charity ought to be affective and effective, i.e. it ought to produce internal and external acts. The internal acts of charity toward neighbor are after the manner of the acts of charity toward God (cf. above n. 555): 1. to rejoice together in his prosperous affairs and to be saddened together in his adverse affairs; 2. sincerely to desire good for him. - But the external acts of charity toward neighbor are to do good to him and especially to provide him the seven works of spiritual and corporal mercy, about which there will be treatment below, n. 587 sqq.

2. Charity ought to be universal, i.e. it ought to extend itself to all capable of heavenly beatitude, so that no one is excluded. The extension of charity to enemies will be treated specially below, § 2.

3. Charity ought to be well ordered both as to persons and as to goods. The order of charity will be treated below, § 3.

² Cf. Lev. 19, 17 sq.; Deut. 15, 11.

³ Matth. 22, 39.

⁴ Jo. 13, 34 sq.

⁵ Cf. 1 Jo. 3, 11, 23; 4, 11.

⁶ 2 Jo. v. 5.

⁷ 1 Jo. 3, 17 sq.

⁸ Denz. n. 1160 sq.

S. Th. II-II, q. 44.

971. From natural-divine law there is given a precept of charity, obliging under grave sin, as is clear both from reason: for, supposing that God destines us to a supernatural end, to participation in His own life and to intimate friendship with Him, reverence toward Him demands that we love Him above all things as the supernatural end infinitely lovable for His own sake; and from Scripture, which establishes the commandment of this love, Deut. VI, 5 and Mt. XXII, 37. This precept is both negative, by which we are forbidden to cast away charity, and this obliges always; and affirmative, by which we are obliged to elicit an act of charity, and this does not oblige always.

Hence an act of charity is necessary; nevertheless in the present economy of the New Law it is not necessary by necessity of means. The habit of charity indeed is necessary for all by necessity of means for salvation, not only for adults but also for infants, because without it no one is pleasing to God, no one is in the state of grace or of divine friendship (I Cor. XIII; I John III, 14; IV, 16; Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7); but the act itself, in the New Testament, strictly is not of necessity of means for justification or salvation, because imperfect contrition with the sacrament really received now suffices. Nevertheless it is necessary by necessity of precept; and those do not satisfy this precept who remain for a long time in the state of mortal sin, or are justified only with imperfect contrition.

972. The obligation of eliciting an act of charity arises from various heads:

A. The virtue itself and the precept of charity obliges under grave sin per se, that is, in circumstances common to the condition of all men. For it is altogether necessary, indeed it is the greatest precept, to tend toward the ultimate supernatural end; yet we do not do this as is due except by an act of charity. Now this is especially necessary 1. at the beginning of the use of reason, when a man is bound to turn himself to God and to choose for himself an end; 2. in the article of death (or toward the end of life), when he is at the point of attaining the end; 3. often in life: for it does not suffice that we tend to God once or twice, but it is necessary to direct the whole life to the ultimate end, and therefore the act of charity must be repeated often (prop. condemned 1 by Alexander VII; 5, 6, and 7 by Innocent XI).1 Some determine this by saying: at least once a year; others, every month (St. Alphonsus), or even every week (Scotus); others finally, more probably: several times, at least three or four times a year. Yet this is easily fulfilled by leading a good Christian life; whence those who live as Christians abundantly satisfy the precept.

B. The virtue itself and the precept of charity obliges per accidens, that is, on the occasion of some special circumstance: 1. when a temptation rises up against charity, which is hoped to be overcome only by an act of this virtue; yet this does not befit the scrupulous who torture themselves in this matter, for whom nothing remains except to despise the temptation; 2. when charity has been lost, namely by an act contrary to it; 3. when we externally manifest it, otherwise the manifestation would be simulation.

C. Other virtues and precepts sometimes oblige one to elicit an act of charity, at least implicitly: 1. when temptations arise against other virtues, which are hoped to be overcome only by that act; 2. when someone, in the state of mortal sin, must celebrate and lacks the availability of a confessor; likewise if he must or intends either to administer a sacrament, or to receive a sacrament of the living, without being able or willing first to confess; 3. when he must or intends to posit an act of another virtue which cannot be exercised without an act of charity, for example, the Lord's Prayer (attentively recited in its full sense), perfect contrition for sins, a resolution of avoiding sin because it displeases God, a desire that all may serve God, etc. But in these cases the obligation does not arise from the precept of charity itself; whence, if its act is omitted, we do not sin against this virtue, but against another precept by force of which it was required.

Since charity is most excellent, most especially commanded, and the cause of supernatural merit, the faithful are to be urged very greatly to exercise it more often, and especially in the article of death, yet without speaking to the dying about the strict precept, lest they be cast into scruples.

1. "A man at no time whatever of his life is bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues."

2. "Whether he sins mortally who would elicit an act of love of God only once in life, we do not dare to condemn." - "It is probable that the precept of charity toward God does not oblige per se, strictly speaking, even every five years." - "It obliges only then, when we are bound to be justified and we do not have another way by which we can be justified."

