Vow of Obedience

MEN of the world find it difficult to understand how one man can surrender his liberty and bind himself by vow to obey another. And yet this counsel of perfection, too, is contained in the life and teaching of the divine Founder of the Church. He did not intend that all the members of his Church should be equal; he placed some in authority over the others, and he gave them power to teach, instruct, correct, and guide those who were subject to them. He therefore laid a duty of obedience to spiritual rulers on all the faithful. Those who were content to observe the Commandments were bound only to obey such positive precepts as the rulers of the Church judged it expedient to impose on all Christians; but those who aimed at perfection became as a consequence subject to the teaching and authoritative guidance of their rulers in matters which pertain to perfection as well. Those who were content with observing the Commandments reserved some liberty for themselves; those who aimed at Christian perfection gave themselves wholly to obedience after the example of him who was obedient even unto death. The prelates of the Church are therefore the superiors of religious men and women, and even if some are exempt in some matters from the jurisdiction of the ordinaries, all are subject to the Pope, not only as the Supreme Head of the Church on earth, but as their highest religious superior.¹ In approving of a religious order or congregation the Pope and the bishops delegate the necessary authority to the lawful superiors of the order, and give them power to command their subjects in all that pertains to the observance of the rule.

A religious, therefore, who takes a vow of obedience binds himself thereby to obey all the precepts which his superiors lay upon him according to the rule of the order.

In order, then, that the obligation of the vow may become operative, a precept must be given by the superior, And here we must distinguish between the vow and the virtue of obedience. The virtue of obedience inclines to the most perfect conformity of will and judgement of the subject with the will and judgement of the superior. A subject who has the virtue of obedience will strive to execute the known will of his superior without waiting for a strict command. The obligation of the vow is not so extensive as the virtue of obedience. The vow will be saved if precepts are externally executed, for, according to the more common opinion, the vow of obedience does not extend to merely internal acts.

The superior’s authority is limited and defined by the rule, and so the subject is only bound to obey such commands of the superior as are sanctioned by the rule directly or indirectly. It is not, however, necessary that the precept should be expressly sanctioned by the rule in order to enable a superior to impose it with authority: it is sufficient if it be implicitly and indirectly sanctioned, as it will be if its imposition conduces to the better and more perfect observance of the rule.

¹ St Thomas, 2-2, q. 186, a. 5; can. 499, sec. 1.

Violations of the vow of obedience are grave sins of themselves. However, in practice, sins of religious against obedience are seldom mortal, for want of sufficiently grave matter, or because the superior does not intend to impose a grave precept. Such sins will be mortal when in grave matter the superior commands anything to be done in virtue of obedience, or when serious harm follows from disobedience, or when a subject refuses to obey from formal contempt of authority, wishing to exercise and display his independence.

When the vow of obedience is violated, there is a double malice in the sin. Such a violation is a sin against the vow, and thus it is a sacrilege; and it is also a sin against the Fourth Commandment of the Decalogue, which prescribes obedience to be rendered to all lawful superiors. Such lawful superiors are armed with spiritual jurisdiction delegated to them by ecclesiastical authority, or at least they have the natural authority which belongs to all rulers of a community, great or small. Superioresses of nuns have this natural authority, and so they can impose even grave precepts of obedience on their subjects, although as women they cannot have ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

I. Notion. It is a promise made to God of fulfilling the commands of legitimate superiors. Whether the vow also extends itself to the rule is disputed. We said:

1. Commands; namely commands strictly so called. Now a superior can command or oblige either under fault or to penalty alone. Under fault, I say, either grave, provided the matter is grave, or light, if the matter is light, or, even if grave, it is commanded only under light fault. But the Superior is considered to oblige under fault if he uses the words "I command," "I order," and similar words; under grave fault, if he employs the formula: "in virtue of obedience," "under grave fault," "under penalty of excommunication," etc. Otherwise he is considered only to oblige to penalty (St. Alphonsus IV, 38; I, 141). This, however, does not prevent the subject from sinning gravely if he proceeds from contempt of authority.

2. Of superiors; namely of those who by force of the vow of obedience can command. Such are the Supreme Pontiff (can. 499, § 1), the Sacred Congregation of Religious, as it seems, other Congregations if a special mandate is added, major and local Superiors; but not the Superiors of religions in which only a promise of obedience is emitted, as among the Oratorians.

3. Legitimate; wherefore observe that whatever is contained in the rule, or is required for its perfect observance and for attaining the end of the institute, is commanded legitimately (St. Alphonsus IV, 38, 39). But those things cannot be commanded which are outside the rule, that is, either: 1st, against the rule, unless the Superior justly dispenses; or 2nd, above the rule, such as certain macerations, unless they are inflicted as a penalty, or the care of sick outsiders imposed on a religious who is not a hospitaller; or 3rd, within the rule, such as vain or ridiculous things, unless the Superior "commands for a cause which is according to the rule, for example, that obedience be exercised. Nor does it matter that the rules command obedience in all things; for this is understood not of the obligation of the vow, but of the perfection of obedience" (St. Alphonsus IV, 40).

Here, however, note these words of St. Thomas: "No one is obliged to the impossible; and therefore if some prelate heaps up or enjoins so many precepts that the subject cannot fulfill them, he is excused from sin; and therefore prelates ought to abstain from a multitude of precepts" (II-II, q. 105, a. 1, ad 3). And St. Alphonsus: "A multitude of decrees would be the ruin of a Congregation" (Correspondence generale, n. 75).

4. Whether and to what extent the vow extends itself to the rule is disputed. Now it certainly extends itself to rules which express the obligation of the vow sufficiently certainly, as if something is commanded in virtue of obedience. Otherwise, according to some, the matter must be resolved from the acceptance and use of the institute itself. According to others, if the rule obliges under sin, its transgression is against the vow. According to others, the vow simply extends itself to the rules just as to the commands of Superiors; but understand this in such a way that the vow obliges either to the act or to penalty alone, according as the rule itself obliges¹ (cf. St. Thomas II-II, q. 186, a. 9; St. Alphonsus IV, 41, 42).

Corollary I. A command to which danger of life is annexed does not oblige unless it accords with the end of the institute or is demanded by the common good (St. Alphonsus IV, 40). Hence a Superior cannot oblige a subject to go to infidels with manifest danger of death or servitude, unless the subject has expressly obliged himself to this. Nevertheless a religious can be compelled to go to very remote provinces beyond the sea, if there are Convents of the Order there; for this pertains to the good of the Religion.

Likewise the Superior can oblige a subject to assist the sick infected by contagious disease, if the sick are religious of the same Monastery or Order; or if they are outsiders and there is lacking someone who would fortify them with the Sacraments of the Church; or finally if the care of the sick is the end of the Institute.²

Corollary II. In doubt whether a thing is outside the rule, likewise whether a thing is licit, one must obey, unless the thing commanded is too difficult, or grave spiritual harm threatens the subject or a third party from it. The reason is both because presumption stands for the superior, and because order, that is, peace and tranquillity, requires that in doubt the right of the superior prevail, and because the rules of various institutes favor this doctrine (St. Alphonsus IV, 47).

Corollary III. A religious is obliged to new statutes of Chapters, provided they are not wholly outside the rule, but are only means apt for attaining the end of the religion and the observance of the rule. But those who have embraced the rule legitimately mitigated cannot be forced to further things (St. Alphonsus IV, n. 44).

Corollary IV. License obtained from an inferior superior is valid, even if it has been denied by a major superior, "because the major Superior by denying license by no means takes away the power of the inferior" (St. Alphonsus IV, 50). And this seems to be valid in itself even if the rule commands that the refusal of the higher Superior be made known to the inferior; if in this case it is not made known, only the manner is illicit. "But I think one must say otherwise if the major Superior positively prohibits the subject from executing the thing requested, because then the inferior cannot dispense in the command of the superior" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Corollary V. A religious can appeal from the commands and penalties of a Superior. Nevertheless, except in the case of dismissal, ordinarily this does not have suspensive effect, unless the abuse of power is excessive. Yet extrajudicial recourse is always available to them.

¹ Cf. Raus, Obedientia religiosa, p. 54 sq., where he sets out the diverse opinions.

² Aertnys-Damen, Theologia Moralis I, n. 1212, question 3.

II. The distinction between the vow and the virtue of obedience consists in this, that the virtue extends itself also to undue things and to internal and cheerful subjection (St. Thomas II-II, q. 104, a. 4, ad 3).

III. Obligation. One who transgresses a true command of a religious Superior sins, as is clear; but of what species the sin is, see n. 148.

There are those who think that a sin of injustice is also committed by one who transgresses a command, at least if it is imposed from dominative power. But that seems to be denied, because dominative power does not confer a strict right to the act commanded, as is clear in parents; for no one would say that disobedient children sin against justice.

Objection. The Superior or institute by force of a contract has a right to the execution of the command.

Response. It is clear from no source that a contract of this kind is entered into. St. Alphonsus, who is sometimes alleged for the contrary opinion, in the place cited by the adversaries (IV, 46), does not speak of a sin of injustice.

What is the object of the vow of obedience? - A Religious from the vow of obedience is obliged to all things which the superior commands according to the rule and constitutions of the order, whether directly and expressly, or indirectly and implicitly. This is established from the very nature of the vow of obedience made in such a religion; for the object of this vow is this: to obey the superior commanding according to the rule of such an order. No religious superior has power above or against the rule. The former power exceeds the limits of promised obedience; the latter would tend to the destruction of religion. - C. 6 de Statu monach.; Suarez, de Rel. t. 3, l. 10, c. 8; St. Thomas Quodl. 10, a. 10; 2. 2, q. 88, a. 5 ad 3; q. 104, a. 5 ad 3; Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 3, d. 3; S. C. of Religious, May 3, 1914, A. A. S. v. 6, p. 231; E. M.

You will resolve: The Superior generally does not have the right of imposing under precept that which from the Institute is not commanded under sin. For this would openly be against the rule. He can do this only when a special reason is given, in certain particular cases. L. l. 1, n. 141. If regular observance has been relaxed, superiors can recall it to its former state. For this was implicitly promised by professing the rule, unless altogether another state of the religion has already come forth, and those professing it wished to embrace it only thus relaxed. L. 44. - Obedience is sometimes to be offered even with danger of life, when the dangerous action is necessary and consonant with the Institute. Thus the Superior can command that a professed member assist other professed members infected with plague; that he administer sacraments to others if secular priests are lacking, especially when the Institute proposes for itself, as its special end, the procuring of the salvation of souls. - Obedience is not owed by force of the vow to a subordinate official. - Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 5, d. 16, n. 2, 3; l. 4, d. 35; l. 3, d. 4, 5; S. C. of Religious, May 3, 1914, A. A. S. v. 6, p. 231.

Note: "Unless the prelate explains the command, for example by saying, I order, I command, etc., the subject is not held to obey. And when the prelate says: I order, I command, etc., the subject would not even be held to obey under grave obligation unless there is added: In the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, or in virtue of obedience, or unless the penalty of excommunication is added, not only to be imposed, but also latae sententiae." For thus it has already been introduced by common practice for avoiding anxieties and doubts. - "Those things which indirectly pertain to the rule, Sylvius, etc., extend to those things which conduce to its fuller observation; Sanchez, however, restricts it to things very necessary, without which the rule cannot conveniently be observed, for otherwise the superior could command any macerations of the body whatsoever; for they are ordered to the fuller observation of the rule." L. 38, 39, 40; St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 104, a. 5 ad 3; 2 d. 44, q. 2, a. 3; Bouix v. 2, p. 429 ff. - Rarely, cautiously, and prudently should superiorissas command in virtue of holy obedience, or under formal precept, and only from a grave cause. It is expedient besides that they impose a formal precept in writing, or at least before two witnesses. Norms art. 136. - A gravely disobedient Religious more probably sins gravely both against the virtue of religion and against the virtue of obedience. For how otherwise could a grave transgression against the vow of obedience be had, unless at the same time grave disobedience is had? L. 46. - Lugo, de Poenit. d. 16, s. 4, § 4; de Iust. d. 36, n. 90, 92; L. 6, n. 313; Ithur. Cas. 8; Escobar tom. 5, lib. 43, s. 2, dub. 17-20; E. M.

