§ I. On the Precept of Love of Neighbor in Itself

I Say 1st. There is a precept of loving one's neighbor with a true and internal affection. This is clear both from the natural law, because also in one's neighbor there exists the same formal motive of love, namely the participated goodness of God; for all men have been created to his image, and are capable of the friendship of God and of eternal beatitude; and from proposition 10 condemned by Innocent XI, which is thus stated: "We are not bound to love our neighbor by an internal and formal act."

But he who lives as a Christian satisfies this precept sufficiently, as to the internal act, by praying in general for his neighbor or by reciting the Lord's Prayer. But as to external acts he satisfies it by succoring the necessities of his neighbor, whether temporal or spiritual, according to the rules to be established below.

I Say 2nd. Some order of charity is to be observed in the love of neighbor. The reason is that the persons to be loved are joined to us more or less closely, and the goods to be desired for them are of different kinds and of different necessity. I said 1st, of different kinds; for some are spiritual, and others temporal; and these again are distinguished into goods of life, goods of reputation and honor, and goods of fortune. - I said 2nd, of different necessity; for this is either temporal or spiritual, and each can be 1st, extreme, when the danger of eternal damnation, or of death, or of another evil nearly equal to death, so presses upon one's neighbor that he, morally speaking, cannot escape it without the help of another; 2nd, grave, when from the circumstances eternal salvation is rendered very difficult, or temporal life very burdensome; 3rd, common, in which one can provide for himself without great difficulty. In this, in the spiritual order, are ordinary sinners, who, if they wished to apply some effort, would rise again from their evil state; but in the temporal order generally mendicant poor persons suffer it, for whom life, according to their condition, is not too burdensome and miserable.

For the practical application of this precept, the following rules are very useful.

Rule I. Each person is bound to love himself simply and absolutely more than his neighbor. The reason is that each person is nearer to himself than any other. This is clear besides from the natural and invincible inclination to love oneself more than one's neighbor; hence the common axiom: Well-ordered charity begins from oneself. Moreover love of self is the rule of love of neighbor according to that saying: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." But the rule is prior and more excellent than the thing ruled.

Rule II. Yet we must succor our neighbor, even with our own advantages placed after his, according to the following order:

1st. In extreme spiritual necessity one's neighbor must be succored even with certain danger of life, provided there is certain hope of helping him, and there is no other by whom he may be relieved, nor does a graver evil threaten from it; because the eternal life of one's neighbor is a good more excellent than our own temporal life.

2nd. In extreme temporal necessity one's neighbor must ordinarily be succored with a great inconvenience indeed, but not with the greatest, such as the donation of a great sum of money would be even for a rich man. The reason is that, on the one hand, the life of one's neighbor is a good more excellent than some good of ours; and, on the other hand, since love of self precedes in order, no one is obliged to undergo so great an inconvenience for others.

3rd. In grave necessity of either order no one is bound to succor his neighbor with his own grave inconvenience, while excluding, however, a title of justice, piety, or office. For from what has been said it follows that we are bound to furnish some help, but not with grave loss of one's own good.

4th. In common necessity of either order one's neighbor is to be succored with some inconvenience indeed, because love of neighbor requires this, but only with a slight one; for there can be only a slight obligation of charity when one's neighbor can rather easily extricate himself from that necessity, or when it is not too burdensome to him. But we are not bound to help all who are placed in common necessity, both because this would be impossible, and because, if at some time it could be done, it would then no longer be a slight inconvenience.

Rule III. Among the various persons to be loved, other things being equal, those are to be preferred who are more closely joined to us by blood, friendship, office, religion, common life, etc., since God has bound them to us by stricter bonds. Hence, outside extreme necessity, first of all a wife is to be succored, because she is one flesh with her husband; 2nd, children; 3rd, parents, and indeed the father before the mother; 4th, brothers, sisters, then relatives, domestics, and intimates. I said outside extreme necessity, because in this, parents, by reason of the fact that they gave life, are more probably to be preferred even to wife and children. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 27 and following; and Hom. Ap., nn. 15 and following.