973. In positive divine law, in the first place concerning charity, a special, distinct, and explicit precept had to be given. For every due thing is commanded: namely, something is commanded insofar as it is due. Now something is due per se, namely the end, because it has the character of good per se (for example, health); and something is due on account of another, namely that which is ordered to the end (for example, medicine to health). But the end of the spiritual life is that man be united to God, which is done through charity, and to this, as to the end, all other things which pertain to the spiritual life are ordered¹ (a. 1). Therefore the greatest precept concerning charity had to be given, and it is so much greater insofar as that which is per se is preferable to that which is on account of another (ibid.). Hence it is called the greatest and first commandment in the law (Mt. XXII, 38; cf. prop. 1 condemned by Alexander VIII).²

¹ St. Thomas proves the minor thus (a. 1): "For all the virtues, concerning whose acts precepts are given, are ordered either to purifying the heart from the disturbances of the passions, as are the virtues which are concerned with the passions; or at least to having a good conscience, as are the virtues which are concerned with operations; or to having right faith, as are those which pertain to divine worship; and these three are required for loving God. For an impure heart is drawn away from the love of God on account of passion inclining to earthly things; but an evil conscience makes one dread divine justice on account of fear of punishment; and fictitious faith draws affection to that which is fashioned concerning God, separating it from the truth of God."

² "It suffices that a moral act tend to the ultimate end interpretatively: hence man is not bound to love either at the beginning or in the course of moral life." See the other condemned propositions, above p. 742.

Moreover concerning charity a twofold precept had to be given in positive law, explicit and distinct: the love of God and of neighbor.

For although in the first the other is included, as the conclusion is contained in the principle, and therefore he who would perfectly know the principle (the love of God) according to its whole force would also perceive the conclusion (the love of neighbor), nevertheless this does not clearly appear to all, and "therefore it is necessary that precepts be given not only concerning the love of God but also concerning the love of neighbor, on account of the less capable, who do not easily consider that one of these precepts is contained under the other" (a. 2). But these two suffice; for charity is friendship, and therefore love toward another whose good we will. Now the good is either the end, or that which is for the end, and therefore concerning charity two precepts suffice: one by which we are induced to love God as the end; the other by which we are induced to love the neighbor on account of God, as on account of the end (a. 3). Concerning love of self no explicit precept had to be given, because man naturally loves himself and his own body; but the mode of loving himself, namely that he love himself in an ordered (and supernatural) way, is sufficiently indicated in the love of God and neighbor, insofar as he ought to love God above all things and his neighbor as himself (ad 1).

Nevertheless the two aforesaid precepts were not to be enumerated in the decalogue, because they are concerning the end, while all the precepts of the decalogue are ordered to the love of God and of neighbor, which therefore are presupposed in all and included in all (a. 1, ad 3). Whence Christ says, Mt. XXII, 40: "On these two commandments depend the whole law and the prophets."

974. The intrinsic mode and mode of precept by which God is to be loved is that He be loved from the whole heart, as is said in Deut. VI, 5 and Mt. XXII, 37. For it is required for an act of virtue not only that it fall upon due matter: God to be loved; but also that it be clothed with the due circumstances by which it is made proportionate to such matter: the mode of love. But God is to be loved as the ultimate end, to whom all things are to be referred. And therefore He is to be loved totally, so that man receive nothing contrary to the love of God (a. 4). Whence it is said (Deut. VI, 5): You shall love the Lord your God from your whole heart.

Accordingly God is not only to be loved effectively by observance of the commandments, but also affectively by explicit affection; and not only affectively, or by the will, but also effectively by all the other powers moved by the will, which thus become principles of spiritual movements, namely, by the intellect, the lower appetite, and the external executive powers. And thus it can be understood that God is said to be loved from the whole heart, and from the whole mind, and from the whole soul, and from the whole strength or with all one's powers (Deut. VI, 5; Mt. XXII, 37; Mk. XII, 30; Lk. X, 27), although perhaps by all these one and the same thing is signified under different words.

"Therefore it is commanded to us that our whole intention (of the will) be borne toward God, which is from the whole heart; and that our intellect be subjected to God, which is from the whole mind; and that our appetite be regulated according to God, which is from the whole soul; and that our exterior act obey God, which is to love God from the whole strength, or virtue, or with all powers" (a. 5).

That precept will be fulfilled fully and perfectly in the fatherland, where charity is always in act according to the whole power; on the way it can be fulfilled imperfectly, insofar as man does nothing against the love of God; and thus one fulfills it more perfectly than another, insofar as he abstracts more from temporal things and thinks about God, and thus approaches more, by a certain likeness, to the perfection of the fatherland (a. 6).

975. The precept concerning love of neighbor is thus fittingly proposed: You shall love your neighbor as yourself (Lev. XIX, 17-18; Mt. XXII, 39). "For in it both the reason for loving and the mode of love are touched upon. The reason for loving is touched upon from the fact that he is named neighbor; for because of this we ought from charity to love others, because they are neighbors to us, both according to the natural image of God and according to capacity for glory... But the mode of love is touched upon when it is said: as yourself; which is not to be understood as to this, that someone should love his neighbor equally with himself, but similarly to himself, and this in three ways: 1. indeed on the part of the end, namely, that someone love his neighbor on account of God, just as he ought to love himself on account of God, so that thus the love of neighbor may be holy (and not merely natural); 2. on the part of the rule of love, namely, that someone not condescend to his neighbor in anything evil, but only in good things, just as a man ought to satisfy his own will only in good things, so that thus the love may be just (that is, honorable); 3. on the part of the reason of love, namely, that someone not love his neighbor on account of his own utility or delight, but for this reason, that he wills good to his neighbor, just as he wills good to himself, so that thus love of neighbor may be true; for when someone loves his neighbor on account of his own utility or delight, he does not truly love the neighbor, but himself" (a. 7). "But from the very fact that it is said: You shall love your neighbor, it is consequently given to be understood that those who are nearer are to be loved more" (a. 8, ad 3): "for the order of charity pertains to the very account (or essence) of the virtue" and falls under the precept (a. 8).