Religious missionaries are bound by a twofold bond of obedience, namely: by force of canonical obedience, as missionaries they are subject to the ecclesiastical Superior; by force of the vow, as religious they are under the religious Superior.

The general rule is that all things which regard the sacred ministry and the temporal administration of the mission must be directed by the ecclesiastical Superior; but those things which protect religious life and discipline pertain to the duty of the religious Superior. Cf. the Statute or Manner of Living to be observed in the missions of the Congregation of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary and also of the perpetual Adoration of the Most Holy Sacrament of the Altar, Rome 1907; Decree of the S. C. de Propaganda Fide, August 18, 1913, for the Ruthenians in the Canadian region, art. 21; Supplement to the Enchiridion Morale, ed. 3, p. 21.

Regulars have the habitual faculty of obtaining academic degrees in biblical studies. S. C. Bishops and Regulars, Prefect, April 19, 1904.

In all Italy and especially in the kingdoms of both Sicilies, Abbesses and Superiorissas of Monasteries are to be elected only for a three-year period. Gregory XIII, Constitution Exposcit debitum, January 1, 1583. Yet outside Italy, Rules and Constitutions approved by the Holy See and immemorial customs are to be observed. S. C. of Religious, June 3, 1910; S. C. Bishops and Regulars, May 4, 1901; A. S. S. v. 34, p. 397; Ferraris v. Abbatissa n. 55. "In elections of an Abbess or Prioress, whether the Monastery is subject to the Bishop or to a Regular Prelate, the individual votes of the nuns are to be collected in a closed urn and opened by the Prelate presiding with two priest scrutineers. But if for a grave cause the votes are given orally, this is to be done before the Prelate, with priest scrutineers nevertheless assisting. The priests about whom there is question are to be of mature age and approved virtue. Yet the ordinary confessors of the nuns themselves are not to be admitted as scrutineers or associates of the Bishop or Prelate." S. C. of Religious, August 27, 1910.

According to the Norms, local Superiorissas in more recent Institutes of simple vows regularly last in office for one three-year period, and only for a grave cause can they be confirmed for another three-year period; but not beyond this term in the same house, art. 309.

Can an abbess command nuns in virtue of obedience, obliging in conscience? - R. In the affirmative. The reason is that through the vow of obedience nuns are obliged to obey all their legitimate superiors. But the abbess in her monastery must be called legitimately and truly a superior. This is established both from the very nature of society and community, which certainly is in a monastery, and from the approval of the Constitutions by the Holy See. For the Holy See, approving Constitutions, certainly approves the order of superiorissas and subjects, the superiority of the former and the subjection of the latter. Otherwise, how could the monastery and regular observance be preserved? Therefore, although the abbess lacks ecclesiastical jurisdiction, she nevertheless does not lack economic and dominative power; this must also be said of male superiors not having ecclesiastical jurisdiction. But from the Norms the matter has been placed beyond every question. Cf. preceding number. - L. 52; E. M.

Can merely internal acts be commanded by force of the vow of obedience? And what also about the other vows? - Almost all agree concerning the vow of poverty, that it touches only external acts of ownership as its proper object. This does not exclude, as is clear, that someone can sin against the vow of poverty also by an internal act, e.g., by a desire of exercising an act of ownership; for that desire is specified by such an object, which by hypothesis is against the vow of poverty.

As regards the vow of chastity, Salmanticenses tr. 15, c. 6, n. 20, Sanchez in Decal. l. 5, c. 6, 9, Busembaum apud St. Alphonsus 37, Gury 165, and several others affirm that its object is both exterior acts and interior acts, because, they say, the vow of chastity is commonly understood thus. But this does not demonstratively prove the assertion, since in several Constitutions of Orders and Congregations this explanation is not found, and religious who vow very often have not given their work to theological studies in such a way that they can have knowledge of this matter. They are content to vow as the others vow according to the mind of the Church approving the Constitutions of the Order and Congregation. Nor indeed can they have another intention. Hence there are not lacking those who think that the vow of chastity touches only external acts and is violated by these. For they say that the Church is not accustomed to command merely interior acts; and therefore neither do vows of religion, approved by the Church, extend themselves to merely internal acts. But it is answered, and thus the common opinion is maintained at the same time, namely, that the vow of chastity in religion is certainly more perfect than a vow outside religion. Moreover the vow of chastity outside religion, since it is understood as a vow of perfect chastity, comprehends both internal and external acts; for chastity extends itself to both. It is confirmed from the Norms art. 129: "Through the vow of chastity the sister emitting profession binds herself to preserving celibacy, and besides, by a new title, that is, of the vow itself, to abstaining from any act whatsoever opposed to chastity."

As regards the vow of obedience, there are various opinions. For some think that the vow of obedience touches only exterior acts and the exterior execution of the mandate of the superior, which Gury 169 also has; others, on the contrary, judge that that vow extends itself even to merely internal acts. St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 186, a. 5 ad 4, although he says this vow of obedience has a certain universality, nevertheless says that it does not extend to all particular acts, and seems to exclude, besides others, also internal acts, concerning which there is discussion in the objection, for he refers himself to q. 104, a. 5, where he positively excludes acts of this kind from obedience to be offered to men. The Angelic Doctor indeed has these things at the aforesaid q. 104, a. 5: "in those things which pertain to the interior movement of the will, man is not held to obey man, but God alone." And ibid. ad 3, he says of religious: "as regards those things alone they are held to obey which can pertain to regular conduct." And q. 186, a. 7 c., he says that through the vow of poverty the good of exterior things is offered to God, through the vow of chastity the good of one's own body, through the vow of obedience one's own will. And ibid. ad 1 he says: "The vow of religion is ordered as to its end to the perfection of charity, to which all interior acts of virtues pertain.... And therefore interior acts of virtues ... do not fall under the vow of religion, which is ordered to them as to its end." Yet obedience is to be offered from the soul, since the vow is about the virtue of obedience, not merely about material compliance. - Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 6, d. 7.

Therefore there is a difference between the vow and the virtue of obedience. The former regards only the external execution of the precept of the superior. The latter extends itself to perfect submission of the will both to the precept of the superior and to his simple manifested will, and also to the Rules or Constitutions. The virtue of obedience certainly commands submission of the will to the will of the superior commanding, and altogether prohibits contempt of him.

Moreover the opening of conscience to be made to a superiorissa or superior, in institutes of nuns of either solemn or simple vows, and in congregations of men of profession and rule wholly lay, is altogether not obligatory. Minor Superiors who dare to induce to this are to be denounced to superiors, and Major Superiors doing this are to be denounced by their own subjects to the S. C. Likewise the right of permitting or prohibiting access, or more frequent access, to sacred communion in no way pertains to Superiors, but only to Confessors, and indeed by reason of mere counsel. But the reason for the prohibition that was made of rendering an account of one's own conscience was not only the violation of secrecy most greatly to be preserved in that matter, but also and chiefly because of the abuse by which, "although manifestation of conscience had been permitted so that pupils might more easily learn from experienced superiors in doubts the arduous way of perfection, on the contrary from some of these there was introduced an intimate scrutiny of conscience, which is reserved solely to the sacrament of penance." S. C. Bishops and Regulars, December 14, 1890. That Decree is to be read publicly once in the year. E. M. Cf. C. Nova 10 de Poenit. et remiss.

And this reason of abuse, as is clear, is universal, and consequently, by reason of the matter, the reported Decree, on this side, regards all religious Institutes, as was also twice declared to me by the Secretaries of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars. And indeed it does not appear how Superiors could oblige their own subjects, by reason of rendering an account of conscience, to make an extra-sacramental confession before them, since already after the Decree of Clement VIII, May 26, 1593, they could not oblige them to make sacramental Confession itself to them; and much less does this seem possible today, after the Decree of Pius X, August 5, 1913, concerning sacramental absolution to be imparted to religious members, by force of which all religious can freely confess to any confessor approved by the Ordinary of the place. - Furthermore, Regular Superiors can in no way know the causes of their subjects which pertain to the Holy Office.

And as regards Religious women, if ever they ask to confess to some extraordinary Confessor, in no way can they be impeded by their own Superiorissas under pretext of any reason whatsoever, as has already been declared several times by the S. C. S. C. Bishops and Regulars, August 5, 1904.

If the Rule of an Order obliges under sin, is its transgression against the vow of obedience? - Suarez, de Rel. tr. 8, l. 1, c. 2, denies it. For the vow does not oblige one to observe the rule, but to obey superiors according to the rule. And therefore the proper obligation of the rule as such is not from the vow of obedience, but from the proper character of law. Busembaum apud St. Alphonsus 41 affirms it, because such a rule is no less preceptive than the voice of the superior. Yet in order that there be a sin not only against obedience, but also against the vow, it is required that either someone by a special vow, or by a special reason, has promised observance of the rule containing true law and precepts, or that in the rule there is expressed a precept of superiors by force of the vow of obedience; for then in reality it is the same as if the precept were imposed on all orally, or in writing through the rule, in virtue of the vow of holy obedience. And this seems to agree with the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor 2. 2, q. 186, a. 9; Quodl. 1, a. 20; S. C. Bishops and Regulars in the Norms 132, 133, 134. - Suarez tr. 7, l. 10, c. 6, n. 6; c. 7, n. 1, 6, 8.

From the aforesaid Norms the matter is now certain. From the Norms art. 133, "it would not be said exactly that the Constitutions of the Institute are to be observed by force of the vow, so that the sister sins against the vow of obedience whenever she acts against some point of the Constitutions."

How does the solemn vow of obedience differ from the simple vow as regards its proper effect? - The simple vow of obedience induces only the obligation of a promise of obeying the prelate, which of itself, or from the nature of the thing, or from positive law, is not sufficient for invalidating the will in matter not contrary to the vow, the rule, religion, or its prelate. Therefore it indeed renders illicit an obligation which is contracted by a subject independently of the consent of the superior, but by no means of itself makes it invalid. Norms 132. And indeed how could such a superior ever in advance invalidate or afterwards rescind either a marriage or a sale validly but illicitly made by a religious who sold his own thing?

But the solemn vow of obedience of itself renders invalid an obligation undertaken by a subject independently of the will of the superior, unless however the matter is one which is by no means subject to the power of the superior, as can be seen in the secret of confession, in a committed secret, etc. For a Regular through solemn profession so fully hands over his will to God that he is said to have neither to will nor not to will. C. Religiosus 2 de Testam. in 6; C. Religiosi ult. de Sepult. in 6; C. Si Religiosus 27 de Elect. in 6. - Suarez, de Rel. tom. 3, l. 2, c. 12, n. 8 ff.; St. Thomas Quodl. 1, a. 15, 16; Quodl. 4, a. 12; L. 48.

