Two Kinds of Voluntary Acts

All human acts are voluntary. The voluntary and involuntary are treated so that the diverse modes may be known according to which the will tends into its object, or according to which acts proceed from the will, because this knowledge contributes much to determining the imputability of human acts and its grades.

42. What the voluntary is. The voluntary is called that which proceeds from the will, as an effect from its cause, with previous knowledge of the intellect. Therefore two things belong to the nature of the voluntary: a. that the act proceed from the will as from its cause; b. that it be placed with the knowledge of the intellect going before.

a. Something can proceed from the will positively, or through its positive influence, or negatively, or through omission of influence.

Something can proceed positively from the will in three ways: immediately, mediately, and effectively. The elicited acts themselves of the will proceed immediately; acts commanded by the will and elicited by other powers proceed mediately; the effects of these acts proceed effectively. Thus in the throwing of a stone by which a man is wounded, the intention of doing so proceeds immediately from the will, the throwing mediately, and the wound inflicted by the stone effectively.

Omissions and their effects are said to proceed negatively from the will. If someone does not extinguish a fire set to a house, the omission of extinguishing and the effect of the house burning are said to proceed negatively from the will.

Therefore four things are said to be voluntary to us: a. elicited acts of the will; b. acts commanded by the will; c. external effects of our actions; d. omissions and their effects.

b. The voluntary differs: a. from the willed: for that is called willed which is the object of the will, even if it does not depend upon the will; but only that object is called voluntary which depends upon the will; b. from the spontaneous, which proceeds from a power with sensitive knowledge; for which reason acts of the insane, of infants, and even of brutes can be called spontaneous, but cannot be called voluntary; c. from the free or from a human act: for the voluntary abstracts from whether the act proceeds from the will freely or necessarily, but a human act is a free act.

For him who kills his enemy, both the purpose of killing and the death of the enemy are voluntary; but for him who desires the death of one killed, but does not bring it about, the desire of death is voluntary, while the death is willed. The farmer's desire for rain is voluntary; the rain is willed. But for God the rain is willed and voluntary. Therefore everything voluntary is willed, but not conversely is everything willed voluntary.

43. On the divisions of the voluntary.¹ 1. The voluntary is necessary or free, according as the act of the will is so borne into the object that the will cannot abstain from it, or so that the will can, at its pleasure, place the act or not place it.

Therefore the voluntary and the free properly differ from each other in such a way that the free is a species of the voluntary. For the voluntary generically is an act which proceeds from the will with knowledge of the intellect. But an act of this sort can proceed either in such a way that man has dominion over it, or the power also of abstaining from it, which is the free; or in such a way that he does not have dominion over it, which is the necessary. Nevertheless, in moral matters voluntary and free are used promiscuously, because in man as wayfarer there are no deliberate acts of the will which are plainly necessary.

2. The voluntary is perfect and imperfect by reason of advertence. The former is done with full advertence of the mind and therefore also with full consent of the will; the latter is done with half-full advertence of the mind and therefore also with imperfect consent of the will. The imperfect voluntary is found, for example, in acts of one half asleep, in acts which are done in great disturbance of soul.

The voluntary is not called imperfect because the will embraces the object reluctantly and only with some repugnance; this is the voluntary in a qualified sense, which belongs to the perfect voluntary. Rather it is called imperfect because the will does not fully determine itself to willing the object, for example sin. For the determination by which the will determines itself to willing the object, as to the grade of perfection, depends upon knowledge more or less unimpeded, to such a degree that without full or unimpeded knowledge there cannot be a full and perfect tendency of the will into the object, such as is required for a perfectly human act.

Therefore, for example, a man who, stirred by great anger, in a quarrel with his adversary breaks forth into blasphemies or says insults to him, does not sin gravely, because the blasphemies and insults are either first-first movements on account of the defect of advertence, or are light sins, because on account of the defect of full advertence they are not perfectly voluntary, unless perhaps the blasphemies, on account of a neglected habit of blaspheming, are grave sins.

