The Interpretation and Cessation of Dispensation

A dispensation already granted can cease: a. by revocation of the one dispensing; b. by cessation of the cause; c. by renunciation of the one dispensed; d. by the death of the one granting.

188. By revocation of the one dispensing. a. He who has dispensed by proper power can validly revoke the dispensation even without a just cause: for the obligation which he removed by dispensing he can always again validly impose.

A dispensation by which, by a single act, an incapacity or impediment, e.g. an irregularity or an impediment of marriage, is wholly removed, if once granted absolutely, cannot be revoked.

He who has dispensed by vicarious power can revoke the dispensation from a just cause; without a just cause the revocation is invalid: for he who dispenses by vicarious power, just as he can grant dispensation only according to the will of the superior, so also can revoke dispensation only according to the will of the same; but revocation without a just cause is judged to be against his will.

A dispensation in a vow once absolutely granted can validly be revoked by no superior.

b. For licitly revoking a dispensation a just cause is always required; nevertheless a revocation made without a just cause does not exceed venial fault.

189. By cessation of the cause. A twofold case must be distinguished:

1. If the motive cause ceases totally before the concession of the dispensation, the dispensation is not valid.

2. If the motive cause ceases totally after the concession but before at least the complete use of the dispensation, a distinction must be made. If the superior intends to dispense absolutely, the dispensation does not cease; but if the superior intends to dispense under the condition: if the cause endures, the dispensation ceases. To discern whether the superior dispensed absolutely or under condition, authors hand down this rule.¹

Let Bertha be an example in this question, who seeks dispensation from a vow of chastity for contracting marriage from a twofold cause: that conceived offspring may be legitimized, and that Bertha's aged mother may be more easily supported. Now imagine that either the mother or the offspring, or both, have died before the marriage has been contracted. - A cleric who has received dispensation from the title of ordination on account of poverty remains dispensed, even if before ordination a rich inheritance comes to him. - Gaius has been dispensed on account of illness from the recitation of the office and from the Lenten fast; now imagine that the illness has entirely ceased during Lent.

It is required, however, that the cause certainly have ceased; therefore he who has been dispensed from abstinence or from the divine office on account of infirmity can use the dispensation until he has perfectly recovered.

a. If a dispensation has a successive effect, as in the law of abstinence, in the law of reciting the divine office, when the cause ceases the dispensation ceases, since the superior cannot be supposed to wish to dispense without cause.

b. If a dispensation has an effect wholly at once, as in irregularities, in impediments of marriage, when the cause ceases the dispensation does not cease, because the law once removed through dispensation cannot revive except through the will of the legislator; but no indication of this will can be assigned.

a. There are some who except this case: if someone obtained dispensation from a vow of chastity so that he could enter marriage for legitimizing offspring, and the offspring dies before the marriage; for if the legitimation of offspring is the sole cause of the dispensation, marriage cannot licitly be entered unless dependently upon that cause existing at the time of the marriage.² But others judge that the dispensation is valid even in this case: for even if the offspring dies after the dispensation has been made, nevertheless the impediment or obligation of the vow once removed does not revive.³

b. If the cause and the use of the dispensation cease at the same time, e.g. if someone was dispensed from a vow of chastity so that he could enter marriage for legitimizing offspring, and a little after the marriage has been entered the other party dies, he can enter another marriage, unless the dispensation was given for one marriage only: for if the dispensation was made without limit, through it the obligation of the vow is simply removed, and with that removed nothing stands in the way of a further marriage.

¹ Cf. Suarez, De leg. l. 6. c. 20. n. 18.

² Lehmkuhl II. n. 173.

³ Laymann l. 1. tr. 4. c. 22. n. 15.

190. By renunciation of the one dispensed. a. Anyone can renounce a dispensation made, unless the renunciation falls to the damage of others; but in order that the dispensation granted may cease through renunciation, it must become known to the superior and be accepted by him: for the obligation removed through the will of the superior cannot arise anew except through the will of the same superior. b. Non-use of a dispensation of itself is not a sign of renunciation: for non-use can exist together with the will of using the dispensation afterward; therefore he who has been dispensed from fasting or from the divine office can use the dispensation, even if after the dispensation has already been obtained he has for some time recited the office or fasted.

Nor is a contrary act of itself a sign of renunciation; thus if someone dispensed for entering marriage with Bertha marries Sempronia, by this very fact he does not renounce the accepted dispensation.

191. By the death of the one dispensing a dispensation then alone ceases if it was granted with this or a similar clause: at our discretion or until it shall please us, because by the death of the one granting every good pleasure and discretion of his ceases; but it does not cease if it was given absolutely or with this or a similar clause: until it is revoked, because it is a grace made; but a grace made does not expire by the death of the one granting, even if it has not yet been mandated for execution, unless something else is established from the terms of the concession.

