The Habit of Faith

The Habit of Faith.—Faith is not only an act that passes, but it is also a permanent quality or habit conferred by God, one of the “most great and perfect promises” which man must make use of (II Peter, i. 3 sqq.), a charism that is not for a time but for all this life, just like hope and charity (I Cor., xiii. 13). God, who does all things sweetly (Wis., viii. 1), and who has provided for His natural creatures internal powers by which they incline and move themselves towards the ends of their activities, has not done less for those whom He moves to a supernatural destiny; and, in justifying the sinner, He infuses along with grace the supernatural virtues of faith, hope and charity (Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 6).

The virtue of faith is thus defined by the Council of the Vatican: “Faith is a supernatural virtue, by which, with the help of God’s grace, we believe the truths revealed by Him, not on account of an intrinsic evidence of the truths themselves, perceived by natural reason, but on account of the authority of God who revealed them.”

Hence, the virtue of faith has the following properties:

(a) It is supernatural, not only because its object and motive are supernatural, but because it proceeds from a supernatural principle, i.e., grace (John, vi, 29; Eph., ii. 8).

(b) It is obscure, because the believer assents to that which has no intrinsic evidence for him. He does not see its truth as the blessed see God, for “we see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face” (I Cor., xiii. 12). He does not know its truth as he knows evident or naturally demonstrated propositions, for faith is about truths that surpass reason—things “that appear not.” This, of course, does not mean that faith is not rightly called a new light added to the mind, and that the motives which call for the acceptance of faith are not evidently credible.

(c) It is free, because, although one cannot dissent from that which is evident intrinsically (e.g., that two and two make four), one is able to dissent from that which is obscure.

(d) It is not a process of reasoning, but a simple act of assent, in which one accepts at the same time the authority of the Revealer and the truth of His revelation. “Jesus said to her (Martha): I am the resurrection and the life .... Believest thou this? She saith to Him: Yea, Lord, I have believed that Thou art the Christ, etc.” (John, xi. 25-27).

(e) It is firm and unshaken in a far higher degree than the assent of understanding and science, since it rests on the infallible authority of God (I Thess., ii. 13).

Before justification, faith exists, it seems, only as an act performed under the influence of actual or transitory grace. After the infusion of habitual grace, faith is a habit or infused virtue. But there are two modes of existence characteristic of this one habit, and hence the distinction of living and dead faith (Gal., v. 6; James, ii. 26).

(a) Living faith is that which is informed or animated by charity. This latter virtue is called the soul of all the other virtues, inasmuch as it directs them to their supreme end, divine friendship, and gives meritorious value to their works. All those have living faith who join to belief a life in agreement with belief—that is, the state of grace, love of God and good works.

(b) Dead faith is that which is separated from charity. It is a true virtue, because it directs the assent of the intellect to its proper end; but it is an imperfect virtue, because its acts are not directed to the Last End, and are not meritorious of eternal life. All those who believe, but who do not live up to their belief in matters of importance, who neglect serious duties to God or others, have dead faith. Examples are those who call themselves Catholics, but neglect attendance at church and the reception of the Sacraments.

Those who have, or who had faith, are the following:

(a) the Angels in the state of probation and our first parents in Paradise, for faith is necessary as a means in every condition short of the beatific vision (see 785, 158); (b) those in this life who are in the friendship of God, and also those believers who are not in the friendship of God, the former having living, and the latter dead faith (see 800); (c) the souls in purgatory, the ancient patriarchs in limbo.

Those who have not faith are the following: (a) those who have vision of the truths of faith, that is, the Saints in heaven and Christ while on earth (I Cor., xiii. 10); (b) those who reject obstinately even one doctrine of faith, for, if individual judgment is put above the authority of God even in one point, the motive or keystone of faith, and therefore faith itself, is no longer assented to; (c) the lost, for, being cut off entirely from grace, these possess no virtue infused by God. “The devils believe and tremble” (James, ii. 19), but their belief is not supernatural or free, but natural and unwilling.

Of those who have faith, some have greater, and some less faith. Thus, our Lord reproved St. Peter for his little faith (Matt., xiv. 31), and praised the Woman of Canaan for her great faith (Matt., xv. 28). But since all are obliged to have supreme confidence in God and to accept all He teaches, how is there room for different degrees of faith?

(a) Faith must be supreme appreciatively, that is, all must put the formal object of faith, the motive of its assent, above every other motive of assent, for the First Truth speaking deserves more adherence than any other authority. In this respect, therefore, and in the exclusion of every doubt, the faith of all is equal. But faith need not be supreme intensively, that is, it is not required that the intellect should feel the assent of faith more than the assent given to natural truth, or that the will must experience the highest alacrity, devotion and confidence; for the truths that are nearer to us move us more vehemently than do higher and invisible truths. Hence, in this respect the faith of one may be more firm or fervent than the faith of another, according as one is more childlike, more loving, more intense in his acceptance of God’s Word than another.

(b) Faith must be universal, that is, we must accept the entire material object of revelation, and none may pick and choose according to his likes or fancies, for all of revelation has God for its Author. In this respect the faith of all is equal, all believers accepting twelve articles, while those who accept eleven or six or one or none, are not believers. But faith need not be explicit as to all its doctrines, and hence, while one believer who is not thoroughly instructed may know only the twelve articles of the Creed, another believer who is better instructed may know the hundreds of other truths that are contained in the articles. In this way the faith of one is greater extensively.

Can faith grow or decline in the same person? (a) If there is question of acts of faith, the later acts can be more or less firm or fervent than those that preceded, in the way explained in the previous paragraph. In this sense we may understand the Apostles to have asked of our Lord a higher degree of faith, that they might work miracles in His name (Luke, xvii. 5). (b) If there is question of the habit of faith, it itself is increased at every increase of sanctifying grace (see 745). St. Paul writes to the Corinthians (II Cor., x. 15) that he has hope of their “increasing faith.” Moreover, by repeated acts of faith the ease and delight with which the habit is exercised increases, as is the case with acquired habits. But the habit of faith is not diminished directly as was explained regarding the infused virtues in general (see 745).

The means of growing in faith are: (a) prayer to the Father of lights: “Lord, increase our faith” (Luke, xvii. 5); (b) reading of the scriptures, the Lives of the Saints and other similar works, and attendance at spiritual instructions; (c) frequent acts of faith in the world we see not and its coming rewards; (d) exercise of faith, by directing our thoughts, words, and actions according to the teaching of faith, rather than according to the maxims of the world; for “the just man liveth by faith” (Heb., x. 38), and “faith without works is dead” (James, ii. 20).

The cause of faith is God. (a) It is God who directly through revelation, or indirectly through the Church, the evangelists, preachers, etc., “brings the message before man” (Rom., x. 15); (b) it is God who “causes the mind of man to assent” to His message. No matter how persuasive the teacher or how well disposed or learned the hearer may be, faith will not come unless the light of grace leads the way (Eph., ii. 8).

