The Obligation of Absolving

391. Concerning Absolution to Be Granted, Deferred, or Denied: General Rules.¹

1. A sufficiently disposed penitent per se must be absolved under grave sin from justice; for a. a rightly disposed penitent has the right of receiving absolution, since the priest, by this very fact that he hears the confession, binds himself by a tacit contract to grant absolution to him who duly completes confession and appears disposed; b. generally, absolution granted at once profits the penitent more than its delay; for he emerges from the most miserable state of sin, becomes a participant in the graces and goods which are granted to the just and denied to sinners, and finally is helped in amendment of life by the grace of both sacraments, penance and the Eucharist.

a. Even a penitent who has accused only venial sins has the right of receiving absolution, provided he is rightly disposed; if, however, once or twice he is dismissed without absolution with only a blessing, no grave injury is inflicted on him, and therefore this could sometimes be done without sin from a reasonable cause.

b. Those authors also who think that a merely generic confession of venial sins is licit (n. 231) concede that a penitent who accuses himself only in general of venial sins or of mortal sins already remitted, when he could confess in species, and who refuses to confess distinctly when the confessor asks, does not have the right of receiving absolution; for the confessor receiving the penitent does not intend to bind himself to absolve him unless he confesses according to the custom received in the Church.

2. Absolution can be deferred even for a sufficiently disposed penitent, if the confessor has judged this to be truly useful to him; for although he has a right to absolution, nevertheless he does not have the right to receive it immediately when delay seems useful, either for striking horror into him concerning sins committed or for strengthening the will in the purpose of not sinning.

a. It is the most common opinion of theologians that the delay of absolution will sometimes be useful to penitents, especially occasionaries and recidivists, if it is prudently employed. But although the utility of deferred absolution is sometimes great, nevertheless it can never be called a necessary means which must be employed by the confessor to procure the salvation and amendment of a rightly disposed penitent. The delay of absolution can be called necessary only when the confessor doubts concerning the sufficient disposition of the penitent; for in this case it can be the one and necessary means from which the confessor judges concerning disposition. But as regards a rightly disposed penitent, the delay of absolution can never be called prescribed and necessary.

b. Therefore the one reason on account of which absolution can be deferred for a rightly disposed penitent is his spiritual utility. This utility chiefly consists in this: that from the difficulty of obtaining absolution, the penitent better knows the gravity of sin and conceives a greater horror for sins committed, and that his weak will is strengthened in the purpose of amendment. Therefore just as the confessor, foreseeing that delay of absolution will harm the penitent more than profit him, acts unjustly if he nevertheless defers it, so, when the spiritual utility of the penitent exists, he can licitly defer it per se even if the penitent is unwilling.

c. Nevertheless delay of absolution will scarcely ever be useful unless the penitent himself consents to the delay; for if he bears the matter with difficulty, he is offended rather than amended by the delay; wherefore it must be feared that for this reason he will be wholly alienated from receiving the sacraments. Therefore it can be said as a norm: absolution is not to be deferred for a disposed penitent if he himself is unwilling.

d. Absolution is not to be deferred except for a short time: for a few days, for a week, but not for fifteen days, much less for a month; for a longer delay harms the penitent more than it profits, since it is grave to remain for several days in the state of mortal sin both because of the danger of death, which is always threatening, and because of the innumerable goods of which a man who is in sin is deprived.

e. From these things it follows that it cannot be defined by a general rule when absolution should be deferred, but, as St. Leonard of Port Maurice says, "the whole must be left to the prudence of the confessor, who in particular cases ought to follow neither inclination, nor nature, nor compromise, nor the example of others, but only the unction of the Holy Spirit accompanied by good doctrine and the study of prayer."

Note. If, however, the penitent does not consent to the delay, but explicitly asks for absolution, this must be granted to him. For to one who is disposed, delay is not useful if absolution is deferred while he is unwilling. Therefore the new Code, cn. 886, has these things: If the confessor cannot doubt concerning the dispositions of the penitent and the latter asks for absolution, absolution is neither to be denied nor deferred.

3. Absolution must always be denied to a certainly indisposed penitent; for he who absolves an indisposed person commits a grave sacrilege, nor can any necessity of the penitent excuse the confessor from this sin.

Nevertheless those who approach unprepared and indisposed to make confession can, by the work and industry of a zealous confessor with the grace of God, be disposed to receive absolution. And if they give sufficient signs of sorrow and purpose, nothing prevents even those who had approached confession unprepared and indisposed from being absolved at once. Those who think that penitents who approach confession unprepared cannot be rightly disposed by the warning and exhortation of the confessor oppose the doctrine and practice both of the saints and of theologians of great name.²

4. A doubtfully disposed penitent cannot be absolved unless there is a grave cause on account of which absolution can or even must be given under condition: the reason for the first is lest the sacrament be exposed to danger of nullity; the reason for the second is that the sacraments are for men.

a. A doubtfully disposed person can or even must be absolved under condition if he is in the article of death, if otherwise he would incur the mark of infamy because he suggests suspicion of denied absolution, if otherwise he would be alienated from the sacraments, if he would have to lack the grace of the sacrament for a long time, if he would be forced to repeat the confession before another priest, if the precept of annual confession urged, etc.; even doubtfully disposed spouses who are soon to contract marriage can be conditionally absolved lest they certainly contract sacrilegiously.

b. Frequently the matter will be so that absolution can indeed be given because some indications of disposition are present, but also can be deferred because a prudent judgment concerning the disposition cannot be formed. In these circumstances let the confessor consider what, with the character of the penitent taken into account, is more expedient for his salvation. But since in our time it must greatly be feared that those not absolved will not return any more, unless they are animated by firm faith, generally the confessor will profit the salvation of souls more if he is rich in mercy and does not dismiss the penitent to another time, but spends all his care and work so that, with divine grace, he disposes him to receive valid absolution and absolves him when disposed; for if absolution is deferred, after the time has elapsed he will scarcely return more disposed.

Note. Since the general rules established above concerning absolving penitents make a particular difficulty in certain cases, one must treat in particular: a. concerning absolving habitual sinners; b. concerning absolving recidivists; c. concerning absolving occasionaries.

¹ Cf. Bucceroni, Commentarius de absolutione danda, differenda, deneganda (Rome: Armanni, 1889). Pighi, De iudicio sacramentali (Verona: Cinquetti, 1897).

² Those things which Ballerini wisely warns, De poenitente minus disposito iuvando, are worthy to be read. Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 1858 s.

"There are certainly many cases in which the denial and delay of absolution is an opportune remedy, and at times necessary. Let the Confessor see, says St. Charles Borromeo in the Instructions of Penance, that he absolve no one who is unwilling either to lay aside hatred or enmity, or refuses to restore another's goods according to his ability, or is not prepared to depart from a state of mortal sin, or to avoid the occasion of a similar sin. Hence the Apostolic See has always risen up with marvelous zeal against the soft and ill-ordered facility of some casuists in granting absolution, as is evident to any reader from the propositions deservedly and justly condemned by Alexander VII, Innocent XI, and other Roman Pontiffs. But it would be very prolix to enumerate cases of this kind, but they can be seen in St. Charles Borromeo in the Instruction of Confessors; and let Confessors not allow themselves to be led away from those holy rules, confirmed by the consent of the whole Church, by false mercy toward penitents.

But, the excepted cases having been premised, the holding back, indiscriminately and everywhere applied, of any mortal sin whatever, for the sake of conceiving a greater horror against crimes and of acquiring a better disposition for obtaining the benefit of absolution, is certainly not a medicine nor a congruous chastisement ever employed by the Church upon unwilling penitents, but one usurped by rigid and imprudent Confessors alone, against every right, and proscribed by three Roman Pontiffs. Peter de Osma already attempted to introduce this excessively severe and imprudent practice, to say nothing worse, by that proposition: Penitents are not to be absolved unless the enjoined penance has first been completed, deservedly condemned in the Council of Complutum and by Sixtus IV in the year 1579, in the Bull which begins Licet ea. It is clear that the same destructive practice, after the apostate Marcus Antonius de Dominis, book 5, On the Republic of the Church, ch. 7, and Antoine Arnauld, book On Frequent Communion, part 2, from ch. 8, prevailed among the Belgians and some French followers of rigorism. From their books Alexander VIII, among the rest, struck these two propositions with just anathema: 16. The order of putting satisfaction before absolution was introduced not by the polity or institution of the Church, but by the very law and prescription of Christ, the nature of the thing itself in some way dictating the same, and 17. Through that practice of immediately absolving, the order of Penance is inverted. Quesnel again attempted to introduce this cruel practice as regards its substance, under deceitful and equivocal terms, by these two propositions: 87. It is a mode full of wisdom, light, and charity to give souls time to bear with humility and to feel the state of sin, to ask for the spirit of penance and contrition, and to begin at least to satisfy the justice of God before he is reconciled. 88. We do not know what sin and true penance are when we wish immediately to be restored to the possession of those goods of which sin despoiled us, and we refuse to bear the confusion of that separation, deservedly and justly condemned in the Bull Unigenitus by Clement XI. Indeed, that severe practice brings very great ruin to souls, especially to those attrite, or, if you prefer, beginning to love, from St. Leo and Augustine, Epistle 180 to Honoratus, teaching: many perish through defect of the Sacrament who by its aid would have flown up to heavenly things. Therefore they remain exposed to the danger of eternal damnation, our most wise Savior admonishing us that we always watch in justice, for at the hour when we do not think, the Son of Man will come.

But let us grant to rigid directors that persons of this kind who are attrite survive until absolution: absolution having been delayed for them, they remain enemies of God, incapable of all merit and satisfaction; for their works, according to St. Thomas, in 4, dist. 15, since they are done without charity, are not satisfactory: For it is impossible, he says, that someone satisfy God unless he please God; and therefore, that there be a suitable satisfaction, it must be informed by sanctifying grace, and in the Supplement, q. 14, art. 2: works done without charity are not satisfactory. Therefore whatever things may have been proposed, the sinner deprived of absolution will be able to obtain no indulgence; suspicions, losses of reputation, scandals, arise from an indiscriminate delay of absolving; shame in confessing is a strong bridle against sin, as is had from chap. Quem, 88, On Penance, dist. I; because penitents who have been repelled often cast aside thought of salvation by despairing.

Therefore let Missionaries not follow the disorderly reformers of the Church. Let them rather adhere to the Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 14, On the fallen and their reparation, where we have absolution prior to satisfaction, and the guilt of sins together with eternal punishment remitted by the sacrament of Penance before satisfaction, by which only temporal punishment remaining after absolution is remitted. But this prudent and benign practice was not instituted only by Trent, but is, as the Roman Catechism testifies, the most ancient use of the Church, approved by Scripture and the authority of the Fathers. The evangelical father orders the first robe to be brought quickly to the prodigal son returning, and does not send him back so that by feeding swine he might conceive a greater horror against sins and be disposed for the paternal embrace. Among the articles because of which Chrysostom was wrongly deposed by certain Bishops, but restored by Apostolic authority, this was one: If you have sinned again, repent again, and as often as you have sinned, come to me, and I will heal you. Basil to a spiritual son: When, he says, you have felt yourself liable to sins, turn quickly to penance, lest you be confounded. The Clementine law Dudum, On burials, commands the Priest to hear Confessions, impose penances, and absolve. The Decree of Boniface, Bishop of Mainz, establishes that each Presbyter should take care, after receiving the Confession of penitents, at once, a prayer having been given, to reconcile. I would be endless if I wished to bring forward the documents of all the Fathers for such a practice of the Church, but the things alleged suffice.

Therefore that practice, prudent and benign, fortified by so many testimonies, of at once absolving sinners, as attrite or contrite, flourishes in the whole Church where there is an abundance of Confessors, where there is no danger of persecution. How much more, then, must it necessarily be observed in Western Tongking, where many and continual persecutions against Catholics flourish, and where indeed the harvest is great, but the workers very few. Nor let innovators deceive you, who under the shadow of zeal nourish cruelty and deadly sluggishness in the heart; let them not, I say, deceive you by testimonies of Scripture, Ezekiel 13 and Jeremiah 6, which they everywhere abuse. For from these we can collect nothing more than that absolution is not to be imparted to those lacking the necessary disposition, but not that it is to be denied to those furnished with that disposition; nor will you find any place in the oracles of the ancient covenant according to which reconciliation with God was delayed for penitents, or to be deferred. Scarcely had David confessed his offense, saying, I have sinned against the Lord, when Nathan announced in the name of God: The Lord also has taken away your sin; you shall not die. Nor again let them lead you astray by testimonies of Cyprian, of the Roman Clergy, of Innocent I, and of other Fathers, which they likewise abuse; for when those testimonies are read not cut short but whole, it will appear to anyone sincerely attending that they speak concerning certain public sins which at that time were to be punished by public penance; and although approved authors think that in the very imposition of public penance sinners were regularly absolved from the guilt of fault, for this indeed was to receive the imposition of the hand unto penance, to be absolved from the guilt of fault and to receive the mode of public satisfaction. Indeed Morinus himself, of the highest authority among the new Theologians, although he thinks that the absolution, even Sacramental, of public crimes was delayed until the fulfillment of canonical penance, agrees with us as regards other sins; for thus he says: All crimes and sins which in those centuries were not expiated by public penance were remitted at once or a little after confession was made to the Priest, a few excepted, which, when they were public, were sometimes punished by the Canons with privation of Ecclesiastical communion. He teaches the same thing as the Roman Catechism, that the custom of absolving at once after confession is from the very cradles of the Church, if you except certain enormous crimes for which public penance was owed; indeed, that in the Eastern Church from twelve centuries to this time the custom has been observed of absolving at once even from public sins, which toward the end of the work he proves more fully from Greek penitential books.

But since from the Council of Trent there ought to flourish the use of inflicting public penance for public and scandalous sins, descending to the particular case reported by the Apostolic Visitator concerning parents who give consent to the marriage of their children with disparity of cult, it seems certain that as long as it is in their power to dissolve the marriage, and, having been admonished concerning this, they refuse dissolution, they are not capable nor disposed to receiving the benefit of absolution; but if on their part they have done whatever they can, and it is no longer in their power to remove their children from the invalid union, there is no reason that, being contrite and having confessed, they should be deprived of Sacramental absolution for whole years, or even to the end of life. But lest they be an example to others so that similar Marriages be perpetrated, they could, already confessed and absolved, be punished either by communion of the Eucharist, or by another public penance, at the judgment of a prudent and discreet Bishop.

Therefore the mode full of wisdom and charity is to snatch sinful souls as quickly as possible from the state of sin, according to the practice of the universal Church, founded in the Gospel of Christ, so that they may quickly receive the first robe; and not to prolong, but as much as can be done to hasten, the precept of penance, according to the form which the Council of Trent most wholesomely prescribes: that before reconciliation they propose, so that after it, more safely and salutarily, restored into the state of grace, they may strive to satisfy." Instruction of the S. C. de P. F. for the Tongkingese or Annamite Priests who administer the sacrament of Penance in Western Tongking, 1736.

"You place another abuse in this, that you suspect the benefit of Sacramental absolution is excessively deferred. In this matter a certain judgment can by no means be brought. The Confessor, who sits before the tribunal as judge and ought as physician to prepare medicine for the sick, alone can search out how great is the atrocity of crimes, what the obstinacy of sickness, what the disposition of the penitent. Therefore he must diligently investigate whether those who approach the sacrament of Penance execrate the crimes committed with that sorrow of soul which is required for the integrity of the Sacrament by the Council of Trent, sess. 14, ch. 4, On Contrition; whether they promise the beginning of a new life and hatred of the past, not only by voice and lips, but by the inward affection of the heart; whether, in testimony of this good and firm will, they show that they have already ceased for some time from sins; whether they have plainly dismissed those occasions which, either of themselves or from their own malice or depravity, induce to sin, if it was in their power; whether they have applied remedies proposed to them at other times, by whose aid they may avoid sin in necessary and involuntary occasions; whether they have cast off the habit of sinning; whether, if at other times they obtained the benefit of absolution, having again relapsed into the same crimes from their own malice, they were rolled in the same mire; whether, as to goods, reputation, and honor in which they have injured a neighbor, they are ready and prompt to repair the damage or injury, if means or occasion are at hand. These and many other things, which Missionaries can seek from the praised Instructions of St. Charles, are diligently to be weighed by them before they bestow the benefit of absolution. But since these very things lie hidden among the secrets of Confession, it is certainly difficult to judge whether they abuse that power of judge and authority of physician which we indicated above, or whether they act more harshly and severely with penitents duly disposed.

Nevertheless let Missionaries diligently take care that, if sometimes public penance is to be enjoined, and even prolonged for some time, they meanwhile allow no one to be deprived of the benefit of Sacramental absolution, provided that he place no obstacle on his part, and be held worthy that the grace of reconciliation with God be imparted in the forum of conscience. For we think it does not escape you that private absolution of sins, to be indulged to penitents in the Sacramental forum, and public reconciliation with the Church, differ very greatly between themselves. The former is to be denied to no one who is rightly affected and bears before him the necessary dispositions for obtaining this grace. For Holy Mother Church is benign and merciful, and does not suffer anyone to remain under the yoke and servitude of the devil, an enemy of God, lacking all merits of good works, who from the heart and with true striving of soul and mind begs pardon from God for his offenses. But the other, namely public reconciliation, is to be reserved to the judgment of the Bishop, who according to the circumstances of places and times will establish what needs to be done, and will so reconcile severity with gentleness that it will bring both punishment to the guilty and a bridle to the innocent....

The third suspicion of abuses which moves you is that you fear not only that Sacramental absolution is deferred for certain criminals, but that they are even, perhaps for a light cause, repelled from the tribunal of Penance. Yet you do not sufficiently declare how that matter proceeds. For it is not lawful to suspect that those Missionaries, whom you yourself acknowledge to be doing excellent work in procuring the salvation of souls and to be very much commended before you for zeal of piety and charity, have been so forgetful of mercy and gentleness that they repel sinners, excited by some spur of penance, approaching them for Confession of their faults; for to deny Sacramental absolution to the undeserving is within the power of the Priest, but not to hear the Confession of crimes would be an offense not to be borne. Therefore we judged that the question proposed by you is to be taken thus, that one must ask only concerning those sinners who are entangled in those bonds of crimes to which the penalty of excommunication is joined by law. And in this matter it seems that this chiefly must be considered: whether someone has been excommunicated by sentence of the Judge and publicly denounced, or whether indeed he has contracted that censure by law, not indeed declared by sentence of a Judge; but since the crime, because of which he fell into excommunication, is so notorious and manifest that it can be hidden by no evasion, or excused by no support of law, hence everywhere among the rest of the faithful he is held as a public sinner. Both certainly ought to be repelled from the sacrament of Penance; for the excommunicated cannot be made participants in the Sacraments. Yet a distinction intervenes between the two, because one excommunicated and denounced by sentence of a Judge, since he is separated from the communion of the other faithful, is also to be avoided, and therefore he cannot be admitted into church, to assist at the unbloody Sacrifice, pour forth public prayers, and be present at the other common offices of Religion, excepting only the preaching of the word of God, which it is permitted by law for an excommunicated person to hear, chap. Respons., 43, On sentence of excommunication. But he against whom no sentence of excommunication or judicial declaration has been pronounced is neither repelled from the assembly of the faithful, nor prohibited from the entrance of the church, nor excluded from public prayers; nevertheless from participation in the Sacraments, just as he is incapable in himself, so he is deservedly to be kept away by a faithful dispenser of the mysteries of God, because of the notoriety and pertinacity of his crime; from which, since a public scandal has arisen, unless it shall have ceased and been amended by suitable and fitting penance, he is to be judged altogether unworthy to become a participant in the mysteries of Christ, lest, against the precept of the Gospel, pearls be cast before swine. But what and how great the penance to be inflicted on the guilty should be, by what method scandal can be removed, Missionaries must establish, the circumstances of places and times having been weighed, and especially take care that nothing be decreed except with you as author and judge, if the power of consulting you is given.

And hence for this reason the manner of acting of those is not to be approved who, no distinction being employed between excommunicated persons to be avoided and those to be tolerated, prohibit all indiscriminately, even on feast days, from entrance to the church and from the sacred assembly of the faithful. For if they do this because they judge that excommunication has this force, that he who is subjected to it is at once to be kept away from all communion of the faithful, they are opposed to the remembered distinction, and therefore they err. But if they decree this punishment themselves, according to their own judgment, for all excommunicated persons indiscriminately, they are to be corrected for excessive severity. But whether those who, by force, snatch and convey to the house of the spouse girls betrothed by their parents to a gentile man, unwilling as they are, incur the penalty of excommunication, understand thus: either the betrothals were entered into by the parents before the girls obtained the use of reason, and it is not established that after the use of reason they confirmed and ratified them; since these betrothals are wholly void, certainly those who furnish counsel, aid, or favor to the abduction of these virgins are excommunicated by the law itself according to chap. 6, sess. 24, de R. M., Council of Trent; but otherwise if the betrothals either were first entered into with their consent or were then confirmed, and consequently are reputed firm and valid, for those who drag brides by force to the spouse, although they are unwilling and resisting, are not subjected to the penalties of abductors." 29 Apr. 1784, Instruction of the S. C. de P. F. to the Apostolic Vicar of Szechuan.

