The Manner of Acting with Enemies

I. First there is an obligation not to have an enemy in hatred, that is, neither to abhor his person nor to wish evil to him (n. 542).

II. Then there is an obligation of showing to an enemy the common signs of charity (that is, signs absolutely common to all; signs relatively common to those joined by a special relation), unless a particular reason advises the contrary or a just cause excuses. A particular reason advises the contrary, for example, if from this amendment of the enemy is hoped for, if it is feared lest the enemy interpret the signs of charity badly, or lest a new quarrel arise; especially a father and a superior, for the just punishment and amendment of a delinquent inferior, especially a contumacious one, will prudently deny for a time the usual signs of charity (St. Alphonsus, II, 28). The chief among excusing causes is the signification of just sorrow from a grave injury received.

Corollary. When both a reason which advises the contrary and an excusing cause are lacking, denial of common signs is a grave sin: 1. if it is done from gravely evil hatred (n. 542); 2. if there is an external signification gravely offensive to the enemy. But so that judgment may be made about it, one must see from what sort of cause it proceeds, whether from a grave or from a light quarrel - if from a grave one, it more easily becomes gravely offensive; likewise whether the signs of charity are denied for a longer or a shorter time, when the occasion of showing them occurs frequently; likewise whether the enemy notices and bears it more or less painfully. Hence, if the occasion, for example of conversation, frequently recurs - as among domestic persons and religious - denial of such a sign of charity prolonged for more time than a week would commonly constitute a grave sin (St. Alphonsus, II, 28, question); understand, however, mere conversation or address, not denial of familiar conversation.

III. Of itself there is no obligation of showing special signs of charity. Hence of itself you are not bound to "greet an enemy, address him, visit him when sick, console him when sad, receive him with hospitality, or act familiarly with him, etc.; because these are special signs of love" (St. Alphonsus, II, 28, 1).

By accident special signs must be shown: 1. if the enemy, after asking pardon, greets you in a friendly way, addresses you, etc.; in which case denial of similar signs would signify hatred; 2. if you have been accustomed to show special signs to someone, and scandal would arise from their being denied; yet this should not easily be imputed, because from special signs being denied it is undeservedly concluded to hatred; 3. if there is serious hope that the enemy, once the special sign has been offered, will put aside hatred; 4. if, after the circumstances have been considered, denial of the special sign would become a sign of hatred, as if you were to greet everyone you met, or invite all relatives on some occasion, except the enemy (St. Alphonsus, II, 28). If the enemy is in grave spiritual or temporal necessity, certainly of itself he must be helped; but that act with respect to persons who are in such necessity does not have the character of a special sign, but of a relatively common one (n. 529); this also in some way holds for the third case indicated above.

IV. Nor is there an obligation of remitting reparation of the violated right, that is, of the harm inflicted in the good of honor or reputation. Besides, for that end, if it is necessary, it is lawful to institute a judicial action. Likewise it is lawful from zeal for justice to seek from the judge the punishment of an enemy. In practice, however, that zeal for justice will hardly be immune from vengeance: "for, as St. Alphonsus says, I have never been able to persuade myself that persons of this kind, who sometimes come loaded with sins, love the common good and justice so much (not indeed in relation to other delinquents, but only in relation to their own offender) that they are cleansed from every stain of vengeance; whence in them, the Doctors say, it is very easy for their love toward justice to be a colored pretext for covering their desire of their own vengeance" (Hom. Ap., tr. 4, n. 17).

V. Concerning reconciliation, note these things:

1. One who alone has offended is bound to begin reconciliation. Yet commonly there is no obligation, for the sake of reconciliation, of formally or explicitly asking pardon. Except if the one offended is a superior, father, or mother, and the offense was grave. Yet even in this hypothesis the confessor should for the most part proceed by persuading rather than by admonishing about a true obligation.

If each one has offended and the offenses are equal, the one who offended first is bound to begin reconciliation; if they are unequal, the one who offended more gravely. So much theoretically; for in practice the confessor should urge both to begin reconciliation, for example by greeting the enemy; all the more because for the most part each one judges himself to have been more gravely offended.