303 bis. Note: Superiors General and Superiorissas General in New Institutes must every third year transmit to the S. C. Bishops and Regulars a Report on the personal, disciplinary, material, and economic state, according to the Instruction of the same S. C. - S. C. Bishops and Regulars, July 16, 1906. "Monasteries and other religious houses of women which are in the City are subject to the authority and ordinary jurisdiction of one Cardinal Vicar, privileges of exemption being suppressed, with only the duty of protection preserved to the Most Eminent Cardinals." Pius X, Constitution Etsi nos concerning the Vicariate of the City.

The vow of obedience is the most excellent of all the vows of Religion, since through it the Religious offers ¹ and consecrates wholly to God the goods most intrinsic and most excellent to himself, namely the will and the intellect itself. Hence it is said, 1 Kings 15:22: "Obedience is better than victims." And Prov. 21:28: "An obedient man will speak victory."

¹ ** Nevertheless note the things which the Author shortly after adds, n. following, that the matter of the vow does not extend itself to the internal faculties, but to the external execution alone of the command.

168. Principles. - I. A Religious from the vow of obedience is held to all things which the Superior commands according to the rules and constitutions of the Order, either directly and expressly, or indirectly and implicitly. - St. Ligorius, n. 58. Nevertheless, that there be sin against the vow, it is required that the Superior truly command, and not only counsel; which indeed will be plain from the words, the manner of speaking, and the various circumstances of things.

II. The Superior has the right of commanding not only those things which are had explicitly in the rule or constitutions, such as abstinence, silence, etc., but also whatever things are implicitly contained in them, such as penalties against transgressors, and whatever pertains to the offices of the Community duly to be performed, or to its right administration. The reason is that a Religious binding himself to observing the special constitutions of the Order ², obliges himself to all those things which have been wisely established or are prescribed for attaining this end.

² ** This is not to be taken as if by vow a Religious binds himself to observing the Constitutions of the Order.

III. A Religious by force of his vow is not held to obey a Superior commanding a thing impossible, or evidently illicit, or gravely harmful to himself. - St. Ligorius, n. 47, etc. And surely he could not oblige himself to an impossible thing, since no one is held to the impossible; nor to a thing certainly illicit, since a vow cannot be a bond of iniquity; nor finally to a thing gravely harmful to himself, because this is alien to the mind of Religion, and heroic acts do not commonly and implicitly fall under the vow, just as they do not fall under a precept. Except, however, if there is question of offices to be fulfilled within the limits of religious life, for example, of caring for pestilent Religious, etc.

Hence a subject is not held to obey a Prelate ordering him to walk upon waters, etc.; but if examples are reported by which it is established that such obedience was approved by God and confirmed by miracles, it must be said that then the divine good pleasure by a singular and heavenly light was manifested both to the one commanding and to the one obeying.

169. Questions. - QUESTION 1º. What difference intervenes between the virtue and the vow of obedience?

Resp. The same as was indicated above, n. 155, concerning poverty; namely, the object of the vow is the external execution of the command of the Superior, while the virtue reaches even to internal submission and effects perfect obedience itself.

But by a Religious there are diligently to be avoided not only sins against the vow, but also sins against the virtue, which indeed is more frequently accustomed to be injured. For it happens, would that it were more rarely, that a subject obeys the command of the Prelate integrally indeed by external action, but with a reluctant, sad, and sick will. Then, although he satisfies the vow, nevertheless he recedes far from the virtue ³.

³ ** One must inspect what sort of affection is repugnant to obedience. For if it is natural and also consonant with a nature well instituted, and nevertheless does not retard or diminish the affection of obeying, it takes nothing away from the perfection of obedience, as the example of Christ the Lord suggests. But if the repugnance is from the inordination of nature or custom, then either, notwithstanding the contrary impulse, the man promptly obeys, and thus nothing is taken away from the perfection of virtue; indeed, because of the difficulty overcome, the act will seem in some way more perfect. But if the repugnance retards or diminishes the affection of the will otherwise executing the commands, then obedience indeed will be imperfect, insofar as the contrary affections are voluntary; but the account of fault will be taken not indeed from the imperfection of obedience, as if the grade of perfection in the will obeying fell under precept, but from the inordination of affection toward other things, by which it happens that one sins in another kind of virtue. Cf. Suarez (De Relig., tr. 10, bk. 4, ch. 15, n. 19).

Therefore a Religious disobedient to a Superior truly commanding commits a double sin, the one against the natural precept, which prescribes submission to a legitimate superior, and the other against the vow. Hence in pious congregations of men or women leading life in common under the same Rule without the bond of vows, the disobedient are not exempt from sin if they are rebellious against superiors, but they commit one sin.

170. • QUESTION 2º. How does the solemn vow of obedience differ from the simple vow?

Resp. 1º Dispensation can much more easily be obtained from a simple vow than from a solemn vow, which can be dissolved only by the Pope and from a most grave cause.

Resp. 2º A simple vow indeed renders illicit an obligation which is contracted by a subject without the consent of the Superior, yet it does not per se make it invalid, unless perhaps the Superior by force of power over the will of the subject wishes to irritate such an obligation. But the solemn vow so binds the will of the subject to the authority of the Superior by an absolute, perpetual, and irrevocable oblation that the Religious can validly contract no further obligation, neither natural nor civil ⁴.

⁴ ** Understand this as to those things which are subject to the power of the Superior. For if the subject, for example, promises someone a secret, or a secret is committed to him, he certainly contracts an obligation concerning which there is no authority for the Superior. But as to those things which can be matter of obedience, the subject can indeed contract an obligation, for example, of celebrating Mass according to the intention of another, yet conditioned, namely unless the Superior disposes otherwise.

QUESTION 3º. Is a Religious held to obey in doubt whether the thing prescribed is licit or not?

Resp. Affirmative, because then presumption favors the Superior. Moreover the opposite opinion would disturb order in Religious families. - St. Ligorius, n. 47, and others commonly.

171. • QUESTION 4º. When does a Religious sin gravely against the vow of obedience?

Resp. He sins gravely in the following cases, which rarely occur, namely: 1º when he refuses to obey in grave matter a Superior commanding in virtue of holy obedience, or in the name of Jesus Christ, or by other similar formulas, which are very rarely to be used by Superiors; 2º when he responds to the Superior commanding: "I do not wish to obey, I do not wish to do it, I will not do it," or something similar which smacks of formal contempt of the authority of the one commanding ⁵; 3º when from disobedience there follows grave scandal of others, whether of subjects or seculars, or grave inconvenience either for the Community or for others, for example, for the salvation of souls, etc.

⁵ ** This has force even if the matter of the precept, viewed in itself, is not grave.

In other cases disobedience does not exceed venial sin; but since the aforesaid cases of mortal sin rarely occur, commonly the sins of Religious against obedience must be regarded as venial. - Much more rarely still will sins committed against the virtue alone become mortal.

172. • QUESTION 5º. To whom must obedience be given?

Resp. Obedience must be given not only to major Superiors, but also to inferiors, or ministers, or those placed over others who command from the mandate of superiors, since the authority which enjoins the command is the same ⁶.

⁶ ** These things are to be understood of the virtue of obedience; for a precept which constrains the subject by obligation of vow is usually reserved to the Superiors alone of the whole Convent or house, unless the special Constitutions of some Order dispose otherwise.

QUESTION 6º. How must obedience be given?

Resp. That the full perfection of obedience may stand, one must obey 1º from a supernatural motive, as the Apostle prescribes, Coloss. 3:22: "Not serving to the eye, as pleasing men.... Serve the Lord Christ." For otherwise obedience, even if it were immune from sin, would nevertheless lack all merit and would be merely material ⁷. - 2º Cheerfully, or with joy and a willing soul; for God loves a cheerful giver, 2 Cor. 9:7. - 3º Promptly, that is, either immediately or at the prescribed time, and with due care, without sluggishness. - 4º Entirely, or by completing the whole prescribed work.

⁷ ** That one obey the Superior as Christ the Lord is not required for the formal account of the virtue of obedience (see Suarez, De Relig., tr. 10, bk. 4, ch. 14, nn. 2-3); nor again is it required for the account of merit that someone act from a supernatural motive, as has been shown elsewhere (see tom. 1, n. 32, qq. 6, 7, 8).

14. Bernard, a religious, easily transgresses the rules and constitutions of his order, and has no scruple. For he says that they are not contained under religious obedience. Besides, he adds that they of themselves bind neither under grave nor under light sin, as is declared in the rules and constitutions themselves. But the aforesaid rules and constitutions are a mere counsel, and no one can be obligated to counsel.

Question. What is to be said to the Case?

R. Bernard is in error, and he acts altogether badly by so easily transgressing the rules and constitutions of his order. A religious is bound to obedience both from the vow and also from the pact implicitly entered into with the religion. By force of this pact he is bound to observe all things which are contained in the rules and constitutions, and which oblige under sin. In such a case the rules and constitutions are contained under religious obedience. But if the rules and constitutions of themselves do not oblige under sin, it does not therefore follow that one can transgress them freely without sin. For, practically speaking, by accident and from another source, fault is ordinarily not lacking in the aforesaid transgression. Nor does it follow that the rules and constitutions are a mere counsel. For although the rules and constitutions do not oblige in conscience immediately to doing or omitting that which is established in them, nevertheless they oblige mediately in conscience insofar as they subject the transgressor to some penalty, and insofar as they subject the religious to regular discipline, for observing and sustaining which in conscience one is obligated by natural law itself, by the very fact that he has entered religion, so that in it he may tend to perfection through regular discipline. — Suarez, de Relig., tome 3, book 10, chapter 7, no. 16; I. M. 249, 250, 302.

“65. Superiors must be obeyed in the exterior, and the extent of the vow of obedience of Religious reaches only to the exterior. But in the interior the matter is otherwise, where God alone and the director enter.—66. A certain new doctrine in the Church of God is worthy of ridicule: that a soul, as regards the interior, ought to be governed by the Bishop; and that if the Bishop is not capable, the soul should approach him with its director. I call the doctrine new because neither Sacred Scripture, nor Councils, nor Canons, nor Bulls, nor the Saints, nor authors have ever handed it down, nor can they hand it down, because the Church does not judge concerning hidden things, and the soul has the right of choosing whomever it sees fit.—67. To say that the interior must be manifested to the external tribunal of Superiors, and that it is a sin not to do this, is a manifest deception, because the Church does not judge concerning hidden things, and by these deceptions and dissimulations they prejudice their own souls.—68. In the world there is no faculty or jurisdiction to command that the letters of the director concerning the interior of the soul be disclosed; and therefore it is necessary to observe that this is an assault of Satan, etc.” Propositions of Michael de Molinos condemned by Innocent XI.

The explanation of the vow of poverty is the most difficult of the three vows. Wherefore, for the sake of clarity, a general idea of that vow seems to have to be placed before the other explanations.

— I. General Idea of the Vow of Poverty. By the vow of poverty, the religious promises to God that renunciation of exterior goods or riches which is prescribed by the constitutions of the religion as the matter of the vow.

In the present discipline of the Church, by force of the vow of poverty, from common law:

1. Every professed is prohibited from the independent use, for his own advantage, of any thing estimable by price; that is, he can use no thing estimable by price as his own, whether that thing is his own property, or belongs to the community, or to another person.

2. Every professed acquires for his religion the temporal fruits of his own industry, so that if he alienates the same without permission, he is also held to restitution on account of violated commutative justice. And this industry, if we take the norm of the responses of the Sacred Congregation of Religious, March 16, 1922, concerning moneys which come to religious on the occasion of military service, is to be taken very broadly, concerning every emolument of one's own action, even one foreign to the religious state, and concerning every donation which seems in some way remuneratory of such action, as is a donation made in reward of military virtue.

