Point IV. On the Office of Judge

We must treat: 1. of instructing the cause; 2. of rendering the sentence.

614. Principles. - I. The Confessor is bound to question penitents concerning the species, number, and circumstances changing the species; concerning the causes of sins, habit, and proximate occasions, whenever he reasonably presumes or prudently doubts that these things have not been sufficiently declared. The reason is that the Confessor, as minister of the Sacrament, must procure its integrity and, as judge, must obtain for himself the knowledge necessary for rendering an equitable judgment. This is also evident from the Fourth Lateran Council and from the Roman Ritual. - St. Ligorius, no. 617, and Practice of the Confessor, no. 19.

II. The Confessor is not bound to question the penitent except with some ordinary diligence. The reason is that the penitent himself is bound to examine himself not with the greatest but only with moderate, that is, ordinary diligence. But the obligation of the Confessor cannot be graver than that of the penitent, since the Confessor is bound to examine the penitent only secondarily, or in default of him. - St. Ligorius, Practice of the Confessor, no. 20.

III. The Confessor is not bound to question penitents who, although uneducated, seem sufficiently instructed for their condition and diligent in confessing sins with their circumstances according to their state and capacity. - A fortiori, it is not necessary to examine those who confess frequently and rarely sin gravely, such as devout persons, Religious, and Ecclesiastics, unless something necessarily to be explained appears to be omitted by them. - St. Ligorius, no. 607, II and III; Apostolic Homilies, no. 103.

615. Rules for the Practice of Questioning. - I. Rule. Questioning must be moderate, and therefore the Confessor must take care not to be too anxious in questioning. Otherwise, questioning, and consequently confession itself, will be grave and burdensome both to himself and especially to the penitent. Hence let him never ask useless things or permit them to be narrated to him. Therefore let him attend to those things which the Roman Ritual has: Let him take care not to detain anyone with curious or useless questions, especially younger persons of either sex, or others, by imprudently questioning them about that which they do not know, lest they suffer scandal and thereby learn to sin.

And St. Ligorius, no. 607: Let the Confessor not be too anxious in questioning, but let him ask only about those things which probably pertain to the penitent according to his condition. And in the Practice of the Confessor, no. 21: Let him ask only about sins into which they can easily fall, their condition and capacity being considered. Thus also Billuart (dissertation 6, article 10, section 2): In a moral examination (the Confessor ought to examine) not with the greatest and exquisite, but with human and moderate diligence, and conformably to the capacity of the penitent. For the Priest is not bound to examine the penitent more than the penitent himself is bound to examine himself, since the Confessor is bound to examine him in default of the penitent. But the penitent is not bound to examine himself with the greatest and exquisite diligence, but with human and moral diligence. Nor does it matter that, if the Confessor examined more, perhaps he would discover more; for here attention must be paid not only to the material integrity of confession, but also lest the Sacrament be rendered burdensome and odious to penitents by the greatest and excessive industry in examining. It is therefore sufficient if the Confessor prudently judges that the penitent omits nothing. Sporer, no. 792, has the same in nearly the same words. - Salmanticenses, chapter 12, no. 21. - Reuter, The New Confessor, chapter 3, at the end, etc.

616. II. Rule. - Questioning must be discreet; namely, the Confessor must question with great prudence, diligently taking care: 1. not to ask about sins which probably were not committed, considering the condition and capacity of the penitent, etc.; 2. not to ask about those things from which the penitent may learn to sin or may suffer scandal, according to what was just said from the Roman Ritual; 3. not to ask with curiosity or levity even concerning those things about which inquiry must be made, for example, immodestly concerning immodest things, etc., etc. In a word, he must strive that in every question gravity, piety, modesty, and paternal charity alone appear, as the nature and dignity of this office require. - See the Roman Ritual. Hence: 1. he must be very cautious in questioning concerning the matter of lust, especially with women, adolescents, and children, who can suffer scandal much more easily. For how many unhappy penitents have lost innocence and soul because of an incautious question or explanation of the Confessor! But with married persons let him never make mention of the conjugal debt without grave cause (Sacred Penitentiary, June 8, 1842); and it will be sufficient, when the matter requires, to ask the woman whether she has furnished due fidelity and obedience to her husband in all things.

2. The rule admitted by all must be diligently observed: In the matter of lust it is much better to fall short in many things than to exceed in one by reason of the integrity of confession. Therefore, in doubt whether in such a case you can or ought to question, the negative side must always be followed; for it is a lesser evil that the integrity of confession be lacking than to incur the danger of losing a soul.

617. III. Rule. - Questioning must be opportune, that is, it must be done at the time and in the manner which are suitable. But certain questions are ordinarily to be asked before confession, though few, lest the penitent be offended, for example: How long has it been since he confessed? Was he absolved? Did he fulfill the penance ¹?... Is he at peace concerning his past life? This last question should be asked only when the penitent has not confessed for a long time or when a general confession is undertaken from a determined time. - The other questions concerning condition, state, age, etc., will more suitably be asked, as occasion is given, during the course of confession. Thus, on the one hand, every suspicion of curiosity and levity will be avoided, and on the other the penitent will answer more easily when his confidence in the Confessor has been increased.

¹ The Author does not contend that these questions must always be asked, but only that, if at any time, after certain things have been heard, it seems that they should be asked, they are more suitably asked at the beginning.

But those Confessors err who wish always to make a certain judgment concerning the quality of the sin, whether it is grave or light, and torment penitents in order to know with what intention or what conscience they did this; for these will often answer whatever happens to come into their mouth, so that, when questioned a little afterward concerning the same matter, they will deny what they had previously affirmed. The case is different, however, if they appear sufficiently instructed, or if there is doubt about full consent given to a temptation. Generally, unless the circumstances counsel otherwise, it can be presumed that the penitent apprehended the object of the sin as it is evil in itself.

618. Questions. - QUESTION 1. What must the Confessor do in doubt concerning the sincerity of the penitent?

Reply. It is a common rule and a received axiom: The penitent is to be believed when speaking both for himself and against himself. The reason is that in the sacred tribunal the penitent is at once the accused and a witness, his own accuser and advocate, and moreover in doubt he is always to be presumed truthful. Therefore, after suitable questions, the Confessor must absolve a penitent who denies. - St. Ligorius, no. 631.

619. • QUESTION 2. What must the Confessor do if he knows with certainty that some sin is being concealed or denied by the penitent?

Reply 1. If he knows it from the confession of another, he must, lest the seal of confession be violated, question only generally, as he otherwise would have done or ought to have done. But if the penitent, when questioned, denies it, let him reply nothing; rather, if he can do so without arousing suspicion, let him merely exhort him generally to open his conscience with all confidence. Whether the Confessor ought to absolve such a penitent is disputed. - St. Ligorius, after reporting the opinions of others, concludes thus: In my judgment, Croix thinks better, that in this case he should by no means absolve, but should merely say some prayer in order to conceal the denial of absolution ². - More commonly, however, other Doctors with Suarez, On Penance, disputation 32, section 3, no. 9, teach that absolution is to be denied only when it is altogether evident that the penitent is lying against the integrity of confession. Indeed, several say that absolution is to be granted in every case to a penitent denying his sin whenever knowledge of this sin has been obtained solely from the confession of another, namely, an accomplice, because this knowledge is to be held as nothing, since it was acquired from the confession of another. This, moreover, is sufficiently probable. Reply 2. If he knows it outside confession, of itself he must absolve the penitent who denies it, because the penitent speaking for himself and against himself is to be believed; nor can the report of another of itself produce greater faith than the declaration of the penitent himself; therefore the Confessor is no more bound to believe others than the penitent. For if the penitent committed that sin, the Confessor must presume that he either forgot his sin, confessed it to another, has a just cause for concealing it, or that the reporters were instead deceived. - St. Ligorius, ibid. - Billuart, ibid.

² Illsung first introduced this opinion and practice (treatise 6, disputation 6, question 4, article 7, section 4, no. 128), relying upon a fallacious citation of Suarez, who (On Penance, disputation 32, section 3, no. 9) indeed teaches the opposite. Croix borrowed the same from Illsung (book 6, part 2, no. 1969), together with the fictitious support of Suarez, adding through inadvertence a citation of Dicastillus, whom Illsung had cited for another purpose. To these St. Alphonsus (no. 631) added Viva, who (On Penance, question 8, article 5, no. 2), although he reports the opinion of Suarez and De Lugo less exactly, nevertheless in no way adheres to that opinion. Therefore, that entire opinion is owed to an hallucination which wrongly adduced the authority of Suarez, Dicastillus, and Viva.

** The VV. oppose thirty-four columns (pp. 587-603) to the twenty-four lines of which this and the immediately following Note consist. Nevertheless, so great a bulk has more appearance than substance. As the matter demands, we shall give an account of those things which are said in the Note.