2. The one offended is bound, when the enemy asks pardon, "not only to forgive inwardly, but also to show external signs of forgiveness" (St. Alphonsus, II, 29, 3); yet he is not bound to do this immediately, especially if the injury was grave, "because it seems above human weakness to compel the injured person to make reconciliation at once, when the disturbance has not yet been calmed. Hence an opportune time must be awaited; and meanwhile it will suffice that the one offended put aside hatred" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

"He does not truly forgive an offense who says: I do not wish to wish evil to my offender, but neither am I able to will well to him; or who asserts that he forgives, yet adds that he will never speak a word to him. But if someone says that indeed he forgives from the heart, but that it will never happen that he forgets the injury received, one must see in what way he will not be able to forget: whether only as regards memory, and involuntary movements of rancor, or also as regards malevolence. The first must be judged to be the case if he is prepared to show the due signs of charity."

3. Even after reconciliation has been completed, there is no obligation of restoring the familiarity which had previously been freely contracted.

577. 3. Reconciliation with an enemy is not only not to be impeded, but also, according to one's powers, to be facilitated.

As to the order to be followed in making reconciliation, regularly the one who offended another, or, if there are offenses on each side (as commonly happens), he who offended first or more gravely, is bound first to seek reconciliation. For Christ says: "If therefore thou offerest thy gift at the altar, and there shalt remember that thy brother has something against thee [i.e. a just complaint], leave thy gift there before the altar, and go first to be reconciled to thy brother; and then, coming, thou shalt offer thy gift."²⁵ Therefore the offender is bound either to seek pardon²⁶ or in another suitable way to make peace with the offended person, insofar, however, as this is morally possible; for the offender is not bound to satisfy the offended person a) if from this he must suffer a much graver inconvenience than the offense inflicted was, b) if he foresees that the other will not consent to the offered reconciliation or satisfaction. But in practice, since not rarely each person is persuaded that he was first or more gravely harmed, the confessor ought to persuade each one to begin the reconciliation.

Even he who certainly was first and more gravely harmed ought to forgive the enemy the offense received, i.e. to put away aversion, indignation, and hatred, but he is not bound freely to remit the injury and perhaps the damage received; for he can demand suitable satisfaction and restitution for damage. If before the offense there existed a special friendship between the offender and the offended person, it is not required that even this friendship be restored through reconciliation, unless nevertheless some scandal would arise otherwise. For to avoid scandal, or if the enemy is in necessity, not only common signs but also special signs of love are to be shown to him, as was already said.

²⁵ Matth. 5, 23 sq.

²⁶ It is not strictly necessary to seek pardon from the offended person, unless this is the only means for obtaining full reconciliation. This indeed is accustomed to happen: a) if the offense was very grave, b) if the offended person is a legitimate superior.

S. Th. II-II, q. 25, aa. 8 and 9; de Virt., q. 2, a. 8.

891. Enemies are to be loved. - Enemies are those who hate us or ours, or have offended us, or have affected us with injury, or at least are apprehended as such.¹

¹ Offense is only a wounding of another's will, by which we bring annoyance to another and provide a sufficient motive of displeasure and indignation without violation of right properly so called, and it is against charity alone and human peace, or affability, etc.; as if, when a friend asks from you a service which he greatly needs and which you can provide, you deny it: this requires reconciliation. Injury is also a wounding of right properly so called, and is against justice; this is either damaging when in fact it harms neighbor in goods, and this requires restitution, or simple if it does not harm, for example, if you inflict an insult upon someone alone, and this requires simple satisfaction.

Enemies are not to be loved as enemies, that is, their enmity must not be loved, because that is an evil. But enemies according to nature, insofar as they are men capable of eternal beatitude, are to be loved from charity. - It is proved:

a) From the words of Christ, Mt. V, 44: "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you... pray for those persecuting and calumniating you, that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven"; and VI, 12: "Forgive us our debts as we also forgive our debtors," where dilection of enemies is indicated as a condition required for the remission of sins, for v. 15: "But if you do not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive you your sins."

b) From the Old Testament: Lev. XIX, 17-18; Exod. XXIII, 4, 5; Prov. XXV, 21, compared with Rom. XII, 20-21.

c) Reason dictates the principle: What you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another; but no one wills to be held in hatred, but everyone desires to be loved. - Besides, it is against reason, on account of fault, to hate someone not only according to fault, but also according to nature, insofar as there is good in him.

