The Final End of Man

Since moral theology teaches man the way by which he can come to his end, it first treats of the ultimate end of man, both so that he may know the end toward which he must tend by his acts, and so that the foundation and supreme principle of moral theology may be clear: for all things depend upon and are governed by the end. Nevertheless, the ultimate end is to be treated in such a way that those things which are set forth at length in moral philosophy are briefly recalled here, and then those things are added which are proper to moral theology.

In treating this question, a distinction must be made between the end for whom and the end which, or, in other words, between the subject into which some good is ordered and the good itself which is ordered into that subject.

I. The final end for whom of man - as also of every creature - is God, or the divine goodness. This is clear: 1. from Sacred Scripture: "For whom are all things, and through whom are all things"; "The Lord has made all things for himself, the wicked also for the evil day."¹

It is proved 2. by reason. He who is the first cause and therefore the absolute Lord of all things is necessarily the end to which all things are subordinated. But God is the first cause and therefore the absolute Lord of all things.

¹ Heb. 2:10; Prov. 16:4.

II. The final end which of man is the external glory of God, both objective and formal.¹ This is clear 1. from Sacred Scripture: "And everyone who calls upon my name, I have created him for my glory, I have formed him and made him."² It is clear 2. from reason; for from the fact that God is the final end for whom of man, it follows that man is ordered to the good of God. But the good of God to which man is ordered can be nothing other than the external glory of God, and that both objective and formal. For that good cannot be some intrinsic good, since God is infinite and therefore his intrinsic good cannot be perfected. Nor can it be some extrinsic good which is useful to God, since God is infinitely blessed. It remains, therefore, that that good is the external glory of God, or consists in the fact that man glorifies the divine goodness.

Now the end of man is the external glory of God, and that both objective and formal. For every creature ought to glorify God in the manner in which it can accomplish this. Now man can glorify him not only objectively - that is, by displaying a likeness of his goodness - but also formally, that is, by knowing, loving, and extolling him (St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 3, chapter 20). Hence the Vatican Council says: "God, by his goodness and almighty power, not for increasing his beatitude, nor for acquiring it, but for manifesting his perfection through the goods which he imparts to creatures, by a most free counsel... created the creature from nothing." And: "If anyone denies that the world was made for the glory of God, let him be anathema."³

¹ Glory is taken in two ways: improperly, for the excellence itself by force of which someone deserves to be known, praised, loved; properly, for knowledge, praise, and love of excellence, and taken in this sense it is usually defined as: clear knowledge with praise. The glory of God is distinguished as twofold, internal and external, according as it is in God or is offered to him by creatures.

Internal glory again is twofold, objective and formal. Objective glory is the divine excellence itself; formal glory is God's own infinite knowledge, love, and joy concerning his infinite excellence.

External glory also is twofold, objective and formal. Objective glory consists in this, that divine excellence or perfection shines forth in creatures. Formal glory is situated in this, that divine perfection is known, loved, and extolled by creatures. Now irrational creatures glorify God only objectively; rational creatures, however, are also bound to formal glorification. Besides, objective glory is ordered to formal glory and is completed by it; in other words, irrational creatures are ordered to manifesting the divine perfections to man and to arousing him so that he may formally glorify God. Hence irrational things are said to be ordered into God through man as mediator; man, however, is ordered immediately into God.

² Isa. 43:7.

³ Constitution Dei Filius, chapter 1 and canon 5.

III. Besides the absolutely final end, which man has in common with every creature and which consists in the external glory of God, there is also another final end proper to man. "In the parts of the universe," says St. Thomas, "each creature is for the sake of its own proper act and perfection" (I, q. 65, a. 2). Now the final end proper to man is beatitude. For that is rightly called the proper end of man toward which he himself tends by a natural appetite, and therefore by one implanted by the author of nature. But man tends by a natural appetite toward beatitude.

Corollary. Beatitude, although rightly called the final end proper to man, is nevertheless subordinated to the glory of God, which is the absolutely final end. For from the fact that God is the final end for whom of man, it follows that all things which pertain to man or regard him, and therefore also the beatitude itself of man, are ordered to the good of God, that is, to his external glory. Besides, the beatitude of man and the external glory of God are so connected with each other that they are constituted by the same acts. Lessius explains this in these words: "The highest glory of God is our highest good, and our highest good cannot be anything except his highest glory. The reason is that his highest external glory is that he be perfectly known, loved, and tasted by us. Hence it consists in three vital acts; and in the same acts our highest good formally consists.... For our highest good and formal beatitude is to see, love, taste God, or, what can be said in one word as the same thing, to enjoy God. And so in the highest glory of God our highest good is formally and intrinsically included, so that it cannot be conceived without it; and by this very fact, that God intends and seeks that glory, he intends and seeks our highest good and advantage."¹

¹ Lessius, De perfectionibus divinis, book 14, chapter 3.

IV. In order that beatitude, which we have proved to be the end proper to man, may be more fully clarified, several things must be set forth concerning beatitude.

1. In what does beatitude consist? Beatitude, which by its concept implies the presence of every good and the absence of every evil, is taken objectively or materially, and subjectively or formally. Objective beatitude is the "perfect good which totally quiets the appetite" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 2, a. 5). Subjective beatitude is the very attainment or possession of the fully beatifying good. Therefore:

a) Objective beatitude, or the perfect good which totally quiets the human appetite, is not a created thing but God. For that good totally quiets the human appetite which perfectly quiets the intellect and the will. But no creature can perfectly quiet the aforesaid faculties; God, however, does quiet them.

The major is proved. The sensitive and vegetative parts of man are subordinated to the rational part, so that they are not for their own sake, but so that they may render rational life possible. Hence they have one final end together with the rational part. Given this, they attain their end by the very fact that the rational part is perfectly quieted.

The minor is proved. Since intellect and will are capable of every truth and good, and have an innate desire for them, that good alone can perfectly quiet the said faculties which contains in itself every truth and good. But no creature contains every truth and good; God, however, contains them (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 2, a. 8).

b) Subjective or formal beatitude, by the consent of all, consists in some operation, and indeed in an operation of the rational part. It consists in some operation: "for beatitude is the ultimate perfection of man; but each thing is perfect insofar as it is in act" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 3, a. 2). It consists in an operation of the rational part, not of the sensitive part; "for the beatitude of man consists essentially in his conjunction to the uncreated good, which is the final end, as was shown above, to which man cannot be conjoined through an operation of the senses" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 3, a. 3), as is plain. But it is disputed in which act of the rational part beatitude consists. According to some, it is situated in an act of the will alone, whether of love, as the Scotists teach, or of joy, as others judge. According to others, it consists in an act of intellect and will. According to others, it consists in an act of the intellect alone, namely in the perfect knowledge of God. This is the opinion of St. Thomas (I-II, q. 3, a. 4), and it seems true. For beatitude formally consists in the act by which we formally attain the highest good. But that act is not love, nor joy, but the perfect knowledge or vision of God. It is not love, by which we are inclined toward the object but do not attain it; nor joy, which concerns a possessed good and therefore supposes its acquisition; but perfect knowledge or vision, since by it the knower unites to himself, and therefore attains, the known object.

