When an act is wholly good, and the multiple malice of an act

In order that an action may be altogether and simply good, the object, the end, and the circumstances must all be good; for good indicates completeness and perfection; there is evil in any defect. If all the sources of morality are evil, the action may have a triple malice; as when a thief steals Church plate in order to be able to indulge his vicious propensities. If only one source or circumstance of an action be mortally sinful, the perpetration of it turns the evil-doer away from God and makes the action wholly bad. An accidental and secondary circumstance, when only venially sinful, does not corrupt the whole action; it only lessens its merit. Thus it is a grievous sacrilege to receive Holy Communion in a state of mortal sin; a state of venial sin only makes the Communion less fruitful.

You will resolve: 1. A human act can have a threefold moral goodness or malice, whether within the same species, or even of diverse species. Thus, for example, if someone were to steal a sacred thing in order to give it as a gift to a prostitute for obtaining fornication from her, such an act from the object would be theft; from the circumstance of the sacred thing, sacrilege; from the end, fornication; and therefore it would have a threefold malice diverse in species.

2. The intrinsic and essential moral goodness or malice of the act is taken from the object. For from the object the will is moved first and per se, or directly, to the act. Hence, although for a human act to be good simply it is required that it have no evil circumstance, nevertheless it is not required that it always have proper objective circumstances, from which it receives accidental goodness or an increase of goodness, as is clear in an act concerning an altogether simple object, such as love of God. Objective circumstances are mentioned, or those on the part of the object, for circumstances on the part of the act itself are always at least in some way found, which confer upon it some goodness or malice. And thus always, at least morally speaking, which is enough in the present matter, there is in an act some intensity, pertaining to the circumstance how, by reason of which the act has some goodness or malice, which can be called accidental, insofar as the species of the act could be preserved without it.

3. In order that circumstances confer their moral goodness or malice upon an act, they must be willed either after the manner of an object, or at least after the manner of an act; because an object does not confer moral goodness or malice upon a human act except insofar as it is intended and willed. Objective circumstances, that is, those which hold themselves on the part of the object, must be willed after the manner of an object, because circumstances of this kind affect the object itself and the act indivisibly attains the object, not as though naked, but as though clothed with its circumstances. But circumstances which hold themselves on the part of the act must be willed either after the manner of an object, if that circumstance is extrinsic to the act itself, as is, for example, the circumstance who, for the one acting can regard himself as the object of his own will, and will the dignity or condition of his person to be applied to the work; or after the manner of an act, if that circumstance is intrinsic to the act itself, as is, for example, the circumstance how or when. And thus, in order that the goodness or malice of the act of the will be increased from intensity or duration, it is enough that the intensity and duration be voluntary after the manner of an act, namely insofar as the intense, lasting, etc., act itself is voluntary. S. Th. C. G. l. 3. c. 138, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4. 6. 7; Suarez tr. 3. d. 4, d. 5, d. 6. s. 3.

Is an act good if the circumstance is evil? - R. Affirmatively, if the question concerns one and the same act in the genus of nature, and one which is multiple in the genus of morals. The reason is that then a bad circumstance of this kind is altogether extrinsic to the good act itself. And thus in the celebration of Mass, a priest consecrating in the state of grace places a good act; then, sinning gravely by adhering to a shameful thought, and taking a sacrilegious communion, he places an evil act. - R. Negatively, if the question concerns one and the same act of the will in the genus of morals. The reason is that the act of the will, which embraces all these things together, namely the object and the circumstances, is one most simple act, and therefore, if it is not good from every side, it will be evil.

Hence, if there is a circumstance which is only lightly evil and extrinsic to the object, which the will embraces concomitantly, this lightly evil circumstance does not corrupt the good act, since it is altogether extrinsic and accidental to the substance of the act constituted in itself. And thus an affection toward venial sin in Communion does not corrupt Communion in its substance, although it renders it less fruitful. But if the lightly evil circumstance is intrinsic to the object itself, then the whole act is evil. Therefore the action of a religious giving alms against the vow of poverty or against the precept of a Superior, or from another's property, is evil, although the unlawfulness by reason of the vow or precept is only light. Suarez tr. 3. d. 8. s. 1; Wirceburg. c. 3. art. 1.