Question 1. Is it contrary to the charity due to oneself to wish for death on account of the misfortunes of life?

Response. Negatively, if it is done from desire for a better life or eternal happiness, as is evident; but the answer is otherwise if it is done from weariness of life, or from dejection of soul. Yet they do not sin who desire death when life is so burdensome that it is judged harder than death itself. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 30.

Question 2. Is it contrary to charity to desire temporal evil for one's neighbor, or to rejoice over it, on account of a good end?

Response. Negatively, if the due order of charity is observed, that is, if it is done on account of a greater good, or for a lesser evil. Hence this is licit: 1st, on account of the spiritual good of the neighbor himself; 2nd, on account of the common good, whether spiritual or temporal; 3rd, on account also of the good of many persons, of much greater moment, for example, of a family, a community, etc. - But otherwise one must speak when the order of charity is perverted, as is clear from proposition 14 condemned by Innocent XI, which is as follows: "It is licit by an absolute desire to wish for the death of one's father, not indeed as an evil of the father, but as a good of the one wishing, because namely a rich inheritance will come to him." - But we know from Fr. Viva that this was the cause of the condemnation. Hence a wife cannot desire the death of her husband from the fact that she is unjustly badly treated by him, nor the death of her daughter because on account of deformity she cannot marry. - Cf. Baller., note (c), p. 186.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. A mother is not bound to undergo danger of life so that her offspring may be baptized, when it is uncertain whether it will survive for baptism. A pastor is bound in time of plague to succor his own and administer the necessary sacraments either by himself or by an equally suitable substitute.

2nd. He sins against charity toward himself, gravely or lightly, who neglects due care of soul or body. Yet it is licit to deprive oneself of non-necessary spiritual goods for the temporal or spiritual good of one's neighbor, for example, to omit Mass on a weekday. Indeed someone can desire and procure for his neighbor greater non-necessary spiritual goods than for himself, excluding contempt of them.

3rd. It is never licit to commit any sin for procuring the good of one's neighbor, whether spiritual or temporal; nor is it licit to expose oneself to proximate danger of sinning when a fall appears morally certain. Yet it is licit to expose oneself to remote danger. Indeed, as St. Alphonsus teaches, l. 6, n. 453, sometimes someone will even be bound to a work of charity when a fall is otherwise very probable, if one's neighbor is placed in extreme spiritual necessity; provided one forearms himself with opportune means, because one can certainly and justly hope for the help of God. - Baller., note (a), p. 186.

Only he is called an enemy who has injured another either by mere offense or by injury. - Besides, it must be noted that signs of love are of a twofold kind; namely, some common, and others special. The former are owed, and in fact are mutually given, by those who belong to the same state or social condition. The latter, which are called by St. Thomas friendly benefits, and proceed from familiarity, are freely exhibited to certain particular persons by reason of friendship. Both these signs are diverse according to diversity of customs and regions. Cf. Baller., note (a) and (c), p. 188.

I Say. There exists a precept of loving enemies. It is clear both from the words of Christ, Matt. v, 44: "But I say to you, love your enemies"; and because even in enemies the divine goodness shines forth, not insofar as they are enemies, but insofar as they are rational creatures. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 25, art. 8.

St. Thomas teaches in this article: 1st, enemies as such are not to be loved from charity, because "this is perverse, repugnant to charity"; 2nd, but according to their nature, that is, in the universal, "love of enemies is of the necessity of charity: namely so that someone loving God and neighbor does not exclude his enemies from that generality of love of neighbor"; 3rd, "love of enemies can be considered in the special, namely so that someone in the special is moved by a movement of love toward an enemy: and this is not of the necessity of charity absolutely, because neither is it of the necessity of charity to be moved by a movement of love in the special toward each and every man individually: because this is impossible. Yet it is of the necessity of charity according to preparation of soul, namely so that a man have his soul prepared for this, that he would love an enemy in the singular if necessity occurred," namely not only by interior love, which does little toward necessity, but also by exterior love by which he may assist one suffering necessity: and therefore not only in affection, but in effect. But that without an article of necessity a man should fulfill even this act, so that he loves an enemy on account of God, this pertains to the perfection of charity.