892. Enemies by precept are to be loved in common, that is, as other men even unknown are loved, insofar as we cannot exclude them from dilection of neighbor; whence we are bound in itself and generally to offer them, from internal affection, the common signs and benefits of dilection: for to deny these generally is held as a sign of hatred, and easily causes scandal, both with respect to the enemy who is thereby confirmed in enmity, and also with respect to those seeing.

But in particular, by exercising a special act of dilection toward the person of an enemy, it is not of precept but of perfection and counsel; and therefore generally to exhibit special signs of dilection is not of precept. Nevertheless this is in the precept according to preparation of soul, namely, that man be prepared to love an enemy in particular, and to do good to him, and to exhibit to him special signs of dilection, if necessity should require it (Prov. XXV, 21).

893. Common signs and benefits of dilection are those which, by reason of general charity, either are exhibited to all men or to all of some condition (for example, when someone prays for all, or gives alms to all the poor of the same city), or are customarily exhibited mutually by all men of such a state or condition (for example, by a neighbor to neighbors, by a relative to relatives, by a father to sons, by a student to fellow students, etc.). But what these are must be judged from the estimation of the prudent and from received custom: for there is great diversity according to region, state, and time. Hence, says St. Alphonsus, n. 28: "It is not permitted to exclude an enemy from common prayers, for example, the Lord's prayer, which is instituted for the community, nor from common alms, returning a greeting, response (even by letters), sale of displayed merchandise; because these are common signs of dilection, and therefore to act against these, for example, to invite all relatives, to greet all those met from the neighborhood or college according to custom, with the enemy alone excluded" is in itself and regularly evil.

894. Special signs and benefits of dilection are those which are owed to no one, nor are required by the condition of the person and the custom of the region, but from mere liberality are specially exhibited to some persons, by reason of special friendship which is not toward all of the same condition: these, just as they are freely assumed, are freely omitted. Hence in itself and generally we are not bound to visit sick enemies, to console the sorrowful, to receive them with hospitality or at a banquet, to pray specially for them, to have frequent intercourse with them, for example, by letters, indeed not even to speak to or greet them first, unless there were question of a superior or of those very closely joined, or unless greeting or speaking were a common sign of charity toward those met (for example, in small places, at a banquet, in communities, etc.), from which to abstain longer would be held as a sign of hatred.

895. To omit common signs and benefits of dilection sometimes is permitted, but accidentally and extraordinarily, for a time, on account of a just cause:

a) from justice, namely, 1) if a superior offended by an inferior thus hopes to amend him (provided the hope is founded), or intends to correct him, or to give an example to others: for a superior has the right of punishing;²

² Parents can cast out children for a time, on account of a crime committed, or on account of an unworthy marriage, namely, for amendment or chastisement; but they cannot deny reconciliation perpetually.

b) from charity: 2) if it is done without hatred, even by a non-superior, so that the boldness and insolence of the offender may be restrained, or so that he may be amended;³ 3) if someone, from the exhibited signs, prudently fears greater obstinacy of the enemy, remembrance of injuries, new disturbance or quarrel;

³ Some, such as Ballerini and Genicot, say that this is permitted for taking vengeance concerning a lighter injury: for what can be sought from judges in graver injuries seems able to be assumed by each one on account of the same ends in lighter offenses, for avenging which one is not accustomed to have recourse to judges. - Nevertheless this does not seem to be approved, because in all Catholic theology the principle has always been solemn that private vengeance is illicit, both because it is permitted to no one to render right to himself and to vindicate his own rights for himself, but this belongs to judges, and because in practice it will be difficult to seek vengeance solely from love of justice without any malevolent mind; but the principle of Ballerini is new and unheard of. Hence this mode of acting is to be admitted only not as vengeance for a past injury, but as a restraint upon a further injury. Nevertheless Prummer notes, Th. M. II, n. 119, that this is permitted practically, if the superior is judged to delegate a private person; for example, by the presumed permission of parents a small correction can be administered to children, such as a light beating.

c) from another reasonable cause: 4) if it is done as a sign of just sorrow from an actual or recent injury, especially if this was atrocious; 5) if it is done on account of an injury gravely defaming, lest that injury seem to be little esteemed; 6) if, without scandal, it is done because someone knows certainly that the enemy will not respond to the signs exhibited, for example, because he has experienced this; but if he doubts, he is bound to try at least once.