4. “Thus, therefore, in a human action goodness can be considered in four ways. One indeed according to genus, namely insofar as it is an action, because as much as it has of action and entity, so much it has of goodness. Another according to species, which is taken according to a fitting object. The third according to circumstances, as according to certain accidents. But the fourth according to the end, as according to relation to the cause of goodness.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4. “Nothing prevents an action having one of the aforesaid goodnesses from lacking another, and according to this it happens that an action which is good according to its species, or according to circumstances, is ordered to an evil end, or conversely. Nevertheless an action is not good simply unless all the goodnesses concur, because any singular defect causes evil; but good is caused from an integral cause.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4, body and ad 3.

5. Therefore a human act can have a threefold moral goodness or malice, either within the same species or even of a diverse species. Thus, for example, if someone were to steal a sacred thing so that he might give it as a gift to a prostitute for obtaining fornication from her, such an act from the object would be theft, from the circumstance of the sacred thing sacrilege, from the end fornication; and therefore it would have a threefold malice diverse in species. But the intrinsic and essential moral goodness or malice of the act is taken from the object. For from the object the will is first and of itself, or directly, moved to the act. Hence although, in order that a human act be good simply, it is required that it have no evil circumstance, nevertheless it is not required that it always have proper objective circumstances from which it receives accidental goodness or an increase of goodness, as is clear in an act concerning an altogether simple object, such as the love of God. Objective circumstances are meant, or circumstances on the part of the object, for at least some circumstances on the part of the act itself are always found which confer on it some goodness or malice. And thus always, at least morally speaking, which is enough in the present matter, there is in the act some intensity, pertaining to the circumstance how, by reason of which the act has some goodness or malice which can be called accidental, insofar as the species of the act could be preserved without it. But in order that circumstances confer their moral goodness or malice on the act, they must be willed either after the manner of an object, or at least after the manner of an act, because an object does not confer moral goodness or malice on a human act except insofar as it is intended and willed. Objective circumstances, that is, those which hold themselves on the part of the object, must be willed after the manner of an object, because circumstances of this sort affect the object itself, and the act indivisibly attains the object, not as if naked, but as if clothed with its own circumstances. But circumstances which hold themselves on the part of the act must be willed either after the manner of an object, if that circumstance is extrinsic to the act itself, as, for example, is the circumstance who; for the one operating can regard himself as the object of his will and will to apply the dignity or condition of his person to the work; or after the manner of an act, if that circumstance is intrinsic to the act itself, as, for example, is the circumstance how or when. And thus, in order that the goodness or malice of the act of the will be increased from intensity or duration, it is enough that the intensity and duration be voluntary after the manner of an act, namely insofar as the intense, lasting act itself is voluntary, etc. Cf. St. Thomas, C. G. l. 3, c. 138; 1. 2, cited places; Suarez, D. 4, D. 5, D. 6, S. 3.

15. From what has been said it is clear, 1.º that circumstances changing the species can be threefold: because they give to the act a new species of goodness or malice beyond the preceding species from the object; because they change the act from good into evil; because they give to the act its first moral goodness or malice. 2.º There are two general rules concerning circumstances giving species to moral acts. The first is that whenever a circumstance makes an act evil from good, or good or evil from indifferent, it gives species to the act. The second is that whenever a circumstance regards a special, of itself proper order of reason, it again gives species to the act. But it regards a special proper order of reason when it of itself exhibits something congruent with or discordant from reason. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 72. a. 8, 9; q. 73. a. 7; q. 88. a. 5; De Malo, q. 2. a. 6 ad 2, a. 8.

