Article Third. On Fortitude.

275. Its nature. Fortitude is taken in a broader and in a stricter sense.

a. In the broader sense it is firmness of soul in pursuing the honorable good. In this sense fortitude is not a special virtue, but a condition of every perfect virtue. For any perfect virtue ought to effect this, that the man who possesses it, with firm and constant purpose, persevere in exercising the acts of the virtue even in difficult circumstances.

b. In the stricter and proper sense it is defined as the moral virtue which firms man in difficult things, but especially in dangers of death to be endured or repelled.

According to the doctrine of St. Thomas, he cannot be called simply brave who indeed tolerates all the annoyances of this life, but is not prepared to endure death.

276. Object. 1. a. The material object is constituted by the passions of fear and daring in dangers and labors.

a. For in arduous and terrible matters there rises in the soul either great fear, which must be restrained lest it compel one to act against right reason, or vehement daring rises, which must be curbed lest it rush rashly into dangers.

b. Therefore fortitude moderates the irascible appetite and rules it according to the prescriptions of reason. Wherefore fortitude orders man to himself, not to another.

b. The formal object is natural honesty, which shines forth in the moderation of fear and daring: for it befits the dignity of man very greatly that he be neither depressed by excessive fear nor lifted up by excessive daring.

2. The proper act of this virtue is twofold: to endure grave things, which act requires that fears be repressed, and to attack dangers, which requires that daring be curbed. The former constitutes passive fortitude, the latter active fortitude; the former is more difficult and more excellent, the latter appears more splendid.

3. The dangers concerning which fortitude is observed must be such as can be honorably undertaken and endured; but if they are not such, there is not fortitude, but rashness or ferocity, etc.

a. Primary dangers are warlike dangers, not only common ones which are justly undertaken for defending fatherland and religion, but also private ones which are unjustly brought on by wicked men in a private attack.

b. Secondary dangers are other dangers, whether of death or of other evils, e.g. mutilation, exile, diseases, chains, etc.

277. Opposed vices. The vices opposed to fortitude by defect are fearlessness and cowardice; and the vices opposed to it by excess are timidity and rashness.

a. Fearlessness, or emptiness of fear, is the vice by which one falls short in fearing: for a man empty of just fear does not fear when fear is due, nor does he fear those things which are to be feared.

b. Cowardice is the vice by which one falls short in daring: for the cowardly man does not dare to attack dangers and difficulties as and when just reason dictates.

c. Timidity is the vice by which one exceeds in fearing: for the timid man fears what he ought not to fear, or when he ought not, or more than he ought.

d. Rashness or daring is the vice by which one exceeds in daring: for the daring man attacks dangers either when it is not expedient, or in a mode in which it is not expedient.

278. Parts of fortitude. 1. Fortitude strictly such does not have subjective parts: for its matter is evils or dangers; now in the order of nature dangers are indeed diverse, but in the genus of morals they are not diverse, although some are greater than others.

2. The integral parts of fortitude are four: magnanimity, magnificence, patience, and perseverance or constancy.

a. Magnanimity is the virtue inclining to great and heroic works in every genus of virtues. Opposed to it by defect is pusillanimity; by excess, presumption, ambition, and vain glory.

b. Magnificence turns about great and costly things according to the prescription of reason. Opposed to it is smallness in doing by defect, and excessive profusion by excess.

3. The same four virtues are at the same time potential parts of fortitude: for those virtues can also be considered in other less difficult matters; now in these matters they are called potential parts of fortitude, because they imitate fortitude without attaining its perfection.

On Martyrdom.

279. Nature. 1. By the name martyrdom, in ecclesiastical usage, is understood the real testimony given to the faith by death endured. By the same name is also understood the death itself endured in testimony of the faith, as when we say that someone underwent martyrdom.

a. In the treatise on baptism, martyrdom is considered insofar as it is the baptism of blood; in the treatise on true religion, insofar as it is an argument of the true religion; in the treatise on virtues, insofar as it is an act of fortitude.

b. Although martyrdom is properly an elicited act of fortitude, nevertheless for true martyrdom, theologically accepted, it is not required that the martyr undergo death from the motive itself of fortitude, or from the honesty of this act; but this can happen from the motive of any Christian virtue whatever, e.g. from charity, from obedience toward God, for imitating the example of Christ, for attaining eternal life, or even for exercising Christian fortitude.

2. A twofold martyrdom is distinguished: one of infants, which consists in death endured before the use of reason in hatred of the faith; the other of adults, which consists in the voluntary acceptance and endurance of death in testimony of the true faith.

a. That infants are capable of martyrdom the Church teaches us, since she venerates the innocents killed for Christ as true martyrs. For the martyrdom of infants no other condition is required except that violent death be inflicted on them in hatred of the faith. This martyrdom, from a special privilege of Christ, supplies baptism, but it is neither an act of virtue nor has any merit.

b. Therefore an adult who, without voluntary acceptance of death, is killed unexpectedly by enemies of the faith is not a martyr: for he can neither place an act of fortitude nor give testimony except by voluntary acceptance of death.