2. How is beatitude divided? Beatitude is divided into natural and supernatural. Natural beatitude "is proportioned to created nature, namely that which a created thing can attain according to the power of its nature" (St. Thomas, I, q. 23, a. 1). Supernatural beatitude is that which "exceeds the proportion and capacity of created nature" (St. Thomas, same place).

Now natural beatitude consists in "a knowledge of God that is indeed perfect, relatively to the capacity of nature, but mediate and only abstractive, insofar as he is the Author of nature. Namely, this contemplation of divine things, although as to clarity far more perfect than every knowledge of this mortal life, in the state of pure nature would not have reached the vision of God, but would have been knowledge of God from creatures, and chiefly through infused science. From that knowledge would have flowed perfect natural love of the infinite Good and endless joy. And so in the state of natural beatitude man, wholly immune from every physical and moral evil, would have been naturally perfectly blessed by the perpetual possession of the infinite Good."¹

Supernatural beatitude consists in the immediate or intuitive vision of the highest Good, or of the divine Essence (n. 8).

Note. The state of supernatural beatitude is the complex of all those things which render man blessed in every respect in the supernatural order. To this, besides those things which are required for the essence, belong beatific love, joy, perpetuity, impeccability, the resurrection and glorification of the body, etc.

¹ Potters, Compendium Ethicae Generalis, number 43.

3. What beatitude is the end of man?

Supernatural beatitude is truly the end of man. This is clear both from Sacred Scripture¹ and from the doctrine of the Church.² From these things, however, it does not follow that natural beatitude has been taken away. "Now there is the same nature, and consequently the same capacity; hence, since grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it, it does not deprive it of this natural perfection. And so it is certain that in supernatural beatitude man will have every perfection connatural to himself, in the way in which St. Thomas proves that a man seeing God is not deprived of the natural knowledge of God; rather, he is perfected in it to the highest degree; and the same is proportionally true of love."³

¹ Cf. 1 Cor. 13:12; 1 John 3:2.

² Benedict XII, Constitution Benedictus Deus; Council of Florence, in the Decree of Union, Denzinger-Bannwart, numbers 530, 693.

³ Suarez, De ultimo fine, disputation 4, section 3, number 4.

4. The destination of this life is the imperfect glorification of God, and secondarily imperfect beatitude. Since the final end, that is, the external glorification of God and beatitude, cannot be perfectly obtained in the present life, it remains that this life must be the way and preparation for attaining the perfect or consummated glorification of God and beatitude in the other life. Now earthly life cannot be the way, preparation, or disposition toward the glorification of God and our consummated beatitude unless we begin the said glorification and beatitude in this life. Therefore the destination of this life is the begun or imperfect glorification of God, and secondarily imperfect beatitude, consisting in the knowledge and love of God, and in the joy and peace that will arise from them.

Axiom of Pseudo-Dionysius: “That act is good whose causes are complete; that act is evil in which a single cause is lacking.”

(a) This axiom can be understood as referring to perfect good, and the meaning then is that an act is not perfectly good in the moral sense unless all its elements—its object, purpose and circumstances—are good; just as an oration is not called perfect, unless all its elements—the speaker, the matter, the style and the delivery—are what they should be. Hence, a single defect is enough to make an act fall short of perfection.

(b) The axiom can be understood of essential goodness, and the meaning then is that an act is not essentially good unless all the causes that contribute to essential goodness—the object of the act and any circumstances that may through the intention of the agent take on the character of object—are good; just as a man is not said to be healthy, unless his heart, lungs, and all the other chief parts of the body are sound. Hence, an act is substantially bad, if either its own end (the object of the act) or the special purpose had in mind by the agent (the end of the agent) is bad, as explained above in 79-81.

The axiom of Dionysius does not mean: (a) that an act cannot be essentially or substantially good and at the same time accidentally bad (see 78), for, if even one circumstance not properly attended to could change an act from good into bad, how few good acts would be done even by the most saintly persons! Example: Caius who sacrifices himself for the service of God and his neighbor, now and then feels some slight vanity over his work. His acts remain substantially good. (b) The axiom does not mean that an act cannot be substantially bad and yet have good circumstances that diminish its badness (see 81).

36. But the fundamental and universal objective principle of demonstration, pervading and governing the whole of moral Theology, is that God is the ultimate end of man, and accordingly that man is bound by obligation to tend to God by acts proportioned to the aforesaid end, morally good, and moreover supernatural, since God is the ultimate end of man not merely naturally but supernaturally. For the beatitude to which man is destined in the present order of divine providence consists in the intuitive vision of God and in the fruitful love of God; this end is wholly supernatural, exceeding all the powers and all the exigencies of created nature. Indeed, the reason by which God is moved to create the world and man is His own divine goodness and infinite perfection itself, namely love of His own infinite goodness and perfection. The world exists and we exist because God is good. But since divine goodness and perfection are infinite and cannot in any way be increased in themselves, God, creating the world and man, can intend nothing other than to communicate outwardly His good and His perfections, which consequently all creatures may manifest, and rational creatures may know, and thus may tend to God and glorify Him. The Lord has wrought all things for Himself, Prov. 16:4. Therefore man was founded by God in order that he may know and love Him; and in this knowledge and love of God consists both the glory of God and at the same time the beatitude of man. But, showing the riches of His divine goodness and infinite perfection, God made man a sharer in the divine nature, by destining man to see Him as He is, not through a mirror in an enigma, but face to face. Therefore after this mortal life man enjoys the divine essence, by whose knowledge and love he possesses eternal beatitude. But this immediate and intuitive vision of God, and enjoyment of God from love of the divine goodness immediately known, is a participation in the divine life itself: when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, 1 John 3:2; and consequently it exceeds all natural exigencies and powers, and is wholly supernatural. Eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it ascended into the heart of man, what things God has prepared for those who love Him. 1 Cor. 2:3.

153. 1. Concerning the relation of the act to God. Baius, the Jansenists, and certain Louvain doctors, thinking that human nature had been wholly vitiated by original sin, taught that for the moral goodness of an act it is required that it be referred to God as ultimate end, and indeed not only implicitly, but also explicitly.¹ Now the relation of an act to the ultimate end is explicit when the agent thinks about it and intends it; implicit, when the ultimate end is not intended in itself, but in another, for example in the objective goodness of the act.

¹ According to Baius and Jansenius, he sins who acts without charity or heavenly delight, because no middle is given between charity and vicious cupidity; the Louvain doctors embraced the doctrine of Baius, although they tried to soften it somewhat. Cf. Vacant-Mangenot, Dict. de théol., t. II, under the word Baius.

154. Thesis: For the moral goodness of an act an explicit relation to God is not required, but an implicit relation suffices. Thus the common and true opinion.