16. Whether an act is good if the circumstance is evil? R. 1.º In the affirmative, if the question concerns one and the same act in the genus of nature, and one which is multiple in the genus of morals; for example, someone chants the canonical hours in choir, or sings the conventual Mass, and at some time during the singing consents to vain glory concerning his beautiful voice, etc. The reason is that then an evil circumstance of this sort is altogether extrinsic to the good act itself, for example to the celebration of the divine offices, etc. And thus in the celebration of Mass, a priest consecrating in the state of grace places a good act; then, gravely sinning by adhering to a base thought and sacrilegiously receiving Communion, he places an evil act. — 2.º In the negative, if the question concerns one and the same act of the will in the genus of morals. The reason is that the act of the will which embraces all these things together, namely the object and circumstances, is one most simple act, and therefore, if it is not good on every side, it will be evil. “And therefore,” says St. Thomas, 2 D. 36. q. un. a. 5, “it happens that an act has goodness from matter and yet be done badly because of undue circumstances.” And in 1. 2. q. 18. a. 1, an act of this sort is called by the Holy Doctor good in a certain respect and evil in a certain respect; and generally, insofar as it falls short of goodness, so it is called evil: “for example, if there be lacking to it either a determinate quantity according to reason, or a due place, or something of this sort.” And q. 19. a. 2 ad 2, he says: “it must be said that, supposing that the will is of the good, no circumstance can make it evil. Therefore what is said, that someone wills some good when he ought not, can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that this circumstance is referred to the thing willed. And thus the will is not of good, because to will to do something when it ought not be done is not to will good. In another way, so that it is referred to the act of willing. And thus it is impossible that someone will good when he ought not, because man ought always to will good, except perhaps accidentally, insofar as someone by willing this good is prevented from then willing some due good. And then evil enters not from the fact that someone wills that good, but from the fact that someone does not will another good. And similarly it must be said concerning other circumstances.” — Hence, if the circumstance is only lightly evil and extrinsic to the object, and the will embraces it concomitantly, this lightly evil circumstance does not corrupt the good act, since it is altogether accidental to the substance of the act constituted in itself. This indeed happens in natural things; the same ought much more to be in moral things. Suarez, D. 8, S. 1, n. VII ff. “And thus an affection for mortal sin in Communion corrupts it substantially and renders it sacrilegious; an affection for venial sin in Communion does not corrupt it in its substance, although it renders it less fruitful.” But if a circumstance, even lightly evil, is intrinsic to the object itself, then the whole act is evil, because that circumstance is the ultimate determination of the moral object. And thus the whole action of a Religious giving alms against the vow of poverty or against the precept of a Superior is evil, although the prohibition by reason of the vow, or by reason of the precept of the Superior, is only light.

29. You Will Resolve. - 1. Every election of an evil means is evil, but not conversely is every election of a good means good. Thus no one is praised because he abstains from drink out of avarice; but he must be held guilty who steals money in order to give alms.

2. He who chooses an honest means for an honest end posits an act of twofold honesty ⁴, if each honesty is intended. Likewise he is guilty of twofold malice who chooses an evil means for an evil end, for instance if someone steals money in order to make himself drunk.

⁴ ** St. Alphonsus (On Human Acts, no. XXXVIII), after Collet (On Human Acts, ch. 6, art. 2, sect. 2, conclusion 3), writes that this doctrine is common among theologians, with Vasquez alone excepted. But this exception of Vasquez is a mere hallucination of Collet, who here did not have accurately before his eyes the distinctions and conclusions of the schools. Namely, so that in the case there be a twofold goodness of the act, it is necessary that the means be loved not only because it is useful for the end, but also because it is good in itself. To this pertain those words of Becanus (On Human Acts, ch. 4, q. 3, no. 6): When the object of election, which is good per se, is not loved in any way on account of itself, but only on account of the end, then the goodness of the object does nothing to the matter. But when it is loved both on account of itself, insofar as it is good per se, and on account of the end, insofar as it is useful for obtaining that end, then the goodness of the object remains with the goodness of the end. For this reason the Author adds that phrase: If each honesty is intended. And to this Vasquez pertains (On I-II, disp. 51, ch. 3, no. 13; which place Collet alleges), where he says: When someone choosing a work of one virtue from the intention of the end of another virtue is then not allured by the goodness of the virtue of which that matter is, and chooses that work only as useful for the end, it is effected that that election has only the goodness of the end.

But to avoid Collet's hallucinations, even where a twofold honesty or goodness in reality comes to the act, the doctrine of the school must be inspected, which Suarez expresses thus (On I-II, treatise 3, disp. 6, sect. 2, no. 2): It can happen that an honest object is not indeed willed on account of its own honesty, yet its honesty is willed in itself and per se on account of another end.....; for one good can be useful for another not only by reason of its matter, but also by reason of its honesty; and then indeed the honesty of one object or act can be loved in itself, although it is not loved precisely on account of itself, but on account of another end. And soon the same Suarez says (ibid., no. 3): Concerning an act of this kind almost all also agree that it has essential and first goodness from the end, but not from the material object nor from its honesty. Thus St. Thomas can be taken (3 Against the Gentiles, ch. 138), where he signifies that abstinence done from vow has, besides the goodness of temperance, also the goodness of religion: indeed that it is more praiseworthy from the vow than from abstinence.