896. We must exhibit special signs of dilection accidentally and extraordinarily; which then are already common signs owed to all:

a) in grave spiritual or temporal necessity (of life, reputation, fortune) of neighbor, for then to deny them would rightly be held as a sign of hatred;

b) when an enemy asks pardon, or exhibits special signs for obtaining it, in which case to deny special signs ordinarily is a sign of hatred; yet sometimes someone will licitly deny them (for a time), for example, a superior for amendment, punishment, or example, and anyone for expressing just sorrow if pardon is sought immediately after the offense;

c) for resisting hatred to which you feel yourself prone;

d) for avoiding scandal, which nevertheless generally can be avoided otherwise, for example, by a declaration or admonition of those seeing;

e) if there is founded hope that the enemy will then put aside grave hatred, from which obligation nevertheless a grave inconvenience excuses (cf. below, p. 3, q. 3, a. 2).

897. To deny to an enemy owed signs of charity is a mortal sin from its genus. - It is mortal because it is against charity;⁴ this happens 1) from internal intention, when it proceeds from hatred or an appetite of vengeance mortally evil, 2) on account of external signification, when it is considered by the enemy as a grave offense, or when it causes grave scandal, or when it would be held by others as a sign of grave hatred or of an appetite of vengeance mortally evil. To judge this last, one must attend to the cause on account of which the signs are omitted; for example, if it is done on account of a preceding grave quarrel, it will more easily be held as a sign of grave hatred than if it is done on account of trifles. Hence it seems too general, what some say without restriction, that a religious who after ten days does not wish to speak to a confrere is not to be absolved: for it is not always held as a sign of grave hatred.

⁴ St. Thomas proves the matter, Q. D. de Virt., q. 2, a. 8: "In him who exercises enmity against us, there are two things to be found: one which is the reason of dilection, namely, that he pertains to God, and another which is the reason of hatred, namely, that he is opposed to us. But in whomever the reason of dilection and the reason of hatred are found, if, with dilection passed over, we are turned into hatred, it is manifest that that which is the reason of hatred preponderates in our heart over that which is the reason of dilection. Therefore if someone hates his enemy, that one's enmity preponderates in his heart over divine love. Therefore he hates that one's enmity more than he loves God. But we hate something as much as we love the good which is taken away from us by the enemy. It remains therefore that whoever hates an enemy loves some created good more than God, which is against the precept of charity. Therefore to have an enemy in hatred is contrary to charity."

It is mortal from its genus; therefore it admits lightness of matter: thus if a person much greater does not return the greeting of an inferior, for example, a nobleman of a rustic, a father of a son, it does not seem mortal; and otherwise in our regions the omission of greeting or of returning a greeting once or twice is often a venial sin: for in itself it is opposed only to affability, nor among us is it always a sign or effect of grave hatred, or cause of grave scandal.

898. We are bound interiorly to remit the offense to an enemy (Mt. VI, 15; XVIII, 35), yet not to renew with him the former special friendship, if this was freely assumed. Nor are we bound in itself, even if he asks pardon, to remit restitution for damage caused, or satisfaction for injury inflicted (for no one is bound in itself to remit a good owed to him), indeed not even to accept them if he offers them; but we can seek them by juridical action, provided that we do not principally intend the evil of the enemy, but the good which such an action procures, namely, the amendment of the enemy, or restraint, the quiet of others, or the conservation of justice.

In practice, however: 1) Generally we must accept sufficient satisfaction spontaneously offered, nor can we pursue it juridically, especially if there is question of seeking a grave penalty against the enemy without advantage for us, or of urging a greater satisfaction than he can provide. The reason is that in seeking such things, a spirit of vengeance is with difficulty absent: for it is difficult that someone seek public vengeance from a judge from pure love of justice, without a disordered love of private vengeance which is illicit, and to which man is very prone; whence also common estimation holds this as a sign of vengeance.