(A) For here there is question of a work good in itself and performed on account of an honorable motive. But he who does good from an honorable end by that very fact acts in a manner consonant with right reason, and consequently with divine reason itself. Therefore such a work of itself, by its own weight, tends to the glory of God, and consequently is truly done on account of God, although implicitly.

155. (B) Nor does the argument taken by the adversaries from the words of St. Paul² avail to the contrary: "Whether you eat, or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all things unto the glory of God." Whether those words are to be understood of a precept or of a counsel is controverted among theologians. But even those who, with St. Thomas, hear them as concerning a precept, require nothing else than that all works be referred implicitly and objectively to God, as has already been explained. - Augustine³ declares this excellently thus: "I suggest a remedy, whence all day long you praise God, if you wish: whatever you do, do it well, and you have praised God... Have you ceased from singing a hymn, do you depart so that you may refresh yourself? Do not become drunk, and you have praised God... Do you carry on business? do not commit fraud, and you have praised God."

² I Cor., X, 31.

³ St. Augustine, on Psalm 34, serm. II, n. 16, Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 341.

And indeed, if the aforesaid words signified a universal precept of referring all acts explicitly to God, it would follow that all the works of unbelievers are sins, since these do not explicitly refer them to the true God; yet this has deservedly been reprobated by the Church.⁴ - But if it is said that here there is question of a particular precept binding only the faithful, an intolerable yoke is imposed on them: for most very often act without thinking about the ordination of their works to God; indeed they are persuaded that they act well when, for example, they give alms to relieve a poor man, without thinking about the ultimate end. Therefore such an interpretation is opposed to the common sense and practice of the faithful.

⁴ Indeed by Pius V, 1 October 1567, this proposition 25 of Baius was condemned at least as scandalous: "All works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices." (Denzinger, Enchiridion, n. 905).

N. B. Although we are not bound to refer all our acts to God, nevertheless there is given a precept of turning oneself to Him several times in the course of life, as will be explained below, where we treat concerning the virtue of charity. - Besides, it is certainly expedient not only in the morning, but also more often during the day, to offer all one's acts to God, that they may become more perfect.

156. 2. Concerning the relation of the act to an end positively honorable. As we noted above, n. 5, honorable good is distinguished from delightful or useful good. Wherefore the question arises whether we ought to act on account of an honorable end, or whether it is lawful to act on account of delightful or useful good. Among theologians themselves the matter is controverted.

(A) For some teach that it is by no means required that the will positively intend an honorable end, but that it suffices that it not exclude it, or apprehend that it is doing nothing contrary to an honorable end; for, they say, for an honorable action it is not required that an honorable end always be intended, but it suffices that it be good from the circumstances, provided the end is not evil; thus he acts well who plays in order to recreate himself, without thinking about the honorable character of this action.¹

¹ Thus Ballerini-Palmieri, t. I, n. 112-129; Genicot, I, n. 39; Noldin, n. 69.

157. (B) But others, more commonly and more truly, teach that delightful or useful good ought not to be sought except on account of an honorable end, positively willed at least implicitly. For delight is ordered by God, the author of nature, primarily to alluring men to necessary or useful operations to which it is annexed; thus a certain delight is annexed to the use of foods, so that man may thereby be allured to eating and may preserve his life; therefore he acts inordinately who, at least implicitly, does not refer this delight to self-preservation, but eats solely on account of pleasure.² The same must be said concerning useful good, which from its own nature ought to be referred to a further end. - But he implicitly intends on account of an honorable end who acts moderately; for moderation proceeds from right reason.

² To this belongs proposition 8, condemned by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679, as scandalous and pernicious in practice: "To eat and drink even to satiety, for pleasure alone, is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can lawfully enjoy its own acts." For, according to Viva (on this proposition, n. 7), the proposition was condemned not only because here there is question of immoderate pleasure, but also because it supposes that it is lawful to enjoy pleasure by intending it uniquely and ultimately. Cf. Denzing., n. 1025.

Nevertheless we can intend useful or delightful good not only insofar as it is honorable, but also insofar as it is useful or delightful, provided the reason of the honorable is not neglected, nor the due order inverted. For the delightful and the useful are something good, although subordinated to honorable good; therefore it is lawful to intend each, not indeed primarily, but secondarily, as an intermediate end to honorable good.

Hence the intention of one's own good, even delightful good, does not render an action evil, provided the will does not rest in it as in the ultimate end; nevertheless he acts more perfectly who, affectively renouncing delights, intends nothing except the properly universal good and that which is consonant with right reason, namely honorable good.

1. Unless otherwise noted, the places indicated in the text are from St. Thomas's Summa, in I-II, in the questions which we submit to commentary.

15. Thesis I. In all deliberate and voluntary, or human, actions, man, in the mode proper to himself, acts for the sake of some end or good. - It is proved:

a) From the notion of good: all actions which proceed from some power are caused by it according to the reason of its object. But the object of the will is good and end. Hence voluntary or human acts must be for the sake of an end (q. 1, a. 1).

b) From the notion of end: in causes subordinated per se, of which one does not move unless it is moved by another, there is no process to infinity; but when the first is removed, the others must necessarily be removed. But the end is first among causes, because nothing acts except from a determinate intention of an end: for if the agent were not determined to some effect, it would no more will or do this than that. Therefore all human acts depend upon and are derived from the intention of the end, and thus are done for the sake of the end (a. 2 and 4).

c) Billuart brings an argument from induction: all human acts are elicited or commanded by the will. Elicited acts are occupied either about the end, and then they are for the sake of the end, which by its goodness allures the will to love it; or about the means, and then they also are for the sake of the end, since the will does not will them except for the end. Likewise commanded acts, because the will commands them from love of the end, so that through them as through means it may attain the end. Therefore.

2. Billuart, diss. 1, art. 2.

1. The aforesaid doctrine is not opposed by the fact that the ultimate end itself consists in certain actions, and therefore that all human actions are not for the sake of an end. - Response: St. Thomas, a. 1, ad 2: "If a human action is the ultimate end, it must be voluntary, otherwise it would not be human... But some action is called voluntary in two ways: in one way because it is commanded by the will, as walking or speaking; in another way because it is elicited by the will, as willing itself. But it is impossible that the very act elicited by the will be the ultimate end; for the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is color. Hence, just as it is impossible that the first visible thing be seeing, because every seeing is of some visible object, so it is impossible that the first appetible thing, which is the end, be willing itself. Hence it remains that if a human action is the ultimate end, it is itself commanded by the will; and thus some action of man, at least willing itself, is for the sake of an end. Whatever, therefore, man does, it is true to say that man acts for the sake of an end, even by doing the action which is the ultimate end."

