Morals of the Church
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Section — Marc, Institutiones Morales

§ 3. On the Interpretation of Privilege

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¶253.
  1. The interpretation of privilege is made either authentically or doctrinally.
  1. AUTHENTICALLY, the prince can interpret privileges, or others to whom it has been committed by the prince.

Here it must be noted: "a) Bishops are prohibited by Clement IV and other Pontiffs from juridically interpreting privileges of regulars. Nevertheless, in a case in which the Apostolic See cannot be consulted, this was conceded by Alexander VI and Paul III to jurisconsults and other judges in favor of regulars. b) The same was conceded to Generals, visitors, and even provincials and immediate prelates, whenever they themselves consult the skilled. The same has place in the interpretation of rules, constitutions, and customs" (ibid.).

  1. DOCTRINALLY, any learned man can interpret privileges; and it is lawful to acquiesce in his resolution, as all affirm (compare n. 171, 172).

The following RULES of interpretation are assigned:

  1. Every privilege is to be interpreted in such a way that it is neither useless nor burdensome to the privileged person.

  2. A privilege is to be interpreted broadly or strictly, according as it is favorable or odious. But a privilege is called odious which derogates from common right, or from particular statutes or customs which are not against common right, or which yields to the detriment of others; otherwise it is favorable. Therefore you will interpret strictly, for example, a privilege conceded to one illegitimate for receiving orders: namely restrict it to minor orders. But faculties conceded to religious you will extend broadly also to religious congregations and novices.

But an odious one is equated with a favorable one, and must be interpreted broadly, if either a) it is inserted in the Body of Law; or b) it is real, for on account of its perpetuity it is held as inserted in the Body of Law; or c) it is conceded with the clause: from certain knowledge, from proper motion; or d) it is a privilege of absolving, dispensing, or communicating it with others; or e) if otherwise it would be rendered useless.

"But privileges in prejudice of others, of which kind would be those for obtaining several benefices, or for conferring vacant benefices, or against regular observance, are to be interpreted strictly, even if they have been conceded from proper motion" (ibid., n. 7).

  1. Privileges conceded to some Order, community, or for some pious cause are to be interpreted, according to the most common opinion, not only broadly, but most broadly, even if they are opposed to common right, or the right of some third party. The reason is, because they are presumed to have been conceded as remuneratory for services performed, and therefore are judged most favorable.

  2. Where in a privilege there is had the clause: insofar as it is not opposed to the sacred canons, it is understood only concerning those canons in which there is expressed: not

notwithstanding any privilege whatever. But where there is had the clause: supplying each defect, it is understood only of defects of those things which are required by positive right, of accidental defects only, but not of defects from natural right, or substantial defects; as if the petitioner were excommunicated, or if the supplication were subreptitious or fraudulent, etc. (ibid., n. 8).

  1. Privileges conceded to someone, not as to a particular person, but by reason of his office or dignity, or as to a member of that community, are understood to have been conceded to all others of the same office or community. Thus also privileges conceded to subjects, inferior prelates, a convent, etc., are judged to have been conferred upon superior prelates, other convents of the same Order, and even of others with whom communication is had, namely when the same or a similar reason operates (Salmant., tr. 18, c. 1, n. 108).

But privileges given for a determined time, or through particular Briefs and on account of a special cause, or in matters of difficult concession, are not communicated.

See more things in St. Alphonsus, or among the Salmanticenses.

Human ActsLawPrivilegesCessation of Obligation