2. Sometimes we must remit reparation for a merely personal injury, when the burden which the enemy would undergo in repairing it would be too great with respect to the good which would come to us from it.

3. It is never permitted to remit it, if a superior needed his reputation not so much for himself, but more for the good and salvation of others, or if it is an injury which would create infamy for the whole family or community, unless it were repaired by juridical satisfaction.

899. On the order and mode of reconciliation. - The offender must begin reconciliation (Mt. V, 23-24) as soon as he morally can: for from charity he is bound, just as not to place an offense, so also to remove it; but if the offense is mutual, he who offended more gravely; if it is nearly equal, he who offended first. An exception is if it is certainly foreseen that pardon will be denied by the other, or if the offender greatly surpasses him in dignity or state, unless perhaps the injury is enormous.

Reconciliation generally is sought sufficiently in an indirect mode through a special sign of dilection: by sending a gift [the original prints dotium], by providing deference, a service or benefit, by anticipating in honor, by friendly conversation, etc., or by the intercession of others. Nevertheless, when the offense was grave, and no other means of reconciliation is present (or if a superior or judge imposes it), the offender also must directly ask pardon, because just as from charity he was bound not to place the offense, so from charity he is bound to remove it. But in practice, a formal petition of pardon admits many excuses, for example, if it is not in use among persons of such a condition, if the offended person demands an unaccustomed humiliation, or does not care about the petition, or if satisfaction can be made fully otherwise, for example, by money or by an indirect means, through a sign of special dilection or honor, as was said above.

900. Practical warning. - Since each one easily persuades himself that he has suffered the graver injury, let the confessor exhort each one to seek reconciliation. Nevertheless, let him not easily impose the obligation of directly asking pardon, because this is almost never present; indeed even if it is certainly present, prudence often advises that he leave the penitent in good faith, if the admonition is not hoped to be profitable.

IV. Rules to be observed in reconciliation. - They are the following:

1. If injuries intervened on one side only, the one offending is bound to seek reconciliation by himself or through another, and to repair damages if there are any; likewise if between two offenders one has offended more gravely or first. Exception is made if a legitimate reason excuses, for example if the offense was not grave, or the offended person is absent, or does not care for the petition of pardon, or does not accept it, or for another reason he is judged to have been satisfied.

2. If injuries from both sides were morally equal and simultaneous, each is bound, when occasion is given, to begin reconciliation by greeting, conversation, benefit, etc., according to the case, for example that one first who passes before the other or comes upon him.

3. An opportune time is to be sought; for although the offended person is bound from the beginning to condone the offense, nevertheless he is not bound, at least under grave obligation, to suffer it with such calm spirit that he is immediately prepared for reconciliation. That seems as it were violent and above human frailty.

V. Practical observations for confessors. - 1. Unworthy of absolution is he who positively does not wish to put away deliberate and gravely sinful hatred, i.e., who deliberately wishes grave evil to another under the aspect of evil and by resting in the evil itself; likewise he who negatively does not wish to love as the law of God commands, for example to wish the good of one's own beatitude, to forgive a personal injury, to furnish the common and necessary signs of love, in those circumstances in which denial is held as a sign of grave hatred or causes grave scandal: for he injures charity in a grave matter.

But a) penitents who accuse themselves of hatred are not at once to be charged with sin, especially grave sin: for often they confuse hatred properly so called, of malevolence, with horror and recollection of a true or apparent offense committed by the neighbor, or with the wishing of evil from an honorable end, or also with natural and invincible antipathy toward the person of the neighbor, so that they cannot see him without vehement disturbance. These do not sin gravely, provided that they do not desire notable evil nor refuse the ordinary signs of love; but then there is danger that a passage may easily be made to true hatred, concerning which danger the confessor should warn them.

