Article II: On the Voluntary Both Positive and Direct, and Negative and Indirect

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 3; q. 71, a. 5; q. 77, a. 7.

59. Notions. - Man is master not only of his willing and acting, but also of his not acting and not willing, insofar as "by willing and acting he can impede this, namely, not willing and not acting." Hence:

1. Therefore the negative and indirect voluntary always coincides with the free.

1. According to the diverse things which proceed from the will, the voluntary is rightly called positive if the placing of an act proceeds; negative if the omission of an act proceeds. For voluntary omission is not to be confused with the will of omitting; for the omission of fornication or of Mass is not voluntary to him who is held in prison, and yet he can have the will of omitting fornication or Mass, while saying within himself: I would not do it, or I would not hear it, if I could. On the contrary, omission can be voluntary even if someone does not say: I will not to hear, provided that, at the time when he can hear Mass, he voluntarily does something else. In the first case there is the placing of an act or commission, namely, of desire, which is positively voluntary (I do not will to act, that is, I will not to act); in the second case there is the omission of an act, and this is negatively voluntary (I do not will to act). Yet both can exist at the same time, when from the will of omitting someone omits a work.

The positive voluntary essentially includes an act, because it proceeds from the will through a real influx. The negative voluntary essentially does not include an act: for in its essence it is not constituted by an act but by a negation, because it is not an act but the omission of one; nevertheless this, so that it can proceed from the will, supposes a preceding or concomitant act of the will as cause or occasion of itself: for either man intends the omission itself in itself, or at least voluntarily places another act incompossible with the omitted act, such as playing, sleeping, remaining at home, when the celebration of Mass is imminent. St. Thomas says aptly, q. 71, a. 5: "If in a sin of omission there is understood only that which per se pertains to the notion of sin, then sometimes the sin of omission is... without every act, either interior or exterior... But if in a sin of omission there are also understood the causes or occasions of omitting, then it is necessary that there be some act in the sin of omission."

1. St. Thomas adds: "Judgment about things must be given according to that which is per se, and not according to that which is per accidens. Whence it can more truly be said that some sin (or voluntary thing) can be without every act."

2. By the same name of positive and negative voluntary, more recent authors call either that which proceeds from the will as from a positive cause, namely, from a voluntary act through a true and positive influence; or that which proceeds from it as from a negative cause, namely, from a voluntary omission, or that which is judged to proceed from the will not operating and omitting to act when it can and ought to act. These proceed from the will according to a diverse mode, and therefore by St. Thomas they are respectively called: the direct voluntary, that which directly proceeds from it insofar as it is acting (as heating from heat) and toward which the will is borne; and the indirect, that toward which it is not borne but which proceeds from it indirectly insofar as it could have prevented but does not prevent, or does not act when it ought to act, as the sinking of a ship is said to be from the helmsman to whom the steering was entrusted, insofar as he ceases from steering.

2. It is called indirect because the will causes it by way of removing what prevents, namely, by removing that which can impede another thing.

Therefore the direct voluntary is from the acting will; the indirect from the will not acting when it ought to act.

60. Principles. I. In order that omission be voluntary, it is required and sufficient that someone be able to place the act which is omitted and advertently omit it; nor is it required that he ought to place it. For he can just as voluntarily omit Mass on a weekday as on a feast day. But in order that it be imputed to him, something more is required: for praise, that he intended the omission for a good end, for goodness is not contracted unless it is willed and intended as such; for fault, that he ought to have placed the omitted act, for there is no fault unless someone transgresses some precept.

3. By the name of omission also comes the negation which necessarily and directly coheres with it, such as ignorance from the omission of learning, weakness of powers from the omission of eating: for such a negation seems rather one thing with the omission than its effect. Thus St. Thomas, in II Sent. d. 22, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2; and I-II, q. 76, a. 3, ad 5.

1. That the effect could and ought to have been morally foreseen, that is, that it was in some way foreseen at least confusedly, obscurely, or indistinctly, insofar as someone at least doubted or suspected that it would follow, or knew the obligation of adverting: for nothing is willed unless it is foreknown;

2. That it could have been avoided, and therefore that the omission freely took place: for the effect is not more voluntary than its cause;

3. That it ought to have been avoided, or that there was an obligation not to omit but to place the omitted act, and indeed to place it lest the effect follow: for a positive effect is not contained in an omission, and therefore an effect from a negative cause cannot be voluntary unless there is an obligation of impeding it. For if the aforesaid obligation is lacking, since a simple omission cannot have a real influence upon a positive effect, every connection, even moral, of causality between the omission and this effect is now lacking, and therefore this is only permitted, but not willed in the omission nor voluntary. On the contrary, if someone ought to avoid the effect and does not avoid it, he is morally judged, and imputably is, its cause, namely, its privative cause. - But if the aforesaid conditions are present, the effect is also imputed to fault, because some precept is violated.

61. Observation.

The intention of the agent cannot change the nature and causality of things, nor make some effect proceed from a certain action or omission as from a cause. Hence if, with the third condition lacking, the obligation of avoiding the effect is lacking, that effect does not become voluntary even if someone intends the omission precisely as a means on account of an evil effect, or even a good effect. The effect will then be willed in itself, but it will not be voluntary, because the connection of causality between the effect and the omission is lacking, and the omission is not its true cause. Thus if someone, precisely so that another may be immersed in waters, abstains from bringing help, although he ought not bring help, because, for example, the danger is greater for himself. The intention, like the omission or the act placed with it, will be imputed for fault or praise, but not the effect itself; indeed the good effect which follows an omission will never be imputed for praise because, although it can be done with a good intention, nevertheless it does not arise from the good intention from the omission as from a cause.