"No one enjoying the communion of the Church is to be repelled from the tribunal of Penance. - Let an Instruction be given, that they are always to be received for Confession, but only the disposed are to be absolved." S. C. de P. F. 16 Jan. 1804.

"The S. C. could not approve the excessive facility which is narrated concerning the Confessors of your Vicariate in the administration of the sacrament of Penance, who are said, with no distinction made among penitents, to absolve all indiscriminately, even recidivists and those remaining in a habitual custom of the sin of superstition. Certainly, since from the very institution of the sacrament of Penance it is established that sins are to be remitted to some, but retained to others, John 20:23, it is manifest that this custom of your confessors, if the things narrated about them are true, is opposed to the very institution of the sacrament of Penance; for it cannot be supposed that in all penitents of your Vicariate there are present the dispositions which are known to be necessary, from the just-praised institution of the sacrament of Penance, for obtaining Sacramental absolution. To this custom of your Confessors there is also opposed the Roman Ritual itself, in which, title On the sacrament of Penance, it is read: But let the Priest diligently see when and to whom absolution is to be conferred or denied. This would not have been prescribed if absolution were to be imparted indiscriminately to all penitents, even recidivists and those existing in a habitual custom of sinning. Therefore let your Confessors be taught concerning this threefold species of penitents, according to the Roman Ritual just praised, and let them deny absolution to those who provide either no indications or only feigned indications of penance; but let them defer it for those whose penance is deservedly held uncertain and suspect. Thus teach the more judicious Theologians; thus teach the Instructions proposed to Confessors by St. Charles Borromeo and by St. Francis de Sales, who adopted the rules handed down by St. Charles in his synodal Constitutions, as can be seen in their title 9, art. 5, n. 5; and the Confessors of your Vicariate just mentioned ought to remember that from great facility of absolving a great facility of sinning must necessarily arise." Instruction of the S. C. de P. F. to the Apostolic Vicar of Cochinchina, Aug. 1827.

“There are certainly many cases in which the denial and delay of absolution is a suitable remedy, and sometimes a necessary one. Let the confessor see to it, says St. Charles Borromeo in the Instructions on Penance, that he absolves no one who either is unwilling to lay aside hatred or enmity, or refuses to restore another’s property according to his ability, or is not prepared to depart from the state of mortal sin or to avoid an occasion of a similar sin. Hence the Apostolic See has always risen up with marvelous zeal against the lax and perverse facility of certain casuists in granting absolution, as is evident to every reader from the propositions rightly and deservedly condemned by Alexander VII, Innocent XI, and other Roman Pontiffs. It would be very lengthy, however, to enumerate cases of this kind; but they can be seen in St. Charles Borromeo’s Instruction for Confessors, and confessors should not allow themselves to be led away from these holy rules, confirmed by the consent of the whole Church, by a false mercy toward penitents. “Nevertheless, apart from the cases set forth above, an indiscriminate and widespread withholding of absolution for every mortal sin, for the sake of conceiving a greater horror of crimes and acquiring a better disposition for obtaining the benefit of absolution, is certainly neither a medicine nor a suitable chastisement ever employed by the Church against unwilling penitents, but was usurped by rigid and imprudent confessors alone, contrary to all right, and proscribed by three Roman Pontiffs. Peter of Osma already attempted to introduce this excessively severe and imprudent practice—to say nothing worse—by this proposition: Penitents are not to be absolved unless the penance enjoined has first been performed, deservedly condemned in the Council of Alcalá and by Sixtus IV in the year 1479, in the Bull which begins Licet ea. It is evident that, after the apostate Marco Antonio de Dominis, book 5, On the Republic of the Church, chapter 7, and Antoine Arnauld, On Frequent Communion, part 2, from chapter 8, this same deadly practice prevailed among the Belgians and certain French followers of rigorism. From their books Alexander VIII, among others, transfixed these two propositions with a just anathema: ‘16. The order of placing satisfaction before absolution was introduced, not by the discipline or institution of the Church, but by the very law and precept of Christ, the nature of the thing itself in a certain manner dictating it’; and ‘17. By that practice of absolving immediately, the order of penance is inverted.’ Quesnel attempted once again to introduce this practice, cruel in substance, by means of these two propositions couched in deceptive and equivocal terms: ‘87. It is a way full of wisdom, light, and charity to give souls time to bear with humility and to feel the state of sin, to seek the spirit of penance and contrition, and to begin at least to satisfy the justice of God before being reconciled. 88. We do not know what sin and true penance are when we wish to be restored immediately to the possession of those goods of which sin stripped us, and refuse to bear the shame of that separation’; these were rightly and deservedly condemned by Clement XI in the Bull Unigenitus. This severe practice certainly brings the greatest ruin upon souls, especially upon those who are imperfectly contrite, or, if you prefer, are beginning to love, according to St. Leo and St. Augustine (Letter 180 to Honoratus), who teach that ‘very many perish for want of the sacrament who, by its aid, would have flown to heaven.’ They therefore remain exposed to the danger of eternal damnation, while our most wise Savior warns us always to keep watch in justice, for ‘at an hour we do not expect, the Son of Man will come.’

“But let us grant to rigid directors that persons imperfectly contrite in this way survive until absolution: when absolution is delayed for them, they remain enemies of God, incapable of any merit or satisfaction; for their works, according to St. Thomas, on Book IV of the Sentences, distinction 15, since they are done without charity, are not satisfactory: ‘For it is impossible,’ he says, ‘for anyone to make satisfaction to God unless he is pleasing to God; and therefore, in order that satisfaction be fitting, it must be informed by sanctifying grace’; and in the Supplement, question 14, article 2: ‘Works done without charity are not satisfactory.’ Whatever indulgence, then, may have been proposed, the sinner deprived of absolution will be able to gain none; suspicions, harm to reputation, and scandals arise from an indiscriminate delay of absolution. The shame of confessing is a strong bridle against sin, as is held in chapter Quem, 88, On Penance, distinction 1. What of the fact that penitents who are repelled often cast aside the thought of salvation in despair?

“Therefore, let missionaries not follow the perverse reformers of the Church. “Rather, let them adhere to the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 14, On the Fallen and Their Restoration, where we have absolution preceding satisfaction, and the guilt of sins, together with eternal punishment, remitted by the Sacrament of Penance before satisfaction, by which only the temporal punishment remaining after absolution is remitted. This prudent and benign practice, however, was not instituted by Trent alone; rather, as the Roman Catechism bears witness, it is the most ancient usage of the Church, confirmed by Scripture and the authority of the Fathers. The father in the Gospel commands the first robe to be brought quickly for the returning prodigal son, nor does he send him away to feed swine so that he might conceive a greater horror of sins and be disposed for the fatherly embrace. Among the articles on account of which Chrysostom was wrongly deposed by certain bishops, but restored by Apostolic authority, was this: ‘If you have sinned again, repent again; and as often as you have sinned, come to me, and I will heal you.’ Basil says to his spiritual son: ‘When,’ he says, ‘you perceive yourself to be liable to sins, turn quickly to penance, lest you be confounded.’ The Clementine law Dudum, On Burials, commands the priest to hear confessions, impose penances, and absolve. A decree of Boniface, Bishop of Mainz, established that every priest should take care, after receiving the confession of penitents, to reconcile them immediately by giving the prayer. I would be endless if I wished to adduce the teachings of all the Fathers in favor of such a practice of the Church, but those cited are sufficient.

“This practice, therefore, prudent and benign and fortified by so many testimonies, of immediately absolving sinners who are either imperfectly or perfectly contrite, prevails throughout the whole Church where there is an abundance of confessors and no danger of persecution; how much more, therefore, must it necessarily be observed in Western Tonkin, where there are many continual persecutions against Catholics, and where indeed the harvest is great, but the laborers are very few. Nor let the Innovators deceive you, who nourish cruelty and deadly indolence in their hearts under the appearance of zeal; do not, I say, let them deceive you with texts of Scripture, Ezekiel 13 and Jeremiah 6, which they everywhere abuse; for from these we can gather nothing more than that absolution is not to be imparted to those who lack the necessary disposition, not that it is to be denied to those endowed with that disposition; nor will you find any place in the oracles of the Old Covenant according to which reconciliation with God was delayed for penitents or was to be deferred. David had scarcely confessed his offense, saying, ‘I have sinned against the Lord,’ when Nathan proclaimed in the name of God: ‘The Lord also has taken away your sin; you shall not die.’ Nor again let them seduce you with the testimonies of Cyprian, the Roman Clergy, Innocent I, and other Fathers, which they likewise abuse; for when these testimonies are read, not in mutilated form but in full, it will be apparent to every candid and attentive person that they speak of certain public sins which at that time were to be punished by public penance. Although approved authors think that, in the very imposition of public penance, sinners were ordinarily absolved from the guilt of sin—for this was to receive the imposition of the hand unto penance: to be absolved from the guilt of sin and to receive the manner of public satisfaction. Indeed, Morinus himself, who possesses the highest authority among newer theologians, although he thinks that the absolution of public crimes, even sacramental absolution, was delayed until the fulfillment of canonical penance, agrees with us as regards other sins; for he says: ‘All crimes and sins which in those ages were not expiated by public penance were remitted immediately or a little after confession had been made to a priest, excepting a very few which, because they were public, were sometimes punished by the canons with deprivation of ecclesiastical communion.’ The Roman Catechism teaches the same: “that the custom of absolving immediately after confession existed from the very cradle of the Church, if one excepts certain enormous crimes for which public penance was due; indeed, it demonstrates at greater length toward the end of the work, from the penitential books of the Greeks, that even in the Eastern Church the custom of immediately absolving even from public sins has been preserved for twelve centuries down to the present.

“But since, according to the Council of Trent, the custom of inflicting public penance for public and scandalous sins ought to remain in force, we descend to the particular case reported by the Apostolic Visitor concerning parents who consent to the marriage of their children with disparity of worship. It seems certain that, so long as it is within their power to rescind the marriage and, after being admonished about it, they refuse the rescission, they are neither capable nor disposed to receive the benefit of absolution. But if, for their part, they have done whatever they can and it is no longer within their power to recall their children from the invalid contract, there is no reason for those persons, contrite and having confessed, to be deprived of sacramental absolution for whole years or until the end of life. Yet lest they be an example to others to perpetrate similar marriages, after they have confessed and been absolved they could either be deprived of Eucharistic Communion or be punished with another public penance, according to the judgment of a prudent and discreet bishop.

“The way full of wisdom and charity, therefore, is to snatch sinful souls as quickly as possible from the state of sin, according to the practice of the universal Church founded in the Gospel of Christ, so that they may quickly receive the first robe; and not to prolong, but, insofar as can be done, to hasten the prescribed penance, according to the form which the Council of Trent most salutarily prescribes: that they propose it before reconciliation, so that after it, restored to the state of grace more safely and salutarily, they may strive to make satisfaction.” Instruction of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, 3 October 1736.

“You place the second abuse in this: that you suspect that the benefit of sacramental absolution is delayed excessively. No certain judgment can be made in this matter. The confessor, who sits before the tribunal as a judge and as a physician must prepare medicine for the sick, alone can examine how great is the atrocity of the crimes, what is the persistence of the sickness, and what is the disposition of the penitent. He must therefore diligently investigate whether those who approach the Sacrament of Penance detest the crimes they have committed with that sorrow of soul which the Council of Trent, Session 14, chapter 5, On Contrition, requires for the integrity of the sacrament; whether they promise the beginning of a new life and hatred of the past, not merely by voice and lips, but with the innermost affection of the heart; whether, as evidence of this good and firm will, they show that they have now abstained from sins for some time; whether they have entirely dismissed, if it was within their power, those occasions which either of themselves or from their own malice or depravity induce them to sin; whether they have applied the remedies proposed to them on other occasions, by whose protection they may avoid sin in necessary and involuntary occasions; whether they have cast off the habit of sinning; whether, if they obtained the benefit of absolution on other occasions, they again relapsed into the same crimes from their own malice and wallowed in the same mire; whether they are ready and prompt to repair the damage or injury in goods, reputation, and honor in which they have injured their neighbor, if they have the means or opportunity. These and many other things, which missionaries can obtain from the praised instructions of St. Charles, must be carefully weighed by them before they impart the benefit of absolution. But since these very things lie hidden among the secrets of confession, it is certainly difficult to judge whether they abuse the power of a judge and the authority of a physician, as we intimated above, “or conduct themselves more harshly and severely toward penitents who are rightly disposed.

“Nevertheless, let the missionaries take diligent care that, if at any time public penance is to be enjoined and even prolonged for some time, they do not meanwhile allow anyone to be deprived of the benefit of sacramental absolution, provided that he places no obstacle on his part and is regarded as worthy to have the grace of reconciliation with God imparted to him in the forum of conscience. For we think it is not unknown to you that the private absolution of sinners, to be granted to penitents in the sacramental forum, differs greatly from public reconciliation with the Church. The former is to be denied to no one who is rightly disposed and displays the dispositions necessary for obtaining this grace. For holy Mother Church is benign and merciful, and does not permit anyone who from the heart and with a true exertion of soul and mind implores pardon from God for his offenses to remain under the yoke and servitude of the devil, an enemy of God, deprived of all the merits of good works. The latter, namely public reconciliation, is to be reserved to the judgment of the bishop, who will determine according to the circumstances of places and times what needs to be done, and will thus reconcile severity with lenity, so that it brings punishment to the guilty and restraint to the innocent....

“The third suspicion of abuses which disturbs you is that you fear not only that sacramental absolution is delayed for certain criminals, but that they are also repelled, perhaps for a slight cause, from the tribunal of penance. You do not, however, explain sufficiently how this matter proceeds. For it is not right to suspect that those missionaries, whom you yourself acknowledge to devote excellent labor to procuring the salvation of souls and to be highly commended by you for their zeal for piety and charity, have become so forgetful of mercy and lenity that they repel sinners who, aroused by some stimulus of penance, approach them for the confession of their faults. For it is within the power of the priest to deny sacramental absolution to the undeserving, but not to hear the confession of their crimes would be an intolerable wickedness. We have therefore judged that the question proposed by you is to be understood in this way: that inquiry is to be made only concerning those sinners who are entangled in the bonds of crimes to which the penalty of excommunication has been attached by law. And in this matter it seems especially to be considered whether someone has been excommunicated by the sentence of a judge and publicly denounced, or instead has contracted that censure by law, not indeed declared by the sentence of a judge, but, since the crime on account of which he incurred excommunication is so notorious and manifest that it cannot be concealed by any evasion or excused by favor of law, he is therefore everywhere regarded among the rest of the faithful as a public sinner. Both are certainly to be repelled from the Sacrament of Penance, for excommunicated persons cannot be made participants in the sacraments. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between the two: one excommunicated and denounced by the sentence of a judge, since he is separated from the communion of the rest of the faithful, is also to be avoided, and therefore cannot be admitted into a church to assist at the unbloody Sacrifice, pour forth public prayers, or attend the other common offices of religion, with the sole exception of the preaching of the word of God, which an excommunicated person is permitted by law to hear, chapter Respons. 43, On the Sentence of Excommunication. But one upon whom no sentence or judicial declaration of excommunication has been imposed is neither repelled from the assembly of the faithful, nor prohibited entry to the church, nor excluded from public prayers; yet just as he is incapable in himself of participation in the sacraments, so he is rightly to be kept from them by a faithful “steward of the mysteries of God because of the notoriety and pertinacity of his crime; since public scandal has arisen from it, unless it has ceased and been amended by a suitable and appropriate penance, he is to be judged altogether unworthy to become a participant in the mysteries of Christ, lest, contrary to the precept of the Gospel, pearls be cast before swine. The missionaries must determine what and how great the penance to be imposed upon the guilty ought to be and in what manner the scandal can be removed, after weighing the circumstances of places and times; and they should especially take care that, if there is an opportunity of consulting you, nothing be decreed except with you as author and judge. Hence, therefore, the procedure of those who, making no distinction between excommunicated persons who are to be avoided and those who are tolerated, indiscriminately prohibit all, even on feast days, from entering the church and from the sacred assembly of the faithful, is not to be approved. For if they do this because they judge that such is the force of excommunication that one subjected to it is immediately to be kept from all communion with the faithful, this is contrary to the distinction mentioned and they therefore err; but if they, at their own discretion, decree this penalty indiscriminately for all excommunicated persons, they are to be reproved for excessive severity. Concerning whether those who seize girls betrothed by their parents to pagan men against their will and conduct them to the house of the bridegroom incur the penalty of excommunication, the matter is as follows: either the betrothals were entered into by the parents before the girls attained the use of reason, and it is not established that after attaining the use of reason they confirmed and ratified them; since these betrothals are altogether invalid, those who furnish counsel, assistance, or favor for the abduction of these maidens are certainly excommunicated by the law itself, according to chapter 6, Session 24, On the Reformation of Matrimony, of the Council of Trent. It is otherwise, however, if the betrothals were either first entered into with their consent or afterwards confirmed, and consequently are reputed firm and valid; for those who forcibly drag brides to the bridegroom, though unwilling and resisting, are not subject to the penalties of abductors.” Instruction of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, 29 April 1784.

“No one enjoying the communion of the Church is to be repelled from the tribunal of penance.—Let an instruction be given that all are always to be received for confession, but only those disposed are to be absolved.” Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, 16 January 1804.

“The Sacred Congregation could not approve the excessive facility said to be found among the confessors of your Vicariate in the administration of the Sacrament of Penance: they are said to absolve everyone indiscriminately, without making any distinction among penitents, even relapsing sinners and those remaining in a habitual custom of the sin of superstition. Indeed, since from the very institution of the Sacrament of Penance it is established that the sins of some are to be remitted and those of others retained, John 20:23, it is manifest that this custom of your confessors, if what is related about them is true, is opposed to the very institution of the Sacrament of Penance; for it cannot be supposed that all penitents of your Vicariate possess the dispositions which, from the institution of the Sacrament of Penance just praised, are known to be necessary for obtaining sacramental absolution. This custom of your confessors is also opposed by the Roman Ritual itself, in which, under the title On the Sacrament of Penance, it is read: ‘Let the priest consider diligently when and to whom absolution is to be granted or denied.’ This would not have been prescribed if absolution were to be imparted indiscriminately to all penitents, even relapsing sinners and those existing in a habitual custom of sinning. Let your confessors therefore be instructed concerning this threefold class of penitents, according to the Roman Ritual just praised, and let them deny absolution to those who show either no signs of penance or only feigned signs; “but let them defer it for those whose penance is rightly regarded as uncertain and suspect. Thus teach the sounder theologians; thus teach the Instructions proposed to confessors by St. Charles Borromeo and by St. Francis de Sales, who adopted in his Synodal Constitutions the rules handed down by St. Charles, as can be seen in their title 9, article 5, no. 3. And the aforesaid confessors of your Vicariate must remember that, from a great facility in absolving, a great facility in sinning must necessarily arise.” Instruction of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith to the Apostolic Vicar of Cochinchina, August 1827.

We must treat: 1. of instructing the cause; 2. of rendering the sentence.

614. Principles. - I. The Confessor is bound to question penitents concerning the species, number, and circumstances changing the species; concerning the causes of sins, habit, and proximate occasions, whenever he reasonably presumes or prudently doubts that these things have not been sufficiently declared. The reason is that the Confessor, as minister of the Sacrament, must procure its integrity and, as judge, must obtain for himself the knowledge necessary for rendering an equitable judgment. This is also evident from the Fourth Lateran Council and from the Roman Ritual. - St. Ligorius, no. 617, and Practice of the Confessor, no. 19.

II. The Confessor is not bound to question the penitent except with some ordinary diligence. The reason is that the penitent himself is bound to examine himself not with the greatest but only with moderate, that is, ordinary diligence. But the obligation of the Confessor cannot be graver than that of the penitent, since the Confessor is bound to examine the penitent only secondarily, or in default of him. - St. Ligorius, Practice of the Confessor, no. 20.

III. The Confessor is not bound to question penitents who, although uneducated, seem sufficiently instructed for their condition and diligent in confessing sins with their circumstances according to their state and capacity. - A fortiori, it is not necessary to examine those who confess frequently and rarely sin gravely, such as devout persons, Religious, and Ecclesiastics, unless something necessarily to be explained appears to be omitted by them. - St. Ligorius, no. 607, II and III; Apostolic Homilies, no. 103.

615. Rules for the Practice of Questioning. - I. Rule. Questioning must be moderate, and therefore the Confessor must take care not to be too anxious in questioning. Otherwise, questioning, and consequently confession itself, will be grave and burdensome both to himself and especially to the penitent. Hence let him never ask useless things or permit them to be narrated to him. Therefore let him attend to those things which the Roman Ritual has: Let him take care not to detain anyone with curious or useless questions, especially younger persons of either sex, or others, by imprudently questioning them about that which they do not know, lest they suffer scandal and thereby learn to sin.