b) Therefore when someone accuses himself of hatred against the neighbor, let the confessor diligently inquire whether the discourse is about true hatred. For there are those who accuse themselves of hatred, and nevertheless do not labor under hatred; there are also those who foster hatred and nevertheless say that they desire every good to those by whom they have been offended. Therefore those accusing themselves of this are to be examined. If the one examined has none of those things by which hatred is expressed, although he complains that he experiences aversion against someone and that his blood is moved when he meets the other, or that he cannot forget, look at, or speak to him, he is not detected as laboring under voluntary hatred: for there can be a movement of the sensitive appetite which precedes reason, although the free will does not consent. Nevertheless the penitent is to be warned that he pray for the other, seek speech with him, speak well of him among others, excuse his defects, etc.; for thus the aversion or displeasure, which, if secretly preserved, is fostered and remains, will soon be dissipated.

c) Those who on the contrary say that they condone, but refuse to speak to the enemy and to furnish other common and owed signs and offices of charity, cast suspicion of hatred upon themselves: with them let the confessor proceed cautiously lest he absolve unduly. Likewise, those who before promised to seek reconciliation and to exhibit common signs of charity to the adversary and did not do this, ordinarily ought not to be absolved, but absolution generally is to be deferred for them.

2. Men implicated in hatred and enmity are wont to be hard in spirit. In treating a penitent of this kind, much patience and prudence are needed.

Therefore first of all let the confessor beware of every austerity of words; rather let him strive kindly to sympathize with the penitent on account of the injury received, let him permit him to complain, exaggerate, etc., lest the penitent be exasperated; let him beware lest he seem to act as advocate of the adversary, but rather let him show that he seeks the good of the offended person.

3. The obligations of one guilty of hatred are to be declared to him, once the cause is well known from responses to these or similar questions: from what time he has fostered hatred, whether he has wished evils, whether he has wished to inflict them, what ones, whether he has not rejoiced concerning the evils of the other, whether he has not grieved concerning goods, whether he has denied the common signs of charity: whether he has spoken to the adversary, whether he has responded to one greeting him, etc.

Let the confessor warn the penitent that satisfaction can be exacted, that it is not lawful to will evil to the neighbor so that it may be evil to him, that the common signs of love are to be exhibited, and that every sign of enmity is to be taken away.

4. The penitent is to be induced to perform this by various reasons, such as: the necessity for salvation, the Lord's Prayer, the example of God forgiving sin and especially of Christ forgiving on the cross, the good which follows from forgiveness, namely peace of conscience and consequent joy, glory before God and men in such an exercise of virtue, utility, because it opens the door of divine mercy, the consideration of human frailty and of the disposition of divine providence which permits such things to happen for our good, forgiveness to be made to Christ asking this, who took all sins upon Himself and said: What you have done to one, you have done to me (Mt. XXV, 40).

Briefly: a) the necessity of forgiving and of satisfying charity, according to what we ask in the Lord's Prayer: forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors (Mt. XVIII, 35); b) how glorious it is to forgive, for it is the greatest victory and a sacrifice most pleasing to God (Mk. XII, 33); c) the utility of forgiveness and the consequent delightfulness (Mt. V, 7; 44, 45); d) the example of God forgiving our sins and desiring that we forgive our enemies, likewise of Christ praying for His adversaries on the cross.

But if the penitent does not yield to these, let it be said that he cannot be absolved nor hope for pardon from God unless he forgives.

5. Let the confessor indicate the means for putting away hatred, namely prayer for the enemy and for grace for himself, and services of charity.

IT IS TO BE ASSERTED that it is a precept to love the enemy not only in affect, but also in effects.

It is PROVED by D. Bonaventure, first from the old testament, Exodi 23: If thou see the ass of him that hateth thee lie under a burden, thou shalt not pass by, but shalt lift him up with him. Prouerb. 25: If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat: if he thirst, give him drink. But these commandments were given to all the Israelites.

It is PROVED secondly by S. Thomas, and S. Thom. from 5. Matth., where by the same precept it is enjoined: Love your enemies, and do good to them that hate you; and pray for them that persecute and calumniate you, Where the Gloss: The Church does three things: she loves, benefits, and prays: Therefore he who does not benefit enemies, and does not pray for them, is not a living member of the Church.

It is PROVED thirdly by S. Thomas. Where there is true Charity, there are its effects, just as where there is fire, there is the heating of the matter applied to it; but the effects of Charity are works shown forth for good, as is said in Ioan. 15: You are my friends, if you do the things that I command you, where Gregory, homil. 30. in Euang.: The proof of love is the showing forth of the work: Therefore; otherwise the love will be feigned.