In this first little Note the question is whether a confessor can absolve a penitent concerning whom he knows from the confession of another that a sin is being concealed. But in the Note it is said that Illsung replied in the negative, relying upon a fallacious citation of Suarez, who indeed teaches the opposite. Therefore, that Illsung relies upon a citation of Suarez is beyond controversy. But the words of Suarez cited by Illsung prove that he cites Suarez fallaciously. These words of Suarez are (loc. cit. above in the Note): It is replied that as a rule one must stand by the confession and word of the penitent. Hence, however much (Illsung incorrectly has from whatever source) the confessor knows the sin of the penitent from the report of others, he is bound in this judgment to believe the penitent himself rather, for the reason given. Then, if the confessor himself saw the sin with his own eyes and can probably judge that the penitent confessed that sin to another, he can dissemble and believe that he then denies it because he is not bound to confess it again. But if it is altogether evident that he is lying against the integrity of confession, he is not bound so to stand by the words of the penitent that he cannot use his knowledge to convince and reprove the penitent himself. Moreover, Illsung argues from this text thus: According to Suarez, the confessor is not bound to stand by the words of the penitent if it is altogether evident that he is lying. But from the confession of another which has been heard, it can become altogether evident that the penitent is lying. Therefore.

But the reasoning is fallacious and contrary to the mind of Suarez if, according to Suarez, that complete evidence cannot be referred to a case of knowledge drawn from the confession of another. That, according to Suarez, that complete evidence cannot be referred to knowledge drawn from the confession of another is manifestly evident from these words of the same author: HOWEVER MUCH the confessor knows the sin of the penitent FROM THE REPORT OF OTHERS, etc. For the word however much embraces whatever certitude the Confessor can have from the confession of another. Therefore Illsung relies fallaciously upon the authority of Suarez.

The VV. here object (p. 589) that the words of Suarez, as a rule one must stand by the word of the penitent, are to be referred also to knowledge received from the report of others. - Reply. I deny the whole. For the context evidently proves that the word as a rule indeed intimates the exception which he adds, if the confessor saw it with his own eyes and cannot conjecture that the penitent confessed that sin to another; but the word however much in no way permits an exception as regards knowledge received from the report of another.

2. It is added in the Note that Croix borrowed from Illsung the false citation of Suarez and, furthermore, through inadvertence added the false citation of Dicastillus, whom Illsung had cited for another purpose. It is easily evident that these things are so. For Dicastillus, in the place which Illsung cites (On the Eucharist, disputation 9, no. 491), disputes whether the administration of the Eucharist can be simulated by giving an unconsecrated particle and, from this, generally whether it is lawful to simulate the administration of Sacraments. But Illsung cites him to prove that absolution can be simulated. Yet Dicastillus has not even one word concerning our present question. Therefore, through mere inadvertence Croix added the fallacious testimony of Dicastillus to the fallacious support of Suarez.

3. Finally, it is added in the Note that St. Alphonsus took from Croix the citations of Suarez, Illsung, and Dicastillus, and added to these Viva, who, although he reports the opinion of Suarez and De Lugo less exactly, nevertheless in no way adheres to that opinion (namely, of Illsung). - These things too are demonstrated with little business. For Viva indeed says (loc. cit. in the Note) that a penitent is not to be absolved if the confessor prudently judges that the penitent denies the sin from shame; but he nowhere says that this prudent judgment is had in the case of St. Alphonsus. Moreover, he reports the opinion of De Lugo and Suarez less exactly; for these did not say, if the confessor prudently judges, but if it is altogether evident. Therefore, in their opinion, a judgment, unless it is altogether evident, will not be prudent. But De Lugo (disputation 22, no. 22) denies that a judgment which rests upon the testimony of another penitent is evident and therefore prudent. You ask, he says, what if the confessor knows evidently from the confession of others that Peter committed such a sin, which he himself afterward denies in confession? It is replied that it is contradictory for him to know this evidently from the confession of others, since that entire knowledge is resolved into the testimony of another penitent. And these things can suffice to give an account of those things which had been written in this brief little Note.

For the opinion of St. Alphonsus the VV. add (pp. 592-594), besides Henno, who inclines to that opinion, also the authorities of Babenstuber, Reuter, and Voit. - Reply. St. Alphonsus had already observed that not all Authors thought the same in this question; this ought therefore to seem even less surprising because different authors frame different hypotheses. Moreover, Babenstuber, Reuter, and Voit, no less than St. Alphonsus, manifestly transcribed from Illsung and Croix.

Finally, the VV. conclude this part thus (p. 594): But it matters little whether more or fewer Authors approved the opinion of Father Illsung; for the holy Doctor approved it not on account of extrinsic authorities, but on account of intrinsic reasons which are certainly evident and convincing. - Reply. The holy Doctor in fact adduces no reason, but merely cites the Authors whom we indicated in the Note; the Note itself also, as is evident, merely has certain things concerning the Authors cited by the holy Doctor. Moreover, if truly evident reasons were present, as the VV. boast, we would not thus have dissenting Authors. For why, in a matter which depends especially upon prudent judgment, would we have as blind in an evident matter Suarez and Cardinal De Lugo, easily the foremost of the Theologians?

And let these things suffice for those sixteen columns which the VV. wrote against the eight lines of the preceding little Note. We shall subjoin to the Note itself the response to the other eighteen columns which the VV. added against the sixteen lines of the following Note.

I said, of itself; for if the confessor is altogether certain of the sin committed by the penitent because, for example, he himself saw him stealing, heard him blaspheming, etc., or knows it from the certain report of others ³, he cannot absolve one who denies, provided he is certain that the latter has not forgotten his sin and has no motive for concealing it; for this rule, The penitent is to be believed, etc., avails indeed in a matter less certain, but not in a matter evidently certain.

³ These words, if he knows it from the certain report of others, etc., seem to have slipped inadvertently from Benjamin Elbel (On Penance, conference 17, no. 454), from whom St. Alphonsus then took them, and our Author from him also. For Elbel adds that all think thus, although, even by the admission of St. Alphonsus, this is manifestly false, and that doctrine is the common one which Suarez expresses thus (On Penance, disputation 32, section 3, no. 9): However much the Confessor knows the sin of the penitent from the report of others, he is bound in this judgment to believe the penitent himself rather, for the reason given.

Indeed, Elbel himself teaches the opposite (On the Sacraments in General, conference 2, no. 44), where he proposes this case: "A certain bridegroom confessed that on the preceding night he had acted shamefully with his bride; and because the Confessor knew that he had already relapsed several times and was unwilling to avoid the proximate occasion, he dismisses him without absolution. Immediately after him the bride, very well known to the Confessor, approaches; nevertheless, perhaps fearing the denial of absolution, she says not a word about the sins of lust committed with the bridegroom. The Confessor doubts whether he ought to absolve." And he replies: "If the bride denies that she committed anything against chastity, he is bound to absolve her, because he is bound to place faith in the penitent as at once the accused and the accuser, speaking both for herself and against herself."

** It could seem incredible that from this brief Note the VV. could have taken matter with which to fill eighteen solid columns. For they heap together from everywhere texts of Authors by which they prove that a confessor cannot impart absolution to a penitent when he is altogether certain, when he knows evidently, that the penitent mendaciously and in bad faith denies the grave sin which he committed. But surely, with so great an apparatus of arms, are they not fighting against shadows?

For in the Note merely a certain defect of coherence in Elbel was noted: while he teaches that the confessor is bound in the proposed case to absolve the bride at least under a condition, he then says that absolution is to be denied if the confessor becomes more certain of the state of the penitent from the report of others. In what sense the words of Elbel in the Note are to be understood is evident from the fact that the opinion which St. Alphonsus attests to be commonly handed down is opposed to him. But this opinion is of this kind (book 6, no. 631): A distinction must be made: if he knows outside confession and knows by his own knowledge, for example, by seeing him steal or hearing him blaspheme, without doubt he ought not to absolve if he denies it, provided there is not a prudent doubt, etc. But if the confessor has it from suspicion or from the report of others, Suarez, Laymann, Holzmann, Sporer, and others also commonly say that after diligent questioning he ought as a rule to absolve. But if you understand the words of Elbel as referring to that certainty by which, for example, in Fagundez, cited by the VV. (p. 597), the Confessor is certain of someone's concubinage FROM PUBLIC NOTORIETY, the question is indeed reduced to such a condition that you seek adversaries to attack in vain. For this reason it was said that the VV. fashioned shadows for themselves against which they turned their arms.

620. • QUESTION 3. How in particular must the Confessor deal with the uneducated?