3. The voluntary is voluntary simply and voluntary in a qualified sense. The former is that which is done with the full inclination of the will without any repugnance at all; the latter is that which is done with full inclination of the will indeed, but at the same time with some repugnance of it. For example, the martyr who offers himself to death wills death simply, that is, he would not wish not to die; and the martyr who is dragged to death wills death in a qualified sense, that is, he would wish not to die.

a. In this division two diverse acts are considered and compared with each other, one of which is done without repugnance, while the other is done with repugnance. Voluntary simply is also called pure voluntary, and voluntary in a qualified sense is called mixed voluntary, because in the same act of the will an inclination is joined with repugnance.

b. The mixed voluntary, or voluntary in a qualified sense, contains in the same act an inclination or consent of the will joined with some repugnance toward that very thing into which the consent is borne, for example the migration of one who is sent into exile. Therefore the mixed voluntary is usually called voluntary simply and involuntary in a qualified sense: voluntary simply, because the will in fact wills the thing and consents to it; involuntary in a qualified sense, because the will would choose the contrary if this were possible. For example, in one who hands over a purse to a robber, handing over the purse is voluntary simply, because he absolutely wills the handing over of the purse, but it is involuntary in a qualified sense, because he would not hand it over unless moved by fear. Likewise the unjust action of one who lends at usury is voluntary simply, because he wills it absolutely, but involuntary in a qualified sense, because he knows that it is unjust.

c. Those things which are done from fear, for example denial of the faith from fear of death, are voluntary simply and involuntary in a qualified sense. A mixed voluntary of this sort is relatively imperfect on the part of consent if it is compared with the pure voluntary, but not of itself on the part of knowledge; therefore the mixed voluntary of itself constitutes a perfectly human act.

4. The voluntary is express and tacit. The former is present when elicited consent is manifested outwardly by words or other signs, as if a superior by stated words or a nod grants or denies something. The latter is present when elicited consent is not manifested outwardly, but is only gathered to be present from some fact or from the omission of a fact, as if a superior, knowing something to be done against the law, does not prohibit it; he is considered to consent tacitly or to give permission. Hence the axiom has prevailed: he who is silent seems to consent.

a. From tacit voluntary there must be distinguished presumed voluntary, which is had when in fact no act or consent of the will is present, but because of the fittingness of the matter it is supposed to be present; for if the matter were proposed, without doubt consent would in fact be present. For example, if someone says to a young man entering a tavern, from the presumed consent of the father: your father wishes you to return home. Sometimes even the tacit voluntary is called presumed, because its existence must be gathered or presumed from external signs and circumstances.

b. Concerning the saying, "he who is silent seems to consent," these things must be noted. Silence of itself signifies neither consent nor dissent; therefore in a particular case one or the other must be gathered from the circumstances. The following rules, however, are established so that the consent or dissent of one who is silent can be presumed from the circumstances according to prudent estimation:

a. One who is silent is considered to consent in favorable matters, namely where it concerns his favor and advantage, but not in odious matters, where it concerns his burden and prejudice. Hence one who is silent when another promises him something is considered to consent; but if someone asks that something be given to him by another and that other is silent, he is not considered to consent.

b. One who is silent is considered to consent even in odious matters if, not wishing to consent, he ought and could contradict; but he is not considered to consent if he is not bound to contradict or cannot. Now he is said not to be able when he cannot without harm or great inconvenience. One who takes a thing while the owner is present and not contradicting does not commit theft, because the owner is considered to consent, unless he is silent from fear or for another reason. And if a prince or superior knows that something is being done against order and does not contradict, he is considered to consent if he could easily contradict or impede it, but not if he could not easily impede it.

5. The voluntary is in itself and in another, or in the cause, which by others is called direct and indirect voluntary, by reason of the mode in which something is intended. The first is what the will immediately intends in itself; thus, for him who deliberately kills his enemy, the death of the enemy is voluntary in itself. The other is that which is not itself intended, but whose cause is intended, and which therefore is foreseen as going to follow from something which is intended in itself and immediately as from a cause; thus to one writing evil books, the sins of the readers, which he foresees but does not intend, are voluntary in the cause.²

a. In order that something be called voluntary in itself, it is not necessary that it be desired for its own sake or as an end, but it can also be desired for the sake of another thing or as a means. Thus for a shipmaster the throwing overboard of goods is voluntary in itself, although he does not will it for its own sake, but as a means for saving the life of those sailing.³ Likewise not only the cause but also the effect together with the cause can be voluntary in itself, provided the will also wills this in itself, as in one who wills, together with medicine, also the effect of health.