That precept was proposed more perfectly and declared more evidently by Christ in the New Testament, to be exercised in a more perfect manner than in the Old, and by this reason it is called new: "A new commandment I give to you, that you love one another; as I have loved you, that you also love one another" (John XIII, 34-35; cf. XV, 12-13; I John III, 16). Namely, it is new 1. by reason of a new exemplar (John XIII, 34 and XV, 12); 2. by reason of the motive, because Christ is in our neighbors: for supernatural love is founded in the communication of the divine life of Christ, who joins all in one mystical body of which He is the head, and in one participation of the Eucharist (John XV-XVII); whence Christ says: "Amen I say to you, as long as you did it to one of these my brethren, you did it to me" (Mt. XXV, 40); 3. by reason of the measure and mode, because it is necessary to love even to the giving of one's life (John XV, 12-13; I John III, 16; Eph. V, 2); 4. by reason of extension, because it is toward all, even strangers and enemies, which was not explicitly handed down in the Old Testament (Mt. V, 43-45; Lk. VI, 27-28; Rom. X, 12). The Apostle excellently describes the distinguished qualities of this eminent charity in I Cor. XIII, 4-7.

The precept obliges not only to doing good to the neighbor effectively and externally, but before all things to truly loving him with internal affection (cf. I Pet. I, 22; props. 10 and 11 condemned by Innocent XI);³ which generally is sufficiently fulfilled by the very love of God in which it is implicitly contained; nevertheless it is to be exercised explicitly when it is necessary for an external work and benefit to be furnished to the neighbor, or for avoiding hatred and offense of the neighbor. But since occasions of this kind frequently occur, hence the faithful living as Christians by that very fact abundantly satisfy this precept.

³ "We are not bound to love our neighbor by an internal and formal act." - "We can satisfy the precept of loving the neighbor by external acts alone."

Fulfilling the great commandment of love according to the exemplar of Christ toward all, toward enemies also and evildoers, looking in all things to the image of the Savior and the dignity of the children of God, ready to lay down our life for our brethren, loving not in word and tongue but in deed and truth, we have the pledge of divine love and of the charity which joins us to God. As, by the inspiration of the Spirit of eternal Love, the apostle of charity himself testified (I John IV, 12 and 16): "If we love one another, God abides in us, and His charity is perfected in us... God is charity, and he who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him."

Of three things it will be necessary to speak here, namely:

1. concerning the precept of love of neighbor in itself,
2. concerning the works of charity to be fulfilled from it,
3. concerning the vices opposed to charity toward neighbor.

I Say 1st. There is a precept of loving one's neighbor with a true and internal affection. This is clear both from the natural law, because also in one's neighbor there exists the same formal motive of love, namely the participated goodness of God; for all men have been created to his image, and are capable of the friendship of God and of eternal beatitude; and from proposition 10 condemned by Innocent XI, which is thus stated: "We are not bound to love our neighbor by an internal and formal act."

But he who lives as a Christian satisfies this precept sufficiently, as to the internal act, by praying in general for his neighbor or by reciting the Lord's Prayer. But as to external acts he satisfies it by succoring the necessities of his neighbor, whether temporal or spiritual, according to the rules to be established below.

I Say 2nd. Some order of charity is to be observed in the love of neighbor. The reason is that the persons to be loved are joined to us more or less closely, and the goods to be desired for them are of different kinds and of different necessity. I said 1st, of different kinds; for some are spiritual, and others temporal; and these again are distinguished into goods of life, goods of reputation and honor, and goods of fortune. - I said 2nd, of different necessity; for this is either temporal or spiritual, and each can be 1st, extreme, when the danger of eternal damnation, or of death, or of another evil nearly equal to death, so presses upon one's neighbor that he, morally speaking, cannot escape it without the help of another; 2nd, grave, when from the circumstances eternal salvation is rendered very difficult, or temporal life very burdensome; 3rd, common, in which one can provide for himself without great difficulty. In this, in the spiritual order, are ordinary sinners, who, if they wished to apply some effort, would rise again from their evil state; but in the temporal order generally mendicant poor persons suffer it, for whom life, according to their condition, is not too burdensome and miserable.

For the practical application of this precept, the following rules are very useful.

Rule I. Each person is bound to love himself simply and absolutely more than his neighbor. The reason is that each person is nearer to himself than any other. This is clear besides from the natural and invincible inclination to love oneself more than one's neighbor; hence the common axiom: Well-ordered charity begins from oneself. Moreover love of self is the rule of love of neighbor according to that saying: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." But the rule is prior and more excellent than the thing ruled.

Rule II. Yet we must succor our neighbor, even with our own advantages placed after his, according to the following order:

1st. In extreme spiritual necessity one's neighbor must be succored even with certain danger of life, provided there is certain hope of helping him, and there is no other by whom he may be relieved, nor does a graver evil threaten from it; because the eternal life of one's neighbor is a good more excellent than our own temporal life.

2nd. In extreme temporal necessity one's neighbor must ordinarily be succored with a great inconvenience indeed, but not with the greatest, such as the donation of a great sum of money would be even for a rich man. The reason is that, on the one hand, the life of one's neighbor is a good more excellent than some good of ours; and, on the other hand, since love of self precedes in order, no one is obliged to undergo so great an inconvenience for others.

3rd. In grave necessity of either order no one is bound to succor his neighbor with his own grave inconvenience, while excluding, however, a title of justice, piety, or office. For from what has been said it follows that we are bound to furnish some help, but not with grave loss of one's own good.