Reply. Ordinarily the Confessor himself must examine the more uneducated, because, if left to themselves, they will not examine themselves better; and if they are dismissed, they will never return better disposed. Indeed, deterred by the difficulty of examining their conscience, they will easily abstain from confession. - St. Ligorius, no. 607.

621. Principles. - I. Absolution must be granted from justice and under grave obligation to every penitent who has confessed properly and is disposed. The reason is that in the very act of confession a certain quasi-contract has been entered into, by force of which a penitent who has confessed properly and is disposed has a right to receive the Sacrament. Otherwise, an intolerable burden would be imposed upon the penitent without just cause, namely, that he make a confession to another, without being able moreover to trust with certainty that he will receive absolution from this new Confessor. Furthermore, this is also demanded by the end of the institution of the Sacrament and the tribunal of Penance, which was instituted by Christ for the purpose of imparting mercy. Therefore, a Priest denying absolution to a disposed penitent would act unjustly, abuse the power of the keys, and render the Sacrament odious.

II. Nevertheless, absolution can be deferred for a brief time, even for a penitent rightly disposed ⁴, and even without his consent, when, namely, the Confessor judges that this is useful for his reform. The reason is that the deferral of absolution is not its denial; and although a disposed penitent has a right to absolution, nevertheless, he does not have, at least speaking per se, a right to obtain it immediately. For the Confessor is not only a judge, but also a physician ⁵, and therefore, if If, therefore, you inquire into the origin of this practice, you will easily find that it is owed to the zeal for devising everywhere new expedients by which, in certain circumstances, the faithful might perhaps seem capable of being helped more fully; but its reason and end were situated principally in this: that a penitent who, through sluggishness in fulfilling some obligation, was accustomed to weave new delays day after day, month after month, and even year after year, might at length be stirred to put his hand to the work. You have an example in St. Antoninus (part 3, title 14, chapter 19, section 19), where, treating of those who, as he says elsewhere (part 2, title 2, chapter 8, section 35), always procrastinate and are found annually promising the confessor that they will make restitution, and afterward do not do so, he rejects the opinion of those (ibid., section 2) who thought that these persons were to be absolved under the condition of future restitution, and admits the opinion of William that they ought to be absolved simply and without condition; then he adds: After the Confessor has considered that such persons have done this several times, PERHAPS IT WOULD BE A GOOD PRECAUTION to tell such persons that they should first make restitution and afterward come to confession, or for absolution.

⁴ It is of the greatest importance to consider the origin and reason of this practice. Although scarcely any trace of it appears in the writings of the more ancient Theologians, one would nevertheless wrongly take occasion from this, with certain Jansenists, to attribute it to them as its first authors, even though those same men then most notably abused the discipline of canonical penance to deter the faithful from the Sacraments, and were sometimes able, under a feigned appearance of zeal, to impose upon certain Catholics.

But that these Doctors treat of a disposed penitent is manifestly evident from the fact that they suggest deferral of absolution not as necessary, but as merely useful, to be employed from mere counsel and only sometimes. Thus, for example, Suarez (loc. cit.), although he treats of a habit which, as he says, has in a certain way passed into nature, after saying that the penitent's purpose is to be believed notwithstanding any preceding frequency and inconstancy of his, finally adds: If he has proposed more frequently to be corrected and does not do so, suitable remedies must be employed.... Finally, if these should not suffice, IT WILL SOMETIMES BE USEFUL to defer absolution for some days, IN WHICH HE MAY BE COMPELLED TO WATCH, etc. He repeats the same (On Penance, disputation 32, section 2, no. 4) concerning a man who, being placed in a proximate necessary occasion of sinning, relapses again and again: Nor is absolution to be denied to him, even if he relapse again and again, especially if he restrains himself somewhat and gradually diminishes the number of sins, as Navarrus noted, chapter 3, no. 21. SOMETIMES, however, absolution can be deferred (note well: can, not must).

And Sanchez (On the Decalogue, book 2, chapter 32, no. 45): If the penitent does not bear it very painfully, and it is hoped that he will not thereby be drawn away from confession, but rather that it will be a medicine, it will be A COUNSEL to defer absolution, employing the greatest possible gentleness; but if the opposite is hoped, it will not be a counsel.

Filliucci (loc. cit., question 10, no. 320): The remedies are frequent confession, almsgiving.... If these should not profit, a deferral of absolution for some days would be useful.

Gregory Sayrus (loc. cit., no. 8): SOMETIMES, however, it is a most salutary COUNSEL, as Medina, Peter of Aragon, Emmanuel Rodriguez, and Ludovicus Lopez rightly note, not to absolve before, etc.

Palaus (loc. cit., no. 6): FROM COUNSEL the priest will be able to defer absolution if he judges that the deferral will be profitable.

Bonacina (loc. cit., no. 7): Absolution does not seem to be denied to a penitent who has a firm purpose of abstaining in the future from oaths of this kind.... I add... that absolution can be deferred whenever the confessor shall have judged that this is expedient for the salvation of the penitent.

Azor (loc. cit., question 4): Although absolution is not to be denied simply, it nevertheless seems that it should be deferred for a time, so that he may meanwhile devote some effort to this; unless there is otherwise a just cause by which he ought to be absolved from sins immediately.

Reginaldus (loc. cit., no. 87): It is a salutary counsel to defer absolution for such a person, so that he may thus be induced to beware of relapse by watching more attentively.

Cardinal De Lugo (On Penance, disputation 14, no. 166): Finally, IT WILL SOMETIMES BE USEFUL to defer absolution for some days, etc.

Cardinal Toletus (book 3, chapter 18, no. 3): In these cases it is A USEFUL COUNSEL that absolution be deferred, after the whole confession has been heard, until some correction appears.

And this indeed is the practice against which John Sanchez fought with so much ardor (Selected Disputations, etc., disputation 9, from no. 11), contending, not indeed that penitents are to be absolved indiscriminately even if there can be doubt about their disposition, as certain men wrongly impute to him, but that, generally speaking, the hope of greater fruit expected from the deferred absolution of one who is disposed is vain, and consequently that the counsel of deferring absolution for this penitent is not commonly salutary. Hence he further inferred that, when this cause for deferral ceases, the right of the penitent to absolution prevails, so that, since the priest, as his adversaries admit, can absolve immediately, by that very fact he is bound not to defer it. But these things do not in fact oppose the preceding principle of the Doctors; for they too freely and unanimously agree that this medicine is not to be employed when it appears likely to harm rather than to profit. Whether, however, it is at times expedient on account of the fruit hoped for from it is a question pertaining to prudence, concerning which the Author presently treats. Nevertheless, that it can sometimes profit does not seem capable of being denied against the opinion of so many Doctors.

It will be useful to note this one thing: that a few persons proceeded further and contended that the confessor not only can defer absolution, but is bound to do so. But these either labor under an equivocation when they call the penitent disposed, or certainly affirm this against the common opinion. No means can ever be called necessary unless it is the only one. Moreover, the assertion that, with a penitent already disposed for absolution, the only means by which he may be compelled to carry something out is deferral of absolution smacks of a hypothesis altogether too improbable.

⁵ Concerning the office of physician, see what we noted above from Cardinal De Lugo (in the note to no. 605).

You will see this expedient suggested more frequently among Theologians who are somewhat less ancient when they treat of the obligation of employing certain means for correcting a depraved habit, especially one which impels to evil semi-deliberately or even indeliberately, although those acts are culpable in their cause, namely, in sluggishness and neglect of correction, which in these circumstances place a man in a continual state, as they say, of mortal sin. Hence the reason why the Doctors generally touch upon this matter not where they treat of the Sacrament of Penance, but where they treat of the Second Precept of the Decalogue, and accordingly of the depraved habit of blaspheming, rashly swearing, and then committing perjury. Thus the Salmanticenses, treatise 17, On an Oath, chapter 2. - Suarez, On an Oath, book 3, chapter 8, no. 7. - Sanchez, On the Decalogue, book 2, chapter 32, where he treats of blasphemy, and book 3, chapter 5, where he treats of the habit of swearing. - Bonacina, On the Second Precept, disputation 4, question 1, part 14. - Filliucci, treatise 25, chapter 10, on blasphemy and an oath. - Sayrus, Clavis Regia, book 5, chapter 5, where he treats of an oath. - Palaus, On an Oath, disputation 1, point 9. - Viva, On the Precepts of the Decalogue, question 7, article 7, On Perjury. - Trullench, Exposition of the Decalogue, book 2, chapter 1, doubt 20. - Azor, part 1, book 11, chapter 3, On an Oath. - Reginaldus, book 18, On the Second Precept of the Decalogue. The same is to be said of Bartholomew Medina, Emmanuel Rodericus, Ludovicus Lopez, and others whom it would be lengthy to enumerate. he judges that such a remedy will be notably ⁶ profitable to the soul of the penitent, he can prudently use it. - Thus expressly St. Ligorius, no. 462, and in the Practice of the Confessor, no. 76. - Lacroix, no. 1764.

