The Participant

I. Notion and division. The participant is distinguished in two ways: participant in the thing and participant in the unjust action, according as he either buys or receives as a gift part of the thing offered, or helps the damager in inflicting damage (St. Alphonsus, III, 571).

II. Damages to be repaired. The participant in the thing is bound as an unjust possessor of another's thing; the participant in the unjust action must restore as an unjust damager, and indeed in proportion to his influence (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.; n. 993 sq.).

Question. To what extent is it permitted, in order to avoid one's own damage, to cooperate in a damaging action? The discussion is about material cooperation, because formal cooperation is always illicit. Furthermore:

Response 1. To cooperate mediately in damage to one's neighbor is permitted for a proportionately grave cause. Thus it is permitted, for example, in order to avoid death, to hand over a sword to one who is going to kill another (St. Alphonsus, III, 571; n. 556).

Response 2. To cooperate immediately is permitted as follows:

1. It is not permitted to cooperate immediately in the killing or mutilation of another, because such cooperation is intrinsically evil (n. 556).

2. It is permitted for a grave cause to cooperate immediately in damage in goods of fortune: 1° if the cooperator has both the power and the will of repairing the damage to be inflicted; 2° if there is question of inflicting light damage; 3° if, cooperation being denied, the damage will nevertheless be inflicted by the principal author. The reason for all of these is that in the cases posited the one to be harmed is bound by charity to consent to the cooperation, so that injury ceases. Outside the enumerated cases it is not permitted to cooperate immediately, because the one to be harmed is not bound to consent, so that injury does not cease. Make exception if, from denied cooperation, some most grave evil threatens someone, for example death, mutilation, etc., because then the one to be harmed is again bound to consent; or even consent is not required, almost as if there is question of one who in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity can take another's goods, by which he averts most grave damage (St. Alphonsus, III, 571).

It is disputed whether in this last case the cooperator is bound to restitution. Others affirm, excepting the case in which the cooperator was absolutely poor, that is, poor in reality and in hope; just as one is bound who in extreme necessity took another's goods. But with St. Alphonsus it seems that the distinction must be made thus: the cooperator is not bound to restitution if he avoided damage of a higher order, for instance death, mutilation, grave infamy; he is bound if he avoided damage of the same order, that is, damage of fortune. The reason is that in the former case he did not spare his own goods, otherwise in the latter case (III, 571).

I. Negative cooperators are: 1° the silent one; 2° the one not opposing; 3° the one not manifesting. The silent one is said to be he who by speaking or warning does not prevent damage to be inflicted. The one not opposing is he who does not impede the damage that is being inflicted or omits to procure restitution to be made. The one not manifesting is he who does not denounce damage that has been inflicted (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 62, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, III, 573).

II. The requisites in order that negative cooperators be held to restore are:

1. That they ought by strictly so-called justice to have prevented the damage. Now an obligation of strictly so-called justice arises from a contract, whether express or tacit.

By express contract there are bound, for example, keepers of woods, of hunts, administrators of the goods of an institute, etc.

A tacit contract is contained in the acceptance of an imposed office which, by reason of the remuneration annexed to it, is also considered a benefit; but not in the acceptance of an office which lacks the character of a benefit, as the office of parents or of the Superior of a religious house (St. Alphonsus, III, 360, but doubt 1°). By contract, at least tacit, there are bound, for example, officials of the police, who must provide for the safety of citizens, customs guards, etc., as will be explained more below.

2. That they could have prevented the damage without grave inconvenience. I said without grave inconvenience, because commonly contracts are not entered into with a greater burden, nor do offices carry a greater burden with them.

3. That with theological fault they did not impede the damage, according to what was said in n. 995 (St. Alphonsus, III, 573; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 62, a. 7).

Corollary I. By force of natural law, owners, likewise parents or tutors, are bound to restore damages inflicted by their things which cannot govern themselves - for example by animals, by children lacking the use of reason - on account of culpable negligence; namely, by justice they are bound with moral diligence to prevent the said things from harming others.

Corollary II. By force of civil law, even if theological fault is lacking and merely juridical fault is had, commonly these are bound: 1° parents or tutors for damage inflicted by minor children living in the same household; 2° teachers and craftsmen for harm done by pupils or servants during the time in which they are under their custody; 3° masters for damage inflicted by animals, etc. Nevertheless, the law does not bind except after the sentence of a judge (n. 1009).

