The seven circumstances

By the circumstances of an action we understand certain accidental conditions, which, as it were, surround (circumstant) and complete the substance of the action. enumerated in the doggerel line— There are seven Who, what, where, when, by what means, why, and how.

The circumstance indicated by who does not signify the agent merely as the author of the action; the action must necessarily be done by someone; but it signifies some special quality in him or condition which affects the morality of the action. Thus if a son strike his father, the circumstance of the parental relation changes the morality of the act, and makes it a sin not only against justice, but also against the fourth commandment or the virtue of piety. If a thief steals a consecrated chalice, the sacredness of the object makes the sin a sacrilegious theft, a circumstance indicated by what. And so of the rest.

It is obvious that circumstances of this kind are sources of morality, for they make the action conformable or not to the norm of morality. It is against right reason to strike anyone unjustly, but it is still more inordinate to strike a parent. At the proper time it is a good action to play in the proper place and with good playmates; if any of these circumstances be wanting, the action becomes so far bad.

How many circumstances of human acts are numbered? - Seven, and they are: who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when. "The reason of this enumeration can be taken thus. For a circumstance is said as something existing outside the substance of the act, yet in such a way that it touches the act itself in some way. But this can happen in three ways. In one way insofar as it touches the act itself. In another way insofar as it touches the cause of the act. In a third way insofar as it touches the effect. But it touches the act itself either after the manner of measure, as time and place; or after the manner of quality of the act, as the manner of acting. On the part of the effect it is when what someone has done is considered. But on the part of the cause of the act, as to the final cause, why is taken; on the part of the material cause or object, about what is taken (which is comprehended under what); on the part of the principal agent, who acted is taken; but on the part of the instrumental agent cause, by what aids is taken." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 3.

How are the aforesaid circumstances to be considered? - They are not to be taken insofar as the substance of the act depends on them, but insofar as they accidentally affect it. Otherwise they would no longer have the notion of circumstances. - Therefore:

1. Who does not signify the substance of the one acting, but his quality or condition, for example, that he is bound by a vow, joined in marriage, a public magistrate, etc. To this circumstance Lugo, De Poenit. d. 16. n. 200, brings back the habit of sin; for through it is explained how someone is disposed to sin more easily. The circumstance of person, generally speaking, does not transfer sin into another species, unless the sin is directly opposed to a union, office bringing a special obligation, vow, or state; as if a priest fornicates, it passes into sacrilege, but if he blasphemes, he is guilty only of blasphemy, just as another blaspheming. Malach. 2:1. 8; C. Trid. sess. 22. C. 1 de R.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 45. a. 4, q. 110. a. 4 ad 5; Lugo De Poenit. d. 16. s. 4.

2. What and about what likewise does not express the substance of the effect or object, but its quality or quantity, for example in theft it does not denote that the stolen thing belongs to another, for this pertains to the very substance of the act, but that it is sacred or profane, of great or small quantity, with damage thereby to a poor person, to wards, to girls to be married, with scandal of many, etc. The circumstance what and about what can easily be species-changing. But what, that is, the effect, when it is foreseen and willed, draws into its own species. To this circumstance can be brought back how often, or the multiplication of acts. Nevertheless S. Th. did not count it among the circumstances. And the reason is that circumstances are around the same act. But the number of operations does not stand around one and the same operation. For a second theft is not a circumstance of the first, or conversely; nor the third of the second, and so on. From this it follows that, because someone is no less bound to confess the second sin than the first, and no less the hundredth than any other, it is not enough to say that he stole many times, but he must explain how many times he stole, if he remembers the number; and if he does not remember, he must express how frequently, so that a probable number may be had. Lugo l. c. s. 4. § 7. s. 5. 6. 9.

3. Where does not signify bare place; for it is certain that every act of man happens somewhere; but the quality of the place, for example, that it is public, whence scandal arises; that it is sacred, whence sacrilege is had, etc. The circumstance of a sacred place, although it aggravates all sins accidentally, nevertheless draws only those into the species of grave sacrilege which are directly opposed to the sanctity of the place, or to the immunity annexed to it, such as effusions of blood or of human seed, which impede the divine worship to be exhibited there, for which the place is directly sanctified, and violent removals, which are contrary to immunity. Lugo l. c. s. 10.