From these things someone could conclude with Collet that according to Suarez a twofold goodness is denied in an act of temperance. But theologians do not so speak, although they call one goodness essential, the other accidental. Thus also Vasquez (cited disp. 51, ch. 2): If however the means has from itself proper goodness... even if the election had proper goodness from the means, nevertheless it would take also the species of another goodness from the end, so that that goodness would be primary and substantial, insofar as it is election, but that which it would have from the means according to itself would be secondary to it and as it were accidental.

3. He who employs an evil means for a good end contracts only the malice of the means, for example, if someone lies to free his neighbor from danger. Likewise conversely, he who employs an honest means for an evil end contracts only the malice of the end.

4. He who employs an indifferent means for a good or evil end contracts only the goodness or malice of the end. Thus, for example, if you undertake a journey in order to show the way to a pilgrim, you have only the merit of the end; likewise if you sing in order to cause annoyance to another, you have only the guilt of the end. But in confession it is not necessary to declare the circumstance of means of this kind, as is clear.

30. Questions. - YOU WILL ASK 1. Whether any evil end corrupts the whole goodness of the act?

I answer 1. A gravely evil end always entirely infects the act, however good the object may be in itself. For that act can be good in no part, since the agent, by sinning mortally, totally recedes from God.

I answer 2. A lightly evil end also corrupts the whole act, if it is the total end, or at least the primary end, of the agent. For if it is total, it encompasses the whole object, and therefore infects the whole, because the agent, by an evil end, wills the good under the aspect of evil, and therefore, as it is willed by him, it is evil. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, art. 7. - This is also clear from the words of Christ, Matt. 6. 23: If thy eye is wicked, thy whole body will be dark. Hence the gifts of Cain, although good in themselves, displeased God as proceeding from an evil end.

But if a twofold end is had, and the evil one is primary, it must be resolved in the same way, because that act is still chosen so that it may be an instrument for evil, and therefore it is vitiated substantially.

I answer 3. But if a lightly evil end is merely secondary, more probably it does not corrupt the whole act, which will be partly good, partly evil. The reason is that that act retains its goodness from the object; but the evil end holds itself only concomitantly, and does not influence the very substance of the action. If it were otherwise, fewer good acts would be found. - Billuart, diss. 4, art. 4. - Gerdil, On Human Acts, and others commonly.

What moral goodness or malice requires. In order that an act be good, it is necessary that its goodness be not only known, but in some way intended, that is, that, at least confusedly, as good, it be voluntary. For goodness toward which we are not formally affected is not ours, remains extrinsic to us, and cannot render the will formally good.

Yet a reflected intention is not required, but a direct or exercised intention suffices, which per se he has who, conscious of the good nature of the action, effects it.

But in order that an act be evil, it suffices that the malice be known, although in itself it displeases. The reason is the negative precept of avoiding evil, which is violated by every voluntary transgression. Moreover malice in itself is not lovable. Whence evil cannot terminate the will except per accidens, or as joined with good.

What the circumstance of the end can do. An act evil from the object cannot become good because of a good end. For by choosing this means of an evil action, the will is not wholly turned away from evil. Although from a good end, as from every good note, sin can be diminished.

On the contrary, an act good from the object can become evil on account of an evil end or evil circumstances. It becomes evil if it is wholly referred to an evil end, or if on account of an evil circumstance the act itself is prohibited: as if a suspended priest gives a sacred sermon.

On the other hand, there are accidental and extrinsic circumstances which, although less good, allow the act to be substantially good: motions of impatience in the service of the sick.

The maxim. Whence there appears that which St. Thomas copies from pseudo-Dionysius: Good is caused from an integral cause, but evil from individual defects. And it is manifest per se, since good and being are convertible, and absolute evil, or that which would be nothing except evil, cannot exist, that evil is spoken of by the partial privation of good. Wherefore evil has origin from individual privations; but once privations are removed, good is obtained, and at the same time integral good. Cf. 1, 2, q. 18, art. 1; and q. 19, art. 6, ad 1.

Intention and the exterior act. Nevertheless intention cannot change the nature of an exterior work as such; and therefore it will not render unjust an action which was done according to right. Wherefore he is not to be charged with injustice who from hatred pronounces a just sentence of condemnation; nor the commander of an army who wills to kill innocents through the explosion of a fortress, otherwise necessary or licit. Cf. Bucceroni, Institutiones, I, n. 80.

