Question II: On the Accidental Element or on Circumstances

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 7.

102. Circumstance, by force of the word, signifies that which stands around something; hence it designates something extrinsic to a thing, which nevertheless touches it or approaches it according to place. Hence that which is outside the substance of an act and yet in some way touches it, as an accident of it, is called a circumstance of the act, and is therefore defined: an accident of a human act affecting it as already constituted in being.

Of the substance of theft are the man taking, the property of another, and the appropriation of it against the owner's will; but that the man be a priest or a layman, rich or poor, that he steal a sacred or profane thing, a precious or cheap thing, where he steals, in a church or in a street, are circumstances.

103. Seven circumstances are customarily enumerated: who, what, where, by what helps, why, how, when; to which Aristotle adds: about what, which by others is comprehended under what.

For circumstances can touch either the human act itself, or its cause, or its effect. The act itself is affected both by the two measures, namely place or where and time or when, and by the quality or mode of acting: how; on the part of the final cause there is the circumstance why or on account of what; on the part of the principal agent: who; on the part of the instrument: by what helps; finally, on the part of the material cause: about what, and on the part of the effect: what.

It should be noted that circumstances designate not essential but accidental conditions of place, time, mode, effect, agent, etc., likewise an accidental end.

104. Observations.

1. Circumstances must be considered by the theologian. For he considers acts 1) in order to the ultimate end, 2) according as goodness or malice, and indeed greater or lesser goodness or malice, is found in them, 3) according as they are meritorious and demeritorious. But a) human acts are proportioned to the end according as they are done with due circumstances; b) according to these they are good or evil, better and worse; indeed c) meritorious and demeritorious: for acts are voluntary, and therefore meritorious, or involuntary according to knowledge or ignorance of circumstances. Therefore.

These things will be clearer from what is to be said below.

2. The most principal of all circumstances is "on account of what," or the end, because it is the motive and object of the will; there follows the circumstance "what," which indicates the effect of the act and at the same time the quantity and quality of the object, and thus touches the very substance of the act.

3. There is not given a circumstance "how often," because it does not affect the same act but multiplies acts.