And St. Ligorius, no. 607: Let the Confessor not be too anxious in questioning, but let him ask only about those things which probably pertain to the penitent according to his condition. And in the Practice of the Confessor, no. 21: Let him ask only about sins into which they can easily fall, their condition and capacity being considered. Thus also Billuart (dissertation 6, article 10, section 2): In a moral examination (the Confessor ought to examine) not with the greatest and exquisite, but with human and moderate diligence, and conformably to the capacity of the penitent. For the Priest is not bound to examine the penitent more than the penitent himself is bound to examine himself, since the Confessor is bound to examine him in default of the penitent. But the penitent is not bound to examine himself with the greatest and exquisite diligence, but with human and moral diligence. Nor does it matter that, if the Confessor examined more, perhaps he would discover more; for here attention must be paid not only to the material integrity of confession, but also lest the Sacrament be rendered burdensome and odious to penitents by the greatest and excessive industry in examining. It is therefore sufficient if the Confessor prudently judges that the penitent omits nothing. Sporer, no. 792, has the same in nearly the same words. - Salmanticenses, chapter 12, no. 21. - Reuter, The New Confessor, chapter 3, at the end, etc.

616. II. Rule. - Questioning must be discreet; namely, the Confessor must question with great prudence, diligently taking care: 1. not to ask about sins which probably were not committed, considering the condition and capacity of the penitent, etc.; 2. not to ask about those things from which the penitent may learn to sin or may suffer scandal, according to what was just said from the Roman Ritual; 3. not to ask with curiosity or levity even concerning those things about which inquiry must be made, for example, immodestly concerning immodest things, etc., etc. In a word, he must strive that in every question gravity, piety, modesty, and paternal charity alone appear, as the nature and dignity of this office require. - See the Roman Ritual. Hence: 1. he must be very cautious in questioning concerning the matter of lust, especially with women, adolescents, and children, who can suffer scandal much more easily. For how many unhappy penitents have lost innocence and soul because of an incautious question or explanation of the Confessor! But with married persons let him never make mention of the conjugal debt without grave cause (Sacred Penitentiary, June 8, 1842); and it will be sufficient, when the matter requires, to ask the woman whether she has furnished due fidelity and obedience to her husband in all things.

2. The rule admitted by all must be diligently observed: In the matter of lust it is much better to fall short in many things than to exceed in one by reason of the integrity of confession. Therefore, in doubt whether in such a case you can or ought to question, the negative side must always be followed; for it is a lesser evil that the integrity of confession be lacking than to incur the danger of losing a soul.

617. III. Rule. - Questioning must be opportune, that is, it must be done at the time and in the manner which are suitable. But certain questions are ordinarily to be asked before confession, though few, lest the penitent be offended, for example: How long has it been since he confessed? Was he absolved? Did he fulfill the penance ¹?... Is he at peace concerning his past life? This last question should be asked only when the penitent has not confessed for a long time or when a general confession is undertaken from a determined time. - The other questions concerning condition, state, age, etc., will more suitably be asked, as occasion is given, during the course of confession. Thus, on the one hand, every suspicion of curiosity and levity will be avoided, and on the other the penitent will answer more easily when his confidence in the Confessor has been increased.

¹ The Author does not contend that these questions must always be asked, but only that, if at any time, after certain things have been heard, it seems that they should be asked, they are more suitably asked at the beginning.

But those Confessors err who wish always to make a certain judgment concerning the quality of the sin, whether it is grave or light, and torment penitents in order to know with what intention or what conscience they did this; for these will often answer whatever happens to come into their mouth, so that, when questioned a little afterward concerning the same matter, they will deny what they had previously affirmed. The case is different, however, if they appear sufficiently instructed, or if there is doubt about full consent given to a temptation. Generally, unless the circumstances counsel otherwise, it can be presumed that the penitent apprehended the object of the sin as it is evil in itself.

618. Questions. - QUESTION 1. What must the Confessor do in doubt concerning the sincerity of the penitent?

Reply. It is a common rule and a received axiom: The penitent is to be believed when speaking both for himself and against himself. The reason is that in the sacred tribunal the penitent is at once the accused and a witness, his own accuser and advocate, and moreover in doubt he is always to be presumed truthful. Therefore, after suitable questions, the Confessor must absolve a penitent who denies. - St. Ligorius, no. 631.

619. • QUESTION 2. What must the Confessor do if he knows with certainty that some sin is being concealed or denied by the penitent?

Reply 1. If he knows it from the confession of another, he must, lest the seal of confession be violated, question only generally, as he otherwise would have done or ought to have done. But if the penitent, when questioned, denies it, let him reply nothing; rather, if he can do so without arousing suspicion, let him merely exhort him generally to open his conscience with all confidence. Whether the Confessor ought to absolve such a penitent is disputed. - St. Ligorius, after reporting the opinions of others, concludes thus: In my judgment, Croix thinks better, that in this case he should by no means absolve, but should merely say some prayer in order to conceal the denial of absolution ². - More commonly, however, other Doctors with Suarez, On Penance, disputation 32, section 3, no. 9, teach that absolution is to be denied only when it is altogether evident that the penitent is lying against the integrity of confession. Indeed, several say that absolution is to be granted in every case to a penitent denying his sin whenever knowledge of this sin has been obtained solely from the confession of another, namely, an accomplice, because this knowledge is to be held as nothing, since it was acquired from the confession of another. This, moreover, is sufficiently probable. Reply 2. If he knows it outside confession, of itself he must absolve the penitent who denies it, because the penitent speaking for himself and against himself is to be believed; nor can the report of another of itself produce greater faith than the declaration of the penitent himself; therefore the Confessor is no more bound to believe others than the penitent. For if the penitent committed that sin, the Confessor must presume that he either forgot his sin, confessed it to another, has a just cause for concealing it, or that the reporters were instead deceived. - St. Ligorius, ibid. - Billuart, ibid.

² Illsung first introduced this opinion and practice (treatise 6, disputation 6, question 4, article 7, section 4, no. 128), relying upon a fallacious citation of Suarez, who (On Penance, disputation 32, section 3, no. 9) indeed teaches the opposite. Croix borrowed the same from Illsung (book 6, part 2, no. 1969), together with the fictitious support of Suarez, adding through inadvertence a citation of Dicastillus, whom Illsung had cited for another purpose. To these St. Alphonsus (no. 631) added Viva, who (On Penance, question 8, article 5, no. 2), although he reports the opinion of Suarez and De Lugo less exactly, nevertheless in no way adheres to that opinion. Therefore, that entire opinion is owed to an hallucination which wrongly adduced the authority of Suarez, Dicastillus, and Viva.

** The VV. oppose thirty-four columns (pp. 587-603) to the twenty-four lines of which this and the immediately following Note consist. Nevertheless, so great a bulk has more appearance than substance. As the matter demands, we shall give an account of those things which are said in the Note.

In this first little Note the question is whether a confessor can absolve a penitent concerning whom he knows from the confession of another that a sin is being concealed. But in the Note it is said that Illsung replied in the negative, relying upon a fallacious citation of Suarez, who indeed teaches the opposite. Therefore, that Illsung relies upon a citation of Suarez is beyond controversy. But the words of Suarez cited by Illsung prove that he cites Suarez fallaciously. These words of Suarez are (loc. cit. above in the Note): It is replied that as a rule one must stand by the confession and word of the penitent. Hence, however much (Illsung incorrectly has from whatever source) the confessor knows the sin of the penitent from the report of others, he is bound in this judgment to believe the penitent himself rather, for the reason given. Then, if the confessor himself saw the sin with his own eyes and can probably judge that the penitent confessed that sin to another, he can dissemble and believe that he then denies it because he is not bound to confess it again. But if it is altogether evident that he is lying against the integrity of confession, he is not bound so to stand by the words of the penitent that he cannot use his knowledge to convince and reprove the penitent himself. Moreover, Illsung argues from this text thus: According to Suarez, the confessor is not bound to stand by the words of the penitent if it is altogether evident that he is lying. But from the confession of another which has been heard, it can become altogether evident that the penitent is lying. Therefore.

But the reasoning is fallacious and contrary to the mind of Suarez if, according to Suarez, that complete evidence cannot be referred to a case of knowledge drawn from the confession of another. That, according to Suarez, that complete evidence cannot be referred to knowledge drawn from the confession of another is manifestly evident from these words of the same author: HOWEVER MUCH the confessor knows the sin of the penitent FROM THE REPORT OF OTHERS, etc. For the word however much embraces whatever certitude the Confessor can have from the confession of another. Therefore Illsung relies fallaciously upon the authority of Suarez.

The VV. here object (p. 589) that the words of Suarez, as a rule one must stand by the word of the penitent, are to be referred also to knowledge received from the report of others. - Reply. I deny the whole. For the context evidently proves that the word as a rule indeed intimates the exception which he adds, if the confessor saw it with his own eyes and cannot conjecture that the penitent confessed that sin to another; but the word however much in no way permits an exception as regards knowledge received from the report of another.

2. It is added in the Note that Croix borrowed from Illsung the false citation of Suarez and, furthermore, through inadvertence added the false citation of Dicastillus, whom Illsung had cited for another purpose. It is easily evident that these things are so. For Dicastillus, in the place which Illsung cites (On the Eucharist, disputation 9, no. 491), disputes whether the administration of the Eucharist can be simulated by giving an unconsecrated particle and, from this, generally whether it is lawful to simulate the administration of Sacraments. But Illsung cites him to prove that absolution can be simulated. Yet Dicastillus has not even one word concerning our present question. Therefore, through mere inadvertence Croix added the fallacious testimony of Dicastillus to the fallacious support of Suarez.

3. Finally, it is added in the Note that St. Alphonsus took from Croix the citations of Suarez, Illsung, and Dicastillus, and added to these Viva, who, although he reports the opinion of Suarez and De Lugo less exactly, nevertheless in no way adheres to that opinion (namely, of Illsung). - These things too are demonstrated with little business. For Viva indeed says (loc. cit. in the Note) that a penitent is not to be absolved if the confessor prudently judges that the penitent denies the sin from shame; but he nowhere says that this prudent judgment is had in the case of St. Alphonsus. Moreover, he reports the opinion of De Lugo and Suarez less exactly; for these did not say, if the confessor prudently judges, but if it is altogether evident. Therefore, in their opinion, a judgment, unless it is altogether evident, will not be prudent. But De Lugo (disputation 22, no. 22) denies that a judgment which rests upon the testimony of another penitent is evident and therefore prudent. You ask, he says, what if the confessor knows evidently from the confession of others that Peter committed such a sin, which he himself afterward denies in confession? It is replied that it is contradictory for him to know this evidently from the confession of others, since that entire knowledge is resolved into the testimony of another penitent. And these things can suffice to give an account of those things which had been written in this brief little Note.

For the opinion of St. Alphonsus the VV. add (pp. 592-594), besides Henno, who inclines to that opinion, also the authorities of Babenstuber, Reuter, and Voit. - Reply. St. Alphonsus had already observed that not all Authors thought the same in this question; this ought therefore to seem even less surprising because different authors frame different hypotheses. Moreover, Babenstuber, Reuter, and Voit, no less than St. Alphonsus, manifestly transcribed from Illsung and Croix.

Finally, the VV. conclude this part thus (p. 594): But it matters little whether more or fewer Authors approved the opinion of Father Illsung; for the holy Doctor approved it not on account of extrinsic authorities, but on account of intrinsic reasons which are certainly evident and convincing. - Reply. The holy Doctor in fact adduces no reason, but merely cites the Authors whom we indicated in the Note; the Note itself also, as is evident, merely has certain things concerning the Authors cited by the holy Doctor. Moreover, if truly evident reasons were present, as the VV. boast, we would not thus have dissenting Authors. For why, in a matter which depends especially upon prudent judgment, would we have as blind in an evident matter Suarez and Cardinal De Lugo, easily the foremost of the Theologians?

And let these things suffice for those sixteen columns which the VV. wrote against the eight lines of the preceding little Note. We shall subjoin to the Note itself the response to the other eighteen columns which the VV. added against the sixteen lines of the following Note.

I said, of itself; for if the confessor is altogether certain of the sin committed by the penitent because, for example, he himself saw him stealing, heard him blaspheming, etc., or knows it from the certain report of others ³, he cannot absolve one who denies, provided he is certain that the latter has not forgotten his sin and has no motive for concealing it; for this rule, The penitent is to be believed, etc., avails indeed in a matter less certain, but not in a matter evidently certain.

³ These words, if he knows it from the certain report of others, etc., seem to have slipped inadvertently from Benjamin Elbel (On Penance, conference 17, no. 454), from whom St. Alphonsus then took them, and our Author from him also. For Elbel adds that all think thus, although, even by the admission of St. Alphonsus, this is manifestly false, and that doctrine is the common one which Suarez expresses thus (On Penance, disputation 32, section 3, no. 9): However much the Confessor knows the sin of the penitent from the report of others, he is bound in this judgment to believe the penitent himself rather, for the reason given.

Indeed, Elbel himself teaches the opposite (On the Sacraments in General, conference 2, no. 44), where he proposes this case: "A certain bridegroom confessed that on the preceding night he had acted shamefully with his bride; and because the Confessor knew that he had already relapsed several times and was unwilling to avoid the proximate occasion, he dismisses him without absolution. Immediately after him the bride, very well known to the Confessor, approaches; nevertheless, perhaps fearing the denial of absolution, she says not a word about the sins of lust committed with the bridegroom. The Confessor doubts whether he ought to absolve." And he replies: "If the bride denies that she committed anything against chastity, he is bound to absolve her, because he is bound to place faith in the penitent as at once the accused and the accuser, speaking both for herself and against herself."

** It could seem incredible that from this brief Note the VV. could have taken matter with which to fill eighteen solid columns. For they heap together from everywhere texts of Authors by which they prove that a confessor cannot impart absolution to a penitent when he is altogether certain, when he knows evidently, that the penitent mendaciously and in bad faith denies the grave sin which he committed. But surely, with so great an apparatus of arms, are they not fighting against shadows?

For in the Note merely a certain defect of coherence in Elbel was noted: while he teaches that the confessor is bound in the proposed case to absolve the bride at least under a condition, he then says that absolution is to be denied if the confessor becomes more certain of the state of the penitent from the report of others. In what sense the words of Elbel in the Note are to be understood is evident from the fact that the opinion which St. Alphonsus attests to be commonly handed down is opposed to him. But this opinion is of this kind (book 6, no. 631): A distinction must be made: if he knows outside confession and knows by his own knowledge, for example, by seeing him steal or hearing him blaspheme, without doubt he ought not to absolve if he denies it, provided there is not a prudent doubt, etc. But if the confessor has it from suspicion or from the report of others, Suarez, Laymann, Holzmann, Sporer, and others also commonly say that after diligent questioning he ought as a rule to absolve. But if you understand the words of Elbel as referring to that certainty by which, for example, in Fagundez, cited by the VV. (p. 597), the Confessor is certain of someone's concubinage FROM PUBLIC NOTORIETY, the question is indeed reduced to such a condition that you seek adversaries to attack in vain. For this reason it was said that the VV. fashioned shadows for themselves against which they turned their arms.

620. • QUESTION 3. How in particular must the Confessor deal with the uneducated?

Reply. Ordinarily the Confessor himself must examine the more uneducated, because, if left to themselves, they will not examine themselves better; and if they are dismissed, they will never return better disposed. Indeed, deterred by the difficulty of examining their conscience, they will easily abstain from confession. - St. Ligorius, no. 607.

621. Principles. - I. Absolution must be granted from justice and under grave obligation to every penitent who has confessed properly and is disposed. The reason is that in the very act of confession a certain quasi-contract has been entered into, by force of which a penitent who has confessed properly and is disposed has a right to receive the Sacrament. Otherwise, an intolerable burden would be imposed upon the penitent without just cause, namely, that he make a confession to another, without being able moreover to trust with certainty that he will receive absolution from this new Confessor. Furthermore, this is also demanded by the end of the institution of the Sacrament and the tribunal of Penance, which was instituted by Christ for the purpose of imparting mercy. Therefore, a Priest denying absolution to a disposed penitent would act unjustly, abuse the power of the keys, and render the Sacrament odious.

II. Nevertheless, absolution can be deferred for a brief time, even for a penitent rightly disposed ⁴, and even without his consent, when, namely, the Confessor judges that this is useful for his reform. The reason is that the deferral of absolution is not its denial; and although a disposed penitent has a right to absolution, nevertheless, he does not have, at least speaking per se, a right to obtain it immediately. For the Confessor is not only a judge, but also a physician ⁵, and therefore, if If, therefore, you inquire into the origin of this practice, you will easily find that it is owed to the zeal for devising everywhere new expedients by which, in certain circumstances, the faithful might perhaps seem capable of being helped more fully; but its reason and end were situated principally in this: that a penitent who, through sluggishness in fulfilling some obligation, was accustomed to weave new delays day after day, month after month, and even year after year, might at length be stirred to put his hand to the work. You have an example in St. Antoninus (part 3, title 14, chapter 19, section 19), where, treating of those who, as he says elsewhere (part 2, title 2, chapter 8, section 35), always procrastinate and are found annually promising the confessor that they will make restitution, and afterward do not do so, he rejects the opinion of those (ibid., section 2) who thought that these persons were to be absolved under the condition of future restitution, and admits the opinion of William that they ought to be absolved simply and without condition; then he adds: After the Confessor has considered that such persons have done this several times, PERHAPS IT WOULD BE A GOOD PRECAUTION to tell such persons that they should first make restitution and afterward come to confession, or for absolution.

⁴ It is of the greatest importance to consider the origin and reason of this practice. Although scarcely any trace of it appears in the writings of the more ancient Theologians, one would nevertheless wrongly take occasion from this, with certain Jansenists, to attribute it to them as its first authors, even though those same men then most notably abused the discipline of canonical penance to deter the faithful from the Sacraments, and were sometimes able, under a feigned appearance of zeal, to impose upon certain Catholics.

But that these Doctors treat of a disposed penitent is manifestly evident from the fact that they suggest deferral of absolution not as necessary, but as merely useful, to be employed from mere counsel and only sometimes. Thus, for example, Suarez (loc. cit.), although he treats of a habit which, as he says, has in a certain way passed into nature, after saying that the penitent's purpose is to be believed notwithstanding any preceding frequency and inconstancy of his, finally adds: If he has proposed more frequently to be corrected and does not do so, suitable remedies must be employed.... Finally, if these should not suffice, IT WILL SOMETIMES BE USEFUL to defer absolution for some days, IN WHICH HE MAY BE COMPELLED TO WATCH, etc. He repeats the same (On Penance, disputation 32, section 2, no. 4) concerning a man who, being placed in a proximate necessary occasion of sinning, relapses again and again: Nor is absolution to be denied to him, even if he relapse again and again, especially if he restrains himself somewhat and gradually diminishes the number of sins, as Navarrus noted, chapter 3, no. 21. SOMETIMES, however, absolution can be deferred (note well: can, not must).

And Sanchez (On the Decalogue, book 2, chapter 32, no. 45): If the penitent does not bear it very painfully, and it is hoped that he will not thereby be drawn away from confession, but rather that it will be a medicine, it will be A COUNSEL to defer absolution, employing the greatest possible gentleness; but if the opposite is hoped, it will not be a counsel.

Filliucci (loc. cit., question 10, no. 320): The remedies are frequent confession, almsgiving.... If these should not profit, a deferral of absolution for some days would be useful.

Gregory Sayrus (loc. cit., no. 8): SOMETIMES, however, it is a most salutary COUNSEL, as Medina, Peter of Aragon, Emmanuel Rodriguez, and Ludovicus Lopez rightly note, not to absolve before, etc.

Palaus (loc. cit., no. 6): FROM COUNSEL the priest will be able to defer absolution if he judges that the deferral will be profitable.

Bonacina (loc. cit., no. 7): Absolution does not seem to be denied to a penitent who has a firm purpose of abstaining in the future from oaths of this kind.... I add... that absolution can be deferred whenever the confessor shall have judged that this is expedient for the salvation of the penitent.

Azor (loc. cit., question 4): Although absolution is not to be denied simply, it nevertheless seems that it should be deferred for a time, so that he may meanwhile devote some effort to this; unless there is otherwise a just cause by which he ought to be absolved from sins immediately.

Reginaldus (loc. cit., no. 87): It is a salutary counsel to defer absolution for such a person, so that he may thus be induced to beware of relapse by watching more attentively.

Cardinal De Lugo (On Penance, disputation 14, no. 166): Finally, IT WILL SOMETIMES BE USEFUL to defer absolution for some days, etc.

Cardinal Toletus (book 3, chapter 18, no. 3): In these cases it is A USEFUL COUNSEL that absolution be deferred, after the whole confession has been heard, until some correction appears.

And this indeed is the practice against which John Sanchez fought with so much ardor (Selected Disputations, etc., disputation 9, from no. 11), contending, not indeed that penitents are to be absolved indiscriminately even if there can be doubt about their disposition, as certain men wrongly impute to him, but that, generally speaking, the hope of greater fruit expected from the deferred absolution of one who is disposed is vain, and consequently that the counsel of deferring absolution for this penitent is not commonly salutary. Hence he further inferred that, when this cause for deferral ceases, the right of the penitent to absolution prevails, so that, since the priest, as his adversaries admit, can absolve immediately, by that very fact he is bound not to defer it. But these things do not in fact oppose the preceding principle of the Doctors; for they too freely and unanimously agree that this medicine is not to be employed when it appears likely to harm rather than to profit. Whether, however, it is at times expedient on account of the fruit hoped for from it is a question pertaining to prudence, concerning which the Author presently treats. Nevertheless, that it can sometimes profit does not seem capable of being denied against the opinion of so many Doctors.