I. All morality is taken from the object completely taken, with the end and circumstances. The object taken precisely can be indifferent, good, or evil by intrinsic goodness or malice, that is, from the nature of the thing, and by extrinsic goodness or malice.

More strictly, that malice is called intrinsic which cannot be removed by the will of God. But the object, if it has any morality, contributes the first morality.

II. The end is distinguished as end of the work and end of the worker; proximate, remote; intermediate, ultimate, whether simply or according to something, whether negatively or positively; total, partial, primary, and secondary.

The end can be good or evil, but not indifferent, if the act is human from the end.

III. Hence to act on account of delight which itself is perceived not to be evil is neither evil nor indifferent, but morally good, though less so than if the delight is positively referred to an honorable end.

IV. An action cannot be better than its total end. To formal goodness an intermediate end, merely loved as a means, adds nothing. But the primary end confers the principal morality. From two principal ends the action as it were becomes morally twofold, since it participates in the morality of each.

V. Good or evil circumstances sometimes merely increase or diminish morality; sometimes they transfer the same to another species, whether moral or theological; sometimes they confer the first morality: but then they are rather the object.

VI. Because goodness must be intended in order that the action be good from it, while an action becomes evil by the sole choice of evil, and because an evil end and evil circumstances can corrupt an act but cannot, if it is already evil from the object, render the same good, good is said to be from an integral cause, but evil from any defect. Yet there are accidental circumstances not gravely evil which allow an act to be substantially good.

An evil intention does not change the objective nature of an external act as such.

118. Corollary. From the two stated principles it follows that circumstances can influence the morality of a human act in a fourfold way.

1. An act indifferent from the object becomes good or evil because of an influencing circumstance. Thus, for example, the act of walking, indifferent from the object, becomes good if it is done from reasonable pursuit of health; but evil if it is done for the sake of sinning.

2. An act good from the object becomes evil. For example, to give alms is an act good from the object; to give alms solely because of vainglory or from another's goods is an evil act. A gravely evil circumstance destroys the goodness of the act to which it is joined; for example, the punishment of a delinquent subject is a good act, and if grave cruelty accedes to it, it becomes an act simply evil. But a lightly evil circumstance does not take away, but diminishes, the goodness of the act; for example, tepidity in prayer does not take away the whole goodness in prayer, but diminishes it.⁵¹

3. An act good or evil from the object becomes more good or evil. For example, to fast is a good act; to fast on bread and water is a better act. To make oneself drunk is an evil act; to make oneself drunk daily is a more evil act (at least if it happens from a habit not retracted).

4. An act good or evil from the object receives a new and specifically diverse goodness or malice. For example, to preserve chastity is a good act, namely, of the virtue of temperance; to preserve chastity because of a vow emitted is furthermore an act of the virtue of religion. To strike one's neighbor unjustly is a sin against justice; to strike one's parents unjustly is furthermore a sin against piety.

⁵¹ Cf. however below n. 122.

Concerning the more principal circumstance "why" enough has been said where the end was treated; likewise concerning the circumstance "what," where the goodness and malice of the effect was treated. Moreover, the things we noted about the passions already regard the circumstance "how" (as to part of it). Therefore it remains to speak of the remaining circumstances not explained, and indeed in order to the interior act and exterior act together, because all can modify the latter and several the former.

181. The circumstance who does not denote the very person of the one acting according to himself (for thus he pertains to the substance of the human act), but his accidental condition or quality, by reason of which in the moral estimation the act or omission is of greater or lesser moral value, for example, that the agent is religious, a priest or a layman, married or free, superior or subject, rich or poor, a child or an old man, etc.

Often it indicates an office or special obligation (of justice, piety, fidelity), and then it brings to the good or evil act a new species of goodness or malice, as if one bound by vow preserves chastity or a married person fornicates; otherwise it is only aggravating: thus, other things being equal and the same deliberation or negligence being supposed, a religious acts better or sins more gravely than a secular, the learned man than the unlearned, because he operates more perfectly or sin disgraces him more.

182. The circumstance about what does not signify the object itself or the matter (for that pertains to the substance of the act), but an accident joined to it, for example, quantity or quality, such as that the thing is sacred or profane, of one's father or of a stranger, much or little, grave or light, etc.