b. Something can be voluntary in the cause in two ways: either because by a positive action the cause is posited from which the effect is foreseen as going to follow, and this indeed is called voluntary in a positive cause; or because by omitting an action, the cause is not removed or not impeded, although it can be impeded, and this is called voluntary in a negative cause. Let the death of innocent men in a military commander who fires cannon into a fortress, and the burning of a house in one who does not extinguish a fire set by another, serve as examples.

c. Cause here in a broader sense signifies everything in which another thing is contained, whether as an effect in a cause, or as a part in a whole, or as connected with the other, so that the will cannot desire one without being considered to desire also the other.

d. Therefore the voluntary in the cause is generally an effect which is not intended but which follows apart from intention from a cause which is voluntary in itself and is intended.

6. The voluntary is actual, virtual, habitual, by reason of the influence which the act of the will exercises upon the work, or upon the effect. Since this voluntary agrees in reality with actual, virtual, and habitual intention, it is better to set forth this division under that respect. Intention is the act or tendency of the will toward some end to be obtained through apt means.

a. Actual intention is that which exists here and now, influences the work, and is adverted to reflexively when the work is placed. Thus one who here and now wills to confer baptism and in fact confers it has actual intention in conferring baptism.

It can be twofold: explicit, if the will intends what is apprehended clearly and distinctly, as if someone intends to confer the sacrament of baptism; or implicit, if that which the will intends is in some way contained in that which is explicitly known and intended, as if one baptizing intends to do what he saw the pastor doing. The former has actual explicit intention in conferring baptism; the latter actual implicit intention.

b. Virtual intention is that which, elicited previously, continues here and now, influences the work, but is not adverted to when the work is placed. Thus one who confers baptism which he had previously proposed to confer, but now, when he confers it, no longer thinks of this proposal, has virtual intention in conferring baptism.

The influence of virtual intention is discerned from this example. If someone goes walking after setting for himself the end of the walk, he does not think of the end at each step, but the intention of the end latently continues and brings it about that each step is suitably disposed to the end. This intention is called virtual from the force or virtue by which the act or intention of the will influences the action. What that force is which flows from an act of the will previously elicited into the action now to be placed, and brings it about that the action is virtually voluntary, is explained by authors in diverse ways;⁴ but all agree in this rule to be assigned for practice, by whose aid it can be judged how long a previously elicited intention continues and influences the action: namely, a previously elicited intention influences the action as long as the agent, although he does not think about the intention, nevertheless, if asked what or why he is acting, without a new act of the will and without reflection, from the mere remembrance of the prior intention, immediately says: I am doing this, or, I am doing this for that.⁵

c. Habitual intention is that which, elicited previously, no longer exists nor influences when the work is placed. Thus one who elicited the intention of offering tomorrow's sacrifice of the Mass for a deceased friend, and thinking no more about this intention celebrates tomorrow, applies the Mass from habitual intention.

a. In order that an action proceed from intention as from its cause, the intention must be actual or virtual; habitual intention does not suffice, since this no longer perseveres when the action is placed, nor influences it.

b. Nothing prevents someone from having several intentions at once, or intending several objects at once, whether these are ordered to one another, as if someone wills medicine and through it health, or are not ordered to one another, as if someone undertakes a pious pilgrimage to venerate a saint and to visit a friend.

¹ Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 15-32. St. Thomas I-II, q. 6. Suarez, De voluntario et involuntario, disp. 10. Frins I, n. 77 ff.

² Others, who follow more exactly the way of speaking of St. Thomas, distinguish direct and indirect voluntary from voluntary in itself and in the cause, and define it so that it agrees with positive and negative voluntary. Cf. St. Thomas I-II, q. 6, a. 3; q. 77, a. 7.

³ Lehmkuhl I, n. 4.

⁴ On this matter Walsch n. 70 ff. and especially Frins I, n. 51-56 can be consulted.

⁵ Cf. Sporer-Bierbaum III, tr. 7, n. 107 ff.