It will be useful to note this one thing: that a few persons proceeded further and contended that the confessor not only can defer absolution, but is bound to do so. But these either labor under an equivocation when they call the penitent disposed, or certainly affirm this against the common opinion. No means can ever be called necessary unless it is the only one. Moreover, the assertion that, with a penitent already disposed for absolution, the only means by which he may be compelled to carry something out is deferral of absolution smacks of a hypothesis altogether too improbable.

⁵ Concerning the office of physician, see what we noted above from Cardinal De Lugo (in the note to no. 605).

You will see this expedient suggested more frequently among Theologians who are somewhat less ancient when they treat of the obligation of employing certain means for correcting a depraved habit, especially one which impels to evil semi-deliberately or even indeliberately, although those acts are culpable in their cause, namely, in sluggishness and neglect of correction, which in these circumstances place a man in a continual state, as they say, of mortal sin. Hence the reason why the Doctors generally touch upon this matter not where they treat of the Sacrament of Penance, but where they treat of the Second Precept of the Decalogue, and accordingly of the depraved habit of blaspheming, rashly swearing, and then committing perjury. Thus the Salmanticenses, treatise 17, On an Oath, chapter 2. - Suarez, On an Oath, book 3, chapter 8, no. 7. - Sanchez, On the Decalogue, book 2, chapter 32, where he treats of blasphemy, and book 3, chapter 5, where he treats of the habit of swearing. - Bonacina, On the Second Precept, disputation 4, question 1, part 14. - Filliucci, treatise 25, chapter 10, on blasphemy and an oath. - Sayrus, Clavis Regia, book 5, chapter 5, where he treats of an oath. - Palaus, On an Oath, disputation 1, point 9. - Viva, On the Precepts of the Decalogue, question 7, article 7, On Perjury. - Trullench, Exposition of the Decalogue, book 2, chapter 1, doubt 20. - Azor, part 1, book 11, chapter 3, On an Oath. - Reginaldus, book 18, On the Second Precept of the Decalogue. The same is to be said of Bartholomew Medina, Emmanuel Rodericus, Ludovicus Lopez, and others whom it would be lengthy to enumerate. he judges that such a remedy will be notably ⁶ profitable to the soul of the penitent, he can prudently use it. - Thus expressly St. Ligorius, no. 462, and in the Practice of the Confessor, no. 76. - Lacroix, no. 1764.

⁶ How grave the cause must be on account of which the confessor employs this remedy, otherwise not necessary but merely useful, with a disposed penitent is clearly understood from those things which were disputed above (nos. 499 and 500). For there we saw from the common opinion of the Doctors that for anyone unwillingly to be deprived of the benefit of absolution is so grave a matter that a deferral beyond one or two days, according to Suarez, Viva, Renzi, Fagundez, Herincx, and others cited by the Salmanticenses (St. Alphonsus, book 6, no. 490), furnishes a sufficient cause why the penitent may licitly set aside either the natural precept of not defaming one's neighbor in a grave matter, or the divine precept concerning the integrity of confession; because, as De Lugo says (On Penance, disputation 16, no. 416), it is a grave thing to be in the state of sin for three days; which he can deservedly fear, since it is difficult to have a true act of contrition; wherefore he will do no small thing if, on account of the reputation of his neighbor, he defers confession for two days. Indeed, St. Alphonsus judged a deferral not only of two days, but even of one day excessive. But to me, he says (loc. cit.), it seems harsh that one who is in mortal sin should remain without absolution even for a day; and Antoine does not seem to dissent from him (chapter 2, question 13, reply 3), where he says that one who is in the state of mortal guilt is not absolutely bound to wait. Therefore, if absolution, as the Author adds with the common opinion of the Doctors, is not to be deferred when the deferral falls into no slight inconvenience of the penitent, it is readily evident with how much caution and prudent sobriety the Confessor must employ this remedy.

I said, at least speaking per se; because, if absolution cannot be deferred without inconvenience to the penitent, it must be granted immediately; for the penitent is then judged to have a strict right to obtain it immediately. - St. Ligorius, ibid., and others commonly.

622. • III. Absolution is altogether to be denied in every case, even that of extreme necessity, to penitents who are certainly indisposed. But absolution is to be denied to penitents who are doubtfully disposed outside the case of grave necessity; in a necessity of this kind, however, absolution under condition can, and indeed must, be imparted. - St. Ligorius, nos. 431 and 432.

623. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Is it often expedient to defer absolution for a sufficiently disposed penitent for the sake of a remedy or experiment ⁷?

⁷ It seems to pertain to an experiment rather than to a remedy when the confessor defers absolution because of a doubt not indeed about future constancy in fulfilling some obligation, but about the present will of the penitent. To this seem in part to pertain the things which De Lugo has (On Penance, disputation 14, no. 167), where, perhaps with none of the Doctors preceding him, he institutes the question: Whether sometimes, when the confessor could believe a penitent saying that he here and now has sorrow and a purpose, he can nevertheless, FOR BETTER PROVING and confirming that purpose, defer absolution for some days. But most frequent experience advises that this way is less suitable for that end and profits altogether little. Reason confirms it. For anyone who deceives himself and the confessor by affirming that he has a will which he does not in fact have will indeed bear this patiently here and will restrain himself until he obtains absolution, just as others who deceive themselves and the confessor abstain for some time before the paschal feasts from their accustomed sins, interrupt for a little while, or rather suspend, disgraceful friendships, etc., so that they may soon obtain absolution more easily; but that deferral of absolution alone should be thought to have induced that will which perhaps was previously lacking, and consequently that the confessor should be rendered more certain of the present disposition of the penitent, there is nothing which solidly persuades this.

Reply. The solution of the question depends upon various circumstances; but attention must principally be given to the greater good of the penitent.

Hence: 1. Absolution is never to be deferred when the deferral is foreseen as more likely to harm. This is evident from what has been said. 2. Nor is it to be deferred if the penitent would incur from the deferral a mark of infamy ⁸. 3. Absolution is rarely to be deferred for a disposed penitent unless he himself accepts the deferral sufficiently easily; otherwise it would profit him with greater difficulty. For the rest, no certain rule can be established ⁹; and if at any time some deferral of absolution appears expedient, it must be made only for a brief time, for example, for three, five, or eight days, etc. Sometimes, where it can easily be done, it will be useful to defer absolution even for one day or a few hours.

⁸ Above (no. 621) the Author had already said that the same is to be done if absolution cannot be deferred without inconvenience to the penitent, as, for example, if he must lack the Sacrament for a long time, or repeat the confession before another, or undergo the burden of a long journey, or incur a mark, if not of infamy, at least of astonishment or a suspicion that absolution was denied, or lose an occasion of gaining an indulgence, etc.

2. Nevertheless, St. Alphonsus does not omit to indicate when, generally speaking, the outcome of this greater advantage can scarcely be hoped for. Thus he says (book 6, no. 463): That I may pronounce my judgment here, I say that if the penitent has relapsed on account of an intrinsic cause or frailty, as happens in sins of pollution, morose delectation, hatred, blasphemy, and the like, I think absolution should RARELY be deferred for a recidivist who is sufficiently disposed.... I said rarely; for I judge that one should not regularly depart FROM THE COMMON OPINION handed down by Sanchez, Decalogue, book 2, chapter 32, no. 45; Laymann, chapter 4, no. 10; De Lugo, disputation 14, no. 166; Filliucci, treatise 7, instruction, chapter 3; Abelly, On Penance, chapter 5, section 20, no. 3; Dicastillus, disputation 10, doubt 29; Navarrus, chapter 3, no. 21; Croix, no. 1822, with the common opinion, as he asserts; Salmanticenses, chapter 5, no. 68; Sporer, chapter 2, no. 330; Toletus, book 5, chapter 13; namely, that absolution is not to be deferred for a penitent who has relapsed from intrinsic frailty, because in such a penitent it is to be hoped more that the grace of the Sacrament will be profitable than a deferral of absolution. From this context someone could conclude that, if St. Alphonsus, while pronouncing his judgment, departs somewhat from the common opinion, he departs not so as to incline toward the more benign way, but toward the stricter one. For he signifies that he departs from the common opinion in this, that he says absolution is sometimes, although rarely, to be deferred for recidivists of this kind, while the common opinion, by his own testimony, teaches that it is not to be deferred. And to this surely someone could refer these words of the same St. Alphonsus (no. 460): I think that he by no means errs who directs himself according to opinions commonly received from Doctors of no humble reputation.

3. But that he thinks somewhat differently concerning those who are involved in some proximate occasion of sinning will recur below for fuller explanation. For now it may be noted only that when Blessed Alphonsus (no. 464) endeavors with many arguments to confirm what he had said, namely, that absolution is regularly not to be deferred for those who relapse from intrinsic frailty, because it is to be hoped that the grace of the Sacrament will profit them more than deferral of absolution, he brought forward for this purpose also these words of the Salmanticenses from the treatise On Penance, chapter 5, no. 68: Why is more to be hoped from a sinner who, through deferral, does not have grace than from one established by absolution in the friendship of God?

Moreover, the Salmanticenses in fact altogether affirm this concerning those who relapse not merely from intrinsic frailty, but also from an occasion of sinning from which they cannot separate themselves either physically or morally; and they prefer that for these also, without interposing a deferral of absolution, you rather confer the benefit of absolution and the grace of the Sacrament twice, for example, today and again after eight days. John Baptist Faure agrees with them (Theological Doubts, etc., doubt 4, section 8): Other things being equal, it is more useful for a disposed penitent to receive the Sacraments of the Church twice than once; that is, it is more useful to be absolved and also to communicate this Sunday, and again to be absolved and communicate on the following Sunday, than to do the same thing only on the following Sunday and not now. For the twofold reception of the Sacraments merits and confers greater sanctifying grace in this world, greater glory in the future world, and a richer abundance of helps for each end.

4. On this matter it will not be useless to bring forward those things which John de Dicastillo has (On Penance, disputation 10, doubt 29, nos. 573-578), and which the Salmanticenses followed: What (he says) if, various means having been tried, he still miserably relapses? Here certainly not a few are at a loss, and I confess that I have not rarely been at a loss. For what some say, that absolution is to be deferred for them several times until some correction appears, experience has proved not rarely to harm, unless it is done meanwhile as he is better instructed and the whole matter is considered according to those things which I said in disputation 6, doubt 21. Here note that which he says, as he is better instructed, and, as he has below, as he is better disposed; for this is what Father Gury had before his eyes when he presently adds that it is sometimes useful to defer absolution for one day, or for a few hours, etc., namely, when the end of the deferral is not that the penitent should at length overcome the difficulty, for example, in making restitution, in pardoning an offense, in asking pardon, in destroying an obscene book or picture, etc., but that by some pious meditation, by more fervent prayers, or by some work of piety or mercy, he may dispose himself better and receive the Sacraments with greater devotion and richer fruit.

5. Note also that Dicastillus says that experience has proved that deferral not rarely harms. Indeed, Cardenas (Theological Crisis, part 4, disputation 39, chapter 2, no. 12) thinks the contrary is to be concluded from the little story he brings forward of a certain woman who, receiving the deferral with great indignation, departed; but returned on the following day full of contrition and tears, saying: If the other confessors had acted thus with me, I would not have persisted so long in depraved morals. But you might call this argument almost childish; and St. Alphonsus will meet us, saying (no. 464): How many unhappy persons I myself have known who, on account of denied absolution, cast themselves into despair and wandered for many years alienated from the Sacraments!

6. Why, however, deferral not rarely harms, Dicastillus adds this reason also: For the rest, deferral precisely as such rarely profits and often harms..., and Confessors experience that it does not always turn out well, indeed that it often turns out badly. For thus many change their Confessor, so that now a new series of remedies may begin and they may receive the benefit of absolution for the first occasions; and if afterward it does not succeed with him, they change and proceed to another, renewing the cause and litigation from the beginning.

7. Then, returning to the method of those who think that penitents of this kind are to be absolved only several times, he says: But what is to be done if, although he does not approach another confessor nor omit confession for a year, but consults the same confessor again and more frequently and asks to be absolved, nevertheless no correction appears? Is he thus to be rejected? Or rather is he sometimes to be absolved? Surely, if he is never absolved throughout the whole year, what can that non-absolution profit, IF OTHERWISE HE IS CAPABLE HERE AND NOW when he approaches? For if he is not capable, there is no question, but it is certain that he is not to be absolved. But if HE IS CAPABLE WHEN HE APPROACHES, and it is thought that absolution is sometimes to be denied as a medicine, why so many times and not more frequently? Or why, if he is always capable, is it not always conferred upon him, especially if it is already known by experience that it is not very troublesome to him to be deprived of absolution several times? Hence I do not see what advantage that remedy can then have; indeed, it has rather the disadvantage that he is deprived of the grace of the Sacrament and of the helps which are accustomed to be given in view of its worthy reception and otherwise would not be given. On account of these and similar things, I judge (I confess) that the aforesaid remedy of denying absolution is rarely to be used; and it always seems harsh to me to deprive a penitent otherwise capable of so great a grace. Nor do I esteem the fear or trouble of denied absolution to profit so much as the helps of grace and the grace itself of imparted absolution, apart from the suitability of a time granted for better instructing and disposing him, as I have already said.

8. But that Dicastillus says these things concerning those who relapse on account of an occasion of sinning which is indeed necessary but proximate is evident from the words immediately following (loc. cit., no. 576): Therefore, in this matter, when just and reasonable causes for not removing the aforesaid occasion subsist, even if the penitent relapses more frequently, he is neither to be compelled to remove that occasion nor to be deprived of absolution, even if he is a most frequent recidivist; rather he is to be exhorted to come frequently to confession, and other means are to be employed which, with the state and opportunity of the person considered, seem expedient to a prudent Confessor, in which matter there are no, indeed scarcely can there be, any certain rules assigned.

9. He gives the reason for these things thus (ibid., no. 577): This doctrine is thus declared, insofar as it can be done by me. Either that absolution is then to be denied on account of the frequency of sinning, or on account of the occasion not avoided. Not on account of the latter, because, as we suppose, he is not bound here and now to avoid it; not on account of the former, as the argument made proves, because that denial of absolution can scarcely profit except perhaps most rarely, and the frequency of Confession and the frequent benefit of absolution will profit more. Therefore, it is to be denied on no account, IF THE PENITENT IS OTHERWISE CAPABLE.

10. Finally, he concludes the matter with these things, which the Salmanticenses also adopted (no. 578): Therefore, just as in sins in which the occasion can be removed neither morally nor physically, as happens in the sin of masturbation, the Doctors and the practice of Confessors rather have frequent confession before the same Confessor enjoined than deprive one who comes of absolution; so in these sins, in which, if not a physical, at least a moral impossibility of turning away from the occasion is found, neither the remedy of separation from the occasion nor the remedy of denying absolution seems to be exacted, since Christ instituted this Sacrament not only to blot out past sins but to guard against future ones. But when absolution is denied, or (which is the same in the present matter) deferred, the Sacrament is denied, and consequently the remedy instituted by Christ against future sins. But who ever saw that it is necessary to deprive a sick person, otherwise capable of the remedy, of the best and greatest remedy for healing a wound, in order that the wound may be healed? Therefore I conclude that it is scarcely necessary, when the penitent is capable of absolution, to use a remedy of this kind, unless perhaps when absolution is deferred for a brief time so that he may be disposed still more perfectly, if this is hoped for, to receive... absolution.... For correction can rarely be hoped for from mere deferral of absolution. And surely I do not see why more is to be hoped (these are the words first transcribed by the Salmanticenses and afterward by St. Alphonsus) from a sinner who is merely attrite and consequently does not have the grace and friendship of God before absolution is conferred, than from that same person already established in the friendship of God through absolution conferred. But if he approaches not merely attrite but contrite, it seems much more harsh and incongruous to me to deprive one who is a friend of God and loves Him above all things, not now on account of past sins but on account of fear of future ones, of the benefit of the Sacrament and absolution.

11. But what was noted concerning the words of the Salmanticenses can likewise be noted concerning the words of the Roman Ritual, which St. Alphonsus (no. 464) likewise brings forward to prove that absolution is regularly not to be deferred for those who relapse from intrinsic frailty, and which are as follows: For those who easily relapse into sins, it will be most useful to counsel them to confess frequently. For no distinction is had here whether anyone relapses from intrinsic frailty alone or also under the impulse of some proximate occasion which cannot be avoided; nor does the same Ritual reckon either of these among those to whom it afterward says absolution is to be denied or deferred.

** To this Note, which otherwise consists almost entirely in reporting the opinions of others, the VV. oppose twenty columns (pp. 768-778), and indeed columns written in a sufficiently fervent style. But in truth not much is needed to satisfy their complaints.

First, therefore, the VV. (p. 769) are vehemently indignant because in Note no. 2 it is said that someone could conclude from the context of St. Alphonsus that St. Alphonsus, if he departs somewhat from the common opinion, does not depart so as to incline toward a more benign way, but toward a stricter one. And they add: 1. that it can escape no sensible and attentive reader that in that proposition there is merely a less correct construction, and that the word regularly, which pertains to the second part of the proposition, was transferred into the first either by a slip of the pen, an error of the copyist (thus), or of the printer. - 2. They add (p. 770) that Father Ballerini knows well what St. Alphonsus says in the texts immediately preceding and how he explains his doctrine in the Apostolic Man and the Practice of the Confessor; and hence anyone can judge whether, by a manner of acting of this kind, unworthy of a Theologian, Ballerini has preserved the rights both of truth and of Blessed Alphonsus. - 3. Finally, they take an argument (p. 770) from the fact that in the Cause of the Beatification of St. Alphonsus the Promoter of the Faith objected that the doctrine of St. Alphonsus concerning recidivists was too benign, namely, that ordinarily speaking, it profits habitual sinners, recidivists, and those in occasions more that absolution be imparted to them when they approach disposed... contrary to the mind of Alexander VII and Innocent XI.

Reply. Someone may deservedly find it marvelous that the VV. could be struck with so great an indignation for this reason alone: that someone could have believed that the holy Doctor, IF AT ANY TIME HE JUDGED that one should depart somewhat from the common opinion, inclined toward the stricter rather than the more benign way. For what? Does not the holy Doctor, in this very question concerning whether absolution is to be deferred for penitents otherwise rightly disposed, depart, as we shall presently see, from opinions which he himself calls common and most probable, inclining toward the stricter opinion? Why, then, could one think only by an absurdity that even in the disputed text the holy Doctor had departed at least somewhat from the common opinion? Indeed, since the disputed text clearly bears this sense on its face (nor were the VV. able to deny it), why could it appear so absurd to attribute to the holy Doctor the opinion which the text plainly bore on its face, that whoever did not suspect a corrupted syntax must be considered senseless and drowsy? And the VV. seem certainly to have considered too little upon whom that grave designation of a senseless and drowsy reader ultimately falls. Indeed, beginning from the edition of the year 1757, which is called the first Venetian edition after two Neapolitan ones, down to the most recent editions of our age, this text of the holy Doctor is read thus in all. Therefore, shall we regard as senseless and drowsy all those who read the Moral Work of the holy Doctor for a century and more, and indeed inquired most diligently into his doctrines, because they did not notice so enormous a fault in the syntax of the text? Let the excellent Father Haringer, the associate of the VV., bear this patiently; for he also, who prepared the Regensburg edition of 1846 and illustrated it with his Notes, suspected nothing of this perversion of syntax, and consequently he too will have to hear himself called a senseless and drowsy reader. But no more concerning point 1.

To point 2. Reply. I deny that from the immediately preceding texts it is so manifestly evident that the aforesaid fault of syntax is contained in the disputed text that only the senseless and drowsy did not see it. For in book 6, no. 463, the holy Doctor, after setting forth two opinions on the proposed question, merely adds two things: first, it is better said that no certain rule can be established in this matter; second, that I may pronounce my judgment here, I say, etc. But what is elicited from these things such that this fault should strike the eyes? Indeed, since the holy Doctor seems in a certain way to oppose his own judgment to the two opinions which he had set forth, while one of those is the one which the VV. contend is to be ascribed here to the holy Doctor, the preceding texts can rather suggest the opposite. Nor should the VV. say (p. 769) that among the Authors alleged by the holy Doctor for the common opinion there is no one who teaches that absolution is never to be deferred for those sufficiently disposed who relapse from intrinsic frailty, from whom, therefore, the holy Doctor thinks one should rarely depart. - Reply 1. Among them you have Laymann, Filliucci, Navarrus, and Toletus, from whose testimonies you will extract nothing. 2. The Salmanticenses (chapter 5, no. 68) do not treat only of recidivists from intrinsic frailty; therefore they do not pertain to the matter; indeed, concerning these they have these words: The Doctors and the practice of confessors rather have frequent confession before the same confessor enjoined than deprive one who comes of absolution. But Sporer, cited with others by the holy Doctor, has these most clear words (chapter 2, no. 330): The penitent will have to be absolved as often as he seriously proposes to amend in the future and wholly to abstain, provided that the Confessor prudently believes that he truly proposes and speaks seriously. Therefore, what the VV. assert so confidently is not true.