4. By what aids signifies accidental instruments, or means, which the one acting used, for example, if someone used sacred vessels for poisoning, employed the aid of the devil, induced other men by command or counsel to the execution of sin. Although this circumstance sometimes seems to relate to sin merely materially, nevertheless sometimes it also changes the species. Lugo l. c. n. 475. 476.

5. Why denotes not the intrinsic end of the work, for this pertains to the substance of the act, but the extrinsic end, and that of the one acting, as if someone steals in order to get himself drunk. Why can manifestly give another species to an act. Lugo l. c. n. 477 seq.

6. How designates the accidental mode by which the interior act of the will is done, for example, intensely or remissly, from contempt, from levity, from ignorance, from fear, from passion. It also designates the mode of the exterior action, for example, that you killed by poison, by the sword, with cruelty and savagery, etc. How, although ordinarily aggravating or diminishing sin, can sometimes also give species. - Lugo l. c. n. 497 seq.; Laym. l. 3. de Iust. tr. 3. p. 3. c. 4. n. 1; Tambur. Meth. Confess. l. 2. c. 6. n. 2; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66. a. 3 ad 1, a. 4.

7. When signifies the quality or quantity of time, for example, on a feast day, of Communion, of Holy Week; for a long time, for a short time. The circumstance of sacred time aggravates sin, but does not add the grave species of sacrilege, unless it is done in contempt of the sacred time. Lugo l. c. n. 515 seq.; Lessius on q. 7; Cajetan on the same q.; L. 1. 6. n. 923; S. Th. 4. D. 32. q. 1. a. 5, q. 4. Sol. 2.

9. But there are other circumstances which essentially change the nature of the work and act and are called those changing the species. Circumstances of this sort are those which according to themselves regard a special order of reason. Thus, for example, to take another’s property has species from the character of what is another’s; for from this it is constituted in the species of theft. And if beyond this the character of place or time is considered, it will have itself in the character of a circumstance. But because reason can also order concerning place or time and other things of this sort, it happens that the condition of place concerning the object is taken as according to itself contrary to the order of reason; for example, that reason orders that injury is not to be done to a sacred place. Whence to take something belonging to another from a sacred place adds a special repugnance as regards the order of reason. And therefore the place which previously was considered as a simple circumstance is now considered as a principal condition of the object repugnant to reason.

11. Hence St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 10 ad 2, says: “a circumstance, remaining in the character of circumstance, since it has the character of an accident, does not give species; but insofar as it is changed into a principal condition of the object, according to this it gives species.” For indeed since an act, as the whole that it is, tends to the object, it is indeed specified by the object. But since it tends to a concrete object, it also attains its circumstances, and from them itself puts on various accidental qualities. But when those circumstances import some consonance or dissonance with reason, and are changed into a certain principal condition of the object, then the act, which attains the object as it is, namely according to that condition which it really has, and is specified by the object, also takes species from that condition of the object. Namely that circumstance, constituting the principal condition of the object, itself also becomes the object of the act, so that there is, as it were, a twofold act, or one act virtually twofold: one concerning the object of the act, the other concerning the object of the circumstance, as appears in theft in a sacred place; namely the taking of another’s thing, the object of the act of theft, and the injury inflicted on the sacred place, the object of the circumstance of theft. And thus the principle still stands: that an act is specified by the object; for in truth there is a twofold object which is attained by the act: since the object here is not simply this or that thing, but according as it bears relation to the order of reason; moreover both the object of the act properly such, and the circumstance of that object, will be able to be consonant with or discordant from the order of reason.

14. What, generally, are circumstances changing the species? — “A circumstance is sometimes taken as an essential difference of the object, according as it is compared to reason; and then it can give species to a moral act. — And this must be whenever a circumstance changes an act from goodness into malice; for a circumstance would not make an act evil except through this, that it is repugnant to reason.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 6 ad 4. This same thing must be whenever a circumstance changes an act from indifferent into good or evil, by giving namely the first and essential species of goodness or malice. — Thus, for example, if someone after a vow of chastity should use marriage, from that circumstance of the vow the act is changed from goodness into malice; if someone for the sake of recreation wished to ride in a church, or to hold a wedding banquet in a church, or to eat a small quantity on a fast day after several other small meals; from the circumstance of place and fast the act becomes evil from indifferent, and is constituted in a determinate species of malice. — For indeed, from the fact that a circumstance according to itself is repugnant to or fits reason, it imports malice or goodness according to itself, and bears before itself an object repugnant to or fitting to reason; and through this it places in its proper species the act which it changes into evil from good, or changes into good or into evil from indifferent. For the constitution of an act in the being of evil or good is from the object. But it is clear that the changing of an act from good into evil, from indifferent into evil or good, is a constitution in the being of evil or good.