4th. In common necessity of either order one's neighbor is to be succored with some inconvenience indeed, because love of neighbor requires this, but only with a slight one; for there can be only a slight obligation of charity when one's neighbor can rather easily extricate himself from that necessity, or when it is not too burdensome to him. But we are not bound to help all who are placed in common necessity, both because this would be impossible, and because, if at some time it could be done, it would then no longer be a slight inconvenience.

Rule III. Among the various persons to be loved, other things being equal, those are to be preferred who are more closely joined to us by blood, friendship, office, religion, common life, etc., since God has bound them to us by stricter bonds. Hence, outside extreme necessity, first of all a wife is to be succored, because she is one flesh with her husband; 2nd, children; 3rd, parents, and indeed the father before the mother; 4th, brothers, sisters, then relatives, domestics, and intimates. I said outside extreme necessity, because in this, parents, by reason of the fact that they gave life, are more probably to be preferred even to wife and children. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 27 and following; and Hom. Ap., nn. 15 and following.

Question 1. Is it contrary to the charity due to oneself to wish for death on account of the misfortunes of life?

Response. Negatively, if it is done from desire for a better life or eternal happiness, as is evident; but the answer is otherwise if it is done from weariness of life, or from dejection of soul. Yet they do not sin who desire death when life is so burdensome that it is judged harder than death itself. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 30.

Question 2. Is it contrary to charity to desire temporal evil for one's neighbor, or to rejoice over it, on account of a good end?

Response. Negatively, if the due order of charity is observed, that is, if it is done on account of a greater good, or for a lesser evil. Hence this is licit: 1st, on account of the spiritual good of the neighbor himself; 2nd, on account of the common good, whether spiritual or temporal; 3rd, on account also of the good of many persons, of much greater moment, for example, of a family, a community, etc. - But otherwise one must speak when the order of charity is perverted, as is clear from proposition 14 condemned by Innocent XI, which is as follows: "It is licit by an absolute desire to wish for the death of one's father, not indeed as an evil of the father, but as a good of the one wishing, because namely a rich inheritance will come to him." - But we know from Fr. Viva that this was the cause of the condemnation. Hence a wife cannot desire the death of her husband from the fact that she is unjustly badly treated by him, nor the death of her daughter because on account of deformity she cannot marry. - Cf. Baller., note (c), p. 186.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. A mother is not bound to undergo danger of life so that her offspring may be baptized, when it is uncertain whether it will survive for baptism. A pastor is bound in time of plague to succor his own and administer the necessary sacraments either by himself or by an equally suitable substitute.

2nd. He sins against charity toward himself, gravely or lightly, who neglects due care of soul or body. Yet it is licit to deprive oneself of non-necessary spiritual goods for the temporal or spiritual good of one's neighbor, for example, to omit Mass on a weekday. Indeed someone can desire and procure for his neighbor greater non-necessary spiritual goods than for himself, excluding contempt of them.

3rd. It is never licit to commit any sin for procuring the good of one's neighbor, whether spiritual or temporal; nor is it licit to expose oneself to proximate danger of sinning when a fall appears morally certain. Yet it is licit to expose oneself to remote danger. Indeed, as St. Alphonsus teaches, l. 6, n. 453, sometimes someone will even be bound to a work of charity when a fall is otherwise very probable, if one's neighbor is placed in extreme spiritual necessity; provided one forearms himself with opportune means, because one can certainly and justly hope for the help of God. - Baller., note (a), p. 186.

Only he is called an enemy who has injured another either by mere offense or by injury. - Besides, it must be noted that signs of love are of a twofold kind; namely, some common, and others special. The former are owed, and in fact are mutually given, by those who belong to the same state or social condition. The latter, which are called by St. Thomas friendly benefits, and proceed from familiarity, are freely exhibited to certain particular persons by reason of friendship. Both these signs are diverse according to diversity of customs and regions. Cf. Baller., note (a) and (c), p. 188.

I Say. There exists a precept of loving enemies. It is clear both from the words of Christ, Matt. v, 44: "But I say to you, love your enemies"; and because even in enemies the divine goodness shines forth, not insofar as they are enemies, but insofar as they are rational creatures. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 25, art. 8.

St. Thomas teaches in this article: 1st, enemies as such are not to be loved from charity, because "this is perverse, repugnant to charity"; 2nd, but according to their nature, that is, in the universal, "love of enemies is of the necessity of charity: namely so that someone loving God and neighbor does not exclude his enemies from that generality of love of neighbor"; 3rd, "love of enemies can be considered in the special, namely so that someone in the special is moved by a movement of love toward an enemy: and this is not of the necessity of charity absolutely, because neither is it of the necessity of charity to be moved by a movement of love in the special toward each and every man individually: because this is impossible. Yet it is of the necessity of charity according to preparation of soul, namely so that a man have his soul prepared for this, that he would love an enemy in the singular if necessity occurred," namely not only by interior love, which does little toward necessity, but also by exterior love by which he may assist one suffering necessity: and therefore not only in affection, but in effect. But that without an article of necessity a man should fulfill even this act, so that he loves an enemy on account of God, this pertains to the perfection of charity.

But so that the practical application of this precept may be seen more easily, attention must be given to the following rules:

Rule I. Of themselves the common signs of love are owed to enemies, because denial of them would be an act of vengeance and a manifestation of hatred, which is repugnant to charity. I said of themselves, because sometimes a reasonable cause is present for denying them for a time, for example, by reason of due correction, of a good effect in children or inferiors, or on account of prudent fear of quarrels from the sight or conversation of an enemy, etc., likewise on account of the expression of just sorrow conceived from injury, etc.