Concerning the formula at our good pleasure, however, it must be noted that it is often employed as equivalent to the formula until revocation, and in this sense the S. C. of Bishops and Regulars, 19 June 1866, decided in a particular case that faculties given under this formula did not cease by the death of the bishop granting them.¹

Whether it is lawful to use a dispensation outside the diocese. It is not lawful to use a dispensation which has been granted in a common law by a general indult for the whole diocese: for this, equally as a common precept, is territorial. But a particular dispensation which has been granted to an individual person from a special cause can be used everywhere on earth, because it inheres in the person to whom it has been granted and accompanies him.

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri V. n. 355.

I. Dispensations which refer to lawsuits, or harm rights acquired by others, or are opposed to a law for the advantage of private persons, or finally were obtained for the acquisition of an ecclesiastical benefice, are to be interpreted strictly; likewise those which were granted for a particular case. All the rest are to be interpreted broadly (can. 85, 5°).

II. A dispensation ceases, considering can. 86:¹

¹ The cited chapter speaks only of a dispensation which has successive duration; but from the nature of the matter nearly the same things must be applied to every dispensation.

I. Through revocation of the superior made known to the dispensed person (cf. can. 71 and 60); namely:

1. The legislator and his superior can validly revoke a dispensation without cause; a delegate cannot do this without a just cause. The reason for the former is that, just as the legislator can relax a law without cause, so also he is able without cause to impose it again on the dispensed person. The reason for the latter is that the one delegating is not considered to have granted that faculty to the delegate. Nevertheless, even a delegate can revoke a dispensation with a just cause, because the one delegating is presumed to have conferred this power on him (St. Alphonsus, I, 197). You should except the case in which someone has been delegated to confer an individual dispensation; for once this has been conferred, his whole power is exhausted.

2. No one licitly revokes a dispensation without cause. Nevertheless, the legislator of himself sins only lightly; by accident he can sin gravely, suppose by reason of scandal, injury to charity, etc. A delegate sins gravely, unless smallness of matter excuses.

3. One who can revoke a dispensation sometimes cannot sustain it, namely "when the motive cause has totally ceased" (St. Alphonsus, I, 197).

Note. No one can validly revoke a dispensation given in a vow or oath, because an obligation of this sort can flow again only from the proper will of the dispensed person.

II. Through renunciation by the dispensed person accepted by the competent superior (cf. can. 72). Moreover, it is required:

1. That the dispensed person can renounce the dispensation. Furthermore, each person can renounce a dispensation granted only in his own favor; but not one which was conferred on the community (cf. can. 72; St. Alphonsus, I, 198).

2. That the dispensed person has truly renounced the dispensation, whether expressly or tacitly. Nevertheless, tacit renunciation will not easily be established. Thus, for example, non-use of a dispensation does not necessarily involve renunciation (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

3. That the superior has accepted the renunciation, and thus binds the subject again, since a relaxation of law proceeding from a superior cannot cease except through the superior himself.

If there is question of dispensation in a vow or oath, acceptance by the superior is not required, since each person can impose anew upon himself the obligation of a vow or oath.

III. Through death or cessation in law of the superior, a dispensation ceases only when it was given with the clause "at our good pleasure" or another equivalent clause (cf. can. 73). Hence it does not cease if it was given "at the good pleasure of the Holy See" or "of the Bishop."

IV. Through cessation of the cause. 1. A dispensation which has successive duration, that is, whose effect can conveniently be divided, as obtains in a dispensation from the law of fasting, abstinence, etc., ceases by the certain and total cessation of the motive cause; but not by its doubtful or partial cessation, nor by the cessation of the impulsive cause (can. 86). Hence, for example, a sick person dispensed in the law of fasting is held to fast again after he has certainly recovered sufficiently.

2. An obtained dispensation which does not have successive duration, that is, whose effect cannot at all, or cannot conveniently, be divided, does not cease even if the cause on account of which it was granted has ceased. Hence one dispensed from the impediment of consanguinity can enter Matrimony with the blood relative, even if the cause has ceased before Matrimony. The reason is taken both from the nature of the matter and from the intention of the legislator, who in cases of this sort is presumed to have dispensed absolutely (cf. can. 86; St. Alphonsus, I, 196; VI, 1132). Nevertheless, it is disputed whether the same can be said if someone has been dispensed from a vow or oath in order to enter Matrimony: for example, someone is dispensed from a vow of chastity solely to legitimate offspring; but the offspring dies before Matrimony is entered. Does the dispensation subsist? It seems it must be denied, since Christ is not considered to have conferred on the Church the power of dispensing in a natural obligation except continuously dependently on its cause.