⁶ How grave the cause must be on account of which the confessor employs this remedy, otherwise not necessary but merely useful, with a disposed penitent is clearly understood from those things which were disputed above (nos. 499 and 500). For there we saw from the common opinion of the Doctors that for anyone unwillingly to be deprived of the benefit of absolution is so grave a matter that a deferral beyond one or two days, according to Suarez, Viva, Renzi, Fagundez, Herincx, and others cited by the Salmanticenses (St. Alphonsus, book 6, no. 490), furnishes a sufficient cause why the penitent may licitly set aside either the natural precept of not defaming one's neighbor in a grave matter, or the divine precept concerning the integrity of confession; because, as De Lugo says (On Penance, disputation 16, no. 416), it is a grave thing to be in the state of sin for three days; which he can deservedly fear, since it is difficult to have a true act of contrition; wherefore he will do no small thing if, on account of the reputation of his neighbor, he defers confession for two days. Indeed, St. Alphonsus judged a deferral not only of two days, but even of one day excessive. But to me, he says (loc. cit.), it seems harsh that one who is in mortal sin should remain without absolution even for a day; and Antoine does not seem to dissent from him (chapter 2, question 13, reply 3), where he says that one who is in the state of mortal guilt is not absolutely bound to wait. Therefore, if absolution, as the Author adds with the common opinion of the Doctors, is not to be deferred when the deferral falls into no slight inconvenience of the penitent, it is readily evident with how much caution and prudent sobriety the Confessor must employ this remedy.

I said, at least speaking per se; because, if absolution cannot be deferred without inconvenience to the penitent, it must be granted immediately; for the penitent is then judged to have a strict right to obtain it immediately. - St. Ligorius, ibid., and others commonly.

622. • III. Absolution is altogether to be denied in every case, even that of extreme necessity, to penitents who are certainly indisposed. But absolution is to be denied to penitents who are doubtfully disposed outside the case of grave necessity; in a necessity of this kind, however, absolution under condition can, and indeed must, be imparted. - St. Ligorius, nos. 431 and 432.

623. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Is it often expedient to defer absolution for a sufficiently disposed penitent for the sake of a remedy or experiment ⁷?

⁷ It seems to pertain to an experiment rather than to a remedy when the confessor defers absolution because of a doubt not indeed about future constancy in fulfilling some obligation, but about the present will of the penitent. To this seem in part to pertain the things which De Lugo has (On Penance, disputation 14, no. 167), where, perhaps with none of the Doctors preceding him, he institutes the question: Whether sometimes, when the confessor could believe a penitent saying that he here and now has sorrow and a purpose, he can nevertheless, FOR BETTER PROVING and confirming that purpose, defer absolution for some days. But most frequent experience advises that this way is less suitable for that end and profits altogether little. Reason confirms it. For anyone who deceives himself and the confessor by affirming that he has a will which he does not in fact have will indeed bear this patiently here and will restrain himself until he obtains absolution, just as others who deceive themselves and the confessor abstain for some time before the paschal feasts from their accustomed sins, interrupt for a little while, or rather suspend, disgraceful friendships, etc., so that they may soon obtain absolution more easily; but that deferral of absolution alone should be thought to have induced that will which perhaps was previously lacking, and consequently that the confessor should be rendered more certain of the present disposition of the penitent, there is nothing which solidly persuades this.

Reply. The solution of the question depends upon various circumstances; but attention must principally be given to the greater good of the penitent.

Hence: 1. Absolution is never to be deferred when the deferral is foreseen as more likely to harm. This is evident from what has been said. 2. Nor is it to be deferred if the penitent would incur from the deferral a mark of infamy ⁸. 3. Absolution is rarely to be deferred for a disposed penitent unless he himself accepts the deferral sufficiently easily; otherwise it would profit him with greater difficulty. For the rest, no certain rule can be established ⁹; and if at any time some deferral of absolution appears expedient, it must be made only for a brief time, for example, for three, five, or eight days, etc. Sometimes, where it can easily be done, it will be useful to defer absolution even for one day or a few hours.

⁸ Above (no. 621) the Author had already said that the same is to be done if absolution cannot be deferred without inconvenience to the penitent, as, for example, if he must lack the Sacrament for a long time, or repeat the confession before another, or undergo the burden of a long journey, or incur a mark, if not of infamy, at least of astonishment or a suspicion that absolution was denied, or lose an occasion of gaining an indulgence, etc.

2. Nevertheless, St. Alphonsus does not omit to indicate when, generally speaking, the outcome of this greater advantage can scarcely be hoped for. Thus he says (book 6, no. 463): That I may pronounce my judgment here, I say that if the penitent has relapsed on account of an intrinsic cause or frailty, as happens in sins of pollution, morose delectation, hatred, blasphemy, and the like, I think absolution should RARELY be deferred for a recidivist who is sufficiently disposed.... I said rarely; for I judge that one should not regularly depart FROM THE COMMON OPINION handed down by Sanchez, Decalogue, book 2, chapter 32, no. 45; Laymann, chapter 4, no. 10; De Lugo, disputation 14, no. 166; Filliucci, treatise 7, instruction, chapter 3; Abelly, On Penance, chapter 5, section 20, no. 3; Dicastillus, disputation 10, doubt 29; Navarrus, chapter 3, no. 21; Croix, no. 1822, with the common opinion, as he asserts; Salmanticenses, chapter 5, no. 68; Sporer, chapter 2, no. 330; Toletus, book 5, chapter 13; namely, that absolution is not to be deferred for a penitent who has relapsed from intrinsic frailty, because in such a penitent it is to be hoped more that the grace of the Sacrament will be profitable than a deferral of absolution. From this context someone could conclude that, if St. Alphonsus, while pronouncing his judgment, departs somewhat from the common opinion, he departs not so as to incline toward the more benign way, but toward the stricter one. For he signifies that he departs from the common opinion in this, that he says absolution is sometimes, although rarely, to be deferred for recidivists of this kind, while the common opinion, by his own testimony, teaches that it is not to be deferred. And to this surely someone could refer these words of the same St. Alphonsus (no. 460): I think that he by no means errs who directs himself according to opinions commonly received from Doctors of no humble reputation.

3. But that he thinks somewhat differently concerning those who are involved in some proximate occasion of sinning will recur below for fuller explanation. For now it may be noted only that when Blessed Alphonsus (no. 464) endeavors with many arguments to confirm what he had said, namely, that absolution is regularly not to be deferred for those who relapse from intrinsic frailty, because it is to be hoped that the grace of the Sacrament will profit them more than deferral of absolution, he brought forward for this purpose also these words of the Salmanticenses from the treatise On Penance, chapter 5, no. 68: Why is more to be hoped from a sinner who, through deferral, does not have grace than from one established by absolution in the friendship of God?

Moreover, the Salmanticenses in fact altogether affirm this concerning those who relapse not merely from intrinsic frailty, but also from an occasion of sinning from which they cannot separate themselves either physically or morally; and they prefer that for these also, without interposing a deferral of absolution, you rather confer the benefit of absolution and the grace of the Sacrament twice, for example, today and again after eight days. John Baptist Faure agrees with them (Theological Doubts, etc., doubt 4, section 8): Other things being equal, it is more useful for a disposed penitent to receive the Sacraments of the Church twice than once; that is, it is more useful to be absolved and also to communicate this Sunday, and again to be absolved and communicate on the following Sunday, than to do the same thing only on the following Sunday and not now. For the twofold reception of the Sacraments merits and confers greater sanctifying grace in this world, greater glory in the future world, and a richer abundance of helps for each end.

4. On this matter it will not be useless to bring forward those things which John de Dicastillo has (On Penance, disputation 10, doubt 29, nos. 573-578), and which the Salmanticenses followed: What (he says) if, various means having been tried, he still miserably relapses? Here certainly not a few are at a loss, and I confess that I have not rarely been at a loss. For what some say, that absolution is to be deferred for them several times until some correction appears, experience has proved not rarely to harm, unless it is done meanwhile as he is better instructed and the whole matter is considered according to those things which I said in disputation 6, doubt 21. Here note that which he says, as he is better instructed, and, as he has below, as he is better disposed; for this is what Father Gury had before his eyes when he presently adds that it is sometimes useful to defer absolution for one day, or for a few hours, etc., namely, when the end of the deferral is not that the penitent should at length overcome the difficulty, for example, in making restitution, in pardoning an offense, in asking pardon, in destroying an obscene book or picture, etc., but that by some pious meditation, by more fervent prayers, or by some work of piety or mercy, he may dispose himself better and receive the Sacraments with greater devotion and richer fruit.