But so that the practical application of this precept may be seen more easily, attention must be given to the following rules:

Rule I. Of themselves the common signs of love are owed to enemies, because denial of them would be an act of vengeance and a manifestation of hatred, which is repugnant to charity. I said of themselves, because sometimes a reasonable cause is present for denying them for a time, for example, by reason of due correction, of a good effect in children or inferiors, or on account of prudent fear of quarrels from the sight or conversation of an enemy, etc., likewise on account of the expression of just sorrow conceived from injury, etc.

Rule II. Of themselves special signs of love are not owed to enemies, because friendship is owed to no one. Hence you are not bound, for example, to visit them when sick, console them when sad, receive them with hospitality or at a banquet, in those circumstances indeed in which actions of this kind are not regarded as common signs of love. I said of themselves, for by reason of avoiding scandal, or if by a particular and obvious sign of benevolence you can without grave inconvenience placate an enemy and bring it about that he lay aside hatred, you are sometimes bound to furnish this sign for his salvation. - Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 189.

Rule III. Indeed sometimes even those special signs of benevolence must be exhibited, and if they were omitted, someone would morally show and conduct himself as an enemy. Hence to one seeking pardon and offering a satisfaction congruent to the injury, if any intervened, particular signs also of special love, if any previously used to be given, generally speaking, are not to be refused, although there is not an obligation afterward to repeat those signs and preserve the former friendship. - Cf. St. Thom. in 3, dist. 30, q. 1, art. 2, ad 5. - Baller., note (b), p. 189.

Question 1. What order must be observed in making reconciliation?

Response. He who offended another ought, of himself, first to employ the means toward reconciliation, as natural equity dictates. But if the offense is mutual and equal, let him who first offended first promote reconciliation; but if it is unequal, let him go first who offended more gravely. For the rest, absolute rules cannot be assigned, but the circumstances must be considered.

Question 2. Must an offender seek pardon from the one injured?

Response. Affirmatively, unless some other means or more fitting mode of reconciliation is available, for example, by furnishing various duties or benefits; or unless a petition for pardon seems to profit nothing toward placating the offended person. They also except the case if the offender is far superior to the offended, or if the offended is prudently judged to condone it. Cf. Lacroix, lib. 2, n. 189.

Question 3. Is there an obligation to greet an enemy encountered on the way?

Response. Affirmatively, if circumstances of state, condition, or other similar things demand that all greet one another indiscriminately, or if it is a question of a subject toward his superior, or if the enemy greeted you first. But otherwise, if greeting and conversation are regarded as special signs, excluding however the case in which these are required to avoid scandal or to gain one's brother; but then the obligation, according to St. Alphonsus, is not grave, nor does it seem to be urged strongly, because acts of this kind bring no small difficulty in the offended person. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 28. Baller., note (b), p. 190.

Question 4. Are penitents who accuse themselves of hatred immediately to be reproved concerning sin, especially grave sin?

Response. Negatively, because penitents often confuse hatred properly so called, or enmity, with hatred of abomination, or of a quality or defect. Often also, especially the ruder, or those who are of a more ardent nature, labor only under some natural and invincible aversion of soul, or suffer a certain indignation. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 30. - Voit, n. 703.

Question 5. Are those to be absolved who, although they say that they have no hatred properly so called, nevertheless refuse to speak to an enemy?

Response. A distinction must be made; for either that speaking, from the circumstances, is reckoned only a special sign of love, and besides no reason is present, from those which were assigned above, by force of which, by accident, this sign, although special, ought to be given to an enemy, or not. If the first, the penitent who refuses to speak to an enemy can and must be absolved; if the other, it will be necessary to weigh whether hatred of this kind properly so called is or is not a mortal sin. For just as the inflicting of evil, so also the desire of another's evil admits smallness of matter; and if this holds with those who have injured us in nothing, a fortiori it ought to hold with an enemy, who through an unjust injury has provoked one to just indignation. - Cf. Baller., note (b), p. 192.