It is PROVED fourthly by S. Thomas: Our flesh is more an enemy to us than any enemy whatsoever; but we are bound to preserve it, as is said in Ephes. 5. Therefore.

It is PROVED fifthly: To withhold the effects of Charity is an effect of hatred and of vengeance, which is contrary to Charity; but we are bound not to take vengeance, Leuit. 19. Rom. 12. Therefore we are bound not to withhold the effects of Charity.

But S. Thomas OBSERVES in corpore that this precept presses in the necessity of the enemy, which he proves with that, prima Ioan. 3: He that shall see his brother in necessity, and shall shut up his bowels from him: how doth the Charity of God abide in him? And he closes: My little children, let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed, and in truth.

THEREFORE it is a precept in case of necessity to succor the enemy, especially in spiritual things, as I showed in the preceding quaest., from D. Augustine.

BECAUSE, however, here there is a twofold precept — one negative, not to hear, nor deny, the signs of love; the other affirmative, to show these signs — you must know that the negative, of not hating, etc., binds always. Therefore in Matth. 18. he is delivered to the tormentor who has not forgiven the injury. So Nauar. cap. 14. num. 25. Lorca 2.2. sect. 3. disp. 25. num. 33. Valencia disp. 3. quaest. 3. punct. 2. Suarez disp. 5. sect. 5 num. 9. Tannerus disp. 2. quaest. 3. dub. 1. Coninchez disp. 24. dub. 6. num. 82. Caspensis disp 3 sect. 2. Fagundez on the first precept of the Decalogue Lib. 1. cap 28. num. 9. with D. Bonaventure here, and in the preceding quaest. But insofar as it is affirmative, although it may seem not to bind to eliciting any internal act of love, nevertheless per accidens it often binds by reason of avoiding scandal. Whence you ought to bear yourself toward the enemy so as not to show signs of enmity, which is left to the judgment of the prudent to determine; yet some rules are handed down.

FIRST, when you pour out general prayers, do not exclude the enemy; for otherwise you do not bear yourself rightly in the Church, and you show yourself a dead member of the Church, which prays for all, as S. Thomas has it, fundamento secundo.

WHEN you bestow alms on a needy community, you ought not to exclude a needy enemy. So Syluester V. Charitas, num. 3. §. 5. Toletus Lib. 4. summa, cap. 10. Nauar. summa Latina, cap. 25. Fagundez numero 10.

SIMILARLY, when you stand in the circle, you ought to address the enemy in common, and to salute him who greets you as he meets you. Hence S. Thomas, de profectu religiosi, cap. 28. says: let them examine how they would minister food to a hungry enemy, if they deny salutation, especially if he seeks it. Whence he gathers that such a one will not keep that: Rom. 12. and prouerb. 25: If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat. So also D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 25. art. 9. and the expositors, and Suarez disp. 5. de Charitate, sect. 5. n. 7. Valencia disp. 3. quaest. 3. puncto 3 toward the end, vers. 3. Coninch. disp. 24. dub. 6. from num. 85. Fagundez loco cit. who gathers two things from this: The first is, that it is mortal to deny these signs of Charity. So also Suarez num. 7. The second, that it is then a sin of scandal when alms and the other things are altogether public; for then necessity presses. But you are not bound per se to be the first to salute; not to return a salutation, however, is per se only venial, as Caspensis says, num. 15., unless scandal be present. Bassaeus adds, V. Charitas, num. 14., and notable contempt, where he says the circumstances are to be observed, especially if the condition be gravely unequal, and he does not so quickly condemn it as mortal. So Diana part. 2. tract. 1. resol. 62.

But the SIGNS of special love on any occasion of opportunity are only of perfection. So Fagundez num. 11. Coletus Lib. 4. summa, cap. 10. Caspensis loco citato, with D. Bonaventure in corpore. Nay, Nauar. adds, loco cit., and Caietanus, art 9., that even one reconciled with an enemy is not bound to show him first the services shown in the time of friendship; nay, it can even be necessary to abstain sometimes, if the familiarity is harmful, as Tannerus says, disp. 2. quaest. 3. dub. 1. num 9.