But as to what the VV. add, that this manner of acting is unworthy of a theologian and that the rights both of truth and of the holy Doctor were unworthily violated because the doctrine of Blessed Alphonsus could have been elicited more clearly from the Apostolic Man and the Practice of the Confessor: let it be omitted for now whether, through this comparison, the sense resulting from the Moral Work is excluded; let it also be omitted whether all the writings of the holy Doctor, indeed whether all parts of the same work, always bear altogether the same opinion, which it will surely be quite difficult to assert and defend; but let it be permitted to ask: Is sufficient discretion exercised toward the readers of the Moral Work of Blessed Alphonsus if it is exacted from them that, for every single proposition or opinion, they take upon themselves the burden of inquiring into all the Works and Opuscules of the holy Doctor, otherwise to incur the designation and accusation of a manner of acting unworthy of a theologian and of a right violated against truth and the holy Doctor? Let the excellent Father Haringer whom we praised also bear this patiently from his associates; he, when preparing the edition of the Moral Work, sometimes added notes taken from other opuscules, but nevertheless subjected no Note to the disputed text.

What of the fact that not even the holy Doctor escapes those insulting accusations? For he surely knew what he had written in the Apostolic Man and the Practice of the Confessor; he himself several times diligently reviewed his Moral Work. What, therefore, is the reason that he always preserved untouched the disputed text, which, as was said, is read in the same way in all editions, even the first? Will the VV. represent the holy Doctor himself also as senseless or drowsy?

To point 3, finally. Reply. Let the antecedent pass, and I deny the consequent. I said, let the antecedent pass, because an apt argument for solving the doubt concerning the disputed text can be taken neither from the words of the Promoter of the Faith nor from those of the Defender. I said, I deny the consequent; and let the VV. find the reason for themselves in those things which it is known happened in the cause of the Doctorate of Blessed Alphonsus. Indeed, in the Additional Summary Father Ballerini is accused once and again of having represented the holy Doctor Alphonsus, in a certain little Dissertation, by a sacrilegious and blasphemous jeer as a man not of sound mind; which nevertheless the VV. themselves confessed had fallen from their pen through a mere hallucination. From this, then, let it be argued how much weight is sometimes to be attributed to the sayings of defenders. And let these things suffice concerning the objections of the VV. against no. 2; for otherwise it pertains little to the purpose of the things said there whether or not the holy Doctor departs somewhat from the common opinion.

As regards the other parts of the preceding Note, the VV. attack for seven columns (pp. 773-776) that which is said concerning the Salmanticenses (no. 10), namely, that they adopted those things which are brought forward there from Dicastillus. For after filling almost three solid columns, almost beside the matter, with texts of the Salmanticenses, they conclude (pp. 774-775) that the Salmanticenses hold a middle way between Thomas Hurtado and Dicastillus and approve neither opinion. Father Ballerini (they say, p. 775) affirms that the Salmanticenses follow the opinion of Dicastillus; but the opposite is manifestly evident from the text brought forward.

Let us therefore subjoin this text (On Penance, chapter 5, no. 68): Although absolutely speaking the remedy of deferring absolution greatly pleases Thomas Hurtado...; on the contrary, Dicastillus asserts that experience has proved this sharp remedy not rarely to harm, unless it is done meanwhile for an hour or for a time, while the penitent is better instructed or something is prescribed according to the rules of prudence; and he judges NOT WITHOUT REASON that the frequency of confession and the frequent benefit of absolution MORE FREQUENTLY profit; and just as, in sins in which the occasion cannot be wholly removed even physically, as happens in the sin of masturbation, the Doctors and the practice of Confessors rather have frequent confession before the same confessor enjoined than deprive one who comes of absolution, so in those sins in which, if not a physical, at least a moral impossibility of turning away from the occasion is found, FREQUENCY RATHER THAN DEFERRAL WILL MORE FREQUENTLY HELP THE SICK PERSON OTHERWISE CAPABLE OF THE REMEDY OF ABSOLUTION, since Christ instituted the Sacraments not only to blot out past sins but to guard against future ones. BESIDES, why is more to be hoped from a sinner who is merely attrite and consequently does not have the grace and friendship of God before absolution is conferred, than from that same person already established in the friendship of God by absolution conferred AND VERY FREQUENTLY RECEIVING THE SACRAMENTS? Thus the Salmanticenses. Now I ask: Do they not approve the doctrine of Dicastillus when they write: HE JUDGES NOT WITHOUT REASON, etc.? Do not those words marked here in capital letters, which the Salmanticenses supply to add force to the opinion of Dicastillus, indicate approval? How, therefore, do the VV. not hesitate to affirm that the opposite IS MANIFESTLY EVIDENT from the text brought forward?

The VV. (p. 775) bring forward the words of the Note (no. 3) concerning the Salmanticenses, that they prefer that for these also, without interposing a deferral of absolution, for example, for eight days, you rather confer the benefit of absolution and the grace of the Sacrament twice, namely, today and again after eight days; then they add: But the Salmanticenses have not even a word about this matter, and the distinguished Professor attributes to them what Father Faure says in his Doubts.

Reply. In the Note the opinion of the Salmanticenses is reported, but not word for word; otherwise, according to custom, it would have been marked in a different type. But you have their opinion repeated not once but several times, where they praise the frequent benefit of absolution and frequency of confession rather than deprivation of absolution; where they expressly say: Frequency rather than deferral will help the sick person; and finally where they praise one very frequently receiving the Sacraments.

The VV. add (p. 775): From this genuine doctrine of the Salmanticenses, which we have now explained, St. Alphonsus in no way differs.

Reply. I deny what is supposed, namely, that the genuine doctrine of the Salmanticenses is explained by the VV., as we have already seen. For the rest, to define by a decisive argument whether or not the opinion of St. Alphonsus differs from the doctrine of the Salmanticenses, it suffices to have noted this one thing. For the distinction is very well known which the holy Doctor establishes between absolving those who fall and relapse from intrinsic frailty (see Note no. 2) and absolving those who are situated in an occasion, even a necessary one: he establishes that absolution is rarely to be deferred for the former; but for the latter, when they approach confession for the first time, that it is always to be deferred, as the VV. themselves (p. 776) say in these words: Therefore the holy Doctor declares that, supposing absolution can conveniently be deferred, he himself would always defer it for a penitent situated in a necessary occasion and approaching confession for the first time. But the Salmanticenses, as is evident from their text brought forward, treat both penitents in the same way in that place, so that from the practice observed with those who fall from intrinsic frailty they deduce the practice to be observed with those who are situated in the aforesaid occasion. It is therefore manifestly false that the holy Doctor Alphonsus does not differ from the doctrine of the Salmanticenses.

And indeed the VV. make this falsity openly evident by their own words. For, as is evident from their words brought forward, the practice which pleases St. Alphonsus more is that, as often as it can conveniently be done, absolution should always be deferred for occasionaries of this kind. But the VV. themselves, as we saw above, contend (although falsely) that the Salmanticenses held a middle way between Hurtado and Dicastillus. Thus they say (p. 775): But (the Salmanticenses) approve neither opinion, but hold the middle way already indicated above, namely, that deferral is SOMETIMES expedient. Therefore, by the admission of the VV. themselves, that enormous difference stands between the doctrine of the Salmanticenses and that of St. Alphonsus which intervenes between SOMETIMES and always.

Finally, the VV. (p. 777) censure what is said in the Note (no. 5) concerning Cardenas: In part, say the VV., they have nothing to do with the matter, because Cardenas there speaks of habitual sinners; in part they are false, because Cardenas there thus concludes: But for this great prudence is required in the Confessor; for remedies which profit some can harm others on account of the different dispositions of the sick.

Reply. In the question now at issue, whether imparted absolution or deferral of absolution can profit a disposed penitent more, and indeed prescinding from those circumstances in which it is already evident even from the common opinion of the Doctors which counsel is to be preferred, in this question, I say, even St. Alphonsus judges that absolution is rarely to be deferred for habitual sinners who fall from intrinsic frailty. Since, therefore, Cardenas, by an argument taken from that little story, shows himself more severe even concerning these, his citation pertains to the matter a fortiori when occasionaries are treated.

As regards the other part of the censure: Reply. Those words of Cardenas conclude nothing. For each person frames the laws of prudence according to his own judgment, so that even those who are considered most severe think and profess that they are led by prudence. But toward which side Cardenas inclines there can be learned even from this: that when (no. 6) he poses the question concerning one who has a purpose of correction KNOWN EVEN TO THE CONFESSOR, afterward (no. 19), in order to contend against Sanchez that the grace of the Sacrament confers no greater strength for not sinning than deferral of absolution, he objects, contrary to the hypothesis of the question, that perhaps on account of a defect of purpose the Sacrament is not valid. Behold what the name of prudence is worth in the mouth of certain men.

⁹ 1. Thus wisely St. Alphonsus; for since the penitent in the case is supposed to be disposed for receiving grace in the Sacrament, and since this immense benefit ought not to be deferred except on account of some greater advantage of the penitent, the judgment must be taken from the proportionate outcome which can be expected from the deferral; and since this judgment depends upon the prudent consideration of all the circumstances, the saying of the ancients consequently holds here, that there is no science of particulars, and therefore no certain rule can be handed down. Whether it is expedient (say the Salmanticenses, On Penance, chapter 5, no. 68) here and now, abstracting from circumstances, we cannot certainly determine, since it depends upon many things which are easily varied according to the diversity of subjects; hence, after these have been maturely weighed, it will pertain to the judgment of the prudent to impart absolution here and now or to defer it for a time....

624. • QUESTION 2. Is certainty concerning the disposition of the penitent required in order that he may be absolved?

Reply 1. Absolute certainty is not required, nor even strict moral certainty, such as is required in the other Sacraments, for example, concerning the consecration of the Eucharist. The reason is that the Sacrament of Penance scarcely admits a more certain judgment of this kind.

Reply 2. A prudent judgment, or broad moral certainty, which, as St. Alphonsus says, is equivalent to prudent probability, is required and suffices. For penitents commonly display only a probability of disposition. - Thus St. Ligorius, no. 461 ¹⁰. - Suarez, disputation 32, section 2, no. 1, and others commonly. - The Catechism of the Council of Trent, no. 60, agrees, where it is read: If, after hearing the Confession, the Priest judges that neither diligence in enumerating the sins nor sorrow in detesting them has been altogether lacking to the penitent, he can be absolved.

¹⁰ ** The words of St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 461) are: It suffices that the confessor have a prudent probability concerning the disposition of the penitent and that, on the other hand, no prudent suspicion of indisposition stands in the way; otherwise scarcely anyone could be absolved, since whatever signs penitents give furnish only a probability of disposition, as Suarez rightly teaches. See the opinion of Suarez in the following Note.

625. • QUESTION 3. What are the ordinary signs of sufficient disposition?

Reply. The principal signs are the following: 1. if the penitent confesses candidly and humbly; 2. if he asserts from the heart that he is sorry for his sins and has a firm purpose of not sinning hereafter; 3. if he sincerely declares all sins, even the greater and shameful ones; 4. if he has freely approached confession from some pious motive; 5. if, from a desire of conversion, he has already ceased from sin. - Lacroix, no. 1734 ¹¹.

¹¹ St. Alphonsus (no. 460) reckons nearly all these signs among the extraordinary signs of disposition.

Those words of Suarez seem more pertinent to the matter (On Penance, disputation 32, section 2, nos. 1-2): Before (the priest) *absolves, it is necessary that he prudently and probably judge the penitent to be disposed, because otherwise he would expose himself to the danger of erring and would act without sufficient knowledge. It remains to be explained what the Confessor ought to do in order to judge this prudently and satisfy his conscience. In this it must be observed that this disposition of the penitent arises from two things, namely, displeasure with the past and a purpose for the future. And indeed, as regards displeasure, the Confessor can easily satisfy himself; because, if the penitent in the very manner of his confession and accusation gives signs of sorrow, or certainly if he is a man not very uneducated and appears well-mannered, the Confessor is bound to employ no diligence in this; he will nevertheless always do well by proposing and counseling detestation of sin; and when he does not have sufficient signs of sorrow, he can and must ask the penitent whether he detests the sin from his heart, and he is bound to believe him when he affirms it. And the same is to be said concerning a purpose for the future, when from the confession no special obligation arises of making restitution or leaving some proximate occasion of sinning, but only the common and general obligation of not sinning hereafter.... Nor is it necessary that the Confessor persuade himself and judge even probably that it will so happen that

QUESTION 4. Is the Confessor bound to arouse sorrow in the penitent?

Reply 1. Yes, if the penitent does not appear sufficiently disposed; the reason is that one who absolves an indisposed person exposes the Sacrament to the danger of frustration, but if he dismisses him without absolution, he exposes him to the danger of remaining for a long time in the state of mortal sin, or even of not returning again. - St. Ligorius, no. 608.

Reply 2. No, if the penitent appears sufficiently instructed and disposed, as are well-mannered penitents and those who confess frequently. For then the Confessor is bound to nothing, neither by reason of charity, since the penitent does not need special help, nor by reason of reverence for the Sacrament, which is exposed to no danger. - St. Ligorius, no. 608. - Laymann, chapter 13, no. 10. - Sporer, no. 792.

626. • QUESTION 5. To whom principally is absolution to be denied?

Reply. According to the Roman Ritual and St. Charles Borromeo, it is to be denied: 1. to those who give no signs of sorrow or are unwilling to amend their life; 2. to those who are unwilling to restore another's property, pay debts, repair injured honor or reputation, or repair any other grave harm, when they are able; 3. to those who are unwilling to use the remedies which are necessary for correction or for preventing a fall; 4. to those who refuse to lay aside enmities and hatreds, to pardon an offense, or to be reconciled with enemies; 5. to those who are unwilling to abstain from usury, superstitions, illicit arts and trades, or any evil work; 6. finally, to those who are unwilling to leave a proximate occasion of sinning when they can, or who provide an occasion to others ¹².

¹² You will have all these things, and many others which could easily be added, in this brief rule: namely, that absolution is to be denied to ALL and only those who refuse to fulfill some grave obligation.

627. • QUESTION 6. Can a debtor be absolved before he makes restitution?

Reply. Yes, if the Confessor discovers that the debtor is prepared to make restitution as he ought. But if the penitent has either several times not kept his promises of making restitution, or it is prudently foreseen that he will not keep his purpose, it is expedient that the Confessor exact restitution before he absolves, unless some grave reason nevertheless advises otherwise ¹³.

¹³ ** In the preceding Edition this little Note had been placed here: See concerning this question the doctrine of St. Antoninus in the Note to no. 621. But in that place these things were said concerning St. Antoninus: "St. Antoninus (part 3, title 14, chapter 19, section 19), treating of those who, as he says elsewhere (part 2, title 2, chapter 8, section 3), always procrastinate and are found annually promising the confessor that they will make restitution, and afterward do not do so, rejects the opinion of those (ibid., section 1) who thought that these persons were to be absolved under the condition of future restitution, and, admitting the opinion of William that they ought to be absolved simply and without condition, then adds: After the Confessor has considered that such persons have done this several times, perhaps it would be a good precaution to tell such persons that they should first make restitution and afterward come to confession, or for absolution." This opinion of St. Antoninus indeed confirms what Father Gury has, namely, that in circumstances of this kind it is expedient for the confessor first to exact restitution, etc.

This passage of St. Antoninus stung the VV. not a little, since it seems to differ from the doctrine of Daniel Concina, into whose opinion St. Alphonsus also went (book 3, no. 682, and Apostolic Man, treatise 10, no. 105), writing in the latter place: When the penitent can make restitution immediately, regularly speaking we say WITH CONCINA that the confessor CANNOT absolve the debtor unless he first makes restitution. And in the other place: But the second opinion, which Father CONCINA holds, altogether pleases me, that regularly the debtor IS NOT TO BE ABSOLVED unless he first makes restitution, when restitution is morally possible for him. Therefore, concerning the preceding Note and the citation of St. Antoninus, the VV. write (p. 757): Father Ballerini badly confounds two disparate passages and badly interprets them, and supposes in St. Antoninus a most lax doctrine which neither here nor any other of the older theologians who treat diffusely of restitution hands down.

Reply. In the one place (part 3, title 14, chapter 19, section 19), St. Antoninus treats generally of those who do not perform that to which they are bound, but defer it, for example, to make restitution. But in the other place (part 2, title 2, chapter 8, section 3), he treats of those who, since they are bound to make restitution, certainly ought to live more sparingly so that they may gather what they are to restore, and nevertheless do not do so, but always procrastinate and are found annually promising the confessor, etc. Therefore, in the one place St. Antoninus touches upon the general question; in the other he touches upon a particular case which is contained under the general question. To what the VV. object, therefore, that in the Note two disparate passages are confounded, I reply with a distinction: disparate in location, I concede; disparate as regards the question, I deny. For the rest, it is sufficiently evident of itself that the words taken from the aforesaid place in part 2, always procrastinate, etc., are employed in the Note to indicate generally the condition of penitents of this kind, which St. Antoninus again indicates in the cited place from part 3, saying that such persons have done this several times, etc., and not insofar as those former words are said there of that special case.

Let us come to the accusation of bad interpretation, which appears incredible by the very fact that in the Note the mere words of St. Antoninus are reported without gloss.

The opinion of William which is indicated in the Note is contained in these words in St. Antoninus (loc. cit. from part 3): But if the priest believes or doubts that the one confessing will not perform the penance, or that to which he is otherwise bound, such as to make restitution or the like, William says that the Confessor ought not on this account to exact a promise, vow, or oath, but it suffices if (the one confessing) says that he has a purpose of doing it. And thus he ought to absolve simply and without condition, after nevertheless making a declaration, if he is held suspect, that if he does not do it, he will render the fruit of confession void for himself. Thus William. Moreover, since the VV. (p. 759) say that St. Antoninus supports William (which nevertheless is not altogether true, as we shall presently see), let it be permitted to argue ad hominem thus: St. Antoninus supports William teaching that the confessor OUGHT TO ABSOLVE a penitent if, without any promise or oath, he says that he has a purpose of doing, or making restitution, however suspect the penitent may be held. Therefore, the doctrine of St. Antoninus is not the doctrine of Concina adopted by St. Alphonsus; nor does any bad interpretation appear here.

But the VV. wished to infer something else from William. It is manifest, therefore, they

We must treat: 1. of those who are situated in an occasion of sin; 2. of habitual sinners and recidivists; 3. of devout and timorous penitents. say, that (William) supposes that such a penitent is not to be absolved who, after making that declaration, received absolution and returns to confession without having made restitution. - Reply. I deny this entirely: 1. because it is asserted gratuitously; for the words of William in no way indicate or suggest it; 2. because it is in no way evident that William said these things only of one who had not broken the purpose of the preceding confession; 3. because St. Antoninus stands in the way, who judged that William's opinion, as though too general, should in some way be circumscribed or moderated by those things which we subjoin here.

For St. Antoninus, after bringing forward the opinion of William, proceeds thus: But because many deceive themselves, promising in every confession to make restitution and the like, and always defer; after the confessor has considered that such persons have done this several times, PERHAPS IT WOULD BE A GOOD PRECAUTION to tell such persons that they should first make restitution and afterward come to confession or for absolution, or to assign them some suitable time within which they ought to carry it out. Hence thus: St. Antoninus, as the adversative particle But manifestly signifies, wished to except something from William's general opinion, or wished to moderate it by some qualification. Therefore, either St. Antoninus did not grasp the force of William's opinion, or in the mind of St. Antoninus some exception or moderation of this kind seemed necessary to be added to William's opinion. But any moderation of this kind would have been superfluous if William's opinion bore the meaning which the VV. fabricate, namely, if in William's mind absolution was to be deferred, at least by way of some good precaution, for a penitent who returns without yet completing restitution. Therefore, no bad interpretation of ours has crept in here, but, from the testimony of St. Antoninus, this supposition and interpretation of the VV. is plainly gratuitous and fabricated at pleasure.

Meanwhile, from this latter text of St. Antoninus, the VV. (loc. cit.) wish to deduce that in his mind it is a good precaution for the confessor to defer absolution until the penitent has in fact made restitution, or to assign a suitable time within which he ought to carry it out, and (as the VV. infer a little later) within that time they may absolve him. - Reply. The VV. pervert the opinion of St. Antoninus under more than one head. For: 1. St. Antoninus did not say that it is a good precaution generally to defer absolution until he has made restitution, but to tell them that they should make restitution first; which supposes that this can then be done promptly and within a short time. 2. What the VV. add, that a time is to be assigned within which the confessor can absolve, bears a plainly absurd sense. For either it is supposed that within that time the thing which the penitent ought to do is to be carried out, so that, the matter having been accomplished, he can be absolved, and thus this second member of the disjunction falls back into the first; or the penitent is supposed to be absolved within that time even if he has not fulfilled his duty, and then this assignment of time becomes insipid. Therefore, that assignment of time does not pertain to deferral of absolution, but merely presents the second of the three modes by which St. Antoninus (ibid.) had said beforehand that the confessor can impose something upon the penitent, namely, by way of a declaration of a common obligation. And here it must be noted that this opinion of St. Antoninus is not restricted to the obligation of restitution, but extends to anything else which someone is bound to do. Hence he begins the paragraph by saying: The confessor imposes something upon the penitent in three ways: in one way, by way of counsel and exhortation.... In another way, by way of a declaration of a common obligation.... In a third way, by way of special satisfaction for things committed....