3. Those solemnly professed are incapable of ownership and, after such profession, acquire all things for the religion, if this is capable; otherwise, for the Holy See (c. 582).

It is also common that those simply professed of themselves preserve their patrimony and are capable of new acquisition.

All remaining things vary, whether you consider ownership of goods or dispositions concerning goods.

For what goods can those simply professed acquire? Quite often, besides goods which connaturally accede to the patrimony, also any legacies and gifts made in view of their own person. Yet this rule is not universal: the faculty of scholastics of the Society of Jesus is less broad.

As to dispositions concerning revenues, the professed sometimes disposes by his own free judgment; sometimes the disposition must be approved by Superiors; sometimes it is defined by the Constitutions themselves.

But concerning goods, c. 583 establishes this: To those professed of simple vows in religious Congregations it is not lawful: "1. By an act between the living to abdicate the ownership of their goods by gratuitous title." The making of a testament is prescribed to novices of religious Congregations, c. 569, §3. As to the mode of disposing of goods, sometimes, but not always, permission of the Superior is to be sought.

As to sanctions, a disposition illicitly made can be opposed either to the vow or to ecclesiastical law alone or to the Constitutions. More easily are acts contrary to the vow by which something is illicitly acquired or kept than acts by which someone illicitly renounces goods. And because in religious Orders simple profession succeeded solemn profession, which by the vow of poverty excluded all independent acts concerning any goods whatsoever, those simply professed in religious Orders seem, as often as they act illicitly, at the same time to violate the vow, while so absolute a rule cannot commonly be applied to religious Congregations.

The Constitutions must be consulted; the way in which the vow of poverty is commonly understood in the Institute must be considered.

4. But all, with due permission, can perform acts civilly necessary, for example for possessing or acquiring common goods.

— II. The remote matter of the vow of poverty is an external temporal thing estimable by price; therefore not honor, reputation, the very industry of the religious, or the application of Mass, but indeed the fruits of industry, stipends received for the application of Mass. Manuscripts, insofar as they are retained with the person, fall outside this matter, as too much joined with the person; but if the writer wishes to separate them from his person, now donation or alienation without permission is prohibited by the vow itself. Cf. Sacred Congregation of Religious, July 13, 1913.

A work made by art, a painted picture, are matter of the vow. But a religious artist does not violate the vow who from the beginning promises or cedes to someone the work by which he will make a statue or picture, especially if the other has furnished the material.

— III. With the goods which continue to belong to the professed now set aside, the following acts violate the vow, unless they are made honest by due permission: acquisition, in such a way nevertheless that permission can easily be presumed for accepting what yields to the utility of the religion; donation and renunciation of a right already acquired, in such a way that by refusing an alms or donation not yet accepted, though it must be said otherwise of a legacy, charity alone can be injured; exchange, in such a way nevertheless that if it concerns fungible things of the same kind, such as various coins of themselves are, this scarcely seems repugnant to the vow, and, from presumed permission, is done altogether honestly; so that exchange of things wholly similar lacks grave fault, and lesser fault is present in exchanges of similar things among brothers of the same house; consumption, in such a way that if you receive and consume food or drink among outsiders themselves, probably, according to Cardinal De Lugo (De iust. et iure, d. 3, n. 53), you do nothing except a use of fact by which the vow is not injured; otherwise if you carry things home and consume them there; loan and commodatum, in such a way that, if restitution is certain and the concession has been made for a brief time, there will not have been grave violation, and less grave if you give to a brother than to an outsider; use for other ends than those which have been taxatively indicated by the prelate expressly or tacitly, as if you do not expend the whole travel allowance given for a journey and, returned home, keep it for various uses; great negligence or quasi-dissipation in using clothing, etc., or consuming things of which, as for example paper and oil, disposition is permitted to the reasonable judgment of the religious; retention of a thing beyond the time for which it is conceded, as if you retain books of common use longer, but it will not be grave if another who needs them can easily recognize the holder; concealment of a thing, even one obtained with permission, done for this reason, lest the Superior be able to take the thing away. If the thing is concealed or locked up for another end, for example lest others see it importunately, or lest a Superior of lesser grade petition revocation of the faculty, the vow will not be violated, unless the permission is judged to have been given on this condition, that nothing be closed to the immediate Superior.

— They do not violate the vow, although they can be illicit from elsewhere: administration of another's thing, made in his name; destruction of a thing, probably, if you do it merely with the mind of doing harm, taking no utility from it; acceptance of money for a pious use, whether determined, which all concede, or even, as is probable, to be defined by the religious himself, provided that he cannot use the thing also for profane uses by his own judgment; administration of a benefice, since it accedes to a spiritual thing; possession of goods in common.

What concerning a deposit properly so called, not concerning a certain simple custody of a thing furnished? A deposit seems to others repugnant to the vow, since the depositary takes on an obligation to which he cannot fully satisfy except as owner; which others deny, since it contains no act of ownership over the thing deposited.

— The permission by which the vice of proprietorship is warded off must proceed from the proper competent Superior of the religious. Wherefore, unless the constitutions subject guests to the Superior of the house in which they are staying, he will not be able to give permission except to those religious who have domicile or quasi-domicile in the house over which he presides.

Permission would be invalid if it were extorted by force or fraud. But of itself it can be general, special, express, tacit, reasonably presumed. Presumption is plainly legitimate in circumstances where the prelate is prudently judged to oppose neither the thing or substance of the fact, nor the mode by which you act, that is, permission not having first been petitioned. For then the act is made dependently upon the will of the prelate. On the contrary, permission which would be denied cannot be presumed. If the prelate, having been asked, would have conceded permission, but is opposed to the fact that you did it with himself not consulted, then either he is judged so disposed that absolutely he would not will the thing to be used by you without permission, or, the negligence being known, he would be opposed merely to the omission of permission. In the latter case, he is unwilling only as to the mode, nor is the vow injured; in the former case, he is said to be unwilling by reason of the mode as to the substance, and the vow has been violated. Displeasure which seems likely to be grave or light can be held as a sign of one or the other repugnance.

After the fact, it is of itself fitting to admonish the Superior concerning presumed permission, and not rarely the rule enjoins it. Yet to omit this is not opposed to poverty, unless the matter, not plainly past, has some successive course, as if you keep with yourself a thing accepted from a presumed faculty.

Of itself, unless otherwise established, the permission which a prelate now performing an office previously gave continues to be valid; but he cannot give permissions to himself, as to an inferior, for the later time: for he was never subject to himself.

The dissent of a greater prelate, or a simple prohibition made by the same, of itself takes nothing away from the power of a lesser prelate, who therefore can validly concede what the greater Superior has denied. Yet the latter can weaken the former's faculty in advance or after the act.

From a reasonable interpretation, express permission of receiving several medals, rosaries, and little images in number is tacit permission of distributing them; but permission made to someone of giving or receiving, when from the declaration of the Superior or from usage it is judged to regard all, consequently gives to others the faculty of receiving or giving. Yet one must act in good faith, lest one person seem to have been constituted through whom all mutual gifts, with the Superior unaware, pass. And unless the prelate has contradicted it, from tacit or presumed permission, religious can, when the prelate cannot be approached, give modest alms in grave necessity of the poor or when this seems to pertain to edification. The same must be said concerning slight donations which are, as it were, owed from gratitude, if the religious has certain goods conceded to himself for use. St. Alphonsus, l. 4, n. 21. And when, as in certain religions it has been accustomed to be done for clothing, a certain amount of moneys or things is so given for the support of the religious that neither the monastery must supply anything nor he himself render an account, or if he is staying outside the cloister, the faculty is judged conceded of giving to whomever he pleases that which by living more sparingly he has obtained as remaining over.

— IV. Grave Matter. 1. The question concerning grave injury of poverty is reputed difficult and is accustomed to be treated incompletely. For although today most religious are no longer solemnly professed, nevertheless present moral treatises are accustomed to examine only those cases which formerly were almost universal, namely of religious who can have nothing proper. Yet it is manifest that donation of a thing which a religious truly possesses cannot be assimilated to donation of a thing not possessed. Donation of the former, unless there were a positive prohibition, would not even be contrary to the vow of poverty. For by donating or abdicating, someone becomes poorer.

2. When there is question of the vice of proprietorship properly so called, or of acts which are prohibited by the vow to be done concerning things not proper to oneself, the more common opinion proposes this rule: the same quantity which would constitute grave theft is to be indicated as a grave injury of religion in one professing poverty. That rule rests upon a certain likeness between theft and sin against the vow of poverty: in each an undue appropriation is committed.

But this rule must be explained more; for there is absolutely and relatively grave matter of theft. Most take matter relatively grave, with account had of the riches or poverty of the monastery itself. Yet there is not question of estimating damage, which pertains to injustice, but of weighing neglect of due dependence upon Superiors, which seems to be the same whether the thing wrongly usurped belongs to a poor or to a rich one. Wherefore Palmieri, t. IV, whom Genicot follows, II, 98, thinks that an absolutely grave quantity must be taken. That opinion will be safe in a religion whose approved authors have defended it: the intention of those vowing can be judged accommodated to this, who can, not indeed turn light matter into grave, but attenuate the obligation which of itself would correspond to the matter.

But elsewhere we would not put it forward; for it seems to us alien from the true. For does not another relative consideration succeed in place of the relative consideration of damage or detriment brought? Both, justice and poverty, regard property, but in a different way: the former, that you may preserve another's property inviolate; the latter, that you may repel it from yourself. Therefore, just as under the former respect the question concerning grave matter is posed thus: what is notable spoliation of another, so under the other respect, which is our present one, this question must be solved: what is notable acquisition of a religious as such? But that this varies according to the manner of living of the one acquiring is manifest. And who will deny that a religious who, as a Capuchin Friar Minor, professes strict poverty sins gravely by a lesser quantity than a regular canon of a wealthy monastery? Wherefore we judge that the condition in which the religious who has sinned stands from his profession is to be attended to. Is it, as in most present religions, the condition of an honest priest? Matter grave in comparison with an honest priest will of itself have to be taken.

3. But a much greater quantity is required when a religious, without due permission, disposes of goods whose ownership he lawfully keeps. For then not so much the thing as the very distribution or administration is usurped. Wherefore: a. if he disposes for himself, we judge that he sins gravely when from this he draws a tenor of life which gravely derogates from the profession of poverty; b. but if he attributes to another, the quantity absolutely grave in the account of theft could perhaps be taken four or five times. And if the use was a work of piety, or something similar, the Superior will scarcely of himself be gravely unwilling.

4. Several things which are accustomed to make the prelate, whose permission removes the vice of poverty, less unwilling attenuate the gravity of the sacrilege, so that there is need of a greater quantity for lethal sin. Hence, if there is question of edibles and drink, especially for the present use of the religious, unless the thing was extraordinary and precious, grave fault will be absent; the fault is also of itself lighter if from common things you illicitly take for yourself or give to brothers of the same house than if you give to outsiders; if you intend a useful use than if a vain one.

And it is clear that when use alone is usurped, the value of the use is to be considered.

On the contrary, because the prelate is judged more unwilling, several wish that one sins more gravely against the vow if at the same time he has injured justice than if he has injured religion alone.

5. Small sacrileges, although often repeated, do not seem to coalesce. Yet he sins gravely from the beginning who deliberately accepts small things with the mind of progressing to grave matter; and he who, from several things preserved, has with himself a grave value which he cannot retain without grave guilt.