Finally note these words of St. Alphonsus: "When... a dispensation has been granted absolutely, it does not cease through one act; for example, you obtained a dispensation in a vow of chastity in order to contract Matrimony; when the spouse has died, the dispensation endures: unless it was granted for a special case, namely, to marry a virgin deflowered by you. And so concerning similar things" (St. Alphonsus, I, 196).

Dispensation can cease for a manifold reason, namely 1. by cessation of the cause; 2. by revocation; 3. by renunciation.

120. Hence resolves. - 1. A dispensation ceases when the total motive cause ceases before its execution; for then the prayers do not rest on truth. It is otherwise if the motive cause ceases only in part, because the cause of the dispensation still remains. Hence a dispensation from fasting conceded because of infirmity ceases if beforehand you have already fully recovered; otherwise, if the infirmity remains in part. - St. Lig., no. 196, and others commonly.

2. A dispensation ceases, even if the motive cause ceases after its execution, but before the effect or use of the grace has begun ¹, unless the Superior is judged to have granted the grace absolutely. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig., ibid.

¹ There can be a question not only of a cause ceasing before the use of the dispensation has begun, for example if before contracting matrimony the cause on account of which dispensation had been given from an impediment ceases, but also when the use of the grace has already begun, if the effect is divisible, for example if after the minor Orders or subdiaconate have been received, the poverty of him who for this cause had been dispensed from irregularity for the effect of receiving sacred Orders ceases; or if one dispensed absolutely from recitation of the Breviary because of an infirmity of the eyes judged incurable by physicians afterward recovers. And indeed that the solution of these questions is by no means easy is openly shown by the dissenting opinions of Authors on these things (see St. Alph., book 1, no. 196); wherefore Suarez wrote (On Laws, book 8, ch. 30, no. 11): I confess that the matter is intricate and perplexed, as these moral matters are accustomed to be when general rules must be handed down, which can scarcely be regular, much less infallible.

And indeed St. Alphonsus (l.c.) very well commended the rule which Father Gury here intimates, namely that one should inspect whether the dispensation is given absolutely, or under the condition, if the cause endures. But, as he himself adds, the difficulty presses further: when must a dispensation be considered granted absolutely, and when under a tacit condition? And indeed what will you determine if someone is dispensed from a vow of Religion because of infirm health, or from a vow of chastity for marrying because of grave temptations, and then soon recovers, or those temptations altogether vanish before matrimony, indeed even before any betrothals?

St. Alphonsus (l.c.) seeks help from another rule, namely that a dispensation must be considered given absolutely if the cause could be judged perpetual, although perhaps afterward it ceases per accidens. But soon he himself rejects certain consequences which others were deducing from that norm concerning one dispensed from fasting or from recitation of the Breviary.

Suarez supplies a more apt support (On Laws, book 6, ch. 20, no. 18), when he distinguishes dispensations which have an indivisible effect, by removing an inability, impediment, or vow, and dispensations from laws having a successive course by reason of matter which is divisible and has succession, as in the law of the Lenten fast. For in the former, the whole dispensation is granted at once and absolutely. But in the latter, the dispensation is virtually multiple, so that, for the successive obligation, individual dispensations are in a certain way given for individual days; and therefore each one requires its proper cause for its own time: if this cause is ever lacking, by that very fact the reason for the dispensation will cease, unless the Superior is considered to have granted the grace absolutely. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig. ibid.

3. Dispensation altogether ceases when the express revocation of the Superior accedes, because obligation or de-obligation depends on the will of the Superior. Yet revocation without a just cause would be illicit. - But it does not cease because of revocation by an inferior without a just cause, because the faculty of revoking is not in his arbitrary power. - St. Lig., no. 197. - Salmanticenses. - Roncaglia, etc.

4. For the validity of renunciation the acceptance of the Superior is required, because only the Superior can bind the will, just as also loose it from the bond of law. - St. Lig. ibid. and others commonly.

258. Cessation of dispensation. Concerning this matter the Code of Canon Law c. 86 establishes: "A dispensation which has successive duration ceases in the same ways as a privilege, and also by the certain and total cessation of the motive cause." How privileges cease will be said below, n. 268. A dispensation which does not have successive duration, namely one which is completed by a single act, cannot cease once it has produced its effect, according to that adage: a fact cannot be made not done. Other dispensations can cease in three ways: 1. on the part of the one dispensing; 2. on the part of the one dispensed; 3. on the part of the final cause.