Often quality changes the species, namely, if it brings a distinct goodness or malice, as alms given to a poor church, or the theft of a sacred thing, the praise or striking of a father or cleric. Thus in acts concerning another, in the matter of chastity by reason of the accomplice, in the matter of religion toward sacred things. When, namely, a quality on the part of the agent changes the species, the same quality on the part of the object or matter also does this; hence it is understood that there is a double malice in adultery or carnal sacrilege if each person is married or sacred, because a double circumstance changes the species. Sometimes quality only aggravates, as to love an enemy or do good to orphans and widows, to harm one who is plainly innocent.

But quantity of matter only aggravates, for example, to give or steal two hundred francs instead of one hundred, to pray for many hours or to work on the Lord's Day.

183. The circumstance by what helps indicates the accidental instruments or means (also companions) which we use for acting, for example, to employ the help of a saint or a demon, to get drunk with money taken by theft, to use a sacred thing for fornication, to kill with prohibited weapons, with a sword or with poison.

It changes the species if the means imply a special morality, as the use of magicians for seducing a girl, of sacred rites for deceiving another (Gen. XXXIV, 15), of confession for soliciting; otherwise it aggravates, as if you induce a priest to lie, or choose weapons devised for torture in order to kill, or if the feet of the Lord are anointed with precious ointment (Lk. VII, 46; Mt. XXVI, 7; Mk. XIV, 3; Jn. XII, 3).

184. The circumstance how signifies the accidental mode by which the internal or external act is done, for example, with a voluntary that is perfectly or imperfectly deliberate, direct or indirect; intensely or remissly; from malice, passion, or ignorance; from contempt, levity, force, deceit; cautiously or imprudently; in good or bad faith, etc.

Sometimes it changes the species: thus violence makes robbery from simple theft, rape from fornication; likewise the modes against nature in lust. Ordinarily it aggravates, for example, to act from perfect knowledge or from a will confirmed in good or evil, to kill limb by limb; or it diminishes, for example, to act from grave fear, vehement temptation, sudden passion. Thus intensely or remissly does not change the species but increases or diminishes.

185. The circumstance where does not denote bare place (for every act must take place somewhere), but the accidental quality of place conferring upon the act something of goodness or malice, such as that the place is sacred, with respect to prayer and worship, or theft, fornication, homicide, etc.; or public, in scandal or good example (II Kings XVI, 21).

It rather often changes the species in external acts by adding the special morality of religion or charity; it also gives the first species of morality if the work is of itself indifferent and is prescribed or prohibited by reason of place, such as to uncover oneself or to carry on commerce in a church. More rarely it aggravates, namely, in internal acts which do not have so direct a relation with place, for example, meditation performed in church, complacency there in a shameful thought.

186. The circumstance when denotes an accidental condition of time, as quantity or duration if the act lasts long or briefly (for example, love or hatred or desire), or quality if the act is done on a feast day, in sacred time, in a more difficult time.

Quantity of time is an aggravating or diminishing circumstance; but quality of itself, and direct intention of honoring or dishonoring being set aside, does not do much to increase morality, unless the act of itself good or evil has been specially prescribed or prohibited by reason of sacred time (Mass, breakfast), or through it special reverence or irreverence is brought upon divine worship, or scandal is present, for example, if someone on Good Friday exhibited public games or immediately after communion went to a concubine or got drunk.

Time differs from place: the latter, because of stability, is capable of consecration and permanent holiness; time, continually passing, is called sacred only per accidens, by reason of the mystery or action which is then recalled or done; hence of itself it does not change the species.

If an act of itself neither good nor evil is prescribed or prohibited in sacred time, the circumstance of time passes over into the notion of object, and gives the first morality, for example, to work on a sacred day or to abstain from work.

187. Case.

That the concurrence of circumstances in one act may be better understood, we note the following case, classic in theology: "John, the church custodian, violently snatches from the hands of the pastor, in church, on Holy Thursday itself, with companions employed and with the intention of profaning the Sacrament, a consecrated golden ciborium containing Hosts necessary for paschal communion. How many and which circumstances intervene in this case?"

Resp. All of them; namely, 1) the circumstance who: the church custodian; 2) about what, by reason of quantity: a golden ciborium; by reason of quality: a consecrated ciborium; 3) what, by reason of effect: deprivation of paschal communions; 4) where: in church; 5) by what helps: companions employed; 6) why: from the intention of profaning the Sacrament; 7) how: violently; 8) when: on Holy Thursday itself.