Chapter III. On the Parts of Fortitude

625. There are no subjective parts. The parts of a cardinal virtue can be threefold, namely, subjective, integral, and potential. But subjective parts are not customarily assigned to fortitude, insofar as it is a special virtue, because it is not divided into virtues differing in species, since it concerns a very special matter, namely, dangers of death.¹¹²⁴ Whence fortitude is called a most specific species, because it has no other species of virtues under itself. Therefore, its integral and potential parts remain to be assigned.

Integral and potential parts. The same virtues are assigned to fortitude both as integral parts and as potential parts, although considered under a diverse respect. Four parts are enumerated by St. Augustine from Cicero: confidence (fiducia), or magnanimity, magnificence, patience, and perseverance. Insofar as these four parts or virtues concern the same matter as fortitude, namely, dangers of death to be attacked and endured, they are integrating parts of fortitude, assisting toward its perfect act; but insofar as they concern less difficult matter, they are potential parts and, as it were, secondary virtues annexed to fortitude.

To the point the Angelic Doctor writes:¹¹²⁵ "There is a twofold act of fortitude, namely, to attack and to endure. Now for the act of attacking two things are required. The first of these pertains to the preparation of the soul, namely, that someone have a soul ready to attack, and with respect to this Tully posits confidence, whence he says that 'confidence is that by which the soul itself places much trust in itself, with certain hope, in great and honorable matters.' But the second pertains to the execution of the work, namely, lest someone fail in executing those things which he confidently began; and with respect to this Tully posits magnificence; whence he says that 'magnificence is the thought and administration of great and exalted matters with a certain ample and splendid proposal of soul,' that is, execution, so that administration may not fail an ample proposal. Therefore, these two, if they are restricted to the proper matter of fortitude, namely, to dangers of death, will be as integral parts of it, without which fortitude cannot exist; but if they are referred to certain other matters in which there is less difficulty, they will be virtues distinct from fortitude according to their species; nevertheless they will be joined to it as the secondary to the principal: as magnificence is posited by the Philosopher concerning great expenditures, whereas magnanimity, which seems to be the same as confidence, concerns great honors.

"For the other act of fortitude, which is to endure, two things are required. The first of these is that the soul not be broken by sadness through the difficulty of threatening evils and fall away from its greatness; and with respect to this he posits patience, whence he says that 'patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous or difficult things for the sake of honorableness or utility.' But the other is that through prolonged suffering of difficult things a man not become weary to the point of desisting, according to this: 'That you be not wearied, fainting in your minds,'¹¹²⁶ and with respect to this he posits perseverance; whence he says that 'perseverance is a stable and perpetual continuance in a reason well considered.' These two also, if they are restricted to the proper matter of fortitude, will be, as it were, integral parts of it; but if they are referred to any difficult matters whatsoever, they will be virtues distinct from fortitude; and nevertheless they are joined to it as secondary virtues to a principal one."

The individual virtues will now be treated one by one insofar as they are potential parts of fortitude.

¹¹²⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 128, a. un.

¹¹²⁵ Ib.

¹¹²⁶ Heb. 12:3.