Corollary III. Guards of taxes who connive with those defrauding are bound to restore the value of the taxes to be paid. It is disputed whether they must also restore the fine which those defrauding, if denounced, would have had to pay. Now with St. Alphonsus (IV, 237) and others we deny, because a fine has the character of a penalty; but a penalty, of course after the sentence of a judge, is to be borne by the delinquent, not by another.

Objection. He who unjustly impedes another from obtaining a good is bound to restitution. But guards, by not denouncing those defrauding taxes, act unjustly, and therefore unjustly impede the treasury from obtaining a good, in the case from receiving a fine.

Response. He who unjustly impedes another from obtaining a good is bound to restitution if that good has the character of a penalty: I deny, because the penalty is to be borne by the delinquent himself, condemnation having been posited.

Keepers of woods, of hunts, etc., are bound to restore the damages that followed for the owner from their omission (St. Alphonsus, III, 573). "Nevertheless, the damage must be of great moment, and the owner rationally unwilling. Hence the keeper will not be bound to restore if he permits a poor person to take something away; or if the one defrauding were of such condition that he prudently presumed the owner, if he knew, would give him the faculty or would afterward ratify it; or finally, if by custom or by the patience of the Government knowing and dissimulating, it had been received that they should perform the office not so severely and with so great a burden."¹

Corollary IV. Deputies who, by not casting a vote, are the cause that an unjust law is adopted are bound to restore damages that will follow from it for citizens; not so electors who, by neglecting to elect, are the cause why an unjust deputy is elected. The reason for the former is that deputies are bound to cast a vote from an office to which remuneration is annexed. The latter must be admitted for the contrary reason.

Corollary V. Servants who culpably did not prevent damage to the master are bound to restore if there is question of a thing specially committed to them. If there is discussion of other things, they are not bound to restore damages inflicted by fellow servants, because to prevent hatreds, the prevention of damages of this sort is not considered included in the contract (St. Alphonsus, III, 344). As regards damages inflicted by outsiders, there is dispute. Some affirm, because by the very fact that they are taken into the household, they are considered to have undertaken that burden. But that is today called into doubt in law, because servants are no longer accustomed to obligate themselves beyond the limits of the works assigned. Nevertheless, attention should be paid to circumstances, which sometimes are such that the aforesaid burden is considered to have been undertaken; this can easily happen, for example, if a servant is hired by a widow.

Corollary VI. A confessor who - even culpably - merely omits to warn a penitent about restitution to be made is not held by the obligation of restitution, neither with respect to the injured person, nor with respect to the penitent who perhaps suffers damage from the omitted warning. The reason is that the confessor is not bound by justice to warn the penitent. It must be said otherwise, however, if the confessor expressly or equivalently - for example if, when questioned, he is silent or dissimulates, although the reason for being silent or dissimulating is lacking - exempts the penitent from restitution (St. Alphonsus, VI, 621).

Corollary VII. A witness, even though legitimately interrogated, who does not manifest what he knows is not bound to restore, because he is not bound by justice to open the truth. The same must be said of a witness who falsely says or swears that he knows nothing, because, although he thus says or swears, nevertheless he did not by an unjust means impede someone from obtaining a good; since even in the case he impeded someone from acquiring a good not precisely by that lie or perjury, but by opening nothing, which is not unjust (St. Alphonsus, IV, 270).

¹ Aertnys-Damen, II, n. 786.

What of one participating? - A participant is twofold: one in the prey, another in the damaging action. One participating in the prey is held to restitution of the part which he received and keeps with himself. For he is a possessor in bad faith of another's thing. One participating in the damaging action, or concurring with another, whether immediately or proximately, in physically inflicting damage, is held to restitution. For immediate cooperation, e.g., carrying off money together with a thief, helping him, is cooperation in the damage itself. But proximate cooperation is that which already begins to injure, e.g., breaking open the door of a house with a thief, and therefore contains injury and brings in the obligation of restitution; namely, unless fear of a graver evil excuses. One participating in the damaging action only mediately or remotely is excused from restitution. For mediate and remote cooperation contains no injury, and is forbidden by charity alone. Nor is it forbidden even by charity if the act in itself is not intrinsically evil, and one furnishes it to avoid grave damage. If the one inflicting damage would certainly have inflicted it in the same way without another's cooperation, the cooperator is excused from restitution, because cooperation is not understood if superfluous work is furnished; for instance, holding a ladder for one climbing, who without such help would have climbed well enough by himself. L. 563.; Billuart diss. 8, art. 13.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 7.; L. 571.; C. A. 1313.