16. Corollary.

From this it follows that all human acts receive their species (at least their physical species) from the end, whether a) they are considered actively, as an action proceeding from an agent, or as the motion by which man moves himself; and then they have their species from the formal principle. But the principle of an act of the will is its object, which is the good and the end (in intention); or b) they are considered passively, as a passion tending to something, and the motion by which man is moved by himself to a term; and then they are specified by the term. But that at which the human act is terminated is that which the will intends as an end (in execution) (a. 3).

17. Thesis II. In all deliberate acts man, at least implicitly, acts for the sake of the ultimate end of the whole of life, at least conceived abstractly and in common, or for the sake of perfect good. - It is proved:

a) From the notion of good: everything that man seeks, he seeks under the aspect of good. But good is sought either as a perfect, satiating good and ultimate end, or as an inchoation and part of perfect good, and therefore as tending to perfect good and the ultimate end, because the inchoation of anything is always ordered to its consummation, as every part to the whole (a. 6).

b) From the notion of ultimate end: the ultimate end stands in moving the will as the first mover stands in motions, because it is first in intention. But among movers there is no process to infinity, because second movers do not move except insofar as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary goods, or intermediate and subordinated ends, do not move the appetite except in order to the perfect good, which is the ultimate end (a. 6). And indeed, if there were a process to infinity in ends, and if all were intermediate and subordinated ends, there would be no end which the will would intend for its own sake and in which it would ultimately rest, none from which the will would first begin to be moved, and therefore it would never will anything, would never begin to do anything; just as neither would an action once begun ever be terminated. And thus there would be no human act; and even if there were some act, it would be altogether vain (a. 6 and 4).

18. Thesis III. Man cannot at the same time choose two ultimate ends, but only one.

This is to be understood not only of the ultimate end taken formally and in the abstract, or of beatitude in common and the very notion of the supreme good, which evidently is one; but also of the ultimate end taken materially in the concrete, that is, of the thing in which man places the supreme good. Not indeed if the end is considered partially, because several things collectively taken can concur toward it as parts, which together constitute one perfect and integral good; but if it is considered totally, because the notion of the supreme good cannot be attributed to several things dividedly and separately, so that man would tend into several disparate things as into ultimate total and adequate ends not subordinated to one another, as if each one alone without the others were the whole ultimate end. And therefore Christ says (Mt. VI, 24): No one can serve two masters, namely, not subordinated to one another.

It is proved: a) From the fact that the ultimate end has the nature of the perfect: someone seeks as ultimate end that which he seeks as a perfect good, completing himself and fully satiating him (from the intention of the one seeking); otherwise he would not rest in it and it would not be the ultimate end. Therefore the ultimate end so fills and satiates the whole appetite of man that nothing outside it is left to be sought.

But it would not fill nor fully satiate if something outside it, namely another end, could be sought and were required for its perfection.

Hence it cannot be that the will tend into two in such a way as if each were its perfect good and ultimate end.

This is confirmed: if there were two ultimate ends, neither would be the supreme and full good of the one seeking, neither would perfectly satiate the appetite, since with one obtained the other would be appetible. Whence they would at once be fully satiating, because ultimate ends, and they would not be, because outside each there would remain something appetible which would not be subordinated to it, namely, the other end.

b) From the fact that the ultimate end has the nature of the first natural good: that which is naturally desired cannot be except one, because nature is determined to one and does not tend except to one; whence just as there is only one form and one species of one thing, so neither is there except one natural inclination.

But the ultimate end or supreme good is naturally desired.

Therefore the ultimate end is one.

The minor is clear from internal experience, and is also understood: just as in reason the principle is that which is known as naturally implanted, so in the will the principle is that which is desired by natural tendency; whence love of the end or of the supreme good is implanted in the will, because it is the principle in appetible things.

c) From the fact that the ultimate end has the nature of the first thing specifying: in every genus of causing and operating, there is one principle from which all things are derived; otherwise there would not be one genus.

But all human acts constitute one genus of operating and causing, because all appetible things of the will are of one genus, namely, a good befitting man; but the ultimate end is the first principle in this genus because appetible for its own sake.

Therefore the ultimate end is one. "Since voluntary actions receive their species from the end," says St. Thomas, "they must receive the notion of genus from the ultimate end, which is common" (a. 5).

19. Thesis IV. The ultimate end of man truly is happiness or beatitude. - It is proved:

The ultimate end is the highest and perfect good of man. But beatitude or happiness is nothing other than the possession of this highest good, sufficient and complete, which ultimately perfects and terminates every tendency and fully satiates and totally quiets the whole appetition of an intellectual nature, which consciously knows this full sufficiency of its own in the good and rejoices in it (I, q. 26, a. 1). Therefore the ultimate end of man is beatitude.

Hence beatitude can be defined, both objective: the perfect good totally quieting and satiating the appetite (q. 2, a. 8), or the most complete good which completes the whole appetition of a rational agent, so that nothing is left to be desired, or the perfect and sufficient good, excluding every evil and fulfilling every desire (q. 5, a. 3), the ultimate perfection of rational or intellectual nature (I, q. 62, a. 1); and formal: stable possession and rest in ultimate perfection, possession of the perfect good which totally quiets our desire, or a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods (Boethius).

That this beatitude truly exists and is possible for us is proved: man by an innate appetite and instinctive necessity tends to perfect beatitude, so that it is impossible not to think of it frequently and not to desire it, or sincerely to will the opposite. But an innate appetite cannot be vain, for otherwise our nature would be badly constituted; furthermore it is repugnant to the wisdom, truth, and goodness of God that He should have implanted in us an inclination and appetite for something which does not exist or which we are unable to attain. Therefore.

20. Corollaries.

1. The end is the cause, origin, and root of all affections. This "can be declared more fully not only by the example of light, which, because it is the first and highest visible thing, is the reason for seeing all differences of colors; or by the example of the motion of the heart, which, because it is the first motion of life, is the cause from which all vital motions flow; but still far more brilliantly by the comparison, most frequent in St. Thomas, of the intellect with the will. For the love of the ultimate end is related among appetible things as the knowledge of principles is among intelligible things; whence, just as first principles are the first things known, so beatitude or the ultimate end is the first thing willed. And just as we do not assent to particular conclusions except insofar as they cohere with first principles, so neither do we will particular goods except insofar as they are connected with the ultimate end, namely, beatitude. And finally, just as the knowledge of principles moves to all other cognitions, insofar as, enlightened by it, we understand the rest, and therefore it is the root of all cognitions, indeed the other cognitions are nothing but certain propagations and diffusions of that first light, so that first love of beatitude moves to other loves, insofar as, stirred up by it, we seek those things which lead to it, and it is the first root of all affections; indeed the other affections are nothing but certain branches, shoots, and diffusions of that first love; or lines born from this circumference and terminated in its center, namely, beatitude. Whence Boethius excellently says, On the Consolation, III, prose 2: Every care of mortals, which the labor of manifold studies exercises, proceeds indeed by a diverse path, but nevertheless strives to arrive at one end of beatitude. And St. Augustine, On the Trinity, book XIII, chapter 5: All men will to be blessed, and they most ardently desire this, and for the sake of this they desire the rest." Thus Goudin, Philosophy, part 3, q. 1, a. 1, § 1, conclusion 2.