— A religious injures justice, whether toward the religion or toward outsiders, who damages, steals, retains for himself, or gives to others what by right belongs to the community or to others, all these things being understood as is explained in the treatise On Justice. But when the detriment belongs to his own religion, although the very severity of discipline and the lesser faculty of disposing in a prelate, who is not owner but administrator, does not allow that the religious be judged a son under family power, nevertheless, because the goods of the religion yield to the utility of the religious, their case seems able to be estimated more benignly than that of outsiders, so that you can increase somewhat, for example by half, the quantity required for grave sin.

The cases are:

a. of injury without sacrilege: as if a religious, merely from the mind of doing harm, brings damage upon another's thing, or as confessor unjustly dispenses someone from restitution;

b. of sacrilege without injury: as if the religious otherwise applies or hands over to another what he could consume unproductively for a certain end; if he takes for himself what the prelate would not have denied him; if what he has spared of money, for example on a journey, he expends otherwise in the same moral time; if from outsiders he accepts something consumable by use and offered exclusively to himself;

c. of sacrilege concurring with injury: as if he does not hand over to the religion the fruits of his own industry, for example Mass stipends received.

And grave injury can be light sacrilege, and conversely: as if a religious snatches a modest quantity from a poor person, or, conversely, takes for himself a great amount of money from a person lightly unwilling.

— Because permissions and obligations of religious are judged to have been made or undertaken for no temporal profit of the Institute but for the sake of religion, sloth or laziness of a religious does not seem to be condemned as injustice. A religious will make restitution to the community by avoiding expenses which he could lawfully make from common goods, by handing over to the community what he could have applied to other uses. Yet for that reason he must not deprive himself of things which are referred to his own honest support.

— On Common Life and on Peculium. A threefold account of common life can be distinguished. The first is had when, other things being equal, religious are clothed, fed, and treated in a morally equal way. Other things being equal, insofar as Superiors at the same time with paternal charity provide for the peculiar necessities of a weaker body, and, with attention to the end of the Institute, procure what special studies or ministries can require.

Another account is observed if religious obtain necessary things for themselves from the community, formally or equivalently. Formally, as when things are bought with common money; equivalently, as when things bought with another's money are handed over to the free disposition of the Superior, and are conceded for use to the religious for whom they were destined by the buyer only dependently upon the will of the Superior and precariously.

Finally the third account demands that things be administered commonly, and that there be no portion of common things which the religious, beyond what present necessity morally requires, is permitted to possess, administer, or hold for his own uses.

The first account of common life procures uniformity; the other, common possession; the third, common administration.

To the second and third account of common life peculium is opposed. But peculium is distinguished into that of perfect right, which the Superior now cannot take away, and that of imperfect right, which can be circumscribed or taken away by the Superior. Peculium of perfect right is opposed to the vow of poverty, just as it is commonly understood in present law; peculium of imperfect right is not of itself repugnant to the vow, but if there is question of lasting peculium and one received, as it were, by customs, it is alien from the mind of the Church. She urges everywhere the prudent restoration of common life. But a custom which is opposed to the Code cannot be tolerated unless centenary or immemorial, insofar as Ordinaries have judged this opportune.

2. Now the Code, c. 594, §1, prescribes that "in any religion common life be observed by all, even in those things which pertain to food, clothing, and furniture." Besides, in §2 it is enjoined that whatever religious, even Superiors, acquire by their own industry or by reason of religion, and whatever goods come to an Order by reason of the solemn profession of members, be mixed with common goods, and that any money and all securities be deposited in the common chest.

With this prescription of the second paragraph saved, the common life of which in §1 seems able to be understood as it is imposed by the constitutions. This is confirmed by c. 2389. For canon 2389 commands Superiors gravely to admonish, and, if amendment has not followed, to punish religious who in a notable matter violate the law of common life as prescribed by the constitutions.

— There does not exist a special virtue of poverty, since riches and the possession of them are of themselves indifferent. But excessive affection toward temporal goods, just as in another person, so also in a religious, is to be charged as a sin which, according to the varying case, will be opposed to varying virtue.

— Matter of the Vow. By the vow of chastity, which coheres intimately with the profession of sanctity, a religious is prohibited, from the motive of religion: a. from all lust, internal and external; b. from marriage during profession.

For the common understanding of the matter has it thus: that the material object of the vow is the same as that of the virtue. Yet it can happen that, with the virtue intact, only the vow of chastity is violated, and conversely. One who is bound by a simple vow contracts marriage illicitly but, with peculiar exception saved, validly. If he uses the same, he will indeed injure the vow but not the virtue of chastity. And he who, himself free of lust, induces someone to sin with another person, will have sinned against the virtue, but not against the vow.

Some charge the violation of a solemn vow as a stricter sacrilege; but that the species varies on account of solemnity is not demonstrated.

Marriages honorable of themselves, with a pact of continence and therefore with a vow of chastity, can be composed together. But in the vow of chastity of religious, a vow of celibacy is judged to be contained, as is proved by the canonical penalties themselves to be alleged immediately below.

— Juridical Effects. "Religious who have professed solemn vows attempt marriage invalidly" (c. 1073).

Besides, "a marriage not consummated between baptized persons, or between a baptized party and a non-baptized party, is dissolved... by the law itself through solemn religious profession" (c. 1119).

With a special disposition set aside, as in the Society of Jesus, a simple vow of chastity does not dirime marriage. And by no simple profession is a marriage merely ratified dissolved. But by simple profession nuptials are prohibited; and every vow of chastity of religious, since it is public, is reserved to the Holy See. Concerning the effect of dismissal or departure with indult, cf. below, nn. 154, 157.

— Penal Sanction. Those solemnly professed who presume to contract marriage even civilly only, just like persons who presume to contract nuptials with them in the same way, are punished with an excommunication latae sententiae simply reserved to the Holy See. If there is question of those professed of perpetual simple vows, the excommunication latae sententiae is reserved to the Ordinary (c. 2388).

On account of the word "presume," every ignorance, with affected ignorance alone excluded, excuses from the censure. But the Ordinary to whom the excommunication is reserved, since the Code defines nothing further, seems to be the one to whom the penitent is actually subject.

— Account of the Vow. The vow of obedience of religious is a promise made to God of the obedience which is owed in religious life.

1. Whom one must obey. By force of the vow of obedience, the religious must obey: a. that hierarchical prelate who commands him as a religious by power of jurisdiction. This is, as to Orders and Congregations of pontifical law, the Supreme Pontiff (c. 499, §1) and the regular Prelate, at least exempt; as to diocesan religions, also the bishop or quasi-bishop; b. those who are placed over the internal governance of the religion or house: therefore the religious Superior properly so called, and also, if usage bears this, others to whom the Superior has communicated his power, as to a Prior, sub-Prelate, or Minister, sub-Rector. But usage rather has it that, at least when the Superior of the house is present, he alone is to be obeyed from the vow. Yet in other matters the authority of the Superior himself, and thus the vow, could be violated.

2. The remote matter of the vow is contained in all those things which either are explicitly presented by the rule or constitutions, or belong to it reductively, insofar as they are at least very suitable for the observance of the rule: thus mutual services, suitable punishment of delicts. For religious vow obedience according to their religious manner of life. St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 104, art. 5 ad 3.

Although the matter is disputed, internal acts do not seem able to be directly prescribed, since obedience owed to man cannot exceed the mutual conversation of men, which is circumscribed by external things.

In doubts concerning power, the presumption stands for the Superior, at least when the matter belongs to the genus in which it is established that the Superior can command; in doubts concerning the honesty of the matter, if the Superior prescribes what is probably honorable, he seems to have to be obeyed, though Lessius is contrary, c. 41, n. 76. In negative doubts, let the subject simply commit himself to the governance of Superiors.

— The proximate matter of the vow of obedience comprehends precepts strictly such, which are imposed on religious as such by force of dominative power or even of jurisdiction.⁽¹⁾ Precepts strictly such, that is, by which the Superior intends to oblige conscience; on religious as such, that is, precepts which are referred to their proper state, not to the common condition of citizens or the faithful, such as precepts concerning the observing of sacred times; by force of dominative power or even of jurisdiction, so that he also will have violated the vow who has transgressed a rule obliging under sin. Yet one must see how the vow is commonly understood in the religion of the one vowing. But violation of the special law of religious or of laws which have been made for religious does not seem contrary to the vow unless it brings forth properly so-called precepts.

In many religions today, the Superior is not judged properly to command, not even under light sin, through the very words: "I strictly prescribe"; "I enjoin under precept"; but it is necessary that he command in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, or in virtue of holy obedience, or by at least some other manner clearly express his will of obliging conscience.

Therefore he sins against the vow:

1. Who impedes the precepts themselves while he tries to withdraw himself from the dominion of Superiors in perpetuity or for a time: through apostasy, flight, or by illicitly procuring his own expulsion.

2. Who virtually violates the precepts when, even on the occasion of a simple command, he absolutely declares: "I do not wish to obey, I will not do it," understanding that of every matter or of some grave matter. If he limits it to a small matter, which seems to him useless or ridiculous, the violation will not have been grave.

3. Who violates a precept obliging under sin.

Violation of the vow of obedience is sacrilege; and besides, a sin, generally light, against observance toward the Superior to whose dominative power the religious is subject. If the Superior, which he is not presumed to do, has used his power of jurisdiction in commanding, the sin will also be opposed to that virtue to which the matter prescribed pertains.

⁽¹⁾ There are those (Suarez, Rel., tr. 7, l. 10, c. 2, n. 5; Sanchez, Dec., 4. 11, 25) who think that it remains entire for the Superior, when he prescribes by force of jurisdiction, either to urge or to omit the obligation of the vow. Rather, from our very definition of religious obedience, we would take away the opposite opinion from Lugo. Cf. Lugo, Paenit., 10, 172.

— An Opportune Manner of Prescribing. It pertains to the gentle governance of Superiors that they rarely induce the guilt of sin by their precepts. But a religious who does not obey the more broadly preceptive will of the prelate, although he is not a transgressor of his vow, nevertheless will offend observance toward the Superior, charity toward the community, and humility; and habitual disobedience of this kind does not seem to be excused from grave guilt, whether on account of the sadness by which it affects the Superior and Brothers, or on account of the common detriment which it effects, or on account of the danger of expulsion which it thus prepares. It is not rarely said to transgress the virtue of obedience, or obedience commonly so called. Yet the special virtue of obedience does not intervene here.

I say. The object of the vow of obedience, which is the most excellent of all the vows of Religion, because through it the Religious offers to God goods most intrinsic to himself, extends itself to all and only those things which the superior truly and properly commands, and which are contained either implicitly or explicitly in the rules and constitutions of the Order. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 38.

Question 1. What distinction intervenes between the virtue and the vow of obedience?

Resp. The same which was indicated above concerning poverty; namely, the object of the vow is the external execution of the mandate of the superior, while the virtue reaches even to internal submission and makes obedience itself perfect. But by a Religious there are diligently to be avoided not only sins against the vow, but also against the virtue, which indeed is usually wounded more frequently. For sometimes it happens that a subject obeys the command of the Prelate wholly in external action, but with a reluctant, sad, and sick will; and then, although he satisfies the vow, nevertheless he recedes far from virtue. Moreover one must inspect of what sort that reluctance is; for if it is natural and consonant even with well-ordered nature, and yet does not delay or diminish the affection for obeying, it detracts nothing from the perfection of obedience, as the example of Christ the Lord counsels. Cf. Suarez, de Relig., tract. 10, lib. 4, cap. 15, n. 19. - Baller., note (a), p. 109.