Furthermore, the VV. (loc. cit.) think light for understanding this text of St. Antoninus is to be drawn from another place, namely, from part 2, title 2, chapter 8, section 3, where, as we said, he treats of those who, by living sparingly, ought to gather something for making restitution, but who always procrastinate concerning that which they can do, and are found annually promising the confessor to make restitution, and afterward do not do so. - Reply. Perhaps the fact that the VV. use this comparison of passages will seem marvelous to someone. For if they reproached us because, by taking certain words from this passage in part 2, we badly confounded disparate passages, how do they now not hesitate themselves to have recourse to this passage, as though for them they now cease to be disparate passages? For the rest, since in the case the circumstances are such that the confessor cannot say, as above, that they should first make restitution, St. Antoninus thus applies that general rule disjunctively to these circumstances, namely, that they do not appear to be absolved unless they first act, that is, begin to put their hand to the work, or arrange the affair efficaciously so that it may have execution, that is, efficaciously resolve to put the matter into execution and determine something concerning the manner of doing it; by which things, as is evident, he does not impose the necessity of denying absolution. Hence St. Antoninus does not depart from his general norm.

Let us conclude: the doctrine of St. Antoninus and the doctrine of Concina manifestly differ from one another. The latter establishes that regularly the confessor CANNOT absolve unless the penitent has first made restitution, and does not distinguish whether he had confessed this previously and then proposed and promised it but did not keep the promise, if not several times, at least once. St. Antoninus, on the contrary, teaches only concerning those who have several times broken their purpose or faith that PERHAPS IT IS A GOOD PRECAUTION (which words present a counsel rather than a norm always and necessarily to be observed) to use either one of two remedies: namely, either to impose that they first make restitution and then come for absolution, or to fix a time within which they ought to carry out the affair, lest, by deferring the matter in the accustomed way to an uncertain time, they finally arrive, as before, at the point that they return to confession in the following year with the matter still undone. And indeed the VV., as we saw, do not hesitate to accuse the Note as though it supposes in St. Antoninus a most lax doctrine, although the mere words of St. Antoninus are reported. But perhaps it is not marvelous that the doctrine of St. Antoninus can seem most lax in comparison with the doctrine of Concina, whom the holy Doctor Alphonsus did not hesitate to call most rigorous.

the penitent will abstain from sinning; but it is sufficient that he judge that the penitent now has such a purpose, although after a brief time he is going to change it. THUS ALL AUTHORS TEACH.*

QUESTION 7. Can, or indeed must, a penitent be absolved who wishes to follow an opinion opposed to the opinion of the Confessor?

483. Principle: Absolution generally and of itself must be granted under grave obligation, from justice, to a penitent guilty of grave sin who with moral certainty is well disposed. It is certain.

For the confessor, by receiving the confession of the penitent, binds himself by a quasi-contract to pass sentence according to the institution of Christ; but according to the institution of Christ, absolution must of itself be granted to the well disposed, since this sacrament was instituted for remitting sins. Therefore he must of itself absolve the disposed by force of a tacit contract, and therefore from justice; and indeed under grave obligation, if the penitent is in the state of mortal sin, because he is unjustly deprived of the greatest good.

484. (a) Nevertheless it is said generally and of itself, because regularly absolution granted at once is of more profit than if it is deferred; for he who is absolved emerges from the dangerous state of sin, receives sacramental grace, and therefore the right to obtain actual graces at the opportune time; wherefore he is able to resist temptations more efficaciously and to tend toward the practice of virtues. - Nevertheless, sometimes and accidentally, absolution can be deferred even to one sufficiently disposed, when the confessor prudently judges this to be truly useful to the penitent. For on the one hand, the penitent, although he has a right to absolution, does not have a strict right to be absolved immediately; and on the other, the confessor, since he is not only judge but physician, must intend the greater utility of the penitent; but sometimes delay is more useful to the penitent, especially to one in an occasion or to a recidivist, so that from the difficulty of obtaining absolution he may conceive a greater horror of sin and a firmer purpose of avoiding it. But generally this delay will not be of profit unless the penitent consents to it; for if he bears the matter with displeasure, it is to be feared lest he be alienated from confession. In practice, therefore, the confessor must inquire whether the penitent in this case is prepared willingly to return after a few days.

Nor is it ever expedient to defer absolution for a long time, for example, for a month or fifteen days; because it is a grave inconvenience to remain long in mortal sin, both because of the danger of death, and because of merits lost.

(b) It is said to one guilty of grave sin, because if only venial sins, or mortal sins already remitted, are accused, sometimes to defer a penitent, even one rightly disposed, is not a grave sin, because no grave injury is inflicted upon him; indeed, if this is done from a reasonable cause, it will be no sin.

(c) It is said, who with moral certainty is disposed; here there is question of moral certitude broadly taken, which excludes prudent doubt, but not necessarily every doubt; for when there is question of the dispositions of the penitent, absolute certitude cannot be had, but that persuasion suffices which is very probable.

485. Principle: Absolution is to be denied to those who with moral certainty are incapable or unworthy. It is certain.

For in either case absolution is invalid; now knowingly and willingly to minister a sacrament in a certainly invalid manner is grave sacrilege.

Now the incapable are those perpetually insane, - not yet baptized, - those who are already certainly dead, - or who do not know the truths necessary by necessity of means, - or who certainly are not morally present.

486. But the unworthy, or indisposed, can be considered, according to St. Leonard of Port Maurice:

(a) those who knowingly and willingly do not wish to leave a proximate and free occasion of sinning; (b) those who knowingly and willingly do not wish to put away grave enmities or hatred; (c) those who are not prepared to make necessary restitution or reparation of harms, when they are able; (d) those who refuse to leave arts or occupations gravely sinful; (e) those who refuse to labor for correcting a depraved habit; (f) those who do not wish to employ remedies truly necessary for avoiding relapse; (g) those who are not prepared to remove the scandal which they have given or are giving to others.¹ - To these can be added, in a general way, all those who do not wish to fulfill a grave obligation known to themselves; or who refuse to confess their sins integrally, unless by a grave reason, at least a putative one, they are excused from material integrity. For in these or similar cases the essential condition required for the validity and liceity of absolution is lacking, namely contrition.

¹ This the Roman Ritual briefly summarizes thus (Ordo minist. Sacr. Paenitentiae): "Let him not absolve those who are incapable of such a benefit; such are: those who give no signs of sorrow, who do not wish to put away hatreds and enmities, or to restore another's goods if they can, or to leave a proximate occasion of sinning, or in another way to abandon sins and amend life for the better; or who have given public scandal, unless they publicly make satisfaction and remove the scandal."

But before absolution is denied, the confessor must exhort these sinners to contrition, as we said above; for if, first unprepared, then by a fervent exhortation they conceive attrition, they can now be absolved at once. Besides, only with kindly words must the confessor deny absolution, by explaining the reason why it cannot be granted and declaring that he will gladly grant absolution as soon as the penitent is disposed.

487. Principle: Absolution is to be deferred to those who are plainly doubtfully disposed, unless a grave reason urges that they be absolved under condition. It is certain.

For it is not lawful to expose the sacrament to danger of nullity, unless there is a grave reason: for this is prohibited by the reverence due to the sacrament.

488. Now, according to St. Leonard, those are considered doubtfully disposed: (a) who have relapsed in the same or a worse manner, without employing the remedies prescribed by the confessor, and without a serious effort at amendment; (b) who answer only coldly that they are sorry, especially if they have already relapsed rather often; (c) if they show a great affection for sin, or have drawn great utility or great pleasure from sin, or devote their whole effort to satisfying the passions; (d) when they rashly excuse their sins, or enter into contention and altercation with the confessor, or seem to boast about the sin committed; (e) when they approach the sacrament not spontaneously, but only by command of parents or others, or from mere custom, or to please others, or from fear lest they lose reputation; (f) if they refuse a moderate penance proportioned to their strength.

But when the doubtfully disposed can be conditionally absolved has already been set forth, n. 182.

489. Corollary. When there are on both sides reasons seriously and solidly probable, so that the penitent is prudently judged to be disposed, yet there is still prudent doubt concerning his disposition, the confessor prudently defers absolution or grants it under condition, according as, from the various circumstances, delay is foreseen to be useful or harmful to the penitent. Namely, if delay is judged very probably useful to the penitent, because, after some time, he is going to approach the sacred tribunal better disposed, he should be dismissed kindly; but if he probably will not return, because he is not endowed with firm faith or virtue, after fervent exhortation to sorrow and firm purpose, he can be absolved under condition, according to most theologians.¹ For moral certitude is not always required for absolving, but sometimes a prudent judgment suffices, which is had in the case.

¹ Thus Suarez, disp. XXXII, sect. 2, n. 1; Sporer, n. 801; Faure, Dubitat. theologicae, ed. 4, Louvain, 1865, dub. I-II, p. 9-22; Lehmk., n. 428; Genicot, n. 367. - Certain ones, however, from these authors, Faure and Genicot, seem to proceed further and to teach that those who are probably disposed can always and without condition be absolved; but it is commonly held, and deservedly, that this is lawful only for a grave reason, and indeed conditionally. Cf. Vindiciciae Alphons., p. 710-752.

This can be drawn from these words of the Catechism of the Council of Trent (n. 50): "For if, after confession has been heard, he shall have judged that neither diligence in enumerating sins nor sorrow in detesting them was wholly lacking to the penitent, he can be absolved"; now if it is prudently judged that the penitent is contrite, it is judged that sorrow was not wholly lacking. St. Alphonsus seems to contradict this conclusion when he says (n. 459): "That the confessor may absolve the penitent, he must be morally certain concerning his disposition"; but elsewhere he teaches (n. 432) that a penitent about whom there is doubt whether he is rightly disposed can be absolved under condition if it is prudently feared that he will not return again to confession and will waste away in his sins. Hence it can be said that in the former assertion of the Holy Doctor the general rule is contained, but in the latter the exception.

The confessor is bound in strict justice, and under pain of mortal sin, to absolve all properly disposed penitents who confess to him; for every Catholic who is truly sorry for his sins has a right to the Sacrament of which absolution is an essential part.³ The presumption, as we have seen before, is always in favor of the penitent, and unless a confessor has serious reasons for assuming the contrary, he should act on the ethical principle that every man must be presumed to be good until or unless he is proved to be bad (nemo praesumitur mains nisi probetur). All that is necessary is to have moral certainty that there are no valid reasons for doubting the disposition of the penitent.⁴

³ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., II, n. 467: "Absolution must in justice and under grave obligation be granted to every penitent who has duly confessed and is legitimately disposed. The reason is that in the very act of confession a certain sacred quasi-contract is entered into, by force of which a penitent who has duly confessed and is legitimately disposed has a right to receive the Sacrament. Otherwise an intolerable burden would be imposed upon the penitent without just cause, namely, that he make a confession to another without being able safely to trust that he will receive absolution from this new confessor. Moreover, the end of the institution of the Sacrament and tribunal of Penance also requires this, for it was instituted by Christ for the purpose of imparting mercy. Therefore, by denying absolution to a disposed penitent the priest would act unjustly, abuse the power of the keys, and render the Sacrament hateful."

⁴ Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 5, qu. 50: "If the confessor, after hearing the confession, judges that the penitent was not entirely lacking either diligence in enumerating sins or sorrow in detesting them, he can be absolved."

The validity of absolution in no way depends on the performance of the satisfaction imposed.⁵

⁵ Prop. Damnat. ab Alex. VIII., Dec. 7, 1690, prop. 16-18 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1306 sqq.).

—The confessor is obliged in justice and under pain of mortal sin to deny absolution to applicants who are not properly disposed, because such are unworthy of forgiveness.⁷

⁷ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., II, n. 469: "Absolution must altogether be denied in every case, even in extreme necessity, to penitents certainly indisposed." —Lacroix, Theol. Mor., l. VI, P. 2, n. 1699: "The office of the confessor is to absolve one who is disposed and not another. He must be morally certain of the penitent’s good disposition; otherwise he will sin mortally by absolving him."

A penitent lacks the right disposition if he: a) is ignorant of the principal dogmas of the Catholic religion; b) shows no real sorrow for his sins or evidently lacks the required purpose of avoiding mortal sin and its voluntary proximate occasions; c) refuses to restore ill-gotten goods to their rightful owner, or to repair public scandal given, or to become reconciled to his enemies.⁸

⁸ Kit. Rom., tit. 3, c. 1, n. 22: "Such persons are incapable who give no signs of sorrow; who are unwilling to put away hatreds and enmities, to restore another’s goods if they can, to abandon a proximate occasion of sin, or otherwise to forsake sins and amend their life for the better; or who have given public scandal unless they make public satisfaction and remove the scandal."

In a word, absolution must be denied to all who are unwilling to comply with some serious obligation.

Before the confessor discharges a penitent unabsolved, however, he should try by all means in his power to dispose him for the worthy reception of the Sacrament.⁹

⁹ Cfr. Leo XII, Constit. "Caritate Christi," Dec. 25, 1825.

When a penitent is properly disposed, and capable of receiving absolution, but guilty of some sin that makes his case one reserved to higher authority, he cannot be absolved without special faculties.¹⁰

¹⁰ Rit. Rom., 1. c.: "Nor is the priest to absolve those whose sins are reserved to superiors." —Cfr. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 222 sqq.; Hilarius a Sexten, Tract, de Censuris Eccles., Mayence 1898, pp. 20 sqq.

— 1. By c. 874, §1, religious priests are prohibited from using jurisdiction received from the local Ordinary without the license, at least presumed, of their Superior.

The degree of fault committed by one who hears confessions against the will of the Superior will be greater or less according to the Superior's opposition and the frequency of the transgression. Of itself, unless a precept of obedience is added, or a prohibition under censure, the matter does not seem grave. But a religious can freely use a faculty which the Holy See has given, unless something else is indicated in the indult itself.

2. "The master of novices and his associate, the Superior of a Seminary or college, are not to hear the sacramental confessions of their pupils dwelling with them in the same house, unless the pupils, from a grave and urgent cause, in particular cases, spontaneously ask this" (c. 891).

Therefore by this canon no jurisdiction is either granted or taken away. But its use is of itself prohibited to the master of novices, his associate, the Superior of a seminary or college, toward their pupils dwelling with them in the same house. Therefore the prohibition does not affect the higher Superior, such as the local Ordinary, who does not dwell in the seminary, nor the immediate Superior during vacations, if the pupils are then not members of the same household. And because a college is spoken of with respect to boarders, the prohibition is not with respect to externs, or those who do not spend the night in the college.

Nevertheless the confession of such a novice or pupil, which always remains valid, will licitly be heard if these concur: spontaneous petition; a grave and urgent cause; a particular case. A grave and urgent cause will be present if the penitent wishes to be heard for quiet of conscience and, because of circumstances whether external, for example imminent Communion or an absent confessor, or personal, does not find another to whom he can easily declare his scruple or sin. And he who spontaneously approaches a confessor is judged to have sufficient cause, so that this canon is to be observed at the same time sincerely and without scruple.

— 3. Religious Superiors who have ordinary or delegated power of hearing confessions can indeed hear the confessions of subjects who spontaneously and of their own motion approach them, "but without grave cause let them not do this by way of habit." And let them beware lest by themselves or through another, by force, fear, importunate persuasions, or any other reason, they induce any subject to confess sins before themselves.

— 4. In danger of death a penitent is licitly absolved by any priest, even of another rite, even by an excommunicate to be avoided whom the penitent has sought ¹ (c. 2261, §3). Nor does the presence of an approved priest stand in the way. Only the absolution of an accomplice remains, on the part of the confessor, illicit outside the case of necessity (cf. below on absolution of an accomplice).

¹ Faulty administration of the sacrament, outside necessity, to those who are bound by censure remains illicit (cf. Noldin, III, 340, and c. 2261, §1 itself). Absolution cannot be sought from a heretic or schismatic using the rite of his sect, on account of forbidden cooperation in false worship.

— 5. The use of probable jurisdiction is simply licit. For the only cause of illicitness would be the danger of nullity, which is wholly removed by c. 209.

The use of negatively doubtful jurisdiction is illicit, unless a very grave cause, or notable detriment to the soul of the penitent (d'Ann., III, 311), demands that he be helped in the better way possible. For since the Church does not supply jurisdiction, the sacrament is exposed to danger of nullity and the penitent to grave harm of itself. Besides, you impose upon the penitent the burden of confessing the sins again to one having certain jurisdiction, at least if afterward it is discovered that jurisdiction was truly lacking. Indeed Busembaum, De iurisd., and Ball.-Palm., V, 395, seem always to require a repeated confession, since the absolution is not probably valid. Wherefore he who absolves in necessity with doubtful jurisdiction must make the penitent more certain of the matter, so that he may at least provide for his own salvation by perfect contrition. But he will have to give absolution under an express or tacit condition: if I have jurisdiction. One thus absolved, if he wishes to use the other sacraments, of himself stands in the condition of one who doubts whether he has committed mortal sins or not.

A sufficient cause of using doubtful jurisdiction is judged to be present if the penitent who has not confessed for a long time either must communicate or celebrate, and does not have the supply of another; or if the precept of annual confession presses; or if the doubt occurs after the confession has already begun, unless perhaps the penitent can break off the confession without too much difficulty.

Observe, however, that there is no obligation for the penitent in these cases to confess to a priest who has only doubtful jurisdiction.

— 6. Although the Church supplies jurisdiction in common error, nevertheless she does not intend to permit a priest to procure jurisdiction for himself in this way, and, for example, relying on common error, omit to ask for a new faculty after the time has elapsed. Wherefore it is not only intrinsically illicit for someone to pretend that he is approved, or to provoke common error, but also of itself he cannot hear confessions who is conscious that jurisdiction is lacking to him, although he is commonly held to be approved.

Does he avoid the suspension, not reserved, a divinis, carried by c. 2366 against the priest who, without necessary jurisdiction, presumes to hear confessions or absolve? Cerato, De censuris n. 118, and Genicot-Salsmans, II, 331, deny this, because he truly usurps jurisdiction. Yet for the more benign opinion it can be said that, since the Church supplies, he does not lack the necessary jurisdiction.

Nevertheless in a grave necessity of the penitent, who would be without absolution for a long time, and in cases where they permit the use of doubtful jurisdiction, it seems also lawful that one who is conscious absolve the penitent in common error.

Indeed there are some today who do not seem to require a grave cause, in order that one may use the benefit of common error. Thus Noldin, III, 346, observes nothing concerning the use of common error; and to a priest who, while he is hearing confessions, remembers that the time of jurisdiction has already elapsed, he simply concedes that he may continue to hear the confessions. Others, on the contrary, have required a grave cause (cf. Lehmk., II, 504-506).

Common utility, such as can occur in public missions, when through a certain error jurisdiction has been sought neither by the missionary nor by the inviting pastor, seems plainly to suffice (cf. Jombart, art. cit.), with the obligation saved of obtaining the necessary faculties immediately.

— The obligation of hearing, by themselves or through others, the confessions of the faithful committed to them, as often as these reasonably ask to be heard, presses pastors and others to whom the care of souls has been entrusted by force of office (c. 892, §1).

Since the pastor is named expressly, several, for example Lehmk., II, 50, and deservedly, as it seems, since this pertains to his office, wish him to be bound personally, unless he has been impeded, or the subject is willing to go to another. Yet neither Suarez, De Paen., d. 32, s. I, n. 5, nor Lugo, Paenit., d. 22, n. 3, seem to require this, unless some spiritual necessity of the penitent demands that he be heard by the pastor. The Code does not seem to urge the matter except according to the benign opinion.

But the pastor gravely sins who provides his parishioners occasion for confession only on a few days in the month. For he renders burdensome and difficult the reception of the sacraments, which he ought to render easy (Lehmk., II, 50).

"When necessity is urgent, all confessors are held by the obligation from charity of hearing the confessions of the faithful; and in danger of death, all priests" (c. 892, §2).

Confessors are those who, since they have obtained jurisdiction which they are accustomed to exercise, now receive confessions as if from office. Wherefore I would not think them excused by grave inconvenience, if those asking are in grave spiritual necessity, or if, in paschal time, there is a common scarcity of confessors in the place where they dwell. But if the one asking confession is in danger of death, now any priest is bound, and indeed under grave obligation, if the necessity of the penitent is grave. For in the priesthood received by them, the Church recognizes the title of an obligation which c. 892 declares to be present from charity.

— "If the confessor cannot doubt concerning the dispositions of the penitent, and the latter asks absolution, absolution is neither to be denied nor deferred" (c. 886).

If we compare this canon with c. 870, we shall say that here the Code inculcates the right which one duly disposed has, that in the sacramental judgment he be absolved: for absolution is a just sentence due to the penitent, and therefore not to be deferred. Besides, this rule is commonly proclaimed: that absolution is to be denied to him who is certainly indisposed, but of itself to be conceded to him who is certainly disposed.

Yet no one's right is injured on account of a manner of acting to which the lord of the right is not reasonably unwilling. But there are certain cases where all say that it is expedient, for example for rendering certain the execution of a present obligation, that absolution be deferred even for a disposed penitent. They then affirm that it can be deferred for the utility of the penitent himself. Besides there are also approved writers in the Church who think that delay of absolution must be used as a remedy for correcting relapsing penitents. Their opinion indeed is attacked by others, as we shall see in the moral part.

