The Parts of Fortitude

275. Its nature. Fortitude is taken in a broader and in a stricter sense.

a. In the broader sense it is firmness of soul in pursuing the honorable good. In this sense fortitude is not a special virtue, but a condition of every perfect virtue. For any perfect virtue ought to effect this, that the man who possesses it, with firm and constant purpose, persevere in exercising the acts of the virtue even in difficult circumstances.

b. In the stricter and proper sense it is defined as the moral virtue which firms man in difficult things, but especially in dangers of death to be endured or repelled.

According to the doctrine of St. Thomas, he cannot be called simply brave who indeed tolerates all the annoyances of this life, but is not prepared to endure death.

276. Object. 1. a. The material object is constituted by the passions of fear and daring in dangers and labors.

a. For in arduous and terrible matters there rises in the soul either great fear, which must be restrained lest it compel one to act against right reason, or vehement daring rises, which must be curbed lest it rush rashly into dangers.

b. Therefore fortitude moderates the irascible appetite and rules it according to the prescriptions of reason. Wherefore fortitude orders man to himself, not to another.

b. The formal object is natural honesty, which shines forth in the moderation of fear and daring: for it befits the dignity of man very greatly that he be neither depressed by excessive fear nor lifted up by excessive daring.

2. The proper act of this virtue is twofold: to endure grave things, which act requires that fears be repressed, and to attack dangers, which requires that daring be curbed. The former constitutes passive fortitude, the latter active fortitude; the former is more difficult and more excellent, the latter appears more splendid.

3. The dangers concerning which fortitude is observed must be such as can be honorably undertaken and endured; but if they are not such, there is not fortitude, but rashness or ferocity, etc.

a. Primary dangers are warlike dangers, not only common ones which are justly undertaken for defending fatherland and religion, but also private ones which are unjustly brought on by wicked men in a private attack.

b. Secondary dangers are other dangers, whether of death or of other evils, e.g. mutilation, exile, diseases, chains, etc.

277. Opposed vices. The vices opposed to fortitude by defect are fearlessness and cowardice; and the vices opposed to it by excess are timidity and rashness.

a. Fearlessness, or emptiness of fear, is the vice by which one falls short in fearing: for a man empty of just fear does not fear when fear is due, nor does he fear those things which are to be feared.

b. Cowardice is the vice by which one falls short in daring: for the cowardly man does not dare to attack dangers and difficulties as and when just reason dictates.

c. Timidity is the vice by which one exceeds in fearing: for the timid man fears what he ought not to fear, or when he ought not, or more than he ought.

d. Rashness or daring is the vice by which one exceeds in daring: for the daring man attacks dangers either when it is not expedient, or in a mode in which it is not expedient.

278. Parts of fortitude. 1. Fortitude strictly such does not have subjective parts: for its matter is evils or dangers; now in the order of nature dangers are indeed diverse, but in the genus of morals they are not diverse, although some are greater than others.

2. The integral parts of fortitude are four: magnanimity, magnificence, patience, and perseverance or constancy.

a. Magnanimity is the virtue inclining to great and heroic works in every genus of virtues. Opposed to it by defect is pusillanimity; by excess, presumption, ambition, and vain glory.

b. Magnificence turns about great and costly things according to the prescription of reason. Opposed to it is smallness in doing by defect, and excessive profusion by excess.

3. The same four virtues are at the same time potential parts of fortitude: for those virtues can also be considered in other less difficult matters; now in these matters they are called potential parts of fortitude, because they imitate fortitude without attaining its perfection.

On Martyrdom.

279. Nature. 1. By the name martyrdom, in ecclesiastical usage, is understood the real testimony given to the faith by death endured. By the same name is also understood the death itself endured in testimony of the faith, as when we say that someone underwent martyrdom.

a. In the treatise on baptism, martyrdom is considered insofar as it is the baptism of blood; in the treatise on true religion, insofar as it is an argument of the true religion; in the treatise on virtues, insofar as it is an act of fortitude.

b. Although martyrdom is properly an elicited act of fortitude, nevertheless for true martyrdom, theologically accepted, it is not required that the martyr undergo death from the motive itself of fortitude, or from the honesty of this act; but this can happen from the motive of any Christian virtue whatever, e.g. from charity, from obedience toward God, for imitating the example of Christ, for attaining eternal life, or even for exercising Christian fortitude.

2. A twofold martyrdom is distinguished: one of infants, which consists in death endured before the use of reason in hatred of the faith; the other of adults, which consists in the voluntary acceptance and endurance of death in testimony of the true faith.

a. That infants are capable of martyrdom the Church teaches us, since she venerates the innocents killed for Christ as true martyrs. For the martyrdom of infants no other condition is required except that violent death be inflicted on them in hatred of the faith. This martyrdom, from a special privilege of Christ, supplies baptism, but it is neither an act of virtue nor has any merit.

b. Therefore an adult who, without voluntary acceptance of death, is killed unexpectedly by enemies of the faith is not a martyr: for he can neither place an act of fortitude nor give testimony except by voluntary acceptance of death.

