Article III. On the Cessation of Dispensation

Dispensation can cease for a manifold reason, namely 1. by cessation of the cause; 2. by revocation; 3. by renunciation.

120. Hence resolves. - 1. A dispensation ceases when the total motive cause ceases before its execution; for then the prayers do not rest on truth. It is otherwise if the motive cause ceases only in part, because the cause of the dispensation still remains. Hence a dispensation from fasting conceded because of infirmity ceases if beforehand you have already fully recovered; otherwise, if the infirmity remains in part. - St. Lig., no. 196, and others commonly.

2. A dispensation ceases, even if the motive cause ceases after its execution, but before the effect or use of the grace has begun ¹, unless the Superior is judged to have granted the grace absolutely. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig., ibid.

¹ There can be a question not only of a cause ceasing before the use of the dispensation has begun, for example if before contracting matrimony the cause on account of which dispensation had been given from an impediment ceases, but also when the use of the grace has already begun, if the effect is divisible, for example if after the minor Orders or subdiaconate have been received, the poverty of him who for this cause had been dispensed from irregularity for the effect of receiving sacred Orders ceases; or if one dispensed absolutely from recitation of the Breviary because of an infirmity of the eyes judged incurable by physicians afterward recovers. And indeed that the solution of these questions is by no means easy is openly shown by the dissenting opinions of Authors on these things (see St. Alph., book 1, no. 196); wherefore Suarez wrote (On Laws, book 8, ch. 30, no. 11): I confess that the matter is intricate and perplexed, as these moral matters are accustomed to be when general rules must be handed down, which can scarcely be regular, much less infallible.

And indeed St. Alphonsus (l.c.) very well commended the rule which Father Gury here intimates, namely that one should inspect whether the dispensation is given absolutely, or under the condition, if the cause endures. But, as he himself adds, the difficulty presses further: when must a dispensation be considered granted absolutely, and when under a tacit condition? And indeed what will you determine if someone is dispensed from a vow of Religion because of infirm health, or from a vow of chastity for marrying because of grave temptations, and then soon recovers, or those temptations altogether vanish before matrimony, indeed even before any betrothals?

St. Alphonsus (l.c.) seeks help from another rule, namely that a dispensation must be considered given absolutely if the cause could be judged perpetual, although perhaps afterward it ceases per accidens. But soon he himself rejects certain consequences which others were deducing from that norm concerning one dispensed from fasting or from recitation of the Breviary.

Suarez supplies a more apt support (On Laws, book 6, ch. 20, no. 18), when he distinguishes dispensations which have an indivisible effect, by removing an inability, impediment, or vow, and dispensations from laws having a successive course by reason of matter which is divisible and has succession, as in the law of the Lenten fast. For in the former, the whole dispensation is granted at once and absolutely. But in the latter, the dispensation is virtually multiple, so that, for the successive obligation, individual dispensations are in a certain way given for individual days; and therefore each one requires its proper cause for its own time: if this cause is ever lacking, by that very fact the reason for the dispensation will cease, unless the Superior is considered to have granted the grace absolutely. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig. ibid.

3. Dispensation altogether ceases when the express revocation of the Superior accedes, because obligation or de-obligation depends on the will of the Superior. Yet revocation without a just cause would be illicit. - But it does not cease because of revocation by an inferior without a just cause, because the faculty of revoking is not in his arbitrary power. - St. Lig., no. 197. - Salmanticenses. - Roncaglia, etc.

4. For the validity of renunciation the acceptance of the Superior is required, because only the Superior can bind the will, just as also loose it from the bond of law. - St. Lig. ibid. and others commonly.