Question 2. Are one or rather two sins committed in violation of the vow of obedience, no otherwise than in violation of chastity?

Resp. Only one, at least probably; for there would be two sins for this reason: one against the natural precept which prescribes submission to a legitimate superior, and the other against the vow, insofar as independently of the vow the superior has the right of commanding. But the whole right of the superior comes from the vow alone. Therefore . . . - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 46. - Varceno, vol. 1, p. 205, edit. VIII.

Question 3. When does a Religious sin gravely against the vow of obedience?

Resp. He sins gravely in the following cases, which rarely occur; namely, 1st, when he refuses to obey in grave matter a superior commanding in virtue of holy obedience, or in the name of Jesus Christ, or through other similar formulas, which are to be employed very rarely by Superiors; 2nd, when to a superior commanding he responds, "I do not wish to obey, I do not wish to do it, I will not do it," or something similar which smells of formal contempt of the authority commanding, even if the matter of the precept in this case is not grave; 3rd, when from disobedience there follows grave scandal of others, whether of subjects or of seculars, or grave inconvenience either for the community or for others, for example, for the salvation of souls, etc. But since the aforesaid cases rarely happen, commonly sins of Religious against obedience are to be reckoned as venial. Much more rarely still do sins committed against the virtue alone become mortal.

Question 4. Whom must one obey?

Resp. By force of the vow, one must obey only Superiors properly so called, that is, those who, either in the house, or in the province, or in the whole Religious family which they govern, have no one above themselves, unless the special constitutions of some Order dispose otherwise. The reason is that only with Superiors properly so called does authority reside. - I said by force of the vow, because right order and the prescription of the rule, and therefore the virtue of obedience, altogether demand that simple officials be faithfully obeyed in all things which pertain to their office.

Question 5. How must one obey?

Resp. That obedience may be altogether perfect, one must obey: 1st, from a supernatural motive, as the Apostle prescribes, Coloss. iii, 22: "Not serving to the eye, as pleasing men . . . serve the Lord Christ"; otherwise obedience, even if it were immune from sin, nevertheless would lack all merit and would be merely material; 2nd, cheerfully, or with joy and a willing soul, for in II Cor. ix, 9 it is said: "God loveth a cheerful giver"; 3rd, promptly, that is, either at once, or at the prescribed time and with due care, without sluggishness; 4th, completely, or by completing the whole work prescribed.

Question 6. Can religious Superiors command their subjects, even in virtue of holy obedience, that they themselves celebrate according to the intention prescribed by the constitutions or established by the Superiors themselves, with exceptions sanctioned by the constitutions or by legitimate custom being safe?

Resp. Affirmatively, the Sacred Congregation de Religiosis, on the day 23 March 1914.

Concerning the privileges of religious the new Code establishes a general principle:

§1. Any religion enjoys only those privileges which either are contained in this Code or have been granted directly to the same by the Apostolic See, any communication being excluded in the future.

§2. The privileges by which a regular Order rejoices belong also to nuns of the same Order, insofar as they are capable of them (Can. 613).

Therefore in the future communication ceases to be the source of the privileges of religious in the way in which it was before. Every religion must recognize its privileges well.¹

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1113, n. 59.

Concerning Exemption. 1st. Regulars, novices not excluded, whether men or women, with their houses and churches, except those nuns who are not subject to regular Superiors, are exempt from the jurisdiction of the local Ordinary, except in cases expressed by law (Can. 615). - Cf. Can. 615; 618; 631, §1; 1261, §2.

2nd. Therefore they are exempt from the visitation of the Bishop both as regards persons and as regards monasteries and churches. Except: 1st, monasteries of Nuns not subject to Regulars, and also of those subject to them as regards the custody of enclosure, for the care of which Bishops, as delegates of the Apostolic See, watch over them; 2nd, churches of seculars whose Parish Priest is a Religious; 3rd, churches of Regulars, if they are parishes, but only as regards those things which pertain to the parish and to the Parish Priest, insofar as he carries out that office, as is established by Benedict XIV, Const. Firmandis, 6 Nov. 1744. - Cf. Can. 512, §1, 2.

§1. Religions of simple vows do not enjoy the privilege of exemption unless it has been specially granted to them (Can. 618). Cf. St. Alphonsus, loc. cit. n. 75.

Concerning the Sacrament of Penance. In an exempt clerical religion, for hearing the confessions of the professed, of novices, and of others dwelling day and night in a religious house because of service, or education, or hospitality, or infirm health, delegated jurisdiction is conferred not only by the local Ordinary but also by their own Superior, who can grant it to priests from the secular clergy or from another religion. Cf. Can. 875 and 514, §1. The Superior grants, as also the local Ordinary does, this delegated jurisdiction for his professed, novices, and others above mentioned. He can grant this faculty not only to his own priests, but also to priests from the secular clergy and another religion.

As Regards Begging. §1. Regulars who from their institute are called and are mendicants can seek alms in the diocese where their religious house is established by the permission alone of their Superiors; but outside the diocese they need, moreover, permission given in writing by the Ordinary of the place in which they desire to collect alms.

§2. Let Ordinaries of places, especially of neighboring dioceses, not deny nor revoke this permission except for grave and urgent causes, if the religious house can in no way live from begging in the diocese alone in which it is established (Can. 621).

Concerning Irregularities and Vows. Major Superiors of an exempt clerical religion can dispense their subjects from all irregularities arising from an occult delict, except that which arises from voluntary homicide or abortion, or another brought to the judicial forum. Cf. Can. 990. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 109.

Superiors of an exempt clerical religion can dispense and irritate non-reserved vows with their subjects. - Cf. Can. 1313; 514, §1. They can commute the same. Cf. Can. 1314. The same also, as regards a promissory oath, can both dispense and commute. - Cf. Can. 1320.

Concerning Mass, Communion, and the Last Sacraments. §1. In every clerical religion, Superiors have the right and duty, by themselves or through another, of ministering Eucharistic Viaticum and extreme unction to the sick professed, novices, or others dwelling day and night in a religious house because of service, or education, or hospitality, or infirm health (Can. 514). - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 121 and 122.

If there is question of a house of an exempt religion, the major Superior can grant permission of celebrating outside a church and oratory upon a sacred stone and in a decent place, but never in a bedroom, only for a just and reasonable cause, in some extraordinary case, and by way of an act. Cf. Can. 822, §4.

Concerning Particular Cases. 1st. They can dispense their subjects, with cause, in ecclesiastical laws, as Bishops can, for example, concerning fasting, abstinence, etc.; because they have quasi-episcopal jurisdiction.

2nd. Through an indult legitimately granted by the local Ordinary, the obligation of the common law ceases also for all religious dwelling in the diocese, with the vows and proper constitutions of any religion being safe (Can. 620).

This must be much attended to, lest someone think Canon 613 is opposed to this canon. Canon 620 contains the rule applied before and everywhere. S. C. de Rel., 1 Sept., 1912.

I. The violation of poverty is the rock upon which cloistered men most easily strike. Hence Religions both ancient and later have suffered more or less relaxation. Nevertheless the Institutors of the sacred Orders not only did not mitigate this poverty circumscribed by an exact common life, but fortified it with stronger safeguards. The mendicant Orders, seeing monastic discipline collapsed on account of redundant riches, rejected riches and revenues even to be possessed in common, and determined to live by begging. To these succeeded the Clerks Regular, who, beholding the collapsed discipline of the Mendicants, that they themselves might not be obnoxious to this vicissitude, prescribed a poverty so severe that some determined not even to receive offerings for the celebration of Masses, others not even to seek alms. Why this? The counsel of poverty is free. To possess riches absolutely brings no evil. The Patriarchs of the sacred Orders learned by the experiment of so many ages that the observance of that common life is most difficult and most easily violated by those vowing it. It would have been of their charity to temper this poverty, to permit private purses and life-rents, that by this way they might remove from their subjects the occasions of sinning. For when a law concerning a free and innocuous thing is with difficulty observed by subjects, it is the part of a wise legislator either to take the same away, or to temper it and accommodate it to common use.

II. On the contrary, all the Patriarchs to a man not only did not relax the law of poverty, but strengthened it more severely and fortified it with new safeguards. Why did none of the holy Patriarchs grant private purses and revenues to individual Religious? Why did all without exception most severely forbid them? Let them object to me even one Patriarch who granted private purses and revenues, and I am willing to submit the fasces to them and to sing their victory.

III. What therefore is the cause why all the holy Patriarchs conspired to this, that by unanimous consent they should restrict, straiten, and by every conceivable mode confirm this vow of poverty? Because, the poverty of the common life being taken away, the vow of exact obedience and the observance of regular discipline must needs fall. Since indeed the profession of the regular life, as regards poverty, is a mutual contract, as I have indicated, by force of which subjects with a solemn rite cede all their goods, both present and future, to the Religion; the Religion in turn binds itself by the same sacred bond of feeding and clothing its subjects, both healthy and infirm. If the Prelates of Religions do not discharge their pledged faith, by ministering all necessaries to their subjects, it necessarily follows that subjects are loosed from the bond of obedience, as regards the procuring of those things which are necessary for food and clothing. Therefore, community being taken away, the vow of obedience, and consequently the regular discipline itself, falls in ruins.

IV. The industries, labours, and means which subjects employ that they may acquire a private purse most often are not congruous to Religion. If Prelates attempt to hinder them, subjects oppose the right of nature of providing for themselves in food and clothing not bestowed by the Prelates. Since indeed in cloisters from which a perfect community is exiled, some sum is delivered for clothing, in one place greater, in another less, which does not suffice for the whole. The furniture of cells is not given at least entire. For journeys, for letters, either little or nothing. For the curing of infirmity certain things are held out, as in a hospital; and those who have not whence to succour themselves languish most wretchedly. But those who abound — far be it that they bestow anything upon infirm brethren. Hence some depart in the highest penury; others dying leave very much money. By what helps did they procure vast private purses?

V. Suppose Prelates forbid unfit subjects to hold sermons, because they are not endowed with that probity of morals which is required that outside the cloisters they may be an example to Christians; that they hear not the confessions of Nuns; that they mingle not themselves in earthly businesses; that they seek not patronages; that they wander not through the cities. Straightway subjects cry out: we lose these gains; who will give us clothes; who will pay the expenses of letters, of journeys, of infirmities? Who will hold out chocolate, who tobacco, who so many other things either necessary or congruous? Life-rents are either scanty or none, and so forth; by the common patrimony provision is not made for us: therefore by the right of nature, which precedes every vow, we can justly procure these things for ourselves. What thence? Men rude in letters, destitute of integrity of morals or of prudence go forth from the cloisters; the unskilled preach, the unlearned hear confessions, the inept transact businesses. Those hunt favours and patronages; these canvass for prefectures and offices. If Prelates wish to interdict them, subjects oppose, as I have said, the right of nature.