We are bound also under mortal sin, to enemies begging pardon, to remit the injury, as regards hatred, and as regards the fault committed against us; but not as regards the satisfaction due, nor as regards the action we have against them in judgment. So the Doctors commonly with D. Thom. here; so Caietanus and Aragon. ibi, Toletus Lib. 4. summae, cap. 10. Syluester V. Charitas, num. 4. §. 6. Angelus verbo iniuria, num. 6. Nauar. summa Latina, cap. 14. num. 25. Tannerus num. 8. So Lucae 17: If thy enemy return to thee, saying: It repenteth me: forgive him. Whence S. Thomas observes, in his commentary, from Bede in the Gloss, that it is not commanded to forgive the sinner indiscriminately, but the penitent. Therefore he adds: and if he sin against thee seven times in a day, and seven times in a day be converted unto thee, saying: It repenteth me; forgive him: But he shows this elegantly thus: We are commanded to love the enemy, and to spare him, that we may be merciful, as the heavenly Father is merciful, and so may be his sons regenerated. But he himself spares the penitent, not the obstinate, Ezech. 33: The wickedness of the wicked shall not hurt him, in what day soever he shall be converted. Whence the Gloss of Bede on this place of Luke: We are commanded to grant pardon otherwise to a brother asking, otherwise to an enemy persecuting: to the brother by granting remission we communicate, with the fellowship of Charity. To the persecutor wishing us evil, or, if he can, doing it, let us do with good will what we can, and this, by the example of Christ, Lucae 23: Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do. By the example of David, Psalm. 7: If I have rendered to them that repaid me evils, etc. and Act. 7, the example of Stephen: Lord, lay not this sin to their charge. So S. Bonaventura.

Yet we are not bound to remit satisfaction; nay, Nauar. adds, in summa Latina, cap. 14. num. 25., that sometimes some cannot be remitted even if they wish, as is had in cap. Parochianos, de sent. excom. in verb. satisfaciant: such is a son of a family, a servant, etc. So also Tannerus num. 10. with others.

But when the injury is equal in time, gravity, and the other circumstances, let a mutual compensation be made, as Lessius says, Tom. 1. Lib. 1. cap. 11. dub. 25. num. 133., against Nauar. summa Latina, cap. 18. num 47. and Caietanum, 2. 2. quaest. 26. art. 2., who do not admit compensation, but wrongly; for it is given also in money and in other temporal goods: Therefore also in reputation. It is certain, indeed, that the one who offended first is bound to ask pardon first. But if one began, and the other gravely transgressed, the latter is bound to ask first. So Syluester in Rosa aurea, cap. 56.; yet always attend to the quality of the persons, as Fagundez notes, num. 13.

But the ARGUMENTS to the contrary are solved by D. Bonaventure with this distinction: to be bound in necessity, and with the conditions given above; but outside necessity, it is asserted to be of perfection by the Gloss on 5. Matth. and by D. Augustine, cap. 73. Enchir, who cap. 24. says: But whosoever does not forgive from the heart him that begs, and asks, or is penitent, let him by no means think that his sins are forgiven him by the Lord. So D. Bonavent. dist. 30.

He OBJECTS still. It is natural that the enemy not be loved, but assailed.

He answers, that nature indeed proceeds in necessary agents, as the hot against the cold; but enmity against men is against our nature; nay, even against the sociable nature of beasts of the same species. I will add: Grant that I am not bound to remit satisfaction in judgment, as I said, save where there is grave loss to the injured party; yet remission is to be urged, especially if he is to be punished by death, mutilation, etc., whence nothing accrues to the injured party. I do not refuse that, if the infamy must be washed away, satisfaction is to be sought, etc. Sylvest. verb. Charitas, quaest. 6. Malder. 2. 2. quaest. 25. art. 9. Filliuc. tract. 28. num. 25. Sylvius 2. 2. loc. cit. Laym. lib. 2. tract. 3. cap. 4. Tanner. himself, disp. 2. quaest. 3. dub. 1. num. 11. Bassaeus verb. Charitas, num. 16. who admonish us to beware of vengeance palliated by justice.