44. On the involuntary. The involuntary is called that which does not proceed from the will. And since two things are required for the voluntary, consent of the will and knowledge of the intellect, it can happen in two ways that some action is involuntary to the agent: either because he is forced by an external force against the inclination of the will to place the action, as if someone is violently dragged to the shrine of an idol; or because he places the action ignorantly, as if someone kills a man thinking him to be a beast.

a. The involuntary is distinguished into negatively or privatively involuntary and positively involuntary. The former is had when no act exists in the will toward some object; the latter is had when there exists in the will toward some object an act of aversion or unwillingness.

The privatively involuntary is also called the non-voluntary. There are some who distinguish between involuntary and non-voluntary: they call involuntary what someone does while ignorant, which he would not have done if he had known, and therefore against the will; they call non-voluntary what someone indeed does while ignorant, but which he would have done even if he had known, and therefore without the will. The former is done from error, the latter with error. Thus if someone, wishing to kill a beast, kills the goat of his enemy, whom he has long intended to harm, the killing of the goat is indeed not involuntary, but nevertheless non-voluntary.

b. There is perfect and imperfect involuntary. The former is had when the will fully and, as far as lies in it, efficaciously rejects something; the latter is had when the will rejects something weakly and remissly, only with some hesitation. A temptation against faith, charity, or chastity which is entirely rejected without hesitation is perfectly involuntary; but one which is rejected with some hesitation and negligence is imperfectly involuntary.

Two Kinds of Voluntary Acts.—Having discussed human or voluntary acts in general, we shall now indicate in particular the acts that are of this kind. There are two classes of voluntary acts: (a) those elicited by the will; (b) those commanded by the will.

Acts Elicited by the Will.—The first class of acts under the control of the will are those that are performed by the will itself—i.e., that are begun and completed in that power of the soul.

There are three acts of the will that are directed to the end the will has in view, viz., wish, intention and fruition. Wish is the love or inclination of the will towards the end without any reference to the means by which it is to be obtained: this is the first act of the will. Intention is the direction of the will to the gaining of the end through certain means. Fruition is the enjoyment of the end after it has been gained: this is the last act of the will.

There are three acts of the will that are directed to the means and that follow after intention, viz., consent, election, and use. Consent follows upon the counsel of the intellect, and is an act of the will agreeing to several means as suitable for the intended end. Election follows after a practical judgment of the intellect about the means consented to, and is an act of the will which chooses one of the means in preference to the others, as being most suitable for gaining the intended end. Use is the act by which the will directs and moves the other powers to employ the particular means that has been chosen.

Acts Commanded by the Will.—The second class of acts that are under the control of the will are those that proceed, not from the will itself, but from the other powers under the direction of the will.

Acts commanded by the will are of various kinds: (a) intellectual acts, such as judgment, reasoning, etc., performed under the direction of the will, (b) sensible acts such as sight, hearing, imagination, the passions of love, hate, etc.; (c) external corporal acts, such as walking, writing, etc. None of the foregoing acts need be commanded by the will, as they may be indeliberate (see 23).

The following kinds of acts are not subject to the control of the will: (a) intellectual acts, such as the assent of the reason to self-evident truths, as regards the specification of the act; (b) sensible acts, such as the passions considered as arising from bodily dispositions before they are adverted to; (c) acts of the vegetative life, such as digestion and growth; (d) bodily movements, such as the circulation of the blood and the beating of the heart.

16. But properly and strictly such a voluntary is so not only materially, because the voluntary is narrowed to the free, but also formally, since then the act, as has also been said, is from an intrinsic principle simply, not only insofar as the will simply acts and acts on account of an end, but also insofar as from itself it is determined to acting on account of an end, since it can be toward either, as St. Thomas says; or, as the same Angelic Doctor says, it itself is what moves itself unto the end. Since, on the contrary, toward an act of which it itself is not mistress, the will is as it were applied, determined, moved unto the end from elsewhere, namely by the very instinct of nature, by God himself conferring nature, by whom the principle of its motion unto the end is impressed, as the Holy Doctor says. Hence the former act, strictly and properly speaking, is voluntary; the latter should rather be called of the will. The former is from the power of the will, namely from the will which can be toward either; the latter is only from the natural inclination of the will. Since that former free act is in reality not concerning the end, namely concerning the necessary end which we necessarily will, by the natural instinct itself, but concerning the means to be chosen for the end; hence St. Thomas constantly narrows the voluntary to the free choice of means.