280. Conditions of true martyrdom are: a. death inflicted; b. death inflicted in hatred of the faith; c. death patiently endured. The Church requires this threefold condition in order to venerate someone as a martyr.¹

1. Death inflicted: for martyrdom by its nature is testimony given by death endured. It is not required that death actually follow, but it suffices that a cause of death be inflicted from which death naturally ought to follow, unless it is divinely impeded.

a. Therefore a distinction is made between completed or perfect martyrdom and true martyrdom. St. John the Apostle underwent true martyrdom, but not completed martyrdom.

b. Death can be inflicted not only by torments or wounds, but also by poison, want, and other grave afflictions.

c. Those who die a natural death from a pious cause, e.g. in the service of those sick with pestilence, are not truly martyrs, even if they are customarily called martyrs of charity improperly. Neither the desire of martyrdom, however most ardent, nor torments of soul, even if most vehement, suffice for true martyrdom. Wherefore also the Blessed Virgin Mary is a martyr only by similitude.

2. Death inflicted in hatred of the faith: for martyrdom is testimony given to Christ by death endured; but death is not testimony given to Christ unless it is inflicted in hatred of Christ. Therefore St. Augustine says: not the punishment but the cause makes the martyr.²

But by the name faith there is understood not only the truth of faith to be believed, but also any virtue to be exercised, insofar as it is commanded and commended by God. Although it is required that death or torments be inflicted in hatred of the faith, nevertheless the nature of martyrdom is not taken away by the fact that the tyrant feigns another title, provided the cause of faith truly concurs.

a. From these things it is clear that he who does not have the true faith cannot be a martyr, nor he who dies for a philosophical truth, since it belongs to the nature of martyrdom that someone die for the true faith or for a Christian virtue. Wherefore if a heretic, whether formal or material, were to die for the defense of a true article which he believes, or for a true virtue, he would not be a martyr; for true martyrdom is an external testimony of the true faith, but he himself externally rather bears testimony against the true faith.

b. Therefore virgins killed on account of chastity are truly martyrs, just as St. John the Baptist, killed on account of his rebuke of adultery, is truly a martyr.

3. Death patiently endured without resistance: for he who resists the one inflicting death is not considered to die as a witness of Christ, but as a soldier conquered by an enemy. Moreover the martyr ought to imitate Christ, who by his passion and death was made the exemplar of martyrs; but Christ suffered without resistance.

Therefore soldiers fighting in a war of the faith, even from the purest intention, and falling, have never been regarded by the Church as martyrs, since indeed a martyr does not fight back.

¹ C. Benedict XIV, De servorum Dei beatificatione, l. 3, c. 11.

² Sermo 2, in Ps. 34, n. 13.

281. The due disposition for obtaining the effect of martyrdom is the state of grace, or at least attrition for sins committed.

a. In him who is in the state of sin, that sorrow for sins committed is required for obtaining the effect of martyrdom is clear: for without sorrow forgiveness of sins is not granted, not even through the sacraments of baptism and penance, although they were instituted first and of themselves for destroying sins; much less, therefore, through martyrdom.

b. That perfect contrition is not required, but that attrition suffices, is gathered from this, that the effects of martyrdom are not had from the work of the one working, but from the work worked, just as in baptism; but that baptism produce justice, the disposition of attrition suffices; therefore it also suffices in martyrdom. Moreover, if attrition did not suffice, martyrdom itself would never destroy grave sin.

From this condition it seems to follow that the salvation of many martyrs can be doubted, which is contrary to the persuasion of the Church, which believes that all are saved. Yet besides the fact that it will most rarely happen that a martyr does not have at least implicit attrition, the Church venerates as a saint only the martyr whom she knows to have died holily.¹

¹ Cf. Lessius, l. 3, c. 1, n. 50.

282. Effects of martyrdom. Martyrdom is a heroic act, to which by the will of Christ certain privileges are annexed.

a. The first and chief privilege is that of itself and as it were from the work worked it confers sanctifying grace on the one duly disposed and destroys every punishment: for with one voice the holy fathers teach that Christ willed martyrs to be washed white in their own blood, just as those who are baptized in water.¹ Therefore the Church does not pray for martyrs, but venerates and invokes them immediately after death, even if they were killed before baptism. To confirm this doctrine they appeal to the words of Christ: He who shall confess me before men, I also will confess him before my Father. And again: He who shall lose his soul for my sake shall find it.² He who hates his soul in this world keeps it unto eternal life.³

b. To the essential reward of eternal beatitude martyrdom adds an accidental reward, namely the aureole of martyrs, on account of the distinguished victory won over the world.