5. Note also that Dicastillus says that experience has proved that deferral not rarely harms. Indeed, Cardenas (Theological Crisis, part 4, disputation 39, chapter 2, no. 12) thinks the contrary is to be concluded from the little story he brings forward of a certain woman who, receiving the deferral with great indignation, departed; but returned on the following day full of contrition and tears, saying: If the other confessors had acted thus with me, I would not have persisted so long in depraved morals. But you might call this argument almost childish; and St. Alphonsus will meet us, saying (no. 464): How many unhappy persons I myself have known who, on account of denied absolution, cast themselves into despair and wandered for many years alienated from the Sacraments!

6. Why, however, deferral not rarely harms, Dicastillus adds this reason also: For the rest, deferral precisely as such rarely profits and often harms..., and Confessors experience that it does not always turn out well, indeed that it often turns out badly. For thus many change their Confessor, so that now a new series of remedies may begin and they may receive the benefit of absolution for the first occasions; and if afterward it does not succeed with him, they change and proceed to another, renewing the cause and litigation from the beginning.

7. Then, returning to the method of those who think that penitents of this kind are to be absolved only several times, he says: But what is to be done if, although he does not approach another confessor nor omit confession for a year, but consults the same confessor again and more frequently and asks to be absolved, nevertheless no correction appears? Is he thus to be rejected? Or rather is he sometimes to be absolved? Surely, if he is never absolved throughout the whole year, what can that non-absolution profit, IF OTHERWISE HE IS CAPABLE HERE AND NOW when he approaches? For if he is not capable, there is no question, but it is certain that he is not to be absolved. But if HE IS CAPABLE WHEN HE APPROACHES, and it is thought that absolution is sometimes to be denied as a medicine, why so many times and not more frequently? Or why, if he is always capable, is it not always conferred upon him, especially if it is already known by experience that it is not very troublesome to him to be deprived of absolution several times? Hence I do not see what advantage that remedy can then have; indeed, it has rather the disadvantage that he is deprived of the grace of the Sacrament and of the helps which are accustomed to be given in view of its worthy reception and otherwise would not be given. On account of these and similar things, I judge (I confess) that the aforesaid remedy of denying absolution is rarely to be used; and it always seems harsh to me to deprive a penitent otherwise capable of so great a grace. Nor do I esteem the fear or trouble of denied absolution to profit so much as the helps of grace and the grace itself of imparted absolution, apart from the suitability of a time granted for better instructing and disposing him, as I have already said.

8. But that Dicastillus says these things concerning those who relapse on account of an occasion of sinning which is indeed necessary but proximate is evident from the words immediately following (loc. cit., no. 576): Therefore, in this matter, when just and reasonable causes for not removing the aforesaid occasion subsist, even if the penitent relapses more frequently, he is neither to be compelled to remove that occasion nor to be deprived of absolution, even if he is a most frequent recidivist; rather he is to be exhorted to come frequently to confession, and other means are to be employed which, with the state and opportunity of the person considered, seem expedient to a prudent Confessor, in which matter there are no, indeed scarcely can there be, any certain rules assigned.

9. He gives the reason for these things thus (ibid., no. 577): This doctrine is thus declared, insofar as it can be done by me. Either that absolution is then to be denied on account of the frequency of sinning, or on account of the occasion not avoided. Not on account of the latter, because, as we suppose, he is not bound here and now to avoid it; not on account of the former, as the argument made proves, because that denial of absolution can scarcely profit except perhaps most rarely, and the frequency of Confession and the frequent benefit of absolution will profit more. Therefore, it is to be denied on no account, IF THE PENITENT IS OTHERWISE CAPABLE.

10. Finally, he concludes the matter with these things, which the Salmanticenses also adopted (no. 578): Therefore, just as in sins in which the occasion can be removed neither morally nor physically, as happens in the sin of masturbation, the Doctors and the practice of Confessors rather have frequent confession before the same Confessor enjoined than deprive one who comes of absolution; so in these sins, in which, if not a physical, at least a moral impossibility of turning away from the occasion is found, neither the remedy of separation from the occasion nor the remedy of denying absolution seems to be exacted, since Christ instituted this Sacrament not only to blot out past sins but to guard against future ones. But when absolution is denied, or (which is the same in the present matter) deferred, the Sacrament is denied, and consequently the remedy instituted by Christ against future sins. But who ever saw that it is necessary to deprive a sick person, otherwise capable of the remedy, of the best and greatest remedy for healing a wound, in order that the wound may be healed? Therefore I conclude that it is scarcely necessary, when the penitent is capable of absolution, to use a remedy of this kind, unless perhaps when absolution is deferred for a brief time so that he may be disposed still more perfectly, if this is hoped for, to receive... absolution.... For correction can rarely be hoped for from mere deferral of absolution. And surely I do not see why more is to be hoped (these are the words first transcribed by the Salmanticenses and afterward by St. Alphonsus) from a sinner who is merely attrite and consequently does not have the grace and friendship of God before absolution is conferred, than from that same person already established in the friendship of God through absolution conferred. But if he approaches not merely attrite but contrite, it seems much more harsh and incongruous to me to deprive one who is a friend of God and loves Him above all things, not now on account of past sins but on account of fear of future ones, of the benefit of the Sacrament and absolution.

11. But what was noted concerning the words of the Salmanticenses can likewise be noted concerning the words of the Roman Ritual, which St. Alphonsus (no. 464) likewise brings forward to prove that absolution is regularly not to be deferred for those who relapse from intrinsic frailty, and which are as follows: For those who easily relapse into sins, it will be most useful to counsel them to confess frequently. For no distinction is had here whether anyone relapses from intrinsic frailty alone or also under the impulse of some proximate occasion which cannot be avoided; nor does the same Ritual reckon either of these among those to whom it afterward says absolution is to be denied or deferred.

** To this Note, which otherwise consists almost entirely in reporting the opinions of others, the VV. oppose twenty columns (pp. 768-778), and indeed columns written in a sufficiently fervent style. But in truth not much is needed to satisfy their complaints.

First, therefore, the VV. (p. 769) are vehemently indignant because in Note no. 2 it is said that someone could conclude from the context of St. Alphonsus that St. Alphonsus, if he departs somewhat from the common opinion, does not depart so as to incline toward a more benign way, but toward a stricter one. And they add: 1. that it can escape no sensible and attentive reader that in that proposition there is merely a less correct construction, and that the word regularly, which pertains to the second part of the proposition, was transferred into the first either by a slip of the pen, an error of the copyist (thus), or of the printer. - 2. They add (p. 770) that Father Ballerini knows well what St. Alphonsus says in the texts immediately preceding and how he explains his doctrine in the Apostolic Man and the Practice of the Confessor; and hence anyone can judge whether, by a manner of acting of this kind, unworthy of a Theologian, Ballerini has preserved the rights both of truth and of Blessed Alphonsus. - 3. Finally, they take an argument (p. 770) from the fact that in the Cause of the Beatification of St. Alphonsus the Promoter of the Faith objected that the doctrine of St. Alphonsus concerning recidivists was too benign, namely, that ordinarily speaking, it profits habitual sinners, recidivists, and those in occasions more that absolution be imparted to them when they approach disposed... contrary to the mind of Alexander VII and Innocent XI.

Reply. Someone may deservedly find it marvelous that the VV. could be struck with so great an indignation for this reason alone: that someone could have believed that the holy Doctor, IF AT ANY TIME HE JUDGED that one should depart somewhat from the common opinion, inclined toward the stricter rather than the more benign way. For what? Does not the holy Doctor, in this very question concerning whether absolution is to be deferred for penitents otherwise rightly disposed, depart, as we shall presently see, from opinions which he himself calls common and most probable, inclining toward the stricter opinion? Why, then, could one think only by an absurdity that even in the disputed text the holy Doctor had departed at least somewhat from the common opinion? Indeed, since the disputed text clearly bears this sense on its face (nor were the VV. able to deny it), why could it appear so absurd to attribute to the holy Doctor the opinion which the text plainly bore on its face, that whoever did not suspect a corrupted syntax must be considered senseless and drowsy? And the VV. seem certainly to have considered too little upon whom that grave designation of a senseless and drowsy reader ultimately falls. Indeed, beginning from the edition of the year 1757, which is called the first Venetian edition after two Neapolitan ones, down to the most recent editions of our age, this text of the holy Doctor is read thus in all. Therefore, shall we regard as senseless and drowsy all those who read the Moral Work of the holy Doctor for a century and more, and indeed inquired most diligently into his doctrines, because they did not notice so enormous a fault in the syntax of the text? Let the excellent Father Haringer, the associate of the VV., bear this patiently; for he also, who prepared the Regensburg edition of 1846 and illustrated it with his Notes, suspected nothing of this perversion of syntax, and consequently he too will have to hear himself called a senseless and drowsy reader. But no more concerning point 1.