A participant is twofold: one in the prey, another in the damaging action. Hence the following things must be established.

686. Principles. - I. A participant in the prey is held to restitution of the part which he accepted and detains with himself; this is plain from what was said above concerning the possessor of bad faith.

II. A participant in a damaging action, or one concurring with another, whether immediately or mediately, to inflict damage physically, is, generally speaking, held to restitution whenever his cooperation really influenced the substance of the damage. - St. Lig., n. 571.

III. Yet sometimes a participant in a damaging action will be excused from restitution, especially if he concurs only mediately, provided the required conditions are present, namely: 1. that the act is not intrinsically evil; 2. that it is elicited from a relatively grave cause; 3. that the good effect intended by the cooperator arises immediately from a good or at least indifferent cause ¹. Recall what was said concerning Human Acts, n. 9, and concerning Charity, n. 249. - Billuart, diss. 8, art. 13. - Carrière, n. 1197.

¹ The sense is that the immediate effect ought not of itself to be evil, although afterwards some good may be expected from an evil effect.

687. Questions. - Q. 1. Whether or when immediate cooperation in the damage of the neighbor in the matter of justice is licit?

Resp. 1. As regards damage of life, it is never licit to cooperate immediately, not even with danger to life, because it is never licit to kill an innocent person directly.

Resp. 2. As regards damage of members, it is likewise never licit, even for avoiding death, to concur immediately in the mutilation of another, unless perhaps for averting the death of that person himself.

Resp. 3. As regards damage in goods of fortune, three cases are commonly admitted in which cooperation from grave fear is licit, for the reason that the owner is not judged reasonably unwilling, namely: 1. if the one cooperating can and wishes to repair the damage, when perhaps he is held to this; 2. if grave damage would equally and certainly have been inflicted by the principal agent without the cooperator; 3. if the damage is light with respect to the owner, since I myself am not held to undergo grave inconvenience in order to prevent the light inconvenience of another.

But it is controverted whether it is licit for you to cooperate immediately in grave damage of the neighbor from most grave fear, for example, of death, if you cannot or do not wish to repair the damage. - Some deny it, because the act seems intrinsically evil, since it injures the right of the neighbor, who is deservedly supposed reasonably unwilling. And surely the injured person is held to consent to this cooperation neither from justice, which does not oblige one to preserve the life of another with so great a burden of his own, nor from charity, which also does not urge with so great an inconvenience. Billuart. - Yet others probably affirm. For one constituted in extreme necessity can steal that by which he may avoid death, because then all goods are common, as was said above, n. 616. Therefore why will he to whom death is threatened not be able to cooperate in stealing the goods of the neighbor for snatching his own life from proximate danger? - St. Lig., n. 571. - Molina, etc.

688. • Q. 2. What cause is required for mediate cooperation in the matter of justice to be licit?

Resp. It will be licit whenever the conditions indicated in principle III are present. But a not small difficulty consists in deciding when a sufficient reason for thus cooperating is found. But concerning this one must judge from equity and good. Generally the following rules will be useful, namely: 1. The greater the evil effect to follow thence, the greater reason is required. 2. The nearer the cause influences the damage, the greater reason is required. 3. A greater reason is required when the damage would not follow without your cooperation, than if it would nevertheless have happened.

689. Resolutions. - 1. Blacksmiths do not sin against justice who sell arms indiscriminately, although they know that some generally will abuse them; for otherwise commerce would be wholly taken away. But if they foresee in species that some are proximately going to abuse the aforesaid arms, they cannot sell them for ordinary profit, but a grave cause is required, according as the hope of impeding the abuse is greater or lesser ².

² If nevertheless they sold them, they would indeed sin against charity, but not against justice; for short of some special obligation from office or contract, we are not held from justice to impede the damages of others. Therefore although they sinned by selling arms, nevertheless they would not be held by the office of repairing the damage.