17. How many circumstances of human acts are numbered? — R. Seven, and they are these: who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when. “The reason of this enumeration can be taken thus. For a circumstance is said as though existing outside the substance of the act, yet in such a way that it touches the act itself in some way; but this happens to be done in three ways. In one way, insofar as it touches the act itself. In another way, insofar as it touches the cause of the act. In a third way, insofar as it touches the effect. But it touches the act itself either after the manner of measure, as time and place, or after the manner of the quality of the act, as the mode of acting. On the part of the effect, as when what someone did is considered. But on the part of the cause of the act, as to the final cause, why is taken; but on the part of the material cause or object, there is taken about what (which is comprehended under what); but on the part of the principal agent, who acted is taken; but on the part of the instrumental acting cause, by what aids is taken.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 7. a. 3.

27. • Circumstances are accidental determinations of an act, without which it could exist as to substance, and which nevertheless in some way touch upon its morality. Hence circumstances are not the object of the act, because they are touched upon by the will only secondarily.

Seven classes of circumstances are numbered, expressed in this little verse:

Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when?

Namely: Who, or what sort is the agent, married, cleric, etc.? - what, or what is the accidental quality or quantity of the object? - where, or in what place, whether sacred or profane? etc. - by what aids, that is, what means, instruments, etc., did the agent use? - why, or from what end, namely extrinsic? - how, namely whether maliciously, or in good faith, whether in an intense or remiss manner, whether advertently or not? - when, that is, at what or how much time?

I say: A human act takes true morality from circumstances. The reason is that circumstances determine the act as moral, namely as having a relation of agreement or disagreement with reason and right order; indeed sometimes circumstances alone introduce agreement or disagreement of this kind into an act, as happens in acts indifferent from the object.

Hence 1. some circumstances are those which pertain to the morality of the act; - 2. others are those which contribute nothing to it, and therefore must be held wholly indifferent; - 3. others are those which leave the object in the same moral species, and others which change the species itself, or add a new species. Of the former, some aggravate the malice, but others lessen it, and do this gravely or lightly ¹.

¹ If circumstances so lessen or aggravate sin that from mortal it becomes venial, or vice versa, then they are said to transfer the act into another theological species.

YOU WILL ASK: Whether a lightly evil circumstance always corrupts the whole good act?

I answer. No. For the substance of the good act can remain unharmed notwithstanding a circumstance of this kind; whence that act is infected only in part. Thus, for example, the agent does not lose the whole merit of a good work, nor its principal part, although he may have given consent to some incident temptation of vainglory. - Billuart, diss. 4, art. 4. - See what is to be said below concerning the end, no. 30.

115. Number. Already from the most ancient times seven circumstances were customarily enumerated,⁴⁴ which are expressed in this little verse:

"Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when."

Who denotes the special quality of the person acting. For example, the morality of fornication is modified if it was done by a free person or by a person joined in marriage.

What designates the quality or quantity of the object, insofar as they influence the morality of the act. For example, theft was committed in a small or in a great quantity, in lay or ecclesiastical goods.

Where denotes the quality of place influencing morality. For example, lust committed in a profane or sacred place, in a hidden or public place.

By what aids signifies the special means employed for completing the act, insofar as they modify morality. For example, someone, employing physical coercion, violated a virgin.

Why expresses the end extrinsic to the work, on account of which the act was perpetrated. For example, to steal in order to make oneself drunk. There will be special discussion of this moral circumstance in the following paragraph.

How signifies the special moral mode by which the work was committed. For example, with vehement passion, from full deliberation, without complete advertence, etc.

When denotes the quantity or quality of time. For example, whether the work was done for a long time or briefly, at a sacred or ordinary time, etc.

All these circumstances often influence the morality of the act only lightly; and then they are not necessarily to be declared in the confession of sins. Sometimes they influence the morality of the act in absolutely no way, for example, whether someone blasphemed in the morning or evening; whether someone struck another with the right or left hand; and then let the confessor not permit circumstances of this kind of a sinful act to be narrated in confession. For they are accustomed to be useless chatterings and to harm rather than help the integrity of confession.

⁴⁴ Ibid. q. 7, a. 3.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 7.