259. 1. On the part of the one dispensing, dispensation ceases a) by revocation; b) sometimes also by his death.

a) As to revocation, these things must be noted: He who has dispensed by proper authority can always validly revoke the dispensation conceded, provided every obligation has not been extinguished by the prior dispensation. For he who by proper authority freely suspends some obligation can also impose it again. Thus, for example, the Pope can revoke a dispensation given concerning the law of fasting. If, however, the matter dispensed has already lost every obligation, revocation can no longer be made. Thus, for example, the Pope cannot revoke a dispensation conceded concerning a ratified marriage, since what has once been dissolved and destroyed cannot revive. - He who conceded a dispensation from delegated authority cannot revoke it without a sufficient reason; for just as he could not validly or licitly concede a dispensation without a sufficient reason, so neither can he validly or licitly revoke it once conceded without a sufficient reason. But the reason is that the power of one dispensing from delegation is bound to only licit use. But someone uses his power illicitly if he does not act from a sufficient and reasonable cause. Therefore neither can the legislator himself, or anyone who has dispensed from proper authority, licitly revoke without sufficient reason a dispensation conceded.

b) By the death of the one dispensing or cessation in office, a dispensation generally does not cease; but it ceases if it was conceded by the following or similar formulas referring to the very person of the one conceding: "at our good pleasure,"⁸⁶ "at our judgment," "until it shall have pleased"; on the contrary it does not cease if it is conceded by the following or a similar formula: "until revocation," because revocation has not in reality been made.

⁸⁶ Cod. iur. can. cc. 86 and 73.

261. 3. On the part of the final cause, that dispensation ceases which was not conceded absolutely. Otherwise the dispensation remains valid. Therefore two things are required for the cessation of a dispensation: 1) That the truly final cause cease. For from the cessation of an impulsive cause the dispensation does not cease, provided some final cause remains. 2) That the dispensation was not given absolutely. A dispensation whose effect is indivisible and is at once obtained totally is judged to have been given absolutely. Certainly in practice it is not rarely very difficult to discern whether some dispensation was given absolutely, or only conditionally, namely under the condition of the cause subsisting. Hence very often doubts are wont to arise concerning the value of a dispensation, because the final cause now does not exist or has been essentially changed. To eliminate these doubts at least partially, Pius X established that in matrimonial impediments of lesser degree a dispensation always be conceded from motu proprio, and therefore in these dispensations the cessation of the final cause now does not harm the value of the dispensation obtained.⁸⁸ - But in other dispensations which have "successive duration," as it is said, when the final cause ceases, by that very fact the dispensation also ceases. Thus, for example, he who because of illness had been dispensed from the law of abstinence must, health having been recovered, again observe the law of abstinence; he who at the beginning of Lent had been dispensed from the law of fasting because of grave labors to be carried out is bound to fast if during Lent those labors have ceased. Modern authors rather commonly teach⁸⁹ that dispensations concerning impediments of marriage and concerning irregularities are conceded in an absolute mode, and therefore the dispensation remains valid if before the use of the dispensation the final cause has ceased, provided it really existed at the time of the concession itself. For example, Bertha obtained a dispensation concerning the impediment of consanguinity in order to legitimate offspring already received. At the time at which the dispensation was conceded, the offspring was living, but died before the marriage was to be contracted. Nevertheless the dispensation conceded is valid.⁹⁰ - Concerning dispensation from a vow of chastity there were special difficulties and controversies, but today this dispensation is conceded with clauses added so clear that in practice no grave difficulty any longer subsists. But it seems that in vows a dispensation ceases if before its execution the sole cause of dispensing has ceased. For no one (not even the Pope) can dispense in vows without a sufficient and really existing cause, since they are of divine right. Wherefore, for example, if Bertha bound by a vow of chastity had been dispensed for entering marriage solely for the sake of legitimating offspring, and this offspring died before celebration of the marriage, the dispensation of the vow ceases, so that Bertha remains bound by the vow and needs a new dispensation.

Territorial dispensation ceases if someone has gone out of that territory; on the contrary, personal dispensation follows the dispensed person wherever he may be. Hence, for example, a German cannot outside Germany use dispensations in the law of abstinence conceded for his fatherland; but if he received a personal dispensation in the law of abstinence, he can use it everywhere on earth. The matter is plain from what was said above n. 196 sqq. concerning the obligation of travelers.

⁸⁸ Cf. above n. 256.

⁸⁹ Thus Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 268; Noldin, De princ. n. 189; cf. also St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 196.

⁹⁰ Cf. below in the treatise on marriage III, 880 and 883.

