Point V. On the Interpretation and Cessation of Dispensation

I. Dispensations which refer to lawsuits, or harm rights acquired by others, or are opposed to a law for the advantage of private persons, or finally were obtained for the acquisition of an ecclesiastical benefice, are to be interpreted strictly; likewise those which were granted for a particular case. All the rest are to be interpreted broadly (can. 85, 5°).

II. A dispensation ceases, considering can. 86:¹

¹ The cited chapter speaks only of a dispensation which has successive duration; but from the nature of the matter nearly the same things must be applied to every dispensation.

I. Through revocation of the superior made known to the dispensed person (cf. can. 71 and 60); namely:

1. The legislator and his superior can validly revoke a dispensation without cause; a delegate cannot do this without a just cause. The reason for the former is that, just as the legislator can relax a law without cause, so also he is able without cause to impose it again on the dispensed person. The reason for the latter is that the one delegating is not considered to have granted that faculty to the delegate. Nevertheless, even a delegate can revoke a dispensation with a just cause, because the one delegating is presumed to have conferred this power on him (St. Alphonsus, I, 197). You should except the case in which someone has been delegated to confer an individual dispensation; for once this has been conferred, his whole power is exhausted.

2. No one licitly revokes a dispensation without cause. Nevertheless, the legislator of himself sins only lightly; by accident he can sin gravely, suppose by reason of scandal, injury to charity, etc. A delegate sins gravely, unless smallness of matter excuses.

3. One who can revoke a dispensation sometimes cannot sustain it, namely "when the motive cause has totally ceased" (St. Alphonsus, I, 197).

Note. No one can validly revoke a dispensation given in a vow or oath, because an obligation of this sort can flow again only from the proper will of the dispensed person.

II. Through renunciation by the dispensed person accepted by the competent superior (cf. can. 72). Moreover, it is required:

1. That the dispensed person can renounce the dispensation. Furthermore, each person can renounce a dispensation granted only in his own favor; but not one which was conferred on the community (cf. can. 72; St. Alphonsus, I, 198).

2. That the dispensed person has truly renounced the dispensation, whether expressly or tacitly. Nevertheless, tacit renunciation will not easily be established. Thus, for example, non-use of a dispensation does not necessarily involve renunciation (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

3. That the superior has accepted the renunciation, and thus binds the subject again, since a relaxation of law proceeding from a superior cannot cease except through the superior himself.

If there is question of dispensation in a vow or oath, acceptance by the superior is not required, since each person can impose anew upon himself the obligation of a vow or oath.

III. Through death or cessation in law of the superior, a dispensation ceases only when it was given with the clause "at our good pleasure" or another equivalent clause (cf. can. 73). Hence it does not cease if it was given "at the good pleasure of the Holy See" or "of the Bishop."

IV. Through cessation of the cause. 1. A dispensation which has successive duration, that is, whose effect can conveniently be divided, as obtains in a dispensation from the law of fasting, abstinence, etc., ceases by the certain and total cessation of the motive cause; but not by its doubtful or partial cessation, nor by the cessation of the impulsive cause (can. 86). Hence, for example, a sick person dispensed in the law of fasting is held to fast again after he has certainly recovered sufficiently.

2. An obtained dispensation which does not have successive duration, that is, whose effect cannot at all, or cannot conveniently, be divided, does not cease even if the cause on account of which it was granted has ceased. Hence one dispensed from the impediment of consanguinity can enter Matrimony with the blood relative, even if the cause has ceased before Matrimony. The reason is taken both from the nature of the matter and from the intention of the legislator, who in cases of this sort is presumed to have dispensed absolutely (cf. can. 86; St. Alphonsus, I, 196; VI, 1132). Nevertheless, it is disputed whether the same can be said if someone has been dispensed from a vow or oath in order to enter Matrimony: for example, someone is dispensed from a vow of chastity solely to legitimate offspring; but the offspring dies before Matrimony is entered. Does the dispensation subsist? It seems it must be denied, since Christ is not considered to have conferred on the Church the power of dispensing in a natural obligation except continuously dependently on its cause.

Finally note these words of St. Alphonsus: "When... a dispensation has been granted absolutely, it does not cease through one act; for example, you obtained a dispensation in a vow of chastity in order to contract Matrimony; when the spouse has died, the dispensation endures: unless it was granted for a special case, namely, to marry a virgin deflowered by you. And so concerning similar things" (St. Alphonsus, I, 196).