2. Those are exempt from all restitution and sin who, compelled by fear of grave damage, perform functions prior to the damage and influencing it only remotely, for example, placing a ladder, helping one climbing a wall...

3. The excuse is still easier if others would not be lacking who would supply the instruments necessary for the damage.

4. Indeed more probably you do not sin, nor are you held to restitution ³, if for avoiding death you return a sword deposited with you to its owner asking for it in order to kill another, although the killing of that person depends on this handing over of the sword; because your life is equivalent to the life of the neighbor. - Billuart, diss. 8, art. 13. - Vogler, n. 318. - Carrière, n. 1203, and many others, with St. Lig., n. 571, against several. - See Casus, n. 676-679.

³ The same observation recurs as above; for one returning a sword short of fear of death or of grave evil would sin against charity, but not against justice; whence the question concerning the obligation of restitution does not pertain here, as the Author also warns below, n. 690, res. 1.

533. Notion. A participant can be twofold: in the booty and in the unjust action. If the former, he must restore that which he unjustly received, as will be said below concerning the possessor of another's thing; here we treat only of the participant in an unjust action.

Now cooperation of this kind is called formal, or intentional, if the one cooperating concurs both in the action and in the unjust intention; material, if he concurs only in the wicked action. Thus he who hands over the keys of a house to a thief so that the latter may more easily steal cooperates formally; but materially, if he does this only for this end, that he may avoid his own damage, death or a wound.

534. Principles. (A) He who formally cooperates with another in an unjust action, and indeed efficaciously, is bound to restitution: for then he is the unjust, efficacious, and culpable cause of the damage inflicted, since he intends to do injury and in fact does it.

The specific malice of cooperation is taken from the nature of the sin to which concurrence is furnished, and therefore in confession this sin must be declared.

535. (B) He who materially cooperates in a damaging action is excused from sin and from the obligation of restitution, provided the act is not intrinsically evil, and moreover there is a proportionate cause for cooperating. This is clear from what was said where cooperation in general was treated.

Hence it is not licit to participate immediately in the killing of an innocent man, since this action is intrinsically evil; - nor in his mutilation, except for preserving his life or health, from what was said above, n. 308.

It is more probably licit materially and immediately to cooperate in theft in order to avoid an evil of a higher order, e.g., death; for then the owner, if he were to oppose, would not be reasonably unwilling. - Indeed this is licit from a grave cause, if the one cooperating can and wishes to repair the damage going to follow from his cooperation, - or if the damage is light, - or if equal damage would be inflicted even if cooperation were omitted: for in these cases he is not judged reasonably unwilling.

108. The participant is twofold: a) a participant in the prey, who receives part of a thing unjustly taken away; b) a participant in the action, who helps another damager in an unjust action, e.g., by providing tools to a thief, by keeping watch, etc.

a) The participant in the prey ought to restore all those things which he himself received from the thief, unjustly taken away. Therefore he is to be treated as a possessor in bad, doubtful, or good faith.⁵⁶

b) The participant in an unjust action ought to repair the damages of which his own action is the efficacious and culpable cause. But it is altogether required that theological fault have been present; otherwise the obligation of restitution does not arise, and this especially if the cooperation was only material.⁵⁷ For the participant is excused from reparation of the damage caused, provided that the required conditions are present, namely 1. that the act not be intrinsically evil; 2. that it be elicited from a relatively grave cause; 3. that the good effect intended by the cooperator arise immediately from a good or at least indifferent cause.

In practice the quantity of reparation to be made is often determined with difficulty. Let this be the general rule: if the cooperation was so necessary that without it the damaging action would have been impossible, then the cooperator is held to repair the whole damage (in solidum).⁵⁸ But if even without the cooperation the damage would have been caused, the cooperator is held to repairing only a part of the damage, and indeed according to the quantity of influence.

