Article V: On Enemies to Be Loved

S. Th. II-II, q. 25, aa. 8 and 9; de Virt., q. 2, a. 8.

891. Enemies are to be loved. - Enemies are those who hate us or ours, or have offended us, or have affected us with injury, or at least are apprehended as such.¹

¹ Offense is only a wounding of another's will, by which we bring annoyance to another and provide a sufficient motive of displeasure and indignation without violation of right properly so called, and it is against charity alone and human peace, or affability, etc.; as if, when a friend asks from you a service which he greatly needs and which you can provide, you deny it: this requires reconciliation. Injury is also a wounding of right properly so called, and is against justice; this is either damaging when in fact it harms neighbor in goods, and this requires restitution, or simple if it does not harm, for example, if you inflict an insult upon someone alone, and this requires simple satisfaction.

Enemies are not to be loved as enemies, that is, their enmity must not be loved, because that is an evil. But enemies according to nature, insofar as they are men capable of eternal beatitude, are to be loved from charity. - It is proved:

a) From the words of Christ, Mt. V, 44: "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you... pray for those persecuting and calumniating you, that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven"; and VI, 12: "Forgive us our debts as we also forgive our debtors," where dilection of enemies is indicated as a condition required for the remission of sins, for v. 15: "But if you do not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive you your sins."

b) From the Old Testament: Lev. XIX, 17-18; Exod. XXIII, 4, 5; Prov. XXV, 21, compared with Rom. XII, 20-21.

c) Reason dictates the principle: What you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another; but no one wills to be held in hatred, but everyone desires to be loved. - Besides, it is against reason, on account of fault, to hate someone not only according to fault, but also according to nature, insofar as there is good in him.

892. Enemies by precept are to be loved in common, that is, as other men even unknown are loved, insofar as we cannot exclude them from dilection of neighbor; whence we are bound in itself and generally to offer them, from internal affection, the common signs and benefits of dilection: for to deny these generally is held as a sign of hatred, and easily causes scandal, both with respect to the enemy who is thereby confirmed in enmity, and also with respect to those seeing.

But in particular, by exercising a special act of dilection toward the person of an enemy, it is not of precept but of perfection and counsel; and therefore generally to exhibit special signs of dilection is not of precept. Nevertheless this is in the precept according to preparation of soul, namely, that man be prepared to love an enemy in particular, and to do good to him, and to exhibit to him special signs of dilection, if necessity should require it (Prov. XXV, 21).

893. Common signs and benefits of dilection are those which, by reason of general charity, either are exhibited to all men or to all of some condition (for example, when someone prays for all, or gives alms to all the poor of the same city), or are customarily exhibited mutually by all men of such a state or condition (for example, by a neighbor to neighbors, by a relative to relatives, by a father to sons, by a student to fellow students, etc.). But what these are must be judged from the estimation of the prudent and from received custom: for there is great diversity according to region, state, and time. Hence, says St. Alphonsus, n. 28: "It is not permitted to exclude an enemy from common prayers, for example, the Lord's prayer, which is instituted for the community, nor from common alms, returning a greeting, response (even by letters), sale of displayed merchandise; because these are common signs of dilection, and therefore to act against these, for example, to invite all relatives, to greet all those met from the neighborhood or college according to custom, with the enemy alone excluded" is in itself and regularly evil.

894. Special signs and benefits of dilection are those which are owed to no one, nor are required by the condition of the person and the custom of the region, but from mere liberality are specially exhibited to some persons, by reason of special friendship which is not toward all of the same condition: these, just as they are freely assumed, are freely omitted. Hence in itself and generally we are not bound to visit sick enemies, to console the sorrowful, to receive them with hospitality or at a banquet, to pray specially for them, to have frequent intercourse with them, for example, by letters, indeed not even to speak to or greet them first, unless there were question of a superior or of those very closely joined, or unless greeting or speaking were a common sign of charity toward those met (for example, in small places, at a banquet, in communities, etc.), from which to abstain longer would be held as a sign of hatred.