The effects of faith are fear of God and purification of the heart. (a) Dead faith causes one to fear the penalties of divine justice, that is, to have servile fear (James, ii. 19): living faith causes one to fear sin itself, that is, to have filial fear. (b) Faith, by elevating man to higher things, purifies his soul from the defilements of lower things (Acts, xv. 9): if faith is dead, it at least purifies the intellect from error; if it is living, it also purifies the will from evil.

689. 1. Since faith is a gift of God, prayer is required first of all, especially for a twofold reason: for obtaining heavenly light, without which we cannot rightly understand eternal truths; and for fostering the pious affection of the will by which the mind is sweetly inclined to offer firmer assent to revealed truths and to taste them spiritually. Like the Apostles, let us frequently say: "Increase our faith."² This indeed seems more opportune either at the time when temptation against faith urges, or when an occasion presents itself of exercising faith more vividly, for example, in tribulations, in anxieties.

² Luke 17:5.

690. 2. Since faith is more vivid, other things being equal, the more fully revealed truths are known, it is of great profit, for strengthening it, to read the sacred Scriptures, as they are explained by the Church and the Fathers, - and also books in which Christian dogmas are declared no less substantially than lucidly. For as the reading of depraved books is very dangerous, so on the contrary the pious reading of the Scriptures is apt to increase faith: for there we find the very word of God, and if we read it in the spirit in which it was written, the mind of God is manifested to us, and the assent given to it is truly an act of faith.³ It must be read constantly⁴ with simplicity of heart, seeking nothing except the divine mind, wishing nothing except to live conformably to it, according to that saying: he painted by his acts the page which he had read. - Yet it must be read furnished with commentaries, in which the sense is declared from the works of the Fathers and the best interpreters of today.⁵ Nor should books be omitted in which the excellent deeds of those who lived according to faith are narrated;⁶ for by their examples faith is nourished and increased not a little.

³ "Many Catholics would think they were inclining toward Protestantism if they read the Bible. What an aberration! One is Protestant when one seeks in the Bible, arbitrarily interpreted, the rule of faith; one is Catholic when one seeks in the Bible, interpreted by the Church, the food of Christian thought, the nourishment of the soul; for the Bible is the word of God; it is the bread of the soul, says the Savior." (M. d'Hulst, Confer. 1892, p. 120.)

⁴ Jerome writes concerning Nepotian (Ep. 60, P. L., XXII, 595): "And by constant reading and long meditation, he had made his breast the library of Christ." - Experience establishes that the reading of the Gospel is no less delightful than useful, not only to clerics, but also to workers.

⁵ Thus, for example, the commentaries edited by Fr. Rose and others in the collection Pensee chretienne, or the French translation by Crampon.

⁶ In French there is the collection, edited by H. Joly, namely Les Saints; in English, Lives of the Saints, under the care of the Fathers of the Oratory.

To pious reading is equated the hearing of sermons in which the truths of faith are set forth; indeed the word of God uttered by mouth has greater force and efficacy, provided that sacred orators preach Christ, and not themselves.

691. 3. But the most efficacious means is the exercise of faith itself. For although faith properly is not increased, as a supernatural habit, except by divine operation (above, n. 602), facility of eliciting acts is acquired by exercise (n. 603). Therefore he progresses much in it who lives by faith, and therefore rightly orders judgments, words, and works according to the light of faith.⁷ For as man is distinguished from beasts by reason, so the Christian is distinguished from pagans by faith; and as by frequent exercise of reason man is perfected, so the more frequently and intensely faith is exercised, the more perfect is the Christian.

⁷ Therefore, in the prayer at Prime, we say daily: "Deign, O Lord God, King of heaven and earth, today to direct and sanctify, rule and govern our hearts and bodies, our senses, words, and acts in Thy law."

(A) According to the light of faith and the doctrine and examples of Christ, we must think rightly and judge concerning all things. Daily experience establishes that there are many Christians who judge concerning riches, honors, and pleasures according to the maxims of worldly men. St. Bernard refutes these by the example of Christ being born in poverty and humility:⁸ "The judgment of the world is not such: either He (Christ) is deceived, or the world errs. But it is impossible for divine wisdom to be deceived. Deservedly therefore both the prudence of the flesh (for it also is death) is an enemy to God;⁹ and also the prudence of the world is named foolishness.¹⁰ What then? Christ indeed, who is not deceived, chose what is more troublesome to the flesh. Therefore that is better, that more useful, that rather to be chosen: and whoever teaches or advises otherwise must be guarded against as against a seducer."

⁸ Sermon 3 in Nativit., n. 1, P. L., CLXXXIII, 123.

⁹ Rom. 8:7.

¹⁰ 1 Cor. 3:19.

What Bernard writes concerning poverty and mortification is true of the rest: namely, we must judge concerning all things and events, tribulations, persecutions, and anxieties, as Christ Himself would judge: But what would Christ say to these things? For we are not truly Christians if we assent to worldly fallacies contrary to the Gospel.

692. (B) Therefore also, in speeches and conversations, we must speak according to the Gospel. But how many Christians accommodate themselves to the prejudices of the world, approving what Christ reproved, and esteeming less what He Himself praised?

Thus, while He Himself calls blessed the poor in spirit, the meek of heart, those who suffer persecution, do not many call happy those who glory in riches and to whom all things turn out prosperously? The true Christian is not ashamed of the Gospel, but manfully, without boasting, speaks concerning all things and events according to the sayings of Christ Himself, and thus daily progresses in true faith.

693. (C) But especially he manifests the same virtue by his works: for he lives not according to flesh and blood, but according to the spirit, seeking nothing except to cling to the footsteps of Christ. Therefore he works the good not that he may be seen by men, but that he may please God; without ostentation he performs prayer, almsgiving, and other Christian works, not from a desire of vain glory, but from a supernatural motive.

Rising in the morning, he signs himself with the sign of the cross, and joyfully offers all his actions to God through Christ. If he prays, he asks in the name of Christ whatever he needs, mindful of that word: "Amen, amen I say to you, if you ask the Father anything in My name, He will give it to you."¹¹ If one must obey a superior, he places the image of Christ upon his superior, according to that saying: "He who hears you hears Me."¹² If the poor person must be assisted, he furnishes alms or other help to him as to Christ, according to that saying:¹³ "As long as you did it to one of these My least brethren, you did it to Me." If he is vexed by various temptations and afflictions, he trusts in Christ: "I can do all things in Him who strengthens me."¹⁴ In one word, he does all things with Christ, and through Him and in Him, and thus grows daily in faith and at the same time in good works: "He who abides in Me, and I in him, he bears much fruit."¹⁵

¹¹ John 16:23.

¹² Luke 10:16.

¹³ Matt. 25:40.

¹⁴ Phil. 4:13.

¹⁵ John 15:5.

694. 4. But the final means consists in cooperating strenuously for protecting and propagating faith in others.

For today it is permitted to no Christian to rest in tranquil possession of faith. For enemies rising up on every side fiercely attack the Christian religion; many burn with zeal for utterly overthrowing the Church, and the words of Christ have already been fulfilled: "I came not to send peace, but the sword."¹⁶ Therefore nothing remains except to fight the good fight of faith, defending faith not only in ourselves but in others, indeed, when occasion is given, exhorting and urging others to embrace our religion. This will be a work of gratitude toward God, who, by freely giving the light of faith, has given us the greatest and precious gift; a work of charity toward others, who sit in darkness and in the shadow of death, and indeed the most excellent one, since, from what was said above, faith is the beginning and root of all justification; and also a work of charity toward ourselves, since God is accustomed to reward zeal of this kind by strengthening the faith of those who preach the Gospel to others.