Rule II. Of themselves special signs of love are not owed to enemies, because friendship is owed to no one. Hence you are not bound, for example, to visit them when sick, console them when sad, receive them with hospitality or at a banquet, in those circumstances indeed in which actions of this kind are not regarded as common signs of love. I said of themselves, for by reason of avoiding scandal, or if by a particular and obvious sign of benevolence you can without grave inconvenience placate an enemy and bring it about that he lay aside hatred, you are sometimes bound to furnish this sign for his salvation. - Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 189.

Rule III. Indeed sometimes even those special signs of benevolence must be exhibited, and if they were omitted, someone would morally show and conduct himself as an enemy. Hence to one seeking pardon and offering a satisfaction congruent to the injury, if any intervened, particular signs also of special love, if any previously used to be given, generally speaking, are not to be refused, although there is not an obligation afterward to repeat those signs and preserve the former friendship. - Cf. St. Thom. in 3, dist. 30, q. 1, art. 2, ad 5. - Baller., note (b), p. 189.

Question 1. What order must be observed in making reconciliation?

Response. He who offended another ought, of himself, first to employ the means toward reconciliation, as natural equity dictates. But if the offense is mutual and equal, let him who first offended first promote reconciliation; but if it is unequal, let him go first who offended more gravely. For the rest, absolute rules cannot be assigned, but the circumstances must be considered.

Question 2. Must an offender seek pardon from the one injured?

Response. Affirmatively, unless some other means or more fitting mode of reconciliation is available, for example, by furnishing various duties or benefits; or unless a petition for pardon seems to profit nothing toward placating the offended person. They also except the case if the offender is far superior to the offended, or if the offended is prudently judged to condone it. Cf. Lacroix, lib. 2, n. 189.

Question 3. Is there an obligation to greet an enemy encountered on the way?

Response. Affirmatively, if circumstances of state, condition, or other similar things demand that all greet one another indiscriminately, or if it is a question of a subject toward his superior, or if the enemy greeted you first. But otherwise, if greeting and conversation are regarded as special signs, excluding however the case in which these are required to avoid scandal or to gain one's brother; but then the obligation, according to St. Alphonsus, is not grave, nor does it seem to be urged strongly, because acts of this kind bring no small difficulty in the offended person. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 28. Baller., note (b), p. 190.

Question 4. Are penitents who accuse themselves of hatred immediately to be reproved concerning sin, especially grave sin?

Response. Negatively, because penitents often confuse hatred properly so called, or enmity, with hatred of abomination, or of a quality or defect. Often also, especially the ruder, or those who are of a more ardent nature, labor only under some natural and invincible aversion of soul, or suffer a certain indignation. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 30. - Voit, n. 703.

Question 5. Are those to be absolved who, although they say that they have no hatred properly so called, nevertheless refuse to speak to an enemy?

Response. A distinction must be made; for either that speaking, from the circumstances, is reckoned only a special sign of love, and besides no reason is present, from those which were assigned above, by force of which, by accident, this sign, although special, ought to be given to an enemy, or not. If the first, the penitent who refuses to speak to an enemy can and must be absolved; if the other, it will be necessary to weigh whether hatred of this kind properly so called is or is not a mortal sin. For just as the inflicting of evil, so also the desire of another's evil admits smallness of matter; and if this holds with those who have injured us in nothing, a fortiori it ought to hold with an enemy, who through an unjust injury has provoked one to just indignation. - Cf. Baller., note (b), p. 192.

Since some have gravely whittled down, and almost taken out of the way, the precept of charity towards God, it is no wonder that they have published lax opinions against the charity by which we are bound to love our Neighbor. The propositions proscribed by Innocent XI in this matter are the following:

10. We are not bound to love our Neighbor by an internal and formal act.

11. We can satisfy the precept of loving our Neighbor by external acts alone.

12. Scarcely in secular persons will you find, even in Kings, anything superfluous to their state; and so scarcely anyone is bound to almsgiving, when he is bound only out of what is superfluous to his state.

13. If you act with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be saddened over someone's life, and rejoice over his natural death, seek it with an inefficacious desire, and long for it — not indeed from displeasure at the person, but on account of some temporal advantage.

14. It is licit, with an absolute desire, to wish for the death of one's father — not indeed as an evil to the father, but as a good to the one wishing it: because, namely, a rich inheritance will fall to him.

15. It is licit for a son to rejoice over the parricide of his parent, committed by himself in drunkenness, on account of the immense riches thence obtained by inheritance.

I. Marcos Vidal, in his Ark on the precept of charity, inquiry 11, number 57: "Although the Doctors commonly assert that one affected by an injury is sometimes bound to exhibit particular signs of love to his enemy — both to avoid scandal, and also when from the exhibiting of such a sign the spiritual salvation of the enemy might probably be hoped for: because if we ought to correct an erring brother when there is hope of his amendment, that we may gain him for the Lord, then, in order that we may reconcile to God and to ourselves one who is an enemy, we are rightly constrained, for example, to greet him, since there is probable hope of gaining him by our greeting — nevertheless I myself admit neither, nor concede it. First, as to grave scandal, which in these times almost never intervenes, since it is held in practice among nearly everyone not to greet an enemy, nor to speak with him," etc.