2. Beatitude can be considered:

a) In the abstract, and thus it is the universal and complete good which man necessarily wills and cannot not will, and therefore in this all agree.

b) In the concrete, for the thing whose possession ought to render us blessed and perfectly good; and thus man, who does not possess it, freely tends to it, because he does not necessarily see the necessary connection of this or that good with beatitude. Hence under this respect men do not agree in the ultimate end (q. 5, a. 8; q. 1, a. 7).

21. Thesis I. According to Catholic doctrine, the beatitude of man does not consist in created goods, neither external goods, nor internal goods of the body or soul, whether these are taken distributively or collectively.

This must be proved by parts. For the proof it is necessary to consider the conditions required for beatitude, which are not found in the aforesaid goods. For beatitude is the state perfected by the aggregation of all goods, or the stable possession of the perfect good which totally quiets the soul. Hence, that some good may be able to beatify man, perfectly complete and satiate him, it must be:

a) perfect in itself, or ultimately appetible for its own sake and not for the sake of another;

b) sufficient and supreme, or filling all legitimate aspirations of the intellect and will;

c) stable and unfailing.

These things being posited, it must be said that man cannot obtain his beatitude in created goods: whether external goods of fortune, or goods of the body, or goods of the soul, which, although under a manifold respect they are desirable, lack the three aforesaid conditions (q. 2, a. 4).

I. If those alone are saved who are conformed to Christ the Lord, and who crucify the flesh with its concupiscences, it is plain to the eye that their number is small. Be not therefore disturbed if, of the many who come to you imploring absolution from their sins, few are truly contrite; for few are the elect.

II. The discourse is of adult Catholics. That the multitude of the elect, considered absolutely, is innumerable, all confess. The dispute is about the number of the elect in comparison with the reprobate. This comparison being made, the Scriptures and all the Fathers, both the ancient ones and those nearest to us, affirm that the former are few, the latter very many.

III. The oracles of Christ in Matthew 7 are lucid: Enter ye in at the narrow gate: for wide is the gate, and broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. And immediately, moved as it were to wonder, he exclaims: How narrow is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life: and few there are that enter by it! What then follows? Beware of false prophets — namely, of false masters, who speak soft and pleasing things, who under the mask of benignity adulterate the testimony of Christ: for some wrongly blurt out that in this saying only Infidels and Heretics are comprehended — the whole tradition of the Fathers crying out against them.

IV. Christ the Lord confirms this his truth in Luke, chapter 13, where, to one asking whether they are few that are saved, he answered: Strive to enter by the narrow gate; for many, I say to you, shall seek to enter, and shall not be able. Who does not shudder at these words, says St. Augustine: They shall seek to enter, and shall not be able? Worldly men, given over to dissolutions and to the spacious way, seek once, twice, thrice every year to enter the narrow way of chastity, of justice, of penance — but in vain. Today they confess, and after a few days they relapse into the spacious and broad way of the vices. All these seek to enter, but in very truth they do not enter. But the parable which the Evangelist immediately subjoins in the same place explains this truth more lucidly; for St. Luke continues thus: But when the master of the house shall be gone in, and shall shut the door, you shall begin to stand without, and knock at the door, saying: Lord, open to us. And he answering, shall say to you: I know you not, whence you are. Then you shall begin to say: We have eaten and drunk in thy presence, and thou hast taught in our streets. And he shall say to you: I know you not, whence you are: depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity.

V. Who are they that eat and drink the most holy Body and Blood of the Lord, if not Priests and Christians? The discourse, then, is not of Infidels and Heretics, but of domestic Catholics, workers of iniquity. Another parable, in Matthew 13, comes to the same point: Behold the sower went forth to sow. And whilst he soweth some fell by the way side... And other some fell upon stony ground... And others fell among thorns... And others fell upon good ground... He that hath ears to hear, let him hear. The seed is the word of God. Only a fourth part fell upon good ground; the remaining three, by the wayside, among the stones, and among the thorns. This is the explanation of Christ the Lord himself, saying in Luke 8: The seed is the word of God. And they by the way side are they that hear: then the devil cometh, and taketh the word out of their heart, lest believing they should be saved. The faith here spoken of is not that by which we become faithful, but that by which we attain salvation. When Preachers and Directors of souls interpret the said parables to the faithful of Christ, and persuade them to abstain from dances, from games, from comedies, and from the other illusions of the raving world, how many do they find who believe? How many give them credence? Either they deride them, hiss at them, and traduce them as Rigorists, Jansenists, and Fanatics; or, despising them, they go to the benign Casuists, from whom they may receive soft liniments, and run the more swiftly along the broad and spacious way. But let us transcribe the other part of the parable: Now they upon the rock, are they who when they hear, receive the word with joy: and these have no roots; for they believe for a while, and in time of temptation, they fall away. And that which fell among thorns, are they who have heard, and going their way, are choked with the cares and riches and pleasures of this life, and yield no fruit. But that on the good ground, are they who in a good and perfect heart, hearing the word, keep it, and bring forth fruit in patience. Thus far Christ the Lord. Could Christians be more lucidly described — who, often coming both to sermons and to the sacraments, seduced by the thorns of riches, by the solicitudes of the present life, and by the illusions of pleasures, render the word of God sterile? Is it not evident by manifest experience that these are very many, and that they are few who, in a good and perfect heart hearing the word, keep it, and bring forth fruit in patience? These last words must be weighed with the utmost attention, for they declare that it is by no means enough to abstain from vices, as many do, either from fear and worldly respect, or from natural disposition; but that there must moreover be brought forth the fruit of good works, in patience and humility. Not only is that ground reprobate and accursed which puts forth thorns, thistles, and cockle, but also that which does not bear the wheat answering to the seed that was sown, as Christ the Lord expounds more evidently in another parable, Matthew 25.

VI. The ten Virgins, of whom five were foolish, manifest more clearly what has been said. The five reprobate ones were not harlots, not unchaste women, but virgins. They are not accused of harlotry, nor of theft, nor of trafficking. Their crime, according to St. Gregory, was interior elation; and according to Chrysostom, negligence and a certain species of avarice. They wanted oil from their companions for nothing, and only then went to the sellers when the time for buying had passed. Who now, with benign probability, would not excuse them from crime and place them among the elect? Yet at the tribunal of Christ, elation, pride, and the omission of good works are crimes for which the foolish Virgins and foolish Christians are reprobated. No less tremendous is that other parable, Luke 18, where God depicts the reprobate in these words: O God, I give thee thanks that I am not as the rest of men, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, as also is this publican. I fast twice in a week: I give tithes of all that I possess. He does not ascribe his good works to his own powers, since he gives thanks to God. The works were good, if they be regarded in themselves as they really were, for he is not convicted of lying. What then was his crime? A most hidden self-love, elation, and complacency in his own good works, and contempt of other men as sinners. In the books of many Casuists these vices are scarcely to be found; but in the books of the Gospels these are the crimes for which very many men are damned.