¹⁶ Matt. 10:34; cf. Luke 12:51.

Therefore "through patience let us run to the contest proposed to us, looking to Jesus, the author and finisher of faith."¹⁷

¹⁷ Heb. 12:1-2.

After those things which were said above, n. 472 sq., concerning the infused virtues in general, few things remain to be added concerning the infused virtue of faith. - The infused virtue of faith resides in the intellect, since the act of faith is to believe, which indeed certainly is elicited by the intellective power. But a habit perfects that power which elicits acts. - Besides the intellectual habit, by which the act of faith is immediately elicited, an infused habit is required in the will for eliciting the act of pious credulity, or for commanding the assent of the intellect. The reason is that, for perfectly producing some act which proceeds from two principles, it is required that each principle be endowed with a habit perfecting it. St. Thomas writes to the point:⁸³ "To believe is an act of the intellect, according as it is moved by the will to assenting. But an act of this kind proceeds from the will and the intellect; each of which is apt to be perfected by a habit. And therefore it is necessary that there be some habit both in the will and in the intellect, if the act of faith ought to be perfect."

⁸³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 4, a. 2.

492. The existence of the virtue of faith in justified adults must be held by faith; but the existence of the same virtue of faith in baptized infants is altogether certain. The first part of this proposition is clear from the Council of Trent,⁸⁴ which says: "In justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these things at once infused through Jesus Christ, into whom he is inserted: faith, hope, and charity." The other part of the proposition is clear from the Council of Vienne cited above, n. 472.

Controversy. Among theologians it is disputed⁸⁵ whether the virtue of faith can sometimes be infused before the first sanctifying grace, e.g. whether catechumens eliciting acts of faith with the help of actual grace already have the virtue of faith before baptism and sanctifying grace. There are three opinions. The first affirms. Thus Cajetan, Bannez, Medina, Sylvius.⁸⁶ For the same opinion Wilmers⁸⁷ cites Suarez, Vasquez, Valentia, Turrianus, Coninck (he himself holds it more probable). - The second opinion denies; Lugo,⁸⁸ Durandus, Bonaventure, Scotus, Viva, Platel, Kilber, cited by Wilmers,⁸⁹ hold it. This opinion seems better, because the first opinion seems to have no solid foundation either in Sacred Scripture or in the Councils, which on the contrary teach that the virtues are infused together with grace.⁹⁰ - The third opinion teaches that the virtue of faith is infused in baptism received with an obstacle. Thus Dominic Soto.⁹¹ This opinion entirely lacks a solid argument.

Unformed faith. The virtue of faith remains in a Christian sinner, provided, however, that he has not committed the grave sin of infidelity. Discussion will occur later concerning the loss of the virtue of faith through the sin of infidelity. That the virtue of faith remains in a Christian sinner is defined as of faith against Protestants thinking that man is justified by faith alone.⁹² The Council of Trent⁹³ defined: "If anyone says that, when grace has been lost through sin, faith is always also lost at the same time; or that the faith which remains is not true faith, although it is not living; or that he who has faith without charity is not a Christian, let him be anathema." But the reason is that faith, even as to the habit, does not depend necessarily on the habit of grace, since it is not compared to grace as a property necessarily joined with it, as charity is, but as a foundation of the Christian life, which can remain when the building of grace has been destroyed.⁹⁴ Faith, which remains in the sinner after grace has been destroyed, is called unformed faith, because charity is the form of faith, insofar as it orders the act of faith to the ultimate end and renders it meritorious of eternal life.⁹⁵ Moreover, when grace has been destroyed, charity also is necessarily destroyed, and therefore the form of faith. Such faith is indeed called dead by St. James;⁹⁶ nevertheless it is true faith and does not differ essentially from faith formed by charity. For "a habit is diversified according to that which pertains per se to the habit. But since faith is a perfection of the intellect, that pertains per se to faith which pertains to the intellect. But that which pertains to the will does not pertain per se to faith, so that through this the habit of faith could be diversified. But the distinction of formed and unformed faith is according to that which pertains to the will, that is, according to charity, but not according to that which pertains to the intellect. Hence formed and unformed faith are not diverse habits." Thus St. Thomas.⁹⁷ But if sometimes the name of virtue is denied to unformed or dead faith, perfect virtue is to be understood, since faith is truly not perfect except through charity.⁹⁸

⁸⁴ Sess. 6, c. 7 de iustif. (Denz. n. 800).

⁸⁵ Cf. above n. 473.

⁸⁶ Comm. in S. theol. 2, 2, q. 3, a. 2.

⁸⁷ De fide divina prop. 34.

⁸⁸ De fide disp. 16, sect. 2.

⁸⁹ L. c.

⁹⁰ Cf. above n. 473.

⁹¹ De natura et gratia c. 8.

⁹² "It must be taught that if saints ... fall into manifest sins, such as adultery, etc., they shake off faith ... and both faith and the Holy Spirit are absent from them." Thus in the Smalcald Articles.

⁹³ Sess. 6, can. 28 de iustif. (Denz. n. 838).

⁹⁴ Cf. Gonet, De fide disp. 8, a. 2, n. 27.

⁹⁵ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 4, a. 3.

⁹⁶ Jas. 2, 17.

⁹⁷ L. c. a. 4.

⁹⁸ Ib. a. 5 ad 3.

493. The increase of the virtue of faith is not only possible, but holy Church also asks for it when she prays: "Give us, Lord, an increase of faith, hope, and charity."⁹⁹ The supernatural virtue of faith is increased together with sanctifying grace. For just as faith is infused with that grace, so also it is increased with it. A man constituted in sanctifying grace, from repeated acts of supernatural faith, e.g. repeated acts of faith in the Eucharistic Christ, at length acquires facility in eliciting acts of this kind. Nevertheless such facility, which in some sense can be called a habit, more probably is not a supernatural habit, but a natural one. For the same reason obtains concerning the increase and the production of a habit. But by our acts we are not able to produce the supernatural habit of faith. Therefore neither are we able (at least directly) to produce an increase of the same supernatural habit. Therefore by good acts done in the state of grace we merit the increase of grace and faith; but by acts of faith often and fervently elicited we acquire in addition facility in eliciting acts of this kind, but this facility is a natural habit.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Cf. Conc. Trid. sess. 6, c. 10 de iustif. (Denz. n. 803).

¹⁰⁰ Whoever desires more on this question, more speculative than practical, should go to Lugo, De fide disp. 16, n. 69 sqq.