The aureole is granted on account of an excellent victory won over the enemy in this life; but there is a threefold enemy: the world, the flesh, and the devil; therefore there is a threefold excellent victory to which an aureole is given: of martyrs, who conquered the world; of virgins, who conquered the flesh; and of doctors, who conquered the devil.⁴

¹ Cf. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, l. 13, c. 7; Sermo 159, c. 1.

² Matt. 10, 32, 39.

³ John 12, 25.

⁴ St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 96, a. 1.

The Parts of Fortitude.—As has been said above, the parts of a virtue are subjective, integral and potential (see 1635, 1636).

(a) Fortitude has no subjective parts, for it is concerned with a very specialized matter, namely, the danger of death; and hence there is no room for differences of kind, although there are differences of degree (e.g., greater courage is needed to face an ignominious or cruel death than to face death amid applause or with little suffering).

(b) The integral parts of fortitude are those that are necessary for the perfect functioning of its offices in reference to major dangers (i.e., of death). Now, the first act of fortitude, namely, attack, requires greatness of soul (which makes one love the best things and despise all that is opposed to them) and greatness of deed (which makes one perform generously what was nobly willed). The second act of fortitude, namely, endurance, requires patience (that the soul be not thrown into dejection by difficulties) and steadfastness (that the soul be not turned aside from its purpose or wearied by long-continued opposition).

(c) The potential parts of fortitude are the four just named, but as exercised in reference to minor dangers.

1067. To attack and to endure are the two offices of fortitude, from what was said above, n. 1063; for fulfilling these more easily, certain virtues are joined to fortitude: namely magnanimity and magnificence, which are ordered to attacking great things; patience and constancy, which regard enduring harsh things. These must be discussed separately.

1. Magnanimity is promptness of soul for performing great acts of virtues, namely those which are worthy of great honors.

(A) It differs from ambition, which attacks great things on account of human honors; for the magnificent man wills to work those things which are great before God, because it befits a rational creature to intend not only those things which are common, but also those which are excellent. He despises riches, pleasures, honors of this world, and breathes after heavenly things. He indeed intends great honors, but such as are conferred by God: "And therefore he is not lifted up by great honors, because he does not reckon them above himself, but rather despises them... and similarly he is not broken by dishonors, but despises them, as things which he reckons are brought upon him unworthily."⁸

⁸ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 129, a. 2, ad 3.

Wherefore true magnanimity is not opposed to humility, as the Angelic Doctor excellently declares:⁹ "In man there is found something great, which he possesses from the gift of God; and some defect, which belongs to him from the infirmity of nature. Therefore magnanimity makes a man deem himself worthy of great things according to the consideration of the gifts which he possesses from God; thus if he has great virtue of soul, magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue... But humility makes a man account himself little, according to consideration of his own defect." - And so the magnanimous man relies not so much on his own powers as on divine help, and places his trust especially in God.

⁹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 129, a. 3, ad 4.

625. There are no subjective parts. The parts of a cardinal virtue can be threefold, namely, subjective, integral, and potential. But subjective parts are not customarily assigned to fortitude, insofar as it is a special virtue, because it is not divided into virtues differing in species, since it concerns a very special matter, namely, dangers of death.¹¹²⁴ Whence fortitude is called a most specific species, because it has no other species of virtues under itself. Therefore, its integral and potential parts remain to be assigned.

Integral and potential parts. The same virtues are assigned to fortitude both as integral parts and as potential parts, although considered under a diverse respect. Four parts are enumerated by St. Augustine from Cicero: confidence (fiducia), or magnanimity, magnificence, patience, and perseverance. Insofar as these four parts or virtues concern the same matter as fortitude, namely, dangers of death to be attacked and endured, they are integrating parts of fortitude, assisting toward its perfect act; but insofar as they concern less difficult matter, they are potential parts and, as it were, secondary virtues annexed to fortitude.

To the point the Angelic Doctor writes:¹¹²⁵ "There is a twofold act of fortitude, namely, to attack and to endure. Now for the act of attacking two things are required. The first of these pertains to the preparation of the soul, namely, that someone have a soul ready to attack, and with respect to this Tully posits confidence, whence he says that 'confidence is that by which the soul itself places much trust in itself, with certain hope, in great and honorable matters.' But the second pertains to the execution of the work, namely, lest someone fail in executing those things which he confidently began; and with respect to this Tully posits magnificence; whence he says that 'magnificence is the thought and administration of great and exalted matters with a certain ample and splendid proposal of soul,' that is, execution, so that administration may not fail an ample proposal. Therefore, these two, if they are restricted to the proper matter of fortitude, namely, to dangers of death, will be as integral parts of it, without which fortitude cannot exist; but if they are referred to certain other matters in which there is less difficulty, they will be virtues distinct from fortitude according to their species; nevertheless they will be joined to it as the secondary to the principal: as magnificence is posited by the Philosopher concerning great expenditures, whereas magnanimity, which seems to be the same as confidence, concerns great honors.