262. Interpretation of dispensation. 1. The faculty itself of dispensing, if it is ordinary or delegated for a universality of affairs, is to be interpreted broadly; any other strictly. Thus the Code of Canon Law c. 200, § 1. Therefore, for example, a confessor to whom a general faculty of dispensing for the internal forum has been committed can use it not only in the forum of penance, but also outside the confessional, because the internal forum is not restricted to the tribunal of penance. - Although the faculty of dispensing conceded for a certain case is to be interpreted strictly,⁹² nevertheless it also carries with it other powers which are necessary for its use; wherefore, for example, in the faculty of dispensing there is also included the power of absolving from ecclesiastical penalties, if any perhaps stand in the way, but only for the effect of obtaining the dispensation.⁹³

2. The dispensation itself is to be interpreted strictly, because it is judged to be a wound of the law.⁹⁴ Nevertheless sometimes a dispensation is to be interpreted broadly, especially in four cases: a) if it was conceded motu proprio; b) if it was conceded for the public good; c) if it was conceded to the whole community and not to a singular person; d) if it was inserted in the Code of Canon Law.⁹⁵

⁹² Cod. iur. can. c. 85.

⁹³ Ibid. c. 66, § 3.

⁹⁴ Ibid. c. 85.

⁹⁵ Cf. Lehmkuhl, l. c., n. 266.

242. I. INTERPRETATION, in the matter of dispensation, is made according to the following rules:

1. THE POWER OF DISPENSING, even delegated, since it is favorable to the public good, is to be interpreted BROADLY (cf. n. 253, 2.). Except if it has been conceded to someone by way of commission for a certain case; because then it falls back into the dispensation itself, and must be interpreted in the same way as that (I, 187).

He who has received the faculty of dispensing as a missionary can use it for the whole time of the missions, even on the journey; he who has obtained it as a confessor can exercise it even outside Confession, but only toward those over whom he possesses jurisdiction of the internal forum (Noldin, I, n. 166). Some add that the confessor can do this also in favor of travelers.

2. THE DISPENSATION ITSELF, since it is odious and a wound of the law, is to be taken STRICTLY. Whence if it is doubted whether a dispensation extends to these or those circumstances, it is judged not to extend. Except, "unless the dispensation is owed, or is from the motion proper of the prince, or is inserted in the Body of Law, or finally unless it is conceded to a community, for the common good." For in these cases it is held for a favor and must be taken broadly (I, 194). See the very useful case in Lehmkuhl, Cas. consc., I, n. 120.

A dispensation is said to be given motu proprio when it is conceded with no preceding petition, or at least independently of it, if any perhaps preceded. Now indeed: 1. If no petition at all preceded, a dispensation conceded motu proprio is to be interpreted in such a way that it is held valid, even if in the rescript of the Superior some true circumstance, and otherwise necessarily to be expressed, is kept silent.

2. If some petition preceded, it is controverted whether the clause motu proprio has the aforesaid efficacy (cf. Salmant., tr. 18, c. I, n. 73-80).

243. II. As regards the USE of dispensation, it must be noted that this use is sometimes defined by a determined place, and sometimes is circumscribed by no limits. For just as there are given local laws and personal laws, so there are given also local dispensations and personal dispensations.

1. If a dispensation has been given for some determined place, for example, if some diocese has been dispensed from a law which obliges Christians within Lent to abstain from eggs and milk foods, all who are staying in that diocese can use the dispensation, whether they are inhabitants, travelers, or wanderers; but no one outside the territory of the diocese. The reason is, because the dispensation was conceded from a special necessity of the diocese, and therefore as it were adheres to the diocese.

2. If someone personally has been dispensed in a universal law, either by the legislator himself or by his delegate, he can use the dispensation everywhere. Thus, for example, one dispensed by his Bishop in the law of abstinence can eat meat even outside his own diocese. The reason is, because the Bishop dispensed in the name of universal authority, and because the dispensation conceded is judged to have been conceded on account of a personal motive, which clings to the bones (cf. n. 1247).

244. IT IS ASKED. Whether he sins who uses a dispensation indeed VALID, but ILLICITLY obtained?

Resp. Probably he does not sin; because, although he acted fraudulently, for example, by mendaciously setting forth impulsive causes, or by striking unjust fear, nevertheless since the dispensation is valid on account of a motive cause, as is supposed, he himself is now no longer under the law (I, 178; H. Ap., II, 46).

245. The cessation of dispensation can happen in three ways: 1. through cessation of the cause; 2. through revocation by the one dispensing; 3. through renunciation by the one dispensed.

I. A dispensation, or a commission of dispensing, regularly ceases when the MOTIVE cause ceases TOTALLY and CERTAINLY. Thus, for example, the dispensation from not fasting, conceded to you at the beginning of Lent on account of illness, expires when you have fully recovered. But it endures when only the impulsive cause ceases, because this was not the reason of the dispensation; likewise, if the motive cause ceases only partially, because in the remaining part there still remains a sufficient reason of dispensation; likewise, if the motive cause ceases doubtfully, because in doubt possession stands for the dispensation (I, 196; H. Ap., II, 66).