But here the question is raised whether these opinions have virtually been reprobated by the Code or not. We think this must simply be denied, as being wholly foreign to the mind of the legislator. He wished to eradicate a remnant of the Jansenist plague, that is, that abuse by which, in certain regions, confessors, moved by no peculiar utility of the penitent, were accustomed not to confer absolution except after two or three confessions or approaches to the confessor.

Therefore the controversies which were being carried on freely in the Church about this argument among Catholic theologians are not touched by this canon (cf. Ter Haar, C.SS.R., De conferenda absolutione sacramentali iuxta c. 886 Codicis iur. can.).

— Let the confessor "beware entirely lest he inquire after the name of an accomplice" (c. 888).

By this simple prohibition, c. 888 supplies for the excommunication formerly carried by the constitutions of Benedict XIV, Suprema, July 7, 1745; Ubi primum, June 2, 1746, and confirmed by the constitution of Pius IX, Apostolicae Sedis, October 12, 1869, among excommunications simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff, against those who have taught or defended as licit the practice of inquiring after the name of an accomplice under penalty of denied absolution.

The question concerns a penitent who has had an accomplice of his sin. To inquire after the name of that accomplice is studiously and from curiosity to seek that knowledge, whether, within confession, through interrogation of the penitent, or outside it, which would be much worse.

By the very law of nature we are prohibited from questioning the penitent concerning that name without a just cause. And it would be grave to do this under penalty of denied absolution, or if scandal or grave defamation is added: these things being excluded, it will be a sin of light curiosity.

But the penitent can be questioned concerning that name, insofar as there is need that the species or occasion of the sin be known.

The confessor will also be able, indeed of himself ought, to urge the obligation, if the penitent has any, of revealing or denouncing the accomplice outside confession; yet he cannot require that this revelation be made to himself, unless perhaps he is a Superior to whom alone the revelation can usefully be made. (This, however, St. Alph., n. 492, on account of the prohibition of Benedict XIV, does not dare to concede.)

But it is ill-advised for a confessor on his own initiative to assume the burden of denouncing someone for the penitent, indeed to agree to do this regularly. For the error by which perhaps the penitent is deceived will easily be imputed to him; so also the calumny which perhaps the penitent wishes to commit; and he can even come under suspicion of having violated the seal.

— I. 1. Religious priests do not licitly use their jurisdiction except from the faculty, at least presumed, of their Superior.

2. The master of novices and his associate, the Superior of a seminary or college, do not licitly hear the confessions of novices or of their boarder pupils, unless the pupils, from a grave and urgent cause, in particular cases, ask this.

3. Religious Superiors can hear their subjects who spontaneously approach them, but let them not do this by way of habit without grave cause.

4. In danger of death the sick person is licitly absolved by any priest, even of another rite, even by an excommunicate to be avoided whom he has sought, even when another priest is present. Absolution cannot be sought from a heretic or schismatic enrolled in a sect, outside necessity. The absolution of an accomplice remains illicit, on the part of the confessor, outside the case of necessity.

5. The use of probable jurisdiction is of itself licit. No one licitly uses negatively doubtful jurisdiction, or licitly absolves in common error, unless a cause altogether grave, of avoiding detriment, demands this. Concerning doubtful absolution the penitent must be warned that he may provide for himself.

6. Pastors and however many have care of souls entrusted to them must, from office, hear confessions as often as they are reasonably asked; the other confessors, who are accustomed to exercise jurisdiction, when necessity is urgent; and this from charity; in danger of death, all priests.

7. To a disposed penitent who asks absolution, absolution is neither to be denied nor of itself deferred.

8. But the name of an accomplice cannot be sought out by the confessor without a just cause.

1813. Penitents, after admonitions and exhortations have been heard, can be divided into a threefold class: for some are certainly disposed, others doubtfully disposed, and others finally positively indisposed. - Therefore the confessor, so that he may rightly and fruitfully perform his twofold office toward each, i.e. the office of JUDGE and PHYSICIAN, ought to attend to the following:

Principles. I. Absolution IS TO BE GIVEN to capable and worthy penitents, or the RIGHTLY DISPOSED, unless the good of the penitent counsels delay, as will be said at n. 1816. "The reason is because the penitent, after confession has been made, since he is disposed, has a strict right to absolution; by denying which the confessor would inflict grave injury upon him, both because he would deprive him of the grace of the Sacrament, and because he would oblige him to undergo a great burden, namely to repeat before another his grave sins."³⁶

1814. II. Absolution must altogether BE DENIED to incapable and unworthy persons. The reason is because to administer a Sacrament where essential conditions are lacking is a great sacrilege; and often also a most grave deception of the penitent, namely when, from invalid absolution received, he incurs greater danger of eternal damnation.

We said, 1. to the incapable, namely to those who either have never had the use of reason, or are ignorant of necessary things with necessity of means (cf. n. 1808), or are not morally present, or bring no matter to the Sacrament.

We said, 2. to the unworthy, i.e. to those certainly indisposed (cf. n. 1817, q. 4).

Wherefore St. Alphonsus gravely admonishes, saying:³⁷ 1) Let the confessor be inflexible in deferring or denying absolution as often as it is proper; especially with priests and Ordinands. 2) Let him be full of charity, both by bringing it about according to his strength that the indisposed penitent become disposed, and by dismissing with sweet words the one whom he cannot absolve, so that this one may not be reluctant to return (cf. n. 1793, 3).

1815. III. Absolution IS TO BE DEFERRED for the penitent DOUBTFULLY DISPOSED; unless there is present a GRAVE CAUSE because of which absolution can be imparted under condition. - The reason of the first part is because otherwise the confessor would expose the Sacrament to danger of nullity, and so would commit grave sacrilege. The reason of the second part is because the Sacraments are for men, and therefore in a case in which the salvation of a man is endangered, they are to be administered in every better manner by which it can be done; but irreverence toward the Sacrament is removed by a just cause and condition. See individual cases under n. 1663, q. 4, where concerning the conditioned form. But here:

Let it be noted: 1. Delay of absolution, when it can be used, is a most efficacious REMEDY; for it shakes the drowsy, lest they fall into the sleep of death; as a carbuncle it rouses those deceived by the fallacy of sin, so that they open their eyes and know their dangerous state. - Even if they should not return to the same confessor, a just and prudent delay is not useless; because, like a strong admonition, it will be a seed of reflection and conversion, which will bear fruit in its own time.³⁸ It was said: when it can be used; for among penitents doubtfully disposed there are found some who, dismissed, would not return, and would waste away in their sins, although it is not impossible for them to dispose themselves better. These ought rather to be absolved under condition.³⁹

2. The delay ought to be brief, i.e. for eight or ten days, if the sin proceeds from intrinsic frailty; indeed sometimes for a shorter time, e.g. for a day, or an hour, or even for a quarter of an hour. - But if it proceeds from an extrinsic cause, e.g. from a proximate occasion, the delay can be longer, e.g. of one month, if from the circumstances it is required (cf. n. 1831).

And indeed these principles press the Confessor insofar as he is considered solely as judge. But since the parts of physician also must be performed by him, it must be established:

1816. IV. The confessor, insofar as he performs the office of PHYSICIAN, CAN, indeed OUGHT, sometimes TO DEFER absolution for a penitent, even one RIGHTLY DISPOSED, namely when he prudently judges that such a delay will be profitable for his amendment and salvation. To the point St. Alphonsus says thus:⁴⁰ "It is certain and common among all that the confessor can defer absolution for a penitent even disposed, and even without his consent, whenever he prudently judges that delay is useful for his amendment. The reason is because the penitent, although he has a right to absolution by reason of confession performed, nevertheless does not have a right to be absolved at once: for the confessor, to whom not only the duty of judge but also of physician belongs, can well, indeed in my judgment is bound to, defer absolution when he judges such a remedy to be necessarily useful to the salvation of his penitent." But that the Blessed Doctor in this matter by no means departs from the opinion of the ancient Theologians (of the sixteenth century) is found demonstrated splendidly in the Alphonsian Vindications.⁴¹

We said, 1. when he judges that the delay will be profitable: as, e.g., when there is probable danger lest the penitent, after receiving absolution, break his purpose: as often happens to those who must make restitution, make a denunciation, remove an occasion of sin, reconcile themselves with enemies, learn things necessary to be known, shake off culpable negligence, etc. But the delay, in these cases, will be able to be of the very briefest time, namely until they have fulfilled the obligation. - But the obligation itself of deferring absolution will be grave or light, according as the delay itself will be judged necessary, or only useful.⁴²

We said, 2. when he judges PRUDENTLY; because one must proceed considerately. For absolution is never to be put off for one sufficiently disposed if the delay is foreseen as more harmful than profitable, or if from it a mark or danger of infamy would arise for the penitent. And the same must be said if, all things weighed, the delay would seem useless, or if such a remedy could be used with too little convenience.⁴³

Note. - According to the diversity of places and times it is expedient to defer absolution more frequently or more rarely. Thus, in great cities or in impious regions, where faith has collapsed, it hardly ever seems expedient that absolution be deferred; otherwise elsewhere, where faith is living.

1817. Questions. Q. 1. Whether and what sort of CERTITUDE is required concerning the disposition of the penitent, so that he can be absolved?

Resp. The extreme opinions being passed over, of the Rigorists, who will that no one, outside danger of death, is to be absolved before he has put forth most certain arguments of conversion; and of the Laxists, who think that absolution is to be denied to no one unless evidence holds signs of indisposition, we say with St. Alphonsus:

1. In this Sacrament, since the matter is moral, as the acts of the penitent are, MORAL or respective CERTITUDE suffices... "Hence, as regards our purpose, it is sufficient that the confessor have prudent probability concerning the disposition of the penitent, and that, on the other hand, no prudent suspicion of indisposition stands in the way; otherwise scarcely anyone could be absolved, since whatever signs of penitents furnish nothing except probability of disposition... And this seems to be sufficiently expressed in the Roman Catechism, where it is said: If, the confession having been heard, the priest has judged that neither diligence in enumerating sins, nor sorrow in detesting them, was wholly lacking to the penitent, he will be able to be absolved"⁴⁴ (cf. n. 1424).

2. The dispositions of the penitent ought to become known to the confessor through certain signs, whether ordinary or extraordinary. ORDINARY SIGNS indeed suffice if no indication of indisposition appears to the contrary. But if they are attacked by some positive presumption, or in other words, if there is present a founded suspicion concerning the indisposition of the penitent, e.g. because of his new and continuous falls into sin, they no longer suffice; but SOME EXTRAORDINARY SIGN is required. The reason is because the presumption which ordinary signs introduce concerning the disposition of the penitent is destroyed by the presumption which founded reasons furnish concerning his indisposition. Hence the confessor necessarily becomes hesitating and doubtful (in which case see what was said at n. 1815). But where some extraordinary sign (which either precedes the accusation of sins, or, with the confessor admonishing and exhorting, follows it) supervenes, suspicion concerning indisposition is (for the most part) removed, and the confessor judges that his penitent is now sufficiently disposed.⁴⁵

Q. 2. What are the ORDINARY SIGNS of sufficient disposition?

Resp. According to St. Alphonsus,⁴⁶ they are the confession itself rightly made, and the protestation of the penitent asserting that he is sorry and proposes. For the presumption is in favor of the penitent, and he is to be believed when nothing stands in the way to the contrary.

Q. 3. What are EXTRAORDINARY or special SIGNS?⁴⁷

Resp. St. Alphonsus enumerates nine signs of this sort, which can be recalled to two heads, namely some zeal for amendment, and a special manifestation of sorrow.

1. Some ZEAL FOR AMENDMENT, for example: 1) The use of means, e.g. if the penitent diligently avoided the occasion, carried into execution the means prescribed by the confessor, used prayers, alms, etc., for rooting out the vice. - 2) Perseverance for some time, e.g. absolutely speaking, for about three weeks, or relatively to temptations, for one or another week, when previously he was accustomed to fall many times in the week. That continence can happen after confession, which is a better sign, or even before he approaches confession, so that he might dispose himself for it. - 3) A more difficult or rarer fall: more difficult, i.e. after notable resistance; rarer, namely in the same occasions and temptations. - 4) Fulfillment of some difficult obligation, as, e.g., of restitution, repairing the neighbor's reputation, etc.

2. Some SPECIAL MANIFESTATION OF SORROW, e.g. 1) Tears and sighs, at least for the most part, but especially cordial words. - 2) Spontaneous confession made, not from custom, but from an internal impulse of grace, so that divine friendship may be received, especially if there accedes a long journey, loss of notable profit, grave inconvenience, great internal or external conflict. - 3) External impulse of grace, in some extraordinary event, for example because of a sermon heard, because of the death of a friend, because of fear of an imminent scourge. - 4) Confession of sins previously concealed. - 5) Signification of a new knowledge of one's sin, or of the danger of damnation. - 6) Request for means of amendment, and similar things: for example, "if the penitent says that he repented immediately after the sin, if he desires to make satisfaction, if he accepts a great penance with a good mind, if of himself he protests that he would rather die than fall again." From signs of this sort it is rightly gathered that the penitent asserts sorrow and purpose not only with the mouth, but from the soul.⁴⁸

"The following things are to be noted concerning these: 1. Zeal for amendment can sometimes stand with slight amendment, on account of special difficulties of amendment, which can proceed: 1) from a habit very deeply rooted, since it demands great efforts; 2) from assiduous and vehement temptations, because they entangle a man; 3) from a very light and changeable disposition, which is especially proper to adolescents, and by which it happens that with equal facility they pass to good and to evil; 4) from the facility with which some sins are committed, for example sins of heart and of mouth.⁴⁹

"2. Spontaneity of confession is to be presumed especially in those regions in which faith has grown weak; for there human respect does not impel one to receiving the Sacraments, as in others in which religion flourishes, but rather draws one back from them. For the rest, even in regions of this sort, there are not lacking those who approach the sacred Tribunal from custom alone, or from other natural motives.⁵⁰

"3. In the time of a Mission which turns out prosperously, recidivists for the most part are usually rightly disposed, if they diligently attended the sermons, and at this time abstained from sin."⁵¹

Q. 4. What are the signs of INDISPOSITION?

Resp. 1. The ABSOLUTELY indisposed, and therefore incapable of the benefit of absolution, are to be judged, from the Roman Ritual:⁵² "Those who give no signs of sorrow; who DO NOT WANT to lay aside hatreds and enmities, or to restore the goods of others, if they can, or to leave a proximate occasion of sinning, or in another way to leave sins, and amend life for the better; or who have given public scandal, unless they publicly satisfy and remove the scandal"; and generally, whoever refuse to fulfill a known grave obligation.

Resp. 2. The DOUBTFULLY disposed are to be judged: 1) Those who approach the sacred tribunal compelled, or only from human consideration, or without any preparation; - 2) those who confess without any sense of humility, narrating their sins historically and almost jokingly, or without any submission to the confessor, namely excusing their own wicked manner of acting, accusing others, etc.; - 3) those who use crafty words, seeking rather to cover over than to expose sins, or not confessing them unless they have been detected by the industry of the confessor; - 4) those who are very difficult in accepting penances and remedies necessary for sins; - 5) those finally who, remedies being neglected, have fallen back into a wicked habit after they have already been admonished by the confessor.⁵³

But let it be noted FOR PRACTICE: - 1. In the Confessor there is necessary the industry of ardent charity, by which namely, according to his strength, "not without prayers poured out to God from the inmost heart" (as Leo XII says),⁵⁴ he strives to make the unprepared prepared: and this often succeeds with true zeal.

2. "In the penitent there is not necessary an interpretative disposition, namely that if he were found in this or that conflict of circumstances, he would not sin, when he does not at all reflect on this; because otherwise, if confessors wished to presume the interpretative indispositions of penitents, they could absolve few, since they could judge that many of those whose children had been killed certainly would be moved with hatred against the killers; if they were tempted by tyrants with torments, they would fall away from the Faith, etc. - Therefore it suffices to find in the penitent that actual disposition, so that he may be absolved; namely that here and now he resolves no longer to sin in any case in general. Nor does it stand in the way that he would be indisposed by interpretative will, namely if he were admonished."⁵⁵

1427. Principles. - I. Absolution must be granted from justice and under grave obligation to every penitent rightly confessed and disposed. The reason is that in the very act of Confession there is entered into a certain quasi-contract, by force of which the penitent rightly confessed and disposed has the right to receive the Sacrament. But otherwise an intolerable burden would be imposed on the penitent without just cause, namely that he institute Confession before another, without besides being able certainly to trust that he is going to receive absolution from that new confessor. Moreover this is also required by the end of the institution of the Sacrament and of the tribunal of Penance, which was instituted by Christ for the sake of imparting mercy. Therefore the priest, denying absolution to a penitent disposed, would act unjustly, would abuse the power of the keys, and would render the Sacrament odious.

II. Nevertheless absolution can be delayed for a brief time, even for a penitent sufficiently disposed, and even without his consent, when namely the confessor judges that this is useful for his amendment. The reason is that the delay of absolution is not the denial of the same; and, although a disposed penitent has a right to absolution, nevertheless he does not have a right, at least speaking of itself, to obtaining it immediately. For the confessor is not only judge, but also physician; and therefore, if he judges such a remedy to be going to profit the amendment of the penitent, he will be able to use it prudently; indeed he will be held to use it, when he judges that a remedy of this kind is necessarily useful for the salvation of the penitent. - Thus expressly St. Alphonsus, from whom that Theologians, even older ones before the Sixteenth Century, do not dissent, the Vindiciae clearly prove.

I said: at least speaking of itself; because if the delay of absolution 1° is judged more likely to harm than to profit, or 2° cannot be done without a sufficiently notable inconvenience of the penitent, it must be granted immediately: for the penitent is then considered to have a strict right to obtaining it immediately.

III. Absolution is altogether to be denied in every case, even of extreme necessity, to penitents certainly indisposed. But to penitents doubtfully disposed, absolution is to be delayed, or, according to the rules handed down n. 1344. q. 8°. pag. 93. col. 2., can be imparted under condition, or even sometimes must be.

IV. In order that the delay of absolution may be the more profitable, the penitent is gently to be drawn to consent to it.

1428. Questions. - Query 1° Is it often expedient to delay absolution for a sufficiently disposed penitent, without his consent?

Resp. Outside the two cases alleged n. 1427. II., "it is better to say," says St. Alphonsus, "that a certain rule cannot be established in this; but the confessor must direct himself from the occurring circumstances, and, after he has commended himself to God, as he shall have been inspired by God, let him delay or impart absolution." Then he distinguishes a twofold kind of recidivists, and for each brings forward its proper resolution, as will be explained n. 1480.

Query 2° Is certitude concerning the disposition of the penitent required, so that he can be absolved?

Resp. 1° Absolute certitude is not required, nor even strict moral certitude, such as is required in other Sacraments, e.g. concerning wine for the consecration of the Eucharist. The reason is that the Sacrament of Penance scarcely admits a more certain judgment of this kind.

Resp. 2° Prudent probability is required and suffices, to which no prudent suspicion of indisposition is opposed. For evidence is not possible.

Query 3° What are the ordinary signs of sufficient disposition?

Resp. A rightly made Confession with a protestation of penance and purpose.

Query 4° Is the confessor held to excite sorrow in the penitent?

Resp. 1° Affirm., if the penitent does not seem sufficiently disposed; the reason is that one absolving an indisposed person exposes the Sacrament to the danger of frustration; "but if he dismisses him without absolution, he exposes him to the danger of remaining long in the state of mortal sin, or even of not returning any more." - Nor is he excused from this because he must spend much time on it, or because others are waiting, provided nevertheless that there is hope that he is to be disposed here and now.

Resp. 2° Neg., if the penitent seems sufficiently instructed and disposed, as are mature penitents, and those who confess frequently. For then the confessor is held to nothing, neither by reason of charity, since the penitent does not need special help, nor by reason of reverence of the Sacrament, which is exposed to no danger.

Query 5° Can, indeed must, a penitent be absolved who wishes to follow an opinion opposed to the sentence of the confessor?

Resp. Affirm., provided 1° the opinion of the penitent is somewhat probable, at least extrinsically; for the confessor is not a judge of opinions; 2° the penitent is not so unlearned that he is unable to form for himself a right conscience from probability, at least extrinsic, e.g. from the response of another learned and prudent man, with whom, against the opinion of the confessor, he wishes to stand: for he would act against conscience; 3° there is not question of a judgment which directly regards the administration of the Sacrament, e.g. the disposition of the penitent or the jurisdiction of the confessor, because then there is question not only of permitting the penitent his own opinion, but of following it in one's own operation: I add, from the mind of St. Alphonsus, 4° the opinion of the penitent must be not only speculatively but also practically probable, or not joined with a certainly probable danger of formal sin, as was said n. 87. Reg. 1. 2°: for then there is question of judgment concerning the disposition of the penitent.

I. After the confessor has questioned penitents, admonished them and exhorted them to contrition and amendment, and inspected their disposition, he will find some certainly disposed for receiving absolution, others doubtfully disposed, and finally others positively indisposed. Therefore the Ritual says, tit. 3, c. 1, n. 23: "Let him diligently see when and to whom absolution is to be conferred, or denied, or deferred, lest he absolve those who are incapable of such a benefit." Concerning this the following principles are valid.

II. Absolution regularly and of itself, and indeed from justice and under grave obligation, is to be granted to a penitent guilty of grave sin who is certainly well disposed. This general principle is enunciated in the Law, can. 886: "To a penitent certainly disposed and seeking absolution, this is neither to be denied nor deferred."