Number 58: "But as to the second I say: just as I myself ... am not bound under mortal sin to provide for the spiritual salvation of my Neighbor, short of his extreme necessity, with grave temporal loss to myself ... so neither am I bound to yield up my honor and reputation — which are goods of a higher order than temporal goods — under mortal sin, that I may provide for the spiritual life of my Neighbor outside extreme necessity ... But if anyone were bound to exhibit special signs of love to an enemy when by these signs his spiritual salvation might be hoped for, he would also be bound to yield up his honor and reputation short of extreme necessity ..."

This author imposes two things upon the cultivators of the Christian Religion: the one, that he blurts out that the custom of denying a greeting to enemies prevails, as it were, among all; the other, that a loss of honor and reputation is incurred when we embrace our enemies with these offices, that we may gain their eternal salvation.

II. Tamburini, book 5 on the Decalogue, chapter 1, § 3, number 29: "Can a son wish for the death of his father, or rejoice over it — not as an evil to the father (for this would be an execrable hatred), but that the son himself may enjoy the paternal inheritance? Can a mother desire the death of her daughter, lest she be compelled to feed or to dower her? Can a subject desire the death of his Prelate, that he may himself succeed to the prelacy, or that he may be freed from that Prelate who is hostile to him? ... If you only desire, or receive with joy, effects of this kind — the inheritance, the freedom from trouble, the prelacy — you licitly wish for or embrace these things: because you rejoice not over another's evil, but over your own good ... If you desire it under a condition, the answer is likewise easy: you can do so licitly. Finally, if with an absolute desire you desire in this manner: I wish for my father's death, not as it is an evil to my father, but as my own good, or as the cause of my good — namely because from his death I shall enter upon his inheritance; or thus: would that my daughter would die, for thus I shall shake off six hundred anxieties, etc. — if, I say, you so desire, the difficulty of resolving is greater: because then you choose to will evil to them, though as the cause of your own advantage, which does not seem free of fault; and so indeed Bonacina thinks ... Nevertheless Castropalao teaches that the contrary opinion is sufficiently probable."

III. Fernando de Castropalao, treatise 6, disputation 4, point 1, number 11: "Nevertheless I believe that, if you act with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be saddened over someone's life, and rejoice over his natural death, and seek and desire it with an inefficacious affection — not indeed from displeasure at the person, but on account of some temporal advantage following from it. So Emmanuel Sa seems to teach, at the word Charity, number 8, where he teaches absolutely that you can wish bodily evil to your Neighbor for the salvation of his soul, and death for the good of the Commonwealth, and death to an enemy otherwise very harmful to you — not out of hatred, but to avoid your own loss — and likewise to rejoice over his death on account of the good following from it. Azor, part 1, book 3, chapter 12, question 2, and Bonacina, disputation 3, question 4, last point, number 7, affirm that it is lawful for a mother to wish for the death of her daughters, because on account of their deformity or her poverty she cannot give them in marriage according to her desire; and they say the same holds if on their account she were ill-treated by her husband: she could wish for their death, that she might be freed from that harm."

IV. Juan Sánchez, select disputation 2, number 9: "Hence it is inferred that it is lawful to wish death for oneself or for one's Neighbor, in order to avoid a troublesome infirmity, beggary, a penal life inflicted upon a woman by her husband, and other things of this kind — provided the death be desired as to be inflicted by God, not unjustly by man, or by the demon. For health is not worth so great a pain, and a prolonged death is what a life filled with miseries is called."

V. Marcos Vidal, in the Ark on the precept of charity, inquiry 1, number 85: "It must be noted, however, that this precept is fulfilled by this, that no evil be inflicted upon the Neighbor: and therefore there is no precept obliging to have an internal act of love toward the Neighbor, since it does not of itself lie open to the Neighbor, as it does to God."

VI. The same, in the same place, number 88: "It is gathered, secondly, that those living together in some college, or in some religious order, can without the stain of mortal fault mutually deny particular signs of love — namely, greeting, address, and things like these."

VII. The same, inquiry 11, number 46: "Fifth conclusion. It is licit, order and manner being preserved, to wish a temporal evil to another for the honorable end of obtaining some temporal good."

VIII. The same, number 65: "It is gathered, fourthly, that one can licitly imprecate a temporal evil upon another from the motive only of his own or another's utility — as to wish infirmity upon someone, lest he squander everything in gaming; or death, to avoid poverty, or a troublesome infirmity, or a penal life, and the like."

IX. The same, number 66: "It is gathered, fifthly, that one can licitly wish for someone's death, and rejoice over it, on account of an inheritance to be had ... For the object of this act is not the evil, but the advantage following from the death, which is a good and conformable to right reason, as is supposed. Whence the death itself, conducing as a means to such an advantage, and following from natural causes, will be something good."

I. By the name of neighbor are understood all rational creatures capable of eternal beatitude — whether they be infidel men or just, unjust, friends or enemies, predestined or reprobate. Demons and irrational creatures are not comprehended absolutely under the neighbor to be loved; but we can love irrational creatures only insofar as we will that they remain unto the glory of God and the utility of men, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 25, art. 3.

II. Question I. Is there a precept of loving the Neighbor? Answer. All affirm it. Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself: Matthew 22. And John 15: This is my commandment, that you love one another. That this mutual love is the most splendid character of the Christian profession, Christ the Lord adds in the same place: By this shall all men know that you are my disciples, if you have love one for another. And St. Peter, first epistle, chapter 4: But before all things have a constant mutual charity among yourselves, for charity covereth a multitude of sins. St. Paul, to the Galatians, chapter 5: For all the law is fulfilled in one word: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. It is therefore of faith that there is a precept of loving the Neighbor. This precept is natural, insofar as it commands a natural love; but supernatural insofar as we are commanded to love our neighbor not only according as he is akin to us in nature, a neighbor, and by other titles, but also as he is a man redeemed by God and capable of eternal beatitude.