5. • DIVISION. The voluntary is manifold, namely:

1. Perfect, or imperfect. The former is that which is done with full cognition and full consent of the will. But the latter is that which proceeds from somewhat obscure cognition or imperfect consent ².

² Understand: where full deliberation is not present; in which matter there can be many degrees.

2. Voluntary simply, or in a certain respect. The former is that which is done from full deliberation and inclination of the will. But the latter is that which is done with consent of the will, but with some repugnance, or some inclination of the will toward the opposite ³.

³ More commonly the Doctors employ this partition only with those acts in which there is something of the voluntary and at the same time of the involuntary; namely, when the affection of the will tends to two things which it cannot have at the same time, and therefore, concerning one, rises efficaciously and embraces it; toward the other, inefficaciously, and therefore leaves this. Concerning one there is will, concerning the other velleity; toward one the will is borne absolutely, but toward the other conditionally, namely if the former is not to be lost; and thence comes the appellation of absolute or simple will, and of will in a certain respect, namely according to some regard or inefficacious complacency.

3. Direct, or indirect ⁴. The former is that which is intended in itself, or per se, that is, that which is the immediate object of the will ⁵, as theft perpetrated by a thief, or killing intended by a malevolent murderer. The latter is called that which is not willed in itself, but in another directly willed, either as effect in cause, or as something connected with it, for example drunkenness in excessive drinking, or homicide from the rash throwing of a stone.

⁴ Others, with St. Thomas (I-II, q. 6, art. 3), understand by the name of direct and indirect voluntary that which the Author soon designates by the expressions positive and negative voluntary. But the things handed down here express another partition of the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in cause.

⁵ The immediate object of the will can also be an effect very remote, provided that it too is intended in itself. But you will call voluntary in cause that which is not indeed intended in itself, yet is foreseen to follow.

4. Positive, or negative. The former is said to be that which is from the will itself really acting, or that which requires a positive action, for instance reading. The latter is that which proceeds from the omission of an act depending on the will. Such is the omission of Mass in him who, adverting to the instant celebration of it, nevertheless continues to devote himself to study at home ⁶.

⁶ More briefly and clearly you will say that it is called positive when the will elicits an act; negative, when the will elicits no act, but remains suspended. This distinction is employed when it is asked whether omission can be given without any act of the will. See Suarez on I-II, Treatise V, Disputation 3, Section 2.

5. Express, or tacit. It is called express if it is manifested by words or signs; but tacit if it is known to be present from some fact or even omission. Thus the sins of subjects are voluntary and imputable to a Superior if he does not oppose them, when otherwise he can and ought to do it ⁷. Hence rule 43 of law: He who is silent seems to consent ⁸.

⁷ In that example you have 1. tacit voluntary, as is clear; 2. voluntary in cause (the Author calls it indirect), insofar as the sins are judged effects of correction omitted by the Superior; and 3. negative voluntary (others with St. Thomas call it indirect), insofar as the effect comes from omission.

⁸ For rightly understanding the axiom, He who is silent seems to consent, these rules can help. I. Someone is judged to consent in favorable matters. II. Likewise one silent where otherwise there intervenes some obligation or necessity of contradicting, and an available faculty for doing it; to this also pertains that saying: Knowledge and patience in those things which are of slight prejudice works consent. III. One silent, if anything is decreed unjustly or less rightly, where deliberation is made by common counsel and vote. IV. Likewise, one asked several things, who is silent concerning one thing while he refuses the rest. V. Add cases from the disposition of law, for example of a son silent in betrothals contracted for him by a parent.

Not all human actions are ethically free. There are various degrees of self-determination corresponding to the measure of knowledge with which a man acts.¹

¹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 59, art. 3: "Some things do not act from any judgment, but as if acted upon and moved by others, just as an arrow is moved toward its end by the archer. Other things act by a certain judgment, but not a free one, as do irrational animals. For a sheep flees a wolf by a certain judgment by which it considers the wolf harmful to itself; but this judgment is not free in the sheep, but implanted by nature. Only that which has intellect can act by free judgment, insofar as it knows the universal character of the good, from which it can judge this or that to be good. Hence wherever there is intellect, there is free choice."