Authors are accustomed here to raise the question whether those are excused from fault and restitution who, on account of fear of grave detriment, cooperate in an unjust damaging action. The solution of this question cannot be given otherwise than by recurring to the principles concerning the indirect voluntary. But difficulty exists in the right application of those principles. Authors teach rather commonly: 1. that it is never lawful immediately and positively to cooperate in the unjust killing of another; 2. that it is never lawful immediately to cooperate in the unjust grave wounding of another. But if it is a question of damaging in goods of fortune, then authors do not agree. All indeed concede that remote cooperation in damaging is licit, provided that a proportionately grave cause is present. Thus, e.g., on account of fear of death or of another very grave evil, it is lawful to hold a ladder for a thief climbing up, to hand over to him the keys for opening a chest, to carry away prey already taken, and similar things.⁵⁹ Billuart⁶⁰ and the Salmanticenses⁶¹ teach that proximate cooperation in unjust damaging is illicit and intrinsically evil; on the other hand, St. Antoninus,⁶² Sporer,⁶³ St. Alphonsus,⁶⁴ Lehmkuhl,⁶⁵ and several others teach that from a very grave cause, e.g., fear of death, it is licit, and indeed rightly. For the taking away or damaging of another's thing is not unjust except insofar as the owner is reasonably unwilling. But the owner is not reasonably unwilling if I, placed in very grave necessity, cause him damage in fortune, especially if I have the intention of repairing this damage according to my powers.⁶⁶ Cf. the things said above, n. 87, concerning great goods of another to be taken away in extreme necessity.

⁵⁶ Cf. below n. 209 sqq.

⁵⁷ Cf. the things said above (I, n. 52 and 618) concerning the indirect voluntary and cooperation.

⁵⁸ What restitution in solidum is, cf. below n. 223.

⁵⁹ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 8, a. 13, § 6, dico 2.

⁶⁰ L. c. dico 1.

⁶¹ Curs. Theol. mor. tr. 21 de praec. decal. c. 8, n. 75, where the opposite opinion previously exhibited is revoked.

⁶² Summ. theol. P. 2, tit. 1, c. 12.

⁶³ De iust. tr. 4, c. 3, n. 41 and 42.

⁶⁴ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 571.

⁶⁵ Theol. mor. I, n. 1205.

⁶⁶ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 571.

315. A participant (participer; mededeelen) is so either in the thing unjustly received, or only in the unjust action or unjust receiving: the first must restore by reason of the thing received and consequently in the first place, in the same way as the receiver of another's thing; the other by reason of physical and strictly so-called cooperation toward another's damage.

By reason of intention, participation is formal if the participant consents not only to the unjust action but also to the unjust intention of the principal agent; or material, if from another intention he concurs in the unjust action. Thus he who hands over the keys of the house to a thief so that he can steal cooperates formally; but materially if he does it from the sole end that he may avoid damage to himself.

By reason of the mode in which concurrence is furnished, participation is immediate or mediate. It is immediate if someone with another posits an action by which, with no other action interposed, damage is inflicted on a third party, for example, if someone breaks open the door of a house with a thief, or removes another's thing by carrying it with him; mediate, if someone posits an action from which damage to a third party follows through the subsequent action of another and through the malice of another, for example, if someone hands over the keys of a house to a thief or supplies other means to another which the latter abuses for perpetrating injustice. These things having been posited, the following principles hold:

A. He who formally participates with another in an efficaciously unjust action is bound to restitution: for since he intends to do injury and in reality does it as co-executor or as mandatary, he is the truly unjust, efficacious, and culpable cause of the damage inflicted.

B. He who materially participates in an unjust action can be excused, provided that the action by which he cooperates is not intrinsically evil, and there is present a proportionately grave cause, as is established from the general doctrine concerning the morality of cooperation in evil (I, n. 489).

The principle per se and regularly holds of mediate cooperation alone, which consequently on account of a grave reason can quite easily be licit; but not of immediate cooperation, which generally is intrinsically evil. Hence:

1. it is never licit immediately to participate in the killing of an innocent person, since such an action is intrinsically evil;

2. it is not licit immediately to participate in the mutilation of an innocent person, unless for preserving his health or life, because in this case alone mutilation is licit;

3. it is not licit immediately to participate in calumny or in positive unjust contumely, because the actions are intrinsically evil;

4. generally it is illicit immediately to participate in another unjust action, unless probably on account of a most grave cause, for example, for avoiding death or a wound, in theft or injustice toward the external goods of fortune: for then the owner is judged to consent to this, because he would not be reasonably unwilling.

