§ III. On the Vow of Obedience

I. Notion. It is a promise made to God of fulfilling the commands of legitimate superiors. Whether the vow also extends itself to the rule is disputed. We said:

1. Commands; namely commands strictly so called. Now a superior can command or oblige either under fault or to penalty alone. Under fault, I say, either grave, provided the matter is grave, or light, if the matter is light, or, even if grave, it is commanded only under light fault. But the Superior is considered to oblige under fault if he uses the words "I command," "I order," and similar words; under grave fault, if he employs the formula: "in virtue of obedience," "under grave fault," "under penalty of excommunication," etc. Otherwise he is considered only to oblige to penalty (St. Alphonsus IV, 38; I, 141). This, however, does not prevent the subject from sinning gravely if he proceeds from contempt of authority.

2. Of superiors; namely of those who by force of the vow of obedience can command. Such are the Supreme Pontiff (can. 499, § 1), the Sacred Congregation of Religious, as it seems, other Congregations if a special mandate is added, major and local Superiors; but not the Superiors of religions in which only a promise of obedience is emitted, as among the Oratorians.

3. Legitimate; wherefore observe that whatever is contained in the rule, or is required for its perfect observance and for attaining the end of the institute, is commanded legitimately (St. Alphonsus IV, 38, 39). But those things cannot be commanded which are outside the rule, that is, either: 1st, against the rule, unless the Superior justly dispenses; or 2nd, above the rule, such as certain macerations, unless they are inflicted as a penalty, or the care of sick outsiders imposed on a religious who is not a hospitaller; or 3rd, within the rule, such as vain or ridiculous things, unless the Superior "commands for a cause which is according to the rule, for example, that obedience be exercised. Nor does it matter that the rules command obedience in all things; for this is understood not of the obligation of the vow, but of the perfection of obedience" (St. Alphonsus IV, 40).

Here, however, note these words of St. Thomas: "No one is obliged to the impossible; and therefore if some prelate heaps up or enjoins so many precepts that the subject cannot fulfill them, he is excused from sin; and therefore prelates ought to abstain from a multitude of precepts" (II-II, q. 105, a. 1, ad 3). And St. Alphonsus: "A multitude of decrees would be the ruin of a Congregation" (Correspondence generale, n. 75).

4. Whether and to what extent the vow extends itself to the rule is disputed. Now it certainly extends itself to rules which express the obligation of the vow sufficiently certainly, as if something is commanded in virtue of obedience. Otherwise, according to some, the matter must be resolved from the acceptance and use of the institute itself. According to others, if the rule obliges under sin, its transgression is against the vow. According to others, the vow simply extends itself to the rules just as to the commands of Superiors; but understand this in such a way that the vow obliges either to the act or to penalty alone, according as the rule itself obliges¹ (cf. St. Thomas II-II, q. 186, a. 9; St. Alphonsus IV, 41, 42).

Corollary I. A command to which danger of life is annexed does not oblige unless it accords with the end of the institute or is demanded by the common good (St. Alphonsus IV, 40). Hence a Superior cannot oblige a subject to go to infidels with manifest danger of death or servitude, unless the subject has expressly obliged himself to this. Nevertheless a religious can be compelled to go to very remote provinces beyond the sea, if there are Convents of the Order there; for this pertains to the good of the Religion.

Likewise the Superior can oblige a subject to assist the sick infected by contagious disease, if the sick are religious of the same Monastery or Order; or if they are outsiders and there is lacking someone who would fortify them with the Sacraments of the Church; or finally if the care of the sick is the end of the Institute.²

Corollary II. In doubt whether a thing is outside the rule, likewise whether a thing is licit, one must obey, unless the thing commanded is too difficult, or grave spiritual harm threatens the subject or a third party from it. The reason is both because presumption stands for the superior, and because order, that is, peace and tranquillity, requires that in doubt the right of the superior prevail, and because the rules of various institutes favor this doctrine (St. Alphonsus IV, 47).

Corollary III. A religious is obliged to new statutes of Chapters, provided they are not wholly outside the rule, but are only means apt for attaining the end of the religion and the observance of the rule. But those who have embraced the rule legitimately mitigated cannot be forced to further things (St. Alphonsus IV, n. 44).

Corollary IV. License obtained from an inferior superior is valid, even if it has been denied by a major superior, "because the major Superior by denying license by no means takes away the power of the inferior" (St. Alphonsus IV, 50). And this seems to be valid in itself even if the rule commands that the refusal of the higher Superior be made known to the inferior; if in this case it is not made known, only the manner is illicit. "But I think one must say otherwise if the major Superior positively prohibits the subject from executing the thing requested, because then the inferior cannot dispense in the command of the superior" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Corollary V. A religious can appeal from the commands and penalties of a Superior. Nevertheless, except in the case of dismissal, ordinarily this does not have suspensive effect, unless the abuse of power is excessive. Yet extrajudicial recourse is always available to them.

¹ Cf. Raus, Obedientia religiosa, p. 54 sq., where he sets out the diverse opinions.

² Aertnys-Damen, Theologia Moralis I, n. 1212, question 3.

II. The distinction between the vow and the virtue of obedience consists in this, that the virtue extends itself also to undue things and to internal and cheerful subjection (St. Thomas II-II, q. 104, a. 4, ad 3).

III. Obligation. One who transgresses a true command of a religious Superior sins, as is clear; but of what species the sin is, see n. 148.

There are those who think that a sin of injustice is also committed by one who transgresses a command, at least if it is imposed from dominative power. But that seems to be denied, because dominative power does not confer a strict right to the act commanded, as is clear in parents; for no one would say that disobedient children sin against justice.

Objection. The Superior or institute by force of a contract has a right to the execution of the command.

Response. It is clear from no source that a contract of this kind is entered into. St. Alphonsus, who is sometimes alleged for the contrary opinion, in the place cited by the adversaries (IV, 46), does not speak of a sin of injustice.