895. To omit common signs and benefits of dilection sometimes is permitted, but accidentally and extraordinarily, for a time, on account of a just cause:

a) from justice, namely, 1) if a superior offended by an inferior thus hopes to amend him (provided the hope is founded), or intends to correct him, or to give an example to others: for a superior has the right of punishing;²

² Parents can cast out children for a time, on account of a crime committed, or on account of an unworthy marriage, namely, for amendment or chastisement; but they cannot deny reconciliation perpetually.

b) from charity: 2) if it is done without hatred, even by a non-superior, so that the boldness and insolence of the offender may be restrained, or so that he may be amended;³ 3) if someone, from the exhibited signs, prudently fears greater obstinacy of the enemy, remembrance of injuries, new disturbance or quarrel;

³ Some, such as Ballerini and Genicot, say that this is permitted for taking vengeance concerning a lighter injury: for what can be sought from judges in graver injuries seems able to be assumed by each one on account of the same ends in lighter offenses, for avenging which one is not accustomed to have recourse to judges. - Nevertheless this does not seem to be approved, because in all Catholic theology the principle has always been solemn that private vengeance is illicit, both because it is permitted to no one to render right to himself and to vindicate his own rights for himself, but this belongs to judges, and because in practice it will be difficult to seek vengeance solely from love of justice without any malevolent mind; but the principle of Ballerini is new and unheard of. Hence this mode of acting is to be admitted only not as vengeance for a past injury, but as a restraint upon a further injury. Nevertheless Prummer notes, Th. M. II, n. 119, that this is permitted practically, if the superior is judged to delegate a private person; for example, by the presumed permission of parents a small correction can be administered to children, such as a light beating.

c) from another reasonable cause: 4) if it is done as a sign of just sorrow from an actual or recent injury, especially if this was atrocious; 5) if it is done on account of an injury gravely defaming, lest that injury seem to be little esteemed; 6) if, without scandal, it is done because someone knows certainly that the enemy will not respond to the signs exhibited, for example, because he has experienced this; but if he doubts, he is bound to try at least once.

896. We must exhibit special signs of dilection accidentally and extraordinarily; which then are already common signs owed to all:

a) in grave spiritual or temporal necessity (of life, reputation, fortune) of neighbor, for then to deny them would rightly be held as a sign of hatred;

b) when an enemy asks pardon, or exhibits special signs for obtaining it, in which case to deny special signs ordinarily is a sign of hatred; yet sometimes someone will licitly deny them (for a time), for example, a superior for amendment, punishment, or example, and anyone for expressing just sorrow if pardon is sought immediately after the offense;

c) for resisting hatred to which you feel yourself prone;

d) for avoiding scandal, which nevertheless generally can be avoided otherwise, for example, by a declaration or admonition of those seeing;

e) if there is founded hope that the enemy will then put aside grave hatred, from which obligation nevertheless a grave inconvenience excuses (cf. below, p. 3, q. 3, a. 2).

897. To deny to an enemy owed signs of charity is a mortal sin from its genus. - It is mortal because it is against charity;⁴ this happens 1) from internal intention, when it proceeds from hatred or an appetite of vengeance mortally evil, 2) on account of external signification, when it is considered by the enemy as a grave offense, or when it causes grave scandal, or when it would be held by others as a sign of grave hatred or of an appetite of vengeance mortally evil. To judge this last, one must attend to the cause on account of which the signs are omitted; for example, if it is done on account of a preceding grave quarrel, it will more easily be held as a sign of grave hatred than if it is done on account of trifles. Hence it seems too general, what some say without restriction, that a religious who after ten days does not wish to speak to a confrere is not to be absolved: for it is not always held as a sign of grave hatred.