To point 2. Reply. I deny that from the immediately preceding texts it is so manifestly evident that the aforesaid fault of syntax is contained in the disputed text that only the senseless and drowsy did not see it. For in book 6, no. 463, the holy Doctor, after setting forth two opinions on the proposed question, merely adds two things: first, it is better said that no certain rule can be established in this matter; second, that I may pronounce my judgment here, I say, etc. But what is elicited from these things such that this fault should strike the eyes? Indeed, since the holy Doctor seems in a certain way to oppose his own judgment to the two opinions which he had set forth, while one of those is the one which the VV. contend is to be ascribed here to the holy Doctor, the preceding texts can rather suggest the opposite. Nor should the VV. say (p. 769) that among the Authors alleged by the holy Doctor for the common opinion there is no one who teaches that absolution is never to be deferred for those sufficiently disposed who relapse from intrinsic frailty, from whom, therefore, the holy Doctor thinks one should rarely depart. - Reply 1. Among them you have Laymann, Filliucci, Navarrus, and Toletus, from whose testimonies you will extract nothing. 2. The Salmanticenses (chapter 5, no. 68) do not treat only of recidivists from intrinsic frailty; therefore they do not pertain to the matter; indeed, concerning these they have these words: The Doctors and the practice of confessors rather have frequent confession before the same confessor enjoined than deprive one who comes of absolution. But Sporer, cited with others by the holy Doctor, has these most clear words (chapter 2, no. 330): The penitent will have to be absolved as often as he seriously proposes to amend in the future and wholly to abstain, provided that the Confessor prudently believes that he truly proposes and speaks seriously. Therefore, what the VV. assert so confidently is not true.

But as to what the VV. add, that this manner of acting is unworthy of a theologian and that the rights both of truth and of the holy Doctor were unworthily violated because the doctrine of Blessed Alphonsus could have been elicited more clearly from the Apostolic Man and the Practice of the Confessor: let it be omitted for now whether, through this comparison, the sense resulting from the Moral Work is excluded; let it also be omitted whether all the writings of the holy Doctor, indeed whether all parts of the same work, always bear altogether the same opinion, which it will surely be quite difficult to assert and defend; but let it be permitted to ask: Is sufficient discretion exercised toward the readers of the Moral Work of Blessed Alphonsus if it is exacted from them that, for every single proposition or opinion, they take upon themselves the burden of inquiring into all the Works and Opuscules of the holy Doctor, otherwise to incur the designation and accusation of a manner of acting unworthy of a theologian and of a right violated against truth and the holy Doctor? Let the excellent Father Haringer whom we praised also bear this patiently from his associates; he, when preparing the edition of the Moral Work, sometimes added notes taken from other opuscules, but nevertheless subjected no Note to the disputed text.

What of the fact that not even the holy Doctor escapes those insulting accusations? For he surely knew what he had written in the Apostolic Man and the Practice of the Confessor; he himself several times diligently reviewed his Moral Work. What, therefore, is the reason that he always preserved untouched the disputed text, which, as was said, is read in the same way in all editions, even the first? Will the VV. represent the holy Doctor himself also as senseless or drowsy?

To point 3, finally. Reply. Let the antecedent pass, and I deny the consequent. I said, let the antecedent pass, because an apt argument for solving the doubt concerning the disputed text can be taken neither from the words of the Promoter of the Faith nor from those of the Defender. I said, I deny the consequent; and let the VV. find the reason for themselves in those things which it is known happened in the cause of the Doctorate of Blessed Alphonsus. Indeed, in the Additional Summary Father Ballerini is accused once and again of having represented the holy Doctor Alphonsus, in a certain little Dissertation, by a sacrilegious and blasphemous jeer as a man not of sound mind; which nevertheless the VV. themselves confessed had fallen from their pen through a mere hallucination. From this, then, let it be argued how much weight is sometimes to be attributed to the sayings of defenders. And let these things suffice concerning the objections of the VV. against no. 2; for otherwise it pertains little to the purpose of the things said there whether or not the holy Doctor departs somewhat from the common opinion.

As regards the other parts of the preceding Note, the VV. attack for seven columns (pp. 773-776) that which is said concerning the Salmanticenses (no. 10), namely, that they adopted those things which are brought forward there from Dicastillus. For after filling almost three solid columns, almost beside the matter, with texts of the Salmanticenses, they conclude (pp. 774-775) that the Salmanticenses hold a middle way between Thomas Hurtado and Dicastillus and approve neither opinion. Father Ballerini (they say, p. 775) affirms that the Salmanticenses follow the opinion of Dicastillus; but the opposite is manifestly evident from the text brought forward.

Let us therefore subjoin this text (On Penance, chapter 5, no. 68): Although absolutely speaking the remedy of deferring absolution greatly pleases Thomas Hurtado...; on the contrary, Dicastillus asserts that experience has proved this sharp remedy not rarely to harm, unless it is done meanwhile for an hour or for a time, while the penitent is better instructed or something is prescribed according to the rules of prudence; and he judges NOT WITHOUT REASON that the frequency of confession and the frequent benefit of absolution MORE FREQUENTLY profit; and just as, in sins in which the occasion cannot be wholly removed even physically, as happens in the sin of masturbation, the Doctors and the practice of Confessors rather have frequent confession before the same confessor enjoined than deprive one who comes of absolution, so in those sins in which, if not a physical, at least a moral impossibility of turning away from the occasion is found, FREQUENCY RATHER THAN DEFERRAL WILL MORE FREQUENTLY HELP THE SICK PERSON OTHERWISE CAPABLE OF THE REMEDY OF ABSOLUTION, since Christ instituted the Sacraments not only to blot out past sins but to guard against future ones. BESIDES, why is more to be hoped from a sinner who is merely attrite and consequently does not have the grace and friendship of God before absolution is conferred, than from that same person already established in the friendship of God by absolution conferred AND VERY FREQUENTLY RECEIVING THE SACRAMENTS? Thus the Salmanticenses. Now I ask: Do they not approve the doctrine of Dicastillus when they write: HE JUDGES NOT WITHOUT REASON, etc.? Do not those words marked here in capital letters, which the Salmanticenses supply to add force to the opinion of Dicastillus, indicate approval? How, therefore, do the VV. not hesitate to affirm that the opposite IS MANIFESTLY EVIDENT from the text brought forward?

The VV. (p. 775) bring forward the words of the Note (no. 3) concerning the Salmanticenses, that they prefer that for these also, without interposing a deferral of absolution, for example, for eight days, you rather confer the benefit of absolution and the grace of the Sacrament twice, namely, today and again after eight days; then they add: But the Salmanticenses have not even a word about this matter, and the distinguished Professor attributes to them what Father Faure says in his Doubts.

Reply. In the Note the opinion of the Salmanticenses is reported, but not word for word; otherwise, according to custom, it would have been marked in a different type. But you have their opinion repeated not once but several times, where they praise the frequent benefit of absolution and frequency of confession rather than deprivation of absolution; where they expressly say: Frequency rather than deferral will help the sick person; and finally where they praise one very frequently receiving the Sacraments.

The VV. add (p. 775): From this genuine doctrine of the Salmanticenses, which we have now explained, St. Alphonsus in no way differs.

Reply. I deny what is supposed, namely, that the genuine doctrine of the Salmanticenses is explained by the VV., as we have already seen. For the rest, to define by a decisive argument whether or not the opinion of St. Alphonsus differs from the doctrine of the Salmanticenses, it suffices to have noted this one thing. For the distinction is very well known which the holy Doctor establishes between absolving those who fall and relapse from intrinsic frailty (see Note no. 2) and absolving those who are situated in an occasion, even a necessary one: he establishes that absolution is rarely to be deferred for the former; but for the latter, when they approach confession for the first time, that it is always to be deferred, as the VV. themselves (p. 776) say in these words: Therefore the holy Doctor declares that, supposing absolution can conveniently be deferred, he himself would always defer it for a penitent situated in a necessary occasion and approaching confession for the first time. But the Salmanticenses, as is evident from their text brought forward, treat both penitents in the same way in that place, so that from the practice observed with those who fall from intrinsic frailty they deduce the practice to be observed with those who are situated in the aforesaid occasion. It is therefore manifestly false that the holy Doctor Alphonsus does not differ from the doctrine of the Salmanticenses.

And indeed the VV. make this falsity openly evident by their own words. For, as is evident from their words brought forward, the practice which pleases St. Alphonsus more is that, as often as it can conveniently be done, absolution should always be deferred for occasionaries of this kind. But the VV. themselves, as we saw above, contend (although falsely) that the Salmanticenses held a middle way between Hurtado and Dicastillus. Thus they say (p. 775): But (the Salmanticenses) approve neither opinion, but hold the middle way already indicated above, namely, that deferral is SOMETIMES expedient. Therefore, by the admission of the VV. themselves, that enormous difference stands between the doctrine of the Salmanticenses and that of St. Alphonsus which intervenes between SOMETIMES and always.

