Scholion. On the Manner of Acting with Enemies

I. First there is an obligation not to have an enemy in hatred, that is, neither to abhor his person nor to wish evil to him (n. 542).

II. Then there is an obligation of showing to an enemy the common signs of charity (that is, signs absolutely common to all; signs relatively common to those joined by a special relation), unless a particular reason advises the contrary or a just cause excuses. A particular reason advises the contrary, for example, if from this amendment of the enemy is hoped for, if it is feared lest the enemy interpret the signs of charity badly, or lest a new quarrel arise; especially a father and a superior, for the just punishment and amendment of a delinquent inferior, especially a contumacious one, will prudently deny for a time the usual signs of charity (St. Alphonsus, II, 28). The chief among excusing causes is the signification of just sorrow from a grave injury received.

Corollary. When both a reason which advises the contrary and an excusing cause are lacking, denial of common signs is a grave sin: 1. if it is done from gravely evil hatred (n. 542); 2. if there is an external signification gravely offensive to the enemy. But so that judgment may be made about it, one must see from what sort of cause it proceeds, whether from a grave or from a light quarrel - if from a grave one, it more easily becomes gravely offensive; likewise whether the signs of charity are denied for a longer or a shorter time, when the occasion of showing them occurs frequently; likewise whether the enemy notices and bears it more or less painfully. Hence, if the occasion, for example of conversation, frequently recurs - as among domestic persons and religious - denial of such a sign of charity prolonged for more time than a week would commonly constitute a grave sin (St. Alphonsus, II, 28, question); understand, however, mere conversation or address, not denial of familiar conversation.

III. Of itself there is no obligation of showing special signs of charity. Hence of itself you are not bound to "greet an enemy, address him, visit him when sick, console him when sad, receive him with hospitality, or act familiarly with him, etc.; because these are special signs of love" (St. Alphonsus, II, 28, 1).

By accident special signs must be shown: 1. if the enemy, after asking pardon, greets you in a friendly way, addresses you, etc.; in which case denial of similar signs would signify hatred; 2. if you have been accustomed to show special signs to someone, and scandal would arise from their being denied; yet this should not easily be imputed, because from special signs being denied it is undeservedly concluded to hatred; 3. if there is serious hope that the enemy, once the special sign has been offered, will put aside hatred; 4. if, after the circumstances have been considered, denial of the special sign would become a sign of hatred, as if you were to greet everyone you met, or invite all relatives on some occasion, except the enemy (St. Alphonsus, II, 28). If the enemy is in grave spiritual or temporal necessity, certainly of itself he must be helped; but that act with respect to persons who are in such necessity does not have the character of a special sign, but of a relatively common one (n. 529); this also in some way holds for the third case indicated above.

IV. Nor is there an obligation of remitting reparation of the violated right, that is, of the harm inflicted in the good of honor or reputation. Besides, for that end, if it is necessary, it is lawful to institute a judicial action. Likewise it is lawful from zeal for justice to seek from the judge the punishment of an enemy. In practice, however, that zeal for justice will hardly be immune from vengeance: "for, as St. Alphonsus says, I have never been able to persuade myself that persons of this kind, who sometimes come loaded with sins, love the common good and justice so much (not indeed in relation to other delinquents, but only in relation to their own offender) that they are cleansed from every stain of vengeance; whence in them, the Doctors say, it is very easy for their love toward justice to be a colored pretext for covering their desire of their own vengeance" (Hom. Ap., tr. 4, n. 17).

V. Concerning reconciliation, note these things:

1. One who alone has offended is bound to begin reconciliation. Yet commonly there is no obligation, for the sake of reconciliation, of formally or explicitly asking pardon. Except if the one offended is a superior, father, or mother, and the offense was grave. Yet even in this hypothesis the confessor should for the most part proceed by persuading rather than by admonishing about a true obligation.

If each one has offended and the offenses are equal, the one who offended first is bound to begin reconciliation; if they are unequal, the one who offended more gravely. So much theoretically; for in practice the confessor should urge both to begin reconciliation, for example by greeting the enemy; all the more because for the most part each one judges himself to have been more gravely offended.

2. The one offended is bound, when the enemy asks pardon, "not only to forgive inwardly, but also to show external signs of forgiveness" (St. Alphonsus, II, 29, 3); yet he is not bound to do this immediately, especially if the injury was grave, "because it seems above human weakness to compel the injured person to make reconciliation at once, when the disturbance has not yet been calmed. Hence an opportune time must be awaited; and meanwhile it will suffice that the one offended put aside hatred" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

"He does not truly forgive an offense who says: I do not wish to wish evil to my offender, but neither am I able to will well to him; or who asserts that he forgives, yet adds that he will never speak a word to him. But if someone says that indeed he forgives from the heart, but that it will never happen that he forgets the injury received, one must see in what way he will not be able to forget: whether only as regards memory, and involuntary movements of rancor, or also as regards malevolence. The first must be judged to be the case if he is prepared to show the due signs of charity."

3. Even after reconciliation has been completed, there is no obligation of restoring the familiarity which had previously been freely contracted.