Yet this must be understood with the due restrictions necessarily to be added.² For:

² Cf. Waffelaert, De Iustitia, t. II, n. 300; Theol. Mechl., Tr. de Iure et Iustitia, n. 45, q. 2.

a) You cannot without sin concur toward damage to the goods of another so that you may preserve yourself unharmed in your own goods of the same order, unless you do this with the intention of compensating the damage; otherwise the owner would be reasonably unwilling.

b) Nor, for avoiding damage simply grave in reputation, can you cooperate in inflicting grave damage on another in fortune, unless under this condition, that you can and wish afterward to repair it, or that the same damage would equally be inflicted by the principal author without you.

c) Even if there is question of damage to be inflicted for avoiding death, mutilation, or a similar extreme evil, it does not follow from the fact that cooperation is licit that restitution ought not to be made, once the necessity has passed, by that cooperator, when he can. For those things which are taken for meeting extreme necessity are to be restored by him who is rich in hope.

A participant is twofold: one in the booty, another in the damaging action.

I say. A participant in the booty is held to restoring only that part which he accepted and retains in his possession, because only as to that is he compared to the thief. But a participant in the damaging action is held for the whole as often as his cooperation truly exerted influence on the substance of the damage and cannot be excused from formal sin; because then his action will be truly, efficaciously, and unjustly damaging. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 571. - Billuart, dissert. 8, art. 13. - Carrière, n. 1197.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. He is not held to restitution who from so grave a fear cooperates with respect to damage in the goods of fortune, whether the cooperation is mediate or immediate, so that the damage inflicted upon the neighbor is much less than that which threatens you and of such a nature that the neighbor must then be judged not to be reasonably unwilling. - I said with respect to damage in the goods of fortune, because as to the goods of life, the owner must always necessarily be unwilling. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 571.

2nd. Merchants who sell weapons indiscriminately are not held to restitution, even if they know that some in general will abuse them; because since the necessity of carrying on trade excuses them from sin, necessarily it also excuses them from the obligation of restoring. But if they foresee specifically that some are proximately about to abuse the aforesaid weapons, they cannot sell them on account of ordinary gain, but a grave cause is required, according as the hope of preventing the abuse is greater or less. Cf. Vogler, n. 315.

I answer, with a distinction. 1° If they concur by mutual consent and counsel exciting one another, all are bound in solidum ; because then each is the cause not only of the partial damage which he does per se, but also of the damage which another does, and thus all as one cause flow into the whole damage. So more probably Soto, Bannez, Cajetan and others, whom Silvius cites and follows, against Paludanus, Sylvester, Navarro, etc.

2° If several concur to damage, not by common consent mutually exciting one another, but per accidens, each is bound only to his own part. As if, several laying waste a vineyard or despoiling a treasury, you arriving take your part, you are bound only to your part, and not to the parts of the others ; because you do not flow into theirs.

V. But there is a further question : whether by stealing a light part you sin mortally and are bound under mortal sin to restore this light part, if you know grave damage is being inflicted elsewhere by others or has been inflicted; nay, even if you know it not then, or learn afterward, are you likewise bound to restore your light part under mortal sin? V. g., traveling you enter a vineyard, see it already largely despoiled, or know it is soon to be despoiled, meanwhile gather one cluster and another : do you sin mortally and are you bound under mortal sin to restore these few clusters? Likewise you steal one cluster and another from an intact vineyard, not knowing what is thereafter to happen, afterward learn it was totally despoiled by thieves : are you again bound under mortal sin to restore your few clusters?

I answer, negative with Soto, Malderus, the Salmanticenses, Lessius and others; because no one sins mortally unless he has inflicted grave damage, or been the cause of grave damage inflicted by others. Yet in both proposed cases you inflicted no grave damage, nor were you the cause of grave damage inflicted by others. Therefore.

XVII. Partaking is he who takes something of the plunder, or confers some aid to the committing of the evil. Wherefore a partaker is said to be either of the unjust action or of the thing received. Partakers of the unjust action are called all who concur to the evil: as smiths by fabricating false keys, watchers keeping guard that robbers may steal in safety, those who move ladders for entering houses, those who keep, hide, or sell things taken away by theft in the robbers' name, or themselves buy them. All these are held to restitution.