"For the other act of fortitude, which is to endure, two things are required. The first of these is that the soul not be broken by sadness through the difficulty of threatening evils and fall away from its greatness; and with respect to this he posits patience, whence he says that 'patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous or difficult things for the sake of honorableness or utility.' But the other is that through prolonged suffering of difficult things a man not become weary to the point of desisting, according to this: 'That you be not wearied, fainting in your minds,'¹¹²⁶ and with respect to this he posits perseverance; whence he says that 'perseverance is a stable and perpetual continuance in a reason well considered.' These two also, if they are restricted to the proper matter of fortitude, will be, as it were, integral parts of it; but if they are referred to any difficult matters whatsoever, they will be virtues distinct from fortitude; and nevertheless they are joined to it as secondary virtues to a principal one."

The individual virtues will now be treated one by one insofar as they are potential parts of fortitude.

¹¹²⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 128, a. un.

¹¹²⁵ Ib.

¹¹²⁶ Heb. 12:3.

S. Th. II-II, q. 128.

914. Parts of fortitude. - Fortitude:

A. Does not have subjective parts, or several species, because it is concerned with a very special and altogether determinate matter.

B. Has four integral parts, or conditions which concur for its act. For there is required:

a) for attacking: 1) with respect to the hoped-for end, magnanimity or confidence, which prepares for undergoing danger, so that, namely, someone has a prompt soul for attacking; and 2) with respect to the means, magnificence or strenuousness in the execution of the work, lest, namely, someone fail in the execution of those things which he has confidently begun;

b) for sustaining: 3) patience and longanimity in the undertaking of danger, lest by the difficulty of threatening evils the soul be broken through sadness and fall from its greatness; and 4) perseverance and constancy in execution, so that from the long suffering of difficulties man is not wearied to the point that he desists.

C. It also has the same four potential parts. For if they are restricted to the matter of fortitude and are concerned with dangers of death, they are integral parts without which fortitude cannot exist; but beyond this they are potential parts or annexed virtues if they are exercised in overcoming lesser dangers, and thus they imitate fortitude in secondary and less difficult matters, for example, magnificence concerning great expenditures, magnanimity concerning great honors.

Of these under this respect we must chiefly speak.

Fortitude indeed has no subjective parts, of which it might be predicated as a genus; for it is not divided into many virtues specifically distinct; it is one special virtue about a specific object; it has, however, integral parts according to those things which must concur for the act of fortitude; it has also potential parts, inasmuch as those things which fortitude observes about the most difficult matters, namely, the dangers of death, certain other virtues observe about certain other less arduous things, and these are joined to fortitude.

The integral parts of Fortitude, moreover, are four: Magnanimity, or confidence, and a certain hope implanted by virtue of surely overcoming the dangers of death. Magnificence, insofar as it signifies the constant execution of those things which one has destined in his mind by prior confidence. Patience, by which the mind is not broken by sorrow under the difficulty of imminent dangers of death. Perseverance, signifying a mind unmoved amid the dangers of death, and enduring in good even to the end. So S. Thomas loc. cit. ex Tullio lib. 2. de Invent.

5. We may notice as potential parts of Fortitude (s. vii., n. 3, p. 92), the three virtues of Magnificence, Magnanimity, and Patience. It is the part of Patience, philosophically to endure all sufferings short of death. It is the part of the former two, to dare wisely, not in a matter of life and death, but in the matter of expense, for Magnificence, and of honour, for Magnanimity. Magnificence, technically understood, observes the right measure in the expenditure of large sums of money. As being conversant with large sums, it differs from Liberality. A poor man may be liberal out of his little store, but never magnificent. It is a virtue in the rich, not to be afraid of spending largely and lavishly on a great occasion, or a grand purpose. The expense may be carried beyond what the occasion warrants: that is one vicious extreme. The other extreme would be to mar a costly work by sordid parsimony on a point of detail. It is not easy to be magnificent: in the first place, because not many are rich; and then because riches are seldom united with greatness of soul and good judgment. Something analogous to the virtue of Magnificence is shown in the generous use of great abilities, or, in the supernatural order, of great graces. The destinies of the world lie with those men who have it in their power to be magnificent.