⁴ St. Thomas proves the matter, Q. D. de Virt., q. 2, a. 8: "In him who exercises enmity against us, there are two things to be found: one which is the reason of dilection, namely, that he pertains to God, and another which is the reason of hatred, namely, that he is opposed to us. But in whomever the reason of dilection and the reason of hatred are found, if, with dilection passed over, we are turned into hatred, it is manifest that that which is the reason of hatred preponderates in our heart over that which is the reason of dilection. Therefore if someone hates his enemy, that one's enmity preponderates in his heart over divine love. Therefore he hates that one's enmity more than he loves God. But we hate something as much as we love the good which is taken away from us by the enemy. It remains therefore that whoever hates an enemy loves some created good more than God, which is against the precept of charity. Therefore to have an enemy in hatred is contrary to charity."

It is mortal from its genus; therefore it admits lightness of matter: thus if a person much greater does not return the greeting of an inferior, for example, a nobleman of a rustic, a father of a son, it does not seem mortal; and otherwise in our regions the omission of greeting or of returning a greeting once or twice is often a venial sin: for in itself it is opposed only to affability, nor among us is it always a sign or effect of grave hatred, or cause of grave scandal.

898. We are bound interiorly to remit the offense to an enemy (Mt. VI, 15; XVIII, 35), yet not to renew with him the former special friendship, if this was freely assumed. Nor are we bound in itself, even if he asks pardon, to remit restitution for damage caused, or satisfaction for injury inflicted (for no one is bound in itself to remit a good owed to him), indeed not even to accept them if he offers them; but we can seek them by juridical action, provided that we do not principally intend the evil of the enemy, but the good which such an action procures, namely, the amendment of the enemy, or restraint, the quiet of others, or the conservation of justice.

In practice, however: 1) Generally we must accept sufficient satisfaction spontaneously offered, nor can we pursue it juridically, especially if there is question of seeking a grave penalty against the enemy without advantage for us, or of urging a greater satisfaction than he can provide. The reason is that in seeking such things, a spirit of vengeance is with difficulty absent: for it is difficult that someone seek public vengeance from a judge from pure love of justice, without a disordered love of private vengeance which is illicit, and to which man is very prone; whence also common estimation holds this as a sign of vengeance.

2. Sometimes we must remit reparation for a merely personal injury, when the burden which the enemy would undergo in repairing it would be too great with respect to the good which would come to us from it.

3. It is never permitted to remit it, if a superior needed his reputation not so much for himself, but more for the good and salvation of others, or if it is an injury which would create infamy for the whole family or community, unless it were repaired by juridical satisfaction.

899. On the order and mode of reconciliation. - The offender must begin reconciliation (Mt. V, 23-24) as soon as he morally can: for from charity he is bound, just as not to place an offense, so also to remove it; but if the offense is mutual, he who offended more gravely; if it is nearly equal, he who offended first. An exception is if it is certainly foreseen that pardon will be denied by the other, or if the offender greatly surpasses him in dignity or state, unless perhaps the injury is enormous.

Reconciliation generally is sought sufficiently in an indirect mode through a special sign of dilection: by sending a gift [the original prints dotium], by providing deference, a service or benefit, by anticipating in honor, by friendly conversation, etc., or by the intercession of others. Nevertheless, when the offense was grave, and no other means of reconciliation is present (or if a superior or judge imposes it), the offender also must directly ask pardon, because just as from charity he was bound not to place the offense, so from charity he is bound to remove it. But in practice, a formal petition of pardon admits many excuses, for example, if it is not in use among persons of such a condition, if the offended person demands an unaccustomed humiliation, or does not care about the petition, or if satisfaction can be made fully otherwise, for example, by money or by an indirect means, through a sign of special dilection or honor, as was said above.

900. Practical warning. - Since each one easily persuades himself that he has suffered the graver injury, let the confessor exhort each one to seek reconciliation. Nevertheless, let him not easily impose the obligation of directly asking pardon, because this is almost never present; indeed even if it is certainly present, prudence often advises that he leave the penitent in good faith, if the admonition is not hoped to be profitable.