102. Circumstance, by force of the word, signifies that which stands around something; hence it designates something extrinsic to a thing, which nevertheless touches it or approaches it according to place. Hence that which is outside the substance of an act and yet in some way touches it, as an accident of it, is called a circumstance of the act, and is therefore defined: an accident of a human act affecting it as already constituted in being.

Of the substance of theft are the man taking, the property of another, and the appropriation of it against the owner's will; but that the man be a priest or a layman, rich or poor, that he steal a sacred or profane thing, a precious or cheap thing, where he steals, in a church or in a street, are circumstances.

103. Seven circumstances are customarily enumerated: who, what, where, by what helps, why, how, when; to which Aristotle adds: about what, which by others is comprehended under what.

For circumstances can touch either the human act itself, or its cause, or its effect. The act itself is affected both by the two measures, namely place or where and time or when, and by the quality or mode of acting: how; on the part of the final cause there is the circumstance why or on account of what; on the part of the principal agent: who; on the part of the instrument: by what helps; finally, on the part of the material cause: about what, and on the part of the effect: what.

It should be noted that circumstances designate not essential but accidental conditions of place, time, mode, effect, agent, etc., likewise an accidental end.

104. Observations.

1. Circumstances must be considered by the theologian. For he considers acts 1) in order to the ultimate end, 2) according as goodness or malice, and indeed greater or lesser goodness or malice, is found in them, 3) according as they are meritorious and demeritorious. But a) human acts are proportioned to the end according as they are done with due circumstances; b) according to these they are good or evil, better and worse; indeed c) meritorious and demeritorious: for acts are voluntary, and therefore meritorious, or involuntary according to knowledge or ignorance of circumstances. Therefore.

These things will be clearer from what is to be said below.

2. The most principal of all circumstances is "on account of what," or the end, because it is the motive and object of the will; there follows the circumstance "what," which indicates the effect of the act and at the same time the quantity and quality of the object, and thus touches the very substance of the act.

3. There is not given a circumstance "how often," because it does not affect the same act but multiplies acts.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 10 and 11; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6-8.

151. A moral circumstance is an accident of a human act morally affecting it once it has already been constituted in its moral being.

For this a threefold condition is required:

1. that the act already be constituted in moral being, that is, have morality from the object independently of circumstances: for an accident supposes a substance. Thus, with respect to theft, it is not a circumstance that the thing belongs to another, but that it is notable; similarly, an act indifferent from the object has its first specific morality from a circumstance first and principally intended, which therefore becomes the object because it is intended first and per se under the notion of good or evil;

2. that the circumstance be outside the substance of the act and affect it, and therefore that it not destroy or essentially change the substantial moral being which the act has from the object, as if someone does a good act solely for an evil end: for then it would not be an accident, but would pass over into the substance and object;

3. that the circumstance attain the act according to moral being, by increasing or diminishing goodness or malice: thus that someone steals with the right hand or the left hand is a physical and indifferent circumstance; but that the thing be precious or cheap is a moral circumstance.

Now by reason of influence upon morality, some circumstances change the species, others only aggravate or diminish within the same species.

1. Several authors teach that circumstances truly and properly diminishing moral good or evil are not given; but in this there is only a different mode of speaking.

152. Principles. I. Moral circumstances changing the species are those which add to the act a goodness or malice diverse in species from that which the act has from the object, because according to themselves, separately and independently from the morality which proceeds from the object, they imply some agreement or repugnance with right reason, or a special and distinct conformity or difformity with the rules of morals: thus when someone gives alms in order to satisfy for sin, or steals a sacred thing, the circumstance of end expresses a special conformity with reason and the circumstance of the sacred expresses a special difformity. These circumstances do not remain in the notion of circumstance, but rather are considered as the principal condition of the object (or as a partial object), and become as it were the specific difference of this object: the genus is to take another's property or to give alms; the species is to take a sacred thing, to give satisfactory alms.

II. Moral circumstances only aggravating or diminishing within the same species are those which do not imply something per se agreeing with or repugnant to reason, and according to themselves express no order to the rules of morals, but only by reason of a prior circumstance or condition of the object have the morality which they suppose and only modify it, such as more and less, much and little, intensely and remissly. Thus to take much or little of itself does not express goodness or malice, but to take much or little of another's property does.