For the confessor, by receiving confession, obliges himself by a quasi-contract to bear sentence according to the institution of Christ. But according to the institution of Christ, absolution of itself must be granted to the well disposed, since this sacrament was instituted precisely for remitting sins. Therefore of itself by force of contract, and therefore from justice, he must absolve the duly disposed, who accordingly have a strict right to absolution; - and indeed under grave obligation, if the penitent is in the state of mortal sin, because it is a grave injury, since he is unjustly deprived of the greatest good of sacramental grace.

It is said 1) guilty of grave sin, because if he has only venial sins or mortal sins already remitted, to defer the penitent a few times is not a grave sin, because grave injury is not inflicted upon him; indeed, if this happens from a reasonable cause, there will be no sin;

2. who is certainly disposed, that is, morally or quasi-certainly, by practical and imperfect certitude, which excludes every prudent and grave doubt, so namely that there is a grave reason for judging this and no serious reason for doubting. For often it is impossible to have greater certitude concerning dispositions;

3. regularly and of itself: for regularly absolution granted at once profits more than if it is deferred, because it furnishes sacramental grace by which the penitent can more efficaciously resist temptation and cultivate virtue. Nevertheless sometimes accidentally absolution can be deferred even to one sufficiently disposed: a) so that before absolution restitution or reparation which can be made in the present be urged; which is an apt mode of exploring more and proving the disposition of the penitent and of obtaining the fulfillment of the duty more certainly; - b) also if the confessor as physician prudently judges that this is more useful to the penitent, who then would be unwilling irrationally; yet his consent is to be sought, because generally delay will not profit unless the penitent consent to it. Hence by the general rule it is already established in law: "to a penitent certainly disposed and seeking absolution, this is... not to be deferred";

c) only for a brief time, for example, for some hours, for a day, for eight days or a little more, because to remain long in mortal sin is a grave inconvenience.

III. Indications of positive disposition are required, so that there be a truly grave motive for bearing a truly founded or morally certain judgment concerning the sufficient disposition of the penitent.

Of this kind are: 1) the due preparation of the penitent for confession, 2) the confession itself duly performed, especially if it is done spontaneously, for example, for more easily avoiding sin and obtaining the state of grace, 3) the affirmation of the penitent if it appears true and sincere, 4) the mode of confessing, namely, a mode evidently candid and humble. These are ordinary signs, namely, which of themselves and in ordinary circumstances suffice; but when there is a special reason for doubting concerning the disposition or sincerity of the penitent, graver signs are required, drawn from the special circumstances of the penitent, or extraordinary conjectural signs, whether of more abundant grace, or of more intense sorrow, or of firmer purpose:

A. Of more abundant grace, as 1) if he confesses from a supernatural and particular motive, for example, on the occasion of preaching, or the death of a friend, or an impending evil; 2) if he had to undergo a rather great inconvenience in order to confess, such as a long journey, loss of a day's gain, a great external conflict; 3) if the confession is made altogether spontaneously from the impulse of grace alone, with no other external circumstance impelling, especially in regions where faith has grown weak and human respect does not impel to the sacraments.

B. Of more intense sorrow, for example, 1) if he employed special means (fasting, alms, prayers, Masses) so that he might institute a good confession; 2) if he says words flowing from the heart, or gives forth sighs and pours out tears, which is a sign having force in many, but not always certain or sincere; 3) if he confesses with greater sincerity, outpouring of heart, for example, sins which he had previously culpably omitted; 4) if he signifies that he apprehends better his sins and danger of damnation.

C. Of firmer purpose, as 1) if he says that after the sin he immediately repented; 2) if he especially asks for remedies and willingly promises to employ them, or willingly accepts a great penance; 3) if already for some time he has persevered or has employed diligence for this by the remedies indicated, for example, by fleeing the occasion, burning depraved books, renouncing the society of the depraved; in one word, if there is already a change of life; 4) if he has relapsed with greater difficulty, that is, after notable resistance, or more rarely in the same circumstances; 5) if he has already fulfilled a difficult obligation, for example, restitution or reparation of reputation or honor or reconciliation with enemies.

IV. Absolution is to be denied to those who are morally certainly incapable or unworthy. This is altogether certain, since in each case absolution is invalid or at least fruitless; but knowingly and willingly to administer a sacrament in a certainly invalid or fruitless mode is grave sacrilege.

Radically incapable are the perpetually insane, - those not yet baptized, - the certainly dead, - those not knowing the things necessary to be known by necessity of means, - and those who certainly are not morally present.

Those incapable because unworthy are indicated by the Roman Ritual, l. c., n. 23: "Let him not absolve those who are incapable of such a benefit, such as: those who give no signs of sorrow, - who do not wish to lay aside hatreds and enmities - or to restore the goods of another, if they can - or to abandon the proximate occasion of sinning - or in another way to leave sins behind (for example, a depraved habit or sinful art) - and to amend life for the better (for example, by employing necessary remedies), - or those who have given public scandal, unless they satisfy publicly and remove the scandal." To these can be added in a general way all those who do not wish to fulfill a grave obligation known to themselves; or who refuse to confess their sins integrally, unless they are excused from material integrity by a grave reason. For in these or similar cases there is lacking the essential condition required for the validity of absolution, namely, contrition.

Moreover let it be noted that the confessor: 1) before he denies absolution, generally must exhort sinners to contrition so that as far as he can he may dispose them, and if by a fervent exhortation he renders them contrite, he can absolve them; - 2) if he must deny absolution, let him do this only with great charity and kind words, by explaining the reason why he cannot act otherwise and by declaring that he will willingly grant absolution as soon as the penitent is disposed.

V. Absolution is regularly to be deferred to those who are doubtfully disposed, unless a grave reason urges that they be absolved under condition. - This is altogether certain, for of itself it is illicit to expose a sacrament to danger of nullity or fruitlessness, because the reverence owed to the sacrament forbids this as sacrilege; - unless accidentally, if there is a grave and proportionate reason, or a notable utility of the neighbor to be obtained at once, because the sacraments are for men. This is to be understood when the confessor has employed every effort for obtaining sufficient disposition, and certain disposition cannot be obtained.

Namely, as often as there is danger of nullity for the sacrament and danger of notable detriment for the neighbor, and both cannot be avoided at the same time, rather the danger of the neighbor is to be avoided and nevertheless the sacrament is to be conferred under condition: for the sacraments are for men, and the law of charity in a case of grave necessity prevails over the law of religion. Thus in the following cases:

1. in danger of death, while the necessity of absolving here and now urges and there is only doubtful matter, - or doubtful disposition, - or a doubtfully capable subject, for example, because there is doubt concerning his life or concerning sufficient presence to the minister;

2. in the case of a marriage soon to be celebrated, or Confirmation soon to be received, if the disposition of the penitent is doubtful; likewise in return to the Church after Baptism repeated under condition;¹

¹ Not thus of itself, while the precept of communion urges, because this can be postponed; - unless accidentally there is a founded fear of infamy or scandal, as is said under 4.

3. in a case in which a doubtfully disposed penitent would for a long time lack the occasion of confessing;

4. in a case in which a doubtfully disposed penitent would be exposed to grave infamy or to giving scandal to others, if he were dismissed unabsolved;

5. if it is greatly to be feared lest one doubtfully disposed and dismissed be cast into despair or not be about to return to receive the sacrament; not however if he seriously threatens this, because rather it is a sign of indisposition;

6. in doubt concerning the sufficiency of matter which is doubtfully grave, or concerning the sufficient or perfect use of reason in the penitent, while the precept of confession urges, or perhaps grave matter is present;

7. finally in doubt whether the minister has already absolved or absolved duly, that is, with the due form. This case is reduced to doubt concerning the condition of the subject, because if the penitent had already been validly absolved, the matter of the sacrament, namely, a new confession, would be lacking.

Therefore there are only six cases on the part of the penitent, and one on the part of the minister.

VI. According to St. Leonard of Port Maurice, those are judged doubtfully disposed: a) who have relapsed in the same or a worse mode, without employing the remedies prescribed by the confessor and without serious effort of amendment; b) who respond only coldly that they are sorry, especially if they have already often relapsed; c) if they show great affection for sin, or have derived great utility from sin, or put their whole zeal into satisfying passions; d) when they are of a freer and more lax life, or rashly excuse their sins, or institute contention and altercation with the confessor, or seem to boast concerning the sin committed; e) when they approach the sacrament not spontaneously, but only by command of parents or others, or from mere custom, or to please others, or from fear lest they lose reputation; f) if they refuse a moderate penance proportioned to their strength.

Therefore those are called doubtfully disposed in the strict sense against whose disposition a grave suspicion arises from positive indications (such as we have enumerated), without on the other side a probable and prudent judgment concerning sufficient disposition being able to be formed on account of much graver reasons.

It is said: 1) from positive indications; therefore if against dispositions proved by grave reason no grave positive reason militates, or only a slight and tenuous reason, then the penitent is not judged doubtfully disposed, because in human and practical matters a solidly founded opinion to which no grave reason is opposed is equivalent to practical certitude. And thus the opinions of some, who contend that probable disposition suffices (understanding probability in the strict philosophical sense of greater likelihood), are reconciled with the opinion of St. Alphonsus, who requires morally certain disposition;

2. without on the other side a probable and prudent judgment concerning sufficient disposition being able to be formed. For although from one or another motive, for example, from repeated relapse, a grave suspicion can arise, on the other side there can be much graver reasons concerning sufficient disposition, namely, extraordinary signs of contrition. But a notably more probable opinion is equivalent to practical certitude. Then therefore absolution is to be given at once, and indeed in an absolute mode.

VIII. Observations. - 1. If some penitent is doubtfully disposed, all efforts are to be employed that he may be led to certain disposition; only then is he to be absolved under condition, if certain disposition cannot be had and yet there would be grave danger of spiritual detriment, because the grace of the sacrament is necessary to him here and now.

2. It is not licit regularly or always to absolve under condition, because the sacrament of penance was instituted under the form of judgment; but judgment must regularly be pronounced in an absolute mode.

3. Hence concerning the sufficiency of dispositions the confessor is bound from office to judge, and the practice of those is to be reproved who, in order to avoid difficulties, simply absolve under the condition: if you are disposed.

614. Principle VI. Absolution regularly and of itself, and indeed from justice and under grave obligation, must be granted to the penitent guilty of grave sin who is certainly well disposed. - This general principle is enunciated in Law, can. 886: "If the confessor cannot doubt concerning the dispositions of the penitent and the latter asks for absolution, absolution is neither to be denied nor deferred, but granted."

For the confessor, by receiving the confession, obliges himself, as by a contract, to pronounce sentence according to the institution of Christ. But, according to the institution of Christ, absolution must of itself be granted to those well disposed, since this sacrament was instituted precisely for remitting sins. Therefore, by force of contract, and therefore from justice, he must of itself absolve those rightly disposed, who consequently have a strict right to absolution; - and indeed under grave obligation, if the penitent is in the state of mortal sin, because it is a grave injury, since he is unjustly deprived of the greatest private good of sacramental grace.

It is said: 1) guilty of grave sin, because if he has only venial sins or mortal sins already remitted, to defer the penitent sometimes is not a grave sin, because a grave injury is not inflicted upon him; indeed, if this is done from a reasonable cause, sometimes there will be no sin;

2. who is certainly disposed, i.e., morally or quasi-certainly, with a practical and imperfect certitude which excludes every prudent and grave doubt; namely, so that there is a grave reason for judging this and no serious reason for doubting, for often it is impossible to have greater certitude concerning dispositions;

3. regularly and of itself: for absolution granted immediately usually profits more than if it is deferred, because it gives sacramental grace by which the penitent can more efficaciously resist temptation and cultivate virtue. Nevertheless, sometimes by accident absolution can be deferred even for one sufficiently disposed:

a) so that before absolution restitution or reparation which can be made in the present may be urged; this at the same time is an apt way of exploring more and proving the disposition of the penitent and of more certainly obtaining the fulfillment of the duty;

b) also if the confessor as physician prudently judges this to be more useful for the penitent, who then would be unwilling irrationally; yet his consent is to be sought, because delay generally will not profit unless the penitent consents to it. Hence by a general rule it is now established in law: "to a penitent certainly disposed and asking for absolution this... is not to be deferred";

c) only for a short time, e.g., for some hours, for a day, for eight days, or a little more, because it is a grave inconvenience to remain long in mortal sin.

1. Concerning the way in which one is to question in practice, see our Questions concerning Various Categories of Penitents, c. 1, q. 1 and 2.

1. More practical things concerning the obligation of instructing and admonishing are handed down in our little work: On Various Categories of Penitents, c. 1, q. 3.

1. See several other things in our little work On the Minister of Penance, c. 4, q. 2, a. 2, IV. It is profitable to read St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, n. 6-7; 15-16.

615. Principle VII. Absolution must be denied to those who are morally certainly incapable or unworthy. - This is altogether certain, since in either case absolution is invalid or at least fruitless; but knowingly and willingly to administer a sacrament in a manner certainly invalid or fruitless is a grave sacrilege (n. 88).

Those radically incapable are the perpetually insane, the not-yet-baptized, those certainly dead, those ignorant of things necessary to be known by necessity of means, and those who certainly are not morally present.

Those incapable because unworthy are indicated by the Ritual, l.c., n. 23: "Let him not absolve those who are incapable of such a benefit: such are those who give no signs of sorrow; who do not wish to lay aside hatreds and enmities, or to restore the goods of others, if they can, or to leave a proximate occasion of sinning, or in some other way to abandon sins (e.g., a depraved custom or a sinful craft), and to amend life for the better; or those who have given public scandal, unless they publicly make satisfaction and remove the scandal." To these can be added in a general way all those who are unwilling to fulfill a grave obligation known to them; or who refuse to confess their sins integrally, unless they are excused from material integrity by a grave reason. For in these and similar cases the essential condition required for validity is lacking, namely contrition.

But let it be noted that the confessor: 1) before he denies absolution, must generally exhort sinners to contrition, so that as much as can be done he may dispose them, and if by fervent exhortation he renders them contrite, he can absolve them; - 2) if he must deny absolution, he should do this only with great charity and with kindly words, by explaining the reason why he cannot act otherwise, and by declaring that he will gladly grant absolution as soon as the penitent will be disposed.

Question 4. To whom properly is absolution to be denied?

Resp. Many classes of penitents to whom absolution is to be denied are enumerated by diverse authors; but it can be said more briefly and more generally: it is to be denied to all and only those who at least do not promise that they will satisfy some grave and certain obligation in that manner in which they ought. - Cf. Baller. note (a) and (b), p. 590.

A certain confessor enjoys quite a reputation for expediting matters in the confessional. As a rule he pays no attention to the different classes of penitents who approach his confessional. He rarely asks a question; He allows the penitent to tell his sins without interruption, and then if he thinks him at all disposed, he absolves him immediately, without any word of instruction or admonition. On the vigils of great feasts, when the number of penitents is very great, he does not permit his penitents to make a full confession, but when they have told one or the other sin, he admonishes them to tell the rest of their sins in their next confession, and then absolves and dismisses them. He maintains that he is justified in acting thus, because otherwise he would never be able to hear all the people who come to him. To instruct or to admonish penitents in the confessional is not an essential part of the Sacrament of Penance, he says, nor is the confessor strictly bound to interrogate the penitent, provided the penitent confesses materiam sufficientem. What must be thought of his method of action?

Answer.—The practise of this confessor is certainly blameworthy, because he is neglecting certain strict obligations that are binding on the confessor’s conscience.

First, as regards the practise of dismissing all penitents indiscriminately, without admonition or instruction. Benedict XIV, in his encyclical letter, Apostolica Constitutio, of July 26, 1749, issued for the jubilee of the following year, admonishes all confessors that they do not discharge the obligations of their office, but, on the contrary, that they are guilty of mortal sin, if, while sitting in the sacred tribunal of Penance, they show no solicitude for their penitents, but, without admonition or instruction, absolve them immediately they have finished the recital of their sins. The words of the Encyclical are as follows:

Let them remember that all those who, when they sit in the sacred tribunal of Penance, hear penitents, do not admonish them, do not question them, but, when the enumeration of sins is finished, immediately pronounce the form of absolution, do not fulfill the duties of the office they have undertaken and indeed are guilty of a graver crime.

Every priest who exercises the ministry of the Sacrament of Penance is, according to the uniform teaching of the theologians, a teacher, a physician and a judge. As a teacher he is bound to instruct the penitent concerning the things that are, hic et nunc, required for the worthy reception of the Sacrament, as well as in the things he ought to know, in order to be able to lead a Christian life. As a physician of souls, he is required to investigate the causes of the spiritual illness of his penitents, that is to say, the nature and causes of their sins, in order to apply suitable spiritual remedies in each and every case. And, finally, as every judge is obliged to hear and to study the whole case of the culprit before him, to consider its various phases and to weigh justly all extenuating or aggravating circumstances before he renders a final judgment; so likewise does the office of the confessor require of him, as a judge in the court of conscience, that he study the state of the penitent’s conscience, and consider his dispositions and judge of his firm purpose of amendment, and then only to give or deny him absolution. Now it is evident that the confessor mentioned in this case does not and can not fulfil this threefold duty of teacher, physician and judge. His purpose is not to instruct and to heal and to judge; his purpose is to hear and to absolve as many penitents as possible. It stands to reason, of course, that where the number of those desiring to confess is very great, and they are for the most part pious souls, who are accustomed to approach the sacred tribunal of Penance frequently and have at the most only venial sins to confess, and the confessor knows that they are sufficiently instructed concerning the Sacrament of Penance, and rightly disposed, it stands to reason, I say, that the confessor may dispatch his work expeditiously, because such penitents do not need the spiritual care and help of the confessor in order to receive the Sacrament of Penance worthily and with profit. But to proceed in the same manner with all penitents indiscriminately, whether they be known or unknown to the confessor, even with the ignorant and the poorly instructed, whether they confess mortal sins or venial sins, is certainly not to administer the Sacrament of Penance as we are bound by grave obligations to administer it. For experience proves that there are those who approach this holy tribunal unprepared, who have not sufficiently examined their conscience, who through false shame hesitate to confess certain sins, who are lacking in true contrition, though believing themselves contrite, because they have repeated orally the act of contrition. Now the prudent and careful confessor, whose earnest desire is to fulfil this holy ministry validly and licitly, with fruit and with profit, as the Church ordains that it shall be fulfilled, will endeavor to discover and correct the faults and defects and shortcomings of his penitents, by prudently questioning and instructing and disposing them, lest their confession be fruitless or even sacrilegious. If the penitent confess mortal sins, he ought to be admonished of their heinousness, in order that he may be moved to realize his spiritual condition and abhor his sins and take the necessary means of shunning them in the future. If such penitents be absolved and dismissed incontinently from the sacred tribunal without a word of admonition or advice, they will very likely consider their sins of little consequence and never come to a realization of the necessity of correcting them, and thus will they speedily fall into them again.

Every confessor who has had experience of souls in the tribunal of Penance appreciates the gravity of this danger. For this very reason the Roman Ritual admonishes confessors to be careful to instruct their penitents regarding the condition of their souls, endeavoring to make them realize the number and gravity of their sins and to dispose them to contrition and a firm purpose of amendment.

“Finally, after hearing the confession and weighing the magnitude and multitude of the sins which the penitent has committed, according to their gravity and the condition of the penitent, he will apply suitable corrections and admonitions with paternal charity, as he sees needful; he will endeavor by effective words to lead him to sorrow and contrition, will induce him to amend and order his life better, and will give him remedies for sins.”

The great number of penitents waiting to be heard does not excuse the confessor from the obligation of admonishing, correcting and disposing them, so that the reception of the Sacrament of Penance may be of benefit to them. St. Francis Xavier was accustomed to say that it was better to hear a few confessions, and to hear them well, than to hear a great many and to only half hear them. And St. Alfonsus says that it matters little whether there be others waiting to confess or whether some will be obliged to depart without being heard; for on the day of judgment the confessor will have to render an account of those he actually heard, and not of the others..

“It matters little that others are waiting or that they depart without confession; for on the day of judgment the confessor must render an account only concerning this one who now confesses to him, and not concerning the others” (Praxis confess. n.7).

Again it is quite blameworthy that the confessor, on the eves of great festivals, when the number of confessions is very great, should permit the penitent to confess only one or two sins and then absolve him, with the admonition to confess his other sins in his next confession. It is expressly stated in all moral theologies that the number of penitents desiring to be heard in confession can never be a valid or just reason for making only a partial confession, even though many must depart unheard and unshriven. Under all such circumstances a full and integral confession of all mortal sins is required of the penitent, sub gravi. The practise of absolving penitents without permitting them to confess all their mortal sins, because otherwise many must depart without absolution, is expressly condemned by Pope Innocent XI, in the 59th proscribed proposition.

“It is lawful sacramentally to absolve those who have confessed only by half, on account of a great crowd of penitents, such as can occur, for example, on the day of some great feast or indulgence.”

The reason why this proposition was condemned, says Billuart, is that the harm done by sending some penitents away unheard is not so great, as to justify a partial confession, especially when there is danger of absolving the unworthy, by reason of the precipitation with which the confessions are heard and the omission of a part of one’s sins.