A spontaneous or reflex action is one produced by the will without due knowledge. A spontaneous act, as such, is not ethical. "Nihil volitum nisi praecognitum." To the category of spontaneous actions belong the primary perceptions of the external and internal senses, the first stirrings of the imagination and the memory, as well as all acts performed in the state of sleep or disease, under external compulsion or in ignorance.

2. VOLUNTARY AND FREE ACTS. —An act is voluntary and free (voluntarium et liberum) if it is performed by the will with knowledge and deliberation. ² For an act to be voluntary and free, therefore, two conditions must cooperate: a) The act itself must be produced by an internal principle, i. e., the will; b) The person acting must have some knowledge of the end towards which his act tends.

² "Actus procedens a principio intrinseco seu a voluntate cum cognitione finis." —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 1.

Acts performed under external compulsion, therefore, or without knowledge of their purpose, cannot be called free.

In order that an act be entirely free, it must, moreover, be perceived by the agent in all its I parts and circumstances. When even one circumstance is unknown to the agent, the act is not free with regard to this circumstance. For instance, if a man appropriates to himself an object, not knowing that it belongs to another, he is not a thief; or if he knowingly possesses himself of the property of another without being aware of the fact that it is devoted to a sacred purpose, he is not guilty of sacrilege.

There are different degrees of voluntariness, according to the measure of reflection accompanying an act. (1) An act is positively voluntary (voluntarium positivum) if it is directly intended; negatively (voluntarium negativum) if it involves an inexcusable or culpable omission.³

³ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 71, art. 5, ad 2: "Not willing itself can be called voluntary, insofar as it is within man's power to will and not to will."

(2) An act is perfectly voluntary (voluntarium perfectum) if it proceeds from the will with full knowledge and deliberation; it is imperfectly voluntary (voluntarium imperfectum) if the knowledge and deliberation are not full.

(3) An act is immediately voluntary (voluntarium elicitum) if it is produced directly by the will; it is mediately voluntary (voluntarium imperatum) if it is dictated by the will and performed by some other faculty of mind or body.

(4) An act is expressly voluntary (voluntarium expressum) if the consent of the will is manifested by word or sign; it is tacitly voluntary (voluntarium taciturn) if the consent of the will can be deduced from some act or omission. Thus a superior wills expressly what his spoken or written command enjoins; he wills tacitly what he permits, though he be able and in duty bound to prevent it.

(5) Something is said to be willed directly or in itself (voluntarium directum s. in se) when it is in and by itself the object of the will, e. g., a premeditated crime. It is willed indirectly or in the cause (voluntarium indirectum s. in causa) when it is merely the effect of something else which is directly willed. For anything to be willed in the cause, therefore, the effects of that cause must be foreseen but not intended, for if they were intended, the action would be willed in itself or directly. A drunkard, e. g., directly wills the gratification of his appetite for strong drink; indirectly he also wills to ruin his health and squander his money, because he foresees these inevitable effects in the cause.

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6. —V. Frins, S.J., De Actibus Humanis, Vol. I, Freiburg 1897, pp. 85 sqq. —M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 34 sqq. —Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 22 sq. —Sabetti-Barrett, S.J., Compendium Theologiae Moralis, 22nd ed., New York 1915, pp. 11 sqq. —A. Sweens, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, 2nd ed., Haaren 1910, pp. 34 sqq. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, Bruges 1922, pp. 57 sqq.

49. 1. Necessary and free. The first is that which is necessarily produced by the will, so that liberty of omitting that act is lacking. A voluntary of this kind is the desire of felicity on this earth and beatific love in heaven. - The free voluntary is that which is not only immune from coercion, from natural instinct, and from determination to one without potency toward another, but which is produced by the will in such a way that there remains to it the potency of acting or not acting. Of this kind are all properly and perfectly human acts except the two necessary acts cited above. - From these declarations given it follows that everything free is voluntary, but not vice versa is everything voluntary free. For in order that the voluntary be free, it is altogether required that liberty of indifference be added.

