Section — Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)
§ VI. On the Participant
A participant is twofold: one in the prey, another in the damaging action. Hence the following things must be established.
- Principles. - I. A participant in the prey is held to restitution of the part which he accepted and detains with himself; this is plain from what was said above concerning the possessor of bad faith.
II. A participant in a damaging action, or one concurring with another, whether immediately or mediately, to inflict damage physically, is, generally speaking, held to restitution whenever his cooperation really influenced the substance of the damage. - St. Lig., n. 571.
III. Yet sometimes a participant in a damaging action will be excused from restitution, especially if he concurs only mediately, provided the required conditions are present, namely: 1. that the act is not intrinsically evil; 2. that it is elicited from a relatively grave cause; 3. that the good effect intended by the cooperator arises immediately from a good or at least indifferent cause 1. Recall what was said concerning Human Acts, n. 9, and concerning Charity, n. 249. - Billuart, diss. 8, art. 13. - Carrière, n. 1197.
1 The sense is that the immediate effect ought not of itself to be evil, although afterwards some good may be expected from an evil effect.
- Questions. - Q. 1. Whether or when immediate cooperation in the damage of the neighbor in the matter of justice is licit?
Resp. 1. As regards damage of life, it is never licit to cooperate immediately, not even with danger to life, because it is never licit to kill an innocent person directly.
Resp. 2. As regards damage of members, it is likewise never licit, even for avoiding death, to concur immediately in the mutilation of another, unless perhaps for averting the death of that person himself.
Resp. 3. As regards damage in goods of fortune, three cases are commonly admitted in which cooperation from grave fear is licit, for the reason that the owner is not judged reasonably unwilling, namely: 1. if the one cooperating can and wishes to repair the damage, when perhaps he is held to this; 2. if grave damage would equally and certainly have been inflicted by the principal agent without the cooperator; 3. if the damage is light with respect to the owner, since I myself am not held to undergo grave inconvenience in order to prevent the light inconvenience of another.
But it is controverted whether it is licit for you to cooperate immediately in grave damage of the neighbor from most grave fear, for example, of death, if you cannot or do not wish to repair the damage. - Some deny it, because the act seems intrinsically evil, since it injures the right of the neighbor, who is deservedly supposed reasonably unwilling. And surely the injured person is held to consent to this cooperation neither from justice, which does not oblige one to preserve the life of another with so great a burden of his own, nor from charity, which also does not urge with so great an inconvenience. Billuart. - Yet others probably affirm. For one constituted in extreme necessity can steal that by which he may avoid death, because then all goods are common, as was said above, n. 616. Therefore why will he to whom death is threatened not be able to cooperate in stealing the goods of the neighbor for snatching his own life from proximate danger? - St. Lig., n. 571. - Molina, etc.
- Q. 2. What cause is required for mediate cooperation in the matter of justice to be licit?
Resp. It will be licit whenever the conditions indicated in principle III are present. But a not small difficulty consists in deciding when a sufficient reason for thus cooperating is found. But concerning this one must judge from equity and good. Generally the following rules will be useful, namely: 1. The greater the evil effect to follow thence, the greater reason is required. 2. The nearer the cause influences the damage, the greater reason is required. 3. A greater reason is required when the damage would not follow without your cooperation, than if it would nevertheless have happened.
- Resolutions. - 1. Blacksmiths do not sin against justice who sell arms indiscriminately, although they know that some generally will abuse them; for otherwise commerce would be wholly taken away. But if they foresee in species that some are proximately going to abuse the aforesaid arms, they cannot sell them for ordinary profit, but a grave cause is required, according as the hope of impeding the abuse is greater or lesser 2.
2 If nevertheless they sold them, they would indeed sin against charity, but not against justice; for short of some special obligation from office or contract, we are not held from justice to impede the damages of others. Therefore although they sinned by selling arms, nevertheless they would not be held by the office of repairing the damage.
- Those are exempt from all restitution and sin who, compelled by fear of grave damage, perform functions prior to the damage and influencing it only remotely, for example, placing a ladder, helping one climbing a wall...
- The excuse is still easier if others would not be lacking who would supply the instruments necessary for the damage.
- Indeed more probably you do not sin, nor are you held to restitution 3, if for avoiding death you return a sword deposited with you to its owner asking for it in order to kill another, although the killing of that person depends on this handing over of the sword; because your life is equivalent to the life of the neighbor. - Billuart, diss. 8, art. 13. - Vogler, n. 318. - Carrière, n. 1203, and many others, with St. Lig., n. 571, against several. - See Casus, n. 676-679.
3 The same observation recurs as above; for one returning a sword short of fear of death or of grave evil would sin against charity, but not against justice; whence the question concerning the obligation of restitution does not pertain here, as the Author also warns below, n. 690, res. 1.