494. The loss of the supernatural virtue of faith happens through the sole act of infidelity or formal heresy, which is a mortal sin. Thus the certain opinion against Durandus. Hence the Council of Trent¹⁰¹ says: "It must be asserted that not only by infidelity, through which even faith itself is lost, but also by any other mortal sin, although faith is not lost, the grace of justification received is lost." But the reason is that he who pertinaciously denies one article of faith destroys the formal object by which of faith. But when the formal object is destroyed, the whole habit must be destroyed. The formal object of faith is the authority of God revealing, as has been said. But he who knowingly denies one article of faith says at least implicitly that God is not infallible or truthful, and therefore he now has no faith. But if nevertheless he assents to other revealed truths, his assent is not founded upon the authority of God revealing, but upon another motive, and therefore that assent is not the assent of faith. The Angelic Doctor writes to the point:¹⁰² "It is manifest that a heretic who pertinaciously disbelieves one article of faith is not prepared to follow the doctrine of the Church in all things; for if he were not pertinacious, he would now not be a heretic, but only one erring. Hence it is manifest that such a heretic concerning one article does not have faith concerning the other articles, but a certain opinion according to his own will."

Hence the opinion of Lugo,¹⁰³ Viva,¹⁰⁴ and a few others must be rejected, teaching that some imperfect faith can be joined with formal heresy concerning one or another article. The reason of those authors is especially this: A heretic denies this article, not because he believes God to be fallible, but because he does not apprehend that article to be revealed; but he holds other articles as revealed: for it is not necessary for faith that I believe the first truth as manifested through the Church, since God can propose faith through other means as well as through the Church, as through testimonies of prophets, through interior light, etc., just as he truly infuses faith into infants through baptism.

To this argumentation an easy answer is made: Certainly the proposition of the Church is not absolutely necessary for true faith, and God can propose it through many other means. But certainly there is no reason for saying that the heretic about whom the question is raised has it through extraordinary means. For if he truly had it, he would also be prepared in mind to believe all things which are proposed to him as revealed by the Church, whose infallibility is of divine faith. Wherefore, if such a heretic rejects one of the diverse articles of faith proposed by the Church as pertaining to faith, he follows his own judgment, by which he persuades himself that the other articles are revealed, but not this one. Hence he errs gravely, and his proper motive of believing is rather his natural judgment, and that objectively false, than the authority of God revealing. But an act proceeding from such judgment is by no means an act of divine faith,¹⁰⁵ but of natural faith.

¹⁰¹ L. c. c. 15 (Denz. n. 808).

¹⁰² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 5, a. 3.

¹⁰³ De fide disp. 17, sect. 6.

¹⁰⁴ Curs. theol. P. 4, disp. 4, q. 3.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Billuart, De fide diss. 4, a. 2.

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 4, a. 1-5; q. 6, a. 2; De Verit., q. 14, a. 4-7.

716. The habit of faith 1. is in the intellect as in its subject, because its act, which is to believe or to adhere to revealed truths, is an act of the intellect, whose object is the true (n. 693).

2. But that act is commanded by the will (n. 692 and 696): but since several powers concur for producing an act, the act will not be perfect unless all those powers are perfectly disposed through some habit. Hence faith will not be perfect unless the will also is well disposed by a certain habit for commanding faith (a. 2).

3. Nevertheless from this principle it cannot be concluded that there exists in the will a certain special habit which disposes us to nothing else except to commanding faith.

4. But it must be said, conformably to the principles of St. Thomas, that the habit by which man is perfectly disposed for commanding faith, and indeed on account of the ultimate end, is charity, which orders man to the ultimate end and therefore is naturally apt to command the acts of all virtues.

717. Corollaries concerning formed and unformed faith. - From the aforesaid doctrine the following conclusions are easily deduced:

1. Charity gives faith its ultimate perfection, namely, tendency to the ultimate end.

2. Hence charity is called the form (extrinsic, directive, and accidental) of faith (a. 3), and faith which is united to charity is formed or perfect and living faith, while that which is without charity is called unformed and imperfect or dead.

3. Unformed faith does not differ according to essence from formed faith, but, remaining the same in number, with charity acceding, it becomes formed; whence they do not differ according to species, but as perfect and imperfect in the same species (a. 5, ad 3).

4. Although faith is not a merely intellectual virtue but is in the intellect insofar as it is moved by the will, and therefore also inclines to living honorably; nevertheless in the supernatural order it is not a virtue simply so called and according to the perfect account or in the perfect state, which can produce an altogether perfect act, unless it is united to charity, by which the will is perfectly disposed so that it may tend to the good. Because thus it happens, as St. Thomas says, q. 4, a. 5, "that the intellect is always borne into the true,... and that the will is infallibly ordered to a good end." For when two powers concur for one operation, this operation will not be perfect unless each power is perfectly disposed.

5. Unformed faith, because it is a supernatural habit, is caused by God according to its essence, whence it is rightly called the gift of God (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7 and 15, can. 28; Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3, can. 5); nevertheless God is not the cause that it is unformed, or that it is without charity (q. 6, a. 2).

718. Faith is in the speculative intellect, because it is directly occupied with the true and not with operable things. But since the object of faith, first truth, is also the ultimate end on account of which we act, hence faith also extends itself to operations insofar as in them we are directed by revealed truths or eternal and divine reasons. Hence faith is secondarily practical (a. 2, ad 3).

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 4, a. 5-7; De Verit., q. 14, a. 3 and 7.

719. Faith is a virtue because it is a good habit, not including imperfection: it is good because it always tends to the true; - it does not include imperfection, because for man in the state of the way it is not an imperfection but a perfection to admit on account of the authority of God those things which he cannot know by proper reason (a. 5).

It is one virtue because it has one formal object, for by the same divine authority we admit all revealed things (a. 6).

It is the first supernatural virtue: for the theological virtues, which order us to the supernatural end, precede the infused moral virtues, which order us concerning the means; moreover, relatively to the end, to know it is prior to willing it; but we know the supernatural end through faith, and therefore faith is the first virtue. Nevertheless per accidens the act of some virtue can precede the act of faith, insofar as it removes impediments to believing, as humility removes pride, and fortitude removes worldly fear (a. 7).

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 4, a. 8; De Verit., q. 10, a. 12, ad 6; q. 14, a. 1, ad 7.

720. Notions concerning certitude. - Faith is compared with the intellectual habits under the respect of certitude. To understand this, it is fitting to recall that certitude properly so called or speculative is the determination of the intellect to one thing, or firm adherence of the mind to the object without fear of erring. Hence it includes a twofold element: one negative, namely, exclusion of actual doubt; the other positive, namely, firm adherence of the mind; and therefore certitude can be considered under a twofold respect: 1. negatively, insofar as it excludes all doubt or fear, and thus it does not admit degrees but consists in an indivisible; 2. positively, insofar as it adheres firmly to something, and thus it admits degrees and is greater or lesser. This happens in a twofold mode:

a) Simply and as to itself, on the part of the cause and motive, that is more certain which has a more certain cause or motive, to which error is more repugnant; whence the intellect adheres to it more firmly estimatively.