Among these some are:

1. Notably aggravating or diminishing. Such are:

a) in quantitative matter, which consists in number, weight, measure, those which, taken separately and separated from the act, suffice for mortal sin, for example, if someone beyond 100 gold coins steals another 100, or steals a gilt watch which he thinks is gold, it will be a circumstance notably aggravating the theft; on the contrary, if he steals a gold watch which he thinks is silver, it is a circumstance notably diminishing;

b) in other matters (duration, intensity, execution), those which notably exceed the ordinary mode of acting well or badly in these matters, for example, if someone perseveres in hatred for a year, or the whole night with a woman in shameless acts; or only for some instant consents to her. Sometimes they so notably increase or diminish that they render a sin from venial mortal, or from mortal venial, and thus are said to aggravate or diminish infinitely, for example, the circumstance of grave harm for one's neighbor from a slight theft, or the circumstance of half-full deliberation in blasphemy, imprecation, shameful delight.

2. Others are slightly aggravating or diminishing, such as:

a) in quantitative matter, those which, taken separately, do not suffice for mortal sin, as if someone instead of 100 francs steals either 101 or 99;

b) in other matters, those which do not much exceed the ordinary mode of acting, as if someone, angry after a quarrel, remains somewhat in hatred.

153. Practical rules follow from the aforesaid:

1. An act indifferent from the object can become good or evil from circumstances: thus to eat temperately to restore one's strength is good; to do this with excess is evil; then the circumstance passes over into the notion of object because it is first and per se intended under the notion of good or evil.

2. An act good from the object is rendered evil by circumstances, gravely or lightly, according to the degree of malice which is in them, for example, commerce in a sacred place, servile labor on the Lord's Day, marriage with a person bound by a vow of chastity. Then the circumstance becomes the principal condition or part of the object.

3. An act good or evil from the object can receive a new species of goodness or malice from circumstances, for example, one who keeps chastity from a vow contracts the goodness of chastity and of religion; one who steals a sacred thing contracts the malice of theft and sacrilege. This circumstance also becomes a condition of the object.

4. An act good or evil from the object can acquire or lose from circumstances some greater degree of goodness or malice, for example, a poor man giving alms, a man outstanding in learning who places himself after others; a priest sinning, a rich man giving alms as though compelled, a poor man committing theft. Such remain mere circumstances.

154. Observation.

From circumstances properly so called, which affect the act, there differ internal or external actions which sometimes are done during the principal action and only accompany it, without influence upon it. These are truly distinct acts, which can be evil, but do not affect the goodness of the principal action. Thus if care of the sick, communion, or hearing Mass is done also on account of sensible affection for the sick person, vainglory, curiosity, it will be an evil circumstance; on the contrary, if they are done with a movement of impatience, affection toward venial sin, distractions, these will only be evils which accompany them.

Circumstances are accidental determinations of an act, without which the act could exist as to substance, and which nevertheless in some way touch its morality. Seven classes of circumstances are numbered, expressed in this little verse:

Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when?

Namely: Who, or what sort the agent is, married, cleric, etc.? What, or what is the accidental quality or quantity of the object? Where, or in what place, whether sacred or profane, etc.? By what aids, that is, what means, instruments, etc., the agent has used? Why, or from what end, namely extrinsic? How, namely whether maliciously or in good faith, whether in an intense or remiss manner, whether advertently, or not? When, that is, at what sort of time or for how much time? Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 7, arts. 3 and 4.

I say. A human act takes true morality from circumstances. The reason is that circumstances, which cannot together with the object not be intended directly or indirectly, by that very fact affect the act insofar as it is a human act and lies under the rules of morals; but often they have a relation of agreement or disagreement with reason and right order. Therefore they affect the act in the being of morals, or as to morality; indeed sometimes the circumstances alone introduce agreement or disagreement of this kind into the act, as happens in acts indifferent from the object.

Hence, 1st, some circumstances are those which pertain to the morality of an act, others which contribute nothing to it, and which therefore are to be held wholly indifferent. 2nd. Some leave the object in the same moral species, and others change the species itself, or add a new species. 3rd. Of the former, some aggravate malice, but others diminish it, and they do this gravely or lightly. If they so aggravate that they render a sin mortal from venial, or so diminish that they render it venial from mortal, the act, remaining in the same moral species, is said to be changed as to its theological species.

Ordinarily a circumstance is said notably to aggravate malice either when to this malice, grave in itself, it adds an excess which alone would itself be a lethal sin, which in quantitative things is obvious to anyone, as if someone steals ten horses; or when one sinning notably exceeds the mode of delinquency in things not quantitative, as if a murderer cuts an enemy limb by limb.