VI. The evils, scandals, relaxation of discipline, and other absurdities which proceed thence I am unwilling to express in my own words. Dionysius the Carthusian, On the Reformation of the Cloister, chapter 16, writes these things: From a private purse, as from a poisonous root, many sins proceed — as for instance contumacy, pride, contention, partiality, avarice, vainglory, envy, lying, luxury. Since those abounding in a private purse become bold for resisting even superiors, nor do they patiently receive discipline and correction; and they effect partialities, and sometimes are free for revellings and drunkennesses, from which they slip into the vices of the flesh, and most wickedly break their vow of preserving chastity. What if we used this liberty of writing? Like and graver absurdities flowing from a private purse Trithemius and Nider, St. Antoninus, Cajetan, and the theologians commonly describe. Behold the weight of the reasons why the holy Patriarchs even of the last age declared war upon a private purse. Other austerities, as fasts, rough clothing, and several other exercises of penance, they either diminished or took away. But the community of goods, although they acknowledged it to have been a stone of stumbling against which very many struck, they not only did not diminish, but, as I have said, prescribed it more severely: because, this exact community of goods being taken away, the whole monastic discipline must needs fall in ruins.

I. QUESTION I. What is the vow of religious chastity? ANSWER. It is a perpetual abstinence from every venereal act, both internal and external. Priests sinning against this vow increase the malice on account of the twofold title or bond by which priests are bound to preserving chastity. The observance of this vow depends very much upon modesty of the eyes, upon solitude, upon mortification of the flesh, and upon the declining of idleness. Wherefore every Religion prescribes fasts, temperance of food, and other virtues more or less as a safeguard of chastity. They renounce riches, that they may preserve their soul immune from affection for money. They are separated from the world, that, every occasion being taken away, they may more easily guard that chastity which Christians themselves are bound to observe, whether virginal or matrimonial, in the midst of the snares of the world and amid the very prestiges of women. A look at venery and a deliberate lustful delight thrust down into Hell a Christian and a religious man equally, with a difference only in the circumstance of sacrilege.

II. This virtue is carried like the most limpid crystal in a putrid and muddy body. Most easily is the bitumen kindled and the fire of luxury burns, and sulphurous exhalations obscure the candour of chastity, unless it be guarded by assiduous vigilance. Concupiscence is a dire wild beast, which always roars and machinates revolutions. If at the outset it be restrained by a heroic spirit, and bridled by continual custody, a victory of this kind is easy. Never nevertheless is it to be trusted, since it weaves its rebellion out of craft and from ambush. Preachers and confessors above all must needs be vigilant. For these by reason of their ministry frequently address women. From spiritual conversations the beginning is taken; but unless the highest caution be employed, all things fall away into the flesh. Confessors have their own spiritual daughters, with whom they weave familiar discourses. That virginal and at the same time womanly breath, those warm sighs, and the familiarity of a spiritual paternity with a spiritual daughter are to be fled as the hiss of a basilisk. Women are to be handled no otherwise than persons infected with plague. Let spiritual nourishment be held out, and let separation forthwith succeed; otherwise the pest of luxury sends in its enchantments. But since there are innumerable books which treat this argument more fully, therefore I abstain from further discourse.

III. QUESTION II. To what is a Regular bound by reason of the vow of obedience? ANSWER. The vow of obedience is an oblation of one's own will made to God, while a Regular promises to obey his superiors in all those things which they shall command according to his own rule. Wherefore a Regular is bound under grave fault to the precepts of superiors. When a superior does not command, but only wishes and exhorts, even if a subject do not obey, he does not on that account violate the vow of obedience, because he transgresses no precept. But the precepts of superiors must be of a grave matter.

IV. Four conditions the holy Doctors commonly require for exact obedience: 1. That there be a prompt execution of that which is commanded; 2. That the interior will accede to the external execution; 3. That a subject submit his own judgment in a doubtful or controverted matter to the judgment of his superior; 4. That, the superior's will being known, a precept is not to be awaited, but that which the superior desires is to be fulfilled. These conditions nevertheless are required for the greater perfection of obedience, but not for the nature of the same virtue. For this, and that a sin at least a grave one be avoided, it is enough that in fact the subject obey and execute the imposed precept. It is nevertheless to be adverted that superiors sometimes suspend precepts that they may avoid scandal, because they foresee subjects by no means prepared for fulfilling the precept. And then subjects who afford these arguments for resisting the mandates of superiors are in a bad state, and can sin mortally, the gravity of the thing to be commanded being regarded. For in these things the circumstances are to be regarded.

V. Superiors can by right command all those things which are contained within the confines of the Rule and Constitutions, or which even indirectly conduce to the preservation and decorum of the Rule and of the Religion. Prelates can also forbid those things which tend to the violating of their own laws, and command other things which gravely expedite the observation of the Rule and Constitutions. Wherefore a superior can command, necessity urging, that subjects serve Religious and minister the sacraments to Christians infected with plague, chiefly if the Religious profess an Order instituted for procuring the salvation of neighbours.

VI. In a doubtful matter a subject is bound to obey a superior commanding, because possession stands for the superior, as theologians commonly teach. Certain Probabilists contend that subjects having on their side an opinion even less probable are free from the obedience to be furnished, although the opposite opinion be more probable and stand for the superior. And so they are compelled to teach, the probabilistic system being admitted. Hence indeed it appears more luculently how seditious and pernicious Probabilism is to the authority of superiors and to good government.

VII. Superiors on the contrary can command nothing above or contrary to the Rule. A subject nevertheless is not the lawful judge whether that which the Prelate enjoins be against or above the Rule, unless the thing be evident. General Chapters can prescribe and establish new statutes also, which may increase the decorum of the Order and more strongly confirm regular observance. To prefectures also to be accepted and undertaken Prelates can by right urge their subjects with their precepts; otherwise as to accepting dignities or a bishopric outside the Order.

VIII. Regulars sin gravely either while they refuse to fulfil the precept of a superior, or while they contemn his voice, or while they resist him reforming abuses and corruptions brought in against the Rule and Constitutions. They sin venially if they neglect to commit to execution those things which they know to be prescribed by a superior, although not under precept — as when they inculcate the observance of the Rule and Constitutions. And although Constitutions by their own nature do not oblige to fault, yet in fact they are never deliberately violated without some venial fault. But those who from habit and custom transgress them indiscriminately dispose themselves to a tacit contempt, and sin against the precept of aspiring to perfection.

IX. Superiors who dissemble transgressions of the Rule and Constitutions, who neglect to correct and hinder the same with all their strength, either from torpor and negligence or from a certain connivance, sin mortally, as Diana, the Salmanticenses, La Croix, and others commonly teach. For Superiors are destined by their office to the custody of the laws and to the promoting of the observance of the whole discipline. Their negligence in hindering transgressions inflicts a most grave detriment upon Religion. For hence proceed most grave absurdities, and hence have flowed all the relaxations of the sacred Orders. For upon these transgressions there succeed violations of the vows, scandals, the loss of chastity, and the pest of property.

I ASSERT thirdly. The vow also of obedience is a holy counsel of the Lord.

IT IS PROVED by D. Bonavent. loco cit. Diaetae, titulo 6. cap. 2. from Matth. 16.: If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me, on which almost alone Bellarminus solidly relies, lib. 2. cap. 21.

IT IS PROVED secondly by D. Bonavent. in Pharetra, lib. 2. cap. 43. from the holy Fathers, whom Bellarminus also reports.

FIRST D. Augustinus, de operibus monachorum, cap. 17. Tom. 3.: The prayer of one obedient man is heard sooner than ten thousand of the scornful.

D. HIERONYMUS, epistola 4. ad Rufinum monachum, after the middle, Tom. 1.: Serve the brethren, wash the feet of guests, having suffered injuries keep silence, fear the Superior of the monastery as the Lord, love him as a father, believe that whatsoever he shall command is salutary for thee, and judge not the judgment of the greater, whose office it is to obey and to fulfill the things commanded.

D. BERNARDUS de praecepto, et dispensacione, before the middle: Whatsoever man commandeth in the place of God, which nevertheless is not certain to displease God, must be received altogether no otherwise than if God commanded it.

THE SAME, epistola 7. ad Adam monachum: This is to be noted, that some things are pure goods; some pure evils, and in these no obedience is owed by men: because neither are those to be let go, even when they are prohibited; nor these to be committed, when they are commanded. Moreover, between these there are certain middling things, which according to the manner, place, time, or person, can be both evil and good: and in these the law of obedience is laid, as it were in the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, which was in the midst of paradise. In these assuredly it is not lawful to prefer our own sense to the judgment of the masters: in these altogether neither the command nor the prohibition of the prelates is to be despised. O Monk most obedient, who from whatsoever words of the elders lettest not slip one iota, attendest not what sort of thing is commanded, content because it is commanded. And this is obedience without delay. D. Gregorius Magnus, who was a Monk, has like things, lib. 35. moral. cap. 10.

THE SAME D. Bernardus, in the Declamation upon the Gospel: Behold we have left all things; Go then, go to work, thou who disposest to leave all things; remember to count thyself also first among the things to be left; nay, indeed, above all and principally deny thyself, if thou deliberatest to follow him, who emptied himself for thee.

THE SAME, serm. 3. in Adventu Domini: Render reverence, and obedience, to the prelate, of which the one is of the heart, the other of the body. S. Bonavent. reports many other things, lib. 1. cap. 11. S. Bonavent. reports many other things, lib. 1. cap. 11.

MANY things I have adduced from D. Bernardo, whom Calvinus confesses to be a pious writer.

S. BENEDICTUS, in Regula, cap. 5.: Obedience then will be acceptable to God, and sweet to men, if what is commanded be done not lukewarmly, nor tardily, nor with murmuring, nor with the answer of one unwilling; because obedience, which is rendered to superiors, is exhibited to God; and cap. 7.: Obedience, a good, is to be exhibited not only to the Abbot by all, but the brethren also should obey one another, knowing that by this way of obedience they are to go to God.

S. Bonavent. reports also other testimonies of these Fathers, lib. 1. Pharetrae, cap. 11. and the twelfth. Finally S. Doctor shows the whole state of Religion to be holy, cap. 3. Resp. primae.

THAT is a holy state which leads swiftly to Charity: Such is the state of Religion: Therefore. The major is plain, because Charity is the end of perfection, 1. Timot. 1. and from D. Augustino lib. 1. retr. cap. 6. The minor is proved; for Christ praised this perfection above ordinary and necessary observance, Matth. 19. et 16. Hence D. Chrysostomus, homil. 17. ad populum, calls it the Philosophy of Christ. It is confirmed by S. Doctore; for he enjoins works of supererogation, as we saw above, which the SS. adduce as such: Cyprianus lib. de habitu Virg. Hieron. lib. 1. in Iovin. Ambrosius lib. de vid. Gregor. lib. 15. moral. cap. 9. Chrysostomus homil. 8. de Poenit. Basil. lib. de Virg. Nazianzenus orat. 2. in Iul.

WHATEVER Calvinus sees, lib. 4. cap. 13. sect. 12. denying works of supererogation, but saying all are commandments: Why then does he cry out that none is necessary to salvation?

IT IS PROVED still further by S. Doctore above: That state is holy which removes all incentives to evil: Such is Religion: Therefore. The minor is proved; for: Whatsoever fault there is in the world is either the concupiscence of the flesh, or the concupiscence of the eyes, or the pride of life, from D. Ioan. The first, as to occasions, is removed by the vow of Chastity. The second, of Poverty. The third, by the vow of Obedience. In this Evangelical declining consists perfection, as the scriptures, Councils, and Fathers teach, as S. Doctor says there.

The holy Church indeed has attested this in the Councils: Chalc. act. 15. cap. 6. Gangr. cap. 9. Ancyr. c. 18. Carth. I. cap. 3. Carth. 4. cap. 11. Tol. 4. et 10. Eliber. cap. 13. Tur. 2. cap. 21. Constan. sess. 8. Trid. sess. 25. The acts that are not of Religion are the acts of Religious, as S. Doctor says most beautifully, and with him Valentia.