According to the diverse motive, natural certitude is metaphysical, physical, or moral. The first rests upon the essential or metaphysical necessity of things known from their very essences. The second rests upon their natural necessity known from induction, by which, when the same cause (antecedent) is posited even in various circumstances, always or almost always and for the most part the same effect (consequent) recurs, which could not be unless there were a natural property and law according to which that cause constantly tends to this effect and also, unless impeded from elsewhere, will certainly produce it, for example, the sun rises in the morning, from hydrogen and oxygen water is made, mothers love sons. The third rests upon the testimony of other men, which from a quasi-moral induction is demonstrated true, because so many and such great concordant testimonies, diverse from one another and independent, have been given in such various circumstances, that the concord could not be explained except by the truth of the thing asserted, for example, the existence of Julius Caesar, Napoleon, William II, of Rome.

Moreover metaphysical certitude is greater than physical, and this greater than moral, because error is more repugnant to the essence of things than to their natural inclination, and to this than to human testimony.

b) Also according to a certain respect and as to us, that is, on the part of the subject, that is more certain which the intellect attains more fully because it is manifested more clearly to it, and consequently that which more satisfies and quiets the intellect and to which it adheres more firmly intensively without any possibility of doubting. In this mode evident or intrinsic certitude, which necessitates the intellect, is greater than non-evident and extrinsic certitude, which does not necessitate but is sought from the authority of others.

Besides, there is had certitude improperly so called, prudential or practical, which excludes not every speculative doubt, but every reasonable and prudent fear of erring. This is not strict certitude because it does not exclude every fear, but is the greatest probability which is equivalent to certitude, because it suffices for acting rightly and prudently; whence it renders us rather morally, that is, almost and equivalently certain, than being true moral certitude. Such among many is the knowledge of metaphysical and essential moral truths which they admit without full evidence of them; likewise often experimental certitude; especially human faith, which does not seem easily able to rise to strict certitude.

721. Faith is truly certain, as is established from the fact that it rests upon the infallible truth of God revealing (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 9, can. 16, and Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3); it is also supremely certain, as the unanimous opinion of the Holy Fathers and Theologians holds.

a) But it is more certain simply and as to itself, that is, on the part of the cause and motive: for in this mode faith is even more certain than metaphysical certitude, because it is more repugnant to admit the false on account of the truth of God by the light of divine grace than on account of any other motive whatever, even on account of the evidence in every way of the natural light of our reason. Wherefore we adhere more and more firmly to the truths of faith than to others, because the will in faith moves the intellect to an adherence estimatively firmer, before every other natural knowledge; whence man is prepared to deny, so far as is possible for him, all those things which would contradict revealed truths (I John V, 9; Pius IX, encyclical, November 9, 1846: nothing more certain).

b) Nevertheless it is not more certain according to a certain respect, namely, as to us, that is, on the part of the subject, of the man believing: for in this mode faith, because it does not exclude involuntary doubt, is less certain than fully evident assent, which excludes every possible doubt. Yet this is per accidens as to the motive of faith, which in itself has sufficient power of altogether confirming the intellect, and it comes from our imperfect mode of conceiving it, and therefore faith is more certain simply.

Certitude on the part of the motive is called by theologians certitude of infallibility; certitude on our part, certitude of indubitability.

The certitude of faith is proclaimed in the Scriptures:

a) firm adherence is required (Acts II, 36; VIII, 37; Rom. IV, 3-10, 21-25; Heb. X, 22; Gal. I, 8);

b) all doubt is reproved (Mk. XVI, 14; Luke XXIV, 25);

c) the reason is indicated why adherence must be firm (Acts I, 16 sq.; Heb. X, 19 to the end of the epistle; Gal. I, 8, 11; I John V, 9);

d) whence those things to which human reason seems repugnant are said to be humbly admitted (Heb. XI, 1; II Tim. I, 12), and in the Athanasian symbol it is read: This is the Catholic faith, which unless each one shall have believed firmly...

722. Observations. - 1. The certitude of faith is greater on the part of the motive than the certitude of the judgment and motives of credibility; in this sense proposition 19 was condemned by Innocent XI: "The will cannot effect that the assent of faith in itself be firmer than the weight of reasons impelling to the assent of faith deserves," that is, of the preambles on account of which we judge that one must believe, or of the motives thus remotely disposing to faith.

2. Since the conclusion is not more certain than the premises, it follows in the opinion of Lugo, who says that the act of faith is a ratiocination, that it cannot be explained that faith is more certain than rational knowledge; indeed, since he says (in the minor of the syllogism) that revelation is only practically certain, it would follow that faith has only practical and improperly so called certitude.

3. Certain theologians falsely contend that divine grace partially supplies the defect of certitude on the part of the motive, and causes an adherence firmer than the proximate motive of adherence on account of which we adhere and believe demands: for the will cannot reasonably command an adherence firmer than the motive of adherence deserves. Yet grace can illuminate the intellect so that it may more clearly and better perceive the motives of faith and credibility, even those which otherwise it would not perceive; indeed exceptionally it can internally manifest to someone a new and special motive of credibility.¹

¹ Concerning this De Poulpiquet, Le Miracle et ses suppleances, deserves to be inspected.

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 5.

723. Angels and the first man were created in faith. - The reason is that on the one hand they did not enjoy the vision of God in Himself, and on the other hand they were destined for this vision; whence they had to know it by faith, so that they could tend to it as to the supernatural end (n. 707).

724. In the other life faith does not remain. - In the blessed faith does not remain, because they see (I Cor. XIII, 9-10); nevertheless it remains in the souls of purgatory. - But in the damned it is made void, because there remains in them no aptitude nor tendency to the supernatural end; for they are definitively turned away from the ultimate end and confirmed in evil.

Nor say according to Jas. II, 19: "The demons believe and tremble." For they do not properly believe or adhere to revealed truths by supernatural grace from a pious affection of credulity, on account of the authority alone of God revealing, because God is worthy of faith and because they will to trust Him speaking; - but they admit them only by rational knowledge and quasi-historical certitude, because from the perspicacity of their intellect they have such manifest indications that they are revealed by God not lying, and therefore that His testimony concerning them is in fact true, that they are convinced concerning them and cannot doubt, namely, on account of the evidence of the testimony (cf. n. 689, 2). Namely, they do not doubt but adhere, yet on account of signs and reasons inducing them, not on account of the very authority of God revealing.

725. Faith is lost not through any mortal sin whatever, as the Council of Trent defined, sess. 6, can. 28, and as is supposed in the Scriptures, I Cor. XIII, 2; Jas. II, 14; but only through a sin directly contrary to it (I Tim. I, 19), namely, through infidelity (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 15), even if it is occupied only with one point. For he who denies the authority of God revealing in one thing cannot receive it in another, because always and in all things it is of equal weight and value. Hence if a heretic adheres to other articles, this now happens not by divine faith on account of the authority of God, but either by human faith or by his own opinion.

(St. Thomas, qq. 4 et 5.)

You will ask 1° whether faith is rightly defined by the Apostle, Hebr. XI, 1: the substance of things to be hoped for, the proof of things that appear not.

I answer. ²⁴ this definition, although the words are not arranged under the form of a definition, is legitimate, because it contains all that pertains to the definition of faith, as will appear from the following explanation. ²⁴ Here q. 4, a. 1, o.

It is called substance, in Greek hypostasis or subsistence: partly because faith is the beginning, basis and foundation of our hope; for substance is the substratum of all qualities: partly because it makes the things to be hoped for subsist in our intellect, and makes us assent to them as certainly as if they were present.