III. Question II. Does this precept oblige us to love our neighbor by peculiar internal acts? Answer. Not a few have denied it; but their doctrine was condemned by Innocent XI in these two theses: We are not bound to love our Neighbor by an internal act. 2. We can satisfy the precept of loving our Neighbor by external acts alone. Exterior works are dead unto eternal life, unless they be vivified by charity. If I have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. Therefore, interior charity being taken away, the exterior works of liberality and beneficence toward the neighbor are inept for fulfilling that divine precept by which we are commanded to love the Neighbor.

IV. Question III. Must the act by which we are commanded to love our neighbor be distinct from the act of love by which we love God? Answer. Certain authors of a more benign turn deny it; but their opinion is false. For there are two distinct precepts, of which one commands the love of God, the other the love of the neighbor. By two distinct acts, then, must the two precepts be fulfilled? Assuredly. The divine goodness is the reason under which the neighbor is loved; and it is not the reason which is loved. God is the primary object of charity, and the Neighbor the secondary. He who loves God with his whole heart above all things virtually loves his Neighbor. But this does not suffice. Nay, the doctrine contained in this thesis was condemned: We are not bound to love our neighbor by an internal and formal act.

V. Question IV. Does this precept oblige of itself to the love of the neighbor? Answer. If the discourse be of the neighbor in general, it is certain that everyone is bound of himself to love his neighbor by a formal act, prescinding from any circumstance whatsoever. On the contrary, if the neighbor be regarded in particular, it is agreed among the Theologians that he is to be loved by force of the precept only when necessity presses.

VI. Per accidens this precept presses when a grave temptation of hatred assails the soul, and the opposite love is judged an opportune remedy for expelling the hatred. Secondly, when we are bound to succor a neighbor in peril, or to bring help to one pressed by any grave necessity, whether in spiritual or in temporal things: then we are bound to love our neighbor with an internal act, because the law of charity is not fulfilled without internal acts. Thirdly, when a grave injury, whether in the goods of reputation or in the goods of soul or body, is inflicted upon our neighbor, on account of which he is most gravely disturbed and afflicted. Fourthly, when our neighbor, placed in extreme necessity, needs our counsel, or spiritual or temporal aid.

VII. We ought to have our mind prepared to love our neighbor in particular, if necessity should occur. And this promptitude of soul is placed in this, that our soul burn with charity in general. This charity excludes no one from that community. But if you desire to know whether charity toward your neighbor in general burns in your heart, see whether, occasion being given either of an injury received or of one inflicted, you be prompt to love. For the plant is known by its fruits.

VIII. Question V. How ought you to love your neighbor as yourself? Answer. This phrase as thyself St. Thomas expounds, II-II, q. 44, art. 7: Now the mode of the love is touched when it is said, as thyself: which is not to be understood as though one should love his neighbor equally with himself, but in a like manner to himself. And this in three ways. First, on the part of the end: namely, that one love his neighbor for God's sake, just as he ought to love himself for God's sake; so that thus the love of the neighbor may be holy. Secondly, on the part of the rule of love: namely, that one should not comply with his neighbor in any evil, but only in good things; just as a man ought to satisfy his own will only in good things; so that thus the love of the neighbor may be just. Thirdly, on the part of the reason of the love: namely, that one love his neighbor not for his own utility or delight, but for this reason, that he wills good to his neighbor, as he wills good to himself; so that thus the love of the neighbor may be true.

IX. Certain rules are prescribed for loving the neighbor. 1. The neighbor must be loved with an affective and an effective love — one, namely, which, proceeding from the heart and from a conscience not feigned, brings aid to the neighbor according to one's powers and the circumstances. 2. The characters of fraternal love St. Paul sets forth, 1 Corinthians 13: Charity is patient, is kind; charity envieth not, dealeth not perversely, is not puffed up, is not ambitious, seeketh not her own, is not provoked to anger, thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not upon iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth: beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things. It is God who speaks with the voice of Paul. Meditate these things seriously, O reader and teacher, that you may become a doer of charity. In these words the whole of Theology is comprehended. Charity is kind in the conversion of the brethren and in the care of their salvation. Patient in bearing the defects of the neighbor. Envieth not, neither openly nor secretly and by mines — whether by keeping silence about the neighbor's merits, or by disparaging his virtues and casting little clouds upon them. Dealeth not perversely, by contriving frauds against him, or throwing impediments in his way. Is not puffed up on account of any endowments whatsoever, whether of soul or of body, whether riches, or nobility, or knowledge. Is not ambitious, so as to lord it arrogantly over the neighbor and to stand out above him. Seeketh not her own, that she may succor the needy neighbor and relieve his necessity. Is not provoked to anger when assailed by injuries, so as to take vengeance or to repay any evil. Thinketh no evil, but interprets all things in the better part — the truth, however, being preserved: therefore it is added: rejoiceth not upon iniquity, but detests and bewails sins, disapproves indifference and deadly negligence, and lifts up her voice against it, because she rejoiceth with the truth. This truth she prefers to all things. Beareth all things, that she may attain eternal life. Believeth all things on account of the authority of God revealing and of the Church proposing. Endureth all things, that she may please God, keep his law, and attain eternal felicity. St. Paul adds, Galatians chapter 6: Bear ye one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfil the law of Christ. These few words, seriously pondered, instruct you more luminously than the many volumes of certain men. For they were dictated by God, and on these the whole law depends, and the prophets.