THOU OBJECHEST first: Works spontaneous are dearer to God than compelled: But works from vows are necessary: Therefore. The major stands from the scriptures, Psalm. 5. prima Corinth. 7. where he protests that he wills not to compel them to the vow, but that they be free: Not that I cast a snare upon you; secunda Corinth. 3.: Not of sadness, or of necessity: The same he has ad Philem.

IT IS ANSWERED from D. Bonau. in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 2. especially in the first argument, second place: that he who vows spontaneously presents himself to the work not owed, and voluntarily submits himself to the obligation and necessity of rendering; which necessity is voluntary, and does not diminish but increases alacrity, because it proceeds from love. Nor does it oppose cheerfulness in rendering, which stands in the proposal of the heart and the serenity of countenance, as D. Bonau. teaches, in Diaeta, tit. 2. cap. 7. at the end.

BUT THAT of prima Corinth. 7. where Pseudomartyr cries out that the Apostle exhorts to continence, but does not will that they ensnare themselves by vow: S. Bonau. answers that the Apostle wills to say that he does not compel to vowing virginity, as if he reproved marriage; but that he exhorts to vowing it, as more honorable than marriage.

He wills also to indicate that a vow can be a snare holding by force unto ruin, if anyone vow rashly, or compelled; just as also marriages are snares to those marrying unwillingly. Bellarminus brings it in, cap. 29., that Prov. 20.: It is a ruin to man to devote holy things, and after vows to retract, where in Hebrew for the word ruina there is מוקש, which properly indicates a snare.

Thou objectest secondly against the first assertion, that the Apostle, prima Corinth. 7., exhorts to matrimony: Because of fornication, let every man have his own wife; and let every woman have her own husband; and prima Timot. 5.: I will the younger to marry, and to bear children.

S. Bonaventure answers, in 4. dist. 31. q. 1., that men are called to matrimony not on account of temptations alone, but on account of fornication, because otherwise the incontinent live. Therefore the Apostle first said: If they do not contain themselves, let them marry; for it is better to marry than to burn, that is, than not to be continent; and therefore he also says: It is good for a man not to touch a woman: but because of fornication let every man have his own wife, and he subjoins: But return again to the same, that Satan tempt you not for your incontinency. Thus S. Bonavent. answers, ad 2., from D. Hieronymo, and after him Bellarminus; they expound that to Timothy in the same way, because certain young women cast themselves after Satan, as the Apostle himself testifies there.

Thus indeed S. Hieronymus says, in the Apologia pro libris, contra Iovinianum: But if they cannot contain themselves, and wish to quench the ardor of lust not so much by continence as by fornication, it is better to marry than to burn, that is, it is better to take a husband than to fornicate. The SS. expound in the same manner: Clemens Alexand. lib. 4. stromatum, at the beginning, where he reprehends the exposition of the Basilidian heretics, namely that it is better to marry than to burn, that is, to be tormented with temptations; even if we do not assent to what is the example of Luther in the Epithalamio, of Calvin, and of Peter Martyr, on this place. For the innovators have overturned all errors, that they might dig a sewer fouler than the rest.

But our exposition is also that of the author on the epistles of D. Paul, who is judged to be Ambrosius; of D. Augustini, lib. de sancta Virginitate, cap. 34. and de bono coniugali, cap. 10.; of Theodoreti, nay even of Chrysostomi, if it be read attentively, as Bellarminus notes.

But grant that: If they do not contain themselves, let them marry. It is better to marry than to burn, be understood as being struck by the keener stings of the flesh; still they gain nothing; for matrimony is not commanded, as Calvinus wills, lib. 4. Instit. cap. 13. §. 17., but permitted, which the words of the Apostle plainly show; for as, to remove the burning, he says, let them marry; so in a more efficacious manner, namely in the imperative mode of words, he says to the married, if at any time they be continent: Again: return to the same, that Satan tempt you not, and he subjoins: But this I say according to indulgence, not according to commandment. Which expressed that matrimony was by him merely permitted, not commanded, as Bellarminus notes, cap. 30., after D. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 31. art. 2. quaest. 2. in the second argument.

Thus also that is understood: I will the younger to marry, for in prima Corinth. 7. he says: I would that all were as I myself am. So Chrysostomus, Ambrosius here, Hieronymus epist. 11. Augustinus lib. de bono viduit. cap. 8.

Finally these things were said to those not having the vow, but to the free, as the SS. note: Ambrosius ad virg. lapsam, c. 5. Hieronymus lib. 1. in Iouin. Augustinus lib. 1. de adulter. coniug. cap. 15. Gregorius in Pastorali, part. 3. admonitione 28. Chrysostomus lib. de virginitate, cap. 39. Theodoretius, Theophylactus, Oecumenius, and others on that place.

Thou objectest thirdly against the first assertion. It is mad to vow what is not in our power: but continence is such, because it is a gift of God, as is had Sap. 8.: No man can be continent, except God give it. Matth. 19.: He that can take it, let him take it, and prima Corinth. 7.: But every one hath his proper gift from God; Therefore, etc. Bellarminus says this argument, cap. 31., is most difficult.

D. Bonaventure answers, in 2. dist. 28. art. 2. in corpore, that the gift of continence is indeed from God, in such a way that no one is continent by his own proper powers; nevertheless the help of God is always present, and to us willing it remains entire, with that help, to be continent, so that we can even vow continence. But this is the argument of Pelagius, whom the sectaries imitate, namely that what we cannot attain by the powers of free will alone is not in our power; which is most false, because the assisting grace of God is never wanting; for this is not of those gifts which communicate non-necessary actions, as prophecy; but that celibacy is in our power is certain, by the grace of God at least assisting, which is ready to each one willing.

The Seraphic Doctor splendidly illustrates OBEDIENCE under a twofold title, as the school of the Savior, and the ladder of salvation, in Diaeta salut. tit. 3. cap. 2. where he assigns the proofs and the degrees of this heavenly virtue, which obtains its empire by obeying; for the Savior taught it, whether in coming into the world, Ioan. 6. I came down from heaven, not to do my own will: or in remaining in the world, made obedient unto death, Phil. 2. or lastly in going out of it, Not as I will, but as Thou, Matth. 26. He there gathers the degrees of Obedience from St. Bernard; which are: that one be Willing, not recalcitrant, after the example of Paul Act. 9. Simple, not dissembling, after the likeness of the beast of burden Psal. 72. Cheerful, not murmuring, as was Simon of Cyrene Matth. 27. Swift, not putting off till tomorrow, such as Peter and Andrew had, who suddenly left their nets and followed Christ Matth. 4. Manly, not judging, as was the obedience of Peter, ready to be imprisoned with Christ, and to undergo death Lucae 22. Humble, not elated, as the Lord teaches in Luke 17. Say, we are unprofitable servants, etc. Finally let it be Persevering, not discontinuing, even unto death; that by these seven degrees, as by the ladder of Jacob, Heaven may be attained. From these the following question is in large part resolved.

I ASSERT that among the vows Obedience excels in Religion.

It is PROVED from St. Bonavent. ad cap. 1. Regulae Min. That is the most excellent among the vows, whereby the most excellent thing is offered: But in man this is the will; whereas by the Vow of chastity the body, and by the Vow of poverty external goods are offered: Ergo. It is confirmed, for by the Vow of obedience the whole man is consumed as a holocaust; for under it Chastity and Poverty are included. Hence some Religions make profession by promising obedience. It is the argument of John XXII. Extravag. Quorundam, de verb. signif. which the Fathers used, as at B. Bonavent. lib. 2. Phar. cap. 43. and St. Thomas here: Moreover that is more excellent whereby one offers himself, than that whereby he offers his things; but man offers himself by obeying: Ergo.

This vow, however, whereby it is more excellent than the rest, and therewith richer, was at all times harassed by the railings of Heretics; and before all others, from almost the first centuries, the Lampetians dreamed the impious dream that a man, in the worship of God, at the nod of another, renounces his own will; yet they did not think it so evil to promise any vow for another moral end outside the worship of God: Thus walking in darkness they judge perversely, so that what belongs to the service of God is charged with crime, while what is destined to another end is honored by them: This error was followed by the Waldenses, as also by the Beghards and Beguines, as Castro has it, verb. obedientia; finally the rest of the innovators in a body, with Luther at their head, swore to the same heresy. They were refuted by Bellarmine lib. 2. de Monachis, cap. 8. Suarez lib. 10. de voto obedientiae, and other defenders of the truth: Nor indeed can they bring forward any foundation of their error which does not readily collapse for a universal reason: for whatever is in itself good and honest, without doubt becomes better and more honest, while it is placed in a firmer, securer, and immovable state; for this reason, an act elicited from a long-standing habit is more perfect and better than an act from some light disposition, because it becomes more immovable, and proceeds into its act more intensely and more firmly with a stable will; such is that which proceeds from a vow, since it is a state, more stable even than a habit. Who, moreover, will deny that obedience in itself, even when rendered to a man, in the service of God, is good and honest, since for God Christ was made obedient unto death, and was subject to his parents, so that at their nod he even left behind the assembly of the Doctors.

NOTE from St. Bonavent. ad cap. 1. Regulae Min. and l. 2. de profectu Religiosi, cap. 39. whom all Theologians imitate with St. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 104. art. 2. ad 1. that obedience and disobedience are twofold. One is called material, or general. The former is the execution of whatever virtue is commanded. The latter is the omission, or transgression, of any precept; nor does it induce any other sin; just as neither does the former induce another virtue. The other is called formal and special, inclining the subject to carry out the commands of superiors as they are commands, and it is a special virtue; just as the opposite disobedience is a special vice, and sin.

THEREFORE only those things that are commanded are the object of this virtue, as St. Bonaventura admonishes lib. 2. Profec. cap. 41. and lib. 2. Pharetrae, cap. 43. and the holy Fathers, D. Thom. quaest. 186. art. 9. and quaest. 104. art. 2. Valentia d. 7. quaest. 8. puncto 1. Azor. tom. 1. lib. 12. cap. 13. quaestio 1. Less. de inst. lib. 2. cap. 46. d. 4. Sanchez tom. 2. lib. 6. cap. 1.

St. Bonavent. also INFERS, prima pars, Centil. sect. 18. et opusc. Declaratio term. Theol. that formal disobedience is to be unwilling to obey the command, as it is a command, and that contempt consists in this: So also D. Thom. loc. cit. ad 1.

I ASSERT that under the vow of obedience issued by Religious only the commands of superiors are included. So D. Bonavent. lib. 2. de profec. Relig. cap. 41. D. Thom. quaest. 186. art. 9. whom the rest follow.

It is PROVED by the holy Doctors, because by this vow we subject ourselves to the Prelate to the end of Religious governance: Therefore only that which, at the Prelate's bidding, is put forth to this end, is the object of religious obedience. So Less. lib. 2. cap. 46. d. 4. num. 23. Valent. quaest. 3. puncto 1. and Bass. V. Obed. 2.

AMONG Prelates the supreme is the Roman Pontiff, the Father of the Religious, whom we are bound to obey, especially we Friars Minor, because St. Francis cap. 1. Regulae professes this.

Yet we are NOT bound to obey from the formal motive, because it is commanded; for it is an act of virtue even from the motive of Religion; nor can the Prelate command this internal act. So Sylv. p. 2. quaestio 100. art. 9. Vasquez ibi, num. 5. Lessius cited d. 6. num. 42. Sanch. lib. 1. mor. cap. 13.