We have said: REGULARLY; for, even when the motive cause has ceased totally and certainly, the dispensation does not therefore cease: 1. if the dispensation has already obtained its effect, for example, if the one dispensed for obtaining a benefice has already obtained it; 2. if some onerous commutation has been added to the dispensation, for example, payment of money; 3. if the dispensation has been given absolutely, that is, without that tacit condition "if the cause endures," namely when it is conceded from a cause which of itself is perpetual, or is judged perpetual, for example, on account of scarcity of priests, on account of honesty of morals, on account of poverty of parents, etc.: for once the obligation of law has been removed through such a dispensation, this obligation, according to a sufficiently probable opinion, does not return unless it is imposed again by the Superior (I, 195; Salmant., de Leg., c. 5, n. 87).

This also must be noted, that a dispensation given ABSOLUTELY is not exhausted by one act, unless it has been conceded for a special case. Thus one dispensed from a vow of chastity for contracting marriage can, when his spouse has died, pass to second nuptials; provided the dispensation was not given for that case alone, for example, for taking a virgin deflowered by him (I, 196; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 269).

246. II. A dispensation ceases through REVOCATION by the one dispensing, notified to the one dispensed (cf. 233, 1.). Yet in this case a distinction must be made: 1. If revocation is made by a Superior in his own law, it is valid, even if without

cause; because obligation and de-obligation depend on the will of the legislator. Yet he who thus revokes sins, but lightly, because he acts inordinately. 2. If revocation is made by a secondary Superior or by a delegate, when a just cause of revoking is lacking, it is not only illicit, but also invalid; because the faculty of revoking is not in his arbitrary power (I, 197; H. Ap., II, 67).

But whether a dispensation ceases by the death of the one conceding? Resp. It depends on the terms of the concession. If it has been conceded absolutely, or with the clause until it is revoked, or at the judgment of the Apostolic See or of the Bishop, IT DOES NOT CEASE. But otherwise, if it has the clause until it shall have pleased us, or at our judgment; provided, however, that the matter is still untouched, say if the confessor has not yet begun to hear the confession of the one dispensed (cf. n. 233).

247. III. A dispensation ceases through RENUNCIATION of the one dispensed, provided the renunciation has been accepted by the Superior. The reason for this is, because, although a subject can yield his own right, if the renunciation does not redound to the damage of another, nevertheless only the Superior, in his own law, can bind again the will which he had rightly and validly released from the law.

Thus, for example, if Peter, having obtained a dispensation for marrying a blood-relative, married a stranger, he can, when his spouse has died, marry the first woman; provided the Superior has not revoked the dispensation. Likewise, he who obtained a dispensation from reciting the Divine Office, from observing the fast, can use the dispensation, even if meanwhile he has observed the law of the Office and fast (I, 198).

248. What is to be done, you will ask, in doubt WHETHER THE CASE NEEDS DISPENSATION?

Resp. 1. If the doubt is OF RIGHT, that is, if it is doubted whether the case is comprehended in the law, whether the doubt is negative or positive, a dispensation is not required, because this is the same as doubting concerning the law itself, whether it has been imposed for that matter. "Therefore the subject can use his liberty. Nevertheless it is more advisable then to approach the prelate who may declare or dispense; since in such a doubt even an inferior prelate can well dispense, without concession of the legislator" (cf. n. 55). See St. Alph., I, 192; ed. G., I, p. 172; cf. Salmant., tr. XI, c. 5, n. 45, whose doctrine he reports.

2. If the doubt is OF FACT, that is, if you positively doubt whether there is present a cause excusing from law, for example, for exercising servile work on Sunday; or even whether the cause which you have is sufficient for excusing you, dispensation is of itself necessary; because, in each case, the law possesses antecedently to your liberty, and therefore it is truer that you are held to the law.¹ Yet it would be otherwise if it were truly and uniquely probable that the cause is sufficient, or grave enough, to exempt you; or if another principle were added, for example, the natural and certain right of preserving health, etc., in the case in which it is feared lest observance of the law is going to harm gravely. Recall the things said n. 223, 241, q. 2. Cf. St. Alph., III, 1036.

Note what the Holy Doctor writes, III, n. 1049 at the end; ed. G., II, p. 439: "If someone does not have a cause absolutely sufficient for excusing him from fasting, and some probable and just reason appears to him, by which he fasts only twice or thrice in the week, he is not to be urged to fast, even if that cause does not altogether suffice, but he is to be left in his good faith, lest perhaps afterwards he culpably omit all fasts."