X. Question VI. What order is to be observed in charity? Answer. To each object of love his own place must be assigned: if he be of a higher bench, a higher place; if of a lower, a lower place must be granted him in the heart. The measure of the lover's love is the goodness of the person loved. The order is twofold: one of loving, the other of succoring. The order of loving flows from the dignity and goodness of the person; the order of succoring flows from the need of the neighbor who lacks our help. Both orders fall under the precept, says St. Thomas, II-II, q. 44, art. 8: Now the order of charity pertains to the very nature of the virtue, since it is taken according to the proportion of the love to the object of love. Whence it is manifest that the order of charity ought to fall under the precept.

XI. Each one ought to love his neighbor as himself, as is plain from the evangelical text itself: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. Love toward yourself, then, is the rule and measure of love toward your neighbor. He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good? says Ecclesiasticus, chapter 14. For a man is nearer to himself than all others. Fire cannot burn external matter unless it first burn in itself. If your own life and the life of your neighbor be regarded absolutely, your own is to be preferred; but if the life of your neighbor be more useful to the glory of God, your own can be exposed, from a motive of virtue, to the danger of death, that the life of the neighbor may be saved. The same must be said if you were to expose your life to save the life of your father, of your lord, of an intimate friend, of a signal benefactor, in testimony of Christian gratitude. But for the reputation, honor, and other goods of the neighbor it is not licit to expose your own life, because such goods are of an inferior order, whereas life is of a superior order.

XII. We are bound to succor the extreme spiritual necessity of our neighbor with the loss of life and of temporal goods. Extreme spiritual necessity is that in which the neighbor is eternally damned unless you bring him help. This doctrine St. John teaches, first epistle, chapter 3: As Christ laid down his life for us, so we also ought to lay down our lives for the brethren. Hence we are bound to baptize, with danger of life, a child abandoned among those infected with plague. If, however, your life be necessary to the common good of the Church or of the Commonwealth, then by the order of charity the common welfare is to be preferred to the welfare of one Private person. Similarly, if you were guilty of mortal sin, and contrition were difficult for you, or you doubted of it, then your own salvation is to be preferred to your neighbor's.

XIII. One condemned to die of hunger cannot refuse food secretly offered him; nor, if the judge were to command this, would he have to be obeyed, because it would be a horrendous and inhuman precept. Nor are you bound to neglect the defense of your own life, lest the killing of another follow. God must nevertheless be prayed to, that he permit us not to fall into such straits, since I count it most difficult to observe the laws of blameless self-defense. Midwives who have baptized children invalidly are bound, even at the danger of death, to make the offense manifest — whatever Fr. Laymann says to the contrary.

XIV. A pregnant mother who is unable to give birth is not bound to suffer a deadly cutting of the womb, that the child enclosed in the womb may be baptized: because evils are not to be done that goods may come. This opinion St. Thomas teaches, on the fourth book, distinction 6, question 2, article 1, ad 4: Therefore a man ought rather to let the infant perish, than that he himself should perish by committing the crime of homicide upon the mother. The graver Theologians subscribe to the Angelic Doctor. Nor is this opposed to the former opinion, in which it was said that a child must be baptized even at the danger of death: because a child existing in the mother's womb has no right to baptism, such as belongs to a child brought forth into the light. In order to provide for the spiritual salvation of your neighbor, you are not bound — nay, you ought not — to expose yourself to a probable danger of sinning; nor is it lawful to will the privation of grace, even for a time, for the salvation of others.

XV. Question VII. Who are to be preferred in love? Answer. First of all are to be preferred father and mother; then wives and children. Wives are to be preferred to parents only as regards habitation and a more tender love. Brothers are to be set before other blood-relations; and among these, those must be preferred who are nearer. Blood-relations must be set before relations by marriage; the faithful before infidels; friends before enemies; benefactors before non-benefactors; spiritual benefactors before temporal benefactors; fellow-citizens before strangers. But the precept of this preference presses only when extreme necessity presses of succoring one or the other of these neighbors. Hence a stranger placed in extreme necessity must be succored before a father who does not labor under such necessity. A community laboring under grave spiritual necessity you must succor even at the danger of life, because in such a community someone is always found placed in extreme necessity.

We explained above the manner: to love one's neighbour as oneself, not equally, but similarly. First on the side of the end, in order to God. Second on the side of the object and the rule of good love. Third on the side of the reason for loving, that he love him for the good of the neighbour, as the reason of friendship requires.

The time, however, is how often we are bound to do good, and when it would be necessary for avoiding sins against the neighbour, especially hatred, etc. See Valentia, puncto 2.

I append here a charming doubt. The desires of death of those from whom inheritances are expected are usually insinuated. These, indeed, are mortal, says Navarr. man. c. 15. num. 10., and he cites all, because the life of the neighbour is a good higher than riches. But others say it is not necessary to repel them, but that they are licit: so Bassaeus, V. char. num. 23., citing Sa, V. Charitas, num. 8.; Azor p. p. lib. 3. cap. 12. quaestio 2.; Sancius select. disp. 2. num. 9.; Palaus part. 1. tract. 6. de char. disp. 4. part. 1. num. 11.: "so that you do not cooperate in death." Bassaeus proves it, because only a useful good is desired; but death, if God wills it: yet these things are frivolous, and therefore to be passed over.