It is called the proof of things that appear not, taking proof for its effect, or, as another reading has it, conviction; for just as an argument leads the intellect to adhere to some truth, so through faith the intellect firmly adheres to truths that appear not, on account of the authority of God revealing.

It is called, of things that appear not: both because the object of faith is unseen; and to signify that more things pertain to faith than are hoped for, such as past goods and evils to come upon sinners, e. g., hell.

By this definition faith is distinguished from all other intellectual habits. By the phrase, substance of things to be hoped for, it is distinguished from human faith, by which one is not ordered to the happiness hoped for. By τῷ proof, it is distinguished from opinion, suspicion and doubt. By τῷ of things that appear not, it is distinguished from science and the understanding of first principles.

If therefore anyone wishes to reduce these words into the form of a definition, he may say ²⁵ that faith is « a habit of the mind whereby eternal life begins in us, making the intellect assent firmly to things that appear not, on account of the authority of God revealing. » And this definition coincides with that other one commonly current: « A virtue infused by God, whereby the intellect firmly assents to those things that have been revealed by God, on account of the authority of him who reveals them. » ²⁵ Ibid.

[You will ask 2° whether unformed faith is a virtue,

It must be noted that the ultimate form of faith, as of the other virtues, is charity. But charity is not the intrinsic and essential form of faith ²⁶, but is its extrinsic and accidental form, insofar as through charity faith, like all the other virtues, is ordered to the supernatural last end, and thus from charity it has it that its act is perfect and meritorious. This granted, ²⁶ Ibid., a. 3, c and ad 2.

I answer. Faith is of itself a true virtue, but imperfect.

Proof. of the first part. 1° Because it is the principle of a good act determining the intellect to assent to revealed truths. Hence, although it does not make its possessor good simply, in the moral order, which belongs to a perfect virtue, it nevertheless makes him good in its own order, namely the intellective. 2° Because the definition of virtue applies to it. For it is a good quality of the mind whereby one lives well, namely the principle of a good act, and which no one uses as a bad principle. 3° It is the same habit as formed faith; for charity does not create this habit, but perfects it only extrinsically and accidentally. 4° Precepts are given only concerning acts of virtues. But a precept is given concerning the act of unformed faith, as appears in Hebr., XI, 6: He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him. Moreover, he who comes to God is not yet perfectly united to him; which union takes place only through charity. Therefore.

Proof. of the second part ²⁷; because unformed faith does not make a man good simply. For although it is the principle of a good act, yet this act is not meritorious in order to the last end, namely eternal life, and thus faith does not have the state and mode of a perfect virtue.] ²⁷ Ibid., a. 5, ad 3.

You will ask 3° whether faith is more certain than all natural cognitions.

I answer. Faith is more certain, in itself, than all natural cognitions, but not as regards us.

Proof. of the first part ²⁸, Faith has its certitude from the divine truth, which cannot be deceived, and which is applied with certainty to the revealed truths through the infallible Church. Natural cognitions, however, have their certitude from the natural light of reason, which, although the object about which it deals is sometimes certain, is nevertheless enveloped in darkness through sin and liable to error, nor is it certain that it is applied rightly to the things apprehended. Therefore. ²⁸ Ibid.

Proof. of the second part ²⁹, That is said to be more certain as regards us which the intellect attains more fully, which is more connatural and proportionate to it, and which satisfies and quiets it more, although it assents to it less certainly from elsewhere. Now natural cognitions are more connatural and proportionate to the human intellect, are penetrated more deeply by it, satisfy and quiet it more on account of the evidence of things, in which the human intellect ultimately rests, than does faith, which is concerned with obscure and unevident things: hence it happens that, although it is most certain on the side of the motive, it nevertheless suffers, on the side of the subject, certain undeliberated movements of doubt, on account of the weakness of a mind not yet seeing the truth. Therefore. ²⁹ Ibid.

You will ask 4° whether faith is discursive.

I answer. negatively; because, as by the same vision we see color and light, so by the same act we assent to the thing revealed and to the revelation; for the object of faith is the thing revealed, not materially, but formally as revealed. In a discursive process, however, the assent to the principles is really distinguished from the assent to the conclusion.

[You will ask 5° whether faith is free.

I answer. affirmatively, from the Vatican Council defining thus: « If anyone shall say that the assent of Christian faith is not free, but is necessarily produced by arguments of human reason; or that the grace of God is necessary for faith alone living, which works through charity; let him be anathema. »]

I assert that Faith has grown in light from the beginning of the world.

It is PROVED first by the Seraphic Doctor from D. Gregor. homily 16. on Ezech., where, expounding that of Luke 10. Blessed are the eyes that see the things which you see, he says: With the increases of the times the knowledge of the Saints, and of the spiritual Fathers, grew. And the nearer they stood to the coming of the Savior, the more fully they perceived the mystery of salvation: Therefore they knew with a fuller light; but not except by the light of faith: Therefore. D. Thom. means the same, question 1. art. 4. to 4.: those nearer, namely to Christ, were suffused with a greater light — not all, indeed, but some. Valencia adds another limitation, that this is true of the infused light; for by natural light Theologians now know more things. But we were already speaking of the infused light of Faith.

Tanner adds, disp. 1. question 1. number 206., that not even one of the Doctors, succeeding in the Church, received the mysteries of faith more explicitly than the Apostles.

But this is truly PROVED. John 14. The Paraclete will teach you all things; and chapter 15. All things that I have heard from the Father, I have made known to you. And chapter 16. When the Paraclete shall come, he will teach you all things, and at the end of Luke: Then he opened their sense, that they might understand the Scriptures, as the Seraphic Doctor observes in his commentaries. And 2 Corinth. 3. Beholding with unveiled face the glory of the Lord. The Seraphic Doctor adds that of Acts 2., where Peter admonishes the Jews, the prophecy of Joel, chapter 2., being now fulfilled: And it shall be in the last days I will pour out of my spirit upon all flesh, and they shall prophesy, and shall see visions.

The Seraphic Doctor adds, to those words at the end of Luke, an argument from the Scriptures; For Christ has the key of knowledge, as is said Isa. 22. and Apoc. 5. The Lamb opened the Book of revelations, hidden before, and the four animals, which accompany the Evangelists, and the twenty-four elders standing about, saw the secrets. Therefore, the nearer the disciples were to Christ, the wiser they were.

But D. Bonan. on chapter 16. of John objects. How does he say, chapter 15. I have made all things known to you, when here he says: I have many things to say to you? He answers with D. August. Tract. 96. that he speaks of those things that were revealed at the coming of the Holy Spirit, to which they were not yet disposed. For all things, written with canonical authority before the coming of the spirit (says St. Augustine), who hears, or reads? And he puts the past for the future; and signifies, I have made known, that is, I shall make known so certainly that you may hold them as things possessed.