VII. Let St. Paul the Apostle set the seal upon these sacred oracles, who says in 1 Corinthians, chapter 9: All run indeed, but one receiveth the prize. Then in chapter 10 he adds these words: For I would not have you ignorant, brethren, that our fathers were all under the cloud, and all passed through the sea. And all in Moses were baptized, in the cloud, and in the sea: and did all eat the same spiritual food, and all drank the same spiritual drink; (and they drank of the spiritual rock that followed them, and the rock was Christ.) But with most of them God was not well pleased: for they were overthrown in the desert. Now these things were done in a figure of us, that we should not covet evil things as they also coveted... Neither let us commit fornication, as some of them committed fornication, and there fell in one day three and twenty thousand. Neither let us tempt Christ: as some of them tempted, and perished by the serpents. Neither do you murmur: as some of them murmured, and were destroyed by the destroyer. Now all these things happened to them in figure: and they are written for our correction, upon whom the ends of the world are come. Wherefore he that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall.

VIII. All were baptized, all ate the same food, all drank the same drink. But with most of them God was not well pleased. Will anyone chatter that Paul speaks of Infidels? All Catholics are baptized; all eat the same most holy food and drink the same drink; all in common frequent the same sacraments. But with most of them, says the Apostle, God was not well pleased — as their morals make plain. St. Thomas writes many things on this testimony of Paul, lectures 1 and 2: With most of them God was not well pleased — with those, namely, who offended God; but only with two, namely Caleb and Josue, to whom alone it was granted to obtain the land of promise... And it is to be noted that, as in good things that which is figured is far better than the figure itself — as the kingdom of heaven than the land of promise — so in evil things that which is figured is far worse than the figure which signifies it. And according to Augustine, those punishments which they endured were a figure of gehenna, which is greater than every punishment.

IX. All the Fathers of every age defend the fewness of the elect in comparison with the reprobate. I shall touch upon a few testimonies. St. Augustine, on Psalm 47, writes as follows: Now all who partake of his sacraments are counted the people of God; but not all pertain to the mercy of God. All, indeed, who receive the Sacrament of Baptism are called Christians; but not all live worthily of that sacrament. For there are some of whom the Apostle says: Having an appearance of godliness, but denying the power thereof; yet on account of that very appearance of godliness they are numbered among the people of God — just as to the threshing-floor, so long as the threshing lasts, pertains not only the grain but also the chaff; but will it also pertain to the barn? (It is evident that Augustine here speaks of Catholics.) For the thorns themselves do not pertain to the people of God. Will you hear? Thus is the similitude itself set down. As the lily, he says, among thorns, so is my beloved among the daughters. He did not say, among strangers, but among the daughters... There are, then, evil daughters: and among them is the lily in the midst of thorns. Therefore those who have the Sacraments and have not good morals are both called God's and not God's, both called his and aliens: his, on account of his own sacrament; aliens, on account of their own vice. Thus daughters, and aliens: daughters, on account of the form of godliness; aliens, on account of the loss of virtue. Let the lily be there: let it receive the mercy of God: let it hold the root of the good flower: let it not be ungrateful to the rain that cometh from heaven. Let the thorns be ungrateful: let them grow from the showers — they grow for the fire, not for the barn... Now here it occurs to everyone who reflects: And what? this people which in the midst of the people of God receives the mercy of God — how great a number has it? How few they are! Scarcely are any found. Will God be content with them, and will he destroy so great a multitude? They say this who promise you what they have not heard from God promising. And truly, if we live ill, if we thoroughly enjoy the delights of this world, if we serve our lusts, God will destroy us. For how many are they who seem to keep the precepts of God? Scarcely is one found, or two, or a very few. Will God deliver these alone, and damn the rest? Far be it, say they. When he shall come and shall see so great a multitude at his left hand, he will have mercy, and will grant indulgence. This, in truth, is what that serpent also promised the first man. For God had threatened death, if he should taste; but the serpent said: Far be it — you shall not die the death. They believed the serpent; they found true what God had threatened, false what the Devil had promised. So also now, brethren: set the Church before your eyes after the pattern and similitude of Paradise. The serpent does not cease to suggest what he then suggested. But the fall of the first man ought to avail us as a warning for caution, not as a model for sinning. He fell for this, that we might rise. Let us answer such suggestions as he answered [who conquered]. For him too the tempter assailed through a woman, as through Eve — and he who conquered in Paradise was conquered on the dunghill. Let us not, then, listen to such voices; nor let us think the just are few. They are many, but they lie hidden among the more numerous. Nor can we deny that the wicked are more — so many more, that among them the good do not appear at all, just as the grains do not appear on the threshing-floor. For whoever sees the threshing-floor may think that there is only chaff. Take a man without experience, and he thinks it is done in vain that the oxen are sent in, that men sweat there under the heat in order to thresh; but there is the mass to be purged by winnowing. Then comes forth the abundance of wheat, which lay hidden in the abundance of chaff.

X. They who dare to champion the petty opinion, born with the laxer Ethics, of the plurality of the elect and the fewness of the reprobate, set themselves against the Gospel, against Augustine, and against the whole tradition of the Fathers. St. Augustine holds his discourse concerning Catholics dwelling in the bosom of the Church. Of these he teaches that the elect are few and the reprobate more numerous. He compares the Church with the threshing-floor, the elect with the wheat, the reprobate with the chaff. The grains of wheat are many; but the chaff so exceeds them that the grains scarcely appear. He objects to himself the greatness of the divine mercy: We have received thy mercy, O God, in the midst of thy temple. Upon this text of David he builds his sermon, and proves that the mercy of God is infinite, but that Christians for the greater part abuse it. Those who multiply the elect — not because these lead a well-ordered life, but because the mercy of God is great — he likens to the serpent persuading our first parents: You shall not die the death. They believed him, and met their death. Very many Christians believe the Benignists who pledge them entrance into Paradise, and they experience the damnation which God threatens, and find false what the Benignists pledge. As it happened then, so also now, brethren — concludes Augustine. The holy Doctor writes similar things in Sermon 18 on the words of the Lord, chapter 19; likewise in Book 10 against Faustus, chapter 16; and again on Psalm 25; Sermon 32 on the words of the Lord; Book 1 against the Donatists, chapter 2; and elsewhere. The doctrine of Augustine is defended by the other Fathers: St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 33; St. Ambrose, in the book on Noe, chapter 2; St. John Chrysostom, Homily 11 to the people of Antioch; St. Gregory the Great, Homily 29 on the Gospels; St. Jerome, or the Author of the Epistle to Celantia; St. Thomas, I, q. 23, art. 7. Read the illustrious Foggini, in the work published not long ago on this matter.¹

¹ See Tome I, Apparatus, Book 1, Dissertation 2, chapter 7.