It is not of this place to investigate more deeply the nature of a free act. Perhaps there is no more difficult question in all Theology than that concerning the nature of a free act. For our mind is scarcely able to perceive how liberty can stand together with the immutability of God; and yet it is most certain that it is so. Divine acts "ad extra" are free, indeed in the highest degree of liberty, and yet they are immutable. God perfectly knows all and each free act of all men from eternity. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is infallible, every act of every man is infallibly produced, and indeed exactly in that manner just as God foresaw from eternity. Notwithstanding this certitude, all those acts are free. Concerning the nature of liberty, from the times of St. Augustine very many heresies and controversies have arisen. Heretical opinions concerning the nature of the free act have been brought forward especially by the Jansenists, Lutherans, and Calvinists. In our times liberty is denied by very many, for example, by Determinists and Fatalists. Against them a few things are to be said here concerning the notion and existence of free choice.²⁹

²⁹ Concerning the true and false notion of liberty, Leo XIII treats in a truly excellent manner in the encyclical Libertas, June 20, 1888.

55. 5. Positive and negative voluntary. The first proceeds from the will through a positive and directly elicited act; for example, someone takes away another's property. The other consists in the voluntary omission of a due act; for example, some administrator of goods sees goods committed to him being taken away, but omits to prevent such theft. That which follows from such an omission is called by St. Thomas the indirect voluntary.⁴¹

There are still other divisions of the voluntary; for example, expressed, tacit, explicit, implicit, actual, virtual, habitual, interpretative voluntary, etc. All these indeed will be explained in their proper places, when they occur, and especially when there will be discussion of the intention necessary in contracts, vows, sacraments, etc.

⁴¹ S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 3.

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 3; q. 71, a. 5; q. 77, a. 7.

59. Notions. - Man is master not only of his willing and acting, but also of his not acting and not willing, insofar as "by willing and acting he can impede this, namely, not willing and not acting." Hence:

1. Therefore the negative and indirect voluntary always coincides with the free.

1. According to the diverse things which proceed from the will, the voluntary is rightly called positive if the placing of an act proceeds; negative if the omission of an act proceeds. For voluntary omission is not to be confused with the will of omitting; for the omission of fornication or of Mass is not voluntary to him who is held in prison, and yet he can have the will of omitting fornication or Mass, while saying within himself: I would not do it, or I would not hear it, if I could. On the contrary, omission can be voluntary even if someone does not say: I will not to hear, provided that, at the time when he can hear Mass, he voluntarily does something else. In the first case there is the placing of an act or commission, namely, of desire, which is positively voluntary (I do not will to act, that is, I will not to act); in the second case there is the omission of an act, and this is negatively voluntary (I do not will to act). Yet both can exist at the same time, when from the will of omitting someone omits a work.

The positive voluntary essentially includes an act, because it proceeds from the will through a real influx. The negative voluntary essentially does not include an act: for in its essence it is not constituted by an act but by a negation, because it is not an act but the omission of one; nevertheless this, so that it can proceed from the will, supposes a preceding or concomitant act of the will as cause or occasion of itself: for either man intends the omission itself in itself, or at least voluntarily places another act incompossible with the omitted act, such as playing, sleeping, remaining at home, when the celebration of Mass is imminent. St. Thomas says aptly, q. 71, a. 5: "If in a sin of omission there is understood only that which per se pertains to the notion of sin, then sometimes the sin of omission is... without every act, either interior or exterior... But if in a sin of omission there are also understood the causes or occasions of omitting, then it is necessary that there be some act in the sin of omission."

1. St. Thomas adds: "Judgment about things must be given according to that which is per se, and not according to that which is per accidens. Whence it can more truly be said that some sin (or voluntary thing) can be without every act."

2. By the same name of positive and negative voluntary, more recent authors call either that which proceeds from the will as from a positive cause, namely, from a voluntary act through a true and positive influence; or that which proceeds from it as from a negative cause, namely, from a voluntary omission, or that which is judged to proceed from the will not operating and omitting to act when it can and ought to act. These proceed from the will according to a diverse mode, and therefore by St. Thomas they are respectively called: the direct voluntary, that which directly proceeds from it insofar as it is acting (as heating from heat) and toward which the will is borne; and the indirect, that toward which it is not borne but which proceeds from it indirectly insofar as it could have prevented but does not prevent, or does not act when it ought to act, as the sinking of a ship is said to be from the helmsman to whom the steering was entrusted, insofar as he ceases from steering.