Finally, the VV. (p. 777) censure what is said in the Note (no. 5) concerning Cardenas: In part, say the VV., they have nothing to do with the matter, because Cardenas there speaks of habitual sinners; in part they are false, because Cardenas there thus concludes: But for this great prudence is required in the Confessor; for remedies which profit some can harm others on account of the different dispositions of the sick.

Reply. In the question now at issue, whether imparted absolution or deferral of absolution can profit a disposed penitent more, and indeed prescinding from those circumstances in which it is already evident even from the common opinion of the Doctors which counsel is to be preferred, in this question, I say, even St. Alphonsus judges that absolution is rarely to be deferred for habitual sinners who fall from intrinsic frailty. Since, therefore, Cardenas, by an argument taken from that little story, shows himself more severe even concerning these, his citation pertains to the matter a fortiori when occasionaries are treated.

As regards the other part of the censure: Reply. Those words of Cardenas conclude nothing. For each person frames the laws of prudence according to his own judgment, so that even those who are considered most severe think and profess that they are led by prudence. But toward which side Cardenas inclines there can be learned even from this: that when (no. 6) he poses the question concerning one who has a purpose of correction KNOWN EVEN TO THE CONFESSOR, afterward (no. 19), in order to contend against Sanchez that the grace of the Sacrament confers no greater strength for not sinning than deferral of absolution, he objects, contrary to the hypothesis of the question, that perhaps on account of a defect of purpose the Sacrament is not valid. Behold what the name of prudence is worth in the mouth of certain men.

⁹ 1. Thus wisely St. Alphonsus; for since the penitent in the case is supposed to be disposed for receiving grace in the Sacrament, and since this immense benefit ought not to be deferred except on account of some greater advantage of the penitent, the judgment must be taken from the proportionate outcome which can be expected from the deferral; and since this judgment depends upon the prudent consideration of all the circumstances, the saying of the ancients consequently holds here, that there is no science of particulars, and therefore no certain rule can be handed down. Whether it is expedient (say the Salmanticenses, On Penance, chapter 5, no. 68) here and now, abstracting from circumstances, we cannot certainly determine, since it depends upon many things which are easily varied according to the diversity of subjects; hence, after these have been maturely weighed, it will pertain to the judgment of the prudent to impart absolution here and now or to defer it for a time....

624. • QUESTION 2. Is certainty concerning the disposition of the penitent required in order that he may be absolved?

Reply 1. Absolute certainty is not required, nor even strict moral certainty, such as is required in the other Sacraments, for example, concerning the consecration of the Eucharist. The reason is that the Sacrament of Penance scarcely admits a more certain judgment of this kind.

Reply 2. A prudent judgment, or broad moral certainty, which, as St. Alphonsus says, is equivalent to prudent probability, is required and suffices. For penitents commonly display only a probability of disposition. - Thus St. Ligorius, no. 461 ¹⁰. - Suarez, disputation 32, section 2, no. 1, and others commonly. - The Catechism of the Council of Trent, no. 60, agrees, where it is read: If, after hearing the Confession, the Priest judges that neither diligence in enumerating the sins nor sorrow in detesting them has been altogether lacking to the penitent, he can be absolved.

¹⁰ ** The words of St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 461) are: It suffices that the confessor have a prudent probability concerning the disposition of the penitent and that, on the other hand, no prudent suspicion of indisposition stands in the way; otherwise scarcely anyone could be absolved, since whatever signs penitents give furnish only a probability of disposition, as Suarez rightly teaches. See the opinion of Suarez in the following Note.

625. • QUESTION 3. What are the ordinary signs of sufficient disposition?

Reply. The principal signs are the following: 1. if the penitent confesses candidly and humbly; 2. if he asserts from the heart that he is sorry for his sins and has a firm purpose of not sinning hereafter; 3. if he sincerely declares all sins, even the greater and shameful ones; 4. if he has freely approached confession from some pious motive; 5. if, from a desire of conversion, he has already ceased from sin. - Lacroix, no. 1734 ¹¹.

¹¹ St. Alphonsus (no. 460) reckons nearly all these signs among the extraordinary signs of disposition.

Those words of Suarez seem more pertinent to the matter (On Penance, disputation 32, section 2, nos. 1-2): Before (the priest) *absolves, it is necessary that he prudently and probably judge the penitent to be disposed, because otherwise he would expose himself to the danger of erring and would act without sufficient knowledge. It remains to be explained what the Confessor ought to do in order to judge this prudently and satisfy his conscience. In this it must be observed that this disposition of the penitent arises from two things, namely, displeasure with the past and a purpose for the future. And indeed, as regards displeasure, the Confessor can easily satisfy himself; because, if the penitent in the very manner of his confession and accusation gives signs of sorrow, or certainly if he is a man not very uneducated and appears well-mannered, the Confessor is bound to employ no diligence in this; he will nevertheless always do well by proposing and counseling detestation of sin; and when he does not have sufficient signs of sorrow, he can and must ask the penitent whether he detests the sin from his heart, and he is bound to believe him when he affirms it. And the same is to be said concerning a purpose for the future, when from the confession no special obligation arises of making restitution or leaving some proximate occasion of sinning, but only the common and general obligation of not sinning hereafter.... Nor is it necessary that the Confessor persuade himself and judge even probably that it will so happen that

QUESTION 4. Is the Confessor bound to arouse sorrow in the penitent?

Reply 1. Yes, if the penitent does not appear sufficiently disposed; the reason is that one who absolves an indisposed person exposes the Sacrament to the danger of frustration, but if he dismisses him without absolution, he exposes him to the danger of remaining for a long time in the state of mortal sin, or even of not returning again. - St. Ligorius, no. 608.

Reply 2. No, if the penitent appears sufficiently instructed and disposed, as are well-mannered penitents and those who confess frequently. For then the Confessor is bound to nothing, neither by reason of charity, since the penitent does not need special help, nor by reason of reverence for the Sacrament, which is exposed to no danger. - St. Ligorius, no. 608. - Laymann, chapter 13, no. 10. - Sporer, no. 792.

626. • QUESTION 5. To whom principally is absolution to be denied?

Reply. According to the Roman Ritual and St. Charles Borromeo, it is to be denied: 1. to those who give no signs of sorrow or are unwilling to amend their life; 2. to those who are unwilling to restore another's property, pay debts, repair injured honor or reputation, or repair any other grave harm, when they are able; 3. to those who are unwilling to use the remedies which are necessary for correction or for preventing a fall; 4. to those who refuse to lay aside enmities and hatreds, to pardon an offense, or to be reconciled with enemies; 5. to those who are unwilling to abstain from usury, superstitions, illicit arts and trades, or any evil work; 6. finally, to those who are unwilling to leave a proximate occasion of sinning when they can, or who provide an occasion to others ¹².

¹² You will have all these things, and many others which could easily be added, in this brief rule: namely, that absolution is to be denied to ALL and only those who refuse to fulfill some grave obligation.

627. • QUESTION 6. Can a debtor be absolved before he makes restitution?

Reply. Yes, if the Confessor discovers that the debtor is prepared to make restitution as he ought. But if the penitent has either several times not kept his promises of making restitution, or it is prudently foreseen that he will not keep his purpose, it is expedient that the Confessor exact restitution before he absolves, unless some grave reason nevertheless advises otherwise ¹³.

¹³ ** In the preceding Edition this little Note had been placed here: See concerning this question the doctrine of St. Antoninus in the Note to no. 621. But in that place these things were said concerning St. Antoninus: "St. Antoninus (part 3, title 14, chapter 19, section 19), treating of those who, as he says elsewhere (part 2, title 2, chapter 8, section 3), always procrastinate and are found annually promising the confessor that they will make restitution, and afterward do not do so, rejects the opinion of those (ibid., section 1) who thought that these persons were to be absolved under the condition of future restitution, and, admitting the opinion of William that they ought to be absolved simply and without condition, then adds: After the Confessor has considered that such persons have done this several times, perhaps it would be a good precaution to tell such persons that they should first make restitution and afterward come to confession, or for absolution." This opinion of St. Antoninus indeed confirms what Father Gury has, namely, that in circumstances of this kind it is expedient for the confessor first to exact restitution, etc.

