Article — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
Article II. On the virtue of theological faith
After those things which were said above, n. 472 sq., concerning the infused virtues in general, few things remain to be added concerning the infused virtue of faith. - The infused virtue of faith resides in the intellect, since the act of faith is to believe, which indeed certainly is elicited by the intellective power. But a habit perfects that power which elicits acts. - Besides the intellectual habit, by which the act of faith is immediately elicited, an infused habit is required in the will for eliciting the act of pious credulity, or for commanding the assent of the intellect. The reason is that, for perfectly producing some act which proceeds from two principles, it is required that each principle be endowed with a habit perfecting it. St. Thomas writes to the point:83 "To believe is an act of the intellect, according as it is moved by the will to assenting. But an act of this kind proceeds from the will and the intellect; each of which is apt to be perfected by a habit. And therefore it is necessary that there be some habit both in the will and in the intellect, if the act of faith ought to be perfect."
83 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 4, a. 2.
492. The existence of the virtue of faith in justified adults must be held by faith; but the existence of the same virtue of faith in baptized infants is altogether certain. The first part of this proposition is clear from the Council of Trent,84 which says: "In justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these things at once infused through Jesus Christ, into whom he is inserted: faith, hope, and charity." The other part of the proposition is clear from the Council of Vienne cited above, n. 472.
Controversy. Among theologians it is disputed85 whether the virtue of faith can sometimes be infused before the first sanctifying grace, e.g. whether catechumens eliciting acts of faith with the help of actual grace already have the virtue of faith before baptism and sanctifying grace. There are three opinions. The first affirms. Thus Cajetan, Bannez, Medina, Sylvius.86 For the same opinion Wilmers87 cites Suarez, Vasquez, Valentia, Turrianus, Coninck (he himself holds it more probable). - The second opinion denies; Lugo,88 Durandus, Bonaventure, Scotus, Viva, Platel, Kilber, cited by Wilmers,89 hold it. This opinion seems better, because the first opinion seems to have no solid foundation either in Sacred Scripture or in the Councils, which on the contrary teach that the virtues are infused together with grace.90 - The third opinion teaches that the virtue of faith is infused in baptism received with an obstacle. Thus Dominic Soto.91 This opinion entirely lacks a solid argument.
Unformed faith. The virtue of faith remains in a Christian sinner, provided, however, that he has not committed the grave sin of infidelity. Discussion will occur later concerning the loss of the virtue of faith through the sin of infidelity. That the virtue of faith remains in a Christian sinner is defined as of faith against Protestants thinking that man is justified by faith alone.92 The Council of Trent93 defined: "If anyone says that, when grace has been lost through sin, faith is always also lost at the same time; or that the faith which remains is not true faith, although it is not living; or that he who has faith without charity is not a Christian, let him be anathema." But the reason is that faith, even as to the habit, does not depend necessarily on the habit of grace, since it is not compared to grace as a property necessarily joined with it, as charity is, but as a foundation of the Christian life, which can remain when the building of grace has been destroyed.94 Faith, which remains in the sinner after grace has been destroyed, is called unformed faith, because charity is the form of faith, insofar as it orders the act of faith to the ultimate end and renders it meritorious of eternal life.95 Moreover, when grace has been destroyed, charity also is necessarily destroyed, and therefore the form of faith. Such faith is indeed called dead by St. James;96 nevertheless it is true faith and does not differ essentially from faith formed by charity. For "a habit is diversified according to that which pertains per se to the habit. But since faith is a perfection of the intellect, that pertains per se to faith which pertains to the intellect. But that which pertains to the will does not pertain per se to faith, so that through this the habit of faith could be diversified. But the distinction of formed and unformed faith is according to that which pertains to the will, that is, according to charity, but not according to that which pertains to the intellect. Hence formed and unformed faith are not diverse habits." Thus St. Thomas.97 But if sometimes the name of virtue is denied to unformed or dead faith, perfect virtue is to be understood, since faith is truly not perfect except through charity.98
84 Sess. 6, c. 7 de iustif. (Denz. n. 800).
85 Cf. above n. 473.
86 Comm. in S. theol. 2, 2, q. 3, a. 2.
87 De fide divina prop. 34.
88 De fide disp. 16, sect. 2.
89 L. c.
90 Cf. above n. 473.
91 De natura et gratia c. 8.
92 "It must be taught that if saints ... fall into manifest sins, such as adultery, etc., they shake off faith ... and both faith and the Holy Spirit are absent from them." Thus in the Smalcald Articles.