2. It is called indirect because the will causes it by way of removing what prevents, namely, by removing that which can impede another thing.

Therefore the direct voluntary is from the acting will; the indirect from the will not acting when it ought to act.

60. Principles. I. In order that omission be voluntary, it is required and sufficient that someone be able to place the act which is omitted and advertently omit it; nor is it required that he ought to place it. For he can just as voluntarily omit Mass on a weekday as on a feast day. But in order that it be imputed to him, something more is required: for praise, that he intended the omission for a good end, for goodness is not contracted unless it is willed and intended as such; for fault, that he ought to have placed the omitted act, for there is no fault unless someone transgresses some precept.

3. By the name of omission also comes the negation which necessarily and directly coheres with it, such as ignorance from the omission of learning, weakness of powers from the omission of eating: for such a negation seems rather one thing with the omission than its effect. Thus St. Thomas, in II Sent. d. 22, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2; and I-II, q. 76, a. 3, ad 5.

1. That the effect could and ought to have been morally foreseen, that is, that it was in some way foreseen at least confusedly, obscurely, or indistinctly, insofar as someone at least doubted or suspected that it would follow, or knew the obligation of adverting: for nothing is willed unless it is foreknown;

2. That it could have been avoided, and therefore that the omission freely took place: for the effect is not more voluntary than its cause;

3. That it ought to have been avoided, or that there was an obligation not to omit but to place the omitted act, and indeed to place it lest the effect follow: for a positive effect is not contained in an omission, and therefore an effect from a negative cause cannot be voluntary unless there is an obligation of impeding it. For if the aforesaid obligation is lacking, since a simple omission cannot have a real influence upon a positive effect, every connection, even moral, of causality between the omission and this effect is now lacking, and therefore this is only permitted, but not willed in the omission nor voluntary. On the contrary, if someone ought to avoid the effect and does not avoid it, he is morally judged, and imputably is, its cause, namely, its privative cause. - But if the aforesaid conditions are present, the effect is also imputed to fault, because some precept is violated.

61. Observation.

The intention of the agent cannot change the nature and causality of things, nor make some effect proceed from a certain action or omission as from a cause. Hence if, with the third condition lacking, the obligation of avoiding the effect is lacking, that effect does not become voluntary even if someone intends the omission precisely as a means on account of an evil effect, or even a good effect. The effect will then be willed in itself, but it will not be voluntary, because the connection of causality between the effect and the omission is lacking, and the omission is not its true cause. Thus if someone, precisely so that another may be immersed in waters, abstains from bringing help, although he ought not bring help, because, for example, the danger is greater for himself. The intention, like the omission or the act placed with it, will be imputed for fault or praise, but not the effect itself; indeed the good effect which follows an omission will never be imputed for praise because, although it can be done with a good intention, nevertheless it does not arise from the good intention from the omission as from a cause.

I say 2°: The voluntary is divided 1° into perfect and imperfect ¹. Perfect is that which proceeds from perfect cognition of the end; imperfect that which proceeds from imperfect cognition of the end. For since two things concur to the voluntary, namely the intrinsic principle and cognition of the end, the proper perfection of the voluntary by which it is distinguished from the natural cannot be sought from the intrinsic principle in which it agrees with the natural. Therefore from cognition of the end alone, by which it is distinguished from the natural. ¹ Here q. 6, a. 2, c. — 2. Ibid.

Hence it follows that the perfect voluntary belongs to rational nature alone, the imperfect to brutes ²; because perfect cognition is had when not only is apprehended the thing which is the end, but also is known the reason of the end and the proportion of means to end; and such cognition, since it is collative and discursive, belongs to intellectual nature alone. But imperfect cognition of the end is that which consists in the mere apprehension of the thing which is the end, without the knowledge of the reason and dignity of the end and the proportion of means to end. And such cognition of the end is found in brutes through sense and natural estimation. Therefore the imperfect voluntary agrees with brutes, the perfect with rational nature alone; yet not with all its acts, but only those which proceed with full cognition and advertence; whence sudden motions, motions of children, of the insane, of the half-asleep, are only imperfectly voluntary. ² Ibid.