If the matter concerns dispensation over impediments of matrimony, see n. 2046.

Dispensation can cease in multiple ways, namely 1° by cessation of the cause; 2° by revocation; 3° by renunciation.

164. Principles. - I. By cessation of the cause a dispensation ceases (but not a commutation, L. I, 195), if there has ceased: 1) the final cause, and not only the impulsive; and this 2) totally; 3) certainly; and 4) before the dispensation has obtained effect. But if it has already obtained effect, one granted absolutely does not cease; otherwise if under an express or tacit condition: if the cause endures.³

The principle is proved and explained.

It is said: if there has ceased: 1) the final cause and not only the impulsive; for the former, not the latter, is the reason of the dispensation.

It is said: 2) totally. For then the prayers do not rest on truth in any way. It is otherwise if the motive cause ceases only in part, because the cause of dispensation still remains. Hence a dispensation from fasting conceded because of infirmity ceases when you have fully recovered; otherwise, if the infirmity remains in part.¹ Hence likewise, if the final cause, for example, of dispensing in an impediment of marriage is the legitimation of offspring and the reparation of scandal or damage; - if the offspring dies, or the fetus has been miscarried, the dispensation is still sustained for repairing scandal or damage.

It is said: 3) certainly. For in doubt one must stand for the dispensation, which possesses.

It is said: 4) before the dispensation, etc. For he to whom the execution of the letters is committed cannot satisfy his office except under the tacit condition: if the prayers rest upon truth; which condition demands that the final cause persist at the time at which the dispensation obtains execution. Titius, for example, petitions for a dispensation from an impediment of consanguinity, setting forth as the sole final and total cause the legitimation of offspring already begotten from a blood relative; he obtains the dispensation, and the dispensatory letters have already been dispatched; but before the letters are given to execution by the delegate (or before the dispensation has been fulminated), the offspring dies: - the dispensation ceases.

It is added: But if it has already obtained effect, etc. But according to St. Alphonsus² an absolute dispensation is one which is given because of a cause of itself perpetual, such as, for example, in a dispensation over irregularity the poverty of parents, lack of ministers, uprightness of morals is judged to be; otherwise it is held as conditioned, such as infirmity is commonly judged to be, because of which one is dispensed from fasting, abstinence, the Divine Office. (Z) p. 484.

II. Dispensation altogether ceases by the express revocation of the Superior, because obligation or release from obligation depends on the will of the Superior. Yet revocation without just cause would be illicit. - But it does not cease because of revocation by an inferior without just cause, because the faculty of revoking is not in his arbitrary power.³

III. Renunciation must be accepted by the Superior, because he alone can again bind one loosed from the law. But a delegate cannot accept it; for, once the dispensation has been given, he has ceased to be Superior. - A dispensation does not cease by non-use or by contrary use, for example, by fasting or by not marrying the affine, if you were dispensed in fasting, affinity. L. I, 198.

389. Dispensation can be vitiated by violence, fear, and error.

A. Violence strictly so called, or perfect and absolute, invalidates it because it renders it involuntary (can. 103, § 1).

B. Fear of itself does not invalidate, because it does not take away the will of dispensing, unless it was so grave that it altogether disturbed reason; whence a dispensation is judged valid unless something else is provided by law (can. 103, § 2), as for remission of a penalty extorted by fear (can. 2238).

C. Error arising either from subreption, that is, suppression of the truth, or from obreption, that is, expression of the false:

1. invalidates if it bears

a) upon the substance of the object or thing, or upon a quality which enters the substance of the thing about which dispensation is made, for example, affinity instead of consanguinity (can. 40);

b) upon the subject or person to whom it is given, for example, Peter instead of Paul (can. 40);

c) upon those things which, according to the style of the curia, are required to be expressed for validity, even if the superior would dispense otherwise (can. 42, § 1), unless nevertheless the clause motu proprio is added to the dispensation (can. 45);

d) upon the final or motive cause which so moves to dispensing that, once it is removed, the dispensation would not have been given, if the sole cause or all the final causes alleged are false (can. 42, § 2), unless nevertheless an exception is established by law, as for lesser impediments of marriage (can. 1054).

2. Outside these cases it is valid, for example, if the error bears upon accidents of the thing, or upon the name of the person or place or thing, provided, in the judgment of the Ordinary, there is no doubt about the person or thing itself (can. 47), or upon a merely impulsive cause without which the dispensation nevertheless would have been given but which moves one to dispense more easily, or if it bears extrinsically and independently toward the thing requested, even if otherwise it would not have been dispensed: for here and now the one dispensing wills to loose the bond.