XI. The smooth-spoken and benign men press on, exaggerating the divine mercy and crying aloud that Christ the Lord died for all. What follows thence? This quibble proves either nothing, or that no one perishes. They din our ears with the claim that the Fathers, when they assert the number of the elect to be small, comprehend the whole human race. They who prate such things have not read the Fathers. Augustine has already, above, demolished their invention. But, to stop their mouths altogether, let Augustine come forward once more, who on Psalm 73 in this fashion rebukes and refutes these Benignists, who sew cushions under every elbow: There was as yet no example of human fall when it was said to Adam: Thou shalt die the death, if thou touch it. And the serpent came athwart and said: Thou shalt not die the death. The serpent was believed; God was despised. The forbidden thing was done; man died. Was not that rather fulfilled which God threatened, than what the Enemy had promised? So it is, assuredly: we acknowledge this: therefore we are all now born either into death or experiencing it. For even now the serpent does not cease to whisper and to say: Will God really damn such great Crowds? will he deliver only a few? What else is this but: Do against the commandment — you shall not die the death? But as it was then, so also now. If you do what the devil suggests, and despise what God commands, the day of judgment will come, and you will find true what God threatened, and false what the Devil promised. Arise, O Lord, judge my cause: thou hast died, and thou hast been despised.

XII. I shall touch upon a few weighty reasons. The way is narrow. It is trodden either by the innocent or by the penitent. Rare is innocence; rare is penance. The kingdom of heaven suffers violence. A state that does violence to flesh and blood belongs to few. For things that are difficult have place in the fewer, as is known by experience. But most difficult is the attainment of the eternal kingdom. Therefore few arrive there. The elect must needs be conformed to Christ: Whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son. But few are they who display this conformity and likeness. For, as the Apostle says to the Philippians, chapter 2, all seek the things that are their own, not the things that are Jesus Christ's.

XIII. The Fathers teach that a great part of Priests also perish eternally. Chrysostom, in Homily 3 on the Acts of the Apostles, says: I do not think that among Priests there are many who are saved, but that far more are they who perish. St. Jerome, in the epistle to Damasus, writes these words: Behold, the world everywhere teems with Priests; yet good Priests are most rare, so that out of a hundred scarcely one good one is found. The weighty reasons are plain. Few are initiated into the priesthood at God's calling, but very many with the hope of gain and dignity enticing them. Holy Scripture more frequently reproves and chides Priests than the people. God refutes the Priests in Ezechiel, chapter 13: They have deceived my people, saying: Peace, and there is no peace. Against the Priests he inveighs: Woe to them that sew cushions under every elbow: and make pillows for the heads of persons of every age, to catch souls. And when they caught the souls of my people, they gave life to their souls. And they violated me among my people, for a handful of barley, and a piece of bread, to kill souls which should not die. Finally, Christ the Lord most severely refutes the Doctors, Priests, and Theologians, saying in Matthew 15: Let them alone: they are blind, and leaders of the blind. And if the blind lead the blind, both fall into the pit.

XIV. If we look at the company of cloistered Religious, perhaps no greater number of elect appears. The parables of the slothful and drowsy servant, and of the sterile tree bearing no fruit, display the drowsiness and damnation of Religious. The cloisters are the training-grounds of evangelical perfection; they are choice vineyards of a most abundant harvest, flowering gardens of select fruits. Do you bend your eyes upon those who dwell in the cloisters, that you may yourself gather whether those vineyards flourish or wither. Be of good heart if you discover a fervent zeal for monastic perfection, an exact separation from the allurements of the world, a splendid cultivation of evangelical poverty. Meanwhile let us hear St. Bernard, Epistle 254: Where, then, are they who are accustomed to say: It is enough for us; we do not wish to be better than our fathers? O Monk, do you not wish to advance? No. Do you wish, then, to fall back? By no means. What then? Thus, you say, I wish to live, and to remain where I have arrived; I neither suffer myself to become worse, nor desire to become better. You wish, then, what cannot be. For what stands still in this world? And assuredly it was said of man: He fleeth as a shadow, and never continueth in the same state. Finally, the very author of man and of the world, so long as he was seen on earth and conversed with men, did he stand still? Nay, as the Scripture witnesses, he passed through, doing good and healing all. He passed through, then, as not unfruitfully, so not remissly, not slothfully, not with slow step; but, as it is likewise written of him: He hath rejoiced as a giant to run the way. Now he who does not himself likewise run does not lay hold of him who runs. And what does it profit to follow Christ, if one does not succeed in overtaking him? Therefore Paul said: So run that you may obtain. There, O Christian, fix the goal of your course and your progress, where Christ placed his. He became, it is said, obedient unto death. However far, then, you shall have run, if you have not arrived even unto death, you will not lay hold of the prize. The prize is Christ. But if, while he runs, you halt your step, you do not draw near to Christ, but rather remove yourself farther; and you must fear what David says: Behold, they that go far from thee, O Lord, shall perish. Therefore, if to advance is to run, where you cease to advance, there you cease also to run; but where you cease to run, there you begin also to fall back. Hence it is plainly gathered that to refuse to advance is nothing else than to fall back. Meditate these things, and immediately there will vanish those vain and most inept petty distinctions and petty opinions of certain men, devised for excusing excuses in sins.

13. The last end, as stated above (No. 9), is that object in which the agent's desire rests. If in his act the agent excludes all reference to any further end, the end is positively last; if such exclusion is not made, the end is negatively last. By the absolutely last end we mean that object which, by its very nature, requires that all action be subordinated to it, and that in it all desires shall rest.

14. The first principle of Moral Philosophy is this:

Thesis I. God is the absolutely last end of all things.

Proof. Such an end we have defined to be an object which, by its very nature, requires that all action be subordinated to it, and that in it all desires shall rest. Now God alone can be that object. For all things except God are contingent or unnecessary, i. e., they have not in themselves the principle of their own existence (Ment. Phil. No. 104), but they exist only because and in so far as God gives them being (Ment. Phil. No. 220), and preserves them by His will and power (No. 263). Hence God possesses entire and perfect dominion over all things, and in the creature there is nothing that is not dependent on God. He has therefore the right to make all things tend to Himself and to rest in Him as in their last end. Moreover, He is bound to do so by His own perfections. For, since He is infinitely wise (Ment. Phil. No. 253), He must direct all things to an end worthy of Himself. Now, God alone is worthy of God. Consequently, God must require that all things tend ultimately towards Himself, and that in Himself all desires shall rest. Therefore God is the last end of all things.

15. But how do all things tend ultimately to God? We affirm that they must tend towards Him with their whole being; because God has made their whole being, the essence and the attributes of each, and all their powers. Now whatsoever He makes, He must direct ultimately to Himself as being the only end worthy of His action. Therefore all things must tend towards God with their whole being.