This passage of St. Antoninus stung the VV. not a little, since it seems to differ from the doctrine of Daniel Concina, into whose opinion St. Alphonsus also went (book 3, no. 682, and Apostolic Man, treatise 10, no. 105), writing in the latter place: When the penitent can make restitution immediately, regularly speaking we say WITH CONCINA that the confessor CANNOT absolve the debtor unless he first makes restitution. And in the other place: But the second opinion, which Father CONCINA holds, altogether pleases me, that regularly the debtor IS NOT TO BE ABSOLVED unless he first makes restitution, when restitution is morally possible for him. Therefore, concerning the preceding Note and the citation of St. Antoninus, the VV. write (p. 757): Father Ballerini badly confounds two disparate passages and badly interprets them, and supposes in St. Antoninus a most lax doctrine which neither here nor any other of the older theologians who treat diffusely of restitution hands down.

Reply. In the one place (part 3, title 14, chapter 19, section 19), St. Antoninus treats generally of those who do not perform that to which they are bound, but defer it, for example, to make restitution. But in the other place (part 2, title 2, chapter 8, section 3), he treats of those who, since they are bound to make restitution, certainly ought to live more sparingly so that they may gather what they are to restore, and nevertheless do not do so, but always procrastinate and are found annually promising the confessor, etc. Therefore, in the one place St. Antoninus touches upon the general question; in the other he touches upon a particular case which is contained under the general question. To what the VV. object, therefore, that in the Note two disparate passages are confounded, I reply with a distinction: disparate in location, I concede; disparate as regards the question, I deny. For the rest, it is sufficiently evident of itself that the words taken from the aforesaid place in part 2, always procrastinate, etc., are employed in the Note to indicate generally the condition of penitents of this kind, which St. Antoninus again indicates in the cited place from part 3, saying that such persons have done this several times, etc., and not insofar as those former words are said there of that special case.

Let us come to the accusation of bad interpretation, which appears incredible by the very fact that in the Note the mere words of St. Antoninus are reported without gloss.

The opinion of William which is indicated in the Note is contained in these words in St. Antoninus (loc. cit. from part 3): But if the priest believes or doubts that the one confessing will not perform the penance, or that to which he is otherwise bound, such as to make restitution or the like, William says that the Confessor ought not on this account to exact a promise, vow, or oath, but it suffices if (the one confessing) says that he has a purpose of doing it. And thus he ought to absolve simply and without condition, after nevertheless making a declaration, if he is held suspect, that if he does not do it, he will render the fruit of confession void for himself. Thus William. Moreover, since the VV. (p. 759) say that St. Antoninus supports William (which nevertheless is not altogether true, as we shall presently see), let it be permitted to argue ad hominem thus: St. Antoninus supports William teaching that the confessor OUGHT TO ABSOLVE a penitent if, without any promise or oath, he says that he has a purpose of doing, or making restitution, however suspect the penitent may be held. Therefore, the doctrine of St. Antoninus is not the doctrine of Concina adopted by St. Alphonsus; nor does any bad interpretation appear here.

But the VV. wished to infer something else from William. It is manifest, therefore, they

We must treat: 1. of those who are situated in an occasion of sin; 2. of habitual sinners and recidivists; 3. of devout and timorous penitents. say, that (William) supposes that such a penitent is not to be absolved who, after making that declaration, received absolution and returns to confession without having made restitution. - Reply. I deny this entirely: 1. because it is asserted gratuitously; for the words of William in no way indicate or suggest it; 2. because it is in no way evident that William said these things only of one who had not broken the purpose of the preceding confession; 3. because St. Antoninus stands in the way, who judged that William's opinion, as though too general, should in some way be circumscribed or moderated by those things which we subjoin here.

For St. Antoninus, after bringing forward the opinion of William, proceeds thus: But because many deceive themselves, promising in every confession to make restitution and the like, and always defer; after the confessor has considered that such persons have done this several times, PERHAPS IT WOULD BE A GOOD PRECAUTION to tell such persons that they should first make restitution and afterward come to confession or for absolution, or to assign them some suitable time within which they ought to carry it out. Hence thus: St. Antoninus, as the adversative particle But manifestly signifies, wished to except something from William's general opinion, or wished to moderate it by some qualification. Therefore, either St. Antoninus did not grasp the force of William's opinion, or in the mind of St. Antoninus some exception or moderation of this kind seemed necessary to be added to William's opinion. But any moderation of this kind would have been superfluous if William's opinion bore the meaning which the VV. fabricate, namely, if in William's mind absolution was to be deferred, at least by way of some good precaution, for a penitent who returns without yet completing restitution. Therefore, no bad interpretation of ours has crept in here, but, from the testimony of St. Antoninus, this supposition and interpretation of the VV. is plainly gratuitous and fabricated at pleasure.

Meanwhile, from this latter text of St. Antoninus, the VV. (loc. cit.) wish to deduce that in his mind it is a good precaution for the confessor to defer absolution until the penitent has in fact made restitution, or to assign a suitable time within which he ought to carry it out, and (as the VV. infer a little later) within that time they may absolve him. - Reply. The VV. pervert the opinion of St. Antoninus under more than one head. For: 1. St. Antoninus did not say that it is a good precaution generally to defer absolution until he has made restitution, but to tell them that they should make restitution first; which supposes that this can then be done promptly and within a short time. 2. What the VV. add, that a time is to be assigned within which the confessor can absolve, bears a plainly absurd sense. For either it is supposed that within that time the thing which the penitent ought to do is to be carried out, so that, the matter having been accomplished, he can be absolved, and thus this second member of the disjunction falls back into the first; or the penitent is supposed to be absolved within that time even if he has not fulfilled his duty, and then this assignment of time becomes insipid. Therefore, that assignment of time does not pertain to deferral of absolution, but merely presents the second of the three modes by which St. Antoninus (ibid.) had said beforehand that the confessor can impose something upon the penitent, namely, by way of a declaration of a common obligation. And here it must be noted that this opinion of St. Antoninus is not restricted to the obligation of restitution, but extends to anything else which someone is bound to do. Hence he begins the paragraph by saying: The confessor imposes something upon the penitent in three ways: in one way, by way of counsel and exhortation.... In another way, by way of a declaration of a common obligation.... In a third way, by way of special satisfaction for things committed....

Furthermore, the VV. (loc. cit.) think light for understanding this text of St. Antoninus is to be drawn from another place, namely, from part 2, title 2, chapter 8, section 3, where, as we said, he treats of those who, by living sparingly, ought to gather something for making restitution, but who always procrastinate concerning that which they can do, and are found annually promising the confessor to make restitution, and afterward do not do so. - Reply. Perhaps the fact that the VV. use this comparison of passages will seem marvelous to someone. For if they reproached us because, by taking certain words from this passage in part 2, we badly confounded disparate passages, how do they now not hesitate themselves to have recourse to this passage, as though for them they now cease to be disparate passages? For the rest, since in the case the circumstances are such that the confessor cannot say, as above, that they should first make restitution, St. Antoninus thus applies that general rule disjunctively to these circumstances, namely, that they do not appear to be absolved unless they first act, that is, begin to put their hand to the work, or arrange the affair efficaciously so that it may have execution, that is, efficaciously resolve to put the matter into execution and determine something concerning the manner of doing it; by which things, as is evident, he does not impose the necessity of denying absolution. Hence St. Antoninus does not depart from his general norm.

Let us conclude: the doctrine of St. Antoninus and the doctrine of Concina manifestly differ from one another. The latter establishes that regularly the confessor CANNOT absolve unless the penitent has first made restitution, and does not distinguish whether he had confessed this previously and then proposed and promised it but did not keep the promise, if not several times, at least once. St. Antoninus, on the contrary, teaches only concerning those who have several times broken their purpose or faith that PERHAPS IT IS A GOOD PRECAUTION (which words present a counsel rather than a norm always and necessarily to be observed) to use either one of two remedies: namely, either to impose that they first make restitution and then come for absolution, or to fix a time within which they ought to carry out the affair, lest, by deferring the matter in the accustomed way to an uncertain time, they finally arrive, as before, at the point that they return to confession in the following year with the matter still undone. And indeed the VV., as we saw, do not hesitate to accuse the Note as though it supposes in St. Antoninus a most lax doctrine, although the mere words of St. Antoninus are reported. But perhaps it is not marvelous that the doctrine of St. Antoninus can seem most lax in comparison with the doctrine of Concina, whom the holy Doctor Alphonsus did not hesitate to call most rigorous.

the penitent will abstain from sinning; but it is sufficient that he judge that the penitent now has such a purpose, although after a brief time he is going to change it. THUS ALL AUTHORS TEACH.*

QUESTION 7. Can, or indeed must, a penitent be absolved who wishes to follow an opinion opposed to the opinion of the Confessor?

Reply. Yes, if it is truly probable, or at least if the penitent is prepared to stand by the judgment of another learned and prudent man. - Recall what was said On Conscience, volume 1, no. 78.