93 Sess. 6, can. 28 de iustif. (Denz. n. 838).
94 Cf. Gonet, De fide disp. 8, a. 2, n. 27.
95 Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 4, a. 3.
96 Jas. 2, 17.
97 L. c. a. 4.
98 Ib. a. 5 ad 3.
493. The increase of the virtue of faith is not only possible, but holy Church also asks for it when she prays: "Give us, Lord, an increase of faith, hope, and charity."99 The supernatural virtue of faith is increased together with sanctifying grace. For just as faith is infused with that grace, so also it is increased with it. A man constituted in sanctifying grace, from repeated acts of supernatural faith, e.g. repeated acts of faith in the Eucharistic Christ, at length acquires facility in eliciting acts of this kind. Nevertheless such facility, which in some sense can be called a habit, more probably is not a supernatural habit, but a natural one. For the same reason obtains concerning the increase and the production of a habit. But by our acts we are not able to produce the supernatural habit of faith. Therefore neither are we able (at least directly) to produce an increase of the same supernatural habit. Therefore by good acts done in the state of grace we merit the increase of grace and faith; but by acts of faith often and fervently elicited we acquire in addition facility in eliciting acts of this kind, but this facility is a natural habit.100
99 Cf. Conc. Trid. sess. 6, c. 10 de iustif. (Denz. n. 803).
100 Whoever desires more on this question, more speculative than practical, should go to Lugo, De fide disp. 16, n. 69 sqq.
494. The loss of the supernatural virtue of faith happens through the sole act of infidelity or formal heresy, which is a mortal sin. Thus the certain opinion against Durandus. Hence the Council of Trent101 says: "It must be asserted that not only by infidelity, through which even faith itself is lost, but also by any other mortal sin, although faith is not lost, the grace of justification received is lost." But the reason is that he who pertinaciously denies one article of faith destroys the formal object by which of faith. But when the formal object is destroyed, the whole habit must be destroyed. The formal object of faith is the authority of God revealing, as has been said. But he who knowingly denies one article of faith says at least implicitly that God is not infallible or truthful, and therefore he now has no faith. But if nevertheless he assents to other revealed truths, his assent is not founded upon the authority of God revealing, but upon another motive, and therefore that assent is not the assent of faith. The Angelic Doctor writes to the point:102 "It is manifest that a heretic who pertinaciously disbelieves one article of faith is not prepared to follow the doctrine of the Church in all things; for if he were not pertinacious, he would now not be a heretic, but only one erring. Hence it is manifest that such a heretic concerning one article does not have faith concerning the other articles, but a certain opinion according to his own will."
Hence the opinion of Lugo,103 Viva,104 and a few others must be rejected, teaching that some imperfect faith can be joined with formal heresy concerning one or another article. The reason of those authors is especially this: A heretic denies this article, not because he believes God to be fallible, but because he does not apprehend that article to be revealed; but he holds other articles as revealed: for it is not necessary for faith that I believe the first truth as manifested through the Church, since God can propose faith through other means as well as through the Church, as through testimonies of prophets, through interior light, etc., just as he truly infuses faith into infants through baptism.
To this argumentation an easy answer is made: Certainly the proposition of the Church is not absolutely necessary for true faith, and God can propose it through many other means. But certainly there is no reason for saying that the heretic about whom the question is raised has it through extraordinary means. For if he truly had it, he would also be prepared in mind to believe all things which are proposed to him as revealed by the Church, whose infallibility is of divine faith. Wherefore, if such a heretic rejects one of the diverse articles of faith proposed by the Church as pertaining to faith, he follows his own judgment, by which he persuades himself that the other articles are revealed, but not this one. Hence he errs gravely, and his proper motive of believing is rather his natural judgment, and that objectively false, than the authority of God revealing. But an act proceeding from such judgment is by no means an act of divine faith,105 but of natural faith.
101 L. c. c. 15 (Denz. n. 808).
102 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 5, a. 3.
103 De fide disp. 17, sect. 6.
104 Curs. theol. P. 4, disp. 4, q. 3.
105 Cf. Billuart, De fide diss. 4, a. 2.