Section 5: Voluntary Acts

Not all human actions are ethically free. There are various degrees of self-determination corresponding to the measure of knowledge with which a man acts.¹

¹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 59, art. 3: "Some things do not act from any judgment, but as if acted upon and moved by others, just as an arrow is moved toward its end by the archer. Other things act by a certain judgment, but not a free one, as do irrational animals. For a sheep flees a wolf by a certain judgment by which it considers the wolf harmful to itself; but this judgment is not free in the sheep, but implanted by nature. Only that which has intellect can act by free judgment, insofar as it knows the universal character of the good, from which it can judge this or that to be good. Hence wherever there is intellect, there is free choice."

A spontaneous or reflex action is one produced by the will without due knowledge. A spontaneous act, as such, is not ethical. "Nihil volitum nisi praecognitum." To the category of spontaneous actions belong the primary perceptions of the external and internal senses, the first stirrings of the imagination and the memory, as well as all acts performed in the state of sleep or disease, under external compulsion or in ignorance.

2. VOLUNTARY AND FREE ACTS. —An act is voluntary and free (voluntarium et liberum) if it is performed by the will with knowledge and deliberation. ² For an act to be voluntary and free, therefore, two conditions must cooperate: a) The act itself must be produced by an internal principle, i. e., the will; b) The person acting must have some knowledge of the end towards which his act tends.

² "Actus procedens a principio intrinseco seu a voluntate cum cognitione finis." —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 1.

Acts performed under external compulsion, therefore, or without knowledge of their purpose, cannot be called free.

In order that an act be entirely free, it must, moreover, be perceived by the agent in all its I parts and circumstances. When even one circumstance is unknown to the agent, the act is not free with regard to this circumstance. For instance, if a man appropriates to himself an object, not knowing that it belongs to another, he is not a thief; or if he knowingly possesses himself of the property of another without being aware of the fact that it is devoted to a sacred purpose, he is not guilty of sacrilege.

There are different degrees of voluntariness, according to the measure of reflection accompanying an act. (1) An act is positively voluntary (voluntarium positivum) if it is directly intended; negatively (voluntarium negativum) if it involves an inexcusable or culpable omission.³

³ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 71, art. 5, ad 2: "Not willing itself can be called voluntary, insofar as it is within man's power to will and not to will."

(2) An act is perfectly voluntary (voluntarium perfectum) if it proceeds from the will with full knowledge and deliberation; it is imperfectly voluntary (voluntarium imperfectum) if the knowledge and deliberation are not full.

(3) An act is immediately voluntary (voluntarium elicitum) if it is produced directly by the will; it is mediately voluntary (voluntarium imperatum) if it is dictated by the will and performed by some other faculty of mind or body.

(4) An act is expressly voluntary (voluntarium expressum) if the consent of the will is manifested by word or sign; it is tacitly voluntary (voluntarium taciturn) if the consent of the will can be deduced from some act or omission. Thus a superior wills expressly what his spoken or written command enjoins; he wills tacitly what he permits, though he be able and in duty bound to prevent it.

(5) Something is said to be willed directly or in itself (voluntarium directum s. in se) when it is in and by itself the object of the will, e. g., a premeditated crime. It is willed indirectly or in the cause (voluntarium indirectum s. in causa) when it is merely the effect of something else which is directly willed. For anything to be willed in the cause, therefore, the effects of that cause must be foreseen but not intended, for if they were intended, the action would be willed in itself or directly. A drunkard, e. g., directly wills the gratification of his appetite for strong drink; indirectly he also wills to ruin his health and squander his money, because he foresees these inevitable effects in the cause.

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6. —V. Frins, S.J., De Actibus Humanis, Vol. I, Freiburg 1897, pp. 85 sqq. —M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 34 sqq. —Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 22 sq. —Sabetti-Barrett, S.J., Compendium Theologiae Moralis, 22nd ed., New York 1915, pp. 11 sqq. —A. Sweens, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, 2nd ed., Haaren 1910, pp. 34 sqq. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, Bruges 1922, pp. 57 sqq.