6. On The Participant

108. The participant is twofold: a) a participant in the prey, who receives part of a thing unjustly taken away; b) a participant in the action, who helps another damager in an unjust action, e.g., by providing tools to a thief, by keeping watch, etc.

a) The participant in the prey ought to restore all those things which he himself received from the thief, unjustly taken away. Therefore he is to be treated as a possessor in bad, doubtful, or good faith.⁵⁶

b) The participant in an unjust action ought to repair the damages of which his own action is the efficacious and culpable cause. But it is altogether required that theological fault have been present; otherwise the obligation of restitution does not arise, and this especially if the cooperation was only material.⁵⁷ For the participant is excused from reparation of the damage caused, provided that the required conditions are present, namely 1. that the act not be intrinsically evil; 2. that it be elicited from a relatively grave cause; 3. that the good effect intended by the cooperator arise immediately from a good or at least indifferent cause.

In practice the quantity of reparation to be made is often determined with difficulty. Let this be the general rule: if the cooperation was so necessary that without it the damaging action would have been impossible, then the cooperator is held to repair the whole damage (in solidum).⁵⁸ But if even without the cooperation the damage would have been caused, the cooperator is held to repairing only a part of the damage, and indeed according to the quantity of influence.

Authors are accustomed here to raise the question whether those are excused from fault and restitution who, on account of fear of grave detriment, cooperate in an unjust damaging action. The solution of this question cannot be given otherwise than by recurring to the principles concerning the indirect voluntary. But difficulty exists in the right application of those principles. Authors teach rather commonly: 1. that it is never lawful immediately and positively to cooperate in the unjust killing of another; 2. that it is never lawful immediately to cooperate in the unjust grave wounding of another. But if it is a question of damaging in goods of fortune, then authors do not agree. All indeed concede that remote cooperation in damaging is licit, provided that a proportionately grave cause is present. Thus, e.g., on account of fear of death or of another very grave evil, it is lawful to hold a ladder for a thief climbing up, to hand over to him the keys for opening a chest, to carry away prey already taken, and similar things.⁵⁹ Billuart⁶⁰ and the Salmanticenses⁶¹ teach that proximate cooperation in unjust damaging is illicit and intrinsically evil; on the other hand, St. Antoninus,⁶² Sporer,⁶³ St. Alphonsus,⁶⁴ Lehmkuhl,⁶⁵ and several others teach that from a very grave cause, e.g., fear of death, it is licit, and indeed rightly. For the taking away or damaging of another's thing is not unjust except insofar as the owner is reasonably unwilling. But the owner is not reasonably unwilling if I, placed in very grave necessity, cause him damage in fortune, especially if I have the intention of repairing this damage according to my powers.⁶⁶ Cf. the things said above, n. 87, concerning great goods of another to be taken away in extreme necessity.

⁵⁶ Cf. below n. 209 sqq.

⁵⁷ Cf. the things said above (I, n. 52 and 618) concerning the indirect voluntary and cooperation.

⁵⁸ What restitution in solidum is, cf. below n. 223.

⁵⁹ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 8, a. 13, § 6, dico 2.

⁶⁰ L. c. dico 1.

⁶¹ Curs. Theol. mor. tr. 21 de praec. decal. c. 8, n. 75, where the opposite opinion previously exhibited is revoked.

⁶² Summ. theol. P. 2, tit. 1, c. 12.

⁶³ De iust. tr. 4, c. 3, n. 41 and 42.

⁶⁴ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 571.

⁶⁵ Theol. mor. I, n. 1205.

⁶⁶ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 571.