280. Conditions of true martyrdom are: a. death inflicted; b. death inflicted in hatred of the faith; c. death patiently endured. The Church requires this threefold condition in order to venerate someone as a martyr.¹

1. Death inflicted: for martyrdom by its nature is testimony given by death endured. It is not required that death actually follow, but it suffices that a cause of death be inflicted from which death naturally ought to follow, unless it is divinely impeded.

a. Therefore a distinction is made between completed or perfect martyrdom and true martyrdom. St. John the Apostle underwent true martyrdom, but not completed martyrdom.

b. Death can be inflicted not only by torments or wounds, but also by poison, want, and other grave afflictions.

c. Those who die a natural death from a pious cause, e.g. in the service of those sick with pestilence, are not truly martyrs, even if they are customarily called martyrs of charity improperly. Neither the desire of martyrdom, however most ardent, nor torments of soul, even if most vehement, suffice for true martyrdom. Wherefore also the Blessed Virgin Mary is a martyr only by similitude.

2. Death inflicted in hatred of the faith: for martyrdom is testimony given to Christ by death endured; but death is not testimony given to Christ unless it is inflicted in hatred of Christ. Therefore St. Augustine says: not the punishment but the cause makes the martyr.²

But by the name faith there is understood not only the truth of faith to be believed, but also any virtue to be exercised, insofar as it is commanded and commended by God. Although it is required that death or torments be inflicted in hatred of the faith, nevertheless the nature of martyrdom is not taken away by the fact that the tyrant feigns another title, provided the cause of faith truly concurs.

a. From these things it is clear that he who does not have the true faith cannot be a martyr, nor he who dies for a philosophical truth, since it belongs to the nature of martyrdom that someone die for the true faith or for a Christian virtue. Wherefore if a heretic, whether formal or material, were to die for the defense of a true article which he believes, or for a true virtue, he would not be a martyr; for true martyrdom is an external testimony of the true faith, but he himself externally rather bears testimony against the true faith.

b. Therefore virgins killed on account of chastity are truly martyrs, just as St. John the Baptist, killed on account of his rebuke of adultery, is truly a martyr.

3. Death patiently endured without resistance: for he who resists the one inflicting death is not considered to die as a witness of Christ, but as a soldier conquered by an enemy. Moreover the martyr ought to imitate Christ, who by his passion and death was made the exemplar of martyrs; but Christ suffered without resistance.

Therefore soldiers fighting in a war of the faith, even from the purest intention, and falling, have never been regarded by the Church as martyrs, since indeed a martyr does not fight back.

¹ C. Benedict XIV, De servorum Dei beatificatione, l. 3, c. 11.

² Sermo 2, in Ps. 34, n. 13.

281. The due disposition for obtaining the effect of martyrdom is the state of grace, or at least attrition for sins committed.

a. In him who is in the state of sin, that sorrow for sins committed is required for obtaining the effect of martyrdom is clear: for without sorrow forgiveness of sins is not granted, not even through the sacraments of baptism and penance, although they were instituted first and of themselves for destroying sins; much less, therefore, through martyrdom.

b. That perfect contrition is not required, but that attrition suffices, is gathered from this, that the effects of martyrdom are not had from the work of the one working, but from the work worked, just as in baptism; but that baptism produce justice, the disposition of attrition suffices; therefore it also suffices in martyrdom. Moreover, if attrition did not suffice, martyrdom itself would never destroy grave sin.

From this condition it seems to follow that the salvation of many martyrs can be doubted, which is contrary to the persuasion of the Church, which believes that all are saved. Yet besides the fact that it will most rarely happen that a martyr does not have at least implicit attrition, the Church venerates as a saint only the martyr whom she knows to have died holily.¹

¹ Cf. Lessius, l. 3, c. 1, n. 50.

282. Effects of martyrdom. Martyrdom is a heroic act, to which by the will of Christ certain privileges are annexed.

a. The first and chief privilege is that of itself and as it were from the work worked it confers sanctifying grace on the one duly disposed and destroys every punishment: for with one voice the holy fathers teach that Christ willed martyrs to be washed white in their own blood, just as those who are baptized in water.¹ Therefore the Church does not pray for martyrs, but venerates and invokes them immediately after death, even if they were killed before baptism. To confirm this doctrine they appeal to the words of Christ: He who shall confess me before men, I also will confess him before my Father. And again: He who shall lose his soul for my sake shall find it.² He who hates his soul in this world keeps it unto eternal life.³

b. To the essential reward of eternal beatitude martyrdom adds an accidental reward, namely the aureole of martyrs, on account of the distinguished victory won over the world.

The aureole is granted on account of an excellent victory won over the enemy in this life; but there is a threefold enemy: the world, the flesh, and the devil; therefore there is a threefold excellent victory to which an aureole is given: of martyrs, who conquered the world; of virgins, who conquered the flesh; and of doctors, who conquered the devil.⁴

¹ Cf. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, l. 13, c. 7; Sermo 159, c. 1.

² Matt. 10, 32, 39.

³ John 12, 25.

⁴ St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 96, a. 1.