16. The direction which God gives to things is not a momentary extrinsic impulse, such, e. g., as a musket-ball gets from the exploding powder; nor simply a continued extrinsic management, such as the leading of a horse by the bridle; but it is an impulse intrinsic to every creature, which is not distinct in reality from its very essence or nature and its peculiar tendencies. Hence, every action that the creature performs in accordance with its nature is towards that end for which it was created, namely, towards God Himself.

17. Of course, we do not say that every being tends immediately towards God. This can be said of intelligent beings only; yet all other beings tend mediately towards Him.

There is a broad truth in the saying, "Order is Heaven's first law." God's direction, which cannot fail to be wise, is ever appropriate to the nature of the thing directed. Hence, everything is so constituted as to tend towards that which is suited to its nature and is for its good; plants perform just those actions which are good for them, and this their own nature makes them do. By so acting they elaborate from the inert clod food for the animal kingdom. Animals perceive by their senses what is good for them, and are led by their appetites to appropriate that good. Man, finally, whom all material things subserve, tends by the faculties peculiar to himself, his intellect and will, to the knowledge and love of God, and is fitted and prompted by his rational nature to direct the material creation to the glory and service of his sovereign Lord.

18. As the inert clod supports vegetable life, as the vegetable is for the animal, and as the brute animal, together with all inferior things, is for man; so in man himself the lower powers are to subserve the higher powers, which are his intellect and will. Though each faculty has its own specific tendency to its own specific good, still man is not a bundle of independent faculties; but he is a person, essentially one, fitted by nature to employ his faculties for the attainment of what is good for him in his specific nature as man. If, therefore, as it often happens, an inferior faculty craves what hinders rather than promotes the proper action of a higher faculty, reason then requires that such a craving be suppressed, in accordance with this principle of order: the lower faculties are to be controlled by the higher. The good craved in this case is not a real good for the person, but rather a real evil (Ment. Phil. No. 44). The intellect and will, when perfectly controlling the inferior faculties, are in a fit condition to follow up their own specific tendencies toward their proper objects, which are truth and all good worthy of man.

19. Good worthy of man is called becoming, fit or proper. In its strict meaning it is moral good — that good, namely, which is conformable to reason regulating free acts; in a wider meaning, it includes natural or physical good — that is, whatever perfects the nature of man, as health, knowledge, etc. Good viewed as conducive to the attainment of another good is styled useful; viewed as capable of giving satisfaction or pleasure to an appetite it is named pleasurable. The useful and pleasurable, when they are embraced by the will according to the right order of things and in a manner worthy of man, share in the nobility of moral good. Thus the pleasure which a dutiful son finds in making his parents comfortable and happy is morally good; and all the just and indifferent means used to promote this end are in the right order of human acts, and are therefore morally good.

20. Since God is the last end of all things (No. 14), He is, therefore, the last end of our highest powers, the intellect and will. But there is this difference between the tendencies of our higher powers and the tendencies of other things: that, while the latter tend to God only mediately, our intellect and will tend to Him immediately, and do not find rest until they repose in Him as in their last end. When a brute animal has eaten and drunk what its appetite craves, it rests in the satisfaction of its animal desires, and longs for nothing beyond this. But our understanding and will can find rest in nothing short of the knowledge and love of God.

21. Thesis II. By our intellect and will we must tend to God as our last end.

Explanation. Of course, we do not say that it is wrong for man to love created things; but right order requires that we should make all these so many stepping-stones, as it were, to the higher plane of the knowledge and love of God. In this proposition, then, we maintain that the last end of man's intellect and will, that, namely, for which these faculties were given to him, is to know and to love God. We can prove this proposition in two ways: first, by considering the matter in the light of God's nature; and, secondly, by considering it from the standpoint of man's nature. However, we shall confine ourselves at present to the first consideration, which demonstrates that God is the objective end of man's highest powers; the second aspect we shall present further on in connection with man's subjective end (No. 32).

Proof. God is the absolute ultimate end (Thesis I.), the Supreme Good to which man is bound to tend. This tendency must be through faculties or activities by which he can apprehend the Supreme Good. He cannot do so by any organic faculty, because God is a pure spirit, and, consequently, not the object of organic perception. It must, therefore, be through his immaterial faculties, the spiritual activities of his soul, his intellect and will. Man's intellect, by its nature, is able to know God, and his will is able to love what the intellect knows and proposes as worthy of love. Therefore, by our intellect and will we must tend to God as our last end.

22. Thesis III. God created all things for His own extrinsic glory.

Explanation. Honor is the recognition of worth; when expressed in words, it is called praise. Glory is the praise of exalted merit, and in its full acceptance implies love as well as knowledge, together with the manifestation of the same by many persons as a tribute of homage that is due to the person glorified. The knowledge and love which God possesses with regard to Himself is His intrinsic glory; the homage of praise and love that creation renders to God is His extrinsic glory.

Proof 1. We have seen that God is the absolute ultimate end of all things; or, in other words, that all things must tend to Him as to their last end. Since this tendency is something willed by God, it is something good. Yet no good can be added to God intrinsically, because He is Himself the Infinite Good: it can, therefore, be added to God only extrinsically. God has no need of any extrinsic good; yet, if He creates at all, He must necessarily require that creatures shall proclaim Him as their Creator, and thus render Him the glory which is His due. Hence, the end God had in creating all things was His own extrinsic glory.

Proof 2. Man in particular, we know from thesis II., is bound to tend to the Supreme Good, his last end, by his intellect and will — that is, by knowing and loving God; but in these very acts of man consists the extrinsic glory of God. Therefore, man in particular was created for the extrinsic glory of God.

23. Objections.

1. Irrational creatures cannot praise and love God. Answer. They cannot love God, it is true; nor can they praise Him directly: nevertheless, they praise Him indirectly, by displaying God's power, goodness, wisdom, beauty, etc., to the intelligent creation, thereby serving to inspire and increase the praise and love of God on the part of man.

2. God cannot fail of His purpose, but He fails to receive the praise and love of the wicked. Therefore, He did not create them for that end. Answer. Though the wicked refuse God the homage of their love and voluntary praise in this life, they still serve to proclaim His praise. For in the next life they glorify His justice by their punishment, and even in the present life they make manifest His mercy and longanimity.

3. It would be unworthy of God to promote His glory by the misery of His creatures. Answer. To create man for misery would be unworthy of God, yes; we are maintaining that God, on the contrary, created all men for happiness, but on the condition that they shall render Him due service. When the wicked voluntarily turn away from their destined bliss by refusing to do their duty, they must necessarily incur a just punishment. The solution of this and similar difficulties will be better understood after we have treated of the sanction of the natural law (No. 107 et seq.).

24. As we remarked above (No. 10), the object aimed at or intended is the objective or material end, and the attainment or enjoyment of the object is the subjective or formal end. So far we have proved that God is the objective end of all things, and particularly so of His rational creatures; we have explained, also, the manner in which all things tend to God by fulfilling the purpose which He had in view when creating them. We shall next consider the subjective end of man, i. e., his attainment of his objective end.