But the Seraphic Doctor has most splendid things on this, sermon 9. on the day of Pentec., where he observes that the Apostles are called heavens formed by the Holy Spirit, Iob. 26. The spirit of the Lord adorned the heavens. Psal. 116. The heavens show forth the glory of God. Psal. 32. By the word of the Lord the heavens were made firm, and by the spirit of his mouth all their power, as the Fathers expound: and he joins this with that of John 16. When he, the Spirit of truth, shall come, he will teach you all truth, and says: As the heavens are, in which is the fountain of light, and the Luminaries, so in the Apostles shone forth the most splendid Lights of faith. And as in the foundations there is the greater substance, so in the Apostles, who are called the foundations of the Church, Ephes. 2. Apoc. 21. And as the Holy Spirit is called the Fount of the water leaping forth, poured out, which Christ was to give; so they who were nearer to this Fount drank in more: Therefore the holy Apostles were endowed with a greater Light of faith. By these arguments this is proved by the holy Fathers: Cyprian epistle 74. Ambrose sermon 24. Augustine book 5. on Baptism, against the Donatists, chapter 26., in Valencia. And Morand. question 5., who observes with Aragon here art. 7. Cardinal Lugo disp. 3. sect. 5., that the Apostles had explicit faith of all those things which the faithful are now bound to believe; But Suarez book 2. sect. 6. num. 18. holds that this is true only of things looking to the substance of those times, not of contingents, for instance, that the Council of Trent was lawfully convened, which nevertheless was then of faith, but only now declared; so assert Vualdens. book 2. of the doctrinal faith, chapter 22. Lyrin. against heresies chapter 17. Therefore, say Cano, Castr., and others, we are not to expect a new revelation unknown to the Apostles.

Indeed Peter doubted about this great point: Whether the Gospel was to be preached to the nations. Acts 10. and chapter 11.; he is in some way reproved by Paul concerning the use of legal observances.

The Seraphic Doctor goes on to prove the excellence of our faith in the Evangelical law above the Mosaic; because, as the prophecies were ever made clearer even in the old law — whence David says Psal. 118. I have understood above the ancients, and he was esteemed a prophet above the earlier ones; so likewise the later ones were irradiated by the new light, as it were, of the day of grace approaching; so up to the Gospel, in which is the perpetual, resplendent day, the faith is more resplendent. For the Gospel is Light; and the old Law is a Shadow; and so the interior illumination is more resplendent, and the exterior instruction, and therefore the faith is adorned with a greater light.

You will object first. What is above time is not increased by time. Such is faith: Therefore.

The Seraphic Doctor answers that it is above time as to the moving reason, which is the first truth; but as to instruction it grew from night into day.

You will object second. That which shows a more hidden object is a more intense light; but the ancient faith showed the Redeemer to come, who was more hidden than now, since he has already come: Therefore.

The Seraphic Doctor answers first that it would be truer, if such light showed the hidden thing more intensely, and more clearly, by revealing more of it: But if it reveals less, it is denied: Hence the light of faith, although it shows God hidden on the way, is less than the light of glory, which exhibits more, by making God, who is hidden from us, clearer. So the light of the old faith, showing Christ obscure, was more remiss, because it uncovered little of him, and less than ours.

He answers second that the light which unfolds an object obscure in itself, and makes it appear clearer to the powers, is resplendent; But if it shows it in an obscuring cloud, it is not such. Now Christ was obscure in himself in ancient times; and as to the powers he was shown with little light, in shadowy manner; now, however, although he has already come, still objectively, in a natural way, he is little exhibited. For even if we know that there was in Judaea a famous man, called Jesus; and we read many things about him in the historians of the world; nevertheless we have received the knowledge of the Divine Person, of the truth of the doctrine, of the holiness, and of the miracles, by the light of faith, by which we believe the Gospels; and therefore the light that makes this hidden thing known to our minds is clearer than that light infused into the ancients. This reply contains, and explains the preceding one.

The same light suffused those who touched Jesus in the flesh; whence very many, although they saw the miracles, etc., did not believe, as D. Bonav. says, on 3.

You will object third. The light of faith that shows things to come is greater than that which shows things past: But the ancients saw things to come; We things past: Therefore.

The Seraphic Doctor answers that things above natural cognition are equally obscure whether they be past, and that of such things there is prophecy. Thus Moses prophesied, describing the creation of the world Genes. 1., and other past things. And Elizabeth Luke 1. says: Blessed art thou that hast believed, and of such things is faith, as that Jesus the son of God died, etc., which are not accessible to natural light.

You will object fourth. The illumination is greater where the communication of light is greater: But our faith is confirmed by the light even of the ancient Fathers: therefore it receives light from the ancients.

The Seraphic Doctor answers that this happens per accidens, insofar as those Fathers were set forth as lampstands for the posterity of the grace of the new law also. Thus the patience of Job, and of Tobias was set forth; the faith of Abraham, etc., that those first ones should be the exemplars of virtue, and that we, animated, might see what higher sanctity we are bound to climb in the testament of graces, to which indeed innumerable ones have flown over by the observance of the perfection of the counsels, although many have lain hidden under a bushel.

I assert first, that faith does not grow in the respect of its intrinsic certainty.

It is proved by D. Bonav. first, because it hangs on the first truth, which is immutable.

Second, because it hangs on the Divine foreknowledge, and decree, which are immutable.

Third, because it hangs on the divine predictions, which are always certain in the same way.

Fourth. That is more certain which is further removed from error, as that is whiter which recedes more from black, as Aristotle has it 3. Top. chapter 4.; but the ancient faith, and ours, are equally removed from all error: Therefore.

I assert second, that faith grows on the side of the believers, by reason of clearer instruction, and devotion.

It is proved by D. Bonav. first. For that is more certain which is made known by more means; but the mysteries have been expounded with new light, and in new ways: Therefore.

Second, because the mysteries of Christ, which were to come, are now rendered more certain from the fact.

Third, because faith abounds with many witnesses, namely, those who have received the Catholic faith. By which argument D. August. was moved, book against the letter of Fundam. chapter 4. and book on the profit of believing, chapter 14. How much more does the consensus of those who came after St. August. move? Surely so many men did not come to the faith for private advantages, but so many rich, so many wise, so many Princes ran to despoilings of their goods, to prisons, to martyrdoms, as St. Justin argues Apol. 2. to the Emperor. Behold even in our times so many Heroes turning the ribbons of the world into haircloth, and proud roofs into humble little cells.

Then there are the most splendid testimonies of so many martyrs triumphing amid torments, from which, even in our times, in England, and other northern regions, whence every evil is spread, by the cruelty, and unbelief of the sectaries, and Mahometans, have been produced men most wise, and most holy.

Fourth, of so many Kings, Emperors, flourishing with the torque of wisdom in the world, there are testimonies; I mean of those who came to the faith by most splendid conversions down to these very times.

Fifth, the assaults, wars, persecutions surmounted by the Church against heretical sectaries, who watered France, Germany, England with blood, that they might overturn the Catholic faith: Surely these seem to have far surpassed the savageries of the pagan Roman Caesars.

Sixth, the miracles multiplied down to these very times, even in the most remote Indians beyond the seas: By which argument Christ used Matth. 11. But if the miracles are not, and without miracles the Church stands, and grows; what greater miracle can there be? Thus argues St. August. 22. de civitate, chapter 5.: It is a great miracle that the Church navigates safe amid innumerable storms down to these times.