3. A defect of obreption or subreption in only one part does not weaken another, if several dispensations are granted at the same time (can. 42, § 3).

390. Observations. - 1. Canon 84, § 2: "A dispensation, in doubt concerning the sufficiency of the cause, is licitly asked for and can be licitly and validly conferred."

2. Canon 85: "Not only a dispensation according to the norm of can. 50 (concerning a law in the advantage of private persons), but the faculty itself of dispensing granted for a certain case, is subject to strict interpretation"; but not a general faculty, whether ordinary or delegated for a universality of causes, since it is favorable and granted beside the law, and therefore admits a broad interpretation (can. 200, § 1).

3. Canon 86: "A dispensation which has successive duration (and not the whole effect at once, as an irregularity or the removal of an impediment of marriage) ceases in the same modes by which a privilege ceases, and also by certain and total cessation of the motive cause (whether negatively or contrarily)." Whence it also ceases: 1) by revocation of the granting superior signified to the subject (can. 71 and 60), which the legislator always validly effects, but an inferior delegate only for a just cause; 2) by renunciation made by him who can renounce, and accepted by the competent superior (can. 72); 3) by the resolution of the right (and death) of the one granting, if the dispensation was given at pleasure (can. 73) or with an equivalent clause: until I shall will, until it shall please, etc.; otherwise if it was given: until I shall revoke; 4) by the death of the person to whom it was granted, if the privilege was personal; if local, by the destruction of the place, unless it is restored within fifty years (can. 74-75); 5) when the time has elapsed or the number of cases for which it was granted has been completed (can. 77); 6) if the circumstances, in the judgment of the superior, are so changed that the dispensation has become harmful or its use illicit (can. 77); but not by non-use alone, unless it is onerous to others and legitimate prescription or tacit renunciation is also added (can. 76).

But a dispensation which has the whole effect at once, if it is granted absolutely, does not cease even by certain and total cessation of the motive cause.

4. Concerning the invalidity of dispensation the following have force:

Canon 43: "A favor denied by one Sacred Congregation or Office of the Roman Curia is invalidly granted by another Sacred Congregation or Office, or by the local Ordinary, even if he has power, without the assent of the Sacred Congregation or Office by which, or with which, action had begun, saving the right of the Sacred Penitentiary for the internal forum."

Canon 44, § 2: "A favor denied by a Vicar General and afterwards obtained from the Bishop, with no mention made of this denial, is invalid; but a favor denied by the Bishop cannot validly be obtained from the Vicar General, even with mention made of the denial, if the Bishop does not consent."

Canon 53: "The executor of a rescript invalidly performs his office before he has received the letters and recognized their authenticity and integrity, unless previous notice of them has been transmitted to him by authority of the one rescripting."

5. Concerning the cessation of the power of dispensing, one must speak according to the mind of canons 207 and 208.

6. To avoid simony, dispensation must be gratuitous, although modest payments can be exacted under the title of chancery expenses, as for example in can. 1056.

7. A real or territorial dispensation has force in the territory; a personal dispensation, as is that which removes an impediment or inability, everywhere; a mixed dispensation (real and personal) has force for all in the territory, and for subjects also outside the territory.

I say, 1st. A dispensation which has a successive tract ceases in the same ways as a privilege, and also by the certain and total cessation of the motive cause (Can. 86). A dispensation which is virtually multiple, as in the Lenten fast, and, so to speak, renewed on individual days, has a successive tract.

A dispensation which does not have a successive tract, but an indivisible effect, for example, of taking away incapacity or an impediment, is judged to have been granted absolutely and is esteemed perpetual, and does not cease as the former dispensation does.

I say, 2nd. A dispensation altogether ceases when the express revocation of the superior supervenes, because obligation or deobligation depends on the will of the superior. Yet revocation without a just cause would be illicit. But it does not cease on account of the revocation of an inferior without a just cause, because the faculty of revoking is not in his arbitrary power. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 197. - Nor does it cease if the revocation is made, even from a just cause, by one delegated for a particular dispensation; because his delegated power is extinguished after the dispensation has been granted. But it ceases if an inferior Prelate, by ordinary right or by delegation for the universality of causes, granted the dispensation and revoked it from a just cause; because his power is not taken away after the concession has been made. - Cf. Wernz, Jus Decret. v. 1, n. 126.

I say, 3rd. A dispensation also ceases through renunciation; but for its validity acceptance by the superior is required, because only the superior can bind the will, just as he can also loose it from the bond of law. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 198.

A dispensation does not cease by non-use, or by contrary use, or by a new dispensation, or by departure from the territory of the one granting a perpetual dispensation.