Seventh, even our enemies are witnesses Deuter. 32. Josephus the Hebrew book 18. antiq. chapter 9. the pagan Emperors in Eusebius book 4. Hist. chapter 13. and book 9. chapter 9. and Justin Apol. 2. to the Emperor.

Eighth, let them testify with the characters of blood, who assailed our faith. I pass over the ancients: Luther died suddenly: Calvin eaten by worms, and others: Adolphus King of Sweden crushed in war. But if in ancient times this was an incentive to faith, while they saw the pagan Caesars slain, Arius pouring out his bowels, Julian the Apostate struck by lightning, how much more ought it now to move, while we have beheld all the others suddenly snatched from the midst by a terrible death?

Let there come forward so many Councils of Wise men, and of Saints, so many prophetic oracles confirmed, so many arduous labors endured by the Confessors, so many wonders wrought in the Church, which now prevails with the highest majesty, and power: And there is the acclamation Math. 16. The gates of hell shall not prevail. How rightly Richard of St. Victor, book 1. on the Trinity, chapter 2. Lord, if we are deceived, thou hast deceived us; But that God cannot deceive I showed question 4. The Seraphic Doctor shows his indefectible perpetuity in Hexaëm. and Boët. in demonstr. 8.

At last the Seraphic Doctor proves that faith has been made more certain, or, let me say, more founded, by devotion, which fosters faith. Surely the devotion of our Church is marveled at everywhere in the ancient Canticles, as the Fathers expound. For now the army of Saints, the ranks of Martyrs, the choirs of Virgins abound, as St. Bonav. discourses most sweetly here, and in the sermons of the Hexaëmer., especially 8. and following.

It is the most certain assertion among all Theologians that faith is in the intellect as its proximate subject, as Valentia notes quaest. 6. p. 2., Caspensis disp. 4. sect. 1., Tanner disp. 1. quaest. 6. num. 8. The Seraphic Doctor, probing the nature and acts of faith more acutely, does not at once concede that Faith exists in the intellect alone.

THEREFORE he sets out three opinions on this matter.

THE FIRST is that faith is in the speculative intellect. So D. Thomas quaest. 4. art. 2. and Tanner disp. 1. quaest. 6. dub. 2.

IT IS PROVED first. The speculative intellect is that which tends to the true, under the aspect of the true: Now faith makes one believe the articles under the aspect of the true, not because they are good; for thus one believes the damnation of the wicked just as one believes the clarification of the good.

I. Question I. What is faith? Answer. Theological faith, as distinct from the other virtues, is described by the Apostle in Hebrews 11 in these words: Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not. The common notion among the Theologians is this: Faith is an infused habit, by which we firmly assent to the truths revealed by God and proposed by the Church. Theological faith, therefore, rests upon the divine authority; and this revelation is established for us through the divine Scriptures, the proposal of the Church coming in addition.

II. Question II. Of how many kinds is faith? Answer. Faith is divided into actual and habitual. Actual faith is a supernatural assent, firm and certain, excluding all doubt, given to the things revealed by God on account of the authority of that same divine revelation. Habitual faith is an infused virtue, which renders us permanently apt for eliciting acts of faith with the help of actual grace. Again, it is distributed into formed, or living, faith, which is nourished by habitual grace and charity, which works through love and brings forth fruits worthy of eternal life; and into unformed, or dead, faith, which lacks habitual grace and charity. The former is found in the just, the latter in sinners. Finally, one faith is explicit, by which an article revealed by God is expressly believed; another implicit, by which an article is believed in another article that has been revealed. You believe the mystery of the resurrection, and in it you implicitly believe the resurrection of the just.

III. Question III. What, and of how many kinds, is the object of faith? Answer. The object of faith is what is proposed to the mind to be believed. It is twofold. One is the material object, which is also called the formal object which [formale quod]; and these are all the things that are believed, of which God is the primary object, and all the rest are the secondary object. The other is the formal object by which [formale quo], or the reason why we believe; and it is the first truth obscurely revealing. This formal reason, or divine revealing truth, which induces us to believe, demands as a necessary condition the proposal of the Church. A second condition is the firmness of the assent. The third is obscurity. A threefold act of faith is usually distinguished: namely, to believe God revealing [credere Deo], to believe God as the truth revealed [credere Deum], and to believe unto God [credere in Deum], inasmuch as we tend toward him as our last end.

IV. Question IV. Is the confidence by which one certainly believes that his sins have been forgiven him a theological faith necessary to salvation? Answer. The Protestants — Lutherans and Calvinists — affirm it; and their error the Council of Trent condemned, session 6, chapter 9. For theological faith is an assent given to the articles revealed by God, as has been said. But confidence in the divine mercy, by which each one applies to himself the divine promises of the remission of sins, is an act of hope, necessary for justification, but by no means effecting justification, as the Lutherans fable.

V. Question V. Are the things which the Church proposes to be believed as revealed by God evidently credible? Answer. It is one thing to be evidently true, another to be evidently credible. An evident truth offers itself of itself to the mind. That is called evidently credible which luminous and grave arguments propose as worthy that assent be given to it. The articles of faith are evidently credible, says the Royal Prophet, Psalm 92: Thy testimonies are become exceedingly credible. The arguments of this evident credibility are touched upon briefly.

VI. 1. The vaticinations of the Prophets. 2. The propagation of the faith through the whole world — not by the din of arms, not by abundance of riches, not by the enticements of eloquence, not by the allurements of pleasures, but by the unskillfulness, the poverty, and the humility of twelve fishermen. 3. The sanctity of the Christian religion. 4. The immense multitude of miracles. 5. The innumerable host of Martyrs. 6. The dignity of witnesses above all exception. These and other arguments of credibility, which I have explained in Tome I on the Decalogue, book I, dissertation I, chapter 5, Parish priests ought to expound to the people, that their obedience may be reasonable. For these arguments of credibility prepare the mind for a firmer assent of faith.

VII. Question VI. Must a pious affection of the will precede faith? Answer. It is affirmed. That faith may be prudent, he who believes must have arguments which prove that the things to which he must give his assent are worthy of belief. But because these arguments of credibility do not remove the obscurity of the thing to be believed, the intellect cannot assent to the object of faith unless it be aided by an internal movement of the will. For an obscure object cannot bend the mind. This defect of the object the pious affection of the will must supply.

VIII. Question VII. What men are apt for theological faith? Answer. Men who are wayfarers. Wherefore faith is found neither in the damned nor in the demons, since they are deprived of every supernatural gift. They believe indeed, and tremble; but with a natural faith, not a theological one. Nor is faith found in the blessed, because what they believed, they now see. But in the souls of Purgatory faith remains, because what they believe they do not yet see; just as hope also perseveres in them. Sinners who are not infidels retain the faith, though languid and, as it is called, dead. But in Heretics there is no faith: for while they deny one article, they reject the formal reason of believing — namely, the divine revelation proposed by the Church. They assert indeed that they believe on account of revelation; but this divine revelation is proposed by each of them singly, not by the Church.